1995 (for short ‘Regulations 1995’), the Canara Bank Pension Regulations, the legality of the claim for pension in lieu of Contributory Provident Fund (for short ‘CPF’) of some officers of the Canara Bank who had resigned and stood relieved from their respective posts prior to 3.6.1993, i.e. prior to signing of the Statutory Settlement dated 29.10.1993 under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Joint Note dated 29.10.1993, followed by the Canara Bank Pension Regulations, 1995 (for short ‘Regulations 1995’), which was notified in the Gazette of India on 29.9.1995.= The appellants, when tendered their letters of resignation, were governed by the Regulations 1979. Regulation 20(2) of Regulations 1979 dealt with resignation from service and they tendered their resignation in the light of that provision. We are of the view that the appellants have failed to show any pre-existing rights in their favour either in the Statutory Settlement/Joint Note dated 29.10.1993 or under the Regulations 1995. Appellants had resigned from service prior to 1.11.1993 and, therefore, were not covered by the statutory settlement, Joint Note dated 29.10.1993 and the Regulations 1995. They could not establish any pre- existing legal, statutory or fundamental rights in their favour to claim the benefit of Regulations 1995. Consequently, the reliance placed by the appellants either on Regulation 29 or Regulation 22 in support of their contentions, cannot be accepted, since they are not covered by the scheme of pension introduced by the banks with effect from 1.11.1993.

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                    CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 7188-7191  OF 2012
            [Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 30983-30986 of 2008]
M.R. Prabhakar and Others                                .. Appellants
                                   Versus
Canara Bank and Others                                   .. Respondents
                                    WITH
                    Civil Appeal Nos._7185-7186  of 2012
              [Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 30975-30977 of 2008]

                     Civil Appeal Nos. 7192-7193 of 2012
              [Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 30987-30988 of 2008]

                     Civil Appeal Nos. 7194-7195 of 2012
              [Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 30989-30990 of 2008]


                               J U D G M E N T


K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.


1.    Leave granted.
2.    We may, for the disposal of these appeals,  deal  with  the  facts  in
Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 30983-30986 of 2008, since  common
questions arise for consideration in all these appeals.
3.    We are, in these appeals, concerned with the  legality  of  the  claim
for pension in lieu of Contributory Provident  Fund  (for  short  ‘CPF’)  of
some officers of the Canara Bank who had resigned and  stood  relieved  from
their respective posts prior to 3.6.1993,  i.e.  prior  to  signing  of  the
Statutory Settlement dated 29.10.1993 under  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act,
1947, the Joint Note dated 29.10.1993, followed by the Canara  Bank  Pension
Regulations, 1995 (for short ‘Regulations 1995’), which was notified in  the
Gazette of India on 29.9.1995.
4.    The learned single Judge of the High  Court  held  in  favour  of  the
appellants but the Division Bench of the High Court held otherwise.   Hence,
these appeals.
5.    We may, as already indicated, refer to the facts of the case in  civil
appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 30983-30986 of  2008.   The  appellants’
date of appointment and their resignation are as under:

|Position of the         |Date of Appointment     |Date of Resignation   |
|Petitioner as per Cause |                        |                      |
|List                    |                        |                      |
|M.R. Prabhakar          |27-05-1970              |04-06-1991            |
|S. Ananda Rao           |09-09-1970              |22-09-1990            |
|N. Anand                |17-12-1969              |19-04-1993            |
|S. K. Mehta             |15-12-1965              |01-05-1991            |
|N.V. Rangaswamy         |24-07-1968              |09-01-1991            |
|S. Sathyanarayan        |07-0701970              |03-06-1993            |
|K. S. Seshadri          |18-02-1970              |20-07-1992            |
|(since deceased)        |                        |                      |
|K. Suresh Rao           |02-05-1970              |30-06-1990            |
|P. Govinda Pai          |03-04-1968              |30-03-1988            |
|   10. K. V. Puranik    |01-02-1963              |24-07-1986            |

The above mentioned appellants  had  submitted  their  resignations  between
24.7.1986 and 3.6.1993 prior to the  signing  of  the  Statutory  Settlement
dated 29.10.1993 under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Joint  Note
dated 29.10.1993, with regard to the introduction of ‘pension’ as  a  second
retiral benefit in  lieu  of  CPF.   Appellants,  placing  reliance  on  the
various  provisions  of  Regulations  1995,  submitted  that   the   pension
regulations were introduced as an additional  benefit  to  the  serving  and
retired employees.  It was pointed out that an  employee  who  had  resigned
from the bank  was  not  disentitled  to  pension  except  by  operation  of
Regulation  22.   If  this  regulation  was  held  operative   against   the
appellants, it would result in absurd consequences since  by  forfeiture  of
entire past service, such employees would not be entitled to any  pensionary
benefits including gratuity and provident fund.   Further,  it  was  pointed
out that Regulation 22 admittedly never  existed  when  the  appellants  had
submitted their resignation letters  and,  therefore,  the  said  regulation
could  not  operate  to  disentitle  the  appellants  from  any   pensionary
benefits.  Further, it was also pointed out when  appellants  had  submitted
their letters of resignation prior to 1.1.1993  the  concept  of  ‘voluntary
retirement’ did not exist under the Bank  Officers  Regulations,  1979  (for
short ‘Regulations 1979’).   Regulation 1979, it was  pointed  out,  neither
defined the expression ‘resignation’ legally nor the  expression  ‘voluntary
retirement’.  In other words, the  concept  of  ‘voluntary  retirement’  was
required to be defined only because of the  introduction  of  pension  as  a
retiral benefit with effect from 29.9.1995.

6.    Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted  that,  in  the
absence of legal definition of ‘voluntary retirement’ or in the  absence  of
any legally prescribed consequence of ‘resignation’, it  may  be  understood
in the sense of ‘voluntary retirement’ of service.   Further,  it  was  also
urged that the conceptual difference between  ‘resignation’  and  ‘voluntary
retirement’ comes in only if it is made by legal  prescription  and  not  in
the ordinary sense as  perceived  in  the  realm  of  appointment.   Learned
counsel  also  pointed  out  that  pension  regulations  must  be  read  and
interpreted keeping in mind its intended object and  cannot  be  applied  to
deprive those employees who left services honourably either on  the  grounds
of superannuation, resignation or even pre-mature retirement.   Considerable
reliance was placed on a recent judgment of this Court  in  Sheelkumar  Jain
v. New India Assurance Company Limited and Others  (2011)  12  SCC  197  and
submitted that the principle laid down in that judgment  would  squarely  be
applicable to the facts of the present case.  Further, it was  also  pointed
out that the beneficial construction placed by this  Court  in  Madan  Singh
Shekhawat v. Union of India and Others (1996) 6 SCC 459 is  also  applicable
by way of extending the pensionary benefits to the appellants.

7.    Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents  banks  submitted
that the High  Court  had  rightly  denied  the  claim  of  pension  to  the
appellants who  had  resigned  from  their  respective  service  before  the
settlement reached between All India Bank  Officers  Federation  and  Indian
Bank Association (for short ‘IBA’)  and  that  Regulations  1995  would  not
apply to the appellants.  Further, it was pointed out  that  the  appellants
had resigned prior to  1.1.1993  and  were  not  covered  by  the  Statutory
Settlement or the Joint Note dated 29.10.1993 and the Regulations 1995.   It
was pointed out that  the  reliance  placed  by  the  appellants  either  on
Regulation  29  or  Regulation  22  in  support  of  their  contentions  was
completely misplaced since the appellants were not covered by the scheme  of
pension introduced by the  respective  banks  with  effect  from  1.11.1993.
Learned counsel appearing for the banks submitted that the judgment of  this
Court in UCO Bank and Others  v.  Sanwar  Mal  (2004)  4  SCC  412  squarely
applies to the facts of the present case.   In  that  case,  the  very  same
regulation came up for interpretation and the identical reliefs sought  for,
which were rejected by the Court.   Further, it was also  pointed  out  that
Sheelkumar Jain’s case (supra) was interpreting an  insurance  scheme  which
is, not comparable with the Regulations 1995 applicable to the banks.

8.    The appellants, in these two main appeals were officers of the  Canara
Bank, who had resigned and stood  relieved  from  their  respective  service
between 24.7.1986 and  3.6.1993.   IBA,  representing  58  banks  and  their
workmen had entered into a Memorandum  of  Settlement  on  29.10.1993  under
Section 2(p) and Section 18(1) of the Industrial  Disputes  Act,  1947  read
with Rule 58 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957.   During  the
course of negotiations of service conditions of  the  workmen  employees  in
February 1990, IBA agreed to introduce a pension scheme  in  banks  for  the
workmen employees in lieu of employers’ contribution to the provident  fund.
 The pension scheme agreed to by IBA was to  be  broadly  based  on  Central
Government/Reserve Bank of India pattern, details of the scheme were  worked
out later. A Joint Note was also made with regard  to  the  introduction  of
pension as a second retiral benefit in lieu  of  CPF.   Clause  (4)  of  the
Joint Note reads as follows:
            “(iv) The Pension  Scheme  will  also  be  extended  to  retired
      Officers’ who retired on or after 1.1.1986.  They will be entitled for
      monthly pension as well as  commutation  facility  as  from  1.1.1993.
      Those officers who avail of the Pension Scheme  will  be  required  to
      refund Bank’s contribution to the Provident Fund with interest thereon
      drawn by them together with simple interest at 6%  from  the  date  of
      withdrawal of the Provident Fund to the date of refund.”

9.    In furtherance of  the  Statutory  Settlement  and  Joint  Note  dated
29.10.1993, draft of the Pension Regulations  was  negotiated  and  settled.
Clause 17(1), so  far  as  it  is  relevant  for  the  present  purpose,  is
extracted hereunder:
             “17(1)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the   Service
      Regulations/Service Rules an employee may be permitted to  voluntarily
      retire after he has completed 20 years of  qualifying  service,  after
      given three months’ notice in writing to the competent authority.”


10.   Later, in exercise of the powers  conferred  by  Clause  (f)  of  sub-
section (2)  of  Section  19  of  the  Banking  Companies  (Acquisition  and
Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970, the Board of Directors  of  the  Canara
bank, after consultation with the RBI and with the previous sanction of  the
Central Government, made the regulations  called  Canara  Bank  (Employees’)
Pension  Regulations,  1995.   The  same  were  made   applicable   to   the
employees’/officers and were notified in the Gazette of India on  29.9.1995.
 Chapter II of the Regulations deals with the application  and  eligibility,
the operative portion of Regulation 3(1)(a) to 3(1)(c)reads as under:
            “3.  Application: These regulations  shall  apply  to  employees
      who,-


           (1) (a) were in the service of the Bank on or after the 1st  day
                   of January 1986 but had retired before  the  1st  day  of
                   November, 1993; and


                (b)    exercise an option in writing within one hundred and
                   twenty days from the notified date to  become  member  of
                   the Fund; and


               (c)     refund within sixty days after the expiry of the said
                   period of one hundred and twenty days specified in clause
                   (b) the entire amount of the Bank’s contribution  to  the
                   Provident  Fund  including   interest   accrued   thereon
                   together with a further simple interest at  the  rate  of
                   six percent per annum on the said amount from the date of
                   settlement of the Provident Fund account till the date of
                   refund of the aforesaid amount to the Bank; or


                  XXX  XXX        XXX
                  XXX  XXX        XXX”


11.   Regulation 22, which finds a place in Chapter IV of  the  Regulations,
reads as follows:

      “22 Forfeiture of service –


           (1). Resignation or dismissal or removal or  termination  of  an
                  employee  from  the  service  of  the  Bank  shall  entail
                  forfeiture of his entire  past  service  and  consequently
                  shall not qualify for pensionary benefits;


           (2)   An interruption in the service of a Bank employee  entails
                  forfeiture of his past service, expect  in  the  following
                  cases, namely :-


                 a) authorised leave of absence;


                 b)  suspension,  where  it  is  immediately   followed   by
                    reinstatement, whether in the same or a different  post,
                    or where the bank  employee  dies  or  is  permitted  to
                    retire or is retired on attaining the age of  compulsory
                    retirement while under suspension;


                 c) transfer to non-qualifying service in  an  establishment
                    under the control of the  Government  or  Bank  if  such
                    transfer has been ordered by a  competent  authority  in
                    the public interest;


                 d) joining time while on transfer from one post to another.




           (3) Notwithstanding anything contained  in  sub-regulation  (2),
                 the   appointing   authority   may,   by   order,   commute
                 retrospectively the periods of  absence  without  leave  as
                 extraordinary leave.


           (4) (a) In the absence of a specific indication to the  contrary
                    in the  service  record,  an  interruption  between  two
                    spells of service rendered by a bank employee  shall  be
                    treated  as  automatically   condoned   and   the   pre-
                    interruption service treated as qualifying service;


               (b) Nothing in clause (a) shall apply to interruption caused
                    by resignation, dismissal or Removal from the service or
                    for participation in a strike:


                    Provided that before making  an  entry  in  the  service
                    record of the Bank employee regarding forfeiture of past
                    service because  of  his  participation  in  strike,  an
                    opportunity of representation may be given to such  bank
                    employees.”

12.   Classes of Pension are dealt with in Chapter  V  of  the  Regulations.
Regulation 28 deals with  superannuation  pension  and  the  same  reads  as
follows:
            “28.  Superannuation Pension:- Superannuation pension  shall  be
      granted to an employee who has retired on his  attaining  the  age  of
      superannuation specified in the Service Regulations or Settlement.”

           29 Pension on Voluntary Retirement –
            1) On or after the 1st day of November 1993, at any time  after
               the an employee has completed  twenty  years  of  qualifying
               service he may, by giving notice  of  not  less  than  three
               months in writing to the appointing authority,  retire  from
               service :


              Provided that this sub – regulation shall  not  apply  to  an
              employee who is on deputation or on study leave abroad unless
              after having been transferred or having returned to India  he
              has resumed charge of the post in India and has served for  a
              period of not less than one year :


              Provided further that this sub – regulation shall  not  apply
              to an employee who seeks retirement from  service  for  being
              absorbed permanently in an autonomous body or  public  sector
              undertaking  or  company  or  institution  or  body,  whether
              incorporated or not to which he is on deputation at the  time
              of seeking voluntary retirement :


              Provided that this sub – regulation shall  not  apply  to  an
              employee who is deemed to have  retired  in  accordance  with
              clause (1) of regulation 2.


          2.   The  notice  of  voluntary  retirement  given  under  sub   –
              regulation (1) shall require  acceptance  by  the  appointing
              authority:


              Provided that where the appointing authority does not  refuse
              to grant the permission for retirement before the  expiry  of
              the period specified in the said notice, the retirement shall
              become effective from the date of expiry of the said period.


          3. (a) An employee referred to in sub regulation (1)  may  make  a
                 request  in  writing  to  the  writing  to  the  appointing
                 authority to accept notice of voluntary retirement of  less
                 than three months giving reasons therefore :


             (b) On receipt of a request under clause (a),  the  appointing
                 authority  may,  subject  to  the  provisions  of   sub   –
                 regulation (2), consider such request for  the  curtailment
                 of the period of notice of three months on merits and if it
                 is satisfied that the curtailment of the period  of  notice
                 will  not  cause  any  administrative  inconvenience,   the
                 appointing authority may relax the requirement of notice of
                 three months on the condition that the employee  shall  not
                 apply for commutation of a part of his pension  before  the
                 expiry of the notice of three months.


          4.  An employee, who has elected to retire under  this  regulation
              and  has  given  necessary  notice  to  that  effect  to  the
              appointing authority, shall be precluded from withdrawing his
              notice except with the specific approval of such authority:


              Provided that the request for such withdrawal shall  be  made
              before the intended date of his retirement.


          5. The qualifying service  of  an  employee  retiring  voluntarily
              under this regulation shall be  increased  by  a  period  not
              exceeding five years, subject to the condition that the total
              qualifying service rendered by such employee shall not in any
              case exceed thirty three years  and  it  does  not  take  him
              beyond the date of superannuation.


          6. The pension of an employee retiring under this regulation shall
              be based on the average emoluments as  defined  under  clause
              (d) of regulation 2 of these Regulations and the increase not
              exceeding five years in his  qualifying  service,  shall  not
              entitle him any notional fixation of pay for the  purpose  of
              calculating his pension.”


13.   In order to appreciate the scope of the above  mentioned  Regulations,
it is necessary to refer  to  some  of  the  definition  clauses.  The  word
‘retire’ is defined in Regulation 2(x) of the Regulations 1995, which  reads
as under:
      “2(x) “retired” includes deemed to have retired under clause(l).”

The word ‘retirement’ is defined under Regulation 2(y)  of  the  Regulations
1995, which reads as follows:
      “2(y) “retirement” means cessation from bank’s service,-
              a) On attaining the age of superannuation specified in Service
                 Regulations or Settlements;
              b) On  voluntary  retirement  in  accordance  with  provisions
                 contained in regulation 29 of these regulations;
              c) On premature retirement by the Bank  before  attaining  the
                 age of superannuation specified in Service  Regulations  or
                 Settlement.”

14.   The appellants, in our view, did not  retire  from  the  service,  but
resigned from the service.  Appellants tried to build up a case that in  the
absence of a legal definition of ‘voluntary retirement’ or  in  the  absence
of legally prescribed consequences of ‘resignation’, it must  be  understood
in the sense of voluntary relinquishment of service.   It  was  pointed  out
that  there  can  be  no  distinction  between  ‘voluntary  retirement’  and
‘resignation’ and those expressions are to be understood in  their  ordinary
literal sense.

15.   We  find  it  difficult  to  accept  the  contentions  raised  by  the
appellants.   There  is  no  ambiguity  in  the  definition   clause   under
Regulation  2(y)  which  has  statutorily  brought   in   the   ‘voluntarily
retirement’ as ‘retirement’.  Though the concept of  ‘resignation’  is  well
known in Service Jurisprudence, the same has not  been  brought  within  the
definition of  ‘retirement’  under  Regulation  2(y).   Further,  the  words
‘retired’ and ‘retirement’ have some resemblance in their meanings, but  not
‘resignation’.   Regulation  3(1)(a)  specifically   used   the   expression
‘retirement’ and the expression  ‘resignation’  has  not  been  incorporated
either in the definition clause or  in  Regulation  3(1)(a).   We  need  not
labour much on this issue, since the difference between these  two  concepts
‘resignation’  and  ‘retirement’,  in  the  context  of  the  same   Banking
Regulations 1995, came up for consideration before this Court in Sanwar  Mal
(supra), wherein this Court has distinguished the  words  ‘resignation’  and
‘retirement’ and held as follows:
           “9. ……… The words "resignation" and "retirement" carry different
      meanings in common parlance. An employee can resign at  any  point  of
      time, even on the second day of his appointment but  in  the  case  of
      retirement he retires only after attaining the age  of  superannuation
      or in the case of voluntary retirement  on  completion  of  qualifying
      service. The effect of resignation and retirement to the  extent  that
      there is severance of employment but in service jurisprudence both the
      expressions are understood differently.  Under  the  Regulations,  the
      expressions "resignation" and  "retirement"  have  been  employed  for
      different purpose and carry different  meanings.  The  pension  scheme
      herein is based on  actuarial  calculation;  it  is  a  self-financing
      scheme, which does not depend upon budgetary support and  consequently
      it constitutes a complete  code  by  itself.  The  scheme  essentially
      covers retirees as the credit balance to their provident fund  account
      is  larger  as  compared  to  employees  who  resigned  from  service.
      Moreover, resignation brings about complete cessation  of  master  and
      servant  relationship  whereas  voluntary  retirement  maintains   the
      relationship for the purposes of grant of retiral benefits, in view of
      the past service. Similarly, acceptance of  resignation  is  dependent
      upon discretion of the employer whereas retirement  is  completion  of
      service in terms of regulations/rules framed by the bank.  Resignation
      can be tendered irrespective of the length of service whereas  in  the
      case of voluntary retirement, the employee has to complete  qualifying
      service for retiral benefits. …………”
                                                            (emphasis added)

In the above mentioned judgment, this Court has also  held  that  there  are
different yardsticks and criteria for submitting the resignation,  vis-à-vis
voluntary retirement and exceptions thereof.  In that context, the scope  of
Regulation 22 of Regulations 1995 was also considered and the Court held  as
follows:


           9.   …………….In   our   view,   Regulation   22    provides    for
      disqualification of employees who have resigned from service  and  for
      those who have been dismissed or removed from service.  Hence,  we  do
      not find any  merit  in  the  arguments  advanced  on  behalf  of  the
      respondent that Regulation 22  makes  an  arbitrary  and  unreasonable
      classification repugnant to Article 14 of the Constitution by  keeping
      out such class of employees. The view we have taken  is  supported  by
      the judgment of this Court in the case of Reserve Bank  of  India  v.
      Cecil Dennis Solomon (2004) 9 SCC 461. Before concluding we may  state
      that Clause 22 is not in the nature of penalty  as  alleged.  It  only
      disentitles an employee who has resigned from service from becoming  a
      member of  the  Fund.  Such  employees  have  received  their  retiral
      benefits earlier. The pension scheme, as stated above,  only  provides
      for a second retiral benefit. Hence there is no  question  of  penalty
      being imposed on such employees as alleged. The  pension  scheme  only
      provides for an avenue for investment to retirees. They  are  provided
      avenue to put in their savings and as a term  or  condition  which  is
      more in the nature of an eligibility criteria the  scheme  disentitles
      such category of employees out of it.”


16.   We may indicate that in Sanwar Mal  (supra),  the  employee,  who  was
working on Class III  post,  resigned  from  the  service  of  UCO  Bank  on
25.2.1988 after giving one month’s notice and also  accepted  his  provident
fund without protest.  On coming into force of the Regulations 1995,  Sanwar
Mal opted for pension scheme.  Since Sanwar Mal had  resigned  in  the  year
1988, UCO Bank declined its option for admitting him  as  a  member  of  the
fund.

17.   This Court, as already  indicated,  after  referring  to  the  various
provisions of the Regulations 1995 and after examining the  meaning  of  the
expressions ‘resignation’ and ‘retirement’, held that  since  Regulation  22
provided for disqualification of employees who had resigned, such  employees
could not claim membership of the fund.

18.   Learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellants  have  placed  heavy
reliance on Sheelkumar Jain (supra) and submitted that in the light of  that
judgment,  the  decision   rendered   in   Sanwar   Mal   (supra)   requires
reconsideration. We find it difficult to accept  the  contention  raised  by
the learned counsel appearing for the appellants.

19.   We may point out in  Sheelkumar  Jain  (supra)  that  this  Court  was
dealing with an insurance scheme  and  not  the  pension  scheme,  which  is
applicable in the banking sector.  The provisions of  both  the  scheme  and
the Regulation are not pari  materia.   In  Sheelkumar  Jain  case  (supra),
while referring to Para 5, this Court came to the conclusion that  the  same
does not make distinction between ‘resignation’ and  ‘voluntary  retirement’
and it only provides that an employee who wants to leave or discontinue  his
service amounts  to  ‘resignation’  or  ‘voluntary  retirement’.    Whereas,
Regulation 20(2) of the Canara  Bank  (Officers)  Service  Regulations  1979
applicable to banks, had specifically referred to the  words  ‘resignation’,
unlike Para 5 of the Insurance Rules. Further, it is also to be noted  that,
in that judgment, this Court in Para 30 held that the  Court  will  have  to
construe the statutory provisions in each  case  to  find  out  whether  the
termination  of  service  of  an  employee  was  a  termination  by  way  of
resignation or a termination by way of voluntary retirement.

20.   The appellants, when  tendered  their  letters  of  resignation,  were
governed by the Regulations 1979.   Regulation  20(2)  of  Regulations  1979
dealt with resignation from service and they tendered their  resignation  in
the light of that provision.  We are of the view that  the  appellants  have
failed to show any  pre-existing  rights  in  their  favour  either  in  the
Statutory Settlement/Joint Note dated 29.10.1993 or  under  the  Regulations
1995.   Appellants  had  resigned  from  service  prior  to  1.11.1993  and,
therefore, were not covered by the statutory settlement,  Joint  Note  dated
29.10.1993 and the Regulations 1995.  They  could  not  establish  any  pre-
existing legal, statutory or fundamental rights in  their  favour  to  claim
the benefit of Regulations 1995.  Consequently, the reliance placed  by  the
appellants either on Regulation 29 or Regulation  22  in  support  of  their
contentions, cannot be accepted, since they are not covered  by  the  scheme
of pension introduced by the banks with effect from 1.11.1993.

21.   We, therefore, find no  merit  in  these  appeals  and  the  same  are
dismissed, with no order as to costs.


                                                             ……………………………….J.
                                                   (K.S. Radhakrishnan)



                                                            ..………………………………J.
                                                   (Dipak Misra)
New Delhi,
October 3, 2012

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (in short ‘the RTE Act’) =The Writ Petition was filed in the year 2004 and since then, several interim orders have been passed giving directions to the States and the Union Territories to provide the basic infrastructure facilities like toilet facility, drinking water, class rooms, appointment of teachers and all other facilities so that children can study in a clean and healthy environment. We are, inclined to dispose of this Writ Petition with a direction to all the States to give effect to the various directions already given by this Court like providing toilet facilities for boys and girls, drinking water facilities, sufficient class rooms, appointment of teaching and non- teaching staff etc., if not already provided, within six months from today. We make it clear that these directions are applicable to all the schools, whether State owned or privately owned, aided or unaided, minority or non- minority. As the writ petition is disposed of, no orders are required to be passed on applications for intervention and impleadment and the same are disposed of. 10. We make it clear that if the directions are not fully implemented, it is open to the aggrieved parties to move this Court for appropriate orders.

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 631 OF 2004

Environment & Consumer Protection Foundation             .. Petitioner
                                   Versus
Delhi Administration & Ors.                              .. Respondents

                               J U D G M E N T

K. S. Radhakrishnan, J.

1.    This Court’s jurisdiction under Article  32  of  the  Constitution  of
India has been invoked by the petitioner, a registered  charitable  society,
seeking various directions to  improve  the  conditions  of  Government  and
aided schools and also school run by  the  local  authorities  so  that  the
constitutional objective of providing free and  compulsory  education  under
Article 21A of the Constitution of India would be a reality.

2.    The Writ Petition was filed in the year 2004 and since  then,  several
interim orders have been passed giving directions  to  the  States  and  the
Union Territories  to  provide  the  basic  infrastructure  facilities  like
toilet facility, drinking water, class rooms, appointment  of  teachers  and
all other facilities so that children can  study  in  a  clean  and  healthy
environment.   While  the  matter  was  pending  before  this   Court,   the
Parliament enacted the Right of Children to Free  and  Compulsory  Education
Act, 2009 (in short ‘the RTE Act’).  The constitutional validity of the  RTE
Act was challenged before this Court  and  this  Court,  vide  its  Judgment
dated 12.4.2012 in Society for  Unaided  Private  Schools  of  Rajasthan  v.
Union of India and Another (2012)6 SCC  1,  upheld  its  validity  and  gave
various directions, some of which are as follows:


     a) In exercise of the powers conferred upon the appropriate Government
        under Section 38 of the RTE Act, the Government shall  frame  rules
        for carrying out the purposes of this Act and  in  particular,  the
        matters stated under sub-Section (2) of Section 38 of the RTE  Act.




     b) The directions, guidelines and rules shall be framed by the Central
        Government, appropriate  Government  and/or  such  other  competent
        authority under the provisions of the RTE Act, as expeditiously  as
        possible and, in any case, not later than six months from the  date
        of pronouncement of this judgment.



     c) All the State Governments which  have  not  constituted  the  State
        Advisory Council in terms of Section 34 of the  RTE  Act  shall  so
        constitute the Council within three months from today.  The Council
        so  constituted  shall  undertake  its   requisite   functions   in
        accordance with the provisions of Section 34 of the Act and  advise
        the Government in terms of clauses (6), (7) and (8) of  this  order
        immediately thereafter.



     d) Central Government and  State  Governments  may  set  up  a  proper
        Regulatory Authority for supervision and effective  functioning  of
        the Act and its implementation.






3.    This Court, therefore, directed the  Central  Government,  appropriate
Government and other competent authorities functioning under the RTE Act  to
issue proper directions/guidelines for  its  full  implementation  within  a
period of six months from the date of the pronouncement  of  that  judgment.
This Court also directed all  the  State  Governments  to  constitute  State
Advisory Council within  three  months  from  the  date  of  that  judgment.
Advisory Councils so constituted were directed to discharge their  functions
in accordance with the provision of Section 34 of the  RTE  Act  and  advise
the Government in terms of Clauses (6), (7) and (8)  of this Court’s  order.
 The necessity of constituting a proper Regulatory Authority  for  effective
functioning of the RTE Act and its implementation was also highlighted.  The
Central Government was also directed to frame  rules,  in  exercise  of  its
powers under Section 38 of the RTE Act, for  proper  implementation  of  the
RTE Act.

4.    On the  basis  of  directions  issued  by  this  Court  in  this  Writ
Petition, some of the States have responded by  furnishing  the  details  of
infrastructure  facilities  available  in  the  schools  situated  in  their
respective States.   This Court noticed that some of the  schools  have  not
provided proper toilet facilities for boys and girls  and  in  some  of  the
schools, it was noticed, that there is no provision for  drinking  water  as
well.  Detailed interim orders were passed by this Court  on  29.4.2011  and
22.9.2011.  On 18.10.2011, this Court passed the following order:
                 “We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.  It  is
           imperative that all the schools must provide toilet  facilities.
           Empirical  researches  have  indicated  that   wherever   toilet
           facilities are not provided in the schools, parents do not  send
           their children (particularly  girls)  to  schools.   It  clearly
           violates the right to free and compulsory education of  children
           guaranteed under Article 21-A of the Constitution.


                 We direct all the  States  and  the  Union  Territories  to
           ensure that toilet facilities are  made  available  in  all  the
           schools on or before 30th November, 2011.  In  case  it  is  not
           possible to have permanent construction  of  toilets,  at  least
           temporary toilets be provided in the schools on or  before  30th
           November, 2011 and permanent toilets be made available  by  31st
           December, 2011.


                 We direct the Chief Secretaries/Administrators of  all  the
           States/Union Territories to file their affidavits on  or  before
           30th November, 2011.”




5.    Again, on 5.12.2011, this Court reiterated the directions as follows:
                 “In  our  previous  order  dated  18.10.2011,  we   clearly
           indicated that it  is  imperative  that  all  the  schools  must
           provide toilet facilities; empirical researches  have  indicated
           that wherever toilet facilities are not provided in the schools,
           parents do not  send  their  children  (particularly  girls)  to
           schools.  It clearly violates the right to free  and  compulsory
           education of children  guaranteed  under  Article  21-A  of  the
           Constitution.  Office Report dated 3rd  day  of  December,  2011
           indicates that despite opportunity granted, the States of  Tamil
           Nadu, Gujarat, Chhattisgarh, Meghalaya, West  Bengal,  Arunachal
           Pradesh, Punjab, Goa, Tripura and Union Territory of  Lakshdweep
           have not  filed  their  affidavits.   One  more  opportunity  is
           granted  to  these  States/Union   Territory   to   file   their
           affidavits.  Let the affidavits be filed within two  weeks  from
           today.  No further time shall be granted for this purpose.


                 We are  told  that  the  Ministry  of  Drinking  Water  and
           Sanitation is the concerned ministry.  We  request  the  learned
           additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the Union of
           India to take instructions from the Ministry of  Drinking  Water
           and Sanitation and file an  affidavit  within  four  weeks  from
           today, indicating therein the latest position about the  problem
           of drinking water in the country.”






6.    The situation that we get in few States  has  been  elaborately  dealt
with by this Court in its  interim  order  dated  13.1.2012.   Some  of  the
States have taken some  positive  steps,  but  some  the  States  still  lag
behind.  Taking note of all those aspects, this Court  passed  an  order  on
12.3.2012, the operative portion of which reads as follows:
                 “The Chief Secretaries of various States were  directed  to
           ensure that separate permanent toilets for boys  and  girls  are
           constructed in all the schools in their respective States on  or
           before 31st March, 2012 and in  case  it  was  not  possible  to
           construct permanent  toilets,  then  at  least  emporary  toilet
           facilities were directed tobe made available on or  before  28th
           February, 2012 and it was directed than  an  affidavit  to  that
           effect shall be filed by the Chief Secretaries on or before 28th
           February, 2012.


                 In pursuance of the aforesaid  directions  of  this  Court,
           affidavits have been filed  by  the  States  of  Uttar  Pradesh,
           Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Chhattisgarh, Punjab, Nagaland,  West
           Bengal,  Andhra  Pradesh,  Maharashtra,  Uttarakhand,   Odhisha,
           Karnataka,   Jharkhand,   Himachal   Pradesh,   Goa,   Municiapl
           Corporation of Delhi and the  Union  Territory  of  Lakshadweep.
           These States/union Territories in  their  respective  affidavits
           have indicated that they have either constructed the toilets for
           boys and girls or they would complete it before  the  stipulated
           date that is before 31st March, 2012.


                 According to the Office Report  dated  3rd  day  of  March,
           2012, following States have not filed their affidavits:


                 1.    Tripura
                 2.    Tamil Nadu
                 3.    Sikkim
                 4.    Gujarat
                 5.    Bihar
                 6.    Rajasthan
                 7.    Jammu and Kashmir
                 8.    Madhya Pradesh
                 9.    Kerala


                 In the interest of justice, we grant one  more  opportunity
           to these States to file their respective affidavits  within  two
           weeks from today, failing which the Chief Secretary of the State
           concerned shall remain present in this Court on the next date of
           hearing.  No further time shall be granted.


                 Learned counsel appearing on  behalf  of  the  Ministry  of
           Drinking Water and Sanitation has handed over  an  affidavit  of
           Sujoy Mojumdar, Director (Water), Ministry of Drinking Water and
           Sanitation,  Government  of  India.   In  the  affidavit  it  is
           mentioned that under the “Total Sanitation Campaign” (TSC),  the
           Central Government supplements the  efforts  of  the  States  in
           providing sanitation facilities in the  rural  areas,  including
           identified existing rural Government schools and  Anganwadis  by
           providing them with financial assistance and technical  support.
           It is further submitted in the affidavit that under the TSC,  at
           present,  School  Sanitation  Hygiene  Education  Programme   is
           operational in 607 districts spread across 30 States  and  Union
           Territories and a total of 11,99,117 school  toilets  have  been
           financially assisted under the TSC.  The cumulative progress  of
           school toilets unit blocks financially assisted under the TSC in
           the entire country till 29.2.2012 are as follows:








              Project Objectives             -           13,14,636


              Project Performance                  -          11,99,117


              Percentage-wise progress       -           91.21%


                 In paragraph 9 of the said  affidavit  it  is  stated  that
           provision of sanitation facility in Government schools  is  made
           by States within their TSC allocation.   Out  of  the  total  of
           Rs.3068.51 crore  approved  for  School  Sanitation  under  TSC,
           s.2268.28 crore (cumulative) has been  reported  as  expenditure
           and utilized by the States.  The State-wise details of financial
           progress and utilization under TSC till 29.2.2012 are  tabulated
           and enclosed along with the affidavit.


                 In paragraph 10 of the affidavit it is  mentioned  that  as
           per information provided by the Department of  School  Education
           and Literacy, Ministry of Human Resource Development, the number
           of Government schools with sanitation facility available, as per
           their District Information System for Education  (DISE)  2010-11
           is as under:


              Total Number of Govt. Schools        -     10,96,064


              Government Schools with Girls Toilet -     6,24,074


              Government Schools with Boys/
              Common Toilet                  -     8,24,605


                Let copies of this affidavit be supplied by the Registry to
           the learned counsel appearing for the  States/Union  Territories
           within one week from today.


                 Mr. Ravindra Bana, learned counsel appearing on  behalf  of
           the petitioner submits that after this Court has dealt with  the
           problem of electricity, potable drinking water and  toilets  for
           boys and girls in the Government schools, the other main problem
           which is still persistent in most of the  schools  is  regarding
           teachers and infrastructure.  In order to ensure  compliance  of
           Article 21A of the Constitution, it is imperative  that  schools
           must have qualified teachers and basic infrastructure.


                 Learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the   National
           University for Educational Planning and Education undertakes  to
           file  a  comprehensive  affidavit  giving   therein   up-to-date
           position about the availability of teachers  and  infrastructure
           in schools.


                 Let  a  comprehensive  affidavit  be  filed  by   all   the
           States/Union Territories regarding teachers  and  infrastructure
           in schools within three weeks from today, with an  advance  copy
           to the learned counsel for the petitioner and  the  counsel  for
           the States/Union Territories.”

7.    We notice that some of the  States  have  not  fully  implemented  the
directions issued by this Court in Society for Unaided  Private  Schools  of
Rajasthan (supra) as well as  the  provisions  contained  in  the  RTE  Act.
Considering the facts that this Court has already issued various  directions
for proper implementation of the RTE Act and to frame  rules,  there  is  no
reason to keep this Writ Petition pending.

8.    We also notice that Section 31 of  the  RTE  Act  has  also  conferred
certain functions on the National Commission for Protection of Child  Rights
and also on the State Commissions.  Section 31 reads as follows:
           “31. Monitoring of child’s right to education.- (1) The National
      Commission for Protection of Child Rights constituted under section 3,
      or, as the case may be, the State Commission for Protection  of  Child
      Rights constituted under section 17, of the Commissions for Protection
      of Child Rights  Act,  2005,  shall,  in  addition  to  the  functions
      assigned to them under that Act, also perform the following functions,
      namely:—


              a) examine and review the safeguards for rights provided by or
                 under this Act and recommend measures for  their  effective
                 implementation;


              b) inquire into complaints relating to child's right  to  free
                 and compulsory education; and


              c) take necessary steps as provided under sections 15  and  24
                 of the said Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act.



      (2) The said Commissions  shall,  while  inquiring  into  any  matters
      relating to child's right  to  free  and  compulsory  education  under
      clause (c) of sub-section (1), have the same  powers  as  assigned  to
      them respectively under sections 14 and 24 of the said Commissions for
      Protection of Child Rights Act.


      (3)  Where the State Commission for Protection of Child Rights has not
      been constituted in a State, the appropriate Government may,  for  the
      purpose of performing the functions specified in Clauses (a) to (c) of
      sub-section (1), constitute such authority, in such manner and subject
      to such terms and conditions, as may be prescribed.”

      We are confident that those statutory authorities  will  also  examine
and review the safeguards for the child’s rights and recommend measures  for
their effective implementation.

9.    We are, inclined to dispose of this Writ Petition with a direction  to
all the States to give effect to the various  directions  already  given  by
this Court like providing toilet facilities for  boys  and  girls,  drinking
water facilities, sufficient class rooms, appointment of teaching  and  non-
teaching staff etc., if not already provided, within six months from  today.
 We make it clear that these directions are applicable to all  the  schools,
whether State owned or privately owned, aided or unaided, minority  or  non-
minority.  As the writ petition is disposed of, no orders  are  required  to
be passed on applications for intervention and impleadment and the same  are
disposed of.

10.   We make it clear that if the directions are not fully implemented,  it
is open to the aggrieved parties to move this Court for appropriate  orders.


                                                             ……………………………….…J
                                            (K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN)







                                                           …………………………………..J.
                                            (DIPAK MISRA)
New Delhi,
October 3, 2012

ITEM NO.1C               COURT NO.11             SECTION PIL

[FOR JUDGMENT]



            S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A

                         RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO(s). 631 OF 2004



ENVIRONMENTAL & CONSUMER PROTECT. FOUND.          Petitioner(s)

                 VERSUS

DELHI ADMINISTRATION & ORS.                       Respondent(s)



Date: 03/10/2012  This Petition was called on for judgment today.

For Petitioner(s)      Mr. Ravindra Bana,Adv.

For Respondent(s)      Ms. Sunita Sharma,Adv.

                 Ms. Sushma Suri,Adv.

                 Mrs. Anil Katiyar, Adv.

                 Mr. D.S. Mahra,Adv.

                 Mr. Khwairakpam Nobin Singh,Adv.

                 Mr. Sapam Biswajit Meitei,Adv.

                 Mr. Manjit Singh,AAG, State of Haryana

                 Mrs. Vivekta Singh,Adv.

                 Mr. Tarjit Singh,Adv.

                 Mr. Kamal Mohan Gupta,Adv.

                 Mr. Atul Jha,Adv.

                 Mr. Sandeep Jha,Adv.

                 Mr. Dharmendra Kumar Sinha,Adv.

                 Dr. Manish Singhvi,AAG, State of Rajasthan

                 Mr. Irshad Ahmad,Adv.

                 Mr. Sanjiv Sen,Adv.

                 Mr. P. Parmeswaran,Adv.

                 Mr. Ranjan Mukherjee,Adv.

                 Mr. S. Bhowmick,Adv.

                 Mr. S.C. Ghosh,Adv.

                 Mr. Sunil Fernandes,Adv.

                 Ms. Vernika Tomar,Adv.

                 Ms. Astha Sharma,Adv.

                 Mr. Amitesh Kumar,Adv.

                 Mr. Ravi Kant,Adv.

                 Ms. Prerna Mehta,Adv.

                       Ms. Binu Tamta ,Adv

                     Mr. G. Prakash ,Adv

                     Mr. Gopal Singh ,Adv

                     Ms. Hemantika Wahi ,Adv

                     Mr. Naresh K. Sharma ,Adv

                     Ms. Pratibha Jain ,Adv

                     Mr. Surya Kant ,Adv

                     Mr. Shrish Kumar Misra ,Adv

                     Mr. Tara Chandra Sharma ,Adv

                     M/S Arputham,Aruna & Co. ,Adv

                     Mr. Irshad Ahmad ,Adv

                     Mr. V.G. Pragasam ,Adv

                     Mr. S. Rajappa ,Adv

                     Mr. Krishnanand Pandeya ,Adv

                     Mr. Ramesh Babu M.R. ,Adv

                     Mr. Radha Shyam Jena ,Adv

                     Ms. Asha Gopalan Nair ,Adv

                     Mr. Abhijit Sengupta ,Adv

                     Ms. Bina Madhavan ,Adv

                     Mr. Jagjit Singh Chhabra ,Adv

                     M/S Corporate Law Group ,A.O.R.

                     Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija ,Adv

                     Mr. Kuldip Singh ,Adv

                     Mr. S. Thananjayan ,Adv

                     Mr. Abhishek Atrey ,Adv

                     Mr. G.N.Reddy ,Adv

                     Mr. Sudarshan Singh Rawat ,Adv

                     M/S. Bhatia & Co. ,Adv

                     Ms. Prerna Mehta ,Adv



                      Hon'ble Mr.  Justice  K.S.  Radhakrishnan  pronounced
           reportable judgment of the  Bench  comprising  His  Lordship  and
           Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dipak Misra.

                      In terms of  signed  reportable  judgment,  the  writ
           petition is disposed of.




                 |(A.D. Sharma)                        | |(Renuka Sadana)                      |
|Court Master                         | |Court Master                         |


             (Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)

whether the Central Information Commissioner (for short ‘the CIC’) acting under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (for short ‘the RTI Act’) was right in denying information regarding the third respondent’s personal matters pertaining to his service career and also denying the details of his assets and liabilities, movable and immovable properties on the ground that the information sought for was qualified to be personal information as defined in clause (j) of Section 8(1) of the RTI Act.-The details disclosed by a person in his income tax returns are “personal information” which stand exempted from disclosure under clause (j) of Section 8(1) of the RTI Act, unless involves a larger public interest and the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the Appellate Authority is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information.

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

          Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 27734          of 2012
                              (@ CC 14781/2012)



Girish Ramchandra Deshpande                  .. Petitioner
                                   Versus
Cen. Information Commr. & Ors.                     .. Respondents



                                  O R D E R

1.    Delay condoned.

2.    We are, in this case, concerned with the question whether the  Central
Information Commissioner (for short ‘the CIC’) acting  under  the  Right  to
Information Act, 2005 (for  short  ‘the  RTI  Act’)  was  right  in  denying
information regarding the third respondent’s personal matters pertaining  to
his  service  career  and  also  denying  the  details  of  his  assets  and
liabilities, movable  and  immovable  properties  on  the  ground  that  the
information sought for was qualified to be personal information  as  defined
in clause (j) of Section 8(1) of the RTI Act.


3.    The petitioner  herein  had  submitted  an  application  on  27.8.2008
before  the  Regional  Provident  Fund  Commissioner  (Ministry  of  Labour,
Government  of  India)  calling  for  various  details  relating  to   third
respondent, who was employed  as  an  Enforcement  Officer  in  Sub-Regional
Office, Akola, now working in the State of Madhya Pradesh.  As  many  as  15
queries were made to which the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner,  Nagpur
gave the following reply on 15.9.2008:

      ”As to Point No.1:     Copy of appointment order of Shri A.B. Lute, is
                            in 3 pages.  You have  sought  the  details  of
                            salary in respect  of  Shri  A.B.  Lute,  which
                            relates to personal information the disclosures
                            of which has  no  relationship  to  any  public
                            activity   or   interest,   it   would    cause
                            unwarranted  invasion   of   the   privacy   of
                            individual  hence  denied  as   per   the   RTI
                            provision under Section 8(1)(j) of the Act.


      As to Point No.2:      Copy of order of granting  Enforcement  Officer
                            Promotion to Shri A.B. Lute, is  in  3  Number.
                            Details  of  salary  to  the  post  along  with
                            statutory and other deductions of Mr.  Lute  is
                            denied to provide as per RTI  provisions  under
                            Section  8(1)(j)  for  the  reasons   mentioned
                            above.


      As to Point NO.3:      All the transfer orders of Shri A.B. Lute,  are
                            in 13 Numbers.  Salary details is  rejected  as
                            per the provision under Section 8(1)(j) for the
                            reason mentioned above.


      As to Point No.4:      The copies of memo, show cause notice,  censure
                            issued to Mr. Lute, are not being  provided  on
                            the ground  that  it  would  cause  unwarranted
                            invasion of the privacy of the  individual  and
                            has no relationship to any public  activity  or
                            interest.   Please  see  RTI  provision   under
                            Section 8(1)(j).


      As to Point No.5:      Copy of EPF (Staff & Conditions) Rules 1962  is
                            in 60 pages.


      As to Point No.6:      Copy of return of  assets  and  liabilities  in
                            respect of Mr. Lute cannot be provided  as  per
                            the provision of RTI Act under Section  8(1)(j)
                            as per the  reason  explained  above  at  point
                            No.1.


      As to Point No.7:      Details of investment and other related details
                            are rejected as per the provision  of  RTI  Act
                            under  Section  8(1)(j)  as  per   the   reason
                            explained above at point No.1.


      As to Point No.8:      Copy of report of  item  wise  and  value  wise
                            details of  gifts  accepted  by  Mr.  Lute,  is
                            rejected as per the provisions of RTI Act under
                            Section 8(1)(j) as  per  the  reason  explained
                            above at point No.1.


      As  to  Point  No.9:       Copy  of  details  of  movable,   immovable
                            properties of Mr. Lute, the request to  provide
                            the same is rejected as per the RTI  Provisions
                            under Section 8(1)(j).


      As to Point  No.10:      Mr.  Lute  is  not  claiming  for  TA/DA  for
                            attending the criminal case  pending  at  JMFC,
                            Akola.


      As to Point No.11:     Copy of Notification is in 2 numbers.


      As to Point No.12:     Copy of certified true  copy  of  charge  sheet
                            issued to Mr. Lute – The matter  pertains  with
                            head Office, Mumbai.  Your application is being
                            forwarded to Head Office, Mumbai as per Section
                            6(3) of the RTI Act, 2005.


      As to  Point  No.13:      Certified  True  copy  of  complete  enquiry
                            proceedings initiated against  Mr.  Lute  –  It
                            would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy  of
                            individuals and  has  no  relationship  to  any
                            public activity or interest.   Please  see  RTI
                            provisions under Section 8(1)(j).


      As to Point No.14:     It would cause unwarranted invasion of  privacy
                            of individuals and has no relationship  to  any
                            public activity or interest,  hence  denied  to
                            provide.


      As to Point No.15:     Certified true copy of second show cause notice
                            –  It  would  cause  unwarranted  invasion   of
                            privacy of individuals and has no  relationship
                            to  any  public  activity  or  interest,  hence
                            denied to provide.”




4.    Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner approached the  CIC.   The
CIC passed the order on 18.6.2009, the operative portion of the order  reads
as under:

      “The question for consideration is whether the  aforesaid  information
      sought by the Appellant can be treated as  ‘personal  information’  as
      defined in clause (j) of Section 8(1) of  the  RTI  Act.   It  may  be
      pertinent to mention that this issue came up before the Full Bench  of
      the Commission in Appeal No.CIC/AT/A/2008/000628  (Milap  Choraria  v.
      Central Board of Direct Taxes) and the Commission  vide  its  decision
      dated 15.6.2009 held that “the Income Tax  return  have  been  rightly
      held to be personal information exempted from disclosure under  clause
      (j) of Section 8(1) of the RTI Act  by  the  CPIO  and  the  Appellate
      Authority, and the appellant herein has not  been  able  to  establish
      that a larger public interest would be served by  disclosure  of  this
      information.  This logic would hold good as far as the  ITRs  of  Shri
      Lute are  concerned.   I  would  like  to  further  observe  that  the
      information which has been denied to the appellant  essentially  falls
      in two parts – (i) relating to the personal matters pertaining to  his
      services career; and (ii) Shri Lute’s assets  &  liabilities,  movable
      and immovable properties and  other  financial  aspects.   I  have  no
      hesitation in holding that this information also qualifies to  be  the
      ‘personal information’ as defined in clause (j) of Section 8(1) of the
      RTI Act and the appellant has not been able to convince the Commission
      that disclosure thereof is in larger public interest.”




5.    The CIC, after holding so directed the second respondent  to  disclose
the information at paragraphs 1, 2, 3 (only posting  details),  5,  10,  11,
12,13 (only copies of the posting orders) to the appellant within  a  period
of four weeks from the date of the order.  Further, it  was  held  that  the
information sought for with regard to the other queries did not qualify  for
disclosure.

6.    Aggrieved by the said order, the  petitioner  filed  a  writ  petition
No.4221 of 2009 which came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge  and
the court dismissed the same vide order dated  16.2.2010.   The  matter  was
taken up by way of Letters Patent Appeal No.358 of 2011 before the  Division
Bench and the same was dismissed vide order dated 21.12.2011.   Against  the
said order this special leave petition has been filed.

7.    Shri A.P. Wachasunder, learned counsel appearing  for  the  petitioner
submitted that the documents sought  for  vide  Sl.  Nos.1,  2  and  3  were
pertaining to appointment and promotion and Sl.  No.4  and  12  to  15  were
related to disciplinary action and documents at Sl. Nos.6 to 9 pertained  to
assets and liabilities and gifts received by the third  respondent  and  the
disclosure of those details, according to the  learned  counsel,  would  not
cause unwarranted invasion of privacy.

8.    Learned counsel also submitted that the privacy  appended  to  Section
8(1)(j) of the RTI Act widens the scope of documents  warranting  disclosure
and if those provisions are properly interpreted, it could not be said  that
documents  pertaining  to  employment  of  a  person  holding  the  post  of
enforcement officer could be treated as documents having no relationship  to
any public activity or interest.

9.    Learned counsel also pointed out that in view of Section 6(2)  of  the
RTI Act, the applicant making request for  information  is  not  obliged  to
give any reason for the  requisition  and  the  CIC  was  not  justified  in
dismissing his appeal.

10.   This Court in Central Board of  Secondary  Education  and  another  v.
Aditya Bandopadhyay and others (2011) 8  SCC  497  while  dealing  with  the
right of examinees to inspect evaluated answer books in connection with  the
examination conducted by the CBSE Board  had  an  occasion  to  consider  in
detail the aims and object of the RTI Act as well as  the  reasons  for  the
introduction  of  the  exemption  clause  in  the  RTI  Act,  hence,  it  is
unnecessary, for the purpose of this case to  further  examine  the  meaning
and contents of Section 8 as a whole.

11.   We are, however, in this case primarily concerned with the  scope  and
interpretation to clauses (e), (g) and (j) of Section 8(1) of  the  RTI  Act
which are extracted herein below:
      “8. Exemption from disclosure  of  information.-  (1)  Notwithstanding
      anything contained in this Act, there shall be no obligation  to  give
      any citizen,-


      (e) information available to a person in his  fiduciary  relationship,
      unless the competent authority is satisfied  that  the  larger  public
      interest warrants the disclosure  of such information;


      (g) information, the disclosure of which would endanger  the  life  or
      physical safety of any person or identify the source of information or
      assistance  given  in  confidence  for  law  enforcement  or  security
      purposes;


      (j) information which relates to personal information  the  disclosure
      of which has no relationship to any public activity  or  interest,  or
      which  would  cause  unwarranted  invasion  of  the  privacy  of   the
      individual unless the Central Public Information Officer or the  State
      Public Information Officer or the appellate authority, as the case may
      be, is  satisfied  that  the  larger  public  interest  justifies  the
      disclosure of such information.”




12.   The petitioner herein sought for  copies  of  all  memos,  show  cause
notices and censure/punishment awarded to  the  third  respondent  from  his
employer and also details viz. movable and  immovable  properties  and  also
the details of his investments, lending and borrowing from Banks  and  other
financial institutions.    Further, he has also sought for  the  details  of
gifts stated to have accepted by the third respondent,  his  family  members
and friends and relatives at the  marriage  of  his  son.   The  information
mostly sought for finds a place in the  income  tax  returns  of  the  third
respondent.  The question that has come up for consideration is whether  the
above-mentioned  information  sought   for   qualifies   to   be   “personal
information” as defined in clause (j) of Section 8(1) of the RTI Act.

13.   We are in agreement with  the  CIC  and  the  courts  below  that  the
details called for by the petitioner i.e. copies of all memos issued to  the
third respondent, show cause notices and orders of  censure/punishment  etc.
are qualified to be  personal  information  as  defined  in  clause  (j)  of
Section 8(1) of the RTI Act.  The performance of an employee/officer  in  an
organization is primarily a matter between the  employee  and  the  employer
and normally those aspects are governed by  the  service  rules  which  fall
under the expression “personal information”, the disclosure of which has  no
relationship to any public activity or public interest.  On the other  hand,
the disclosure of which would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of  that
individual.  Of course, in a given case, if the Central  Public  Information
Officer or the State Public Information Officer of the  Appellate  Authority
is satisfied that the larger public interest  justifies  the  disclosure  of
such information, appropriate orders could  be  passed  but  the  petitioner
cannot claim those details as a matter of right.

14.   The details disclosed by a  person  in  his  income  tax  returns  are
“personal information” which stand exempted  from  disclosure  under  clause
(j) of Section 8(1)  of  the  RTI  Act,  unless  involves  a  larger  public
interest and the Central Public Information  Officer  or  the  State  Public
Information Officer or the Appellate Authority is satisfied that the  larger
public interest justifies the disclosure of such information.

15.   The petitioner in the instant case has not made  a  bona  fide  public
interest in seeking information, the disclosure of  such  information  would
cause unwarranted invasion  of  privacy  of  the  individual  under  Section
8(1)(j) of the RTI Act.

16.   We are, therefore, of the view that the petitioner has  not  succeeded
in establishing that the information sought for is  for  the  larger  public
interest.  That being the fact,  we  are  not  inclined  to  entertain  this
special leave petition.  Hence, the same is dismissed.


                                                         ……………….……………………..J.
                                             (K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN)






                                                         ………………………………….…..J.
                                             (DIPAK MISRA)
New Delhi
October 3, 2012