It is clear, therefore, that it is not open to a court to prescribe the time limit for disposal of a case and direct that after termination of that period if the case does not get over, the accused should be acquitted or discharged. As held in P. Ramachandra Rao, the court can always exercise its available powers under Sections 309, 311 and 253 of the Code to effectuate the right of an accused to speedy trial. In an appropriate case, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court can undoubtedly quash the proceedings. Following the judgment in P. Ramachandra Rao, this court has in Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar[11] observed that where the court comes to the conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, may be quashed unless the court feels that having regard to the nature of offence and relevant circumstances, quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. This Court further observed that the power possessed by the High Courts under Section 482 of the Code is undoubtedly very wide but it has to be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. This Court further observed that the inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. This Court further observed that it is trite to state that the said powers have to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection only when the court is convinced, on the basis of material on record, that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. Since Trust property is involved in this case, the complainant is expected to be alert and vigilant. We deem it appropriate to give him a final chance to prosecute this case. We direct the trial court to take-up the case for final disposal, after receipt of this order by it and dispose it of within a period of four months from that date. We expect the appellant to cooperate with the trial court and not file frivolous applications leading to procrastination. We make it clear that nothing said by us in this order should be treated as our final expression on the merits of the case of the complainant or the appellant. All questions of facts and law are expressly kept open. The appeal is dismissed with the above directions.

                                                              NON-REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1351 OF 2012
                [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1288 OF 2011]


Shri Sudarshanacharaya                       …     Appellant

                                   Versus

Shri Purushottamacharya & Anr.          …    Respondents


                                  JUDGMENT


(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.


1.    Leave granted.


2.    This appeal, by grant  of  special  leave,  is  directed  against  the
judgment and order dated 10/12/2010 passed by the High Court  of  Judicature
at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench at Lucknow. The High  Court  dismissed  Criminal
Misc. Case No.4227 of 2010 filed by  the  appellant  praying  that  Criminal
Complaint Case No.13 of 2008 be quashed.


3.    Respondent 1 is the  complainant  (‘complainant’,  for  clarity).   He
filed a complaint in the court of  ACJM,  Faizabad  against  the  appellant.
According to the complainant, the  temple  of  Lord  Venkatesh  situated  in
Ayodhya town is managed by a Trust.  The appellant is  the  adopted  son  of
Smt. Hulasmani Devi, the Sarwarkar and  President  of  Vaikunth  Mandap  Sri
Venkatesh Mandir Trust Committee.  In short, the case  of  the  complainant,
as  disclosed  in  Complaint  dated  09/09/1985,  is  that   on   31/08/1973
considering religious nature of the appellant, the appellant  was  entrusted
with  several  silver  and  gold  articles,  jewellery  and  other  articles
belonging to the temple so that he may propagate  the  sect.   In  December,
1973, the appellant requested that he may be given  certain  more  articles.
Accordingly, more articles were given to him.  The receipt of first  set  of
articles was given by him but he did not  give  receipt  of  second  set  of
articles.  The appellant never returned  the  articles.  He  misappropriated
them and thus committed criminal breach of trust.

4.    Certain facts, which can be gathered from  the  various  orders  which
are on record  and  from  the  affidavit  of  Mr.  R.K.  Chaturvedi,  S.S.P.
Faizabad need to be stated.  As we have already  noted,  the  complaint  was
filed on 09/09/1985.  On 17/10/1985, the statement of  the  complainant  was
recorded.  On 25/11/1985, the  statement  of  witness  Bashisht  Pandey  was
recorded.   On  17/12/1985,  the  statement  of  Rakesh  Kumar  Mishra   was
recorded.  Both these  witnesses  confirmed  the  allegations  made  by  the
complainant.  On 07/03/1986,  learned  Magistrate  took  cognizance  of  the
offence and the case was fixed for hearing on  18/06/1988.   On  18/06/1988,
the complainant took time for producing evidence under Section  244  of  the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (“the code”, for short).   Learned  Magistrate
posted the matter  for  hearing  on  25/08/1988.   But  on  25/08/1988,  the
complainant  and  his  advocate  were  absent.   The  appellant’s   advocate
presented an application for  exemption  which  was  accepted.   Application
preferred by the appellant under Section 245(1) of the Code  was  fixed  for
hearing on 26/08/1988.  On 26/08/1988,  learned  Magistrate  discharged  the
appellant under Section  245  (1)  of  the  Code  on  the  ground  that  the
complainant  was  absent  on  25/08/1988,  which  was  the  date  fixed  for
production of evidence.


5.    The complainant filed Criminal  Revision  No.91  of  1988  before  the
Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Faizabad  challenging  the   said   order   of
discharge.  Learned Sessions Judge  observed  that  on  07/03/1986,  learned
Magistrate had summoned the appellant so  as  to  inquire  into  the  charge
under Section 406 of the IPC but the appellant did not appear.   He  finally
appeared  on  18/06/1988  i.e.  after  about  two  and  half  years.    This
observation of the Sessions Court indicates that it  is  the  appellant  who
kept himself away from the court.  Learned Sessions Judge  further  observed
that on 27/05/1988, the appellant was released on  bail  and  the  case  was
adjourned to 18/06/1988.  On the next date of hearing  i.e.  on  25/08/1988,
the complainant as well as  the  appellant  were  absent.   The  appellant’s
advocate gave an application for exemption and  also  an  application  under
Section 245(2) of the Code for discharge.  The Magistrate fixed the  hearing
on 26/08/1988.  On 26/08/1988 the appellant was absent.  His advocate  field
an application for exemption.  The complainant was present.   He  filed  two
applications.   In  one  application,  he  sought  opportunity  to   produce
evidence under Section 244 of the Code and  in  the  other  application,  he
requested learned Magistrate to take further  action  only  after  recording
evidence.  In his application, the complainant gave reasons for his  absence
in the court on 25/08/1988.  He stated that the date ‘26/08/1988’ was  fixed
because of advocates’ strike.  The Sessions Court observed that  if  learned
Magistrate was of the view that the appellant had  to  be  discharged  under
Section 245 of the Code, because evidence was not produced, he  should  have
discharged the accused on the same day.  He, however, adjourned the case  to
26/08/1988.  On that day, the complainant  was  present  and  he  filed  two
applications.  Pertinently, he had requested the Magistrate to allow him  to
produce evidence and take further action only after recording evidence.  The
Sessions Court observed that it was not proper  for  learned  Magistrate  to
pass order on the application of the appellant ignoring applications of  the
complainant, who was present.  No order  was  passed  on  the  complainant’s
applications.  The Sessions Court observed that the  complainant  had  taken
only  two  dates  to  produce  evidence.   The   Sessions   Court   in   the
circumstances, by its order dated 17/02/1990 set aside the  discharge  order
and remanded the matter to the trial  court  with  a  direction  to  provide
adequate opportunity to the complainant to produce evidence.

6.    Being aggrieved by this order, the appellant filed  Criminal  Revision
No.59 of 1990 before the Allahabad High Court.   The  High  Court  vide  its
order dated 28/01/2000 dismissed the said  criminal  revision  and  directed
the trial court to rehear the parties after giving  an  opportunity  to  the
complainant to produce evidence.  It is pertinent  to  note  that  the  High
Court has clearly stated in this order that  the  order  passed  by  learned
Sessions Judge does not suffer from any illegality  or  impropriety.   Thus,
the findings of Sessions Court about  the  conduct  of  the  appellant  were
confirmed by the High Court.  This order  of  the  High  Court  has  assumed
finality.

7.    Thereafter on 21/07/2009, the appellant again  preferred  a  discharge
application stating, inter alia, that Smt. Hulasmani Devi who  had  executed
power of attorney in favour of the complainant had died on  17/08/1985  and,
therefore, all actions taken by the complainant have become null  and  void.
Learned Magistrate observed that after the appellant got bail,  it  is  only
because of untiring efforts of the  complainant  in  obtaining  non-bailable
warrant against him that the appellant appeared in the court on  20/04/2009.
 Learned Magistrate observed that the appellant  is  a  clever  person.   By
filing such  application,  he  is  willfully  delaying  the  case.   Learned
Magistrate observed that because of the conduct of the appellant,  the  case
did not  proceed  for  22  years.   Learned  Magistrate  observed  that  the
appellant knew about the death of Smt. Hulasmani Devi  on  17/11/1994.   But
when the Allahabad High Court was hearing his case  on  28/01/2000,  he  did
not bring this fact to the notice of the court.  Learned Magistrate, in  the
circumstances, dismissed the application  by  his  order  dated  22/09/2010.
The appellant then filed Criminal Misc. Case No.4227 of  2010  in  the  High
Court under Section 482 of the Code for quashing the  complaint.   The  High
Court vide its order dated 10/12/2010 refused to quash the complaint on  the
ground that there was no ground for doing so.  The High Court expedited  the
proceedings and directed that the case will be heard  on  day-to-day  basis.
It is this order which is challenged in this appeal.


8.    Affidavit in rejoinder is filed  by  the  appellant  denying  all  the
allegations.  It is stated in  the  affidavit  by  the  appellant  that  the
allegations made in the complaint, even if they  are  taken  at  their  face
value and accepted in their entirety, do  not  prima  facie  constitute  any
offence or make out a case against the  appellant.   It  is  further  stated
that the instant criminal proceedings  are  manifestly  attended  with  mala
fides. The proceedings are instituted with an ulterior motive  for  wreaking
vengeance.

9.    We have heard Shri S.B. Sanyal,  senior  advocate  appearing  for  the
appellant, as well as Shri Yatish Mohan, advocate  appearing  on  behalf  of
respondent 1.  Shri Sanyal submitted that the appellant is  about  72  years
of age. It is clear from the affidavit of Shri Chaturvedi, S.S.P.,  Faizabad
that the complainant consistently remained absent and, therefore,  the  case
could not be proceeded with.  Counsel submitted that  it  is  apparent  that
the complainant is not serious about prosecuting the complaint.  This  is  a
case of sheer harassment to an  old  man  of  72  years,  against  whom  the
complaint discloses no offence at all.  Relying on State of Haryana  &  Ors.
V. Bhajan Lal & Ors.[1], counsel submitted that, examined in light  of  this
judgment the instant complaint deserves to be  quashed.   Counsel  submitted
that speedy trial is the right of an accused. This right is  denied  to  the
appellant.   It is unfair to submit the appellant to the agony  of  a  trial
after a lapse of 8 years. Counsel submitted that the complaint was filed  by
the power of attorney holder of Sarwarkar of the temple.   Principal  having
died on 17/12/1994,  power  of  attorney  holder’s  right  to  continue  the
proceedings comes to an end because no  substitution  was  made  or  ordered
(Section 201 of Indian Contract Act,  1872).   Counsel  submitted  that  the
case initiated on 09/09/1985 with respect to an offence  of  the  year  1973
and 1976 is barred under Section 468 of the Code and, therefore,  pre-charge
proceedings should not be allowed to continue.  The  appellant  should  have
been  discharged.   Counsel  submitted  that   continuance   of   pre-charge
proceedings is an abuse of the process of the  court.   In  support  of  his
contentions, counsel relied on Punjab  National  Bank  &  Ors.  V.  Surendra
Prasad Sinha[2], “Common Cause” A registered Society v.  Union  of  India  &
Ors.[3] (‘Common Cause-I’), Japani Sahoo v. Chandra  Sekhar  Mohanty[4]  and
Rajiv Gupta & Ors. V. State of H.P.[5].

10.   Counsel for the respondents supported the impugned order.


11.   Having carefully perused the complaint, it is not possible for  us  to
concur with learned counsel for the appellant that the allegations  made  in
the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value, do  not  disclose
any offence at all. The complaint states the relationship of  the  appellant
with the President of Baikunth Mandap Venkatesh Mandir Trust Committee.   It
clearly states that certain gold and silver articles were entrusted  to  the
appellant. The particulars  of  the  articles  are  clearly  stated  in  the
complaint.  It is further stated that for the  first  set  of  articles  the
appellant gave a receipt and for the second set of articles he did not  give
a receipt.  It is alleged that the appellant  never  returned  the  articles
and thus committed criminal breach of trust. Facts are narrated  in  detail.
It cannot, therefore, be said that  prima  facie  no  offence  is  made  out
against the appellant. Judgment of this court in Bhajan Lal  does  not  help
the appellant. Punjab National Bank’s case turns on its own  facts  and  has
no application to this case.


12.   We are mindful of the fact that this court has repeatedly laid  stress
on the importance of speedy trials.  Undoubtedly, the right  of  an  accused
to speedy trial flows from Article 21 of the Constitution of India.   Speedy
trial is  an  important  component  of  the  procedure  established  by  law
contemplated by Article 21 of the  Constitution  of  India.   But,  in  this
case, reliance placed by Mr. Sanyal on ‘Common Cause’ A Regd.  Society    v.
Union of India[6] (‘Common Cause-II’) and Rajiv Gupta is totally  misplaced.
In Rajiv Gupta, reliance was placed  on  the  judgments  of  this  Court  in
Common Cause-(I) and Common Cause-(II).  In  these  cases,  this  court  had
given certain directions for expeditious disposal  of  trials.   This  court
had prescribed periods of limitation at the end of  which  the  trial  court
would be obliged to  terminate  the  criminal  proceedings  and  necessarily
acquit/discharge the accused.  Following  these  cases,  this  court  issued
further directions in Raj Deo Sharma  v.  State of Bihar[7] (Raj Deo Sharma-
I)  and Raj Deo Sharma (II)   v.  State of  Bihar[8]  (Raj  Deo  Sharma-II).
In P. Ramachandra Rao  v.  State of Karnataka[9], the Seven Judges Bench  of
this Court considered whether the directions given  by  this  court  in  the
above cases would apply to prosecutions under the Prevention  of  Corruption
Act and other economic offences.  While  dealing  with  these  issues,  this
court also considered whether time limits of the  nature  mentioned  in  the
above cases can, under the law, be laid down.  After an indepth  examination
of the relevant law on the point, this court came  to  the  conclusion  that
the view taken by it in the above judgments ran counter to  the  view  taken
by the Constitution Bench in  Abdul  Rehman  Antulay   v.   R.S.  Nayak[10].
This court was also of the view that prescribing periods of  limitations  at
the end of  which  the  trial  court  would  be  obliged  to  terminate  the
proceedings and necessarily acquit or discharge the  accused,  and  further,
making such directions applicable to all the cases in the  present  and  for
the  future  amounts  to  legislation  which  cannot  be  done  by  judicial
directives and within the arena of the judicial law making  power  available
to constitutional courts, howsoever liberally Articles 32, 21, 141  and  142
of the Constitution may be interpreted.   This  court,  therefore,  made  it
clear that in the above-mentioned cases the court could not have  prescribed
periods of limitation beyond which  the  trial  of  a  criminal  case  or  a
criminal proceeding cannot continue and must mandatorily be closed  followed
by an order acquitting or discharging the accused.  The relevant  conclusion
of this Court reads as under:

      “It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible  to
      draw or prescribe an  outer  limit  for  conclusion  of  all  criminal
      proceedings. The time-limits or bars of limitation prescribed  in  the
      several directions made in Common Cause (I), Raj Deo  Sharma  (I)  and
      Raj Deo Sharma (II) could not have been so prescribed or drawn and are
      not good law. The criminal courts are not obliged to  terminate  trial
      or criminal proceedings  merely  on  account  of  lapse  of  time,  as
      prescribed by the directions made in Common Cause case  (I),  Raj  Deo
      Sharma case (I) and (II). At the most the periods of  time  prescribed
      in those decisions can be taken by the courts seized of the  trial  or
      proceedings to act as reminders when they may be  persuaded  to  apply
      their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case  before
      them and determine by taking into consideration the  several  relevant
      factors as pointed out in A.R. Antulay case  and  decide  whether  the
      trial or proceedings have become so  inordinately  delayed  as  to  be
      called oppressive and unwarranted. Such time-limits  cannot  and  will
      not by themselves be  treated  by  any  court  as  a  bar  to  further
      continuance of the trial or proceedings and  as  mandatorily  obliging
      the court to terminate the same and acquit or discharge the accused.”




13.   It is clear, therefore, that it is not open to a  court  to  prescribe
the time limit for disposal of a case and direct that after  termination  of
that period if the case does not get over, the accused should  be  acquitted
or discharged.  As  held  in  P.  Ramachandra  Rao,  the  court  can  always
exercise its available powers under Sections 309, 311 and 253  of  the  Code
to effectuate the right of an accused to speedy trial.   In  an  appropriate
case, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482  of  the  Code,  the
High Court can undoubtedly quash the proceedings.   Following  the  judgment
in P. Ramachandra Rao, this court has in Vakil Prasad Singh   v.   State  of
Bihar[11] observed that where the court comes to  the  conclusion  that  the
right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges  or  the
conviction, as the case may be, may be quashed unless the court  feels  that
having regard to the nature of offence and relevant circumstances,  quashing
of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice.   This  Court  further
observed that the power possessed by the High Courts under  Section  482  of
the Code is undoubtedly very wide but it has to be exercised in  appropriate
cases, ex debito justitiae to  do  real  and  substantial  justice  for  the
administration  of  which  alone  the  courts  exist.   This  Court  further
observed that the inherent powers do not confer  an  arbitrary  jurisdiction
on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice.  This  Court  further
observed that it is  trite  to  state  that  the  said  powers  have  to  be
exercised  sparingly  and  with  circumspection  only  when  the  court   is
convinced,  on  the  basis  of  material  on  record,  that   allowing   the
proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process  of  the  court  or
that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to  be  quashed.


14.   We have already noted how the Sessions Court and the High  Court  have
commented on the conduct of  the  appellant.   It  is  true  that  from  the
affidavit filed by Mr. R.K. Chaturvedi, S.S.P., Faizabad,  it  appears  that
the complainant was also negligent and casual at some stage.  We  are  prima
facie of the view that this observation of Mr. Chaturvedi  does  not  appear
to be wholly correct and runs counter to the observations  made  by  learned
Magistrate and Sessions Court  in  this  case.   Pertinently,  the  Sessions
Court  order  in  which  the  conduct  of  the  accused  has  been  severely
criticized has been confirmed by the High Court.  Besides, in this case,  we
are concerned with the Trust property.  Prima facie we  find  that  whenever
the case was about to be heard, the  appellant  tried  to  put  a  spoke  by
filing an application for discharge.  The Sessions Court and the High  Court
had directed that the case should proceed  expeditiously  or  on  day-to-day
basis.  Even by the impugned order, the High Court  has  directed  that  the
case shall commence on day-to-day basis.  The appellant has  challenged  the
said order.  Had the appellant not  raised  repeated  challenges,  the  case
would have proceeded and perhaps got over by now.  Prima  facie  conduct  of
the appellant appears to us to be bad.  In the facts of this  case,  we  are
unable to come to a conclusion that allowing  the  proceedings  to  continue
would be an abuse of the process  of  the  court.  We  are,  therefore,  not
inclined to give any relief to the appellant.  Mr.  Sanyal  has  raised  two
other legal points, one is regarding limitation and the other  is  regarding
the proceedings having already been vitiated on account  of  death  of  Smt.
Hulasmani Devi, who  had  executed  power  of  attorney  in  favour  of  the
appellant.  We do not want to express any opinion on these  questions.  They
involve questions of facts.  We would leave them  open  so  that  the  trial
court can decide them  in  accordance  with  law.   It  is,  therefore,  not
necessary for us to discuss the other decisions of this court cited  by  Mr.
Sanyal.  We must also caution the complainant.  It is not  possible  for  us
to say that the complainant has also been extremely  prompt  in  prosecuting
the case.  Since Trust property is involved in this  case,  the  complainant
is expected to be alert and vigilant.  We deem it appropriate to give him  a
final chance to prosecute this case.  We direct the trial court  to  take-up
the case for final disposal, after receipt of this order by it  and  dispose
it of within a period  of  four  months  from  that  date.   We  expect  the
appellant  to  cooperate  with  the  trial  court  and  not  file  frivolous
applications leading to procrastination.  We  make  it  clear  that  nothing
said by us in this order should be treated as our final  expression  on  the
merits of the case of the complainant or the appellant.   All  questions  of
facts and law are expressly kept open.  The appeal  is  dismissed  with  the
above directions.

                                                       ……………………………………………..J.
                                (AFTAB ALAM)


                                                       ……………………………………………..J.
                                                     (RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI)
NEW DELHI,
SEPTEMBER 4, 2012.


-----------------------
[1]    (1992) Supp 1 SCC 335
[2]    (1993) Supp 1 SCC 499
[3]    (1996) 4 SCC 33
[4]    (2007) 7 SCC 394
[5]    (2000) 10 SCC 68
[6]    (1996) 6 SCC 775
[7]    (1998) 7 SCC 507
[8]    (1999) 7 SCC 604
[9]    (2002) 4 SCC 578
[10]   (1992) 1 SCC 225
[11]   (2009) 3 SCC 355

-----------------------
17

whether the State is duty bound to grant recognition to an unaided educational institution on the touchstone of Article 21A of the Constitution of India overlooking the procedure laid down under Rule 2 and Rule 2A of Chapter V of the Kerala Education Rules (for short ‘KER’).-The State Government, in the instant case, has already granted recognition to the respondent school for conducting the classes from 1 to 10 in the academic year 2010-11 onwards, of course, subject to the result of this SLP. Considering the fact that the local body has also recommended recognition and large number of students are now studying in the school, and the same is situated in a Tribal area, we find no reason to interfere with the recognition already granted to the respondent school as a special case, but we make it clear that this order shall not be treated as a precedent. Appeal is disposed of as above. There will be no order as to costs.

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6267 OF 2012
               [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 34988 of 2010]


State of Kerala and Others                         .. Appellants
                                   Versus
The Tribal Mission                                 .. Respondent

                               J U D G M E N T

K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    We are, in this case, concerned with the question  whether  the  State
is duty bound to grant recognition to an unaided educational institution  on
the touchstone of Article 21A of the Constitution of India  overlooking  the
procedure laid down under Rule 2 and Rule 2A of  Chapter  V  of  the  Kerala
Education Rules (for short ‘KER’).

3.    Respondent established a school by name Betham English  Medium  School
in the year 2001 at Attappady in the Palakkad District, State of  Kerata  in
the unaided sector.  An application for recognition  was  submitted  by  the
respondent school in the  year  2003  before  the  Government.   The  Deputy
Direction of Education, however, forwarded a  report/letter  No.  B1/8863/07
dated 19.10.2007 to the State Government pointing out existence of  a  three
recognized schools within a distance of 5  km  from  the  respondent  school
following Tamil and Malayalam mediums having Standard 1 to 7, of  which  one
is situated within a distance of 2.5 km.  Further, it was pointed  out  that
the respondent school though was having sufficient infrastructure,  granting
recognition would adversely affect the other aided  schools  functioning  in
that area and the possibility of division fall in these  schools  could  not
be ruled out.

4.    The Government rejected the application for recognition on the  ground
that it would  violate  the  Government’s  Policy  referred  to  in  GO  (P)
No.107/07/G Edn dated 13.06.2007. Further, it was also pointed out that  the
procedure for granting recognition to new schools is laid down in Chapter  V
of KER and as per  sub-rule  (2)  of  Rule  2A  of  Chapter  V  of  KER,  an
application for opening a school should be in response to  the  notification
under sub-rule (1) of Rule 2A of Chapter V.  Consequently,  the  application
was rejected by  the  Government  vide  GO  (Rt)  No.  5321/07/G.Edn.  dated
22.11.2007.

5.    Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent along with various  others
approached the learned single Judge of the High Court who upheld the  order.
  Respondent took up the matter  before  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High
Court.  The Division Bench of  the  High  Court,  vide  its  judgment  dated
18.8.2010 allowed the appeal stating that the respondent has  satisfied  the
various conditions laid down in the Government’s Policy dated 13.6.2007  and
therefore, directed the Government to grant recognition  to  the  respondent
school as an unaided self-finance English medium school to run classes  from
standard 1 to 10 from the academic  year  2010-11  onwards.   The  State  is
aggrieved by that judgment and hence this appeal.

6.    We have heard Ms. Bina Madhavan for  the  appellant  and  Shri  M.  P.
Vinod for the respondent.   Chapter V of KER  deals  with  the  opening  and
recognition of schools. For easy reference, we may extract Rule 2  and  Rule
2A of Chapter V as under:


           “2.  Procedure for determining the areas where new  schools  are
      to be opened for existing schools upgraded -  (1)  The  Director  may,
      from time to time, prepare two lists, one is respect of aided  schools
      and the  other  in  respect  of  recognized  schools,  indicating  the
      localities were new schools or any or all grades are to be opened  and
      existing Lower Primary School or Upper Primary Schools or both are  to
      be upgraded.  In preparing such lists he shall take into consideration
      the following.


           (a) The existing schools in and around the locality in which new
      schools are to be opened or existing schools are to be upgraded; 26


           (b) The strength of the several standards and the  accommodation
      available in each of the existing schools in that locality;


           (c) The distance from each of the existing schools to  the  area
      where new schools are proposed to be  opened  or  to  the  area  where
      existing schools are to be upgraded;


           (d) The educational needs of the locality with reference to  the
      habit1ation and backwardness of the area; and


           (e) Other matters which he considers relevant and  necessary  in
      this connection.


           Explanation:-  for the removal of doubts it is hereby  clarified
      that it shall not be necessary to prepare the two lists simultaneously
      and that it shall be open to the Director to prepare only one  of  the
      lists.


           (2) A list prepared by the Director under Sub-rule (1) shall  be
      published in  the  Gazette,  inviting  objections  or  representations
      against such list. Objections, if any, can be filed against  the  list
      published within one month from the date of publication of  the  list.
      Such  objection  shall  be  filed  before  the  Assistant  Educational
      Officers or the District Educational Officers  as  the  case  may  be.
      Every objection filed shall be accompanied  by  chalan  for  Rs.  10/-
      remitted into the Treasury.  Objections filed  without  the  necessary
      Chalan receipt shall be summarily rejected.


           (3)  The  Assistant  Educational  Officer   and   the   District
      Educational  Officer  may  thereafter  conduct  enquiries,  hear   the
      parties, visit the areas and send their report with their views on the
      objections raised to the Director within two months from the last date
      of receipt of the objections.  The Director, if found  necessary,  may
      also  hear  the  parties  and  finalise  the   list   and   send   his
      recommendations with the final list to Government  within  two  months
      from the last date of the receipt of the report from  the  Educational
      Officers.


           (4) The  Government  after  scrutinizing  all  the  records  may
      approve the list with or without modification and forward the same  to
      the Director within one month from the last date for  the  receipt  of
      the recommendations of the Director.  The  list  as  approved  by  the
      Government shall be published by the Director in the Gazette.


           (5) No appeal or revision  shall  lie  against  the  final  list
      published by the Director.


           Provided  that  the  Government  may  either  suo  motu  or   on
      application by any person objecting  to  the  list  published  by  the
      Director under sub-rule (4) made before the expiry of thirty days from
      the date of such publication review their order finalizing  such  list
      and make such modifications in that list as they  deem fit by  way  of
      additions or omissions, if they are satisfied that any relevant ground
      has not been taken into consideration or  any  irrelevant  ground  has
      been taken into consideration or any relevant fact has not been  taken
      into account while finalizing the said list:


           Provided further that no modification shall be  made  under  the
      preceding proviso without giving any  person  likely  to  be  affected
      thereby  an  opportunity   to   make   representation   against   such
      modifications.


           2A. Applications for opening of new  schools  and  upgrading  of
      existing schools - (1) After the publication of the final list of  the
      areas where 8[new school of any or all grades  are  to  be  opened  or
      existing Lower Primary Schools or Upper Primary schools or both are to
      be upgraded the Director shall, by a notification in the Gazette [x  x
      x] call for applications for the opening of New schools of any or  all
      grades] and for raising of the grade of existing Lower Primary Schools
      or Upper Primary Schools or both] in the areas specified.


            (2) Applications for opening of  new  schools  or  for  raising
      schools shall be  submitted  only  in  response  to  the  notification
      published by the Director.  Applications received otherwise shall  not
      be considered.  The applications shall be submitted  to  the  District
      Educational Officer of the area concerned in form No. 1 with 4  copies
      of the application and enclosures within one month from  the  date  of
      publication of the notification under sub- rule (1).


            (3) On receipt of the applications for permission to  open  new
      schools or for upgrading of existing schools, the District Educational
      Officer shall make such enquiries  as  he  may  deem  fit  as  to  the
      correctness of the  statements  made  in  the  application  and  other
      relevant  matters  regarding  such  applications   and   forward   the
      applications with his report thereon to the Director within one  month
      from the last date for submitting applications under sub-rule (2).


            (4) The Director on receipt of the applications with the report
      of the District Educational Officer  shall  forward  the  applications
      with his report to Government. within one month from the last date for
      forwarding the report by the District Educational Officer.


            (5) The Government shall consider the applications in the light
      of the report of the District Educational Officer and the Director and
      other relevant matters which the  Government  think  necessary  to  be
      considered in this connection and shall  take  a  final  decision  and
      publish their  decision  in  the  Gazette  with  the  list  containing
      necessary particulars.  within  one  month  from  the  last  date  for
      forwarding the report by the Director.”




7.    The scope of the above mentioned rules came up  for  consideration  in
the case of State of Kerala & Others v. K. Prasad &  Another  (2007)  7  SCC
140, wherein this Court held as follows:

           10. The two  Rules,  quoted  above,  lay  down  a  comprehensive
      procedure for opening  of  new  schools  in  particular  areas,  their
      recognition and upgradation. It is manifest that a  decision  in  this
      behalf has to be taken primarily by the Government on  an  application
      made for that purpose under Rule 2-A. The  Rules  also  lay  down  the
      guidelines which are to be taken into consideration for preparing  the
      list in terms of sub-rule (1) of Rule 2. On the lists being finalised,
      after their publication and consideration of objections, if  any,  the
      same have to be sent to the  Government  for  its  approval,  with  or
      without modification. Nevertheless the  decision  by  the  Government,
      whether opening of new school  is  to  be  sanctioned  or  whether  an
      existing school is to be allowed to be upgraded has  to  be  taken  on
      consideration of the matters enumerated in Clauses (a) to (e) of  Rule
      2(1) of the Rules. Similarly, an application for either opening of new
      school or for upgradation of an existing aided school can be submitted
      only after the Director publishes a final  list  of  areas  where  new
      schools are to be opened or existing schools are to be upgraded  under
      sub-rule (4) of Rule 2. Any application received otherwise  cannot  be
      considered. In view of such comprehensive procedure laid down  in  the
      statute, an application for upgradation has necessarily to be made and
      considered strictly in a manner in consonance with the Rules. It needs
      little emphasis that the Rules are meant to be and have to be complied
      with and enforced scrupulously. Waiver or even relaxation of any rule,
      unless such power exists under the rules, is bound  to  provide  scope
      for discrimination, arbitrariness and favouritism,  which  is  totally
      opposed to the rule of law and our constitutional values.………….”



8.    The Government’s Policy issued vide GO(P) No.107/07/G  Edn.  dated  13
June, 2007 with regard to up-gradation of existing schools  and  recognition
of unaided schools applies to respondent  school  as  well.   The  operative
portion of the same which applies to unaided schools and grant  of  NOC  for
CBSE/ICSE Schools reads as follows:
           “Recognition of Un-aided Schools and NOC for CBSE/ICSE Schools:


     1.  As  a  policy  unaided  recognized  Schools  need  not  be   given
        recognition in future.


     2. For those schools functioning in the state now whether they may  be
        considered for recognition at all a policy decision may be taken at
        Govt. level.



     3. Since many of them may be  answering  to  the  demand  for  English
        medium and better quality  education  in  the  rural  areas,  those
        having facilities as per Kerala  Education  Rules  and  maintaining
        better academic standards may be considered for recognition, if the
        local bodies also recommend recognition of a  school  acknowledging
        the need for such  a  school  in  the  local  body’s  jurisdiction.
        Further steps can be as in Chapter V Kerala Education Rules,  which
        also envisages the setting up of recognized schools.”



9.    Para 3 above will not give any Carte Blanche to start a school in  the
unaided sector and then seek recognition as a matter of right  because  para
1 above indicates that as  a  policy  unaided  schools  need  not  be  given
recognition in future.  In the  instant  case,  it  is  after  starting  the
school in  the  unaided  sector,  the  respondent  school  is  pressing  for
recognition which, in our view, is not a correct  procedure.  Assuming  that
the respondent school has satisfied all the requirements stipulated in  Para
3, still it has to undergo the procedure laid down under Rule 2 and Rule  2A
of Chapter V, otherwise, as held by this Court in K.  Prasad  case  (supra),
it is bound to provide scope for discrimination, arbitrariness,  favouritism
and also would affect the functioning of other  recognized  schools  in  the
locality.

10.   The Division Bench of the High Court has expressed the view that  once
the respondent satisfies Para 3 of the Policy, the State Government  has  to
grant recognition which in our view would go contrary to the view  expressed
by this Prasad Case (supra) and violates Rule 2, 2A of  Chapter  V  of  KER.
The question, as to whether, the  grant  of  recognition  would  affect  the
existing schools is also a relevant consideration.  The State  spends  large
amounts by way of aid, grant etc. for running schools in  the  aided  sector
as well as the State owned schools.  Indiscriminate grant of recognition  to
schools in the unaided sector may have an adverse affect on the State  owned
schools as well as the existing schools in  the  aided  sector,  by  way  of
division fall, retrenchment of teachers etc.  Therefore, the procedure  laid
down in Rules 2, 2A of Chapter V of KER cannot be overlooked.

11.   The State  Government,  in  the  instant  case,  has  already  granted
recognition to the respondent school for conducting the classes  from  1  to
10 in the academic year 2010-11 onwards, of course, subject  to  the  result
of this SLP.  Considering the fact that the local body has also  recommended
recognition and large number of students are now  studying  in  the  school,
and the same is situated in a Tribal area, we find no  reason  to  interfere
with the recognition already granted to the respondent school as  a  special
case, but we make it clear that  this  order  shall  not  be  treated  as  a
precedent.  Appeal is disposed of as above.  There will be no  order  as  to
costs.

                                             ……………….……………………..J.
                                             (K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN)






                                             ………………………………….…..J.
                                             (DIPAK MISRA)
New Delhi
September 4, 2012

The appellant was awarded the work relating to the construction of residential and non-residential building at Central Excavation Training Institute (CETI) vide work order dated 25.2.1987 for an amount of Rs.68,91,589/-. Appellant submits that for want of final drawings and delay in the supply of cement and other construction materials, including supply of water, the work was delayed, but completed on 1.4.1989 and handed over the buildings to the respondent. - We are of the view that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the amount awarded in respect of the water charges which comes to Rs.1,68,890.25. Going by the general terms and conditions of the contract, in our view, the department was bound to supply water, so found by the arbitrator, in our view, rightly. Therefore, that part of the award of the Arbitrator, with regard to the water charges, is upheld. However, the High Court, in our view, rightly denied the claim with regard to plaster of paris, therefore, not interfered with. Appeals are disposed of accordingly, subject to the above modification of the judgment of the High Court. However, there will be no order as to costs.

                                                              Non-Reportable



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CIVIL  APPEAL  NO. 6262  OF 2012
                @ Special Leave Petition (C) No.24337 of 2009


NAND CONTR. & ENGR. THR G.D. AHUJA      …    Appellant(s)

                                   Versus

NORTHERN COAL FIELD LTD. & ANR.         …    Respondent(s)

                                    WITH

                      CIVIL  APPEAL  NO. 6263  OF 2012
                @ Special Leave Petition (C) No.31125 of 2009

                      CIVIL  APPEAL  NO. 6265  OF 2012
                @ Special Leave Petition (C) No.10681 of 2011

                      CIVIL  APPEAL  NO.  6264  OF 2012
                @ Special Leave Petition (C) No.32878 of 2009
                                     And
                      CIVIL  APPEAL  NO.  6266  OF 2012
                @ Special Leave Petition (C) No.18183 of 2009


                               J U D G M E N T



K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.



1.    Leave granted.

2.    We may take up Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition  (C)
No.24337 of 2009 as a lead case which arises out of a common judgment  dated
14.11.2007 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur.   In  the  first
three appeals, we are concerned with the claim on  interest  alone  and,  in
the other two appeals, the question involved is with  regard  to  the  claim
for interest, water charges and the cost of plaster of paris.



3.    The appellant was awarded the work relating  to  the  construction  of
residential and non-residential  building  at  Central  Excavation  Training
Institute  (CETI)  vide  work  order  dated  25.2.1987  for  an  amount   of
Rs.68,91,589/-.  Appellant submits that  for  want  of  final  drawings  and
delay in the supply of cement and other  construction  materials,  including
supply of water, the work was delayed, but completed on 1.4.1989 and  handed
over the buildings to the respondent.  There was delay on the  part  of  the
respondents in preparing and sanctioning the final bills which gave rise  to
various  disputes  and  ultimately  the  matter  was  referred  to  a   sole
arbitrator.  The arbitrator passed an award dated 30.10.1999 on  the  claims
made by the appellant including claims for  water  charges  and  plaster  of
paris.  So far as the  claim  for  interest  is  concerned,  the  arbitrator
awarded simple interest @ 15% per annum from  six  months  of  the  date  of
completion i.e. 1.4.1989 on  all  the  amounts  awarded  till  the  date  of
payment.  Further, it was also ordered that in case the payment was  delayed
beyond three months of the date of the award, interest be  paid  @  18%  per
annum from the date of payment.  No payment was  made  within  three  months
from the date of the award.  Hence, according to the appellants, as per  the
award he was entitled for 15% interest  from  six  months  of  the  date  of
completion i.e. 1.4.1989 on the amounts awarded by the Arbitrator  till  the
date of payment.



4.    Award passed by  the  Arbitrator  was  challenged  by  the  respondent
before the First Additional District Judge, Sidhi  who  did  not  upset  the
award on merits, but modified the interest awarded  by  the  Arbitrator  and
substituted with 12% per annum simple interest from the date  of  the  award
i.e. 31.10.1999 till the date of payment.   Aggrieved  by  the  said  order,
appeals were preferred by the appellant before the  High  Court.   The  High
Court disposed of all the appeals, reducing the interest to 10%  per  annum.
The High Court has also set aside the award on the claim for  water  charges
and plaster of paris.  Being aggrieved by the judgment, as  already  stated,
these appeals have been preferred by the appellant.



5.    We have heard Shri Rohit Arya and Shri Mahabir Singh,  learned  senior
counsel, appearing for the appellant and  respondents,  respectively.    Mr.
Rohit Arya, learned senior counsel submitted that that  the  High  Court  as
well as the District Court were not justified in interfering with  the  well
considered  award  passed  by  the  Arbitrator.   Learned   senior   counsel
submitted that the reasons stated  by  the  High  Court  are  incorrect  and
contrary to the terms of contract as well as documents produced  before  the
arbitrator.  Learned  senior  counsel  submitted  that  the  Arbitrator  was
justified  in  allowing  the  claim  of  water  charges  to  the   tune   of
Rs.1,68,890.25.   Reference was  also  made  to  clauses  5(a)  and  (b)  of
General Conditions applicable to the contract and submitted that it  is  the
responsibility of the respondents  to  supply  the  water  at  their  costs.
Learned senior counsel also submitted the claim for plaster of  paris  which
was rightly allowed by the arbitrator and there was no reason  to  interfere
with the same.

6.     Shri  Mahabir  Singh,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for   the
respondents, on the other  hand,  submitted  that  there  is  no  reason  to
interfere with the judgment of the High Court  which  has  rightly  rejected
the claims on water charges and plaster of paris and also reduced  the  rate
of interest.  Further, no question of law arises for consideration in  these
appeals.

7.    We are of the view that the dispute between  the  parties  lies  in  a
narrow compass.  We find that the arbitrator has awarded simple  interest  @
15% per annum from six months of the date of  completion  i.e.  1.4.1989  on
the amounts awarded till the date of payment.  The  High  Court  thought  it
fit to reduce the rate of interest to  10%  per  annum,  which  we  find  no
reason to disturb.    The period for which the Arbitrator  has  awarded  the
interest will remain the same.  The appellant, therefore, would be  entitled
to get interest at the rate of 10% per annum from 1.4.1989 till the date  of
payment.



8.    We are  of  the  view  that  the  High  Court  was  not  justified  in
interfering with the amount awarded in respect of the  water  charges  which
comes to Rs.1,68,890.25.  Going by the general terms and conditions  of  the
contract, in our view, the department was bound to supply  water,  so  found
by the arbitrator, in our view, rightly.  Therefore, that part of the  award
of the Arbitrator, with regard to the water charges,  is  upheld.   However,
the High Court, in our  view,  rightly  denied  the  claim  with  regard  to
plaster of paris, therefore, not interfered with.     Appeals  are  disposed
of accordingly, subject to the above modification of  the  judgment  of  the
High Court.  However, there will be no order as to costs.


                                      …....................................J
                                                   (K.S. Radhakrishnan)


                                      …....................................J
                                             (Dipak Misra)

New Delhi,
September  4,  2012

Gramin Bank like the appellant should stand for the benefit of the gramins who sometimes avail of loan for buying buffaloes, to purchase agricultural implements, manure, seeds and so on. Repayment, to a large extent, depends upon the income which they get out of that. Crop failure, due to drought or natural calamities, disease to cattle or their death may cause difficulties to gramins to repay the amount. Rather than coming to their rescue, banks often drive them to litigation leading them extreme penury. Assuming that the bank is right, but once an authority like District Forum takes a view, the bank should graciously accept it rather than going in for further litigation and even to the level of Supreme Court. Driving poor gramins to various litigative forums should be strongly deprecated because they have also to spend large amounts for conducting litigation. We condemn this type of practice, unless the stake is very high or the matter affects large number of persons or affects a general policy of the Bank which has far reaching consequences.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6261 OF 2012

                 @ Special Leave Petition (C) No. 8875/2010




    Gurgaon Gramin Bank                                 .. Appellants

                                   Versus

    Smt. Khazani & Anr.                                 .. Respondents

                               J U D G M E N T

K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.



1. Leave granted.




2.    Number of litigations in our country is on the  rise,  for  small  and
trivial matters, people and sometimes  Central  and  State  Governments  and
their instrumentalities Banks, nationalized or private, come to  courts  may
be due to ego clash or to save the Officers’ skin.  Judicial system is over-
burdened, naturally causes delay in  adjudication  of  disputes.   Mediation
centers opened in various parts of our country have, to some  extent,  eased
the burden of the courts but we are still in the tunnel  and  the  light  is
far away.  On more than one occasion, this court has  reminded  the  Central
Government, State Governments and other instrumentalities as well as to  the
various  banking  institutions  to  take  earnest  efforts  to  resolve  the
disputes at their end.  At times, some give  and  take  attitude  should  be
adopted or both will sink.  Unless, serious  questions  of  law  of  general
importance arise for consideration or a question which affects large  number
of persons or the stakes  are  very  high,  courts  jurisdiction  cannot  be
invoked for  resolution  of  small  and  trivial  matters.   We  are  really
disturbed by the manner in which those types of matters  are  being  brought
to courts even at the level of Supreme Court of India and  this  case  falls
in that category.

3.    Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked by a Gramin Bank on an issue  on
which no question of law arises for consideration.  Facts are as follows:

Smt. Khazani, the first respondent had availed of a loan from the  appellant
bank to purchase a buffalo and the same was insured  for  Rs.15000/-  for  a
period from 06.02.2001 to 06.02.2004 vide Animal’s tag  No.  NIA/03170  with
the New India  Assurance  Company  Ltd.–  second  respondent  herein.   Smt.
Khazani had made payment of Rs.759/- as premium on 05.03.2001  vide  receipt
No. 170612.  The buffalo unfortunately died on 27.12.2001.  The post  mortem
was conducted by veterinary surgeon, Pataudi on 27.12.2001 vide PMR No.50.

4.    Smt. Khazani lodged a claim for insurance money through the  appellant
bank and also supplied ear tag  bearing  No.  NIA  03170  to  the  bank  for
forwarding the same to the insurance  company.   Since  no  steps  had  been
taken either by the bank or by the insurance company, Smt.  Khazani  sent  a
notice on 30.07.2003 to the bank as well as to the insurance company,  which
yielded no results.

5.    Smt. Khazani then filed a complaint  bearing  No.825  of  2004  before
District Consumer Disputes Redressal  Forum,  Gurgaon.   The  complaint  was
allowed by the Forum vide its order dated 26.07.2007 with  cost  stating  as
follows:

        “We, therefore, allow this complaint and direct Opposite Party No.2
        to pay the insurance money  of  the  buffalo  in  question  to  the
        complainant together with interest at the rate of 9% p.a. from  the
        date of death of buffalo till actual  payment  is  made.   Opposite
        Party No.2 is also burdened to pay Rs.3,000/- to the complainant on
        account of cost of litigation and compensation for  the  harassment
        caused by Opposite Party No.2 to the complainant.   Order  of  this
        Forum be complied within one month”.



6.    The bank, dissatisfied with the order by  the  District  Forum,  filed
Appeal No.2404/2007 before State  Consumer  Disputes  Redressal  Commission,
Haryana, Panchkula.  Rejecting the  appeal,  the  appellate  forum  held  as
follows:

        “Admittedly, the complainant had got her buffalo insured  with  the
        opposite party no.1 with Tag bearing No.NIA03170.  The post  mortem
        report Annexure C-2 which was conducted by the vet.  surgeon  is  a
        cogent proof with respect to the death of buffalo and in  the  said
        report the vet. surgeon had mentioned the Tag number of buffalo  as
        03170.  However, the opposite  party  No.1  insurance  company  has
        denied having received of any Tag with the claim form submitted  by
        the complainant.  As per noting given by the field officer  of  the
        opposite party No.1, the buffalo was lying dead and  there  was  no
        Tag in the ear of the dead buffalo.  Thus, the burden shift on  the
        opposite party No.2 that the Tag was not sent to  the  appellant  –
        opposite Party No.1 for  settling  the  claim  in  respect  of  the
        buffalo.”




7.    The matter did not end there.   The  bank  again  moved  the  National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi against  the  order  dated
21.07.2009 passed by the State Commission,  Haryana  by  filing  a  Revision
Petition No. 4098 of 2009.  The National Commission dismissed  the  Revision
on 25.11.2009 stating as follows:

        “Finding recorded by the State Commission  is  a  finding  of  fact,
        which  cannot  be  interfered  with  in   exercise   of   Revisional
        jurisdiction.  Under Section 21  of  the  Consumer  Protection  Act,
        1986, the National Commission, in revision, can interfere  with  the
        orders only if it appears that the Authority below has  exercised  a
        jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has  failed  to  exercise  a
        jurisdiction  so  vested  or  has  acted  in  the  exercise  of  its
        jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.

            We find no error/irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction by
        the State Commission in its impugned order.  Dismissed.”




8.    The bank, still not satisfied, thought of  bringing  Smt.  Khazani  to
the Supreme Court and filed the present Special Leave Petition  against  the
order of the National Commission.  Luckily, they got notice on  the  Special
Leave Petition and Smt. Khazani has been brought to this Court.  May be  due
to the ill-luck of the bank, the matter is before us.  When the matter  came
up for hearing on 09.07.2012, we asked the counsel for the bank  as  to  how
much amount they had spent till date on this dispute which  relates  to  the
death of a buffalo, stake of which is only 15,000/-.  We passed an order  on
09.07.2012 which reads as follows:

        “We find that the dispute is only with regard  to  Rs.15,000/-  and
        the matter has still been brought to Supreme Court.

        Bank will file affidavit within  four  weeks  with  regard  to  the
        amount spent for this litigation.

        List after four weeks.”




9.    The Chief Manager of the bank in compliance with this order  filed  an
affidavit with regard to the amount spent for litigation so far in  a  chart
form which is reproduced hereunder:

|S.No.      |Forum/Courts     |Amount of     |Misc. expenses|Total         |
|           |                 |Legal Fees    |              |              |
|1.         |In District Forum|2,200/-       |200/-         |2,400/-       |
|2.         |In State Forum   |1,750/-       |300/-         |2,050/-       |
|3.         |In Supreme Court |7,500/-       |1000/-        |8,500/-       |
|           |of India         |              |              |              |
|Total      |                 |              |              |12,950/-      |


10.   The Chief Manager stated in the affidavit that no bill was  raised  by
the counsel for the bank for  conducting  the  matter  before  the  National
Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission.  We  have  not  been  told  how  much
money has been spent by the bank officers for their to and fro  journeys  to
the  lawyers’  office,  to  the  District  Forum,  State   Forum,   National
Commission and to the Supreme Court.  For a  paltry  amount  of  Rs.15000/-,
even according to the affidavit, bank has already spent a  total  amount  of
Rs.12,950/- leaving aside the time spent and  other  miscellaneous  expenses
spent by the officers of the bank for to and fro  expenses  etc.    Further,
it may be noted that the District Forum had awarded Rs.3,000/- towards  cost
of litigation and compensation for the harassment caused  to  Smt.  Khazani.
Adding this amount, the cost goes up to Rs.15,950/-.  Remember, the  buffalo
had died 10 years back, but the litigation is not over, fight  is  still  on
for Rs.15,000/-.

11.   Learned counsel appearing for the bank, Shri  Amit  Grover,  submitted
that though the amount involved is not very high but the claim was fake  and
on inspection by the insurance company, no tag was found on  the  dead  body
of the buffalo and hence the insurer was not bound to make  good  the  loss,
consequently the bank had to proceed against Smt. Khazani.

12.   We are of the view that issues raised before us are  purely  questions
of facts examined by  the  three  forums  including  the  National  Disputes
Redressal Commission and we fail to see what is the  important  question  of
law to be decided by the  Supreme  Court.   In  our  view,  these  types  of
litigation should be discouraged and message should also go,  otherwise  for
all trivial and silly matters people will rush to this court.

13.   Gramin Bank like the appellant should stand for  the  benefit  of  the
gramins who sometimes avail  of  loan  for  buying  buffaloes,  to  purchase
agricultural implements, manure, seeds and so on.   Repayment,  to  a  large
extent, depends upon the income which they get out of that.   Crop  failure,
due to drought or natural calamities, disease to cattle or their  death  may
cause difficulties to gramins to repay the amount.  Rather  than  coming  to
their rescue, banks often drive them  to  litigation  leading  them  extreme
penury.  Assuming that the  bank  is  right,  but  once  an  authority  like
District Forum takes a view,  the bank should graciously  accept  it  rather
than going in for further litigation  and  even  to  the  level  of  Supreme
Court.   Driving  poor  gramins  to  various  litigative  forums  should  be
strongly deprecated because they  have  also  to  spend  large  amounts  for
conducting litigation.   We condemn this type of practice, unless the  stake
is very high or the matter affects large number  of  persons  or  affects  a
general policy of the Bank which has far reaching consequences.

14.   We, in this case, find no error in the decisions  taken  by  all  fact
finding authorities including the National  Disputes  Redressal  Commission.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed with cost of Rs.10,000/- to be  paid  by
the  bank  to  the  first  respondent  within  a  period   of   one   month.
Resultantly, the Bank now has to spend altogether Rs.25,950/-  for  a  claim
of Rs.15,000/-, apart from to  and  fro  travelling  expenses  of  the  Bank
officials.    Let God save the Gramins.





                                  …………………………………….........J.
                                  (K.S. Radhakrishnan)








                                  ………………………………………………J.
                                  (Dipak Misra)


      New Delhi,
      September 4, 2012

although the appellant is aged below 18 years and is a child for the purpose of the Bihar Children Act, 1970 on the date of the occurrence, his trial having been conducted along with other accused who are not children is not in accordance with law. However, this contention had not been raised either before the trail court or before the High Court. In such circumstances, this Court in Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar, 1997 (8) SCC 720, following the earlier decision in Gopinath Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, 1984 Supp. SCC 228 and Bhoop Ram v. State of U.P., 1989 (3) SCC 1 and Pradeep Kumar v. State of U.P., 1995 Supp(4) SCC 419, while sustaining that the sentences awarded to them need to be set aside. In view of the exhaustive discussion of the law on the matter in Bhola Bhagat case, we are obviated of the duty to examine the same but following the same, with respect, we pass similar orders in the present case. Conviction of the appellant Arvind Singh is confirmed but the sentence imposed upon him stands set aside. He is, therefore, set at liberty, if not required in any other case.” - Accordingly, we hold that the appellant was juvenile, as envisaged under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, on the date of commission of the offence. The Jail Custody Certificate, produced by the appellant suggests that he has undergone the actual period of sentence of more than three years out of the maximum period prescribed under Section 15 of the Act. In the circumstance, while sustaining the conviction of the appellant for the aforesaid offences, the sentence awarded to him by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court is set aside. Accordingly, we direct that the appellant be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. The appeal is partly allowed.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        In the Supreme Court of India
                       Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction

                   Criminal Appeal No.  1349       of 2012
                 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.9023 of 2010)

Babla @ Dinesh                               .......Appellant

                                   Versus

State of Uttarakhand                    ......Respondent


                               J u d g m e n t

H. L. Dattu, J.


1.    leave granted.

2.    This appeal is directed against the judgment and order passed  by  the
High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Criminal  Appeal  No.1481  of  2001
dated 21.07.2009.  By the impugned judgment, the High  Court  has  confirmed
the Order of conviction and sentence of the appellant passed  by  the  Trial
Court under Section 302 read with Section 149  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code,
1860 (for short ‘the IPC’).

3.    The appellant was one of the accused before the Trial  Court  for  the
alleged offences punishable under Section 302 read  with  Sections  149  and
147 of the IPC.  The Trial Court by its judgment and order dated  18.10.1995
in Sessions Trial No. 39 of 1992, convicted and sentenced the appellant  for
rigorous imprisonment of two years under Section 147  and  imprisonment  for
life under Section 302 read with Section 149  IPC,  both  sentences  to  run
concurrently.  Aggrieved by the order so  made,  the  appellant  and  others
approached the High Court of Uttarakhand at  Nainital  by  way  of  criminal
appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  (for
short ‘the Cr.P.C.’) on various grounds.

4.    Before the High Court, apart from  others,  the  learned  counsel  for
appellant raised the contention that the appellant was juvenile on the  date
of the commission or occurrence of the offence,  i.e.  on  01.12.1991.   The
said contention was rejected by the High Court on the  ground  that  it  was
not raised before the Trial Court  and  no  evidence  has  been  adduced  in
defence and no suggestion had been made to the witnesses  during  the  trial
and that the appellant  admitted  his  age  as  20  years  at  the  time  of
recording his statement under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C..   In  conclusion,
the Court has observed:


   “11.    Learned counsel for the  appellants  contended  that  appellants
   Gadha and Babla, were minors on the day of the incident.   But  no  such
   suggestion was made to any of the witnesses nor is any evidence  adduced
   in defence.  Rather the  accused  /  appellants  Gadha  and  Babla  have
   disclosed their age 20 years on  the  day  when  their  statement  under
   Section 313 Cr.P.C. were recorded also makes out the case that their age
   was more than 16 years on the day of the incident.  It is  pertinent  to
   mention here that on the day of the  incident,  and  during  the  trial,
   Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, was applicable to the cases of Juveniles and
   not Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2000.”

5.    After issuing notice to the opposite  parties  in  the  special  leave
petition, by our  Order  dated  18.04.2011,  we  had  directed  the  learned
Sessions Judge or his nominee to conduct an inquiry  into  the  question  of
the age of the appellant on the date of commission of offence and to  submit
a report as envisaged under Rule  12  of  the  Juvenile  Justice  (Care  and
Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (for short ‘Rules, 2007).

6.    Pursuant to the aforesaid direction, the inquiry report was  submitted
before this Court, but the same was not accepted, as it was merely based  on
the opinion of an individual doctor which was not  in  accordance  with  the
procedure prescribed under Rule 12 of the Rules, 2007.   Therefore,  by  our
Order dated 01.11.2011, we had, once again, directed  the  learned  Sessions
Judge to conduct an inquiry as prescribed under Rule 12 of the  Rules,  2007
and submit his report.

7.    Pursuant to the  directions  issued  by  us,  the  learned  Additional
Sessions Judge has conducted inquiry by following the  prescribed  procedure
under the Rules, 2007 and submitted his  inquiry  report  dated  03.12.2011,
wherein, it is concluded that the appellant was aged about  10-15  years  on
the date of the commission of the offence i.e. 01.12.1991.   Therefore,  the
appellant is juvenile within the meaning of  the  expression  under  Section
2(h) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and  Section  2(k)  of  the  Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.

8.    This report is not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent-
State.

9.    We have heard the learned counsel for the  parties  to  the  lis.   We
have also carefully perused the  judgment  and  order  passed  by  the  High
Court.  We are of the opinion that the High Court has  erred  in  dismissing
the appeal on the ground that no evidence was adduced and no suggestion  was
made to the witnesses regarding  juvenility  of  the  appellant  during  the
trial.  In our opinion, the issue of raising the plea for  determination  of
juvenility for the first  time  at  the  appellate  stage  is  no  more  res
integra.  This Court in Lakhan Lal v. State of Bihar, (2011) 2 SCC 251,  has
allowed such plea raised before this Court for the first  time  and,  taking
note of its previous decisions on this point, has observed thus :
      “The fact remains that the issue as to whether  the  appellants  were
   juvenile did not come up for consideration for whatever  reason,  before
   the Courts below.  The question is whether the same could be  considered
   by this Court at this stage of  the  proceedings.   A  somewhat  similar
   situation had arisen in Umesh Singh and Anr. v. State of Bihar, (2000) 6
   SCC 89 wherein this Court relying upon the earlier  decisions  in  Bhola
   Bhagat v. State of Bihar, (1997) 8 SCC 720, Gopinath Ghosh v.  State  of
   W.P. 1984 Supp SCC 228 and Bhoop Ram v. State of U.P., (1989) 3  SCC  1,
   while sustaining the conviction of the Appellant therein under  all  the
   charges, held that the sentences awarded to them need to be  set  aside.
   It was also a case where the appellant therein was aged below  18  years
   and was a child for the purposes of the Bihar Children Act, 1970 on  the
   date of the occurrence.  The relevant paragraph reads  as  under  (Umesh
   Singh case, SCC, pp.93-94, para 6) :
      “6. So far as Arvind Singh, appellant in Criminal Appeal No.  659  of
   1999 is concerned, his case stands  on  a  different  footing.   On  the
   evidence on record, the learned Counsel for the appellant, was not in  a
   position to point out any infirmity in the conviction  recorded  by  the
   trial court as affirmed by the appellate court.  The only contention put
   forward before the court is that the appellant is born on  1-1-67  while
   the date of the incident is 14-15-1980 and on that date he was hardly 13
   years old.  We called for report of  experts  being  placed  before  the
   court as to the age of the appellant,  Arvind Singh.  The report made to
   the court clearly indicates that on the date of the incident he  may  be
   13 years old.  This fact is also supported by the school certificate  as
   well as matriculation  certificate  produced  before  this  Court  which
   indicate that his date  of  birth  is  1-1-1967.   On  this  basis,  the
   contention put forward before the court is that although  the  appellant
   is aged below 18 years and is a child  for  the  purpose  of  the  Bihar
   Children Act, 1970 on the date of the occurrence, his trial having  been
   conducted along with other accused  who  are  not  children  is  not  in
   accordance with law.  However,  this  contention  had  not  been  raised
   either before the trail  court  or  before  the  High  Court.   In  such
   circumstances, this Court in Bhola Bhagat v. State of  Bihar,  1997  (8)
   SCC 720, following the earlier decision in Gopinath Ghosh  v.  State  of
   West Bengal, 1984 Supp. SCC 228 and Bhoop Ram v. State of U.P., 1989 (3)
   SCC 1 and Pradeep Kumar v. State of U.P., 1995 Supp(4)  SCC  419,  while
   sustaining that the sentences awarded to them need to be set aside.   In
   view of the exhaustive discussion of the law  on  the  matter  in  Bhola
   Bhagat case, we are obviated  of  the  duty  to  examine  the  same  but
   following the same, with respect, we pass similar orders in the  present
   case.  Conviction of the appellant Arvind Singh  is  confirmed  but  the
   sentence imposed upon him stands set aside.  He is,  therefore,  set  at
   liberty, if not required in any other case.”

10.   We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by  this  Court
in the aforesaid decision.

11.   We have carefully perused the report dated 03.12.2011 of  the  learned
Additional Sessions Judge.  Since the  report  is  made  after  holding  due
inquiry as required under the  Act  and  the  Rules,  we  accept  the  same.
Accordingly, we hold that the appellant was  juvenile,  as  envisaged  under
the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, on the date of  commission  of  the
offence.

12.   The Jail Custody Certificate, produced by the appellant suggests  that
he has undergone the actual period of sentence of more than three years  out
of the maximum period prescribed under  Section  15  of  the  Act.   In  the
circumstance, while sustaining the  conviction  of  the  appellant  for  the
aforesaid offences, the sentence awarded to  him  by  the  Trial  Court  and
confirmed by the High Court is set aside.  Accordingly, we direct  that  the
appellant be released forthwith, if not required in  any  other  case.   The
appeal is partly allowed.

       ...................................................................J.
                                                                (H.L. Dattu)


       ...................................................................J.
                                                   (Chandramauli Kr. Prasad)
New Delhi;
sEPtEmber 04, 2012.
-----------------------
8