* Author
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 348 : 2024 INSC 115
Chatrapal
v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 2461 of 2024)
15 February 2024
[B.R. Gavai and Prashant Kumar Mishra,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Inquiry Officer found that the charges levelled against the appellant
were duly established. Inquiry report was accepted and the
appellant was dismissed from service. Whether the dismissal of
the appellant was justified and was the High Court justified in
upholding the same.
Headnotes
Service Law – Findings recorded by Inquiry Officer – Interference
– Scope – Appellant appointed as Ardly (a class IV Post) in the
Bareilly Judgeship was later transferred and posted as Process
Server however, was being paid the salary of Ardly – Aggrieved,
appellant made representations – Appellant was subjected to
departmental inquiry on charges of misconduct, insubordination
alleging that he used inappropriate, derogatory and objectional
language and made false allegations against various higher
officials; and had sent the representations directly to the High
Court and Chief Minister/Minister without routing the same
through proper channel – Inquiry Officer found that the charges
levelled against the appellant were established – Appellant
dismissed – Dismissal upheld by High Court – Correctness:
Held: Finding of making false statement and allegation in his
representation not borne out from the record – Since, this finding
is the fulcrum of the reasoning to hold that charge no.1 is proved,
this finding in the inquiry report is perverse – Ordinarily the
findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer should not be interfered
by the appellate authority or by the writ court – However, when
the finding of guilt recorded by the Inquiry Officer is based on
perverse finding the same can always be interfered – Further,
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 349
Chatrapal v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.
Class-IV employee, when in financial hardship, may represent
directly to the superior but that by itself cannot amount to major
misconduct for which punishment of termination from service should
be imposed – Impugned judgment of the High Court as well as the
order terminating the appellant from service, set aside – Appellant
reinstated with all consequential benefits. [Paras 9, 11-13]
Case Law Cited
Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, [2014] 13 SCR 1312 :
(2015) 2 SCC 610; State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh,
(1977) 2 SCC 491; Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply
and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, [2014] 1 SCR
987 : (2014) 4 SCC 108 – relied on.
Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan, [1986] 2 SCR 957 :
AIR 1986 SC 995; Santosh Bakshi vs. State of Punjab,
[2014] 6 SCR 138 : AIR 2014 SC 2966 – referred to.
List of Acts
U.P. Government Servant Conduct Rules.
List of Keywords
Class-IV employee; Departmental inquiry; Inquiry Officer; Dismissal;
Misconduct; Insubordination; Finding of guilt; Perverse findings;
Financial hardship; Termination from service; Reinstatement;
Consequential benefits.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.2461 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.01.2019 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in WPC No. 297 of 2008
Appearances for Parties
P. K. Dey, Sr. Adv., Ms. Shilpi Dey Auditya, Ms. Shehla Chaudhary,
Md. Anas Chaudhary, Sumit Kumar Sharma, Subart, Ansar Ahmad
Chaudhary, Advs. for the Appellant.
Tanmaya Agarwal, Wrick Chatterjee, Ms. Aditi Agarwal, Vinayak
Mohan, Advs. for the Respondents..
350 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
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Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.
Leave granted.
2. The present appeal, by special leave, is directed against the judgment
and order dated 08.01.2019 passed by the High Court of Judicature
at Allahabad in Writ Petition (C) No. 297 of 2008, whereby the High
Court has dismissed the petition of the appellant being devoid of merit.
3. The facts, briefly stated, are that the appellant was appointed on
permanent basis on the post of Ardly (a class IV Post) in the Bareilly
Judgeship. The appellant was transferred and posted as Process
Server in the Nazarat of outlying court of Baheri, District Bareilly on
24.08.2001. In compliance of the transfer order, the appellant joined
the Nazarat Branch in Baheri, District Bareilly as Process Server on
31.08.2001 but he was being paid the remuneration of Ardly.
3.1 Being aggrieved, the appellant made a representation on
20.01.2003 to the District Judge to pay the salary due to the post
of Process Server. The said representation was duly considered
by the competent authority and a report from the Munsarim in
the office of Civil Judge, Baheri, Bareilly was called for. As per
the report of Munsarim dated 27.02.2003, the appellant joined
the post of Process Server in the Court of Civil Judge, Baheri,
Bareilly on 31.08.2001 and since then is working on the said
post. Allegedly, after submission of the said report, the Central
Nazir started harassing the appellant and demanded illegal
amount of gratification for settling his dues.
3.2 Since the grievance of the appellant was not being redressed,
he made a representation dated 05.06.2003 to the Janapad
Nyaayaadeesh inter alia stating that he is deprived of the
allowance that is admissible to the incumbents who are posted at
an outlying court as Process Server. It is further stated that when
the appellant went to meet the Central Nazir on 04.06.2003,
he demanded bribe to get his work done. The District Judge,
Bareilly sought an explanation from the Central Nazir, Bareilly
Judgeship who in turn admitted that by mistake the salary of
the appellant has been shown as against the post of Ardly,
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 351
Chatrapal v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.
however, he denied having demanded illegal gratification from
the appellant.
3.3 The District Judge placed the appellant under suspension vide
order dated 21.06.2003 and initiated a departmental inquiry.
The Inquiry Officer vide memorandum dated 22.08.2003
served the charge sheet on the appellant on the charges
firstly, the appellant vide communication dated 05.06.2003 had
used inappropriate, derogatory and objectionable language
and made false allegations against the officers including the
District Judge as well as against the Presiding Officer of Aonla
Court and secondly, the appellant communicated letters and
representations to the Registrar General of High Court and
other officials of the State Government including the then Chief
Minister without routing the same through proper channel. The
Inquiry Officer, upon completion of enquiry, recorded in his report
dated 21.04.2006 that the charges levelled against the appellant
are duly established. The District Judge, Bareilly accepted the
inquiry report dated 21.04.2006 and vide order dated 30.04.2007
dismissed the appellant which was challenged in appeal before
the High Court and the same was dismissed vide order dated
19.09.2007 being devoid of any substance while affirming the
order dated 30.04.2007 passed by the Disciplinary Authority
imposing punishment of dismissal.
3.4 Being aggrieved by the order dated 19.09.2007 passed by
the Administrative Judge of the High Court of Allahabad, the
appellant filed the Writ Petition (C) No. 297 of 2008 before the
High Court which attained the same fate as that of the appeal.
Hence, the present appeal.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the first
charge, in particular, is vague as no finding has been recorded by
the Inquiry Officer with regard to the allegations made in the letter
dated 05.06.2003 against the officials. Learned counsel would further
submit that if it is presumed that the language used in the complaint
constitutes flagrant breach of Rule 3 of the U.P. Government Servant
Conduct Rules, the quantum of punishment imposed on the appellant
is not commensurate to the guilt. Learned counsel for the appellant
next submits that the appellant was not supplied copy of various
documents including proposed evidence and thus he was prejudiced.
352 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
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It is lastly argued that the findings of guilt recorded by the enquiry
officer is perverse.
In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant has
placed reliance on the decisions of this Court rendered in ‘Sawai
Singh vs. State of Rajasthan’1
and ‘Santosh Bakshi vs. State of
Punjab2
’
5. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the High Court would submit
that the appellant is habitual of making false allegations against the
senior officers including the District Judge and the charges framed
against him are specific and definite and not vague.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused
the case papers.
7. The appellant was subjected to the departmental inquiry on two charges
of misconduct and insubordination. For the first charge, it was alleged
that he used inappropriate, derogatory and objectional language and
made false allegations against the Central Nazir and higher officials and
earlier also he had lodged a false report against the Presiding Officer of
Aonla Court. For the second charge, he allegedly sent a representation
dated 05.06.2003 to the Registrar General of the High Court and
Harijan Society Welfare Minister as also to the Chief Minister without
using the proper channel and without permission of the Head of the
Department.
8. The Inquiry Officer has found both the charges to be proved. In
the discussion with respect to the first charge, it is mentioned in
the inquiry report that the appellant’s statement in his letter dated
05.06.2003 that he met the Central Nazir, Bareilly number of times
between 24.08.2001 to 15.01.2003 is false because from the order
dated 21.06.2003 of the District Judge, Bareilly it is clear that the
Central Nazir took charge at Bareilly on 23.07.2002, therefore, he
could not have met the Central Nazir, Bareilly before 23.07.2002.
9. However, the finding of the Inquiry Officer that the appellant’s
statement in his application dated 05.06.2003 that he met the
Central Nazir number of times between 24.08.2001 to 15.01.2003
1 [1986] 2 SCR 957 : AIR 1986 SC 995
2 [2014] 6 SCR 138 : AIR 2014 SC 2966
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 353
Chatrapal v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.
is not reflected in appellant’s representation. In fact, the application
dated 05.06.2003 was addressed to the Janapad Nyaayaadeesh
and the relevant statement is that the applicant met the addressee
i.e. Janapad Nyaayaadeesh number of times between 24.08.2001 to
15.01.2003. There is no statement that he met the Central Nazir during
this period. In respect of meeting the Central Nazir, his statement
is that he met him on 04.06.2003. Thus, the finding of making false
statement and allegation in his representation dated 05.06.2003 is
not borne out from the record. Since, this finding is the fulcrum of
the reasoning to hold that charge no. 1 is proved, in our considered
view, this finding in the inquiry report is perverse.
10. Insofar as the allegation that the appellant made false allegations
of discrimination on caste basis, it is significant to notice that the
appellant himself has not made any such allegation in his letter
dated 05.06.2003. In the said letter, he has stated that it was the
Central Nazir who told him that the District Judge is saying that the
appellant is a Harijan employee, and he hates the people of such
community. Thus, it is clear that the appellant himself has not made
any such allegation against the District Judge but it was the Central
Nazir who made that statement. The Inquiry Officer had referred to
the report of the Central Nazir dated 20.06.2003 which is available
on record. Regarding the above statement, the Central Nazir has
not denied specifically. He has only stated that the charges levelled
by the appellant are false and baseless. The Central Nazir has
neither made any specific denial that he has not demanded illegal
gratification of Rs. 3,000/- from the appellant. Even though, in his
letter dated 05.06.2003, the appellant has made specific allegation
to this effect against the Central Nazir.
11. The charge no. 2 against the appellant concerns directly sending
the representations to the High Court and Hon’ble Chief Minister/
Minister without routing the same through proper channel. In this
regard, it is suffice to observe that Class-IV employee, when in
financial hardship, may represent directly to the superior but that
by itself cannot amount to major misconduct for which punishment
of termination from service should be imposed. Even otherwise, the
appellant has cited examples of other employees of the District Court,
Bareilly who have sent representations directly to the superiors, but
no action has been taken against them.
354 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
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12. It is trite law that ordinarily the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer
should not be interfered by the appellate authority or by the writ court.
However, when the finding of guilt recorded by the Inquiry Officer
is based on perverse finding the same can always be interfered as
held in Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran3
, State of Haryana
vs. Rattan Singh4
and Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and
Sewerage Board vs. T.T. Murali Babu5
. In P. Gunasekaran (supra),
the following has been held by this Court in para nos. 12, 13, 16 & 17:
“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing
to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate
authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating
even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding
on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and
was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In
disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot
act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court,
in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation
of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural
justice in conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves
from reaching a fair conclusion by some
considerations extraneous to the evidence and
merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to
be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous
considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is
3 [2014] 13 SCR 1312 : (2015) 2 SCC 610
4 (1977) 2 SCC 491
5 [2014] 1 SCR 987 : (2014) 4 SCC 108
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 355
Chatrapal v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.
so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no
reasonable person could ever have arrived at
such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed
to admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously
admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced
the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India,
the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry,
in case the same has been conducted in
accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on
which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may
appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless
it shocks its conscience.
16. These principles have been succinctly summed up
by the living legend and centenarian V.R. Krishna Iyer, J.
in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh [(1977) 2 SCC 491 :
1977 SCC (L&S) 298] . To quote the unparalleled and
inimitable expressions: (SCC p. 493, para 4)
“4. … in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated
rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may
not apply. All materials which are logically probative for
a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to
hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus
and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities
356 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
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and administrative tribunals must be careful in
evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow
what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian
Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary
to cite decisions nor textbooks, although we have
been taken through case law and other authorities
by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial
approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous
materials or considerations and observance of rules
of natural justice. Of course, fair play is the basis
and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender
of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions
reached, such finding, even though of a domestic
tribunal, cannot be held good.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. In all the subsequent decisions of this Court up to the
latest in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage
Board v. T.T. Murali Babu (2014) 4 SCC 108: (2014) 1 SCC
(L&S) 38, these principles have been consistently followed
adding practically nothing more or altering anything.”
13. Having considered the entire material available on record and keeping
in view that the appellant is a Class-IV employee against whom
charge no. 1 was found proved on the basis of perverse finding
and charge no. 2 is only about sending the representation to the
High Court directly without availing the proper channel, we deem it
appropriate to set-aside the impugned judgment of the High Court
as well as the order dated 30.04.2007 whereby the appellant was
terminated from service. Consequently, the appellant is reinstated
in service with all consequential benefits. The appeal is allowed.
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey Result of the case:
Appeal allowed.
