Elections – Electoral process – Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018 – Electoral Bond Scheme introduced anonymous financial contribution to political parties – Constitutional validity of:

* Authors

Ed. Note : Hon’ble Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, pronounced the judgement of the Bench comprising

his lordship, Hon’ble Mr. Justice B.R. Gavai, Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manoj

Misra, while Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjiv Khanna pronounced his separate judgement.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 420 : 2024 INSC 113

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr.

v.

Union of India & Ors.

(Writ Petition (C) No. 880 of 2017)

15 February 2024

[Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud,* CJI, B R Gavai,

J B Pardiwala, Manoj Misra and Sanjiv Khanna,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

The matter pertains to the constitutional validity of the Electoral

Bond Scheme which introduced anonymous financial contributions

to political parties; as also the constitutional validity of the

provisions of the Finance Act 2017 which, among other things,

amended the provisions of the Reserve Bank of India Act 1934,

the Representation of the People Act 1951, the Income Tax Act

1961; as also whether unlimited corporate funding to political

parties, as envisaged by the amendment to s. 182(1) of the

Companies Act infringes the principle of free and fair elections

and violates Art. 14 of the Constitution; and whether the nondisclosure of information on voluntary contributions to political

parties under the Electoral Bond Scheme and the amendments

to s. 29C of the RPA, s. 182(3) of the CA and s. 13A(b) of the

IT Act are violative of the right to information of citizens u/Art.

19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

Headnotes

Elections – Electoral process – Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018

– Electoral Bond Scheme introduced anonymous financial

contribution to political parties – Constitutional validity of:

Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (for himself

and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) Electoral

Bond Scheme is unconstitutional – Directions to the issuing bank

to stop the issuance of Electoral Bonds – SBI to submit: details

of Electoral Bonds purchased since 12 April 2019 till date to the

ECI including the date of purchase of each Electoral Bond, the

name of the purchaser of the bond and the denomination of the

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 421

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

Electoral Bond purchased; details of political parties which have

received contributions through Electoral Bonds since 12April 2019

till date to the ECI, and each Electoral Bond encashed by political

parties – SBI to submit the said information to the ECI within the

period stipulated – ECI to publish the information shared by the

SBI on its official website – Electoral Bonds within the validity

period of fifteen days but have not been encashed by the political

party yet, to be returned by the political party or the purchaser to

the issuing bank – Constitution of India. [Paras 216, 219] – Held:

(per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) (Concurring with Dr Dhananjaya Y

Chandrachud, CJI.) (Concurring with conclusions albeit with

different reasonings) Electoral Bond Scheme is unconstitutional

and is struck down – Directions to ECI to ascertain the details

from the political parties and the State Bank of India, which issued

the Bonds, and the bankers of the political parties and thereupon

disclose the details and names of the donor/purchaser of the Bonds

and the amounts donated to the political party – Henceforth, the

issuance of fresh Bonds is prohibited – Electoral Bonds within

the validity period of fifteen days but have not been encashed by

the political party yet, to be returned by the political party or the

purchaser to the issuing bank. [Para 79]

Elections – Electoral process – Electoral Bond Scheme –

Amendment to s. 182 of the Companies Act, 2013 Act, deleting

the first proviso thereunder (as amended by the s. 154 of the

Finance Act, 2017) thereby permitting unlimited corporate

funding to political parties – First proviso to s. 182 provided

the limit of contribution by the company upto seven and a half

per cent of its average net profits during the three immediately

preceding financial years – Validity of:

Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (for himself and

for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ): Is arbitrary

and violative of Art. 14 – It infringes the principle of free and fair

elections – Amendment to s. 182 is manifestly arbitrary for treating

political contributions by companies and individuals alike; permitting

the unregulated influence of companies in the governance and

political process violating the principle of free and fair elections;

and treating contributions made by profit-making and loss-making

companies to political parties alike [Paras 215, 216] – Held: (per

Sanjiv Khanna, J.) Amendment to s. 182 of the Companies Act,

deleting the first proviso thereunder, is unconstitutional, and is

422 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

struck down – Principle of proportionality applied which would

subsume the test of manifest arbitrariness – Furthermore, the claim

of privacy by a corporate or a company, especially a public limited

company would be on very limited grounds, restricted possibly to

protect the privacy of the individuals and persons responsible for

conducting the business and commerce of the company – It would

be rather difficult for a public (or even a private) limited company

to claim a violation of privacy as its affairs have to be open to the

shareholders and the public who are interacting with the body

corporate/company – Constitution of India – Art. 14 – Companies

Act, 2013 – s. 182. [Para 73]

Elections – Electoral process – Electoral Bond Scheme –

Non-disclosure of information on voluntary contributions to

political parties under the Electoral Bond Scheme and the

amendments to s. 29C of the Representation of the People

Act 1951, s. 182(3) of the Companies Act and s. 13A(b) of the

IT Act by the Finance Act, 2017 – If violative of Art. 19(1)(a):

Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (for himself and

for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) Information

about funding to a political party is essential for a voter to exercise

their freedom to vote in an effective manner – Electoral Bond

Scheme and the impugned provisions-proviso to s. 29C(1) of the

RPA, s. 182(3) of the CA, and s. 13A(b) of the ITA to the extent

that they infringe upon the right to information of the voter by

anonymizing contributions through electoral bonds are violative of

Art 19(1)(a) and unconstitutional – Union of India was unable to

establish that the measure employed in Clause 7(4) of the Electoral

Bond Scheme is the least restrictive means to balance the rights

of informational privacy to political contributions and the right to

information of political contributions – Deletion of the mandate

of disclosing the particulars of contributions in s. 182(3) violates

the right to information of the voter since they would not possess

information about the political party to which the contribution was

made which, is necessary to identify corruption and quid pro quo

transactions in governance – Such information is also necessary for

exercising an informed vote – s. 29C exempts political parties from

disclosing information of contributions received through Electoral

Bonds whereas s. 182(3) applies to all modes of transfer – Both

must be read together – Only purpose of amending s. 182(3)

was to bring the provision in tune with the amendment under the

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 423

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

RPA exempting disclosure requirements for contributions through

electoral bonds – Amendment to s. 182(3) becomes otiose in

terms of the holding that the Electoral Bond Scheme and relevant

amendments to the RPA and the IT Act mandating non-disclosure

of particulars on political contributions through electoral bonds is

unconstitutional [Paras 104, 168, 169, 172-174, 216] – Held: (per

Sanjiv Khanna, J.) On application of the doctrine of proportionality,

proviso to s. 29C(1) of the RPA, s. 182(3) of the CA, 2013, and

s. 13A(b) of the ITA, as amended by the Finance Act, 2017,

unconstitutional, and are struck down – Representation of the

People Act, 1951 – s. 29C – Companies Act, 2013 – s. 182(3)

– Income Tax Act, 1961 – s. 13A(b) – Constitution of India – Art.

19(1)(a). [Para 74]

Elections – Electoral process – Electoral Bond Scheme –

s. 31(3) of the RBI Act added by the Finance Act, 2017 to

effectuate the issuance of the Bonds which, as envisaged, are

not to mention the name of the political party to whom they

are payable, and hence are in the nature of bearer demand

bill or note – Challenge to:

Held: Per Sanjiv Khanna, J. Sub-section (3) to s. 31 of the RBI

Act, 1934 and the Explanation thereto introduced by the Finance

Act, 2017 is unconstitutional, and are struck down as it permits

issuance of Bonds payable to a bearer on demand by such person

– Finance Act, 2017 – Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 – s. 31(3).

[Para 79]

Elections – Electoral process – Electoral Bonds Scheme, 2018

– Challenge to the Electoral Bond Scheme and the statutory

amendments mandating non-disclosure of information on

electoral financing; and provisions permitting unlimited

corporate funding to political parties – Parameters to test:

Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, (for himself

and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ):

Courts must adopt a less stringent form of judicial review while

adjudicating challenges to legislation and executive action which

relate to economic policy as compared to laws relating to civil

rights such as the freedom of speech or the freedom of religion

– Amendments relate to the electoral process – Correspondence

between the Ministry of Finance and RBI that the Bonds were

introduced only to curb black money in the electoral process, and

424 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

protect informational privacy of financial contributors to political

parties – Union of India itself classified the amendments as an

“electoral reform” – It cannot be said that the amendments deal

with economic policy [Paras 40, 42] – Held: (per Sanjiv Khanna,

J.) Scheme cannot be tested on the parameters applicable to

economic policy – Matters of economic policy normally pertain to

trade, business and commerce, whereas contributions to political

parties relate to the democratic polity, citizens’ right to know and

accountability in the democracy – Primary objective of the Scheme,

and relevant amendments, is electoral reform and not economic

reform – To give the legislation the latitude of economic policy, it

would be diluting the principle of free and fair elections. [Para 15]

Elections – Electoral process – Presumption of constitutionality

– Application, to electoral laws:

Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, (for himself and

for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ): Presumption

of constitutionality is based on democratic accountability, that is,

the legislators are elected representatives who are aware of the

needs of the citizens and are best placed to frame policies to

resolve them; and that they are privy to information necessary

for policy making which the Courts as an adjudicating authority

are not – However, the policy underlying the legislation must

not violate the freedoms and rights entrenched in Part III of the

Constitution and other constitutional provisions – Presumption of

constitutionality is rebutted when a prima facie case of violation

of a fundamental right is established – Onus then shifts on the

State to prove that the violation of the fundamental right is justified

– It cannot be said that the presumption of constitutionality does

not apply to laws which deal with electoral process [Paras 44,

45] – Held: (per Sanjiv Khanna, J.): Doctrine of presumption of

constitutionality has its limitations when the test of proportionality

is applied – Structured proportionality places an obligation on

the State at a higher level, as it is a polycentric examination,

both empirical and normative – While the courts do not pass a

value judgment on contested questions of policy, and give weight

and deference to the government decision by acknowledging

the legislature’s expertise to determine complex factual issues,

the proportionality test is not based on preconceived notion or

presumption – Standard of proof is a civil standard or a balance

of probabilities; where scientific or social science evidence is

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 425

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

available, it is examined; and where evidence is inconclusive or

does not exist and cannot be developed, reason and logic may

suffice. [Para 18]

Elections – Electoral process – Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018

– Corporate donations to national parties through electoral

bonds – Annual audit reports of political parties from 2017-

18 to 2022-23 as available on website of ECI – Significance

– Doctrine of proportionality, application:

Held: (Per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) Data indicative of the quantum

of corporate funding through the anonymous Bonds – It clarifies

that majority of contribution through Bonds has gone to political

parties which are ruling parties in the Centre and the States –

More than 50% of the Electoral Bonds in number, and 94% of

the Electoral Bonds in value terms were for Rs.1 crore – This

supports the reasoning and conclusion on the application of the

doctrine of proportionality – Based on the analysis of the data

available, the Scheme fails to meet the balancing prong of the

proportionality test, however, the proportionality stricto sensu

not applied due to the limited availability of data and evidence.

[Paras 69, 74]

Elections – Electoral Process – Electoral Bond Scheme –

Infringement of the right to information of the voter, if satisfies

the proportionality standard vis-à-vis the purposes of curbing

black money; and protecting donor privacy:

Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (for himself

and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ)

Purpose of curbing black money is not traceable to any of the

grounds in Art 19(2) – Electoral trusts are an effective alternative

through which the objective of curbing black money in electoral

financing can be achieved – Electoral Bond Scheme not being the

least restrictive means to achieve the purpose of curbing black

money in electoral process, there is no necessity of applying

the balancing prong of the proportionality standard – Electoral

Bond Scheme is not the only means for curbing black money in

Electoral Finance – There are other alternatives which substantially

fulfill the purpose and impact the right to information minimally

when compared to the impact of electoral bonds on the right to

information – Constitution of India – Art. 19(1) (a) and 19(2).

[Paras 116, 121, 124, 129, 130]

426 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Elections – Electoral process – Right to informational privacy,

if extends to financial contributions to a political party:

Held : (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (for himself

and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) If the

right to informational privacy extends to financial contributions to

a political party, this Court needs to decide if the Electoral Bond

Scheme adequately balances the right to information and right to

informational privacy of political affiliation – Informational privacy

to political affiliation is necessary to protect the freedom of political

affiliation and exercise of electoral franchise – As regards, right

to informational privacy if can be extended to the contributions to

political parties, Electoral Bond Scheme has two manifestations

of privacy, informational privacy by prescribing confidentiality visà-vis the political party; and informational privacy by prescribing

non-disclosure of the information of political contributions to the

public – Financial contributions to political parties are usually

made because they may constitute an expression of support to

the political party and that the contribution may be based on a quid

pro quo – Law permits contributions to political parties by both

corporations and individuals – Huge political contributions made

by corporations and companies should not be allowed to conceal

the reason for financial contributions made by another section

of the population: a student, a daily wage worker, an artist, or a

teacher – When the law permits political contributions and such

contributions could be made as an expression of political support

which would indicate the political affiliation of a person, it is the

duty of the Constitution to protect them – Contributions made as

quid pro quo transactions are not an expression of political support

– However, to not grant the umbrella of informational privacy to

political contributions only because a portion of the contributions

is made for other reasons would be impermissible – Constitution

does not turn a blind eye merely because of the possibilities of

misuse. [Paras 131, 138, 139, 142]

Doctrines/Principles – Principle of proportionality –

Proportionality standard test – Four prongs –– Explanation of:

Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (for himself

and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ)

Proportionality standard is laid down to determine if the violation

of the fundamental right is justified – Proportionality standard is-the

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 427

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

measure restricting a right must have a legitimate goal (legitimate

goal stage); the measure must be a suitable means for furthering

the goal (suitability or rational connection stage); the measure

must be least restrictive and equally effective (necessity stage);

and the measure must not have a disproportionate impact on

the right holder (balancing stage) – At the legitimate goal stage,

the Court is to analyze if the objective of introducing the law is a

legitimate purpose for the infringement of rights – Second prong

of the proportionality analysis requires the State to assess whether

the means used are rationally connected to the purpose – At

this stage, the court is required to assess whether the means,

if realised, would increase the likelihood of the purpose – It is

not necessary that the means chosen should be the only means

capable of realising the purpose – Next stage is the necessity

stage, wherein the Court is to determine if the means adopted

is the least restrictive means to give effect to the purpose – The

Court is to see, whether there are other possible means which

could have been adopted by the State; whether the alternative

means identified realise the objective in a ‘real and substantial

manner’; whether the alternative identified and the means used

by the State impact fundamental rights differently; and whether

on an overall comparison (and balancing) of the measure and

the alternative, the alternative is better suited considering the

degree of realizing the government objective and the impact on

fundamental rights – In the last stage, the Court undertakes a

balancing exercise to analyse if the cost of the interference with

the right is proportional to the extent of fulfilment of the purpose

– It is in this step that the Court undertakes an analysis of the

comparative importance of the considerations involved in the

case, the justifications for the infringement of the rights, and if

the effect of infringement of one right is proportional to achieve

the goal [Paras 105, 106, 117, 119, 156] – Held: (per Sanjiv

Khanna, J.) Four steps of test of proportionality are: first step is

to examine whether the act/measure restricting the fundamental

right has a legitimate aim, second step is to examine whether

the restriction has rational connection with the aim, third step

is to examine whether there should have been a less restrictive

alternate measure that is equally effective, and last stage is to

strike an appropriate balance between the fundamental right and

the pursued public purpose. [Para 25]

428 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Doctrines/Principles – Principle of proportionality – Test of

proportionality – Proportionality standard to balance two

conflicting fundamental rights – Foreign vis-à-vis Indian

jurisprudence:

Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, (for himself

and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ):

Foreign case *Campbell v MGM Limited judgment adopts a double

proportionality standard – It employed a three step approach to

balance fundamental rights, first step to analyse the comparative

importance of the actual rights claimed, second step to lay down

the justifications for the infringement of the rights, and third to apply

the proportionality standard to both the rights – Said approach must

be slightly tempered to suit Indian jurisprudence on proportionality

– Indian Courts adopt a four prong structured proportionality

standard to test the infringement of the fundamental rights – In

the last stage, the Court undertakes a balancing exercise, wherein

the Court undertakes an analysis of the comparative importance

of the considerations involved in the case, the justifications for

the infringement of the rights, and if the effect of infringement

of one right is proportional to achieve the goal – Thus, the first

two steps laid down in Campbell case are subsumed within the

balancing prong of the proportionality analysis. [Paras 154, 156]

– Held: (per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) Test of proportionality employed

by courts in various jurisdictions like Germany, Canada, South

Africa, Australia and the United Kingdom, however, no uniformity

on application of test of proportionality or the method of using the

last two prongs – In the third prong, courts examine whether the

restriction is necessary to achieve the desired end, wherein they

consider whether a less intrusive alternative is available to achieve

the same ends, aiming for minimal impairment – As regards, the

fourth prong, the balancing stage, some jurists believe that balancing

is ambiguous and value-based, which stems from the premise of

rule-based legal adjudication, where courts determine entitlements

rather than balancing interests – However, proportionality is a

standard-based review rather than a rule-based one – Balancing

stage enables judges to consider various factors by analysing them

against the standards proposed by the four prongs of proportionality

– This ensures that all aspects of a case are carefully weighed

in decision-making – While balancing is integral to the standard

of proportionality, such an exercise should be rooted in empirical

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 429

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

data and evidence as adopted by most of the countries – In

the absence of data and figures, there is a lack of standards by

which proportionality stricto sensu can be determined – However

many of the constitutional courts have employed the balancing

stage ‘normatively’ by examining the weight of the seriousness

of the right infringement against the urgency of the factors that

justify it – Findings of empirical legal studies provide a more solid

foundation for normative reasoning and enhance understanding

of the relationship between means and ends – Proportionality

analyses would be more accurate and would lead to better and

more democratic governance. [Paras 29, 31-33, 35]

Doctrines/Principles – Doctrine of proportionality –

Proportionality standard test to balance fundamental rightsright to information and the right to informational privacy:

Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (for himself and

for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) Proportionality

standard is an effective standard to test whether the infringement of

the fundamental right is justified – It would prove to be ineffective

when the State’s interest in question is also a reflection of a

fundamental right – Proportionality standard is by nature curated

to give prominence to the fundamental right and minimize the

restriction on it – If the single proportionality standard were employed

to the considerations in the instant case, at the suitability prong,

the Court would determine if non-disclosure is a suitable means for

furthering the right to privacy – At the necessity stage, the Court

would determine if non-disclosure is the least restrictive means

to give effect to the right to privacy – At the balancing stage, the

Court would determine if non-disclosure has a disproportionate

effect on the right holder – In this analysis, the necessity and the

suitability prongs would inevitably be satisfied because the purpose

is substantial: it is a fundamental right – Balancing stage will only

account for the disproportionate impact of the measure on the right

to information (the right) and not the right to privacy (the purpose)

since the Court is required to balance the impact on the right with

the fulfillment of the purpose through the selected means – Thus,

the Court while applying the proportionality standard to resolve

the conflict between two fundamental rights preferentially frames

the standard to give prominence to the fundamental right which

is alleged to be violated by the petitioners (in this case, the right

to information). [Paras 152-153]

430 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Doctrines/Principles – Double proportionality standard –

Application of, to both the rights-right to informational privacy

of the contributor and the right to information of the voter:

Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (for himself

and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) Double

proportionality standard is the proportionality standard to both the

rights (as purpose) to determine if the means used are suitable,

necessary and proportionate to the fundamental rights – First prong

of the analysis is whether the means has a rational connection

with both the purposes, that is, informational privacy of the political

contributions and disclosure of information to the voter – Further,

while applying the suitability prong to the purpose of privacy of

political contribution, the court must consider whether the nondisclosure of information to the voter and its disclosure only when

demanded by a competent court and upon the registration of

criminal case has a rational nexus with the purpose of achieving

privacy of political contribution – Undoubtedly, the measure by

prescribing non-disclosure of information about political funding

shares a nexus with the purpose – Non-disclosure of information

grants anonymity to the contributor, thereby protecting information

privacy – It is certainly one of the ways capable of realizing the

purpose of informational privacy of political affiliation – Suitability

prong must next be applied to the purpose of disclosure of

information about political contributions to voters – There is no

nexus between the balancing measure adopted with the purpose of

disclosure of information to the voter – According to Clause 7(4) of

the Electoral Bond Scheme and the amendments, the information

about contributions made through the Electoral Bond Scheme is

exempted from disclosure requirements – This information is never

disclosed to the voter – Purpose of securing information about

political funding can never be fulfilled by absolute non-disclosure

– Measure adopted does not satisfy the suitability prong vis-à-vis

the purpose of information of political funding – The next stage is

the necessity prong, wherein the Court determines if the measure

identified is the least restrictive and equally effective measure –

Court must determine if there are other possible means which

could have been adopted to fulfill the purpose, and whether such

alternative means realize the purpose in a real and substantial

manner; impact fundamental rights differently; and are better suited

on an overall comparison of the degree of realizing the purpose

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 431

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

and the impact on fundamental rights - On an overall comparison

of the measure and the alternative, the alternative is better suited

because it realizes the purposes to a considerable extent and

imposes a lesser restriction on the fundamental rights – Having

concluded that Clause 7(4) of the Scheme is not the least restrictive

means to balance the fundamental rights, there is no necessity

of applying the balancing prong of the proportionality standard.

[Paras 160-164, 168]

Doctrine/Principles – Doctrine of proportionality, when applied:

Held: (Per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) Proportionality principle is applied

by courts when they exercise their power of judicial review in

cases involving a restriction on fundamental rights – It is applied

to strike an appropriate balance between the fundamental right

and the pursued purpose and objective of the restriction. [Para 24]

Doctrine/Principles – Doctrine of proportionality – Application

of proportionality test to Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018 –

Legitimate purpose prong – Retribution, victimisation or

retaliation, if can be treated as a legitimate aim:

Held: (Per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) Retribution, victimisation or

retaliation cannot by any stretch be treated as a legitimate aim – This

would not satisfy the legitimate purpose prong of the proportionality

test – Neither the Scheme nor the amendments to the Finance

Act, 2017, rationally connected to the fulfilment of the purpose to

counter retribution, victimisation or retaliation in political donations

– It will also not satisfy the necessity stage of the proportionality

even if the balancing stage is ignored – Retribution, victimisation

or retaliation against any donor exercising their choice to donate

to a political party is an abuse of law and power – This has to be

checked and corrected – As it is a wrong, the wrong itself cannot

be a justification or a purpose – Cloak of secrecy, leads to severe

restriction and curtailment of the collective’s right to information

and the right to know – Transparency and not secrecy is the cure

and antidote. [Para 39]

Doctrine/Principles – Doctrine of proportionality – Application

of proportionality test to Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018 –

Rational nexus prong:

Held: (Per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) Donor may like to keep his identity

anonymous is a mere ipse dixit assumption – Plea of infringement

432 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

of the right to privacy has no application at all if the donor makes

the contribution, that too through a banking channel, to a political

party – Identity of the purchaser of the Bond can always be revealed

upon registration of a criminal case or by an order/direction of the

court – Thus, the fear of reprisal and vindictiveness does not end

– So-called protection exists only on paper but in practical terms

is not a good safeguard even if it is accepted that the purpose

is legitimate – Under the Scheme, political parties in power may

have asymmetric access to information with the authorised bank

– They also retain the ability to use their power and authority of

investigation to compel the revelation of Bond related information

– Thus, the entire objective of the Scheme is contradictory and

inconsistent – Rational connection test fails since the purpose of

curtailing black or unaccounted-for money in the electoral process

has no connection or relationship with the concealment of the

identity of the donor – Payment through banking channels is easy

and an existing antidote – On the other hand, obfuscation of the

details may lead to unaccounted and laundered money getting

legitimised. [Paras 41, 42, 44]

Doctrine/Principles – Doctrine of proportionality – Application

of proportionality test to Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018 –

Necessity prong:

Held: (Per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) As per the Electoral Trust Scheme,

contributions could be made by a person or body corporate to the

trust which would transfer the amount to the political party – Trust is

thus, treated as the contributor to the political party and guidelines

were issued by the ECI to ensure transparency and openness in

the electoral process – When the necessity test is applied, the

Trust Scheme achieves the objective of the Union of India in a

real and substantial manner and is also a less restrictive alternate

measure in view of the disclosure requirements, viz. the right to

know of voters – Trust Scheme is in force and is a result of the

legislative process – In a comparison of limited alternatives, it is

a measure that best realises the objective of the Union of India in

a real and substantial manner without significantly impacting the

fundamental right of the voter to know. [Paras 50-51]

Doctrine/Principles – Doctrine of proportionality – Application

of proportionality test to Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018 – Fourth

prong-the balancing prong of proportionality:

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 433

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

Held: (Per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) On application of the balancing

prong of proportionality, the Electoral Bond Scheme falls foul and

negates and overwhelmingly disavows and annuls the voters right in

an electoral process as neither the right of privacy nor the purpose

of incentivising donations to political parties through banking

channels, justify the infringement of the right to voters – Voters

right to know and access to information is far too important in a

democratic set-up so as to curtail and deny ‘essential’ information

on the pretext of privacy and the desire to check the flow of

unaccounted money to the political parties – While secret ballots

are integral to fostering free and fair elections, transparency-not

secrecy-in funding of political parties is a prerequisite for free and

fair elections – Confidentiality of the voting booth does not extend

to the anonymity in contributions to political parties. [Para 57]

Constitution of India – Balancing of conflicting fundamental

rights-right to information and the right to informational

privacy – Standard to be followed:

Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (for himself

and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) First

exercise that the Court must undertake while balancing two

fundamental rights is to determine if the Constitution creates a

hierarchy between the two rights in conflict, if yes, then the right

which has been granted a higher status would prevail over the

other right involved – And if not, the following standard must be

employed from the perspective of both the rights where rights A

and B are in conflict, whether the measure is a suitable means

for furthering right A and right B, whether the measure is least

restrictive and equally effective to realise right A and right B, and

whether the measure has a disproportionate impact on right A and

right B – Courts have used the collective interest or the public

interest standard, the single proportionality standard, and the

double proportionality standard to balance the competing interests

of fundamental rights – There is no constitutional hierarchy between

the right to information and the right to informational privacy of

political affiliation. [Paras 145-146, 157, 159]

Constitution of India – Fundamental right – Breach of – Burden

of proof:

Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, (for himself

and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ): Courts

434 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

cannot carve out an exception to the evidentiary principle which is

available to the legislature based on the democratic legitimacy which

it enjoys – In the challenge to electoral law, like all legislation, the

petitioners would have to prima facie prove that the law infringes

fundamental rights or constitutional provisions, upon which the

onus would shift to the State to justify the infringement [Para 45]

– Held: (per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) Once the petitioners are able to

prima facie establish a breach of a fundamental right, then the onus

is on the State to show that the right limiting measure pursues a

proper purpose, has rational nexus with that purpose, the means

adopted were necessary for achieving that purpose, and lastly

proper balance has been incorporated. [Para 17]

Constitution of India – Art. 14 – Doctrine of manifest

arbitrariness – Application of:

Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (for himself

and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) Doctrine

of manifest arbitrariness can be used to strike down a provision

where the legislature fails to make a classification by recognizing

the degrees of harm; and the purpose is not in consonance with

constitutional values – Legislative action can also be tested for

being manifestly arbitrary – There is, and ought to be, a distinction

between plenary legislation and subordinate legislation when they

are challenged for being manifestly arbitrary – Manifest arbitrariness

of a subordinate legislation has to be primarily tested vis-a-vis its

conformity with the parent statute – Doctrines/Principles. [Paras

198, 209]

Constitution of India – Art 19(1)(a) – Right to information,

scope of – Evolution of jurisprudence on right to information:

Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (for himself

and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) Right

to information can be divided into two phases – In the first phase,

the right to information is traced to the values of good governance,

transparency and accountability – In the second phase, the

importance of information to form views on social, cultural and

political issues, and participate in and contribute to discussions

is recognised – Crucial aspect of the expansion of the right to

information in the second phase is that right to information is not

restricted to information about state affairs, that is, public information

– It includes information which would be necessary to further

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 435

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

participatory democracy in other forms – Right to information has

an instrumental exegesis, which recognizes the value of the right

in facilitating the realization of democratic goals – Beyond that, it

has an intrinsic constitutional value; one that recognizes that it is

not just a means to an end but an end in itself. [Paras 60, 64, 65]

Constitution of India – Art. 19(1)(a) – Right to vote – Right to

know – Significance:

Held: (Per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) Right to vote is a constitutional

and statutory right, grounded in Art 19(1)(a), as the casting of a

vote amounts to expression of an opinion by the voter – Citizens’

right to know stems from this very right, as meaningfully exercising

choice by voting requires information – Representatives elected

as a result of the votes cast in their favour, enact new, and amend

existing laws, and when in power, take policy decisions – Access

to information which can materially shape the citizens’ choice is

necessary for them to have a say – Thus, the right to know is

paramount for free and fair elections and democracy – Denying

voters the right to know the details of funding of political parties

would lead to a dichotomous situation – Funding of political

parties cannot be treated differently from that of the candidates

who contest elections – Democratic legitimacy is drawn not only

from representative democracy but also through the maintenance

of an efficient participatory democracy – In the absence of fair

and effective participation of all stakeholders, the notion of

representation in a democracy would be rendered hollow. [Paras

19, 21, 22]

Constitution of India – Fundamental rights – Conflict of –

Voter’s right to know vis-à-vis right to privacy:

Held: (Per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) Fundamental rights are not

absolute, legislations/policies restricting the rights may be enacted

in accordance with the scheme of the Constitution – Thread of

reasonableness applies to all such restrictions – Furthermore, Art.

14 includes the facet of formal equality and substantive equality –

Thus, the principle ‘equal protection of law’ requires the legislature

and the executive to achieve factual equality – This principle can

be extended to any restriction on fundamental rights which must

be reasonable to the identified degree of harm – If the restriction

is unreasonable, unjust or arbitrary, then the law should be struck

down – Further, it is for the legislature to identify the degree of

436 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

harm – Voters right to know and access to information is far too

important in a democratic set-up so as to curtail and deny ‘essential’

information on the pretext of privacy and the desire to check the

flow of unaccounted money to the political parties. [Paras 56, 57]

Elections – Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018 – Clause 7(4), 2(a)

– Features of the Scheme:

Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (for himself

and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) Scheme

defines electoral bond “as a bond issued in the nature of promissory

note which shall be a bearer banking instrument and shall not carry

the name of the buyer or payee” – The Scheme also stipulates

that the information furnished by the buyer shall be treated as

confidential which shall not be disclosed by any authority except

when demanded by a competent court or by a law enforcement

agency upon the registration of criminal case – While it is true that

the law prescribes anonymity as a central characteristic of electoral

bonds, the de jure anonymity of the contributors does not translate

to de facto anonymity – The Scheme is not fool-proof – There are

sufficient gaps in the Scheme which enable political parties to know

the particulars of the contributions made to them – Electoral bonds

provide economically resourced contributors who already have a

seat at the table selective anonymity vis-à-vis the public and not

the political party. [Paras 102, 103]

Elections – Electoral process – Focal point of the electoral

process-candidate or political party:

Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (for himself

and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) Statutory

provisions relating to elections accord considerable importance to

political parties, signifying that political parties have been the focal

point of elections – ‘Political party’ is a relevant political unit in the

democratic electoral process in India – Voters associate voting

with political parties because of the centrality of symbols and its

election manifesto in the electoral process – Form of government

where the executive is chosen from the legislature based on the

political party or coalition of political parties which has secured the

majority – Prominence accorded to political parties by the Tenth

Schedule of the Constitution – Law recognises the inextricable link

between a political party and the candidate though vote is cast for

a candidate – Voters casts their votes based on two considerations:

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 437

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

the capability of the candidate as a representative and the ideology

of the political party. [Paras 80, 86, 89, 94]

Elections – Electoral democracy in India – Basis of:

Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (for himself

and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ)

Electoral democracy in India is premised on the principle of political

equality, guaranteed by the Constitution in two ways – Firstly, by

guaranteeing the principle of “one person one vote” which assures

equal representation in voting, and secondly, the Constitution

ensures that socio-economic inequality does not perpetuate

political inequality by mandating reservation of seats for Scheduled

Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Parliament and State Assemblies

– Constitution guarantees political equality by focusing on the

‘elector’ and the ‘elected’ – However, political inequality continues

to persist in spite of the constitutional guarantees – Difference in

the ability of persons to influence political decisions because of

economic inequality is one of the factors – Economic inequality

leads to differing levels of political engagement because of the

deep association between money and politics – It is in light of the

nexus between economic inequality and political inequality, and the

legal regime in India regulating party financing that the essentiality

of the information on political financing for an informed voter must

be analyzed. [Paras 96-100]

Elections – Electoral process in India – Nexus between money

and electoral democracy:

Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (for himself

and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) Law

does not bar electoral financing by the public – Both corporates

and individuals are permitted to contribute to political parties which

is crucial for the sustenance and progression of electoral politics

– Primary way through which money directly influences politics is

through its impact on electoral outcomes – One way in which money

influences electoral outcomes is through vote buying –Another way

in which money influences electoral outcomes is through incurring

electoral expenditure for political campaigns – Enhanced campaign

expenditure proportionately increases campaign outreach which

influences the voting behavior of voters – Money also creates

entry-barriers to politics by limiting the kind of candidates and

political parties which enter the electoral fray – Challenge to the

438 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

statutory amendments-provisions dealing with electoral finance

and the Electoral Bond Scheme cannot be adjudicated in isolation

without a reference to the actual impact of money on electoral

politics. [Paras 46-51, 55]

Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 –

Allotment of symbols to political parties – Significance:

Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (for himself and

for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) In terms of

the provisions of the Symbols Order, the ECI shall allot a symbol to

every candidate contesting the election – Symbols Order classifies

political parties into recognised political parties and unrecognised

political parties – Difference in the procedure under the Symbols

Order for allotting symbols to recognised political parties, registered

but unrecognised political parties and independent candidates

indicates both the relevance and significance of political parties in

elections in India – Purpose of allotting symbols to political parties

is to aid voters in identifying and remembering the political party –

Law recognises the inextricable link between a political party and

the candidate though the vote is cast for a candidate – Most of

the voters identified a political party only with its symbol and this

still continues to the day – Symbols also gain significance when

the names of political parties sound similar. [Paras 81, 84, 86, 87]

Words and Phrases – Privacy – Definition:

Held : (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (for himself

and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) Privacy

is not limited to private actions and decisions – Privacy is defined

as essential protection for the exercise and development of other

freedoms protected by the Constitution, and from direct or indirect

influence by both State and non-State actors – Viewed in this

manner, privacy takes within its fold, decisions which also have a

‘public component’. [Para 133]

Case Law Cited

In the Judgment of Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI

Roger Mathew v. South Bank of India, CA No. 8588/2019;

PUCL v. Union of India, [2003] 2 SCR 1136 : (2003) 4

SCC 399; ADR v. Union of India, [2002] 3 SCR 696 :

(2002) 5 SCC 294; Anjali Bhardwaj v. Union of India,

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 439

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

[2019] 2 SCR 199 :(2019) 18 SCC 246;Kanwar Lal Gupta

v. Amar Nath Chawla, [1975] 2 SCR 259 : 1975 SCC

(3) 646; Subash Chandra v. Delhi Subordinate Services

Selection Board, [2009] 12 SCR 978 : (2009) 15 SCC

458; Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha v. State of Gujarat, [2020]

13 SCR 886 : (2020) 10 SCC 459; Ramesh Chandra

Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [2023] 2 SCR 422 :

(2023) SCC OnLine SC 162; Shayara Bano v. Union

of India, [2017] 9 SCR 797 : (2017) 9 SCC 1; Rustom

Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, [1970] 3 SCR 530 :

(1970) 1 SCC 248; R.K Garg v. Union of India, [1982]

1 SCR 947 : (1981) 4 SCC 675; Premium Granites v.

State of Tamil Nadu, [1994] 1 SCR 579 : (1994) 2 SCC

691; Peerless General Finance and Investment Co v.

RBI, [1992] 1 SCR 406 : (1992) 2 SCC 343; BALCO

Employees Union v. Union of India, [2001] Suppl. 5 SCR

511 : (2002) 2 SCC 333; DG of Foreign Trade v. Kanak

Exports, [2015] 15 SCR 287 : (2016) 2 SCC 226; Swiss

Ribbons v. Union of India, [2019] 3 SCR 535 : (2019) 4

SCC 17; Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Limited

v. Union of India, [2019] 10 SCR 381 : (2019) 8 SCC

416; State of Bombay v. FN Balsara, [1951] 1 SCR 682;

Dharam Dutt v. Union of India, [2003] Suppl. 6 SCR

151 : AIR 2004 SC 1295; Ramlila Maidan Incident, In

re, [2012] 4 SCR 971 : (2012) 5 SCC 1; Ameerunissa

Begum v. Mahboob Begum, [1953] 1 SCR 404 : (1952)

2 SCC 697; Vatal Nagaraj v. R Dayanand Sagar, [1975]

2 SCR 384 : (1975) 4 SCC 127; P Nalla Thampy Terah

v. Union of India, [1985] Supp. 1 SCR 622 : (1985) Supp

SCC 189; Common Cause (A Registered Society) v.

Union of India, [1996] 3 SCR 1208 : (1996) 2 SCC 752;

State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, [1961] 2 SCR

371; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, [1975] 3 SCR

333 : (1975) 4 SCC 428; SP Gupta v. Union of India,

(1981) Supp SCC 87; Dinesh Trivedi v. Union of India,

[1997] 3 SCR 93 : (1997) 4 SCC 306; Secy., Ministry

of Information & Broadcasting, Govt. of India v. Cricket

Assn. of Bengal, [1995] 1 SCR 1036 : (1995) 2 SCC 161;

Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India, [1985] 2

SCR 287 : AIR 1986 SC 515; Romesh Thappar v. State

of Madras, [1950] 1 SCR 594 : AIR 1950 SC 124; DC

Saxena v. Hon’ble The Chief Justice of India, [1996] 

440 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Suppl. 3 SCR 677 : (1996) 5 SCC 216; Supriyo v. Union

of India, 2023 INSC 920; Union of India v. Association

for Democratic Reforms, [2002] 3 SCR 696 : (2002) 5

SCC 294; Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India, [2006] 1

SCR 562 : (2006) 2 SCC 1; Kihoto Hollohon v. Zachillhu,

[1992] 1 SCR 686 : (1992) Supp (2) SCC 651; Ravi S

Naik v. Union of India, [1994] 1 SCR 754 : AIR 1994 SC

1558; Subash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of

Maharashtra, WP (C) No. 493 of 2022; Modern Dental

College & Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh,

[2016] 3 SCR 575 : (2016) 4 SCC 346; Media One v.

Union of India, Civil Appeal No. 8129 of 2022; Sakal

Papers v. The Union of India, [1962] 3 SCR 842 : AIR

1962 SC 305; Express Newspapers v. Union of India,

[1959] 1 SCR 12 : AIR 1958 SC 578; Sodhi Shamsher

v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1954 SC 276; Kaushal Kishor v.

State of Uttar Pradesh, Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 113

of 2016; Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Dr

Ram Manohar Lohia, [1960] 2 SCR 821 : AIR 1960 SC

633; Justice KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India, [2017] 10

SCR 569 : (2017) 10 SCC 1; In Re Noise Pollution, [2005]

Suppl. 1 SCR 624 : (2005) 5 SCC 733; Subramanian

Swamy v. Union of India, [2016] 3 SCR 865 : (2016) 7

SCC 221; Asha Ranjan v. State of Bihar, [2017] 1 SCR

945 : (2017) 4 SCC 397; Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan

v. Union of India, [2018] 11 SCR 586 : (2018) 17 SCC

324; Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v.

Securities and Exchange Board of India, [2012] 12 SCR

256 : (2012) 10 SCC 603; Justice KS Puttaswamy v. Union

of India, [2018] 8 SCR 1 : (2019) 1 SCC 1; Central Public

Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subash

Chandra Agarwal, [2010] 13 SCR 1120 : Civil Appeal No.

10044 of 2010; Aishat Shifa v. State of Karnataka, [2022]

5 SCR 426 : (2023) 2 SCC 1; Jayantilal Ranchhoddas

Koticha v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., AIR 1958 Bom

155; Basheshar Nath v. CIT, [1959] Supp 1 SCR 528;

State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952] 1 SCR

284 : (1951) 1 SCC 1; Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of

Saurashtra, [1952] 1 SCR 435 : (1952) 1 SCC 215;

Budhan Chowdhury v. State of Bihar, [1955] 1 SCR 1045;

Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S R Tendolkar, [1959] SCR 279;

E P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1974] 2 SCR 348 : 

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 441

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

(1974) 4 SCC 3; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Seheravardi,

[1981] 2 SCR 79 : (1981) 1 SCC 722; Sharma Transport

v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, [2001] Suppl. 5 SCR

390 : (2002) 2 SCC 188; State of Tamil Nadu v. Ananthi

Ammal, [1994] Suppl. 5 SCR 666 : (1995) 1 SCC 519;

Dr. K R Lakshmanan v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1996] 1

SCR 395 : (1996) 2 SCC 226; State of Andhra Pradesh

v. McDowell & Co., [1996] 3 SCR 721 : (1996) 3 SCC

709; Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra,

[1997] Suppl. 6 SCR 717 : (1998) 2 SCC 1; Mardia

Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India,[2004] 3 SCR 982 : (2004)

4 SCC 311; Natural Resources Allocation, In Re Special

Reference No. 1 of 2012, [2012] 9 SCR 311 : (2012) 10

SCC 1; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR

621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248; Navtej Singh Johar v. Union

of India, [2018] 7 SCR 379 : (2018) 10 SCC 1; Joseph

Shine v. Union of India, [2018] 11 SCR 765 : (2019) 3

SCC 39; Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, [1959]

SCR 629 : AIR 1958 SC 731; Binoy Viswam v. Union of

India, [2017] 7 SCR 1 : (2017) 7 SCC 59; Charanjit Lal

Chowdhuri v. Union of India, 1950 SCC 833; In Re Delhi

Laws Act 1912, 1951 SCC 568; Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg.

(Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax

and others, [1974] 2 SCR 879 : (1974) 4 SCC 98; Shri

Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1990] 1 SCR

909 : (1990) 3 SCC 223; Khoday Distilleries Ltd. V. State

of Karnataka, [1995] Suppl. 6 SCR 759 : (1996) 10 SCC

304; State of Tamil Nadu v. P Krishnamurthy, [2006] 3

SCR 396 : (2006) 4 SCC 517; Kesavananda Bharati v.

State of Kerala, [1973] Suppl. 1 SCR 1 : (1973) 4 SCC

225; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, [1978] 2 SCR

405 : (1975) Supp SCC 1; Digvijay Mote v. Union of India,

[1993] Suppl. 1 SCR 553 : (1993) 4 SCC 175; Kuldip

Nayar v. Union of India, [2006] Suppl. 5 SCR 1 : (2006)

7 SCC 1; People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of

India, [2013] 12 SCR 283 : (2013) 10 SCC 1; Mohinder

Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, [1978] 2 SCR

272 : (1978) 1 SCC 405 – referred to.

FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,

436 US 775 (1978); *Campbell v. MGM Limited,

[2004] UKHL 22; Citizens United v. Federal Election

Commission, 558 U.S 310 – referred to.

442 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

In the Judgment of Sanjiv Khanna, J

Swiss Ribbons (P.) Ltd. and Another v. Union of India

and Others, [2019] 3 SCR 535 : (2019) 4 SCC 17;

Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure and Another v.

Union of India and Others, [2019] 10 SCR 381 : (2019)

8 SCC 416 – held inapplicable.

Rojer Matthew v. South Indian Bank Ltd. And Ors., [2019]

16 SCR 1 : Civil Appeal No. 8588 of 2019; R.K. Garg

v. Union of India and Others, [1982] 1 SCR 947 : (1981)

4 SCC 675; Bhavesh D. Parish and Others v. Union of

India and Others, [2000] Suppl. 1 SCR 291 : (2000)

5 SCC 471; Directorate General of Foreign Trade and

Others v. Kanak Exports and Another, [2015] 15 SCR

287 : (2016) 2 SCC 226; Union of India v. Association for

Democratic Reforms and Another, [2002] 3 SCR 696 :

(2002) 5 SCC 294; People’s Union of Civil Liberties

(PUCL) and Another v. Union of India and Another, [2003]

2 SCR 1136 : (2003) 4 SCC 399; Kanwar Lal Gupta v.

Amar Nath Chawla & Ors., [1975] 2 SCR 259 : (1975)

3 SCC 646; K. S. Puttaswamy and Anr. v. Union of

India and Ors. [2017] 10 SCR 569 : (2017) 10 SCC 1;

Modern Dental College & Research Centre and Others

v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, [2016] 3 SCR

579 : (2016) 7 SCC 353; K. S. Puttaswamy (Retired)

and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr., [2018] 8 SCR 1 :

(2019) 1 SCC 1; Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha and Another

v. State of Gujarat, [2020] 13 SCR 886 : (2020) 10 SCC

459; Ramesh Chandra Sharma and Others v. State of

U.P. and Others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 162; Anuradha

Bhasin v. Union of India and Others, [2020] 1 SCR 812 :

(2020) 3 SCC 637; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of

India, [1970] 3 SCR 530 : (1970) 1 SCC 248; Maneka

Gandhi v. Union of India and Another, [1978] 2 SCR 621

: (1978) 1 SCC 248; Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India,

[2023] 9 SCR 1 : (2023) 6 SCC 161; R.C.Poudyal v.

Union of India and Others, [1993] 1 SCR 891 : (1994)

Supp 1 SCC 324; Shayara Bano v. Union of India, [2017]

9 SCR 797 : (2017) 9 SCC 1 – referred to.

Libman v. Quebec (A. G.), [1997] 3 SCR 569; RJRMacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 443

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

3 SCR 199; Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada

(A.G.), [1998] 1 SCR 877; R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 SCR

45; Harper v. Canada (A.G.), [2004] 1 SCR 827; R. v.

Bryan, [2007] 1 SCR 527; Mounted Police Association

of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 SCR

3; Brown v. Socialist Workers Comm., 459 U.S. 87

(1982); Campbell v. MGM Limited, [2004] 2 AC 457;

My Vote Counts NPC v. President of the Republic of

South Africa and Ors., (2017) ZAWCHC 105, para

67; Jeffery Raymond McCloy and Others v. State

of New South Wales and Another, (2015) HCA 34;

Bernstein and Ors. v. Bester NO and Others, (1996)

ZACC 2; Federal Election Commission v. National

Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982);

Buckley v. R Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Grosjean v.

American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Nixon,

Attorney General of Missouri, et al v. Shrink Missouri

Government PAC et al, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); In re.S,

[2005] 1 AC 593; In Re. W, [2005] EWHC 1564 (Fam);

R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103; Canada (Attorney

General) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp., [2007] 2 S.C.R.

610; Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony,

and [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567; Clubb v. Edwards, (2019)

93 ALJR 448; Associated Provincial Picture Houses

Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation, (1948) 1 KB 223 –

referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited

In the Judgment of Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI

Gayatri Devi and Santha Rama Rau, A Princess

remembers: The Memoirs of the Maharani of Jaipur,

(Rupa Publications 1995) [301]; Michael A. Collins,

Navigating Fiscal Constraints in “Costs of Democracy:

Political Finance in India” (edited by Devesh Kapur and

Milan Vaishnav) OUP 2018; Neelanjan Sircar, Money

in Elections: the Role of Personal Wealth in Election

Outcomes in Costs of Democracy: Political Finance in

India (ed. By Devesh Kapur and Milan Vaishnav) OUP

2018; Aradhya Sethia, “Where’s the party?: towards a

constitutional biography of political parties, Indian Law

444 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Review, 3:1, 1-32 (2019); Law Commission of India,

170th Report on the Reform of the Electoral Laws

(1999); Lok Sabha Debates, Companies Bill (16 May

1985); Santhanam Committee Report on Prevention of

Corruption, 1964 – referred to.

John Hart Ely Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of

Judicial Review (Harvard University Press, 2002);

Conrad Foreman, Money in Politics: Campaign Finance

and its Influence over the Political Process and Public

Policy, 52 UIC J. Marshall L. Rev. 185 (2018); D

Sunshine Hillygus, Campaign Effects on Vote Choice

in “The Oxford Handbook of American Elections and

Political Behavior” (Ed. Jan E. Leighley 2010); David

P. Baron, Electoral Competition with informed and

uninformed voters, American Political Science Review,

Vol. 88, No. 1 March 1994; Dominik Hangartner,

NelsonA Ruiz, Janne Tukiainen, Open or Closed? How

List Type Affects Electoral Performance, Candidate

Selection, and Campaign Effort, VAT Institute for

Economic Research Working Papers 120 (2019); Ben

Ansell and Jean Gingrich J (2021). Political Inequality.

The IFS Deaton Review of Inequalities, London:

Institute for Fiscal Studies; Joshua L. Kalla and David

E. Broockman, “Campaign Contributions Facilitate

Access to Congressional Officials: A Randomized

Field Experiment” (2016 60(3)) American Journal of

Political Science; Philip N Howard and Daniel Kreiss,

Political Parties and Voter privacy: Australia, Canada,

the United Kingdom, and United States in Comparative

Perspective, First Monday 15(12) 2010; Colin

Bennet, The politics of privacy and privacy of politics:

Parties, elections, and voter surveillance in Western

Democracies. First Monday, 18(8) 2013; Hon’ble Mr

Justice Andrew Cheung PJ, Conflict of fundamental

rights and the double proportionality test, A lecture in

the Common Law Lecture Series 2019 delivered at

the University of Hong Kong (17 September 2019);

Report of the Committee on Prevention of Corruption,

1964 [11.5] – referred to.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 445

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

In the Judgment of Sanjiv Khanna, J

Suchindran Bhaskar Narayan and Lalit Panda, Money

and Elections-Necessary Reforms in Electoral Finance,

Vidhi 2018 at p. 19; Law Commission of India, Electoral

Reforms, Report No. 255, March 2015 – referred to.

John Parkinson and Jane Mansbridge (eds),

Deliberative Systems (1st edn, Cambridge University

Press 2012) 11; James S Fishkin, When the

People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public

Consultation (Oxford University Press 2011) 33– 34;

Aharon Barak, “Proportionality – Constitutional Rights

and their Limitations”, Cambridge University Press,

2012; David Bilchitz, “Necessity and Proportionality:

Towards a Balance Approach?“, (Hart Publishing,

Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2016); Aparna Chandra,

“Proportionality: A Bridge to Nowhere?”, (Oxford

Human Rights Journal 2020); Jochen von Bernstroff,

Proportionality Without Balancing: Why Judicial

Ad Hoc Balancing is Unnecessary and Potentially

Detrimental to Realisation of Collective and Individual

Self Determination, Reasoning Rights-Comparative

Judicial Engagement, (Ed. Liaora Lazarus); Bernhard

Schlink, ‘Abwägung im Verfassungsrecht’, Duncker

& Humblot, 1976, and Francisco J. Urbina, ‘Is It

Really That Easy? A Critique of Proportionality and

Balancing as Reasoning’ Canadian Journal of Law

and Jurisprudence, 2014; Robert Alexy, A Theory of

Constitutional Rights (Julian Rivers, trans. Oxford

Univ. Press 2002); Cabinet Directive on Law-making

in Guide to Making Federal Acts and Regulations

(2nd edn, Government of Canada; Niels Petersen,

‘Proportionality and judicial Activism: Fundamental

Rights Adjudication in Canada, Germany and South

Africa, (CUP 2017); Yun-chien Chand & Peng-Hsiang

Wang, The Empirical Foundation of Normative

Arguments in Legal Reasoning (Univ. Chicago

Coase-Sandor Inst. For L. & Econ., Res. Paper No.

745, 2016); Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, An

Introduction to Empirical Legal Research 6 (2014);

Joshua B. Fischman, Reuniting “Is” and “Ought” in

Empirical Legal Scholarship, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 117

446 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

(2013); Marilyn Strathern, Improving Ratings: Audit in

the British University System, European review, Vol.

5 Issue 3, pp. 305-321 (1997); Lord Neill of Bladen,

QC, ‘Fifth Report of the Committee on Standards

in Public Life: The Funding of Political Parties in

the United Kingdom’, 1998 pp 61-62; Francisco J.

Urbina, A Critique of Proportionality, American Journal

of Jurisprudence, Vol 57, 2012; Ronald Dworkin,

Taking Rights Seriously (Bloomsbury 2013), pp 41-

42; Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights,

(translated by Julian Rivers, first published 2002,

OUP 2010), pp. 47-48; Robert Alexy, A Theory of

Constitutional Rights (Julian Rivers, trans. Oxford

Univ. Press 2002); David Bilchitz, Necessity and

Proportionality: Towards a Balance Approach?, (Hart

Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2016);

Adrienne Stone, Proportionality and its Alternatives,

Melbourne Legal Studies Research Paper Series

No. 848; John Braithwaite, Rules and Principles:

a Theory of Legal Certainty, Australian Journal of

Legal Philosophy 47 (2002); Harrison Moore, The

Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia;

Jennifer L. Greenblatt, Putting the Government to

the (Heightened, Intermediate, or Strict) Scrutiny

Test: Disparate Application Shows Not All Rights and

Powers Are Created Equal, (2009) 10 Fla Coastal L

Rev 421 – referred to.

Website

In the Judgment of Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI

Election Commission of India, Instructions to political

parties on manifestos dated 24.04.2015, https://

www.eci.gov.in/election-manifestos/; Election

Commission of India, Letter dated 26 May 2017,

No. 56/PPEMS/Transparency/2017 – referred to.

In the Judgment of Sanjiv Khanna, J

Charterpedia, Department of Justice, Government

of Canada, available at: https://www.justice.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 447

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/rfc-dlc/ccrf-ccdl/check/art1.htm

– referred to.

List of Acts

In the Judgment of Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI

Constitution of India; Finance Act, 2017; Companies Act,

1956; Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934; Representation of

the People Act, 1951; Income Tax Act, 1961; Companies

Act, 2013; Companies (Amendment) Act, 1960; Companies

(Amendment)Act, 1969; Companies (Amendment)Act, 1985;

Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1978; Evidence Act, 1872;

Election and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2003;

Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968;

Conduct of Election Rules, 1961.

In the Judgment of Sanjiv Khanna, J

Constitution of India; Companies Act, 1956; Companies Act

of 2013; Finance Act, 2017; Income Tax Act, 1961; Reserve

Bank of India Act, 1934; Representation of the People Act,

1951; Foreign Contribution RegulationAct, 2010; Prevention

of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

List of Keywords

In the Judgment of Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI

Electoral bond scheme, 2018; Electoral bond; Corporate

contributions; Curbing black money; Transparency; Judicial

review; Close association of politics and money; Nondisclosure of information on electoral financing; Right to

information; Electoral process; Donor privacy; Informational

privacy of financial contributions to political parties; Privacy

vis-a-vis political party; Right to informational privacy; Judicial

approach; Balancing fundamental rights; Double proportionality

standard; Arbitrariness; Manifest arbitrariness; Indian

jurisprudence; Anonymous financial contributions to political

parties; Financial contributions to political parties; Financial

448 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

contributions; Election Commission of India; Transparency of

political finance; Quid pro quo arrangements; Free and fair

elections; Presumption of constitutionality; Corporate funding;

Electoral campaigns; Excessive delegation; Principle of ‘one

person-one vote’; Non-disclosure of funding by companies;

Public domain; Corporate donations; Anonymity of donations

to political parties; Judicial restraint; Symbols Order; Electoral

democracy; Proportionality standard; Electoral Trusts; Political

contribution; Electronic transfer other than electoral bonds;

Right to informational privacy of political affiliation; Privacy;

Political beliefs; Political affiliation; Privacy of political affiliation;

Electoral franchise; Corrupt practices; Single proportionality

standard; Plenary legislation; Subordinate legislation; Removal

of contribution restrictions; Loss-making companies; Profitmaking companies.

In the Judgment of Sanjiv Khanna, J

Electoral Bonds Scheme, 2018; Electoral bonds; Electoral

process; Doctrine of proportionality; Corporate funding;

Ban on contributions to political parties; Contributions

by companies; Electronic Clearing System; Economic

policy; Judicial review; Electoral democracy; Burden of

proof; Doctrine of presumption of constitutionality; Test of

proportionality; Structured proportionality; Right to vote;

Right to know; Symbol allotted to political parties; Funding of

political parties; Democratic legitimacy; Substantive balance;

Diversity; Conscientiousness; Equal consideration; Donors of

a political party; Informational privacy of donors; Black money

in electoral finance; Retribution; Victimisation; Retaliation;

Quid pro quo; Multiple donors; Double proportionality; Single

proportionality standard; Principle of reasonableness; Right

of privacy; Balancing prong of proportionality; Principle of lis

pendens; Necessity test; Rational connection test; Standard

based review; Rule based legal adjudication; Empirical

deference; Transparency; Secrecy; Identities of donor;

Money laundering; Alternative measures; Electoral Trust

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 449

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

Scheme; Fundamental rights; Complementary rights; Law

Commission of India; Party wise donation; Test of manifest

arbitrariness.

Case Arising From

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No.880 of 2017

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)

With

Writ Petition (Civil) Nos.59 of 2018, 975 And 1132 of 2022

Appearances for Parties

Kapil Sibal, Sr. Adv., Prashant Bhushan, Ms. Neha Rathi, Pranav

Sachdeva, Ms. Alice Raj, Ms. Shivani Kapoor, Kamal Kishore, Ms.

Kajal Giri, Varinder Kumar Sharma, Varun Thakur, Gautam Bhatia,

Pradanns. S, Ms. Rupali Samuel, Ms.Aprajits Jamuel, Rishabh Parikh,

Shsntanu Sharma, Ms. Deeksha Gaur, Y K Prasad, Shadan Farasat,

Ms. Hrishika Jain, Aman Naqvi, Ms. Natasha Maheshwari, Rizwan,

Ms. Sachi Chopra, Nizam Pasha, Javedur Rahman, Mudassir, Arif

Ali, Ms. Aayushi Mishra, Advs. for the Petitioners.

R Venkataramani, AG, Tushar Mehta, SG, R Balasubramanian, Sr.

Adv., Raj Bahadur Yadav, Ms. Seema Bengani, Shyam Gopal, Ms.

Chinmayee Chandra, Kanu Agrawal, Rajat Nair, Raman Yadav,

Chitvan Singhal, Mrs. Shraddha Deshmukh, Ms. Sonali Jain,Abhishek

Kumar Pandey, Kartikay Aggarwal, Rajan Kumar Chourasia, Ms.

Shraddha Deshmukh, Ankur Talwar, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Amit

Sharma, Dipesh Sinha, Ms. Pallavi Barua, Ms. Aparna Singh, Advs.

for the Respondents.

Vijay Hansaria, Sanjay R Hegde, Sr. Advs. Ms. Sneha Kalita,

Ms. Kavya Jhawar, K.S.bhati, Ms. Jessy Kurian, Ms. Sr. Leona,

Pawanshree Agarwala, Suren Uppal, Aviral Kashyap, Shahrukh Ali,

Sanjeev Menon, Ms. Stuti Srivastava, Ms. Vimal Sinha, Rajesh Kumar,

P.B. Suresh, Prasanna S., Ms. Disha Wadekar, Ms. Deeksha Dwivedi,

Ms. Swati Arya, Yuvraj Singh Rathore, Varun K Chopra, Mehul

Sharma, Abhishek Kandwal, M/S. Vkc Law Offices, Kaleeswaram

Raj, Ms. Thulasi K Raj, Ms. Aparna Menon, Mohammed Sadique

T.A., Advs. for the Intervenors.

450 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI*

A. Background 4

i. Corporate Contributions ........................................... 5

ii. Curbing black money ................................................ 10

iii. Transparency .............................................................. 11

iv. Objections of RBI and ECI to the Electoral

Bond Scheme ............................................................. 13

v. Electoral Bond Scheme ............................................. 18

B. Issues ................................................................................. 23

C. Submissions ....................................................................... 24

i. Submissions of petitioners ....................................... 24

ii. Submissions of Union of India ................................. 36

D. The Scope of Judicial Review ......................................... 40

E. The close association of politics and money ................ 44

F. The challenge to non-disclosure of information

on electoral financing ...................................................... 50

i. Infringement of the right to information of the voter .. 51

a. The scope of Article 19(1)(a): tracing the right to

information ............................................................. 51

b. Right to information of a voter: exploring the

judgments in ADR and PUCL ............................... 55

c. The focal point of the electoral process:

candidate or political party .................................... 64

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 451

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

d. The essentiality of information about political

funding for the effective exercise of the choice of

voting ..................................................................... 73

ii. Whether the infringement of the right to

information of the voter is justified ......................... 78

a. Curbing Black money ............................................. 80

b. Donor Privacy ......................................................... 95

I. Informational privacy of financial contributions to

political parties .......................................................

96

II. Privacy vis-à-vis political party ............................... 103

III. Balancing the right to information and the right

to informational privacy ......................................... 103

a) Judicial Approach towards balancing

fundamental rights: establishing the double

proportionality standard .................................. 103

b) Validity of the Electoral Bond Scheme,

Section 11 of the Finance Act and Section

137 of the Finance Act .................................... 113

c. Validity of Section 154 of the Finance Act amending

Section 182(3) to the Companies Act ................... 120

G. Challenge to unlimited corporate funding ..................... 124

i. The application of the principle of non-arbitrariness 127

a. Arbitrariness as a facet of Article 14 ..................... 127

b. Beyond Shayara Bano: entrenching manifest

arbitrariness in Indian jurisprudence ..................... 131

ii. Validity of Section 154 of the Finance Act 2017

omitting the first proviso to Section 182 of the

Companies Act ........................................................... 140

H. Conclusion and Directions .............................................. 149

452 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

1. The petitioners have instituted proceedings under Article 32 of the

Constitution challenging the constitutional validity of the Electoral

Bond Scheme1 which introduced anonymous financial contributions to

political parties. The petitioners have also challenged the provisions

of the Finance Act 20172 which, among other things, amended the

provisions of the Reserve Bank of IndiaAct 19343

, the Representation

of the PeopleAct 19514

, the Income TaxAct 19615

, and the Companies

Act 20136

.

A. Background

2. Section 31 of the RBI Act stipulates that only the RBI or the Central

Government authorized by the RBI Act shall draw, accept, make, or

issue any bill of exchange or promissory note for payment of money

to the bearer of the note or bond. The Finance Act amended the RBI

Act by including Section 31(3) which permits the Central Government

to authorize any scheduled bank to issue electoral bonds.

3. To understand the context in which the legislative amendments

were introduced, it is necessary to juxtapose the amendments with

the regime on financial contributions to political parties. The law

relating to financial contributions to political parties focusses on (a)

contributions by corporate entities; (b) disclosure of information on

contributions; and (c) income tax exemptions for donations.

i. Corporate Contributions

4. The Companies Act 1956 and the provisions of the RPA, when they

were enacted did not regulate contributions to political parties by

companies and individuals. The Companies (Amendment) Act 1960

included Section 293A7 to regulate contributions by companies.

1 “Electoral Bond Scheme” or “Scheme”

2 “Finance Act”

3 Section 135 of the Finance Act 2017; “RBI Act”

4 Section 137 of the Finance Act 2017;“RPA”

5 Section 11 of the Finance Act 2017; “IT Act”

6 Section 154 of the Finance Act 2017; “Companies Act”

7 “293A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 293, neither a company in general meeting

nor its Board of directors shall, after the commencement of the Companies (Amendment) Act, 1960,

contribute-

(a) To any political party, or

(b) For any political purpose to any individual or body, any amount or amounts which or the aggregate

of which will, in any financial year, exceed twenty-five thousand rupees or five per cent of its

average net profits as determined in accordance with the provisions of sections 349 and 350 during

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 453

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

The provision stipulated that companies cannot contribute to (a)

any political party; and (b) to any individual or body for any political

purpose, amounts exceeding twenty-five thousand rupees in a

financial year or five percent of its average net profits during the three

financial years immediately preceding the contribution, whichever

is greater. Companies were also required to disclose the amount

contributed in a financial year in their profit and loss accounts and

furnish particulars of the total amount contributed and the name of

the party, individual or entity to which or to whom such amount was

contributed. Companies defaulting in complying with the disclosure

requirement were punishable with a fine which could extend to

rupees five thousand.

5. The Companies (Amendment) Act 1969 amended Section 293A8 so

as to ban contributions to political parties and for political purposes.

Companies acting in contravention of the prohibition were punishable

with a fine which could extend to five thousand rupees, and every

officer who defaulted was punishable with imprisonment which could

extend to three years, besides being liable to fine.

6. The Companies (Amendment) Act 1985 amended Section 293A9 to

the three financial years immediately preceding, whichever is greater.

Explanation- Where a portion of a financial year of the company falls before the commencement of the

Companies (Amendment) Act, 1960, and a portion falls after such commencement, the latter portion

shall be deemed to be a financial year within the meaning, and for the purposes, of this sub-section.

(2) Every company shall disclose in its profit and loss account any amount or amounts contributed by it

under sub-section (1) to any political party or for any political purpose to any individual or body during

the financial year to which the account relates, giving particulars of the total amount contributed and the

name of the party, individual or body to which or to whom such amount has been contributed.

(3) If a company makes a default in complying with the provisions of sub-section (2), the company, and

every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with fine which may extend to five

thousand rupees.”

8 “Section 293A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, neither a

company in general meeting nor its Board of directors shall, after the commencement of the Companies

(Amendment) Act 1960 contribute any amount or amounts-

(a) To any political party or

(b) For any political purpose to an individual or body.

(2) If a company contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) then-

(i) the company shall be punishable with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees; and

(ii) every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with imprisonment for a

term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine”

9 “293A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act-

(a) No Government company; and

(b) No other company which has been in existence for less than three financial years,

shall contribute any amount or amounts, directly or indirectly, -

(i) To any political party; or

(ii) For any political purpose to any person.

(2) A company, not being a company referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1), may

454 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

permit contributions to political parties and for political purposes once

again. The explanation of the phrase “political purpose” included

donations made to a person who in the knowledge of the donor is

carrying out any activity at the time of donation which can be regarded

as public support to a political party. Further, the direct or indirect

expenditure by companies on advertisements by or on behalf of

political parties or publications for the advantage of a political party

were also regarded as contributions for political purposes. Three other

restrictions, in addition to the earlier restriction prescribing a cap on

contributions and disclosure requirement were included. First, the

company (which is not a government company) should have been

in existence for more than three years; second, contributions could

only be made when a resolution authorizing the contributions had

been passed at a meeting of the Board of Directors; and third, the

penal consequences attached to the violations of the provision were

contribute any amount or amounts directly or indirectly-

(a) to any political party,-

(b) for any political purpose to any person:

Provided that the amount or, as the case may be, the aggregate of the amounts which may be so

contributed by a company in any financial year shall not exceed five percent of its average net profits

determined in accordance with the provisions of sections 349 and 350 during the three preceding

financial years.

Explanation.- Where a portion of a financial year of the company falls before the commencement of the

Companies (Amendment) Act, 1985, and a portion falls after such commencement, the latter portion

shall be deemed to be a financial year within the meaning, and for the purposes of this sub-section:

Provided further that no such contribution shall be made by a company unless a resolution authorizing

the making of such contribution is passed at a meeting of the Board of Directors and such resolution

shall, subject to the other provisions of this section, be deemed to be justification in law for the making

and the acceptance of the contribution authorized by it.

(3) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2)-

(a) a donation or subscription or payment caused to be given by a company on its behalf or on its

account to a person who, to its knowledge, is carrying on any activity which, at the time at which

such donation or subscription or payment was given or made, can reasonably be regarded as likely

to effect public support for a political party shall also be deemed to be contribution of the amount of

such donation, subscription or payment to such person for a political purpose;

(b) the amount of expenditure incurred, directly or indirectly, by a company on advertisement in any

publication (being a publication in the nature of a souvenir brochure, tract, pamphlet or the like) by

or on behalf of a political party or for its advantage, shall also be deemed,-

(i) where such publication is by or on behalf of a political party, to be a contribution of such

amount to such political party, and

(ii) where such publication is not by or on behalf of but for the advantage of a political party, to

be a contribution for a political purpose to the publishing it.

(4) Every company shall disclose in its profit and loss account any amount or amounts contributed by

it to any political party or for any political purpose to any person during the financial year to which that

account relates, giving particulars of the total amount contributed and the name of the party or person to

which or to whom such amount has been contributed.

(5) If a company makes any contribution in contravention of the provisions of this section-

(a) the company shall be punishable with fine which may extend to three times the amount so

contributed; and

(b) every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term

which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 455

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

made more stringent. A fine extendable to three times the amount

contributed could be imposed, and every officer of the company who

was in default of the provision was punishable for a term which could

extend to three years and be liable for fine.

7. Section 182 of the Companies Act 2013 substantively incorporated

the provisions of Section 293-A of the 1956 Act, as amended in

1985. Section 182 enables a company to contribute any amount

directly or indirectly to any political party. The provision bars a

Government company and a company which has been in existence

for less than three financial years from contributing to a political

party. The provisos to the provision prescribe the following two

conditions:

a. The aggregate of the amount contributed by the company in

any financial year shall not exceed seven and a half per cent of

its average net profits during the three immediately preceding

financial years;10 and

b. A contribution can be made only if the Board of Directors

issues a resolution authorizing the contribution at a meeting.

Such a resolution shall, subject to the other provisions of the

Section, be deemed to be a justification in law for the making

and acceptance of the contribution authorized by the Board.11

8. Sub-section (3) of Section 182 mandates every company to disclose

in its profit and loss account any amount contributed by it to any

political party during the financial year with specific particulars of the

total amount contributed along with the name of the political party

to which the contribution was made.

9. Section 182 of the Companies Act 2013 made two modifications

from Section 293-A of the Companies Act 1956: (a) the cap on the

contributions which can be made by companies was increased from

5 % to 7.5% of their average net profits; and (b) more stringent

consequences for violation of were imposed. The fine was extendable

to five times (instead of three times prescribed in the earlier provision)

of the contribution.

10 Companies Act, First proviso to Section 182(1).

11 Companies Act, second proviso to Section 182(1)

456 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

10. The Finance Act 2017 made three changes to Section 182 of the

Companies Act:

a. The first proviso to Section 182(1) which prescribed a cap on

corporate funding was omitted;

b. Section 182(3) was amended to only require a disclosure of

the total amount contributed to political parties by a company

in a financial year and excluded the requirement to disclose

the particulars of the amount contributed to each political

party; and

c. Sub-section 3A was introduced, by which a company could

contribute to a political party only by a cheque, bank draft, or

electronic clearing system. The proviso to the sub-section states

that a company may also contribute through any instrument

issued pursuant to any scheme notified under any law for the

time being in force for contribution to political parties.

ii. Curbing black money

11. The Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act 1978 included Section 13A to

the IT Act exempting the income of political parties through financial

contributions and investments from income tax. The objects and

reasons of the Amending Act stipulated that tax exemption would

increase disposable funds from “legitimate sources”. However, to

secure the benefit of exemption, the following conditions prescribed

in the proviso were required to be fulfilled:

a. The political party was required to keep and maintain books of

account and other documents which would enable theAssessing

Officer to properly deduce its income;12

b. The political party had to maintain a record of voluntary

contributions in excess of twenty thousand rupees13, along

with the name and address of the person who made such

contributions;14 and

12 IT Act, Proviso (a) to Section 13A

13 It was ten thousand rupees when Section 13A was introduced. It was increased to twenty thousand

rupees by the Election and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act 2003

14 IT Act, Proviso (b) to Section 13A

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 457

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

c. The accounts of the political party were required to be audited

by an accountant.15

12. By the Election and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act 2003,

Sections 80GGB16 and 80GGC17 were inserted in the IT Act making

contributions made to political parties tax deductible. The speech of Mr

Arun Jaitley, the then Minister of Law and Justice while moving the Bill

indicates that contributions were made tax deductible to “incentivize

contributions” through cheque and other banking channels.

13. The Finance Act 2017 made the following amendments to Section

13A of the IT Act:

a. The political party was not required to maintain a record of

contributions if the contribution was received by electoral

bonds;18 and

b. The political party must receive a donation in excess of two

thousand rupees only by a cheque, bank draft, electronic clearing

system or through an electoral bond.19

iii. Transparency

14. The Election and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act 2003

amended the provisions of the RPA. Section 29C of the RP Act was

introduced for requiring each political party to declare the details of the

contributions received. The treasurer of a political party or any other

person authorized by the political party must in each financial year

prepare a report in respect of the contributions in excess of twenty

thousand rupees received by the party from a person or company

15 IT Act, Proviso (c) to Section 13A

16 80GGB. “Deduction in respect of contributions made by companies to political parties-In computing the

total income of an assessee, being an Indian company, there shall be deducted any sum contributed by

it, in the previous year to any political party or an electoral trust:

Provided that no deduction shall be allowed under this section in respect of any sum contributed by way

of cash.”

17 80 GGC. “Deduction in respect of contributions made by any person to political parties- In computing the

total income of an assessee, being any person, except local authority and every artificial juridical person

wholly or partly funded by the Government, there shall be deducted any amount of contribution made by

him, in the previous year, to a political party [or an electoral trust] :

[Provided that no deduction shall be allowed under this section in respect of any sum contributed by

way of cash.]

Explanation.—For the purposes of sections 80GGB and 80GGC, “political party” means a political party

registered under section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951).”

18 IT Act, amendment to Proviso (b) to Section 13A

19 IT Act, Proviso (d) to Section 13A

458 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

other than Government companies in that financial year. The report

prepared must be submitted to the Election Commission before

the due date for furnishing a return of income of that financial year

under the IT Act.20 A political party which fails to submit the report

shall not be entitled to any tax relief as provided under the IT Act.21

15. The provision was amended by the Finance Act 2017 to include

a proviso by which the political party was not required to disclose

details of contributions received by electoral bonds.

Annexure I to this Judgment depicts in a tabular form the amendments

to the provisions of the RP Act, the IT Act, the Companies Act, and

the RBI Act by the Finance Act 2017.

16. The effect of the amendments introduced by the Finance Act to the

above legislations is that:

a. A new scheme for financial contribution to political parties is

introduced in the form of electoral bonds;

b. The political parties need not disclose the contributions received

through electoral bonds;

c. Companies are not required to disclose the details of

contributions made in any form; and

d. Unlimited corporate funding is permissible.

iv. Objections of RBI and ECI to the Electoral Bond Scheme

17. On 2 January 2017, the RBI wrote a letter to the Joint Secretary in

the Ministry of Finance on the proposal of the Government of India

to enable Scheduled Banks to issue electoral bearer bonds for the

purpose of donations to political parties before the Finance Act 2017

was enacted. The RBI objected to the proposal on the ground that:

a. The amendment would enable multiple non-sovereign entities to

issue bearer instruments. The proposal militated against RBI’s

sole authority for issuing bearer instruments which has the

potential of becoming currency. Electoral bonds can undermine

the faith in banknotes issued by the Central Bank if the bonds

are issued in sizable quantities;

20 RPA, Section 29C (3)

21 RPA, Section 29C (4)

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 459

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

b. Though the identity of the person or entity purchasing the bearer

bond will be known because of the Know Your Customer22

requirement, the identities of the intervening persons/entities

will not be known. This would impact the principles of the

Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002; and

c. The intention of introducing electoral bonds can be accomplished

by cheque, demand draft, and electronic and digital payments.

There is no special need for introducing a new bearer bond in

the form of electoral bonds.

18. On 30 January 2017, the Finance Ministry responded to the

observations of RBI and stated that:

a. RBI has not understood the core purpose of electoral bonds

which is to keep the identity of the donor secret while at the

same time ensuring that the donation is only made from tax

paid money; and

b. The fear that electoral bonds might be used as currency is

unfounded because there is a time limit for redeeming the bonds.

19. By a letter dated 4 August 2017, the Deputy Governor of the RBI

stated that India can consider issuing the electoral bonds on a

transitional basis through the RBI under the existing provisions of

Section 31(1) of the RBIAct. The RBI recommended the incorporation

of the following safeguards to minimize the inherent scope of misuse

of the bonds for undesirable activities:

a. The electoral bonds may have a maximum tenure of fifteen days;

b. The electoral bonds can be purchased for any value in multiples

of a thousand, ten thousand, or a lakh of rupees;

c. The purchase of electoral bonds would be allowed from a KYC

compliant bank account of the purchaser;

d. The electoral bonds can be redeemed only upon being deposited

into the designated bank account of an eligible political party;

e. The sale of electoral bonds will be open only for a limited period,

may be twice a year for seven days each; and

f. The electoral bonds will be issued only at RBI, Mumbai.

22 “KYC”

460 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

20. The draft of the Electoral Bond Scheme was circulated to the RBI for its

comments. The draft conferred notified scheduled commercial banks,

apart from the RBI, with the power to issue electoral bonds. The RBI

objected to the draft Scheme by a letter dated 14 September 2017. The

RBI stated that permitting a commercial bank to issue bonds would “have

an adverse impact on public perception about the Scheme, as also the

credibility of India’s financial system in general and the central bank

in particular.” The RBI again flagged the possibility of shell companies

misusing bearer bonds for money laundering transactions. The RBI

recommended that electoral bonds may be issued in electronic form

because it would (a) reduce the risk of their being used for money

laundering; (b) reduce the cost; and (c) be more secure.

21. The Electoral Bond Scheme was placed for deliberation and guidance

by the RBI before the Committee of the Central Board. The Committee

conveyed serious reservations on the issuance of electoral bonds

in the physical form. The reservations were communicated by the

RBI to the Finance Minister by a letter dated 27 September 2017.

The reservations are catalogued below:

a. Issuance of currency is a ‘monopolistic function’ of a central

authority which is why Section 31 of the RBIAct bars any person

other than the RBI from issuing bearer bonds;

b. Issuance of electoral bonds in the scrips will run the risk of money

laundering since the consideration for transfer of scrips from

the original subscriber to a transferee will be paid in cash. This

will not leave any trail of transactions. While this would provide

anonymity to the contributor, it will also provide anonymity to

several others in the chain of transfer;

c. Issuance of electoral bonds in the scrip form could also expose

it to the risk of forgery and cross-border counterfeiting besides

offering a convenient vehicle for abuse by “aggregators”; and

d. The electoral bond may not only be seen as facilitating money

laundering but could also be projected (albeit wrongly) as

enabling it.

22. On 26 May 2017, the Election Commission of India23 wrote to the

Ministry of Law and Justice that the amendments to the IT Act,

23 “ECI”

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 461

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

RPA, and Companies Act introduced by the Finance Act 2017

will have a “serious impact on transparency of political finance/

funding of political parties.” The letter notes that the amendment

to the RPA by which donations through electoral bonds were not

required to be disclosed is a retrograde step towards transparency

of donations:

“2(ii) It is evident from the Amendment which has been

made, that any donation received by a political party

through electoral bond has been taken out of the ambit

of reporting under the Contribution Report as prescribed

under Section 29C of the Representation of the People

Act 1951 and therefore, this is a retrograde step as far as

transparency of donations is concerned and this proviso

needs to be withdrawn.

(iii) Moreover, in a situation where contributions received

through Electoral Bonds is not reported, on perusal of

the Contribution reports of the political parties, it cannot

be ascertained whether the political party has taken any

donation in violation of provisions under Section 29B of

the Representation of the People Act 1951 which prohibits

the political parties from donations from Government

Companies and Foreign sources.”

23. Referring to the deletion of the provision in the Companies Act

requiring companies to disclose particulars of the amount contributed

to specific political parties, the ECI recommended that companies

contributing to political parties must declare party-wise contributions

in the profit and loss account to maintain transparency in the financial

funding of political parties. Further, the ECI also expressed its

apprehension to the deletion of the first proviso to Section 182(1)

by which the cap on corporate donations was removed. The ECI

recommended that the earlier provision prescribing a cap on corporate

funding be reintroduced because:

a. Unlimited corporate funding would increase the use of black

money for political funding through shell companies; and

b. Capped corporate funding ensured that only profitable

companies with a proven track record could donate to political

parties.

462 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

v. Electoral Bond Scheme

24. On 2 January 2018, the Ministry of Finance in the Department of

EconomicAffairs notified the Electoral Bond Scheme 2018 in exercise

of the power under Section 31(3) of the RBI Act. The Electoral Bond

is a bond issued in the nature of promissory note which is a bearer

banking instrument and does not carry the name of the buyer.24 The

features of the Scheme are as follows:

a. The Bond may be purchased by a person who is (i) a citizen

of India; or (ii) incorporated or established in India.25 ‘Person’

includes (a) an individual; (b) a Hindu undivided family; (c) a

company; (c) a firm; (d) an association of persons or a body

of individuals, whether incorporated or not; (e) every artificial

juridical person, not falling within any of the above categories;

and (f) any agency, office, or branch owned or controlled by

such a person. An individual can buy bonds either singly or

jointly with other individuals;26

b. An Electoral Bond can only be encashed by an eligible political

party.27 A political party, to be eligible to receive an electoral

bond, has to be registered under Section 29A of the RP Act,

and ought to have secured not less than one per cent of the

votes polled in the last general election to the House of the

People or the Legislative Assembly of the State.28 An eligible

political party can encash a bond only through a bank account

with an authorised bank.29 The scheme has notified the State

Bank of India as the bank authorised to issue and encash

bonds;30

c. The instructions issued by the Reserve Bank of India regarding

KYC apply to buyers of the bond. The authorised bank may

call for additional KYC documents if necessary;31

24 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 2(a)

25 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 3(1)

26 Electoral Bond Scheme, clause 3(3)

27 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 12

28 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 3(3)

29 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 3(4)

30 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 2(b)

31 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 4(2)

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 463

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

d. Payments for the issuance of the bond are accepted in Indian

rupees, through demand draft, cheque, Electronic Clearing

System or direct debit to the buyer’s account. Where payment

is made by cheque or demand draft, it must be drawn in favour

of the issuing bank at the place of issue;32

e. The bonds are issued in denominations of Rs 1000, 10,000,

1,00,000, 10,00,000 and 1,00,00,000;33

f. The bond is valid for fifteen days from the date of issue. No

payment will be made to a political party if the bond is deposited

after the expiry of fifteen days34. If the bond is not encashed

within fifteen days, it will be deposited by the authorised bank

with the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund;35

g. A buyer who wishes to purchase electoral bond(s) can apply

in the format specified in Annexure II of the Scheme.36 The

issuing branch shall issue the bond if all the requirements are

fulfilled.37 The application shall be rejected if the application

is not KYC compliant or if the application does not meet the

requirements of the scheme;38

h. The bond issued is non-refundable;39

i. The information furnished by the buyer is to be treated as

confidential by the authorized bank. It shall be disclosed only

when demanded by a competent court or upon the registration

of criminal case by any law enforcement agency;40

j. The bond shall be available for purchase for a period of ten days

on a quarterly basis, in the months of January, April, July, and

October as specified by the Central Government.41 Bonds will

32 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 11

33 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 5

34 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 6

35 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 12(2)

36 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 7(1)

37 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 7(3)

38 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 7(4)

39 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 7(6)

40 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 7(4)

41 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 8(1)

464 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

be available for an additional period of thirty days as specified

by the Central Government in a year when General Elections

to the House of People are to be held;42

k. No interest is payable on the bond.43 No commission, brokerage,

or any other charges for issue of a bond shall be payable by

the buyer against purchase of the bond;44

l. The value of the bonds shall be considered as income by way

of voluntary contributions received by an eligible political party

for the purpose of exemption from Income Tax under Section

13A of the IT Act;45 and

m. The bonds are not eligible for trading.46

25. The petitioners instituted proceedings under Article 32 seeking a

declaration that Electoral Bond Scheme and the following provisions

be declared unconstitutional:

a. Section 135 of the Finance Act 2017 and the corresponding

amendment in Section 31 of the RBI Act;

b. Section 137 of the Finance Act 2017 and the corresponding

amendment in Section 29C of the RP Act;

c. Section 11 of the Finance Act 2017 and the corresponding

amendment in Section 13A of the IT Act; and

d. Section 154 of the Finance Act 2017 and the corresponding

amendment to Section 182 of the Companies Act.

26. In its order dated 13 April 2019, this Court observed that the

amendments which have been challenged give rise to weighty

issues which have a bearing on the sanctity of the electoral

process. This Court directed all political parties, in the interim to

submit details of contributions received through electoral bonds

(with particulars of the credit received against each bond, date of

credit, and particulars of the bank account to which the amount

42 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 8(2)

43 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 9

44 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 10

45 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 13

46 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 14

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 465

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

has been credited) to the ECI in a sealed cover. The prayer for

interim relief was rejected by observing that the operations under

the scheme are not placed behind “iron curtains incapable of

being pierced”:

“25. The financial statements of companies registered

under the Companies Act, 2013 which are filed with the

Registrar of Companies, are accessible online on the

website of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs for anyone.

They can also be obtained in physical form from the

Registrar of Companies upon payment of prescribed

fee. Since the Scheme mandates political parties to

file audited statement of accounts and also since the

CompaniesAct requires financial statements of registered

companies to be filed with the Registrar of Companies,

the purchase as well as encashment of the bonds,

happening only through banking channels, is always

reflected in documents that eventually come to the

public domain. All that is required is a little more effort

to cull out such information from both sides (purchaser

of bond and political party) and do some “match the

following”. Therefore, it is not as though the operations

under the Scheme are behind iron curtains incapable

of being pierced.”

27. The petitioners have also challenged the introduction of the Finance

Act as a Money Bill under Article 110 of the Constitution. The issue

of the scope of Article 110 has been referred to a seven-Judge

Bench and is pending adjudication.47 The petitioners submitted

that they would press the grounds of challenge to the Finance Act

independent of the issue on Money Bills in view of the upcoming

elections to Parliament.

28. By an order dated 31 October 2023, the batch of petitions was

directed to be listed before a Bench of at least five-Judges in view

of the provisions of Article 145(3) of the Constitution. It is in this

background that the challenge to the Electoral Bond Scheme and

the amendments is before the Constitution Bench.

47 Roger Mathew v. South Bank of India, CA No. 8588/2019

466 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

B. Issues

29. The present batch of petitions gives rise to the following issues:

a. Whether unlimited corporate funding to political parties,

as envisaged by the amendment to Section 182(1) of the

Companies Act infringes the principle of free and fair elections

and violates Article 14 of the Constitution; and

b. Whether the non-disclosure of information on voluntary

contributions to political parties under the Electoral Bond Scheme

and the amendments to Section 29C of the RPA, Section

182(3) of the Companies Act and Section 13A(b) of the IT Act

are violative of the right to information of citizens under Article

19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

C. Submissions

i. Submissions of petitioners

30. Mr Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel made the following

submissions:

a. There is no rational basis for the introduction of electoral bonds.

The main objective of introducing the Electoral Bond Scheme

as reflected in the article written by the then Finance Minister,

Mr. Arun Jaitley was that it would enhance transparency in

electoral funding since electoral bond transactions can only

be made through legitimate banking channels. However, cash

donations are still permitted even after the introduction of the

Electoral Bond Scheme;

b. The Central Government ignored the objections which were

raised by both the RBI and the ECI to the Electoral Bond Scheme;

c. The statutory amendments and the Electoral Bond Scheme

which mandates non-disclosure of information of electoral

funding are unconstitutional because:

i. They defeat the purpose of introducing provisions

mandating disclosure of information on political funding in

the RPA and the Companies Act which was to enhance

transparency in electoral funding;

ii. They violate Article 19(1)(a) which guarantees to the voter

the right to information concerning the affairs of the public

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 467

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

and the government.48 This includes the right to information

about financial contributions to political parties because the

Constitution through the Tenth Schedule recognizes that

political parties have a decisive control over the formation

of Government and voting by members of the Legislature

in the Legislative Assembly;

iii. They violate Article 21 because the non-disclosure of

information of political contributions promotes corruption49

and quid pro quo arrangements. The available data

indicates that more than ninety four percent of the total

electoral bonds are purchased in denominations of rupees

one crore. This indicates that bonds are purchased by

corporates and not individuals. The limited disclosure

clause in the Electoral Bond Scheme prevents investigating

agencies such as the Central Bureau of Investigation and

Enforcement Directorate from identifying corruption; and

d. They violate the rights of shareholders of Companies who are

donating money to political parties by preventing disclosure of

information to them; and

e. The statutory amendments and the Electoral Bond Scheme

subvert democracy and interfere with free and fair elections

because the huge difference in the funds received by ruling

parties in the States and Centre vitiates a level playing field

between different parties and between parties and independent

candidates.

31. Mr Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel made the following submissions:

a. The amendments and the Electoral Bond Scheme skew free

and fair elections by permitting unlimited contributions to political

parties by corporate entities and removing the requirement of

disclosure of information about political funding;

b. Freedom of a voter in the negative connotation refers to the

freedom to cast their vote without interference and intimidation.

Freedom in the positive connotation includes the freedom to

48 Relied on PUCL v. Union of India, [2003] 2 SCR 1136 : (2003) 4 SCC 399; ADR v. Union of India, [2002]

3 SCR 696 : (2002) 5 SCC 294; Anjali Bhardwaj v. Union of India, [2019] 2 SCR 199 : (2019) 18 SCC 246

49 Relied on Kanwar Lal Gupta v. Amar Nath Chawla, [1975] 2 SCR 259 : 1975 SCC (3) 646

468 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

vote on the basis of complete and relevant information. This

includes information about financial contributions to political

parties;

c. The argument of the Union of India that Courts should show

judicial restraint is erroneous because the amendments in

question relate to the electoral process and do not pertain to

economic policy;

d. The presumption of constitutionality should not apply to

statutes which alter the ground rules of the electoral process.

The principle underlying the presumption of constitutionality is

that the legislature represents the will of the people and that

it is validly constituted through free and fair elections. It would

be paradoxical to accord a presumption of constitutionality to

the very laws or rules that set the conditions under which the

legislature comes into being50;

e. Corporate funding per se is violative of the Constitution because

corporate entities are not citizens and thus, are not entitled to

rights under Article 19(1)(a);

f. The funds contributed to the Electoral Bond Scheme can be

used in any manner and their use is not restricted to electoral

campaigns;

g. The Electoral Bond Scheme severs the link between elections

and representative democracy because those elected are

inclined to fulfill the wishes of the contributors and not the voters.

This could be through direct quid pro quo where an express

promise is made to enact a policy in favour of the donor and

indirect quid pro quo where there is an influence through access

to policy makers;

h. The Scheme promotes information asymmetry where the

information about political donations is not disclosed to voters

but the Central Government is privy to such information through

the State Bank of India which is the authorized bank under the

Scheme. The information asymmetry will ensure that a larger

portion of the donations would be made to the ruling party at the

50 Relied on Subash Chandra v. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board, [2009] 12 SCR 978 : (2009)

15 SCC 458

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 469

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

Centre. According to the data, the political party at the center

has received fifty seven percent of the total contributions made

through electoral bonds;

i. The Electoral Bond Scheme skews the principle of one person,

one vote because it gives the corporates a greater opportunity

to influence political parties and electoral outcomes;

j. The amendment to Section 182(3) permits: (i) loss making

companies to contribute to political parties; (ii) unlimited

contributions to political parties enabling significant policy

influence; and (iii) non-disclosure of information on political

funding to shareholders;

k. The amendments permitting non-disclosure of information on

political funding are violative of the right to information under

Article 19(1)(a). The right to information on funding of political

parties is a natural consequence of the judgment of this Court

in ADR (supra) and PUCL (supra) because the underlying

principle in the judgments is that an informed voter is essential

for a functioning democracy. Information about funding to political

parties is necessary for an informed voter since the Symbols

Order 1968 and the provisions of the Tenth Schedule allow

political parties to influence legislative outcomes and policies;

l. The infringement of the right to information does not satisfy the

proportionality standard vis-à-vis the purpose of curbing black

money.Even if the argument that theElectoralBondScheme fulfills

the purpose is accepted, non-disclosure of information on political

funding is not the least restrictive means to achieve the purpose;

m. The infringement of the right to information does not satisfy the

proportionality standard vis-à-vis the purpose of guaranteeing

informational privacy because:

i. Protecting donor privacy is not a legitimate purpose.

There is no legitimate expectation of informational privacy

to political contributions. The argument that it lies at the

heart of privacy conflates speech with money. Secrecy of

voting cannot be equated to political donations because

while the former is an expression of political equality, the

latter is contrary to political equality because it depends

on the economic capacity of the contributor;

470 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

ii. Political funding is made to influence public policy. They

are public acts which are by their very nature subject to

public scrutiny; and

iii. Even if donor privacy is necessary, on a balance, the

public interest in free and fair elections trumps the private

interest in confidentiality. Further, this Court has to balance

between the possibility of victimization on the disclosure of

information and the infringement of the right to know; and

n. The amendment to Section 31 of the RBI Act is unconstitutional

because of excessive delegation since it does not set out the

contours of the Scheme.

32. Mr Shadan Farasat, learned counsel made the following submissions:

a. The Scheme does not effectively curb black money. Clause

14 of the Electoral Bond Scheme prohibits de jure trading of

the bonds. However, trading is de facto permissible. Nothing

prevents person A from purchasing the bond and trading it with

person B who pays through cash;

b. The right to information on political funding which is traceable to

Article 19(1)(a) can only be restricted on the grounds stipulated

in Article 19(2). The purposes of curbing black money and

recognizing donor privacy is not traceable to the grounds in

Article 19(2);

c. Even if the purposes are traceable toArticle 19(2), the Scheme is

unreasonable and disproportionate to the purpose of “increasing

political funding through banking channels and reducing political

funding through non-banking channels” because:

i. The purpose is not satisfied: The regime still permits cash

funding up to Rupees two thousand. The operation of the

Scheme increases anonymous funding through electoral

bonds at the cost of contributions through regular banking

channels;

ii. There is no rational nexus between the means and the

purpose;

iii. Other less restrictive means of contributing through banking

channels are available; and

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 471

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

iv. The fifth prong of the proportionality analysis as laid down

in Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha v. State of Gujarat51 and

Ramesh Chandra Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh52

that the legislation should have sufficient safeguard to

prevent abuse has also not been satisfied.

d. The statutory amendments and the Scheme are manifestly

arbitrary because (i) large scale corruption and quid pro quo

arrangements would go unidentified due to the non-disclosure

of information about political funding; (ii) they enable capture

of democracy by wealthy interests; and (iii) they infringe the

principle of ‘one person-one vote’ because a selected few

overpower the voice of the masses because of their economic

wealth;

e. The deletion of the limit on corporate contributions is

manifestly arbitrary53 because it (i) permits donations by loss

making companies; (ii) removes the control of shareholders

over the decisions of the Board; (iii) permits unlimited

contribution by corporates and thereby abrogates democratic

principles;

f. The provision permitting non-disclosure of funding by companies

is violative of the shareholders’ rights under:

i. Article 25 which includes the right of the shareholder to

know how the resources generated from their property are

utilized. Once a shareholder comes to know that a company

is financing a political party and their conscience does not

permit it, as an exercise of the right to conscience, the

shareholder should be entitled to sell those shares; and

ii. If the shareholder feels that the political contributions are

not a sound business decision, they must be entitled to

exit the business by selling the shares. The information

that would enable the shareholder to make such a decision

is not disclosed, thus, infringing upon their right under

Article 19(1)(g).

51 [2020] 13 SCR 886 : (2020) 10 SCC 459

52 [2023] 2 SCR 422 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 162

53 Relied on Shayara Bano v. Union of India, [2017] 9 SCR 797 : (2017) 9 SCC 1

472 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

33. Mr Nizam Pasha, learned counsel made the following submissions:

a. The Electoral Bond Scheme and the amendments are arbitrary

as they permit Indian registered companies to purchase electoral

bonds without considering their ownership and control. This goes

against foreign investment laws in India, treating companies

owned or controlled by non-resident Indian citizens as ‘foreign

owned or controlled companies,’ without rational justification;

b. The Electoral Bond Scheme is arbitrary due to its discriminatory

and non-transparent nature. It contradicts existing laws requiring

transparency and verification of the beneficial ownership and

source of funds; and

c. The amendments to Section 29C of the RPA and Section 182

of the CompaniesAct serve no purpose other than perpetuating

illegal ends, as they exempt companies’ purchase of electoral

bonds from public disclosure. This fails to achieve the scheme’s

stated objective of curbing cash donations.

34. Mr Vijay Hansaria, learned senior counsel made the following

submissions:

a. The objects and reasons of the Election and Other Related

Laws (Amendment) Act 2003 which amended the Companies

Act 1956, IT Act 1961, and the RPA indicates that the

amendments were made to incentivize contributions through

banking channels. Thus, the amendments to Section 13A of

the Income Tax Act and Section 29C of the RPA are contrary

to the object of inserting Section 13A and Section 80GGB and

Section 80GGC of the Income Tax Act;

b. Since 1959, when companies were permitted to contribute to

political parties, all companies were required to mandatorily

disclose the total contributions made and the name of party

to which they have contributed. Further, ceiling limits for total

contribution by companies were prescribed. The Finance Act

2017 does away with these transparency requirements; and

c. International perspectives on political funding regulations,

including those from the United States, the United Kingdom,

Switzerland and Singapore, emphasize the importance of

transparency, disclosure, and reporting in political contributions.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 473

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

These examples underscore the global consensus on

transparency in the political funding process.

35. Mr Sanjay R. Hegde, learned senior counsel made the following

submissions:

a. Public listed companies are subject to scrutiny since they raise

funds from the public. Information pertaining to the company is

essential to be brought to the public domain. This will enable

informed debates and discussions regarding the use of money

by such companies. Such information must particularly be made

available to shareholders to enable them to make an informed

choice with regard to trading of securities. Thus, the amendment

to the Companies Act which removes the requirement of

disclosure of information about political contributions is violative

of the right to information of shareholders which flows from

Article 19(1)(a);

b. Public listed companies should not be allowed to make

contributions without the consent of the majority of the

shareholders or the consent of three-fourths of shareholders;

c. Non-disclosure of information about political funding denies

shareholders the right to choice that flows from Article 21.

Shareholders are incapacitated from making a choice about

whether they wish to invest in shares of a company which has

contributed to a political party whose ideology that shareholder

does not agree with; and

d. The amendment to Section 182(3) perpetuates the pre-existing

inequality in power between shareholders and the Board/

Promoters/management and puts the shareholders in an even

weaker position violating the right to substantive equality under

Article 14.

36. Mr PB Suresh, learned counsel made the following submissions:

a. The Scheme and amendments violate Articles 14 and 15 by

disproportionately impacting regional political parties and political

parties which represent marginalised and backward sections

of the society. The representation of the backward classes is

low in the corporate sector. Thus, the Scheme has a disparate

impact on parties whose social base is derived from the SC/

STs and backward classes;

474 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

b. The presumption of constitutionality does not apply in full rigour

to electoral laws because the incumbent legislators have a

vested interest in shaping the laws that would make it easier

for them to be re-elected;

c. The removal of the cap on corporate donations has strengthened

the position of major political parties and created more barriers

for the entry of new political parties; and

d. Political parties have a right to know the funding sources of rival

political parties to enable them to critique it before the public.

ii. Submissions of Union of India

37. The learnedAttorney General forIndia made the following submissions:

a. Political parties are an integral product of a free and open society

and play an important role in the administration of the affairs

of the community. Accordingly, they are entitled to receive all

support, including financial contributions;

b. The Electoral Bond Scheme allows any person to transfer funds

to political parties of their choice through legitimate banking

channels instead of other unregulated ways such as direct

transfer through cash;

c. The Scheme ensures confidentiality of the contributions made

to political parties. The benefit of confidentiality to contributors

ensures and promotes contribution of clean money to political

parties;

d. Citizens do not have a general right to know regarding the

funding of political parties. Right to know is not a general right

available to citizens;

e. This Court has evolved the right to know for the specific

purpose of enabling and furthering the voter’s choice of electing

candidates free from blemish; and

f. The influence of contributions by companies to political parties

ought not to be examined by this Court. It is an issue of

democratic significance and should be best left to the legislature.

38. The learned Solicitor General of India made the following submissions:

a. The legal framework prior to the enactment of the Electoral Bond

Scheme was mostly cash-based which incentivized infusion of

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 475

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

black money into political parties, and consequently, into the

electoral process in India. The Electoral Bond Scheme is an

improvement on the prior legal framework;

b. Donors to a political party often apprehended retribution from

other political parties. Such apprehension incentivized donors

to contribute unaccounted money to political parties to avoid

identification and victimization by other political parties. The

Electoral Bond Scheme maintains the confidentiality of donors

and thereby incentivizes them to contribute clean money to

political parties;

c. In case the donor is a public company, they will have to declare

the amount contributed in their books of account without

disclosing the name of the political party. Similarly, the political

parties will also have to disclose the total amount received

through electoral bonds in their annual audited accounts filed

before the Election Commission of India. This framework ensures

a balance between clean money coming into the system as

against the right to information of citizens;

d. The state has a positive obligation to safeguard the privacy

of its citizens, which necessarily includes the citizens’ right to

political affiliation. The right of a buyer to purchase electoral

bonds without having to disclose their preference of political

party secures the buyer’s right to privacy;

e. The Electoral Bond Scheme has been enacted in pursuance

of a legitimate state interest - to shift from cash driven,

unregulated and unaccounted cash based political donations

to a regulated, digital and legal political donation framework.

The provisions of the Electoral Bond Scheme have a specific

object and purpose of curbing black money and protecting

donor privacy:

i. Clause 3(3) imposes a pre-condition that only a registered

political party which has secured at least 1 per cent of the

votes polled in the last general election would be eligible to

receive bonds. This provision ensures that ghost political

parties are barred from seeking and receiving political

funding;

476 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

ii. Clause 4 requires a buyer of electoral bonds to meet the

requisite KYC Norms. This ensures that only KYC compliant

persons are entitled to buy electoral bonds;

iii. The limited validity period of fifteen days ensures that the

bond is not used as a parallel currency;

iv. Clause 7(4) mandates the authorized bank to treat the

information furnished by a buyer as confidential which shall

not be disclosed to any authority, except when directed

by a competent court or upon registration of criminal case

by any law enforcement agency. This provision protects

the privacy and personal details of the buyer vis-à-vis the

state; and

v. Clause 11 mandates that all payments for the purchase

of electoral bonds shall be accepted through banking

channels. This provision curbs the circulation of black

money.

f. The right of a citizen to know how political parties are being

funded must be balanced against the right of a person to

maintain privacy of their political affiliations. Donating money to

one’s preferred party is a form political self-expression, which

lies at the heart of privacy;

g. Maintaining anonymity of donations to political parties is a part of

the concept of secret ballot because it enables a person to make

political choices without any fear of victimization or retaliation;

h. The right to information only operates against information in the

possession or in the knowledge of the state. It cannot operate

for seeking information not in the knowledge or possession of

the state;

i. The amendments to the RBI Act, RPA, and the IT Act are

intended to curb donations made by way of cash and other

means to political parties and secure the anonymity of donors;

j. The amendment to Section 182 of the Companies Act removes

the limitation of seven and a half percent of the net profits on

the amount contributed by political parties. The removal of the

contribution limit was intended to disincentivize creation of shell

companies;

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 477

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

k. This Court has recognized that the legislature has a wide

latitude in matters concerning economic policy. Further, the

mere possibility that the law might be abused cannot be a

ground for holding the provision procedurally or substantially

unreasonable; and

l. The fact that one party receives substantially more support

through donations than other parties cannot in itself be a legal

ground to challenge the validity of the Electoral Bond Scheme.

D. The Scope of Judicial Review

39. The Union of India submitted that this Court must exercise judicial

restraint while deciding the challenge to the Electoral Bond Scheme

and the statutory amendments because they relate to economic policy.

For this purpose, the Union of India relied on a series of decisions

where this Court has held that Courts must follow judicial restraint

in matters concerning economic and financial policy.54

40. It is a settled position of law that Courts must adopt a less stringent

form of judicial review while adjudicating challenges to legislation

and executive action which relate to economic policy as compared

to laws relating to civil rights such as the freedom of speech or the

freedom of religion.55 More recently, in Swiss Ribbons v. Union of

India56, this Court while deciding a challenge to the constitutional

validity of provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016

observed that the legislature must be given “free play” in the joints

to experiment with economic policy. This position was also followed

in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Limited v. Union of

India57, where amendments to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code

were challenged.

41. The question is whether the amendments under challenge relate

to economic policy. While deciding on a constitutional challenge,

the Court does not rely on the ipse dixit of the government, that a

54 Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, [1970] 3 SCR 530 : (1970) 1 SCC 248; R.K Garg v. Union

of India, [1982] 1 SCR 947 : (1981) 4 SCC 675; Premium Granites v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1994] 1 SCR

579 : (1994) 2 SCC 691; Peerless General Finance and Investment Co v. RBI, [1992] 1 SCR 406 : (1992)

2 SCC 343, BALCO Employees Union v. Union of India, [2001] Suppl. 5 SCR 511 : (2002) 2 SCC 333.

55 RK Garg v. Union of India, [1982] 1 SCR 947 : (1981) 4 SCC 675 [8]; See Balco Employees Union v.

Union of India, [2001] Suppl. 5 SCR 511 : (2002) 2 SCC 333; DG of Foreign Trade v. Kanak Exports,

(2016) 2 SCC 226

56 [2019] 3 SCR 535 : (2019) 4 SCC 17

57 [2019] 10 SCR 381 : (2019) 8 SCC 416

478 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

legislation is an economic legislation. Courts before classifying the

policy underlying a legislation as economic policy must undertake

an analysis of the true nature of the law. The amendment to Section

31 of the RBI Act can be classified as a financial provision to the

extent that it seeks to introduce a new form of a bearer banking

instrument. However, any resemblance to an economic policy ends

there. The amendments in question can be clubbed into two heads:

first, provisions mandating non-disclosure of information on electoral

financing; and second, provisions permitting unlimited corporate

funding to political parties. Both these amendments relate to the

electoral process.

42. In fact, it is evident from the correspondence between the Ministry

of Finance and RBI (which have been summarized above) on the

apprehensions of the Bonds being used as an alternative currency

that the Bonds were introduced only to curb black money in the

electoral process, and protect informational privacy of financial

contributors to political parties. The Union of India has itself classified

the amendments as an “electoral reform”. Thus, the submission of

the Union of India that the amendments deal with economic policy

cannot be accepted.

43. The second argument that this Court needs to address is to determine

the scope of judicial review to decide this batch of petitions. The

petitioners submitted that the presumption of constitutionality does

not apply since the Scheme deals with the electoral process. The

premise of the argument is that the presumption of constitutionality is

based on the principle that the elected body must be trusted to make

decisions and that principle should not be applied when the rules

changing the electoral process are themselves in challenge.58 It was

submitted that in such cases if a prima facie case of constitutional

violation is made out, the State bears a heavy burden of justifying

the law.

44. The presumption of constitutionality is based on two premises. First,

it is based on democratic accountability, that is, legislators are elected

representatives who are aware of the needs of the citizens and are

58 For this purpose, the petitioners referred to the representation-reinforcement model of judicial review

propounded by John Hart Ely in his book Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard

University Press, 2002) and the judgment of this Court in Subash Chandra v. Delhi Subordinate Service

Selection Board, [2009] 12 SCR 978 : (2009) 15 SCC 458

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 479

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

best placed to frame policies to resolve them59. Second, legislators are

privy to information necessary for policy making which the Courts as

an adjudicating authority are not. However, the policy underlying the

legislation must not violate the freedoms and rights which are entrenched

in Part III of the Constitution and other constitutional provisions. It is

for this reason that previous judgments of this Court have held that the

presumption of constitutionality is rebutted when a prima facie case of

violation of a fundamental right is established. The onus then shifts on

the State to prove that the violation of the fundamental right is justified.

In Dharam Dutt v. Union of India60, a two-Judge Bench of this Court

elucidated the principle in the following terms:

“49. In spite of there being a general presumption in favour

of the constitutionality of the legislation, in a challenge

laid to the validity of any legislation allegedly violating any

right or freedom guaranteed by clause (1) of Article 19 of

the Constitution, on a prima facie case of such violation

having been made out, the onus would shift upon the

respondent State to show that the legislation comes within

the permissible limits of the most relevant out of clauses

(2) to (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution, and that the

restriction is reasonable. The Constitutional Court would

expect the State to place before it sufficient material

justifying the restriction and its reasonability. On the State

succeeding in bringing the restriction within the scope of

any of the permissible restrictions, such as, the sovereignty

and integrity of India or public order, decency or morality

etc. the onus of showing that restriction is unreasonable

would shift back to the petitioner. Where the restriction on

its face appears to be unreasonable, nothing more would

be required to substantiate the plea of unreasonability. Thus

the onus of proof in such like cases is an ongoing shifting

process to be consciously observed by the Court called

upon to decide the constitutional validity of a legislation

by reference to Article 19 of the Constitution.”

59 See State of Bombay v. FN Balsara, [1951] 1 SCR 682

60 [2003] Supp. 6 SCR 151 : AIR 2004 SC 1295; Also see Ramlila Maidan Incident, In re, [2012] 4 SCR

971  : (2012) 5 SCC 1; State of Bombay v. FN Balsara, [1951] 1 SCR 682; Ameerunissa Begum v.

Mahboob Begum, [1953] 1 SCR 404 : (1952) 2 SCC 697

480 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

45. The broad argument of the petitioners that the presumption of

constitutionality should not apply to a specific class of statutes, that

is, laws which deal with electoral processes cannot be accepted.

Courts cannot carve out an exception to the evidentiary principle which

is available to the legislature based on the democratic legitimacy

which it enjoys. In the challenge to electoral law, like all legislation,

the petitioners would have to prima facie prove that the law infringes

fundamental rights or constitutional provisions, upon which the onus

would shift to the State to justify the infringement.

E. The close association of politics and money

46. The law does not bar electoral financing by the public. Both corporates

and individuals are permitted to contribute to political parties. The

legal regime has not prescribed a cap on the financial contributions

which can be received by a political party or a candidate contesting

elections. However, Section 77 of the RPA read with Rule 90 of

the Conduct of Election Rules 196161 prescribes a cap on the total

expenditure which can be incurred by a candidate or their agent in

connection with Parliamentary and Assembly elections between the

date on which they are nominated and the date of the declaration of

the result. The maximum limit for the expenditure in a Parliamentary

constituency is between Rupees seventy five lakhs to ninety five

lakhs depending on the size of the State and the Union Territory.62

The maximum limit of election expenses in anAssembly constituency

varies between rupees twenty eight lakhs and forty lakhs depending

on the size of the State.63 However, the law does not prescribe any

limits for the expenditure by a political party. Explanation 1 to

Section 77 stipulates that the expenditure incurred by “leaders of a

political party” on account of travel for propagating the programme

61 Section 77 of the RPA read with Section 169 provides the Central Government in consultation with the

Election Commission, the power to prescribe the amount over which the total expenditure incurred by

the candidate or their agent in connection with Parliamentary election and Assembly election shall not

be exceeded. The total expenditure cap is prescribed in Rule 90 of the Conduct of Election Rules 1961

which is amended from time to time.

62 The expenditure limit is capped at seventy-five Lakhs for the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, and

Sikkim, and the Union Territories of Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Chandigarh, Dadra and Nagar Haveli

and Daman and Diu, Lakshadweep, Puducherry, and Ladakh. For the remaining States and Union

Territories, the expenditure limit is capped at ninety-five Lakhs.

63 For State Assembly elections, the expenditure is capped at twenty-eight lakhs for the States of Arunachal

Pradesh, Goa, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura. Amongst the Union

Territories, the expenditure is capped at twenty-eight Lakhs for Puducherry and forty Lakhs for Delhi and

Jammu and Kashmir.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 481

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

of the political party shall not be deemed to be election expenditure.

Thus, there is an underlying dicohotomy in the legal regime. The

law does not regulate contributions to candidates. It only regulates

contributions to political parties. However, expenditure by the

candidates and not the political party is regulated. Be that as it may,

the underlying understanding of the legal regime regulating electoral

finance is that finance is crucial for the sustenance and progression

of electoral politics.

47. It is believed that money does not vote but people do. However,

studies have revealed the direct and indirect influence of money on

electoral politics.64 The primary way through which money directly

influences politics is through its impact on electoral outcomes.

48. One way in which money influences electoral outcomes is through

vote buying. Another way in which money influences electoral

outcomes is through incurring electoral expenditure for political

campaigns. Campaigns have a measurable influence on voting

behavior because of the impact of television advertisements,

campaign events, and personal canvassing.65 An informed voter

is one who is assumed to be aware of the policy positions of the

candidate or the party they represent and votes on a thorough

analysis of the pros and cons of electing a candidate. On the other

hand, an uninformed voter is assumed to not possess knowledge of

the policy positions of the candidates.66 Campaigns have an effect

on the voting behavior of both an informed and an uninformed voter.

The impact of campaigns on an informed voter is supplementary

because campaign activities enable an informed voter to be further

informed about the policies and ideology of the political party and the

candidate, and their views on specific issues. Electoral campaigns

reduce the uncertainty about candidates for an informed voter.

For an uninformed voter, electoral campaigns play a much more

persuasive role in influencing electoral behavior because campaigns

throw more light on candidates.

64 See Conrad Foreman, Money in Politics: Campaign Finance and its Influence over the Political Process

and Public Policy, 52 UIC J. Marshall L. Rev. 185 (2018)

65 See D Sunshine Hillygus, Campaign Effects on Vote Choice in “The Oxford Handbook of American

Elections and Political Behavior” (Ed. Jan E. Leighley 2010)

66 See David P. Baron, Electoral Competition with informed and uninformed voters, American Political

Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 1 March 1994

482 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

49. Political parties use innovative techniques of campaigning by going

beyond the traditional methods of advertisements, door-to-door

campaigning and processions to increase outreach. For example,

political parties sponsor religious festivals and community fairs,

organize sporting matches and literary competitions where cash

awards are given.67 These outreach techniques leave a lasting

impression on the minds of uninformed voters. Thus, enhanced

campaign expenditure proportionately increases campaign outreach

which influences the voting behavior of voters.

50. Money also creates entry-barriers to politics by limiting the kind of

candidates and political parties which enter the electoral fray. Studies

have shown that money influences the selection of candidates by

political parties because parties would prefer fielding candidates who

would be able to substantially self-finance their campaign without

relying on the party for finance.68 In this manner, candidates who

belong to socio-economically weaker sections face added barriers

because of the close association of money and politics.

51. Money also excludes parties which are new to the electoral fray, and in

particular, parties representing the cause of marginalized communities.

Political parties which do not have enough finance have had to form

electoral coalitions with other established political parties who would in

exchange shoulder a lion’s share of the campaign expenditure of the

newly established political party extending to costs related to coalition

propaganda, print and digital advertising, vehicle and equipment hire,

political rallies, food transportation, and daily expenditure for party

cadres69. The compromises which newly formed political parties have

to make lead to a dilution of the ideology of the party in exchange of

its political sustenance. In this manner, money creates an exclusionary

impact by reducing the democratic space for participation for both

candidates and newer and smaller political parties.

52. The judgments of this Court have recognized the influence of

money on politics. They take a critical view of the role played by

67 Michael A. Collins, Navigating Fiscal Constraints in “Costs of Democracy: Political Finance in India”

(edited by Devesh Kapur and Milan Vaishnav) OUP 2018

68 See Neelanjan Sircar, Money in Elections: the Role of Personal Wealth in Election Outcomes in Costs of

Democracy: Political Finance in India (ed. By Devesh Kapur and Milan Vaishnav) OUP 2018

69 Michael A. Collins, Navigating Fiscal Constraints in “Costs of Democracy: Political Finance in India”

(edited by Devesh Kapur and Milan Vaishnav) OUP 2018

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 483

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

big business and “big money” in the electoral process in India. The

decision in Kanwar Lal Gupta v. Amar Nath Chawla,70 notices that

money serves as an asset for advertising and other forms of political

solicitation that increases a candidate’s exposure to the public. The

court observed that the availability of large funds allows a candidate

or political party “significantly greater opportunity for the propagation

of its programme” in comparison to their political rivals. Such political

disparity, it was observed, results in “serious discrimination between

one political party or individual and another on the basis of money

power and that in turn would mean that “some voters are denied an

‘equal’ voice and some candidates are denied an ‘equal chance’”.

53. In Vatal Nagaraj v. R Dayanand Sagar,71 Justice V R Krishna Iyer

noted that candidates often evade the legal ceiling on expenditure

by using big money channelled by political parties. The court

acknowledged that large monetary inputs are “necessary evils of

modern elections”, which they hoped would be eradicated sooner

rather than later. In P Nalla Thampy Terah v. Union of India,72

a Constitution Bench of this Court was called upon to decide the

validity of Explanation 1 to Section 77 of the RPA which allowed

unlimited channelling of funds by political parties for the election of

their candidates. While upholding the constitutional validity of the

explanation, the Court noted that the petitioners were justified in

criticizing the statute for “diluting the principle of free and fair elections.”

54. In Common Cause (A Registered Society) v. Union of India,73

this Court dwelt on the ostentatious use of money by political parties

in elections to further the prospects of candidates set up by them.

Justice Kuldip Singh described the role of money in the electoral

process, which is relevant for contextualizing the issue:

“18. … [The General Elections] is an enormous exercise

and a mammoth venture in terms of money spent. Hundreds

and thousands of vehicles of various kinds are pressed

on to the roads in 543 parliamentary constituencies on

behalf of thousands of aspirants to power, many days

70 [1975] 2 SCR 259 : (1975) 3 SCC 646

71 [1975] 2 SCR 384 : (1975) 4 SCC 127

72 [1985] Supp. 1 SCR 622 : 1985 Supp SCC 189

73 [1996] 3 SCR 1208 : (1996) 2 SCC 752

484 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

before the general elections are actually held. Millions

of leaflets and many million posters are printed and

distributed or pasted all over the country. Banners by the

lakhs are hoisted. Flags go up, walls are painted, and

hundreds of thousands of loudspeakers play out the loud

exhortations and extravagant promises. VIPs and VVIPs

come and go, some of them in helicopters and air-taxis.

The political parties in their quest for power spend more

than one thousand crore of rupees on the General Election

(Parliament alone), yet nobody accounts for the bulk of

money so spent and there is no accountability anywhere.

Nobody discloses the source of the money. There are no

proper accounts and no audit. From where does the money

come from nobody knows. In a democracy where rule of

law prevails this naked display of black money, by violating

the mandatory provisions of law, cannot be permitted.”

55. The challenge to the statutory amendments and the Electoral Bond

Scheme cannot be adjudicated in isolation without a reference to

the actual impact of money on electoral politics. This Court has in

numerous judgments held that the effect and not the object of the

law on fundamental rights and other constitutional provisions must

be determined while adjudicating its constitutional validity. The effect

of provisions dealing with electoral finance cannot be determined

without recognizing the influence of money on politics. Therefore,

we must bear in mind the nexus between money and electoral

democracy while deciding on the issues which are before us in this

batch of petitions.

F. The challenge to non-disclosure of information on electoral

financing

56. Section 29C of the RPAas amended by the FinanceAct 2017 stipulates

that the political party need not disclose financial contributions

received through electoral bonds. Similarly, Section 13A of the IT Act

as amended does not require the political party to maintain a record

of contributions for contributions received through electoral bonds.

Section 182 of the Companies Act 2013 as amended by the Finance

Act 2017 by which the earlier requirement of disclosure of particulars

of the amount contributed by companies to political parties in their

profit and loss accounts was deleted. The company which has made

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 485

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

financial contributions is now only required to disclose the total amount

contributed to political parties without disclosing specific particulars

about the political party to which the contribution was made.

57. Maintaining the anonymity of the contributor is a crucial and primary

characteristic of the Electoral Bond Scheme. The electoral bond is

defined as a bearer banking instrument which does not carry the name

of the buyer.74 The law mandates the authorized bank to not disclose

the information furnished by the buyer except when demanded by a

competent court or upon the registration of a criminal case by law

enforcement agencies.75

58. The amendments introduced by the Finance Act 2017 and the

Electoral Bond Scheme are challenged on the ground that the nondisclosure of information about electoral contributions is violative of

the right to information of the voter which is traceable to Article 19(1)

(a) of the Constitution.

i. Infringement of the right to information of the voter

59. This segment of the judgment will discuss whether the amendments

and the Electoral Bond Scheme infringe the right to information of

the voter. For this purpose, we will discuss the scope of the right

to information, and whether the right extends to information on

contributions to political parties.

a. The scope of Article 19(1)(a): tracing the right to information

60. Article 19(1)(a) has been held to guarantee the right to information to

citizens. The judgments of this Court on the right to information can

be divided into two phases. In the first phase, this Court traced the

right to information to the values of good governance, transparency

and accountability. These judgments recognize that it is the role of

citizens to hold the State accountable for its actions and inactions

and they must possess information about State action for them to

accomplish this role effectively.

61. In the first phase, this Court delineated the scope of the right to

information in the context of deciding the disclosure of evidence

relating to affairs of the State. Provisions of the Indian Evidence Act

74 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 2(a)

75 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 7(4)

486 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

stipulate that evidence which is relevant and material to proceedings

need not be disclosed to the party if the disclosure would violate

public interest.76 In the 1960’s, this Court framed the issue of

disclosure of documents related to the affairs of the State in terms

of a conflict between public interest and private interest. This Court

observed that the underlying principle in the provisions of the Indian

Evidence Act bearing on the disclosure of evidence related to the

affairs of the State is that if such disclosure is denied, it would

violate the private interest of the party.77 So, when a party seeks

the disclosure of documents, and when such disclosure is denied

on the ground that it would violate public interest, there is a conflict

between private interest and public interest. In subsequent cases,

the courts cast the principle underlying the provisions of disclosure

in the Indian Evidence Act as a conflict between two conceptions

of public interest. This Court held that disclosure of information aids

the party to the proceedings. But beyond that, disclosure also serves

the public interest in the administration of justice.78

62. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain79, the respondent sought to

summon documents in an election petition. The State made a claim

of privilege from disclosure of documents. In his concurring opinion in

the Constitution Bench, Justice KK Mathew observed that there is a

public interest in the impartial administration of justice which can only

be secured by the disclosure of relevant and material documents.

The learned Judge reaffirmed this proposition by tracing the right to

information to Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution:

“74. In a Government of responsibility like ours, where

all the agents of the public must be responsible for their

conduct, there can be but few secrets. The people of this

country have a right to know every public act, everything

that is done in a public way, by their public functionaries.

They are entitled to know the particulars of every public

transaction in all its bearing. The right to know, which is

derived from the concept of freedom of speech, though not

76 Indian Evidence Act 1872, Section 124

77 See State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, [1961] 2 SCR 371 : (1961) 2 SCR 371 [13]

78 See State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, [1961] 2 SCR 371 : (1961) 2 SCR 371 [Subba Rao J]

79 [1975] 3 SCR 333 : (1975) 4 SCC 428

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 487

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

absolute, is a factor which should make one wary, when

secrecy is claimed for transactions which can, at any rate,

have no repercussion on public security.[…]”

63. This principle was further elucidated in SP Gupta v. Union of

India80. The Union of India claimed immunity against the disclosure

of the correspondence between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice

of the High Court of Delhi, and the Chief Justice of India on the

reappointment of Additional Judges. Justice P N Bhagwati while

discussing the position of law on claims of non-disclosure, observed

that the Constitution guarantees the “right to know” which is necessary

to secure “true facts” about the administration of the country. The

opinion recognised accountability and transparency of governance

as important features of democratic governance. Democratic

governance, the learned Judge remarked, is not restricted to voting

once in every five years but is a continuous process by which the

citizens not merely choose the members to represent themselves but

also hold the government accountable for their actions and inactions

for which citizens need to possess information81.

64. Our discussion indicates that the first phase of the jurisprudence on

the right to information in India focussed on the close relationship

between the right and open governance. The judgments in this phase

were premised on the principle that the citizens have a duty to hold

the government of the day accountable for their actions and inactions,

and they can effectively fulfil this duty only if the government is open

and not clothed in secrecy.

65. In the second phase of the evolution of the jurisprudence on the right

to information, this Court recognised the importance of information to

form views on social, cultural and political issues, and participate in

and contribute to discussions.82 Courts recognised that the relevance

of information is to not only to hold the government accountable but

also to discover the truth in a marketplace of ideas which would

80 1981 Supp SCC 87

81 Also see Dinesh Trivedi v. Union of India, [1997] 3 SCR 93 : (1997) 4 SCC 306 where this Court observed

that sunlight is the best disinfectant.

82 Secy., Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Govt. of India v. Cricket Assn. of Bengal, [1995] 1 SCR

1036 : (1995) 2 SCC 161; Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India, [1985] 2 SCR 287 : AIR 1986

SC 515 ; Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, [1950] 1 SCR 594 : AIR 1950 SC 124

488 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

ultimately secure the goal of self-development.83 This Court also

recognised that freedom of speech and expression includes the

right to acquire information which would enable people to debate

on social, moral and political issues. These debates would not only

foster the spirit of representative democracy but would also curb the

prevalence of misinformation and monopolies on information. Thus,

in the second phase, the Court went beyond viewing the purpose of

freedom of speech and expression through the lens of holding the

government accountable, by recognising the inherent value in effective

participation of the citizenry in democracy. This Court recognised

that effective participation in democratic governance is not just a

means to an end but is an end in itself. This interpretation of Article

19(1)(a) is in line with the now established position that fundamental

freedoms and the Constitution as a whole seek to secure conditions

for self-development at both an individual and group level.84 A crucial

aspect of the expansion of the right to information in the second

phase is that right to information is not restricted to information

about state affairs, that is, public information. It includes information

which would be necessary to further participatory democracy in other

forms and is not restricted to information about the functioning of

public officials. The right to information has an instrumental exegesis,

which recognizes the value of the right in facilitating the realization

of democratic goals. But beyond that, the right to information has an

intrinsic constitutional value; one that recognizes that it is not just a

means to an end but an end in itself.

b. Right to information of a voter: exploring the judgments in ADR

and PUCL

66. In Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms85

(“ADR”), this Court traced the right of voters to have information about

the antecedents, including the criminal past, of candidates contesting

elections, to Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. In ADR (supra),

proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution were instituted

before the High Court of Delhi seeking a direction to implement the

Law Commission’s recommendations to (a) debar candidates from

83 DC Saxena v. Hon’ble The Chief Justice of India, [1996] Supp. 3 SCR 677 : (1996) 5 SCC 216 [29]

84 See Supriyo v. Union of India, 2023 INSC 920 [213, 214]

85 [2002] 3 SCR 696 : (2002) 5 SCC 294.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 489

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

contesting elections if charges have been framed against them by a

Court in respect of certain offences; and (b) ensure that candidates

furnish details regarding criminal cases which are pending against

them. The High Court held that the Court cannot direct Parliament to

implement the recommendations of the Law Commission. However,

the High Court directed the ECI to secure information relating to (a)

the details of cases in which a candidate is accused of any offences

punishable with imprisonment;(b) assets possessed by a candidate,

their spouse and dependents; (c) facts bearing on the candidate’s

competence, capacity, and suitability for representing the people;

and (d) any other information which ECI considers necessary for

judging the capacity of the candidate fielded by the political party.

67. The Union of India appealed against the decision of the High Court

before this Court. This Court held that voters have a right to be

sufficiently informed about candidates so as to enable them to exercise

their democratic will through elections in an intelligent manner. Such

information was held to be necessary for elections to be conducted

in a “free and fair manner”:

“34. …the members of a democratic society should be

sufficiently informed so that they may influence intelligently

the decisions which may affect themselves and this would

include their decision of casting votes in favour of a

particular candidate. If there is a disclosure by a candidate

as sought for then it would strengthen the voters in taking

appropriate decision of casting their votes.

[…] we fail to understand why the right of a citizen/voter — a

little man — to know about the antecedents of his candidate

cannot be held to be a fundamental right underArticle 19(1)

(a). In our view, democracy cannot survive without free and

fair election, without free and fairly informed voters. Votes

cast by uninformed voters in favour of X or Y candidate

would be meaningless.As stated in the aforesaid passage,

one-sided information, disinformation, misinformation and

non-information, all equally create an uninformed citizenry

which makes democracy a farce. Therefore, casting of a

vote by a misinformed and non-informed voter or a voter

having one-sided information only is bound to affect the

democracy seriously. Freedom of speech and expression

490 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

includes right to impart and receive information which

includes freedom to hold opinions.”

68. This Court rejected the argument that information about a candidate

contesting elections cannot be compelled to be disclosed because

it is not “public information”. The three-Judge Bench held that

information that candidates are required to disclose is only limited to

aiding the voters in assessing whether they could cast their vote in a

candidate’s favour. The Court observed that the criminal background

of a candidate and assets of the candidate (through which it could

be assessed if the candidate has amassed wealth through corruption

when they were elected previously) would aid the voters to cast their

vote in an informed manner. This Court directed the ECI to call for

the following information on affidavit as a part of nomination:

a. Whether the candidate has been convicted, acquitted or

discharged of any criminal offence in the past and if convicted,

whether they are punished with imprisonment or fine;

b. In the six months prior to the filling of nomination papers,

whether the candidate was accused in any pending case for an

offence punishable with imprisonment for two years or more,

and in which a charge is framed or cognizance is taken by the

court of law;

c. The assets (immovable, movable, bank balances and others)

of a candidate and of his/her spouse and that of dependents;

d. Liabilities, if any, particularly whether there are any over dues

to any public financial institution or government dues; and

e. The educational qualifications of the candidate.

69. This Court observed that the ECI can ask candidates to disclose

information about the expenditure incurred by political parties to

maintain the purity of elections.86 However, the operative portion of

the judgment did not reflect this observation.

86 Paragraph 64(4): “To maintain the purity of elections and in particular to bring transparency in the process

of election, the Commission can ask the candidates about the expenditure incurred by the political

parties and this transparency in the process of election would include transparency of a candidate who

seeks election or re-election. In a democracy, the electoral process has a strategic role. The little man of

this country would have basic elementary right to know full particulars of a candidate who is to represent

him in Parliament where laws to bind his liberty and property may be enacted.”

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 491

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

70. Pursuant to the decision of this Court in ADR (supra), Parliament

amended the RPA to incorporate some of the directions issued

by this Court.87 Section 33-B of RPA stipulated that the candidate

need not disclose any other information (other than the information

required by law) notwithstanding any judgment. In PUCL v. Union

of India88, proceedings were initiated before this Court under Article

32 for challenging Section 33-B of the RPA. Justice M B Shah,

writing for the majority, noted that the decision of the three-Judge

Bench in ADR (supra) tracing the right to know the antecedents of

candidates contesting elections had attained finality and Section

33-B was unconstitutional because it had the effect of rendering

the judgment of this Court inoperative. The learned Judge on an

independent interpretation also held that the right to information of

a voter is a facet of Article 19(1)(a).89

71. Justice Venkatarama Reddi observed in his concurring opinion

that there are two postulates which govern the right to vote : first,

the formulation of an opinion about candidates, and second, the

expression of choice based on the opinion formulated by casting

votes in favour of a preferred candidate. A voter must possess

relevant and essential information that would enable them to evaluate

a candidate and form an opinion for the purpose of casting votes.90

The learned Judge observed that the Constitution recognises the

right of a voter to know the antecedents of a candidate though the

right to vote is a statutory right91 because the action of voting is a

form of expression protected by Article 19(1)(a):

“Though the initial right cannot be placed on the pedestal

of a fundamental right, but, at the stage when the voter

goes to the polling booth and casts his vote, his freedom

to express arises. The casting of vote in favour of one

87 Section 33-A of the RPA required the candidate to furnish the following information:

(a) He is accused of any offence punishable with imprisonment for two years or more in a pending

case in which a charge has been framed by the court of competent jurisdiction; and

(b) He has been convicted of an offence other than any offence referred to in sub-section (1) or subsection (2), or covered in sub-section (3), of Section 8 and sentenced to imprisonment for one

year or more.

88 [2003] 2 SCR 1136 : (2003) 4 SCC 399

89 [2003] 2 SCR 1136 : (2003) 4 SCC 399 [18, 27]

90 [2003] 2 SCR 1136 : (2003) 4 SCC 399 [96]

91 The right to vote is classified as a statutory vote because only citizens who fulfill certain conditions (such

as the age) laid down in a statute can vote.

492 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

or the other candidate tantamounts to expression of his

opinion and preference and that final stage in the exercise

of voting right marks the accomplishment of freedom of

expression of the voter. That is where Article 19(1)(a) is

attracted.”

72. In the context of the decision of this Court in ADR (supra), the

learned Judge observed that the Court issued specific directions for

the disclosure of certain information about candidates because of

a legislative vacuum, and that the directions issued to the ECI will

fill the vacuum until Parliament legislates on the subject. Thus, the

five directions which were issued by this Court in ADR (supra) were

not construed to be inflexible and immutable theorems. The learned

Judge observed that though the voters have a fundamental right to

know the antecedents of candidates, all the conceptions of this right

formulated by this Court in ADR (supra) cannot be elevated to the

realm of fundamental rights.

73. The majority was of the view that the voters have a fundamental

right to all the information which was directed to be declared by this

Court in ADR (supra). Justice Venkatarama Reddi disagreed. In the

opinion of the learned Judge, only certain information directed to be

disclosed in ADR (supra) is “crucial” and “essential” to the right to

information of the voter:

“109. In my view, the points of disclosure spelt out by this

Court in Assn. for Democratic Reforms case [Ed.: See full

text at 2003 Current Central Legislation, Pt. II, at p. 3]

should serve as broad indicators or parameters in enacting

the legislation for the purpose of securing the right to

information about the candidate. The paradigms set by the

Court, though pro tempore in nature as clarified supra, are

entitled to due weight. If the legislature in utter disregard of

the indicators enunciated by this Court proceeds to make

a legislation providing only for a semblance or pittance of

information or omits to provide for disclosure on certain

essential points, the law would then fail to pass the muster

of Article 19(1)(a). Though certain amount of deviation

from the aspects of disclosure spelt out by this Court

is not impermissible, a substantial departure cannot be

countenanced. The legislative provision should be such as

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 493

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

to promote the right to information to a reasonable extent, if

not to the fullest extent on details of concern to the voters

and citizens at large. While enacting the legislation, the

legislature has to ensure that the fundamental right to know

about the candidate is reasonably secured and information

which is crucial, by any objective standards, is not denied.

[…] The Court has to take a holistic view and adopt a

balanced approach, keeping in view the twin principles that

the citizens’right to information to know about the personal

details of a candidate is not an unlimited right and that at

any rate, it has no fixed concept and the legislature has

freedom to choose between two reasonable alternatives.

[…] But, I reiterate that the shape of the legislation need

not be solely controlled by the directives issued to the

Election Commission to meet an ad hoc situation. As I

said earlier, the right to information cannot be placed in

straitjacket formulae and the perceptions regarding the

extent and amplitude of this right are bound to vary.”

74. Justice Reddi held that Section 33-B was unconstitutional because:

a. Parliament cannot impose a blanket ban on the disclosure of

information other than the disclosure of information required by

the provisions of RPA. The scope of the fundamental right to

information may be expanded in the future to respond to future

exigencies and necessities. The provision had the effect of

emasculating the freedom of speech and expression of which

the right to information is a facet; and

b. The provision failed to give effect to an essential aspect of the

fundamental right, namely the disclosure of assets and liabilities

of the candidates.

75. Justice Reddi then proceeded to juxtapose the directions for disclosure

issued by this Court in ADR (supra) with the scope of the provisions

of the RPA mandating disclosure. The learned judge observed that

the extent of disclosure mandated in RPA is fairly adequate with

respect to past criminal records but not with regard to pending cases.92

92 ADR required disclosure related to information of whether the candidate has been convicted/acquitted or

discharged of any criminal offence in the past, and whether six months prior to the filing of the nomination

paper, whether the candidate has been accused in any pending case for an offence punishable with

494 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

With respect to assets and liabilities, the learned Judge observed

that the disclosure of assets and liabilities is essential to the right

to information of the voter because it would enable voters to form

an opinion about whether the candidate, upon being elected in the

past, had amassed wealth in their name or their family Additionally,

information about dues which are payable by the candidate to public

institutions would enable voters to know the candidate’s dealing with

public money in the past.

76. Justice Reddi observed that the requirement to disclose assets of

the candidate’s family was justified because of the prevalence of

Benami transactions. Though mandating the disclosure of assets

and liabilities would infringe the right to privacy of the candidate and

their family, the learned Judge observed that disclosure which is in

furtherance of the right to information would trump the former because

it serves the larger public interest. Justice Reddi then observed that

disclosure of the educational qualifications of a candidate is not an

essential component of the right to information because educational

qualifications do not serve any purpose for the voter to decide

which candidate to cast a vote for since the characteristics of duty

and concern of the people is not “monopolised by the educated”.

A conclusion to the contrary, in the learned Judge’s opinion, would

overlook the stark realities of the society.93

77. The following principles can be deduced from the decisions of this

Court in ADR (supra) and PUCL (supra):

a. The right to information of voters which is traced to Article

19(1)(a) is built upon the jurisprudence of both the first and

the second phases in the evolution of the doctrine, identified

above. The common thread of reasoning which runs through

both the first and the second phases is that information which

furthers democratic participation must be provided to citizens.

imprisonment for more than two years and in which charge has been framed or cognizance is taken by

the Court. With respect to the first direction, law created a distinction between serious and non-serious

offences and mandates disclosure only if a candidate has been convicted of a serious offence. With

respect to the second direction, the provision only mandated the disclosure of cases in which charge has

been framed and excluded the disclosure of cases in which cognizance has been taken. The learned

Judge held that while the non-disclosure of conviction in a serious offence is a reasonable balance which

does not infringe the right to information, the non-disclosure of cases in which cognizance has been

taken would seriously violate the right to information of the voter particularly because framing of charges

gets delayed in a lot of cases.

93 [2003] 2 SCR 1136 : (2003) 4 SCC 399 [122]

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 495

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

Voters have a right to information which would enable them to

cast their votes rationally and intelligently because voting is one

of the foremost forms of democratic participation;

b. In ADR (supra), this Court observed that while the disclosure of

information may violate the right to privacy of candidates and their

families, such information must be disclosed because it furthers

public interest.94 The opinion of Justice Venkatarama Reddi in

PUCL (supra) also followed the same line of reasoning. Justice

M B Shah writing for himself and Justice D M Dharmadhikari

held that the right to privacy would not be infringed because

information about whether a candidate is involved in a criminal

case is a matter of public record. Similarly, the assets or income

are normally required to be disclosed under the provisions of

the Income Tax Act; and

c. The voters have a right to the disclosure of information which

is “essential” for choosing the candidate for whom a vote

should be cast. The learned Judges in PUCL (supra) differed

to the extent of what they considered “essential” information

for exercising the choice of voting.

78. While relying on the judgments of this Court in ADR (supra) and PUCL

(supra) the petitioners argue that non-disclosure of information on

the funding of political parties is violative of the right to information

under Article 19(1)(a). This Court needs to consider the following

two issues to answer the question:

a. Whether the requirements of disclosure of information about

“candidates” can be extended to “political parties”; and

b. If the answer to (a) above is in the affirmative, whether

information on the funding of political parties is “essential”

for exercising choice on voting.

c. The focal point of the electoral process: candidate or political

party

79. The decisions in ADR (supra) and PUCL (supra) recognise the right

to information of a voter about candidates, which enables them to

94 In ADR (supra), this Court notes that such information would enable voters to determine if the candidate

is corrupt and would further openness in democracy. [Paragraph 41].

496 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

cast their vote in an effective manner. The relief which was granted

by this Court in PUCL (supra) and ADR (supra) was restricted

to the disclosure of information about candidates contesting the

election because of the limited nature of the reliefs sought. The

ratio decidendi of the two judgments of this Court is that voters

have a right to receive information which is essential for them to

cast their votes. This Court has to first analyse if the ‘political party’

is a relevant ‘political unit’ in the electoral process to answer the

question whether funding details of political parties are essential

information for the voter to possess.

80. The Constitution of India did not make a reference to political parties

when it was adopted.Areference was made when the Tenth Schedule

was included in the Constitution by the Constitution (Fifty-Second)

Amendment Act 1985. However, even though the Constitution on

its adoption did not make a reference to political parties, statutory

provisions relating to elections accorded considerable importance to

political parties, signifying that political parties have been the focal

point of elections.

81. The ECI notified the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment)

Order 196895 in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 344 of

the Constitution read with Section 29A of the RPA and Rules 596

and 1097 of the Conduct of Election Rules 1961. In terms of the

provisions of the Symbols Order, the ECI shall allot a symbol to

every candidate contesting the election. The Symbols Order classifies

political parties into recognised political parties and unrecognised

political parties. The difference in the procedure under the Symbols

Order for allotting symbols to recognised political parties, registered

but unrecognised political parties and independent candidates

indicates both the relevance and significance of political parties in

elections in India.

95 “Symbols Order 1968”

96 Rule 5 provides the ECI the power to specify by notification, the symbols which may be chosen by

candidates at elections in parliamentary or assembly constituencies.

97 Rule 10 deals with the preparation of list of contesting candidates. Rule 10(5) states that the allotment

of the returning officer of any symbol to a candidate shall be final except where it is inconsistent with the

directions issued by the ECI, in which case the ECI may revise the allotment. Rule 10(6) states that every

candidate shall be informed of the symbol allotted to the candidate.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 497

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

82. A party is classified a National98 or a State recognised party99

based on the total percentage of votes secured at the last general

elections and (or) the number of candidates who have been returned

to the Legislative Assembly. Symbols are reserved for allocation to

recognised political parties.100 All candidates who are being set up by

a national or a State recognised party are to be allotted the symbol

reserved for that party for the purpose of contesting elections.101

83. Symbols other than those reserved for recognised political parties shall

be available for allotment to independent candidates and candidates

set up by political parties which are not recognised political parties in

terms of the Symbols Order.102 Candidates set up by a registered but

unrecognised political party may also be allotted a common symbol

if they fulfil certain conditions laid down in the Symbols Order.103

84. Thus, the Symbols Order creates a demarcation between candidates

set up by political parties and candidates contesting individually.

Political parties are allotted a Symbol such that all candidates who

are set up by that political party are allotted the Symbol of their

political party while contesting elections. Even within candidates

who are set up by political parties, the Symbols Order creates a

distinction between unrecognised but registered political parties and

recognised political parties. Recognised political parties shall continue

to be allotted the same symbol for all General elections until the time

these political parties fulfil the conditions for recognition under the

Symbols Order.104 The effect of the provisions of the Symbols Order

is that the symbols of certain political parties, particularly those which

have enjoyed the status of a recognised political party for long are

entrenched in the minds of the voters that they associate the symbol

with the political party.

98 Symbols Order 1968, Rule 6B

99 Symbols Order 1968, Rule 6A

100 Symbols Order 1968, Rule 5

101 Symbols Order 1968, Rule 8(1)

102 Ibid.

103 Symbols Order 1968, Rule 10B. The party is required to set up candidates in at least five percent of the

assembly constituencies.

104 A recognised National or a State Party shall continue to be treated as a recognised party even if the

political party does not fulfil the conditions at the next election to the General Assembly stipulated for

recognition as a recognised political party. However, it shall continue to be treated as a recognised

political party at the subsequent general election only if the party fulfils the conditions laid down.

498 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

85. For unrecognised but registered political parties, though a common

symbol is allotted for all candidates being set up by the political

parties, the symbol is not “reserved” for the Party. The ECI could allot

different symbols to that political party in each General election. The

candidates of a registered but unrecognised political party may be

represented by a common symbol but the people would not attach

a specific symbol to the political party because the symbol by which

it is represented may change with every election.

86. The purpose of allotting symbols to political parties is to aid voters in

identifying and remembering the political party. The law recognises the

inextricable link between a political party and the candidate though

the vote is cast for a candidate. The literacy rate in India was 18.33

percent when the first General Election was held in 1951. Most of

the voters identified a political party only with its symbol and this still

continues to the day. In a few cases, the voters would not possess

any knowledge of the candidate being set up by the political party.

They would vote solely based on the symbol which is allotted to

the political party; knowledge of which they have obtained through

campaigning activities or its sustained presence in the electoral fray.

Gayatri Devi, the third Maharani consort of Jaipur who was later set

up as a candidate by the Swatantra Party, recalls in herAutobiography

that her team spent hours trying to persuade the voters that they had

to vote for the Symbol Star (which was the symbol of the Swatantra

Party) and not a symbol showing a horse and a rider because she

also rode a horse:105

“Since most of India is illiterate, at the polls people vote

according to a visual symbol of their party. […] The

Swatantra Party had a star. Baby, all my other helpers

and I spent endless frustrating hours trying to instruct the

women about voting for the star. On the ballot sheet, we

said, over and over again, this is where the Maharani’s

name will appear and next to it will be a star. But it was

not as simple as that. They noticed a symbol showing a

horse and a rider, agree with each other that the Maharani

rides so that must be her symbol. Repeatedly we said,

105 Gayatri Devi and Santha Rama Rau, A Princess remembers: The Memoirs of the Maharani of Jaipur,

(Rupa Publications 1995) [301].

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 499

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

“No, no, that’s not the right one.” Then they caught sight

of the emblem of a flower. Ah, the flower of Jaipur – who

else could it mean but the Maharani? “No, no, no, not the

flower.” All right, the star. Yes, that seems appropriate for

the Maharani, but look, here is the sun. If the Maharani

is a star, then the sun must certainly mean the Maharaja.

We’ll vote for both. Immediately the vote would have been

invalidated. Even up to the final day, Baby and I were far

from sure that we had managed to get our point across.”

87. Symbols also gain significance when the names of political parties

sound similar. For example, political parties by the names of “Dravida

Munnetra Kazhagam”, “All IndianAnna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam”,

“Dravida Kazhagam”, “Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam”, “Makkal

Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam”, “Kongu Desa Makkal Katchi”,

“Kongunadu Makkal Desia Katchi”, and “Kongunadu Makkal Katchi”

contest elections in Tamil Nadu. The names of all the political parties

bear similarities due to the usage of the same words with certain

additions or deletions. The allocation of Symbols to political parties

would help voters identify and distinguish between political parties

which have similar sounding names. It is precisely because of the

close association of the symbol with the political party by voters that

both factions of the party vie for the symbol that is allotted to the

Party when there is a split in a recognised political party.

88. India follows the open-list first past the post form of election in which

votes are cast for a candidate and the candidate who secures the

highest number of votes is chosen to represent the people of that

constituency. It could be argued that this system of elections gives

prominence to candidates and not political parties unlike the system of

closed list of elections where the voters do not have any knowledge

of the candidates that are set up by the Political Party.106

89. However, it cannot be concluded that the decision of voting is solely

based on the individual candidate’s capabilities and not the political

party merely because the voter has knowledge of the candidate who

has been set up by the political party. Such a conclusion cannot be

106 See Dominik Hangartner, Nelson A Ruiz, Janne Tukiainen, Open or Closed? How List Type Affects

Electoral Performance, Candidate Selection, and Campaign Effort, VAT Institute for Economic Research

Working Papers 120 (2019)

500 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

definitively drawn particularly in view of the design of the electoral

voting machine which has a list of the names of the candidates who

are contesting the election from the constituency along with the

symbol of the political party which is fielding the candidate. Voters

casts their votes based on two considerations: the capability of the

candidate as a representative and the ideology of the political party.

90. Political parties publish electoral manifestos containing the ideology

of the party, major policies of the political party, plans, programmes

and other considerations of governance which would be implemented

if they came to power.107 While political manifestos do not necessarily

always translate to policies when the party is elected to power,

they throw light upon the integral nature of political parties in the

electoral system. By publishing an election manifesto, a political party

communicates to the voters that they must accord preference to

the political party. Party manifestos prod voters to look away from a

candidate centric and towards a party centric perception of elections.

91. Lastly, the prominence of political parties as electoral units is further

heightened by the form of government in India. India follows a

Westminister system of government which confers prominence to

political parties without strictly separating between the legislature

and the executive. The time-honoured convention of the cabinet form

of government is that the leader of the political party with absolute

majority must be called to form the government.108 The Council of

Ministers is appointed by the President on the aid and advice of

the Prime Minister.109 Political parties are intrinsic to this form of

government because of the very process of government formation.

The recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission on the exercise of

discretion by the Governor when no single political party commands

an absolute majority, which has been given judicial recognition in

Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India,110 also prioritises political

parties making them central to the governance structure.111

107 Election Commission of India, Instructions to political parties on manifestos dated 24.04.2015, https://

www.eci.gov.in/election-manifestos/

108 Constitution of India 1950, Article 75. See, Aradhya Sethia, “Where’s the party?: towards a constitutional

biography of political parties, Indian Law Review, 3:1, 1-32 (2019)

109 Ibid.

110 [2006] 1 SCR 562 : (2006) 2 SCC 1

111 65. “Para 4.11.04 of the Sarkaria Commission Report specifically deals with the situation where no

single party obtains absolute majority and provides the order of preference the Governor should follow in

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 501

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

92. The centrality of political parties in the electoral system is further

accentuated by the inclusion of the Tenth Schedule. The Tenth

Schedule deals with disqualification on the ground of defection from

the political party which set up the elected individual as its candidate.

Paragraph 2 provides the following grounds of defection:

a. Voluntarily giving up membership of the political party; and

b. Voting or abstaining from voting in the House contrary to direction

issued by the political party without obtaining prior permission

from the political party and when such voting has not been

condoned by the political party.

93. The underlying principle of anti-defection law which has been

recognised by a seven-Judge Bench of this Court in Kihoto

Hollohon v. Zachillhu,112 is that a candidate set up by a political

party is elected on the basis of the programme of that political

party. In the course of years, while deciding disputes related to the

Tenth Schedule, judgments of this Court have further strengthened

the centrality of political parties in the electoral system. In Ravi

S Naik v. Union of India113, this Court observed that voluntarily

giving up membership of a political party has a wider connotation

and includes not just resignation of the member from the party

and an inference can also be drawn from the conduct of the

member. In Subash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of

Maharashtra,114 a Constitution Bench of this Court while interpreting

the provisions of the Tenth Schedule held that the political party

and not the legislature party (which consists of the members of

the House belonging to a particular political party) appoints the

Whip of a political party for the purposes of Paragraph 2(1)(b) of

the Tenth Schedule.115

selecting a Chief Minister. The order of preference suggested is:

a. An alliance of parties that was formed prior to the elections.;

b. The largest single party staking a claim to form the Government with the support of others,

including “independents”;

c. A post-electoral coalition of parties, with all the partners in the coalition joining the Government;

d. A post-electoral alliance of parties, with some of the parties in the alliance forming a Government

and the remaining parties, including “Independents” supporting the Government from outside.”

112 [1992] 1 SCR 686 : (1992) Supp (2) SCC 651 [4]

113 [1994] 1 SCR 754 : AIR 1994 SC 1558

114 WP (C) No. 493 of 2022

115 Subash Desai [113]

502 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

94. In summation, a ‘political party’ is a relevant political unit in the

democratic electoral process in India for the following three

reasons:

a. Voters associate voting with political parties because of

the centrality of symbols in the electoral process;

b. The form of government where the executive is chosen

from the legislature based on the political party or coalition

of political parties which has secured the majority; and

c. The prominence accorded to political parties by the Tenth

Schedule of the Constitution.

d. The essentiality of information about political funding for the

effective exercise of the choice of voting

95. In ADR (supra) and PUCL (supra), this Court held that a voter has

a right to information which is essential for them to exercise their

freedom to vote. In the previous section, we have concluded that

political parties are a relevant political unit. Thus, the observations

of this Court in PUCL (supra) and ADR (supra) on the right

to information about a candidate contesting elections is also

applicable to political parties. The issue whether information

about the funding received by political parties is essential for an

informed voter must be answered in the context of the core tenets

of electoral democracy. The Preamble to the Constitution resolves

to constitute a social, economic, and politically just society where

there is equality of status and opportunity. The discourse which

has emanated within and outside the Courts is often restricted

to the ideals of social and economic justice and rarely includes

political inequality.

96. Electoral democracy in India is premised on the principle of political

equality which the Constitution guarantees in two ways. First, by

guaranteeing the principle of “one person one vote” which assures

equal representation in voting. The Constitution prescribes two

conditions with respect to elections to seats in Parliament which

guarantee the principle of “one person one vote” with respect to

every voter and amongst every State:

a. Each State shall be divided into territorial constituencies in

such a manner that the ratio between the population of each

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 503

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

constituency and the number of seats allotted to it shall be the

same throughout the State;116 and

b. The total number of seats allotted to each State in Parliament

should be such that the ratio between the number of seats,

and the population of the State is the same for all States.117

97. Second, the Constitution ensures that socio-economic inequality

does not perpetuate political inequality by mandating reservation of

seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Parliament118

and State Assemblies.119

98. The Constitution guarantees political equality by focusing on the

‘elector’ and the ‘elected’. These two constitutional precepts foster

political equality in the following two ways. First, the Constitution

mandates that the value of each vote is equal. This guarantee ensures

formal political equality where every person’s vote is accorded equal

weightage. Second, the Constitution ensures that members of socially

marginalized groups are not excluded from the political process. This

guarantee ensures (a) equality in representation; and (b) equality in

influence over political decisions.

99. However, political inequality continues to persist in spite of the

constitutional guarantees. One of the factors which contributes to

the inequality is the difference in the ability of persons to influence

political decisions because of economic inequality. In a politically

equal society, the citizens must have an equal voice to influence

the political process.120 We have already in the preceding section

elucidated the close association of money and politics where we

explained the influence of money over electoral outcomes. However,

the influence of money over electoral politics is not limited to its

impact over electoral outcomes. It also spills over to governmental

116 Constitution of India 1950, Article 81 (2)(b). Also see Constitution of India, Article 170(2) where the

Constitution prescribes the same principle with respect to the composition of seats in Legislative

Assemblies of State

117 Constitution of India 1950, Article 81(2)(b)

118 Constitution of India 1950, Article 330 guarantees “as nearly as may be” proportional representation for

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Parliament.

119 Constitution of India 1950, Article 332 guarantees “as nearly as may be” proportional representation for

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Legislative Assemblies of the States.

120 See Ben Ansell and Jean Gingrich J (2021). Political Inequality. The IFS Deaton Review of Inequalities,

London: Institute for Fiscal Studies

504 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

decisions. It must be recalled here that the legal regime in India does

not distinguish between campaign funding and electoral funding. The

money which is donated to political parties is not used by the political

party only for the purposes of electoral campaign. Party donations are

also used, for instance, to build offices for the political party and pay

party workers. Similarly, the window for contributions is not open for

a limited period only prior to the elections. Money can be contributed

to political parties throughout the year and the contributed money

can be spent by the political party for reasons other than just election

campaigning. It is in light of the nexus between economic inequality

and political inequality, and the legal regime in India regulating party

financing that the essentiality of the information on political financing

for an informed voter must be analyzed.

100. Economic inequality leads to differing levels of political engagement

because of the deep association between money and politics. At

a primary level, political contributions give a “seat at the table”

to the contributor. That is, it enhances access to legislators.121

This access also translates into influence over policy-making. An

economically affluent person has a higher ability to make financial

contributions to political parties, and there is a legitimate possibility

that financial contribution to a political party would lead to quid pro

quo arrangements because of the close nexus between money and

politics. Quid pro quo arrangements could be in the form of introducing

a policy change, or granting a license to the contributor. The money

that is contributed could not only influence electoral outcomes but

also policies particularly because contributions are not merely limited

to the campaign or pre-campaign period. Financial contributions

could be made even after a political party or coalition of parties form

Government. The possibility of a quid pro quo arrangement in such

situations is even higher. Information about political funding would

enable a voter to assess if there is a correlation between policy

making and financial contributions.

121 See Joshua L.Kalla andDavidE.Broockman,“Campaign ContributionsFacilitateAccess toCongressional

Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment” (2016 60(3)) American Journal of Political Science. A political

organization conducted an experiment to determine if there is a link between political contributions and

access to the policy makers. The Organization scheduled meetings between 191 Congressional offices

and the organization’s members who were campaign donors. When the Congressional offices were

informed that prospective attendees were political donor, policymakers made themselves available for

the meeting three to four times more often.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 505

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

101. For the information on donor contributions to be relevant and essential,

it is not necessary that voters have to take the initiative to peruse the

list of contributors to find relevant information which would enable

them to cast their vote effectively. Electronic and print media would

present the information on contributions received by political parties,

and the probable link between the contribution and the licenses which

were given to the company in an accessible format. The responses

to such information by the Government and political parties would

go a long way in informing the voter.

102. However, to establish the argument of quid pro quo arrangements

between the contributor and the political party, it is necessary that

the political party has knowledge of the particulars of funding to its

party. The political party to whom contributions are made cannot

enter into a quid pro quo arrangements if it is unaware of the donor.

The Scheme defines electoral bond “as a bond issued in the nature

of promissory note which shall be a bearer banking instrument and

shall not carry the name of the buyer or payee.”122 The Scheme also

stipulates that the information furnished by the buyer shall be treated

as confidential which shall not be disclosed by any authority except

when demanded by a competent court or by a law enforcement

agency upon the registration of criminal case.123

103. The submission of the Union of India is that the political party which

receives the contribution does not know of identity of the contributor

because neither the bond would have their name nor could the bank

discloses such details to the political party. We do not agree with this

submission. While it is true that the law prescribes anonymity as a

central characteristic of electoral bonds, the de jure anonymity of the

contributors does not translate to de facto anonymity. The Scheme

is not fool-proof. There are sufficient gaps in the Scheme which

enable political parties to know the particulars of the contributions

made to them. Clause 12 of the Scheme states that the bond

can be encashed only by the political party by depositing it in the

designated bank account. The contributor could physically hand over

the electoral bond to an office bearer of the political party or to the

legislator belonging to the political party, or it could have been sent

122 Electoral Bond Scheme; Clause 2(a)

123 Electoral Bond Scheme; Clause 7(4)

506 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

to the office of the political party with the name of the contributor, or

the contributor could after depositing the electoral bond disclose the

particulars of the contribution to a member of the political party for

them to cross-verify. Further, according to the data on contributions

made through electoral bonds, ninety four percent of the contributions

through electoral bonds have been made in the denomination of one

crore. Electoral bonds provide economically resourced contributors

who already have a seat at the table selective anonymity vis-à-vis

the public and not the political party.

104. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the

information about funding to a political party is essential for a voter to

exercise their freedom to vote in an effective manner. The Electoral

Bond Scheme and the impugned provisions to the extent that they

infringe upon the right to information of the voter by anonymizing

contributions through electoral bonds are violative of Article 19(1)(a).

ii. Whether the infringement of the right to information of the voter

is justified

105. The next issue which falls for analysis is whether the violation of

the right to information is justified. This Court has laid down the

proportionality standard to determine if the violation of the fundamental

right is justified.124 The proportionality standard is as follows:

a. The measure restricting a right must have a legitimate goal

(legitimate goal stage);

b. The measure must be a suitable means for furthering the goal

(suitability or rational connection stage);

c. The measure must be least restrictive and equally effective

(necessity stage); and

d. The measure must not have a disproportionate impact on the

right holder (balancing stage).

106. The legitimate goal stage requires this Court to analyze if the objective

of introducing the law is a legitimate purpose for the infringement of

rights. At this stage, the State is required to discharge two burdens.

First, the State must demonstrate that the objective is legitimate.

124 Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2016] 3 SCR 575 : (2016) 4

SCC 346

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 507

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

Second, the State must establish that the law is indeed in furtherance

of the legitimate aim that is contended to be served.125

107. The then Finance Minister, Mr.Arun Jaitley encapsulated the objective

of introducing the Electoral Bond Scheme thus:

a. An attempt was made in the past to incentivize donations to

political party through banking channels. Both the donor and

the donee were granted exemption from payment of tax if

accounts of contributions were maintained and returns were

filed. However, the situation had only marginally improved.

Political parties continued to receive funds through anonymous

sources; and

b. Donors have been reluctant in donating through the banking

channel because the disclosure of donor identity would entail

adverse consequences.

108. In other words, Mr. Jaitley stated that the main purpose of the

Scheme is to curb black money in electoral financing and this purpose

could be achieved only if information about political donations is

kept confidential. That is, donor privacy is a means to incentivize

contributions through the banking channel. However, Mr. Tushar

Mehta argued that protecting donor privacy is an end in itself. We

will now proceed to determine if the infringement of the right to

information of the voters is justified vis-à-vis the purposes of (a)

curbing black money; and (b) protecting donor privacy.

a. Curbing Black money

109. The petitioners argue that the infringement of the right to information

which is traceable to Article 19(1)(a) can only be justified if the

purpose of the restriction is traceable to the grounds stipulated in

Article 19(2). They argue that the purpose of curbing of black money

cannot be traced to any of the grounds in Article 19(2), and thus, is

not a legitimate purpose for restricting the right to information.

110. Article 19(2) stipulates that the right to freedom of speech and

expression can only be restricted on the grounds of: (a) the

sovereignty and integrity of India; (b) the security of the State; (c)

friendly relations with foreign states, (d) public order; (e) decency

125 See Media One v. Union of India, Civil Appeal No. 8129 of 2022 [77-79]

508 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

or morality; (f) contempt of court; (g) defamation; and (h) incitement

to an offence. The purpose of curbing black money is traceable to

public interest. However, public interest is not one of the grounds

stipulated in Article 19(2). Of the rights recognized under Article 19,

only Article 19(1)(g) which guarantees the freedom to practice any

profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business can be

restricted on the ground of public interest.126

111. In Sakal Papers v. The Union of India127, the constitutional validity of

the Newspaper (Price and Page) Act 1965 and the Daily Newspaper

(Price and Page) Order 1960 which regulated the number of pages

according to the price charged, prescribed the number of supplements

to be published and regulated the area for advertisements in the

newspapers was challenged on the ground that it violated the freedom

of press under Article 19(1)(a). The Union of India submitted that

the restriction on the freedom of press was justified because the

purpose of the law was to prevent unfair competition which was in

furtherance of public interest. It was argued that the restriction was

justified because the activities carried out by newspapers were also

traceable to the freedom to carry out a profession which could be

restricted on the ground of public interest under Article 19(6). Justice

JR Mudholkar writing for the Constitution Bench observed that the

impugned legislation “directly and immediately” curtails the freedom

of speech guaranteed underArticle 19(1)(a), and the freedom cannot

be restricted on any ground other than the grounds stipulated in

Article 19(2).128 In Express Newspapers v. Union of India,129 a

Constitution Bench while deciding the constitutional challenge to

the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous

ProvisionsAct 1955 held that a law violatingArticle 19(1)(a) would be

unconstitutional unless the purpose of the law falls “squarely within

the provisions ofArticle 19(2)”.130 In Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar

126 Constitution of India 1950; Article 19(6)

127 [1962] 3 SCR 842 : AIR 1962 SC 305

128 Ibid; Paragraph 36:”If a law directly affecting it is challenged, it is no answer that the restriction enacted

by it are justifiable under clauses (3) to (6). For the scheme of Article 19 is to enumerate different

freedoms separately and then to specify the extent of restrictions to which they may be subjected and

the objects for securing which this could be done.”

129 [1959] 1 SCR 12 : AIR 1958 SC 578

130 Also see, Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt Limited v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 515;Sodhi

Shamsher v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1954 SC 276; Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, [1950] 1 SCR 594

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 509

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

Pradesh,131 a Constitution Bench of this Court answered the issue

whether the grounds stipulated in Article 19(1)(a) are exhaustive

of the restrictions which can be placed on the right to free speech

under Article 19(1)(a) affirmatively.

112. However, in the specific context of the right to information, this Court

has observed that the right can be restricted on grounds not traceable

to Article 19(1)(a). In PUCL (supra), one of the submissions was that

dangerous consequences would follow if the right to information is

culled out from Article 19(1)(a) because the grounds on which the

right can be restricted as prescribed in Article 19(2) are very limited.

Justice Reddi in his concurring opinion in PUCL (supra) observed

that the right under Article 19(1)(a) can be restricted on grounds

which are not “strictly within the confines of Article 19(2)”.132 For

this purpose, Justice Reddi referred to the observations of Justice

Jeevan Reddy in The Secretary, Ministry of Information v. Cricket

Association of Bengal133:

“99. […] This raises the larger question whether apart

from the heads of restriction envisaged by sub-article (2)

of Article 19, certain inherent limitations should not be

read into the article, if it becomes necessary to do so in

national or societal interest. The discussion on this aspect

finds its echo in the separate opinion of Jeevan Reddy, J.

in Cricket Assn. case [(1975) 4 SCC 428] . The learned

Judge was of the view that the freedom of speech and

expression cannot be so exercised as to endanger the

interest of the nation or the interest of the society, even if

the expression “national interest” or “public interest” has

not been used in Article 19(2). It was pointed out that such

implied limitation has been read into the First Amendment

of the US Constitution which guarantees the freedom of

speech and expression in unqualified terms.”

113. In Cricket Association of Bengal (supra), one of the submissions

of the petitioner (Union of India) was that the right to broadcast can

be restricted on grounds other than those stipulated in Article 19(2).

131 Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 113 of 2016

132 PUCL (supra), [111]

133 [1995] 1 SCR 1036 : 1995 AIR 1236

510 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Justice P B Sawant writing for himself and Justice S Mohan observed

while summarizing the law on freedom of speech and expression that

Article 19(1)(a) can only be restricted on the grounds mentioned in

Article 19(2).134 The learned Judge specifically refuted the argument

that the right can be restricted on grounds other than those stipulated

in Article 19(2). Such an argument, the learned Judge states, is to

plead for unconstitutional measures. However, while observing so,

Justice P B Sawant states that the right to telecast can be restricted

on the grounds mentioned in Article 19(2) and the “dictates of public

interest”:

“78. […] If the right to freedom of speech and expression

includes the right to disseminate information to as wide a

section of the population as is possible, the access which

enables the right to be so exercised is also an integral

part of the said right. The wider range of circulation of

information or its greater impact cannot restrict the content

of the right nor can it justify its denial. The virtues of the

electronic media cannot become its enemies. It may

warrant a greater regulation over licensing and control

and vigilance on the content of the programme telecast.

However, this control can only be exercised within the

framework of Article 19(2) and the dictates of public

interest.”

(emphasis supplied)

114. Justice Jeevan Reddy in the concurring opinion segregated the

grounds stipulated in Article 19(2) into grounds in furtherance of

“national interest” and “societal interest”. The learned Judge observed

that the grounds of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of

the State, friendly relations with foreign State and public order are

grounds referable to national interest, and the grounds of decency,

morality, contempt of court, defamation and incitement of offence

are referable to state interest. The learned Judge then referred to

the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States in FCC v.

National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting135, where it was

held that a station license can be denied on the ground of public

134 Ibid; [45].

135 436 US 775 (1978)

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 511

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

interest. Justice Reddy observed that public interest is synonymous

to state interest which is one of the grounds underlying Article 19(2):

“189. Reference may also be made in this connection to

the decision of the United States Supreme Court in FCC

v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting [56 L Ed

2d 697 : 436 US 775 (1978)] referred to hereinbefore,

where it has been held that “to deny a station licence

because the public interest requires it is not a denial

of free speech”. It is significant that this was so said

with reference to First Amendment to the United States

Constitution which guarantees the freedom of speech and

expression in absolute terms. The reason is obvious. The

right cannot rise above the national interest and the

interest of society which is but another name for the

interest of general public. It is true that Article 19(2)

does not use the words “national interest”, “interest of

society” or “public interest” but as pointed hereinabove,

the several grounds mentioned in clause (2) are

ultimately referable to the interests of the nation and

of the society.”

(emphasis supplied)

115. The observations of Justice Sawant and the concurring opinion of

Justice Jeevan Reddy in Cricket Association of Bengal (supra)

that the right under Article 19(1)(a) can be restricted on the ground

of public interest even though it is not stipulated in Article 19(2)

must be understood in the specific context of that case. Cricket

Association of Bengal (supra), dealt with the access to and use

of a public good (that is, airwaves) for dissemination of information.

The Court distinguished airways from other means of dissemination

of information such as newsprint and held that since broadcasting

involves the use of a public good, it must be utilized to advance free

speech rights and plurality of opinion (that is, public interest).136 The

observations in Cricket Association of Bengal (supra) cannot be

interpreted to mean that other implied grounds of restrictions have

been read into Article 19(2).

136 Cricket Association of Bengal [201 (1)(a) and 201(1)(b)]

512 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

116. From the above discussion, it is clear that the right to information

under Article 19(1)(a) can only be restricted based on the grounds

stipulated inArticle 19(2). It could be argued that curbing black money

can be traced to the ground of “public order”. However, a Constitution

Bench of this Court has interpreted the ground “public order” to mean

“public safety and tranquility” and “disorder involving breaches of local

significance in contradistinction to national upheavals, such as civil

strife, war, affecting the security of the State.”137 Thus, the purpose

of curbing black money is not traceable to any of the grounds in

Article 19(2).

117. We proceed to apply the subsequent prongs of the proportionality

standard, even assuming that curbing black money is a legitimate

purpose for restricting the right to information. The second prong of

the proportionality analysis requires the State to assess whether the

means used are rationally connected to the purpose. At this stage,

the court is required to assess whether the means, if realised, would

increase the likelihood of curbing black money. It is not necessary

that the means chosen should be the only means capable of realising

the purpose. It is sufficient if the means used constitute one of the

many methods by which the purpose can be realised, even if it only

partially gives effect to the purpose.138

118. The respondents submit that before the introduction of the Electoral

Bond Scheme, a major portion of the total contributions received

by political parties was from “unknown sources”. For example,

immediately preceding the financial year (2016-17) in which the

Electoral Bond Scheme was introduced, eighty one percent of the

contributions (Rupees 580.52 Crores) were received by political

parties through voluntary contributions. Since the amount of voluntary

contributions is not regulated, it allowed the circulation of black money.

However, after the introduction of the Electoral Bond Scheme, fortyseven percent of the contributions were received through electoral

bonds which is regulated money. The Union of India submitted

that providing anonymity to the contributors incentivizes them to

contribute through the banking channel. Assuming, for the purpose

of hypothesis that the Union of India is right on this prong, what it

137 Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Dr Ram Manohar Lohia, [1960] 2 SCR 821 : AIR 1960 SC

633 [18]

138 Media One (supra) [100]

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 513

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

urges is that non-disclosure of information about political expenditure

has a rational nexus with the goal, that is, curbing black money or

unregulated money.

119. The next stage of the proportionality standard is the least restrictive

means stage. At this stage, this Court is required to determine if

the means adopted (that is, anonymity of the contributor) is the

least restrictive means to give effect to the purpose based on the

following standard:139

a. Whether there are other possible means which could have been

adopted by the State;

b. Whether the alternative means identified realise the objective

in a ‘real and substantial manner’;

c. Whether the alternative identified and the means used by the

State impact fundamental rights differently; and

d. Whether on an overall comparison (and balancing) of the

measure and the alternative, the alternative is better suited

considering the degree of realizing the government objective

and the impact on fundamental rights.

120. Before we proceed to determine if the Electoral Bond Scheme is

the least restrictive means to curb black money in electoral funding,

it is important that we recall the regime on electoral funding. After

the amendments introduced by the Finance Act 2017, donations to

political parties exceeding rupees two thousand can only be made by

an account payee cheque drawn on a bank, an account payee bank

draft, the use of electronic clearing system through a bank account

or through an electoral bond.140 All contributions to political parties

through cash cannot be assumed to be black money. For example,

individuals who contribute to political parties in small donations

during party rallies usually contribute through cash. On the other

hand, contributions through the banking channel are certainly a form

of accounted transaction. Restricting the contributions to political

parties in cash to less than rupees two thousand and prescribing

that contributions above the threshold amount must only be made

139 See Justice KS Puttaswamy (5J) (supra) and Media One Broadcasting (supra) [103];

140 IT Act, Section 13A(d)

514 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

through banking channels is itself intended to curb black money.

Thus, the legal regime itself provides other alternatives to curb black

money: contributions through cheques, bank draft, or electronic

clearing system. The Union of India submits that though there

are other alternatives through which circulation of black money in

electoral financing can be curbed, these alternatives do not realize

the objective in a “substantial manner” because most contributors

resort to cash donations as they “fear consequences from political

opponents” to whom donations were not made.

121. In addition to the alternatives identified above, the existing legal

regime provides another alternative in the form of Electoral Trusts

through which the objective of curbing black money in electoral

financing can be achieved. Section 2(22AA) of the IT Act defines an

Electoral Trust as a trust approved by the Board in accordance with

the scheme made in this regard by the Central Government. Section

13B of the IT Act states that any voluntary contributions received

by an electoral trust shall not be included in the total income of the

previous year of such electoral trust if the it distributes ninety five

percent of the aggregate donations received during the previous

year. In terms of Rule 17CA of the IT Rules 1962, the features of

an electoral trust are as follows:

a. An Electoral Trust may receive voluntary contribution from (i)

an individual who is a citizen of India; (ii) a company registered

in India; (iii) a firm or Hindu undivided family or an Association

of persons or a body of individuals residing in India;

b. When a contribution is made to an electoral trust, a receipt

recording the following information shall, inter alia, be provided:

(i) Name and address of the contributor; (ii) Permanent account

number of the contributor or the passport number if the

contributor is not a resident of India; (iii) Amount contributed;

(iv) The mode of contribution including the name and branch

of the bank and the date of receipt of such contribution; and

(v) PAN of the electoral trust;

c. Contributions to the electoral trust can only be made through

cheque, bank draft and electronic transfer. Contributions made

in cash shall not be accepted by the Electoral Trust;

d. The Electoral Trust shall spend five percent of the total

contributions received in a year subject to a limit of Rupees five

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 515

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

hundred thousand in the first year of incorporation and Rupees

three hundred thousand in the second year.141 The remaining

money (that is, ninety five percent of the total contributions

received in that financial year along with any surplus from the

previous year) shall be distributed to political parties registered

under Section 29A of the RP Act;142

e. The political party to which the trust donated money shall

provide a receipt indicating the name of the political party, the

PAN and the amount of contribution received from the trust;143

f. The trust shall also maintain a list of persons from whom

contributions have been received and to whom they have been

distributed;144 and

g. The trust shall furnish a certified copy of the list of contributors

and list of political parties to whom contributions have been

made to the Commissioner of Income Tax along with the audit

report.145

122. In summary, an Electoral Trust is formed only for collecting political

contributions from donors. An electoral trust can contribute to more

than one party. To illustrate, if ten individuals and one company have

contributed to an Electoral Trust and the donations are contributed

to three political parties equally or unequally, the information about

which of the individuals contributed to which of the political parties

will not be disclosed. In this manner, the purpose of curbing black

money in electoral financing will be met. At the same time, there

would be no fear of consequences from political opponents because

the information as to which political party were made is not disclosed.

123. On 6 June 2014, the ECI circulated Guidelines for submission of

contribution reports of Electoral Trusts mandating in the interest of

transparency that all Electoral Trusts shall submit an Annual Report

containing details of contributions received and disbursed by them to

political parties. Pursuant to the Guidelines, Electoral Trusts submit

141 IT Rules 1962, Rule 17CA(8)(i)

142 IT Rules 1962, Rule 17CA(7) and Rules 17CA(8)(ii)

143 IT Rules 1962, Rule 17CA(9)

144 IT Rules 1962, Rule 17CA(11)(ii)

145 IT Rules 1962, Rule 17CA(14)

516 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Annual Reports to the ECI every year. For example, according to the

Annual Report of the Prudent Electoral Trust for the financial year 2021-

22, the Trust received contributions of a total of Rupees 4,64,83,00,116

from seventy contributors including individuals and companies. The

contributions were unequally distributed to the Aam Aadmi Party, All

India Congress Committee, Bharatiya Janata Party, Goa Congress

Committee, Goa Forward Party, Indian National Congress, Punjab Lok

Congress, Samajwadi Party, Shiromani Akali Dal, Telangana Rashtra

Samiti, and YSR Congress. From the report, it cannot be discerned

if contributor ‘A’ contributed to a particular political party. It can only

be concluded that contributor ‘A’ could have contributed to the Party.

124. Thus, even if the argument of the Union of India that the other

alternative means such as the other modes of electronic transfer

do not realize the objective of curbing black money substantially

because contributors would resort to cash donations due to the

fear of consequences is accepted, Electoral Trusts are an effective

alternative. There will be a lesser degree of “political consequences”

for contributions made to the Electoral Trust because the information

about which of the contributors contributed to which of the parties will

not be disclosed. It is only where the Electoral Trust contributes to one

political party, would there be a possibility of political consequences

and witch-hunting (assuming that there is a link between anonymity

and contributions). However, in that case, it is a choice expressly

made by the contributors. Additionally, the law mandates disclosure

only of contributions made above twenty thousand in a financial

year. So, for contributions less than twenty-five thousand, cheques

and other modes of electronic transfer are an effective alternative.

125. When these three methods of political contribution (electronic

transfer other than electoral bonds, contribution to Electoral Trust,

and Electoral Bonds) are placed on a continuum, transfer through

electronic means (other than electoral bonds) would be placed on

one end and Electoral Bonds would be placed on the other end. A

voter would receive complete information about contributions made

above twenty thousand to a political party in the case of electronic

transfer made directly to a political party other than through electoral

bonds.146

146 RPA; Section 29A

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 517

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

126. With respect to contributions through electoral bonds, the voter would

not receive any information about financial contributions in terms of

Section 29C of RPA as amended by the Finance Act. This Court in

the interim order dated 31 October 2023 in the specific context of

contributions made by companies through electoral bonds prima facie

observed the voter would be able to secure information about the

funding by matching the information of the aggregate sum contributed

by the Company (as required to be disclosed under Section 182(3)

of the Companies Act as amended by the Finance Act) with the

information disclosed by the political party. However, on a detailed

analysis of the Scheme and the amendments we are of the opinion

that such an exercise would not reveal the particulars of the donations

because the Company under the provisions of Section 182 and the

political party are only required to disclose the consolidated amount

contributed and received through Electoral Bonds respectively. The

particulars about the political party to which the contributions were

made which is crucial to the right to information of political funding

cannot be identified through the matching exercise.

127. With respect to contributions to an Electoral Trust, a voter receives

partial information. The voter would know the total amount contributed

by the donor and that the donor contributed to one of the political

parties (in case the Electoral Trust has made contributions to multiple

parties). But the donor would not be aware of the exact details of

the contribution.

128. Assuming that anonymity incentivizes contributions through banking

channels (which would lead to curbing black money in the electoral

process), electoral bonds would be the most effective means in

curbing black money, followed by Electoral Trust, and then other

means of electronic transfer. This conclusion is premised on the belief

that the Electoral Bond curbs black money. However, the Scheme

is not fool-proof. The Electoral Bond Scheme does not provide any

regulatory check to prevent the trading of bonds though Clause 14

of the Electoral Bond Scheme states that the bonds shall not be

eligible for trading.

129. On an overall balance of the impact of the alternative means on the

right to information and its ability to fulfill the purpose, for contributions

below twenty thousand rupees, contributions through other means

of electronic transfer is the least restrictive means. For contributions

518 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

above twenty thousand rupees, contributions through Electoral Trust is

the least restrictive means. Having concluded that the Electoral Bond

Scheme is not the least restrictive means to achieve the purpose of

curbing black money in electoral process, there is no necessity of

applying the balancing prong of the proportionality standard.

130. Based on the above discussion, we conclude that Electoral Bond

Scheme does not fulfill the least restrictive means test. The Electoral

Bond Scheme is not the only means for curbing black money in

Electoral Finance. There are other alternatives which substantially

fulfill the purpose and impact the right to information minimally when

compared to the impact of electoral bonds on the right to information.

b. Donor Privacy

131. The Union of India submitted that information about financial

contributions to political parties is not disclosed to protect the

contributor’s informational privacy to political affiliation. There are

two limbs to the argument of the Union of India with respect to the

purpose of donor privacy. First, that the State interest in introducing

the Electoral Bond Scheme which guarantees confidentiality (or

anonymity) to financial contributions is that it furthers donor privacy;

and second, this State interest facilitates a guaranteed fundamental

right. Thus, the submission of the State is that the right to information

can be restricted even if donor privacy is not traceable to the

grounds in Article 19(2) because privacy is a fundamental right in

itself. This Court needs to decide the following issues to determine

if the right to information of voters can be restricted on the ground

of donor privacy:

a. Whether the fundamental right to informational privacy

recognized by this Court in Justice KS Puttaswamy (9J) v.

Union of India147, includes information about a citizen’s political

affiliation; and

b. If (a) above is answered in the affirmative, whether financial

contribution to a political party is a facet of political affiliation.

If the right to informational privacy extends to financial contributions

to a political party, this Court needs to decide if the Electoral Bond

147 [2017] 10 SCR 569 : (2017) 10 SCC 1

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 519

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

Scheme adequately balances the right to information and right to

informational privacy of political affiliation.

I. Informational privacy of financial contributions to political parties

132. In Justice KS Puttaswamy (9J) (supra), a nine-Judge Bench of

this Court held that the Constitution guarantees the right to privacy.

This Court traced the right to privacy to the constitutional ideals of

dignity, liberty, and the thread of non-arbitrariness that runs through

the provisions of Part III. The scope of the right to privacy discussed

in Justice KS Puttaswamy (9J) (supra) is summarized below:

a. The right to privacy includes “repose”, that is, the freedom from

unwanted stimuli, “sanctuary”, the protection against intrusive

observation into intimate decisions and autonomy with respect

to personal choices;

b. Privacy over intimate decisions includes decisions related to

the mind and body. Privacy extends to both the decision and

the process of arriving at the decision. A lack of privacy over

thought (which leads to decision-making) would suppress voices

and lead to homogeneity which is contrary to the values that

the Constitution espouses148;

c. Privacy over decisions and choices would enable the exercise

of fundamental freedoms such as the freedom of thought,

expression, and association freely without coercion;149

d. Privacy is attached to a person and not a space. The scope

of privacy cannot be restricted only to the “private” space; and

e. Privacy includes informational privacy. Information which may

seem inconsequential in silos can be used to influence decision

making behavior when aggregated.150

133. The content of privacy is not limited to “private” actions and decisions

such as the choice of a life partner, procreation and sexuality. Neither

is privacy merely defined from the point of direct State intrusion.

148 Justice Chandrachud (Paragraph 168), Justice Kaul (Paragraph 19)

149 Justice Chandrachud, Justice Chellameshwar, Justice Bobde (paragraph 25 and 29)

150 Justice Chandrachud (paragraph 170): “[…] Individually, these information silos may seem

inconsequential. In aggregation, they disclose the nature of the personality: food habits, language, health,

hobbies, sexual preferences, friendships, ways of dress and political affiliation. Justice Chelameshwar

(Paragraph 38), Justice Kaul (Paragaph 19)

520 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Privacy is defined as essential protection for the exercise and

development of other freedoms protected by the Constitution, and

from direct or indirect influence by both State and non-State actors.

Viewed in this manner, privacy takes within its fold, decisions which

also have a ‘public component’.

134. The expression of political beliefs is guaranteed under Article 19(1)

(a). Forming political beliefs and opinion is the first stage of political

expression. The freedom of political expression cannot be exercised

freely in the absence of privacy of political affiliation. Information

about a person’s political beliefs can be used by the State at a political

level, to suppress dissent, and at a personal level, to discriminate by

denying employment or subjecting them to trolls. The lack of privacy

of political affiliation would also disproportionately affect those whose

political views do not match the views of the mainstream.

135. In the specific context of exercising electoral franchise, the lack of

privacy of political affiliation would be catastrophic. It is crucial to

electoral democracy that the exercise of the freedom to vote is not

subject to undue influence. It is precisely for this reason that the law

recognizes certain ‘corrupt practices’ by candidates. These ‘corrupt

practices’ do not merely include ‘financial’ corrupt practices such as

bribery. They also include undue influence of the voters by an attempt

to interfere with the free exercise of electoral right151, publication of

false information about the personal character of any candidate152,

and providing vehicles for the free conveyance of electors153. The

law penalizes practices which have the effect of dis-franchising the

voter through illegitimate means.

136. Information about a person’s political affiliation can be used to disenfranchise voters through voter surveillance.154 Voter databases

which are developed through surveillance identify voting patterns of

the electors and attempt to interfere with their opinions based on the

information. For example, the data of online purchase histories such

as the books purchased (which would indicate the ideological leaning

151 RPA, Section 123(2). The provision includes the threatening with injury including social ostracism and

ex-communication from any caste or community.

152 RPA; Section 123(4)

153 RPA; Section 123(5)

154 See Philip N Howard and Daniel Kreiss, Political Parties and Voter privacy: Australia, Canada, the United

Kingdom, and United States in Comparative Perspective, First Monday 15(12) 2010

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 521

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

of the individual), clothing brands used (which would indicate the

social class to which the individual belongs) or the news consumed

or the newspapers subscribed (which would indicate the political

leanings or ideologies) can be used to draw on the relative political

affiliation of people. This information about the political affiliation of

individuals can then be used to influence their votes. Voter surveillance

gains particular significance when fewer people have attachments

to political parties.155

137. At a systemic level, information secured through voter surveillance

could be used to invalidate the foundation of the electoral system.

Information about political affiliation could be used to engage in

gerrymandering, the practice by which constituencies are delimited

based on the electoral preference of the voters.

138. Informational privacy to political affiliation is necessary to protect the

freedom of political affiliation and exercise of electoral franchise. Thus,

it follows from the judgment of this Court in Justice KS Puttaswamy

(9J) (supra) and the observations above that the Constitution

guarantees the right to informational privacy of political affiliation.

139. Having concluded that the Constitution guarantees a right to

informational privacy of political affiliation, it needs to be decided

if the right can be extended to the contributions to political parties.

The Electoral Bond Scheme has two manifestations of privacy:

first, informational privacy by prescribing confidentiality vis-à-vis the

political party; and second, informational privacy by prescribing nondisclosure of the information of political contributions to the public.

The Union of India submitted that contributions made to political

parties must be protected both from the political party itself and

the public because donor privacy is an extension of the principle of

secret ballot and is a facet of free and fair elections. The petitioners

argue that equating political contributions with expression of political

preference through voting is flawed because it conflates money with

speech. The petitioners also argue that informational privacy does

not extend to political contributions because they are by their very

nature public acts which influence public policy, and thus, must be

subject to public scrutiny.

155 Colin Bennet, The politics of privacy and privacy of politics: Parties, elections, and voter surveillance in

Western Democracies. First Monday, 18(8) 2013

522 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

140. The issue before this Court is not whether public funding of political

parties is permissible. Neither is the issue whether a restriction

can be placed on the contribution which can be made by a citizen

to a political party. If it was, then the question of whether financial

contribution to a political party is in furtherance of the right to freedom

of political speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) or the right

to freedom to form associations under Article 19(1)(c) would arise.

However, that not being the case, this Court is not required to decide

whether financial contribution to a political party is protected by

Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(c).

141. This Court in Justice KS Puttaswamy (9J) (supra) did not trace the

right to privacy to a particular provision of the Constitution such as

Article 21. Rather, this Court observed that privacy is crucial for the

fulfilment of the constitutional values of self-determination, autonomy

and liberty in addition to its essentiality for realizing the fundamental

freedoms such as the freedom of speech and expression. This Court

further held that the non-intrusion of the mind (the ability to preserve

beliefs, thoughts and ideologies) is as important as the non-intrusion

of the body. This Court (supra) did not hold that privacy is extendable

to the action of speech or the action of expression, both of which

are required to possess a communicative element to receive the

protection underArticle 19(1)(a).156 Rather, the proposition in Justice

KS Puttaswamy (9J) is that privacy (including informational privacy) is

extendable to thoughts, beliefs, and opinions formed for the exercise

of speech and action. Thus, informational privacy would extend to

financial contributions to political parties even if contributions are not

traceable to Article 19(1)(a) provided that the information on political

contributions indicates the political affiliation of the contributor.

142. Financial contributions to political parties are usually made for two

reasons. First, they may constitute an expression of support to

the political party and second, the contribution may be based on a

quid pro quo. The law as it currently stands permits contributions

to political parties by both corporations and individuals. The huge

political contributions made by corporations and companies should

not be allowed to conceal the reason for financial contributions made

by another section of the population: a student, a daily wage worker,

156 See Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, [1950] 1 SCR 594 (602)

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 523

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

an artist, or a teacher. When the law permits political contributions

and such contributions could be made as an expression of political

support which would indicate the political affiliation of a person,

it is the duty of the Constitution to protect them. Not all political

contributions are made with the intent of attempting to alter public

policy. Contributions are also made to political parties which are not

substantially represented in the legislatures. Contributions to such

political parties are made purely with the intent of expressing support.

At this juncture, the close association of money and politics which

has been explained above needs to be recounted. Money is not

only essential for electoral outcomes and for influencing policies. It

is also necessary for true democratic participation. It is necessary for

enhancing the number of political parties and candidates contesting

the elections which would in-turn impact the demographics of

representatives in the Assembly. It is true that contributions made as

quid pro quo transactions are not an expression of political support.

However, to not grant the umbrella of informational privacy to political

contributions only because a portion of the contributions is made

for other reasons would be impermissible. The Constitution does

not turn a blind eye merely because of the possibilities of misuse.

II. Privacy vis-à-vis political party

143. The second issue is whether the right to privacy of political

contributions can be extended to include privacy vis-à-vis the political

party to which contributions are made since according to the Union

of India under the Electoral Bond Scheme, the political party to

which the contribution is made would not know the particulars of

the contributor. Hence, it is submitted that the scheme is akin to

the secret ballot.

144. We are unable to see how the disclosure of information about

contributors to the political party to which the contribution is made

would infringe political expression. The disclosure of the particulars

of the contributions may affect the freedom of individuals to the

limited extent that the political party with the information could coerce

those who have not contributed to them. However, we have already

held above that the scheme only grants de jure and not de facto

confidentiality vis-à-vis the political party. Under the current Scheme,

it is still open to the political party to coerce persons to contribute.

Thus, the argument of the Union of India that the Electoral Bond

524 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Scheme protects the confidentiality of the contributor akin to the

system of secret ballot is erroneous.

III. Balancing the right to information and the right to informational

privacy

a) Judicial Approach towards balancing fundamental rights:

establishing the double proportionality standard

145. At the core of governance is the conflict between different constitutional

values or different conceptions of the same constitutional value.

Countries with a written Constitution attempt to resolve these conflicts

by creating a hierarchy of rights within the constitutional order where

a few fundamental rights are subjected to others. For example,

Article 25 of the Indian Constitution which guarantees the freedom of

conscience, and the profession, practice and propagation of religion is

subject to public order, morality, health and other provisions of Part

III. The first exercise that the Court must undertake while balancing

two fundamental rights is to determine if the Constitution creates a

hierarchy between the two rights in conflict. If the Constitution does

not create a hierarchy between the conflicting rights, the Courts

must use judicial tools to balance the conflict between the two rights.

146. The judicial approach towards balancing fundamental rights has

evolved over the course of years. Courts have used the collective

interest or the public interest standard, the single proportionality

standard, and the double proportionality standard to balance the

competing interests of fundamental rights.

147. Before the proportionality standard was employed to test the validity

of the justification for the infringement of fundamental rights, Courts

balanced conflicting fundamental rights by according prominence

to one fundamental right over the other based on public interest.

This approach was undertaken through two modalities. In the

first modality, the Court while identifying the fundamental rights in

conflict circumscribed one of the fundamental rights in question

such that there was no real conflict between the rights. The Court

while circumscribing the right undertook an exercise of weighing the

relative constitutional values of the rights based on public interest. In

Re Noise Pollution157, writ petitions were filed seeking to curb noise

157 [2005] Suppl. 1 SCR 624 : (2005) 5 SCC 733

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 525

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

pollution. A two-Judge Bench of this Court observed that those who

make noise often justify their actions based on freedom of speech

and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). However, this

Court observed that the right to freedom of speech and expression

does not include the freedom to “engage in aural aggression”. In

this case, there was no necessity for this Court to “balance” two

fundamental rights because the right in question (freedom of speech

and expression) was circumscribed to not include the actions

challenged (noise pollution). In Subramanian Swamy v. Union of

India158, Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 which

criminalized defamation were challenged. A two-Judge Bench of this

Court framed the issue as a conflict between the right to speech and

expression underArticle 19(1)(a) and the right to reputation traceable

to Article 21. In this case, the two Judge Bench held that the right

to speech and expression does not include the right to defame a

person. Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was)

observed that a contrary interpretation would completely abrogate

the right to reputation.159

148. In the second modality of the public interest approach, the Courts

undertook a comparison of the values which the rights (and the

conceptions of the rights) espouse and gave more weightage to the

right which was in furtherance of a higher degree of public or collective

interest. In Asha Ranjan v. State of Bihar160, this Court held that

when there is a conflict between two individuals with respect to their

right under Article 21, the facts and circumstances must be weighed

“on the scale of constitutional norms and sensibility and larger public

interest.” In PUCL (supra), one of the issues before this Court was

158 [2016] 3 SCR 865 : (2016) 7 SCC 221; Paragraph 11 “While one has a right to speech, others have a right

to listen or decline to listen. […] Nobody can indulge in aural aggression. If anyone increases his volume

of speech and that too with the assistance of artificial devices so as to compulsorily expose unwilling

persons to hear a noise raised to unpleasant or obnoxious levels, then the person speaking is violating

the right of others to a peaceful, comfortable and pollution-free life guaranteed by Article 21. Article 19(1)

(a) cannot be pressed into service for defeating the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 21.”

159 144: “[…] Reputation being an inherent component of Article 21, we do not think it should be allowed

to be sullied solely because another individual can have its freedom. It is not a restriction that has an

inevitable consequence which impairs circulation of thought and ideas. In fact, it is control regard being

had to another person’s right to go to court and state that he has been wronged and abused. He can

take recourse to a procedure recognised and accepted in law to retrieve and redeem his reputation.

Therefore, the balance between the two rights needs to be struck. “Reputation” of one cannot be allowed

to be crucified at the altar of the other’s right of free speech. The legislature in its wisdom has not thought

it appropriate to abolish criminality of defamation in the obtaining social climate.”

160 [2017] 1 SCR 945 : (2017) 4 SCC 397

526 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

whether the disclosure of the assets of the candidates contesting

the elections in furtherance of the right to information of the voters

violates the right to privacy of candidates.161 Justice Reddi authoring

the concurring opinion observed that the right to information of the

assets of candidates contesting elections trumps the right to privacy

because the former serves a larger public interest. In Mazdoor

Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India162, proceedings under

Article 32 were initiated challenging orders issued under Section

144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibiting protests in certain

areas in Delhi. The issue before this Court was whether the total

ban of protests at the Jantar Mantar Road would violate the right

to protest which is traceable to Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b). One

of the inter-related issues was whether the right to hold peaceful

demonstrations violates the right of peaceful residence under Article

21, and if it does, how this Court should balance the conflicting

fundamental rights. This Court observed that the Court must while

balancing two fundamental rights examine where the larger public

interest lies.163 This Court framed the following issue in the specific

context of the case: whether disturbances caused to residents by

the protest is a larger public interest which outweighs the rights of

protestors. The two-Judge Bench held that “demonstrations as it has

been happening” are causing serious discomfort to the residents,

and that the right to protest could be balanced with the right to

peaceful residence if authorities had taken adequate safeguards

such as earmarking specific areas for protest, placing restrictions

on the use of loudspeakers and on parking of vehicles around

residential places.

149. The judgment of this Court in Mazdoor Kisan Shakti (supra),

represents the gradual shift from the pre-proportionality phase to

the proportionality stage which signifies a shift in the degree of

justification and the employment of a structured analysis for balancing

fundamental rights. In Mazdoor Kisan Shakti (supra), this Court

applied one of the prongs of the proportionality standard (the least

restrictive means prong) while balancing the right to protest and

the right to peaceful residence. The Court identified other means

161 Ibid, [121]

162 [2018] 11 SCR 586 : (2018) 17 SCC 324

163 (2018) 17 SCC 324 [58]

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 527

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

which would have infringed the right to a peaceful residence to a

lesser extent.

150. In 2012, a five-Judge Bench of this Court in Sahara India Real

Estate Corporation Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board

of India164, used a standard which resembled the structured

proportionality standard used in Justice KS Puttaswamy (5J) v.

Union of India165 to balance the conflict between two fundamental

rights. This judgment marked the first departure from the series of

cases in which this Court balanced two fundamental rights based on

doctrinal predominance. In Sahara (supra), the petitioner submitted

a proposal for the repayment of OFCDs (optionally fully convertible

bonds) to the investors. The details of the proposals were published

by a news channel. Interlocutory applications were filed in the Court

praying for the issuance of guidelines for reporting matters which are

sub-judice. This Court resolved the conflict between the freedom of

press protected under Article 19(1)(a) and the right to free trial under

Article 21 by evolving a neutralizing device. This Court held that it has

the power to evolve neutralizing devices such as the postponement

of trial, retrial, change of venue, and in appropriate cases, grant

acquittal in case of excessive media prejudicial publicity to neutralize

the conflicting rights. This Court followed the Canadian approach

in evolving a two prong standard to balance fundamental rights

through neutralizing devices which partly resembled the structured

proportionality standard. The two-pronged test was as follows:166

a. There is no other reasonable alternative measure available

(necessity test); and

b. The salutary effects of the measure must outweigh the

deleterious effects on the fundamental rights (proportionality

standard).

151. Finally, this Court in Justice KS Puttaswamy (5J) (supra) applied

the structured proportionality standard to balance two fundamental

rights. In this case, a Constitution Bench of this Court while testing the

validity of theAadharAct 2016 had to resolve the conflict between the

164 [2012] 12 SCR 256 : (2012) 10 SCC 603

165 [2018] 8 SCR 1 : (2019) 1 SCC 1

166 (2012) 10 SCC 603 [42, 22]

528 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

right to informational privacy and the right to food. Justice Sikri writing

for the majority held that the Aadhar Act fulfills all the four prongs of

the proportionality standard. In the final prong of the proportionality

stage, that is the balancing stage, this Court held that one of the

considerations was to balance the right to privacy and the right to

food. On balancing the fundamental rights, this Court held that the

provisions furthering the right to food satisfy a larger public interest

whereas the invasion of privacy rights was minimal.167

152. However, the single proportionality standard which is used to test

whether the fundamental right in question can be restricted for the

State interest (that is, the legitimate purpose) and if it can, whether

the measure used to restrict the right is proportional to the objective

is insufficient for balancing the conflict between two fundamental

rights. The proportionality standard is an effective standard to test

whether the infringement of the fundamental right is justified. It would

prove to be ineffective when the State interest in question is also a

reflection of a fundamental right.

153. The proportionality standard is by nature curated to give prominence

to the fundamental right and minimize the restriction on it. If this

Court were to employ the single proportionality standard to the

considerations in this case, at the suitability prong, this Court would

determine if non-disclosure is a suitable means for furthering the

right to privacy. At the necessity stage, the Court would determine

if non-disclosure is the least restrictive means to give effect to the

right to privacy. At the balancing stage, the Court would determine

if non-disclosure has a disproportionate effect on the right holder.

In this analysis, the necessity and the suitability prongs will

inevitably be satisfied because the purpose is substantial: it is a

fundamental right. The balancing stage will only account for the

disproportionate impact of the measure on the right to information

(the right) and not the right to privacy (the purpose) since the Court

is required to balance the impact on the right with the fulfillment

of the purpose through the selected means. Thus, the Court while

applying the proportionality standard to resolve the conflict between

two fundamental rights preferentially frames the standard to give

prominence to the fundamental right which is alleged to be violated

167 (2019) 1 SCC 1 [308]

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 529

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

by the petitioners (in this case, the right to information).168 This could

well be critiqued for its limitations.

154. In Campbell v. MGM Limited169, Baroness Hale adopted the double

proportionality standard to adequately balance two conflicting

fundamental rights. In this case, the claimant, a public figure,

instituted proceedings against a newspaper for publishing details of

her efforts to overcome drug addiction. Baroness Hale applied the

following standard to balance the right to privacy of the claimant and

the right to a free press:

“141. […] This involved looking first at the comparative

importance of the actual rights being claimed in the

individual case; then at the justifications for interfering

with or restricting each of those rights; and applying the

proportionality test to each”

155. In Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v.

Subash Chandra Agarwal170, one of us (Justice D Y Chandrachud)

while authoring the concurring opinion adopted the double

proportionality standard as formulated in Campbell (supra). Referring

to the double proportionality standard, the concurring opinion observes

that the Court while balancing between two fundamental rights must

identify the precise interests weighing in favour of both disclosure and

privacy and not merely undertake a doctrinal analysis to determine

if one of the fundamental rights takes precedence over the other:

“113. Take the example of where an information applicant

sought the disclosure of how many leaves were taken by a

public employee and the reasons for such leave. The need

to ensure accountability of public employees is of clear

public interest in favour of disclosure. The reasons for the

leave may also include medical information with respect

to the public employee, creating a clear privacy interest in

favour of non-disclosure. It is insufficient to state that the

privacy interest in medical records is extremely high and

168 Hon’ble Mr Justice Andrew Cheung PJ, Conflict of fundamental rights and the double proportionality

test, A lecture in the Common Law Lecture Series 2019 delivered at the University of Hong Kong (17

September 2019)

169 [2004] UKHL 22

170 Civil Appeal No. 10044 of 2010

530 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

therefore the outcome should be blanket non-disclosure.

The principle of proportionality may necessitate that the

number of and reasons for the leaves be disclosed and

the medical reasons for the leave be omitted. This would

ensure that the interest in accountability is only abridged

to the extent necessary to protect the legitimate aim of

the privacy of the public employee.”

156. Baroness Hale in Campbell (supra) employed a three step approach

to balance fundamental rights. The first step is to analyse the

comparative importance of the actual rights claimed. The second step

is to lay down the justifications for the infringement of the rights. The

third is to apply the proportionality standard to both the rights. The

approach adopted by Baroness Hale must be slightly tempered to

suit our jurisprudence on proportionality. The Indian Courts adopt a

four prong structured proportionality standard to test the infringement

of the fundamental rights. In the last stage of the analysis, the

Court undertakes a balancing exercise to analyse if the cost of the

interference with the right is proportional to the extent of fulfilment of

the purpose. It is in this step that the Court undertakes an analysis

of the comparative importance of the considerations involved in the

case, the justifications for the infringement of the rights, and if the

effect of infringement of one right is proportional to achieve the goal.

Thus, the first two steps laid down by Baroness Hale are subsumed

within the balancing prong of the proportionality analysis.

157. Based on the above discussion, the standard which must be followed

by Courts to balance the conflict between two fundamental rights

is as follows:

a. Does the Constitution create a hierarchy between the

rights in conflict? If yes, then the right which has been

granted a higher status will prevail over the other right

involved. If not, the following standard must be employed

from the perspective of both the rights where rights A and

B are in conflict;

b. Whether the measure is a suitable means for furthering

right A and right B;

c. Whether the measure is least restrictive and equally

effective to realise right A and right B; and

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 531

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

d. Whether the measure has a disproportionate impact on

right A and right B.

b) Validity of the Electoral Bond Scheme, Section 11 of the Finance

Act and Section 137 of the Finance Act

158. To recall, Section 13A of the ITAct before the amendment mandated

that the political party must maintain a record of contributions in

excess of rupees twenty thousand. Section 11 of the FinanceAct 2017

amended Section 13A creating an exception for contributions made

through Electoral Bonds. Upon the amendment, political parties are

not required to maintain a record of any contribution received through

electoral bonds. Section 29C of the RPA mandated the political party

to prepare a report with respect to contributions received in excess

of twenty thousand rupees from a person or company in a financial

year. Section 137 of the FinanceAct amended Section 29C of the RPA

by which a political party is now not required to include contributions

received by electoral bonds in its report. As explained earlier, the

feature of anonymity of the contributor vis-à-vis the public is intrinsic

to the Electoral Bond Scheme. Amendments had to be made to

Section 13A of the IT Act and Section 29C of the RPA to implement

the Electoral Bond Scheme because the EBS mandates anonymity

of the contributor. In this Section, we will answer the question of

whether the EBS adequately balances the right to informational

privacy of the contributor and the right to information of the voter.

159. In Justice KS Puttaswamy (9J) (supra), this Court did not trace

the right to privacy only to Article 21. This Court considered privacy

as an essential component for the effective fulfillment of the all

entrenched rights. Article 25 of the Constitution is the only provision

in Part III which subjects the right to other fundamental rights.

Article 25 guarantees the freedom of conscience which means the

freedom to judge the moral qualities of one’s conduct.171 Financial

contributions to a political party (as a form of expression of political

support and belief) can be traced to the exercise of the freedom of

conscience under Article 25.172 It can very well be argued that the

right to information of the voter prevails over the right to anonymity

of political contributions which may be traceable to the freedom of

171 See Supriyo (supra) [238 , 239]; Aishat Shifa v. State of Karnataka, [2022] 5 SCR 426 : (2023) 2 SCC 1;

172 See Justice KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India, [2017] 10 SCR 569 : (2017) 10 SCC 1 [372] (opinion of

Justice Chelameswar);

532 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

conscience recognized under Article 25 since it is subject to all other

fundamental rights, including Article 19(1)(a). However, the right

to privacy of financial contributions to political parties can also be

traced toArticle 19(1) because the informational privacy of a person’s

political affiliation is necessary to enjoy the right to political speech

under Article 19(1)(a), the right to political protests under Article

19(1)(b), the right to form a political association under Article 19(1)

(c), and the right to life and liberty under Article 21. The Constitution

does not create a hierarchy amongst these rights. Thus, there is no

constitutional hierarchy between the right to information and the right

to informational privacy of political affiliation.

160. This Court must now apply the double proportionality standard, that

is, the proportionality standard to both the rights (as purposes) to

determine if the means used are suitable, necessary and proportionate

to the fundamental rights. The Union of India submitted that Clause

7(4) of the Electoral Bond Scheme balances the right to information

of the voter and the right to informational privacy of the contributor.

Clause 7(4) stipulates that the information furnished by the buyer

shall be treated as confidential by the authorized bank. The bank

has to disclose the information when it is demanded by a competent

court or upon the registration of a criminal case by a law enforcement

agency. It needs to be analyzed if the measure employed (Clause

7(4)) balances the rights or tilts the balance towards one of the

fundamental rights.

161. The first prong of the analysis is whether the means has a rational

connection with both the purposes, that is, informational privacy of

the political contributions and disclosure of information to the voter.

It is not necessary that the means chosen should be the only means

capable of realising the purpose of the state action. This stage of the

analysis does not prescribe an efficiency standard. It is sufficient if

the means constitute one of the many methods by which the purpose

can be realised, even if it only partially gives effect to the purpose.173

162. This Court while applying the suitability prong to the purpose of

privacy of political contribution must consider whether the nondisclosure of information to the voter and its disclosure only when

demanded by a competent court and upon the registration of criminal

173 Media One Broadcasting (supra), [101]

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 533

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

case has a rational nexus with the purpose of achieving privacy of

political contribution. Undoubtedly, the measure by prescribing nondisclosure of information about political funding shares a nexus with

the purpose. The non-disclosure of information grants anonymity to

the contributor, thereby protecting information privacy. It is certainly

one of the ways capable of realizing the purpose of informational

privacy of political affiliation.

163. The suitability prong must next be applied to the purpose of disclosure

of information about political contributions to voters. There is no

nexus between the balancing measure adopted with the purpose of

disclosure of information to the voter. According to Clause 7(4) of

the Electoral Bond Scheme and the amendments, the information

about contributions made through the Electoral Bond Scheme is

exempted from disclosure requirements. This information is never

disclosed to the voter. The purpose of securing information about

political funding can never be fulfilled by absolute non-disclosure.

The measure adopted does not satisfy the suitability prong vis-àvis the purpose of information of political funding. However, let us

proceed to apply the subsequent prongs of the double proportionality

analysis assuming that the means adopted has a rational nexus with

the purpose of securing information about political funding to voters.

164. The next stage of the analysis is the necessity prong. At this stage,

the Court determines if the measure identified is the least restrictive

and equally effective measure. To recall, the Court must determine

if there are other possible means which could have been adopted

to fulfill the purpose, and whether such alternative means (a) realize

the purpose in a real and substantial manner; (b) impact fundamental

rights differently; and (c) are better suited on an overall comparison

of the degree of realizing the purpose and the impact on fundamental

rights.

165. The provisions of the RPA provide an alternative measure. Section

29C states that contributions in excess of rupees twenty thousand

received from a person or company for that financial year must be

disclosed by the political party through a report. The report must be

filled in the format prescribed in Form 24A of the Conduct of Election

Rules 1961. The form is annexed as Annexure II to this judgment.

A crucial component of this provision when juxtaposed with Section

13A of the IT Act must be noted. Section 13A of the IT Act requires

534 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

the political party to maintain a record of the contributions made in

excess of rupees twenty thousand. Section 29C of the RPA requires

the political party to disclose information about contributions in

excess of rupees twenty thousand made by a person or company

in a financial year. Section 13A mandates record keeping of every

contribution. On the other hand, Section 29C mandates disclosure

of information of contributions beyond rupees twenty thousand per

person or per company in one financial year.

166. Section 29C(1) is one of the means to achieve the purpose of

protecting the informational privacy of political affiliation of individuals.

Parliament in its wisdom has prescribed rupees twenty thousand as

the threshold where the considerations of disclosure of information

of political contribution outweigh the considerations of informational

privacy. It could very well be debated whether rupees twenty thousand

is on the lower or higher range of the spectrum. However, that is

not a question for this Court to answer in this batch of petitions.

The petitioners have not challenged the threshold of rupees twenty

thousand prescribed for the disclosure of information prescribed by

Section 29C. They have only raised a challenge to the disclosure

exception granted to contributions by Electoral Bonds. Thus, this Court

need not determine if the threshold tilts the balance in favour of one

of the interests. We are only required to determine if the disclosure

of information on financial contributions in a year beyond rupees

twenty thousand is an alternative means to achieve the purposes of

securing the information on financial contributions and informational

privacy regarding political affiliation.

167. It must be recalled that we have held above that the right to information

of the voter includes the right to information of financial contributions

to a political party because of the influence of money in electoral

politics (through electoral outcomes) and governmental decisions

(through a seat at the table and quid pro quo arrangements between

the contributor and the political party). The underlying rationale of

Section 29C(1) is that contributions below the threshold do not have

the ability to influence decisions, and the right to information of

financial contributions does not extend to contributions which do not

have the ability to influence decisions. Similarly, the right to privacy

of political affiliations does not extend to contributions which may

be made to influence policies. It only extends to contributions made

as a genuine form of political support that the disclosure of such

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 535

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

information would indicate their political affiliation and curb various

forms of political expression and association.

168. It is quite possible that contributions which are made beyond

the threshold could also be a form of political support and not

necessarily a quid pro quo arrangement, and contributions below

the threshold could influence electoral outcomes. However, the

restriction on the right to information and informational privacy of

such contributions is minimal when compared to a blanket nondisclosure of information on contributions to political parties. Thus,

this alternative realizes the objective of securing disclosure for

an informed voter and informational privacy to political affiliation

in a ‘real and substantial manner’. The measure in the Electoral

Bond Scheme completely tilts the balance in favor of the purpose

of informational privacy and abrogates informational interests.

On an overall comparison of the measure and the alternative,

the alternative is better suited because it realizes the purposes

to a considerable extent and imposes a lesser restriction on

the fundamental rights. Having concluded that Clause 7(4) of

the Scheme is not the least restrictive means to balance the

fundamental rights, there is no necessity of applying the balancing

prong of the proportionality standard.

169. The Union of India has been unable to establish that the measure

employed in Clause 7(4) of the Electoral Bond Scheme is the least

restrictive means to balance the rights of informational privacy

to political contributions and the right to information of political

contributions. Thus, the amendment to Section 13A(b) of the IT Act

introduced by the Finance Act 2017, and the amendment to Section

29C(1) of the RPA are unconstitutional. The question is whether this

Court should only strike down the non-disclosure provision in the

Electoral Bond Scheme, that is Clause 7(4). However, as explained

above, the anonymity of the contributor is intrinsic to the Electoral

Bond Scheme. The Electoral Bond is not distinguishable from other

modes of contributions through the banking channels such as cheque

transfer, transfer through the Electronic Clearing System or direct

debit if the anonymity component of the Scheme is struck down.

Thus, the Electoral Bond Scheme 2018 will also consequentially

have to be struck down as unconstitutional.

c. Validity of Section 154 of the Finance Act amending Section

182(3) to the Companies Act

536 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

170. Before the 2017 amendment, Section 182(3) of the Companies Act,

mandated companies to disclose the details of the amount contributed

to a political party along with the name of the political party to which

the amount was contributed in its profit and loss account. After the

amendment, Section 182(3) only requires the disclosure of the

total amount contributed to political parties in a financial year. For

example, under Section 182(3) as it existed before the amendment,

if a Company contributed rupees twenty thousand to a political party,

the company was required to disclose in its profit and loss account,

the details of the specific contributions made to that political party.

However, after the 2017 amendment, the Company is only required to

disclose that it contributed rupees twenty thousand to a political party

under the provision without disclosing the details of the contribution,

that is, the political party to which the contribution was made. The

profit and loss account of a company is included in the financial

statement which companies are mandated to prepare.174 A copy of

the financial statement adopted at the annual general meeting of the

company must be filed with the Registrar of Companies.175

171. As discussed in the earlier segment of this judgment, the Companies

Act 1956 was amended in 1960 to include Section 293A by which

contributions by companies to political parties and for political

purposes were regulated. Companies were permitted to contribute

within the cap prescribed. All such contributions were required to

be disclosed by the Company in its profit and loss account with

details. Companies which contravened the disclosure requirement

were subject to fine. It is crucial to note here that contributions to

political parties by companies were regulated long before the IT

Act was amended in 1978 to exempt the income of political parties

through voluntary contributions for tax purposes (ostensibly to curb

black money). It is clear as day light that the purpose of mandating

the disclosure of contributions made by companies was not merely

to curb black money in electoral financing but crucially to make

the financial transactions between companies and political parties

transparent. Contributions for “political purposes” was widely defined

in the 1985 amendment (which was later incorporated in Section 182

of the Companies Act 2013) to include expenditure (either directly or

174 The Companies Act 2013; Section 2(40)

175 The Companies At 2013; Section 137

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 537

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

indirectly) for advertisement on behalf of political parties and payment

to a person “who is carrying activity which can be regarded as likely

to affect public support to a political party”. This indicates that the

legislative intent of the provision mandating disclosure was to bring

transparency to political contributions by companies. Companies have

always been subject to a higher disclosure requirement because

of their huge financial presence and the higher possibility of quid

pro quo transactions between companies and political parties. The

disclosure requirements in Section 182(3) were included to ensure

that corporate interests do not have an undue influence in electoral

democracy, and if they do, the electorate must be made aware of it.

172. Section 182(3) as amended by the Finance Act 2017 mandates

the disclosure of total contributions made by political parties. This

requirement would ensure that the money which is contributed to

political parties is accounted for. However, the deletion of the mandate

of disclosing the particulars of contributions violates the right to

information of the voter since they would not possess information

about the political party to which the contribution was made which, as

we have held above, is necessary to identify corruption and quid pro

quo transactions in governance. Such information is also necessary

for exercising an informed vote.

173. Section 182(3) of the Companies Act and Section 29C of the RPA

as amended by the Finance Act must be read together. Section 29C

exempts political parties from disclosing information of contributions

received through Electoral Bonds. However, Section 182(3) not only

applies to contributions made through electoral bonds but through

all modes of transfer. In terms of the provisions of the RPA, if a

company made contributions to political parties through cheque or

ECS, the political party had to disclose the details in its report. Thus,

the information about contributions by the company would be in the

public domain. The only purpose of amending Section 182(3) was

to bring the provision in tune with the amendment under the RPA

exempting disclosure requirements for contributions through electoral

bonds. The amendment to Section 182(3) of the Companies Act

becomes otiose in terms of our holding in the preceding section that

the Electoral Bond Scheme and relevant amendments to the RPA

and the IT Act mandating non-disclosure of particulars on political

contributions through electoral bonds is unconstitutional.

538 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

174. In terms of Section 136 of the Companies Act, every shareholder in a

company has a right to a copy of the financial statement which also

contains the profit and loss account. The petitioners submitted that

the non-disclosure of the details of the political contributions made

by companies in the financial statement would infringe upon the

right of the shareholders to decide to sell the shares of a company

if a shareholder does not support the political ideology of the party

to which contributions were made. This it was contended, violates

Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g), 21 and 25. We do not see the necessity

of viewing the non-disclosure requirement in Section 182(3) of the

Companies Act from the lens of a shareholder in this case when

we have identified the impact of non-disclosure of information on

political funding from the larger compass of a citizen and a voter. In

view of the above discussion, Section 182(3) as amended by the

Finance Act 2017 is unconstitutional.

G. Challenge to unlimited corporate funding

175. The Companies Act 1956,176 as originally enacted, did not contain any

provision relating to political contributions by companies. Regardless

of the same, many companies sought to make contributions to political

parties by amending their memorandum. In Jayantilal Ranchhoddas

Koticha v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd.,177 the decision of the

company to amend its memorandum enabling it to make contributions

to political parties was challenged before the High Court of Judicature

at Bombay. The High Court upheld the decision of the company to

amend its memorandum on the ground that there was no law prohibiting

companies from contributing to the funds of a party. Chief Justice M

C Chagla, cautioned against the influential role of “big business and

money bags” in throttling democracy. The learned Judge emphasized

that it is the duty of Courts to “prevent any influence being exercised

upon the voter which is an improper influence or which may be looked

at from any point of view as a corrupt influence.” Chief Justice Chagla

highlighted the grave danger inherent in permitting companies to

donate to political parties and hoped Parliament would “consider under

what circumstances and under what limitations companies should be

permitted to make these contributions”.

176 “1956 Act”

177 AIR 1958 Bom 155

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 539

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

176. Subsequently, Parliament enacted the Companies (Amendment) Act

1960 to incorporate Section 293A in the 1956 Act. The new provision

allowed a company to contribute to: (a) any political party; or (b) for

any political purpose to any individual or body. However, the amount

of contribution was restricted to either twenty-five thousand rupees

in a financial year or five percent of the average net profits during

the preceding three financial years, whichever was greater. The

provision also mandated every company to disclose in its profit and

loss account any amount contributed by it to any political party or for

any political purpose to any individual or body during the financial

year to which that account relates by giving particulars of the total

amount contributed and the name of the party, individual, or body

to which or to whom such amount has been contributed.

177. In 1963, the Report of the Santhanam Committee on Prevention of

Corruption highlighted the prevalence of corruption at high political

levels due to unregulated collection of funds and electioneering by

political parties.178 The Committee suggested “a total ban on all

donations by incorporated bodies to political parties.” Subsequently,

Section 293A of the 1956 Act was amended through the Companies

(Amendment)Act 1969 to prohibit companies from contributing funds to

any political party or to any individual or body for any political purpose.

178. In 1985, Parliament again amended Section 293A, in the process

reversing its previous ban on political contributions by companies.

It allowed a company, other than a government company and any

other company with less than three years of existence, to contribute

any amount or amounts to any political party or to any person for any

political purpose. It further provided that the aggregate of amounts

which may be contributed by a company in any financial year shall

not exceed five percent of its average net profits during the three

immediately preceding financial years. This provision was retained

under Section 182 of the Companies Act 2013. The only change was

that the aggregate amount donated by a company was increased to

seven and a half percent of its average net profits during the three

immediately preceding financial years. Section 154 of the Finance

Act 2017 amended Section 182 of the 2013 Act to delete this limit

contained in the first proviso of the provision.

178 Report of the Committee on Prevention of Corruption, 1964 [11.5].

540 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

179. At the outset, it is important to be mindful of the fact that the petitioners

are not challenging the vires of Section 182 of the 2013 Act. Neither

are the petitioners challenging the legality of contributions made by

companies to political parties. The challenge is restricted to Section

154 of the Finance Act 2017 which amended Section 182 of the

2013 Act.

i. The application of the principle of non-arbitrariness

180. The petitioners argue that Section 154 of the Finance Act 2017

violatesArticle 14 of the Constitution. The primary ground of challenge

is that the amendment to Section 182 of the 2013 Act is manifestly

arbitrary as it allows companies, including loss-making companies,

to contribute unlimited amounts to political parties. It has also been

argued that the law now facilitates the creation of shell companies

solely for the purposes of contributing funds to political parties. On

the other hand, the respondent has questioned the applicability of

the doctrine of manifest arbitrariness for invalidating legislation.

a. Arbitrariness as a facet of Article 14

181. At the outset, the relevant question that this Court has to answer is

whether a legislative enactment can be challenged on the sole ground

of manifest arbitrariness. Article 14 of the Constitution provides that

the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the

equal protection of laws within the territory of India. Article 14 is an

injunction to both the legislative as well the executive organs of the

State to secure to all persons within the territory of India equality

before law and equal protection of the laws.179 Traditionally,Article 14

was understood to only guarantee non-discrimination. In this context,

Courts held that Article 14 does not forbid all classifications but only

that which is discriminatory. In State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali

Sarkar,180 Justice S R Das (as the learned Chief Justice then was)

laid down the following two conditions which a legislation must satisfy

to get over the inhibition of Article 14: first, the classification must

be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those

that are grouped together from others; and second, the differentia

must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved

179 Basheshar Nath v. CIT, [1959] Supp 1 SCR 528

180 [1952] 1 SCR 284 : (1951) 1 SCC 1; Also see State of Bombay v. FN Balsara, [1951] 1 SCR 682

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 541

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

by the legislation. In the ensuing years, this Court followed this

“traditional approach” to test the constitutionality of a legislation on

the touchstone of Article 14.181

182. In E P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu,

182 this Court expanded

the ambit of Article 14 by laying down non-arbitrariness as a limiting

principle in the context of executive actions. Justice P N Bhagwati

(as the learned Chief Justice then was), speaking for the Bench,

observed that equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects

and dimensions which cannot be confined within traditional and

doctrinaire limits. The opinion declared that equality is antithetic to

arbitrariness, further finding that equality belongs to the rule of law in

a republic, while arbitrariness belongs to the whim and caprice of an

absolute monarch. In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Seheravardi,183 a

Constitution Bench of this Court considered it to be well settled that

any action that is arbitrary necessarily involves negation of equality.

Justice Bhagwati observed that the doctrine of non-arbitrariness can

also be extended to a legislative action. He observed that:

“[w]herever therefore there is arbitrariness in State action

whether it be of the legislature or of the executive or of an

“authority” under Article 12, Article 14 immediately springs

into action and strikes down such State action.”

183. Immediately after the judgment in Ajay Hasia (supra), Justice

E S Venkataramaiah (as the learned Chief Justice then was) in

Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of

India,184 laid down the test of manifest arbitrariness with respect

to subordinate legislation. It was held that a subordinate legislation

does not carry the same degree of immunity enjoyed by a statute

passed by a competent legislature. Therefore, this Court held that

a subordinate legislation “may also be questioned on the ground

that it is unreasonable, unreasonable not in the sense of not

being reasonable, but in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary.”

181 Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, [1952] 1 SCR 435 : (1952) 1 SCC 215; Budhan Chowdhury

v. State of Bihar, [1955] 1 SCR 1045; Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S R Tendolkar, [1959] SCR 279.

182 [1974] 2 SCR 348 : (1974) 4 SCC 3

183 [1981] 2 SCR 79 : (1981) 1 SCC 722

184 [1985] 2 SCR 287 : (1985) 1 SCC 641

542 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

In Sharma Transport v. Government of Andhra Pradesh,185 this

Court reiterated Indian Express Newspapers (supra) by observing

that the test of arbitrariness as applied to an executive action cannot

be applied to delegated legislation. It was held that to declare a

delegated legislation as arbitrary, “it must be shown that it was not

reasonable and manifestly arbitrary.” This Court further went on to

define “arbitrarily” to mean “in an unreasonable manner, as fixed

or done capriciously or at pleasure, without adequate determining

principle, not founded in the nature of things, non-rational, not done or

acting according to reason or judgment, depending on the will alone.”

184. While this Court accepted it as a settled proposition of law that a

subordinate legislation can be challenged on the ground of manifest

arbitrariness, there was still some divergence as to the doctrine’s

application with respect to plenary legislation. In State of Tamil

Nadu v. Ananthi Ammal,186 a three-Judge Bench of this Court held

that a statute can be declared invalid under Article 14 if it is found

to be arbitrary or unreasonable. Similarly, in Dr. K R Lakshmanan

v. State of Tamil Nadu,187 a three-Judge Bench of this Court

invalidated a legislation on the ground that it was arbitrary and in

violation of Article 14. However, in State of Andhra Pradesh v.

McDowell & Co.,188 another three-Judge Bench of this Court held

that a plenary legislation cannot be struck down on the ground that

it is arbitrary or unreasonable. In McDowell (supra), this Court held

that a legislation can be invalidated on only two grounds: first, the

lack of legislative competence; and second, on the violation of any

fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or of

any other constitutional provision.

185. This divergence became more apparent when a three-Judge Bench of

this Court in Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra,189

invalidated certain provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging

House Rates ControlAct 1947 relating to the determination and fixation

of the standard rent. This Court declared the provisions in question

unreasonable, arbitrary, and violative ofArticle 14. However, the Court

185 [2001] Suppl. 5 SCR 390 : (2002) 2 SCC 188

186 [1994] Suppl. 5 SCR 666 : (1995) 1 SCC 519

187 [1996] 1 SCR 395 : (1996) 2 SCC 226

188 [1996] 3 SCR 721 : (1996) 3 SCC 709

189 [1997] Suppl. 6 SCR 717 : (1998) 2 SCC 1

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 543

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

did not strike down the provisions on the ground that the extended

period of the statute was to come to an end very soon, requiring

the government to reconsider the statutory provisions. Similarly, in

Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India,190 another three-Judge

Bench of this Court invalidated Section 17(2) of the Securitization

and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security

Interest Act, 2002 for being unreasonable and arbitrary.

186. In Natural Resources Allocation, In Re Special Reference No. 1

of 2012,191 a Constitution Bench of this Court referred to McDowell

(supra) to observe that a law may not be struck down as arbitrary

without a constitutional infirmity. Thus, it was held that a mere finding

of arbitrariness was not sufficient to invalidate a legislation. The

Court has to enquire whether the legislation contravened any other

constitutional provision or principle.

b. Beyond Shayara Bano: entrenching manifest arbitrariness in

Indian jurisprudence

187. In Shayara Bano v. Union of India,192 a Constitution Bench of this

Court set aside the practice of Talaq-e-Bidaat (Triple Talaq). Section

2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act 1937 was also impugned

before this Court. The provision provides that the personal law of

the Muslims, that is Shariat, will be applicable in matters relating to

marriage, dissolution of marriage and talaq. Justice R F Nariman,

speaking for the majority, held that Triple Talaq is manifestly arbitrary

because it allows a Muslim man to capriciously and whimsically break

a marital tie without any attempt at reconciliation to save it. Thus,

Justice Nariman applied the principle of manifest arbitrariness for

the purpose of testing the constitutional validity of the legislation on

the touchstone of Article 14.

188. Justice Nariman traced the evolution of non-arbitrariness jurisprudence

in India to observe that McDowells (supra) failed to consider two

binding precedents, namely, Ajay Hasia (supra) and K R Lakshmanan

(supra). This Court further observed that McDowells (supra) did not

notice Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,193 where this Court held

190 [2004] 3 SCR 982 : (2004) 4 SCC 311

191 [2012] 9 SCR 311 : (2012) 10 SCC 1

192 [2017] 9 SCR 797 : (2017) 9 SCC 1

193 [1978] 2 SCR 621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248

544 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

that substantive due process is a part of Article 21 which has to be

read along with Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. Therefore,

Justice Nariman held that arbitrariness of a legislation is a facet of

unreasonableness in Articles 19(2) to (6) and therefore arbitrariness

can also be used as a standard to strike down legislation underArticle

14. It held McDowells (supra) to be per incuriam and bad in law.

189. Shayara Bano (supra) clarified In Re Special Reference No. 1 of

2012 (supra) by holding that a finding of manifest arbitrariness is in

itself a constitutional infirmity and, therefore, a ground for invalidating

legislation for the violation of Article 14. Moreover, it was held that

there is no rational distinction between subordinate legislation and

plenary legislation for the purposes ofArticle 14.Accordingly, the test

of manifest arbitrariness laid down by this Court in Indian Express

Newspapers (supra) in the context of subordinate legislation was

also held to be applicable to plenary legislation. In conclusion, this

Court held that manifest arbitrariness “must be something done

by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate

determining principle.” It was further held that a legislation which is

excessive and disproportionate would also be manifestly arbitrary. The

doctrine of manifest arbitrariness has been subsequently reiterated

by this Court in numerous other judgments.

190. The standard of manifest arbitrariness was further cemented by the

Constitution Bench of this Court in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of

India.194 In Navtej Singh Johar (supra), Section 377 of the Indian

Penal Code 1860 was challenged, inter alia, on the ground it is

manifestly arbitrary. Section 377 criminalized any person who has

had “voluntary carnal intercourse against the order of nature”. Chief

Justice Dipak Misra (writing for himself and Justice AM Khanwilkar)

held that Section 377 is manifestly arbitrary for failing to make a

distinction between consensual and non-consensual sexual acts

between consenting adults.195 Justice Nariman, in the concurring

opinion, observed that Section 377 is manifestly arbitrary for penalizing

“consensual gay sex”. Justice Nariman faulted the provision for (a)

not distinguishing between consensual and non-consensual sex for

the purpose of criminalization; and (b) criminalizing sexual activity

194 [2018] 7 SCR 379 : (2018) 10 SCC 1

195 WP (Criminal) 76 of 2016 [Chief Justice Misra, 239]

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 545

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

between two persons of the same gender.196 Justice DY Chandrachud

noted that Section 377 to the extent that it penalizes physical

manifestation of love by a section of the population (the LGBTQ+

community) is manifestly arbitrary.197 Similarly, Justice Indu Malhotra

observed that the provision is manifestly arbitrary because the basis

of criminalization is the sexual orientation of a person which is not

a “rationale principle”198.

191. In Joseph Shine v. Union of India,

199 a Constitution Bench of this

Court expressly concurred with the doctrine of manifest arbitrariness

as evolved in Shayara Bano (supra). In Joseph Shine (supra),

one of us (Justice D Y Chandrachud) observed that the doctrine

of manifest arbitrariness serves as a check against state action or

legislation “which has elements of caprice, irrationality or lacks an

adequate determining principle.” In Joseph Shine (supra), the validity

of Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code was challenged. Section

497 penalized a man who has sexual intercourse with a woman who

is and whom he knows or has a reason to believe to be the wife of

another man, without the “consent and connivance of that man” for

the offence of adultery. Justice Nariman observed that the provision

has paternalistic undertones because the provision does not penalize

a married man for having sexual intercourse with a married woman

if he obtains her husband’s consent. The learned Judge observed

that the provision treats a woman like a chattel:

“23. […] This can only be on the paternalistic notion of

a woman being likened to chattel, for if one is to use

the chattel or is licensed to use the chattel by the ―

licensor‖, namely, the husband, no offence is committed.

Consequently, the wife who has committed adultery is not

the subject matter of the offence, and cannot, for the reason

that she is regarded only as chattel, even be punished as

an abettor. This is also for the chauvinistic reason that the

third-party male has seduced her, she being his victim.

What is clear, therefore, is that this archaic law has long

196 Ibid,[Justice Nariman, 82]

197 Ibid, [Justice DY Chandrachud, 29]

198 Ibid, [Justice Malhotra, paragraph 14.9]

199 [2018] 11 SCR 765 : (2019) 3 SCC 39

546 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

outlived its purpose and does not square with today‘s

constitutional morality, in that the very object with which it

was made has since become manifestly arbitrary, having

lost its rationale long ago and having become in today‘s

day and age, utterly irrational. On this basis alone, the

law deserves to be struck down, for with the passage of

time, Article 14 springs into action and interdicts such law

as being manifestly arbitrary.”

192. The learned Judge further observed that the “ostensible object of

Section 497” as pleaded by the State which is to preserve the sanctity

of marriage is not in fact the object of the provision because: (a) the

sanctity of marriage can be destroyed even if a married man has

sexual intercourse with an unmarried woman or a widow; and (b)

the offence is not committed if the consent of the husband of the

woman is sought.

193. Justice DY Chandrachud in his opinion observed that a provision

is manifestly arbitrary if the determining principle of it is not in

consonance with constitutional values. The opinion noted that Section

497 makes an “ostensible” effort to protect the sanctity of marriage

but in essence is based on the notion of marital subordination of

women which is inconsistent with constitutional values.200 Chief Justice

Misra (writing for himself and Justice AM Khanwilkar) held that the

provision is manifestly arbitrary for lacking “logical consistency” since

it does not treat the wife of the adulterer as an aggrieved person

and confers a ‘license’ to the husband of the woman.

194. It is now a settled position of law that a statute can be challenged

on the ground it is manifestly arbitrary. The standard laid down by

Justice Nariman in Shayara Bano (supra), has been citied with

approval by the Constitution Benches in Navtej Singh Johar (supra)

and Joseph Shine (supra). Courts while testing the validity of a

law on the ground of manifest arbitrariness have to determine if the

statute is capricious, irrational and without adequate determining

principle, or something which is excessive and disproportionate.

This Court has applied the standard of “manifest arbitrariness” in

the following manner:

200 (2019) 3 SCC 39 [Paragraph 35]

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 547

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

a. A provision lacks an “adequate determining principle” if the

purpose is not in consonance with constitutional values. In

applying this standard, Courts must make a distinction between

the “ostensible purpose”, that is, the purpose which is claimed

by the State and the “real purpose”, the purpose identified by

Courts based on the available material such as a reading of

the provision201; and

b. A provision is manifestly arbitrary even if the provision does

not make a classification.202

195. This Court in previous judgments has discussed the first of the above

applications of the doctrine by distinguishing between the “ostensible

purpose” and the “real purpose” of a provision with sufficient clarity.

The application of the doctrine of manifest arbitrariness by Chief

Justice Misra and Justice Nariman in Navtej Singh Johar (supra) to

strike down a provision for not classifying between consensual and

non-consensual sex must be understood in the background of two

jurisprudential developments on the interpretation of Part III of the

Constitution. The first, is the shift from reading the provisions of Part

III of the Constitution as isolated silos to understanding the thread of

reasonableness which runs through all the provisions and elevating

unreasonable (and arbitrary) action to the realm of fundamental

rights. The second is the reading of Article 14 to include the facets

of formal equality and substantive equality. Article 14 consists of two

components. “Equality before the law” which means that the law must

treat everybody equally in the formal sense. “Equal protection of the

laws” signifies a guarantee to secure factual equality. The legislature

and the executive makes classifications to achieve factual equality.

The underlying premise of substantive equality is the recognition that

not everybody is equally placed and that the degree of harm suffered

by a group of persons (or an individual) varies because of unequal

situations. This Court has in numerous judgments recognized that

the legislature is free to recognize the degrees of harm and confine

its benefits or restrictions to those cases where the need is the

clearest.203 The corollary of the proposition that it is reasonable to

201 Justice Chandrachud, Justice Malhotra, and Justice Nariman in Navtej Singh Johar (supra); Justices

Chandrachud and Nariman in Joseph Shine (supra).

202 Chief Justice Misra in Navtej Singh Johar (supra)

203 Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731; Binoy Viswam v. Union of India, [2017] 7 SCR

1 : (2017) 7 SCC 59; Charanjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, (1950) SCC 833

548 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

identify the degrees of harm, is that it is unreasonable, unjust, and

arbitrary if the Legislature does not identify the degrees of harm for

the purpose of law.

196. It is undoubtedly true that it is not the constitutional role of this Court

to second guess the intention of the legislature in enacting a particular

statute. The legislature represents the democratic will of the people,

and therefore, the courts will always presume that the legislature

is supposed to know and will be aware of the needs of the people.

Moreover, this Court must be mindful of falling into an error of equating

a plenary legislation with a subordinate legislation. In Re Delhi Laws

Act 1912,

204 Justice Fazl Ali summed up the extent and scope of

plenary legislation and delegated legislation, in the following terms:

“32. The conclusions at which I have arrived so far may

now be summed up:

(1) The legislature must normally discharge its primary

legislative function itself and not through others.

(2) Once it is established that it has sovereign powers

within a certain sphere, it must follow as a corollary

that it is free to legislate within that sphere in any

way which appears to it to be the best way to give

effect to its intention and policy in making a particular

law, and that it may utilise any outside agency to any

extent it finds necessary for doing things which it is

unable to do itself or finds it inconvenient to do. In

other words, it can do everything which is ancillary

to and necessary for the full and effective exercise

of its power of legislation.

(3) It cannot abdicate its legislative functions, and

therefore while entrusting power to an outside agency,

it must see that such agency acts as a subordinate

authority and does not become a parallel legislature.

(4) The doctrine of separation of powers and the judicial

interpretation it has received in America ever since

the American Constitution was framed, enables the

American courts to check undue and excessive

204 (1951) SCC 568

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 549

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

delegation but the courts of this country are not

committed to that doctrine and cannot apply it in

the same way as it has been applied in America.

Therefore, there are only two main checks in this

country on the power of the legislature to delegate,

these being its good sense and the principle that it

should not cross the line beyond which delegation

amounts to “abdication and self-effacement”.

197. InGwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner

of Sales Tax and others,

205 a Constitution Bench of this Court held

that a subordinate legislation is ancillary to the statute. Therefore, the

delegate must enact the subordinate legislation “consistent with the

law under which it is made and cannot go beyond the limits of the

policy and standard laid down in the law.” Since the power delegated

by a statute is limited by its terms, the delegate is expected to “act in

good faith, reasonably, intra vires the power granted and on relevant

consideration of material facts.”206 This Court has to be cognizant of this

distinction. In fact, the doctrine of manifest arbitrariness, as developed

by this Court in Indian Express Newspapers (supra) in the context

of subordinate legislation, was applicable to the extent that “it is so

arbitrary that it could not be said to be in conformity with the statute

or that it offends Article 14 of the Constitution.”207

198. The above discussion shows that manifest arbitrariness of a

subordinate legislation has to be primarily tested vis-a-vis its

conformity with the parent statute. Therefore, in situations where

a subordinate legislation is challenged on the ground of manifest

arbitrariness, this Court will proceed to determine whether the

delegate has failed “to take into account very vital facts which either

expressly or by necessary implication are required to be taken into

consideration by the statute or, say, the Constitution.”208 In contrast,

205 [1974] 2 SCR 879 : (1974) 4 SCC 98

206 Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 223

207 In Khoday Distilleries Ltd. V. State of Karnataka, (1996) 10 SCC 304, this Court reiterated Indian Express

Newspapers (supra) by holding that a delegated legislation is manifestly arbitrary if it “could not be

reasonably expected to emanate from an authority delegated with the law-making power.” Similarly, in

State of Tamil Nadu v. P Krishnamurthy, [2006] 3 SCR 396 : (2006) 4 SCC 517 this Court held that

subordinate legislation can be challenged on the ground of manifest arbitrariness to an extent “where the

court might well say that the legislature never intended to give authority to make such rules.”

208 Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, [1985] 2 SCR 287 : (1985) 1 SCC 641

550 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

application of manifest arbitrariness to a plenary legislation passed by

a competent legislation requires the Court to adopt a different standard

because it carries greater immunity than a subordinate legislation.

We concur with Shayara Bano (supra) that a legislative action can

also be tested for being manifestly arbitrary. However, we wish to

clarify that there is, and ought to be, a distinction between plenary

legislation and subordinate legislation when they are challenged for

being manifestly arbitrary.

ii. Validity of Section 154 of the Finance Act 2017 omitting the

first proviso to Section 182 of the Companies Act

199. We now turn to examine the vires of Section 154 of the Finance

Act 2017. The result of the amendment is that: (a) a company, other

than a government company and a company which has been in

existence for less than three financial years, can contribute unlimited

amounts to any political party; and (b) companies, regardless of

the fact whether they are profit making or otherwise, can contribute

funds to political parties. The issue that arises for consideration is

whether the removal of contribution restrictions is manifestly arbitrary

and violates Article 14 of the Constitution.

200. As discussed in the earlier section, this Court has consistently

pointed out the pernicious effect of money on the integrity of the

electoral process in India. The Law Commission of India in its

170th Report also observed that “most business houses already

know where their interest lies and they make their contributions

accordingly to that political party which is likely to advance their

interest more.”209 This issue becomes particularly problematic

when we look at the avenues through which political parties

accumulate their capital. Section 182 of the 2013 Act is one such

legal provision allowing companies to contribute to political parties.

The question before us is not how political parties expend their

financial resources, but how they acquire their financial resources

in the first instance.

201. The Preamble to the Constitution describes India as a “democratic

republic”: a democracy in which citizens are guaranteed political

equality irrespective of caste and class and where the value of

209 Law Commission of India, 170th Report on the Reform of the Electoral Laws (1999)

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 551

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

every vote is equal. Democracy does not begin and end with

elections. Democracy sustains because the elected are responsive

to the electors who hold them accountable for their actions and

inactions. Would we remain a democracy if the elected do not

heed to the hue and cry of the needy? We have established the

close relationship between money and politics above where we

explained the importance of money for entry to politics, for winning

elections, and for remaining in power. That being the case, the

question that we ask ourselves is whether the elected would truly

be responsive to the electorate if companies which bring with them

huge finances and engage in quid pro quo arrangements with

parties are permitted to contribute unlimited amounts. The reason

for political contributions by companies is as open as day light.

Even the learned Solicitor General did not deny during the course

of the hearings that corporate donations are made to receive favors

through quid pro quo arrangements.

202. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala,210 the majority of this

Court held that “republican and democratic form of government”

form the basic elements of the constitutional structure. Subsequently,

in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain,211 Justice H R Khanna

reiterated that the democratic set up of government is a part of the

basic features of the Constitution. Elections matter in democracy

because they are the most profound expression of the will of the

people. Our parliamentary democracy enables citizens to express

their will through their elected representatives. The integrity of the

electoral process is a necessary concomitant to the maintenance of

the democratic form of government.212

203. This Court has also consistently held that free and fair elections

form an important concomitant of democracy.213 In Kuldip Nayar

210 [1973] Suppl. 1 SCR 1 : (1973) 4 SCC 225

211 [1978] 2 SCR 405 : (1975) Supp SCC 1

212 In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, [1978] 2 SCR 405 : (1975) Supp SCC 1, Justice Khanna observed

that periodical elections are a necessary postulate of a democratic setup as it allows citizens to elect their

representatives. He further observed that democracy can function “only upon the faith that elections are

free and fair and not rigged and manipulated, that they are effective instruments of ascertaining popular

will both in reality and form and are not mere rituals calculated to generate illusion of defence to mass

opinion.”

213 Digvijay Mote v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 175; Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms,

(2002) 5 SCC 294.

552 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

v. Union of India,214 a Constitution Bench of this Court held that

a democratic form of government depends on a free and fair

election system. In People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union

of India,215 this Court held that free and fair elections denote equal

opportunity to all people. It was further observed that a free and

fair election is one which is not “rigged and manipulated and the

candidates and their agents are not able to resort to unfair means

and malpractices.”

204. The integrity of the election process is pivotal for sustaining the

democratic form of government. The Constitution also places the

conduct of free and fair elections in India on a high pedestal. To this

purpose, Article 324 puts the Election Commission in charge of the

entire electoral process commencing with the issue of the notification

by the President to the final declaration of the result.216 However,

it is not the sole duty of the Election Commission to secure the

purity and integrity of the electoral process. There is also a positive

constitutional duty on the other organs of the government, including

the legislature, executive and the judiciary, to secure the integrity of

the electoral process.

205. During the course of the arguments, the learned Solicitor General

submitted that the limit of seven and a half percent of the average

net profits in the preceding three financial years was perceived as

a restriction on companies who would want to donate in excess of

the statutory cap. The learned Solicitor General further submitted

that companies who wanted to donate in excess of the statutory cap

would create shell companies and route their contributions through

them. Therefore, it was suggested that the statutory cap was removed

to discourage the creation of shell companies.

206. The limit on restrictions to political parties was incorporated in

Section 293A of the 1956 Act through the Companies (Amendment)

Bill 1985. The original restriction on contribution was five per cent

of a company’s average net profits during the three immediately

preceding financial years. The Lok Sabha debates pertaining to the

Companies Bill furnish an insight into why contribution restrictions

214 [2006] Suppl. 5 SCR 1 : (2006) 7 SCC 1

215 [2013] 12 SCR 283 : (2013) 10 SCC 1

216 Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, [1978] 2 SCR 272 : (1978) 1 SCC 405

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 553

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

were imposed in the first place. The then Minister of Chemicals and

Fertilizers and Industry and CompanyAffairs justified the contribution

restrictions, stating that:

“Since companies not having profits should not be

encouraged to make political contributions, monetary

ceiling as an alternative to a certain percentage of profits

for arriving at the permissible amount of political donation

has been done away with.”217

207. Thus, the object behind limiting contributions was to discourage

loss-making companies from contributing to political parties. In 1985,

Parliament prescribed the condition that only companies which

have been in existence for more than three years can contribute.

This condition was also included to prevent loss-making companies

and shell companies from making financial contributions to political

parties. If the ostensible object of the amendment, as contended

by the learned Solicitor General, was to discourage the creation of

shell companies, there is no justification for removing the cap on

contributions which was included for the very same purpose: to deter

shell companies from making political contributions. In fact, when

the proposal to amend Section 182 of the 2013 Act was mooted by

the Government in 2017, the Election Commission of India opposed

the amendment and suggested that the Government reconsider

its decision on the ground that it would open up the possibility of

creating shell companies. The relevant portion of the opinion of the

ECI is reproduced below:

“Certain amendments have been proposed in Section 182

of the Companies Act, where the first proviso has been

omitted and consequently the limit of seven and a half

percent (7.5 %) of the average net profits in the preceding

three financial years on contributions by companies has

been removed from the statute. This opens up the possibility

of shell companies being set up for the sole purpose of

making donations to political parties with no other business

of consequence having disbursable profits.”218

217 Lok Sabha Debates, Companies Bill (16 May 1985).

218 Election Commission of India, Letter dated 26 May 2017, No. 56/PPEMS/Transparency/2017

554 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

208. After the amendment, companies similar to individuals, can make

unlimited contributions and contributions can be made by both profitmaking and loss-making companies to political parties. Thus, in

essence, it could be argued that the amendment is merely removing

classification for the purpose of political contribution between

companies and individuals on the one hand and loss-making and

profit-making companies on the other.

209. The proposition on the principle of manifest arbitrariness culled out

above needs to be recalled. The doctrine of manifest arbitrariness

can be used to strike down a provision where: (a) the legislature

fails to make a classification by recognizing the degrees of harm;

and (b) the purpose is not in consonance with constitutional values.

210. One of the reasons for which companies may contribute to political

parties could be to secure income tax benefit.219 However, companies

have been contributing to political parties much before the Indian

legal regime in 2003 exempted contributions to political parties.

Contributions are made for reasons other than saving on the Income

Tax. The chief reason for corporate funding of political parties is

to influence the political process which may in turn improve the

company’s business performance.220 A company, whatever may

be its form or character, is principally incorporated to carry out the

objects contained in the memorandum. However, the amendment

now allows a company, through its Board of Directors, to contribute

unlimited amounts to political parties without any accountability

and scrutiny. Unlimited contribution by companies to political

parties is antithetical to free and fair elections because it allows

certain persons/companies to wield their clout and resources to

influence policy making. The purpose of Section 182 is to curb

corruption in electoral financing. For instance, the purpose of

banning a Government company from contributing is to prevent

such companies from entering into the political fray by making

contributions to political parties. The amendment to Section 182

by permitting unlimited corporate contributions (including by shell

companies) authorizes unrestrained influence of companies on

the electoral process. This is violative of the principle of free and

219 IT Act, Section 80 GGB

220 Jayantilal Ranchhoddas Koticha v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd (supra)

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 555

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

fair elections and political equality captured in the value of “one

person one vote”.

211. The amendment to Section 182 of the Companies Act must be read

along with other provisions on financial contributions to political parties

under the RPA and the IT Act. Neither the RPA nor the IT Act place

a cap on the contributions which can be made by an individual. The

amendment to the Companies Act when viewed along with other

provisions on electoral funding, seek to equalize an individual and

a company for the purposes of electoral funding.

212. The ability of a company to influence the electoral process through

political contributions is much higher when compared to that of an

individual. A company has a much graver influence on the political

process, both in terms of the quantum of money contributed to political

parties and the purpose of making such contributions. Contributions

made by individuals have a degree of support or affiliation to a political

association. However, contributions made by companies are purely

business transactions, made with the intent of securing benefits in

return. In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,

221

the issue before the Supreme Court of the United States was

whether a corporation can use the general treasury funds to pay

for electioneering communication. The majority held that limitations

on corporate funding bans political speech (through contributions)

based on the corporate identity of the contributor. Justice Steven

writing for the minority on the issue of corporate funding observed

that companies and natural persons cannot be treated alike for the

purposes of political funding:

“In the context of election to public office, the distinction

between corporate and human speakers is significant.

Although they make enormous contributions to our society,

corporations are not actually members of it. They cannot

vote or run for office. Because they may be managed and

controlled by non-residents, their interests may conflict in

fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters.

The financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental

orientation of corporations raise legitimate concerns about

their role in the electoral process.”

221 558 U.S 310

556 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

213. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that companies

and individuals cannot be equated for the purpose of political

contributions.

214. Further, Companies before the amendment to Section 182 could

only contribute a certain percentage of the net aggregate profits.

The provision classified between loss-making companies and profitmaking companies for the purpose of political contributions and for

good reason. The underlying principle of this distinction was that it is

more plausible that loss-making companies will contribute to political

parties with a quid pro quo and not for the purpose of income tax

benefits. The provision (as amended by the Finance Act 2017) does

not recognize that the harm of contributions by loss-making companies

in the form of quid pro quo is much higher. Thus, the amendment to

Section 182 is also manifestly arbitrary for not making a distinction

between profit-making and loss-making companies for the purposes

of political contributions.

215. Thus, the amendment to Section 182 is manifestly arbitrary for (a)

treating political contributions by companies and individuals alike; (b)

permitting the unregulated influence of companies in the governance

and political process violating the principle of free and fair elections;

and (c) treating contributions made by profit-making and loss-making

companies to political parties alike. The observations made above

must not be construed to mean that the Legislature cannot place

a cap on the contributions made by individuals. The exposition is

that the law must not treat companies and individual contributors

alike because of the variance in the degree of harm on free and

fair elections.

H. Conclusion and Directions

216. In view of the discussion above, the following are our conclusions:

a. The Electoral Bond Scheme, the proviso to Section 29C(1) of the

Representation of the PeopleAct 1951 (as amended by Section

137 of Finance Act 2017), Section 182(3) of the Companies

Act (as amended by Section 154 of the Finance Act 2017),

and Section 13A(b) (as amended by Section 11 of Finance Act

2017) are violative of Article 19(1)(a) and unconstitutional; and

b. The deletion of the proviso to Section 182(1) of the Companies

Act permitting unlimited corporate contributions to political parties

is arbitrary and violative of Article 14.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 557

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

217. We direct the disclosure of information on contributions received

by political parties under the Electoral Bond Scheme to give

logical and complete effect to our ruling. On 12 April 2019, this

Court issued an interim order directing that the information of

donations received and donations which will be received must be

submitted by political parties to the ECI in a sealed cover. This

Court directed that political parties submit detailed particulars

of the donors as against each Bond, the amount of each bond

and the full particulars of the credit received against each bond,

namely, the particulars of the bank account to which the amount

has been credited and the date on which each such credit was

made. During the course of the hearing, Mr Amit Sharma, Counsel

for the ECI, stated that the ECI had only collected information on

contributions made in 2019 because a reading of Paragraph 14

of the interim order indicates that the direction was only limited

to contributions made in that year. Paragraphs 13 and 14 of the

interim order are extracted below:

“13. In the above perspective, according to us, the just

and proper interim direction would be to require all the

political parties who have received donations through

Electoral Bonds to submit to the Election Commission of

India in sealed cover, detailed particulars of the donors

as against each bond; the amount of each such bond

and the full particulars of the credit received against

each bond, namely, the particulars of the bank account

to which the amount has been credited and the date of

each such credit.

14. The above details will be furnished forthwith in respect

of Electoral Bonds received by a political party till date.

The details of such other bonds that may be received by

such a political party upto the date fixed for issuing such

bonds as per the Note of the Ministry of Finance dated

28.2.2019, i.e 15.5.2019 will be submitted on or before 30th

May, 2019. The sealed covers will remain in the custody

of the Election Commission of India and will abide by such

orders as may be passed by the Court.”

218. Paragraph 14 of the interim order does not limit the operation of

Paragraph 13. Paragraph 13 contains a direction in unequivocal

558 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

terms to political parties to submit particulars of contributions received

through Electoral Bonds to the ECI. Paragraph 14 only prescribes a

timeline for the submission of particulars on contributions when the

window for Electoral Bond contributions was open in 2019. In view

of the interim direction of this Court, the ECI must have collected

particulars of contributions made to political parties through Electoral

Bonds.

219. In view of our discussion above, the following directions are issued:

a. The issuing bank shall herewith stop the issuance of Electoral

Bonds;

b. SBI shall submit details of the Electoral Bonds purchased since

the interim order of this Court dated 12 April 2019 till date to

the ECI. The details shall include the date of purchase of each

Electoral Bond, the name of the purchaser of the bond and the

denomination of the Electoral Bond purchased;

c. SBI shall submit the details of political parties which have

received contributions through Electoral Bonds since the interim

order of this Court dated 12 April 2019 till date to the ECI. SBI

must disclose details of each Electoral Bond encashed by

political parties which shall include the date of encashment and

the denomination of the Electoral Bond;

d. SBI shall submit the above information to the ECI within three

weeks from the date of this judgment, that is, by 6 March 2024;

e. The ECI shall publish the information shared by the SBI on its

official website within one week of the receipt of the information,

that is, by 13 March 2024; and

f. Electoral Bonds which are within the validity period of fifteen

days but that which have not been encashed by the political

party yet shall be returned by the political party or the

purchaser depending on who is in possession of the bond

to the issuing bank. The issuing bank, upon the return of

the valid bond, shall refund the amount to the purchaser’s

account.

220. Writ petitions are disposed of in terms of the above judgment.

221. Pending applications(s), if any, stand disposed of.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 559

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

ANNEXURE I

Section 29C, Representation of the People Act 1951

Prior to Amendment by the Finance

Act 2017

Upon Amendment by Section 137

of the Finance Act, 2017

29C. Declaration of donation

received by the political parties. -

(1) The treasurer of a political

party or any other person

authorized by the political

party in this behalf shall, in

each financial year, prepare

a report in respect of the

following, namely;

(a) the contribution in excess

of twenty thousand

rupees received by such

political party from any

person in that financial

year;

(b) the contribution in excess

of twenty thousand

rupees received b y

such political party from

companies other than

Government companies

in that financial year.

(2) The report under sub-section

(1) shall be in such form as

may be prescribed.

(3) The report for a financial

year under subsection (1)

shall be submitted by the

treasurer of a political party or

any other person authorized

by the political party in this

behalf before the due date for

furnishing a return of income

of that financial year under

section 139 of the Income-tax

Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), to the

Election Commission.

Section 29C. Declaration of donation

received by the political parties. –

(1) The treasurer of a political

party or any other person

authorized by the political

party in this behalf shall, in

each financial year, prepare

a report in respect of the

following, namely:

(a) the contribution in excess

of twenty thousand

rupees received by such

political party from any

person in that financial

year;

(b) the contribution in excess

of twenty thousand

rupees received b y

such political party from

companies other than

Government companies

in that financial year.

Provided that nothing contained

in this subsection shall apply

to the contributions received

by way of an electoral bond.

Explanation – For the purposes of

this subsection, “electoral bond”

means a bond referred to in the

Explanation to sub-section (3) of

section 31 of the Reserve Bank

of India Act, 1934.

(2) The report under sub-section

(1) shall be in such form as

may be prescribed.

560 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

(4) Where the treasurer of any

political party or any other

person authorized by the

political party in this behalf

fails to submit a report

under sub-section (3) then,

notwithstanding anything

contained in the Income-tax

Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), such

political party shall not be

entitled to any tax relief under

that Act.

(3) The report for a financial

year under subsection

(1) shall be submitted by

the treasurer of a political

party or any other person

authorized by the political

party in this behalf before

the due date for furnishing

a return of income of that

financial year under section

139 of the Income-tax Act,

1961 (43 of 1961), to the

Election Commission.

(4) Where the treasurer of any

political party or any other

person authorized by the

political party in this behalf

fails to submit a report

under sub-section (3) then,

notwithstanding anything

contained in the Income-tax

Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), such

political party shall not be

entitled to any tax relief under

that Act.

Section 182, Companies Act 2013

Prior to Amendment by the Finance

Act, 2017

Upon Amendment by Section 154

of the Finance Act, 2017

182.Prohibitions and restrictions

regarding political contributions.

1) Notwithstanding anything

containedinanyotherprovision

of this Act, a company, other

than a Government company

and a company which has

been in existence for less

than three financial years,

may contribute any amount

directly or indirectly to any

political party:

182.Prohibitions and restrictions

regarding political contributions.

1) Notwithstanding anything

containedinanyotherprovision

of this Act, a company, other

than a Government company

and a company which has

been in existence for less

than three financial years,

may contribute any amount

directly or indirectly to any

political party:

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 561

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

Provided that the amount referred

to in subsection (1) or, as the case

may be, the aggregate of the amount

which may be so contributed by the

company in any financial year shall

not exceed seven and a half per

cent of its average net profits during

the three immediately preceding

financial years:

Provided further that no such

contribution shall be made by

a company unless a resolution

authorising the making of such

contribution is passed at a meeting

of the Board of Directors and such

resolution shall, subject to the other

provisions of this section, be deemed

to be justification in law for the

making and the acceptance of the

contribution authorised by it.

(First proviso omitted)

Provided that no such contribution

shall be made by a company unless

a resolution authorising the making

of such contribution is passed at a

meeting of the Board of Directors

and such resolution shall, subject to

the other provisions of this section,

be deemed to be justification in law

for the making of the contribution

authorised by it.

Section 182 (3) Every company

shall disclose in its profit and loss

account any amount or amounts

contributed by it to any political

party during the financial year to

which that account relates, giving

particulars of the total amount

contributed and the name of the

party to which such amount has

been contributed.

Section 182 (3) Every company

shall disclose in its profit and

loss account the total amount

contributed b y it under this

section during the financial year

to which the account relates.

(3A) Notwithstanding anything

contained in subsection (1), the

contribution under this section shall

not be made except by an account

payee cheque drawn on a bank

or an account payee bank draft or

use of electronic clearing system

through a bank account:

Provided that a company may

make contribution through any

instruments, issued pursuant to

any scheme notified under any

law for the time being in force,

for contribution to the political

parties.

562 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Section 13A, Income Tax Act 1995

Prior to Amendment by the Finance

Act, 2017

Upon Amendment by Section 11 of

the Finance Act, 2017

13A. Special provision relating to

incomes of political parties

Any income of a political party

which is chargeable under the head

“Income from house property” or

“Income from other sources” or

any income by way of voluntary

contributions received by a political

party from any person shall not

be included in the total income of

the previous year of such political

party:

Provided that-

(a) such political party keeps

and maintains such books of

account and other documents

as would enable theAssessing

Officer to properly deduce its

income therefrom;

(b) in respect of each such

voluntary contribution in

excess of ten thousand

rupees, such political party

keeps and maintains a record

of such contribution and the

name and address of the

person who has made such

contribution; and

(c) the accounts of such political

party are audited by an

accountant as defined in the

Explanation below sub- section

(2) of section 288.

13A. Special provision relating to

incomes of political parties

Any income of a political party

which is chargeable under the

head “Income from house property”

or “Income from other sources” or

any income by way of voluntary

contributions received by a political

party from any person shall not

be included in the total income of

the previous year of such political

party:

Provided that-

(a) such political party keeps

and maintains such books of

account and other documents

as would enable theAssessing

Officer to properly deduce its

income therefrom;

(b) in respect of each such

voluntary contribution other

than contribution by way

of electoral bond in excess

of ten thousand rupees, such

political party keeps and

maintains a record of such

contribution and the name and

address of the person who

has made such contribution;

and

(c) the accounts of such political

party are audited b y an

accountant as defined in

the Explanation below subsection (2) of section 288;

and

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 563

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

Explanation.- For the purposes of

this section, “political party” means

an association or body of individual

citizens of India registered with the

Election Commission of India as a

political party under paragraph 3 of

the Election Symbols (Reservation

and Allotment) Order, 1968, and

includes a political party deemed to

be registered with that Commission

under the proviso to subparagraph

(2) of that paragraph.

(d) no donation exceeding

two thousand rupees is

received by such political

party otherwise than by an

account payee cheque drawn

on a bank or an account

payee bank draft or use of

electronic clearing system

through a bank account or

through electoral bond.

Explanation.- For the purposes

of this proviso, “electoral bond”

means a bond referred to in the

Explanation to sub- section (3) of

section 31 of the Reserve Bank of

India Act, 1934;

Provided also that such political

party furnishes a return of income

for the previous year in accordance

with the provisions of sub-section

(4B) of section 139 on or before the

due date under that section.

Section 31, Reserve Bank of India Act 1931

Prior to Amendment by the Finance

Act, 2017

Upon Amendment by Section 11 of

the Finance Act, 2017

31. Issue of demand bills and

notes.

1) No person in India other than

the Bank or, as expressly

authorized by this Act, the

Central Government shall

draw, accept, make o r

issue any bill of exchange,

hundi, promissory note or

engagement for the payment

of money payable to bearer

on demand, or borrow, owe

or take up any sum or sums

of money on the bills, hundis

or notes payable to bearer on

demand of any such person:

31. Issue of demand bills and

notes.

1) No person in India other than

the Bank or, as expressly

authorized by this Act, the

Central Government shall

draw, accept, make o r

issue any bill of exchange,

hundi, promissory note or

engagement for the payment

of money payable to bearer

on demand, or borrow, owe

or take up any sum or sums

of money on the bills, hundis

or notes payable to bearer on

demand of any such person:

564 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Provided that cheques or drafts,

including hundis, payable to bearer

on demand or otherwise may be

drawn on a person’s account with

a banker, shroff or agent.

2) Notwithstanding anything

contained in the Negotiable

Instruments Act, 1881, no

person in India other than

the Bank or, as expressly

authorised by this Act, the

Central Government shall

make or issue any promissory

note expressed to be payable

to the bearer of the instrument.

Provided that cheques or drafts,

including hundis, payable to bearer

on demand or otherwise may be

drawn on a person’s account with

a banker, shroff or agent.

2) Notwithstanding anything

contained in the Negotiable

Instruments Act, 1881, no

person in India other than

the Bank or, as expressly

authorised by this Act, the

Central Government shall

make or issue any promissory

note expressed to be payable

to the bearer of the instrument.

3) Notwithstanding anything

contained in this section,

the Central Government may

authorise any scheduled

bank to issue electoral bond

Explanation.-For the purposes

of this subsection, ‘electoral

bond’ means a bond issued by

any scheduled bank under the

scheme as may be notified by the

Central Government.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 565

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

ANNEXURE II

Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961

(Statutory Rules and Order)

222[FORM 24A

(See rule 85B)

[This form should be filed with the Election Commission before the

due date for furnishing a return of the Political Party’s income of the

concerned financial year under section 139 of the Income-tax Act,

1961 (43 of 1961) and a certificate to this effect should be attached

with the Income-tax return to claim exemption under the Income-tax

Act, 1961 (43 of 1961).]

1. Name of Political Party:

2. Status of the Political Party:

(recognised/unrecognised)

3. Address of the headquarters of the Political Party:

4. Date of registration of Political Party with Election

Commission:

5. Permanent Account Number (PAN) and Income-tax Ward/

Circle where return of the political party is filed:_______

6. Details of the contributions received, in excess of rupees

twenty thousand, during the Financial Year:20 – . –20 .

Serial

number

Name and

complete

address

of the

contributing

person/

company

PAN (if

any_ and

Income-Tax

Ward/Circle

Amount of

contribution

(Rs.)

Mode of

contribution

*(cheque/

demand

draft/cash)

Remarks

222 Ins. By Notifin. No. S.O. 1283(E), dated the 10th November, 2003.

566 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

*In case of payment by cheque/demand draft, indicate name of the

bank and branch of the bank on which the cheque/demand draft

has been drawn.

7. In case the contributor is a company, whether the conditions

laid down under section 293A of the Companies Act, 1956 (1

of 1956) have been complied with (A copy of the certificate

to this obtained from the company should be attached).

Verification

I,______________________________(full name in Block letters),

son/daughter of ___________________________solemnly declare

that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the information given

in this Form is correct, complete and truly stated.

I further declare that I am verifying this form in my capacity as

______________________on behalf of the Political Party above

named and I am also competent to do so.

(Signature and name of the Treasurer/Authorised person)]

Date:____________________

Place:____________________

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 567

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

Sanjiv Khanna, J.

I have had the benefit of perusing the judgment authored by Dr. D.Y.

Chandrachud, the Hon’ble Chief Justice. I respectfully agree with the

findings and conclusions recorded therein. However, since my reasoning

is different to arrive at the same conclusion, including application of the

doctrine of proportionality, I am penning down my separate opinion.

2. To avoid prolixity, the contentions of the parties are not referred to

separately and the facts are narrated in brief.

3. Corporate funding of political parties has been a contentious issue

with the legislature’s approach varying from time to time. The

amendments to the Companies Act, 1956 reveal the spectrum of

views of the legislature. It began with regulations and restrictions in

19601 to a complete ban on contributions to political parties in 19692

.

The ban was partially lifted in 1985 with restrictions and stipulations.3

The aggregate amount contributed to a political party in a financial

year could not exceed 5% of the average net profit during the three

immediately preceding financial years.4 A new condition stipulated

that the board of directors5 in their meeting would pass a resolution

giving legitimacy and authorisation to contributions to a political party.6

4. The Companies Act of 2013 replaced the Companies Act of 1956.

Section 182(1) of the Companies Act, 20137 permitted contributions

by companies of any amount to any political party, if the said company

had been in existence for more than three immediately preceding

financial years and is not a government company. The requirement

of authorisation vide Board resolution is retained.8 The cap of 5%

is enhanced to 7.5% of the average net profits during the three

1 The Companies (Amendment) Act 1960, s 100 inserted into the Companies Act 1956, s 293A which

stipulates that contributions to political parties cannot exceed 5% of the average net profit of the company

during the three immediately preceding financial years.

2 The Companies (Amendment) Act 1969, s 3 substituted of the Companies Act 1956, s 293A introducing

a ban on contributions to political parties.

3 The Companies (Amendment) Act 1985, s 2 replaced of the Companies Act 1956, s 293A bringing back

the 5% cap on contributions to political parties.

4 The Companies Act 1956, s 293A.

5 For short, the “Board”.

6 Second proviso to Section 293A(2), Companies Act, 1956.

7 As originally enacted.

8 Unamended second proviso to Section 182(1) of the Companies Act, 2013. This condition continues to

remain.

568 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

immediately preceding financial years.9 It is also mandated that

the company must disclose the amount contributed by it to political

parties in the profit and loss account, including particulars of name

of political party and the amount contributed.10 In case of violation

of the terms, penalties stand prescribed.

5. The FinanceAct, 2017 made several amendments to the Companies

Act, 2013, Income Tax Act, 1961, Reserve Bank of India11 Act,

1934, the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and the Foreign

Contribution Regulation Act, 2010. These changes were brought

in to allow contributions/donations through Electoral Bonds12. The

changes made by the Finance Act, 2017 to these legislations were

provided in a tabular format by the petitioners. For clarity, I have

reproduced the table below. The specific changes are highlighted

in bold and italics for ease of reference:

Section 182 of the Companies Act, 2013

Prior to Amendment by the Finance

Act, 2017

Post Amendment by Section 154 of the

Finance Act, 2017

182. Prohibitions and restrictions

regarding political contributions-

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained

in any other provision of this Act, a

company, other than a Government

company and a company which has

been in existence for less than three

financial years, may contribute any

amount directly or indirectly to any

political party:

Provided that the amount referred

to in sub-section (1) or, as the case

may be, the aggregate of the amount

which may be so contributed by the

company in any financial year shall

not exceed seven and a half per

cent of its average net profits during

the three immediately preceding

financial years:

182. Prohibitions and restrictions

regarding political contributions-

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained

in any other provision of this Act, a

company, other than a Government

company and a company which has

been in existence for less than three

financial years, may contribute any

amount directly or indirectly to any

political party:

[First proviso omitted]

9 Unamended first proviso to Section 182(1) of the Companies Act, 2013.

10 Unamended Section 182(3) of the Companies Act, 2013.

11 For short, “RBI”.

12 For short, “Bonds”.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 569

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

Provided further that no such

contributionshallbemadebyacompany

unless a resolution authorising the

making of such contribution is passed

at a meeting of the Board of Directors

and such resolution shall, subject to

the other provisions of this section,

be deemed to be justification in law

for the making and the acceptance of

the contribution authorised by it.

Provided that no such contribution

shall be made by a company unless

a resolution authorising the making of

such contribution is passed at a meeting

of the Board of Directors and such

resolution shall, subject to the other

provisions of this section, be deemed

to be justification in law for the making

of the contribution authorised by it.

182 (3) Every company shall disclose

in its profit and loss account any

amount or amounts contributed

by it to any political party during the

financial year to which that account

relates, giving particulars of the

total amount contributed and the

name of the party to which such

amount has been contributed.

182 (3) Every company shall disclose

in its profit and loss account the total

amount contributed by it under this

section during the financial year to

which the account relates.

(3A) Notwithstanding anything

contained in sub-section (1), the

contribution under this section shall

not be made except by an account

payee cheque drawn on a bank or an

account payee bank draft or use of

electronic clearing system through

a bank account:

Provided that a company may make

contribution through any instrument,

issued pursuant to any scheme

notified under any law for the time

being in force, for contribution to the

political parties.

Section 13-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961

Prior to Amendment by the Finance

Act, 2017

Post Amendment by Section 11 of the

Finance Act, 2017

13-A. Special provision relating to

incomes of political parties.— Any

income of a political party which is

chargeable under the head “Income

from house property” or “Income

from other sources” or “capital gains

or” any income by way of voluntary

contributions received by a political

party from any person shall not be

included in the total income of the

previous year of such political party:

13-A. Special provision relating to

incomes of political parties.— Any

income of a political party which is

chargeable under the head “Income

from house property” or “Income

from other sources” or “capital gains

or” any income by way of voluntary

contributions received by a political

party from any person shall not be

included in the total income of the

previous year of such political party:

570 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Provided that—

(a) such political party keeps and

maintains such books of account and

other documents as would enable the

Assessing Officer to properly deduce

its income therefrom;

(b) in respect of each such voluntary

contribution in excess of twenty

thousand rupees, such political party

keeps and maintains a record of

such contribution and the name and

address of the person who has made

such contribution; and

(c) the accounts of such political

party are audited by an accountant

as defined in the Explanation below

sub-section (2) of Section 288:

Provided further that if the Treasurer of

such political party or any other person

authorised by that political party in this

behalf fails to submit a report under

sub-section (3) of Section 29-C of

the Representation of the People Act,

1951 (43 of 1951) for a financial year,

no exemption under this section shall

be available for that political party for

such financial year.

Explanation.—For the purposes of

this section, “political party” means a

political party registered under Section

29-A of the Representation of the

People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951).

Provided that—

(a) such political party keeps and

maintains such books of account and

other documents as would enable the

Assessing Officer to properly deduce

its income therefrom;

(b) in respect of each such voluntary

contribution other than contribution

by way of electoral bond in excess of

twenty thousand rupees, such political

party keeps and maintains a record of

such contribution and the name and

address of the person who has made

such contribution;

(c) the accounts of such political party

are audited by an accountant as defined

in the Explanation below sub-section

(2) of Section 288 and:

(d) no donation exceeding two

thousand rupees is received by such

political party otherwise than by an

account payee cheque drawn on a

bank or an account payee bank draft

or use of electronic clearing system

through a bank account or through

electoral bond.

Explanation.— For the purposes of this

proviso, “electoral bond” means a

bond referred to in the Explanation

to sub-section (3) of Section 31 of

the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934

(2 of 1934).

Provided further that if the Treasurer of

such political party or any other person

authorised by that political party in this

behalf fails to submit a report under

sub-section (3) of Section 29-C of

the Representation of the People Act,

1951 (43 of 1951) for a financial year,

no exemption under this section shall

be available for that political party for

such financial year.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 571

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

Provided also that such political party

furnishes a return of income for the

previous year in accordance with

the provisions of sub-section (4B) of

Section 139 on or before the due date

under that section.

Explanation.—For the purposes of

this section, “political party” means a

political party registered under Section

29-A of the Representation of the

People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951).

Section 31 of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934

Prior to Amendment by the Finance

Act 2017

Post Amendment by Section 135 of

the Finance Act 2017

Section 31. Issue of demand bills

and notes.—

(1) No person in India other than the

Bank, or, as expressly authorized by

thisAct the Central Government shall

draw, accept, make or issue any bill

of exchange, hundi, promissory note

or engagement for the payment of

money payable to bearer on demand,

or borrow, owe or take up any sum or

sums of money on the bills, hundis or

notes payable to bearer on demand

of any such person:

Provided that cheques or drafts,

including hundis, payable to bearer on

demand or otherwise may be drawn

on a person’s account with a banker,

shroff or agent.

(2)Notwithstandinganythingcontained

in the Negotiable Instruments Act,

1881 (26 of 1881), no person in India

other than the Bank or, as expressly

authorised by this Act, the Central

Government shall make or issue

any promissory note expressed to

be payable to the bearer of the

instrument.

Section 31. Issue of demand bills and

notes.—

(1) No person in India other than the

Bank, or, as expressly authorized by

this Act the Central Government shall

draw, accept, make or issue any bill

of exchange, hundi, promissory note

or engagement for the payment of

money payable to bearer on demand,

or borrow, owe or take up any sum or

sums of money on the bills, hundis or

notes payable to bearer on demand of

any such person:

Provided that cheques or drafts,

including hundis, payable to bearer on

demand or otherwise may be drawn

on a person’s account with a banker,

shroff or agent.

2) Notwithstanding anything contained

in the Negotiable Instruments Act,

1881 (26 of 1881), no person in India

other than the Bank or, as expressly

authorised by this Act, the Central

Government shall make or issue

any promissory note expressed to

be payable to the bearer of the

instrument.

572 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

(3) Notwithstanding anything

contained in this section, the Central

Government may authorise any

scheduled bank to issue electoral

bond.

Explanation.— For the purposes of

this sub-section, “electroal bond”

means a bond issued by any

scheduled bank under the scheme

as may be notified by the Central

Government.

Section 29-C of the Representation of the People Act 1951

Prior to Amendment by the Finance

Act 2017

Post Amendment by Section 137 of

the Finance Act 2017

29-C. Declaration of donation received

by the political parties.—

(1) The treasurer of the political party

or any other person authorised by the

political party in this behalf shall, in

each financial year, prepare a report

in respect of the following, namely:—

(a) the contribution in excess of twenty

thousand rupees received by such

political party from any person in that

financial year;

(b) the contribution in excess of twenty

thousand rupees received by such

political party from companies other

than Government companies in that

financial year.

(2) The report under sub-section

(1) shall be in such form as may be

prescribed.

(3) The report for a financial year under

sub-section (1) shall be submitted by

the treasurer of a political party or

any other person authorised by the

political party in this behalf before

the due date for furnishing a return

of its income of that financial year

under Section 139 of the Income

Tax, 1961 (43 of 1961) to the Election

Commission.

29-C. Declaration of donation received

by the political parties.—

(1) The treasurer of the political party

or any other person authorised by the

political party in this behalf shall, in

each financial year, prepare a report

in respect of the following, namely:—

(a) the contribution in excess of twenty

thousand rupees received by such

political party from any person in that

financial year;

(b) the contribution in excess of twenty

thousand rupees received by such

political party from companies other

than Government companies in that

financial year.

Provided that nothing contained in

this sub-section shall apply to the

contributions received by way of an

electoral bond.

Explanation.— For the purposes of

this sub-section, “electoral bond”

means a bond referred to in the

Explanation to sub-section (3) of

Section 31 of the Reserve Bank of

India Act, 1934 (2 of 1934).

(2) The report under sub-section (1) shall

be in such form as may be prescribed.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 573

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

(4) Where the treasurer of any political

party or any other person authorised

by the political party in this behalf fails

to submit a report under sub-section

(3), then, notwithstanding anything

contained in the Income TaxAct, 1961

(43 of 1961), such political party shall

not be entitled to any tax relief under

that Act.

(3) The report for a financial year under

sub-section (1) shall be submitted by

the treasurer of a political party or

any other person authorised by the

political party in this behalf before

the due date for furnishing a return

of its income of that financial year

under Section 139 of the Income Tax,

1961 (43 of 1961) to the Election

Commission.

(4) Where the treasurer of any political

party or any other person authorised

by the political party in this behalf fails

to submit a report under sub-section

(3), then, notwithstanding anything

contained in the Income Tax Act, 1961

(43 of 1961), such political party shall

not be entitled to any tax relief under

that Act.

Section 2 of the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act, 2010

Prior to Amendment by the Finance

Act 2017

Post Amendment by Section 236 the

Finance Act 2017

Section 2 (1) (j)

(j) “foreign source” includes,—

(i) the Government of any foreign

country or territory and any agency

of such Government;

(ii) any international agency, not

being the United Nations or any of

its specialised agencies, the World

Bank, International Monetary Fund

or such other agency as the Central

Government may, by notification,

specify in this behalf;

(iii) a foreign company;

(iv) a corporation, not being a foreign

company, incorporated in a foreign

country or territory;

(v) a multi-national corporation referred

to in sub-clause (iv) of clause (g);

Section 2 (1) (j)

(j) “foreign source” includes,—

(i) the Government of any foreign

country or territory and any agency of

such Government;

(ii) any international agency, not

being the United Nations or any of

its specialised agencies, the World

Bank, International Monetary Fund

or such other agency as the Central

Government may, by notification,

specify in this behalf;

(iii) a foreign company;

(iv) a corporation, not being a foreign

company, incorporated in a foreign

country or territory;

(v) a multi-national corporation referred

to in sub-clause (iv) of clause (g);

574 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

(vi) a company within the meaning of

the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956),

and more than one-half of the nominal

value of its share capital is held, either

singly or in the aggregate, by one or

more of the following, namely—

(A) the Government of a foreign

country or territory;

(B) the citizens of a foreign country

or territory;

(C) corporations incorporated in a

foreign country or territory;

(D) trusts, societies o r other

associations of individuals (whether

incorporated or not), formed or

registered in a foreign country or

territory;

(E) foreign company;

(vi) a company within the meaning of

the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956),

and more than one-half of the nominal

value of its share capital is held, either

singly or in the aggregate, by one or

more of the following, namely—

(A) the Government of a foreign country

or territory;

(B) the citizens of a foreign country or

territory;

(C) corporations incorporated in a

foreign country or territory;

(D)trusts, societies or other associations

of individuals (whether incorporated or

not), formed or registered in a foreign

country or territory;

(E) foreign company;

Provided that where the nominal

value of share capital is within the

limits specified for foreign investment

under the Foreign Exchange

Management Act, 1999 (42 of 1999),

or the rules or regulations made

thereunder, then, notwithstanding

the nominal value of share capital of

a company being more than one-half

of such value at the time of making

the contribution, such company shall

not be a foreign source.

6. The amended Companies Act, 2013 removes the cap on corporate

funding.13 The requirement that the contribution will require a resolution

passed at the meeting of the Board is retained. In the profit and loss

account, a company is now only required to disclose the total amount

contributed to political parties in a financial year.14 The requirement

to disclose the specific amounts contributed and the names of the

political parties is omitted. Section 182(3A), as introduced, stipulates

that the company could contribute to a political party only by way

13 First proviso to Section 182(1), Companies Act, 2013 has been omitted vide the Finance Act, 2017.

14 Section 182(3) of the Companies Act, 2013.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 575

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

of a cheque, Electronic Clearing System15, or demand draft.16 The

proviso to Section 182(3A) permits a company to contribute through

any instrument issued pursuant to any scheme notified under the

law, for the time being in force, for contribution to political parties.

7. Section 13Aof the Income TaxAct, 1961,17 exempts income of political

parties, including financial contributions and investments, from income

tax. The object of providing a tax exemption is to increase the funds

of political parties from legitimate sources. However, conditions

imposed require political parties to maintain books of accounts and

other documents to enable the assessing officer to properly deduce

their income.18 Political parties are required to maintain records of the

name and addresses of persons who make voluntary contributions in

excess of Rs.20,000/-.19 Accounts of the political parties are required

to be audited.20

8. In 2003, Section 80GGB and 80GGC were inserted in the Income

Tax Act, 1961, permitting contributions to political parties. These

contributions are tax deductible, though they are not expenditure for

purposes of business, to incentivise contributions through banking

channels.21

9. By the Finance Act, 2017, Section 13A of the Income Tax Act, 1961,

was amended. Section 13A now stipulates that a political party is

not required to maintain a record of the contributions received by

Bonds.22 Further, donations over Rs.2,000/- are only permitted through

cheques, bank drafts, ECS or Bonds.23

10. Section 29C of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 was

introduced in 2003.24 The section requires each political party to

file a report for all contributions over Rs.20,000/- to the Election

15 For short, “ECS”.

16 Section 182(3A) of the Companies Act, 2013 was introduced vide Section 154 of the Finance Act, 2017.

17 As amended in 1978.

18 First proviso 1(a) to the unamended Section 13A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

19 Second proviso to the unamended Section 13A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

20 Third proviso to Section 13A Income Tax Act, 1961.

21 See Section 37 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

22 Second proviso to Section 13A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

23 Fourth proviso to Section 13A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

24 Introduced vide Section 2, Election and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2003.

576 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Commission of India.25 The report is required to be filed before the

due date of filing income tax returns of the financial year under

the Income Tax Act, 1961. Failure to submit a report disentitles a

political party from any tax relief, as provided under the Income

Tax Act, 1961. Section 29C of the Finance Act, 2017, as amended,

stipulates that political parties are not required to disclose the details

of contributions received by Bonds.26

11. Section 31(3) of the RBI Act, 1934 was added by the Finance Act,

2017 to effectuate the issuance of the Bonds which, as envisaged,

are not to mention the name of the political party to whom they are

payable, and hence are in the nature of bearer demand bill or note.

12. On 02.01.2018, the Department ofEconomicAffairs, Ministry of Finance,

notified the Electoral Bonds Scheme, 201827 in terms of Section 31(3)

of the RBI Act, 1934.28 The salient features of this Scheme are:

⇒ Bonds are in the nature of a promissory note and bearer

instrument.29 They do not carry the name of the buyer or payee.30

⇒ Bonds can be purchased by any ‘person’31 who is a citizen of

India or who is a body corporate incorporated or established in

India.32 Any ‘person’ who is an individual can purchase Bonds

either singly or jointly with other individuals.33

⇒ Bonds are to be issued in denominations of Rs.1,000/-,

Rs.10,000/-, Rs.1,00,000/-, Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.1,00,00,000/-.34

They are valid for a period of 15 days from the date of issue.35

The amount of Bonds not encashed within the validity period

25 For short, “ECI”.

26 Proviso to Section 29C(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

27 For short, “the Scheme”.

28 Finance Act, 2017 has also amended and added Section 31(3) to the RBI Act, 1934 as the Bonds in

question are bearer bonds like Indian currency. However, we do not think this amendment is required to

be separately adjudicated as it merely effectuates the Bonds scheme.

29 Paragraph 2(a) of the Scheme.

30 Ibid.

31 Paragraph 2(d) of the Scheme defines a ‘person’ to include an individual, Hindu undivided family,

company, firm, an association of persons or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. It also

includes every artificial judicial person and any agency, office or branch owned by such ‘person’.

32 Paragraph 3(1) of the Scheme.

33 Paragraph 3(2) of the Scheme.

34 Paragraph 5 of the Scheme.

35 Paragraph 6 of the Scheme.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 577

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

of 15 days, would be deposited by the authorised bank to the

Prime Minister Relief Fund.36

⇒ The Bond is non-refundable.37

⇒ A ‘person’ who wishes to purchase a Bond is required to apply

in the specified format.38 Non-compliant applications are to be

rejected.

⇒ To purchase Bonds, a buyer is required to apply to the authorised

bank.39 RBI’s Know Your Customer40 requirements apply and

the authorised bank could ask for additional KYC documents,

if necessary.41

⇒ The payments for the issuance of Bonds are required to be

made in Indian rupees through demand draft, cheque, ECS or

direct debit to the buyer’s account.42

⇒ The identity and information furnished by the buyer for the

issuance of Bonds is to be treated as confidential by the

authorised issuing bank.43 The details, including identity, can

be disclosed only when demanded by a competent court or on

registration of any criminal case by any law enforcement agency.44

⇒ Only eligible political parties, meaning a party that is registered

under Section 29Aof the Representation of the PeopleAct, 1951,

and has secured not less than 1% of the votes polled in the

last general election to the House of People or the Legislative

Assembly, can receive a Bond.45

⇒ The eligible political party can encash the Bond through their

bank account in the authorised bank.46

36 Paragraph 12(2) of the Scheme.

37 Paragraph 7(6) of the Scheme.

38 Paragraph 7 of the Scheme.

39 Paragraph 2(b) of the Scheme defines an authorized bank as the State Bank of India and its specified

branches.

40 For short, “KYC”.

41 Paragraph 4 of the Scheme.

42 Paragraph 11 of the Scheme.

43 Paragraph 7(4) of the Scheme.

44 Ibid.

45 Paragraph 3(3) of the Scheme.

46 Paragraph 3(4) of the Scheme.

578 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

⇒ The Bonds are made available for purchase for a period of 10

days every quarter, in the months of January, April, July and

October, as may be specified by the Central Government.47

They are also made available for an additional period of 30

days, as specified by the central government in a year where

general elections to the House of People are held.48

⇒ The Bonds are not eligible for trading,49 and commission,

brokerage or other charges are not chargeable/payable for

issuance of a Bond.50

⇒ The value of the Bond is considered as income by way of

voluntary contributions to eligible political parties for the

purposes of tax exemption under Section 13A of the Income

Tax Act, 1961.51

13. In the afore-mentioned writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the

Constitution of India,52 the petitioners are seeking a declaration that

the Scheme and the relevant amendments made by the Finance Act,

2017, are unconstitutional.

14. The question of the constitutional validity of the Scheme and the

amendments introduced by the FinanceAct, 2017 are being examined

by us. The question of introducing these amendments through a money

bill underArticle 110 of the Constitution is not being examined by us.53

The scope of Article 110 of the Constitution has been referred to a

seven-judge Bench and is sub-judice.

54 Further, a batch of petitions

challenging the amendments to the Foreign Contribution Regulation

Act, 2010 by the Finance Acts of 2016 and 2018 are pending. The

challenge to the said amendments is not being decided by us.

15. I fully agree with the Hon’ble Chief Justice, that the Scheme cannot

be tested on the parameters applicable to economic policy. Matters of

47 Paragraph 8(1) of the Scheme.

48 Paragraph 8(2) of the Scheme.

49 Paragraph 14 of the Scheme.

50 Paragraph 12 of the Scheme.

51 Paragraph 13 of the Scheme.

52 For short, “the Constitution”.

53 The Finance Act, 2017 was introduced and passed as a money bill by the Parliament under Article 110

of the Constitution.

54 Rojer Matthew v. South Indian Bank Ltd. and Ors., [2019] 16 SCR 1 : Civil Appeal No. 8588 of 2019.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 579

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

economic policy normally pertain to trade, business and commerce,

whereas contributions to political parties relate to the democratic

polity, citizens’ right to know and accountability in our democracy.

The primary objective of the Scheme, and relevant amendments

introduced by the Finance Act, 2017, is electoral reform and not

economic reform. Thus, the dictum and the principles enunciated

by this Court in Swiss Ribbons (P.) Ltd. and Another v. Union of

India and Others,

55 and Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure

and Another v. Union of India and Others,

56 relating to judicial

review on economic policy matters have no application to the present

case. To give the legislation the latitude of economic policy, we will be

diluting the principle of free and fair elections. Clearly, the importance

of the issue and the nexus between money and electoral democracy

requires us to undertake an in-depth review, albeit under the settled

powers of judicial review.

16. Even otherwise, it is wrong to state as a principle that judicial review

cannot be exercised over every matter pertaining to economic policy.57

The law is that the legislature has to be given latitude in matters

of economic policy as they involve complex financial issues.58 The

degree of deference to be shown by the court while exercising the

power of judicial review cannot be put in a straitjacket.

17. On the question of burden of proof, I respectfully agree with the

observations made by the Hon’ble Chief Justice, that once the

petitioners are able to prima facie establish a breach of a fundamental

right, then the onus is on the State to show that the right limiting

measure pursues a proper purpose, has rational nexus with that

purpose, the means adopted were necessary for achieving that

purpose, and lastly proper balance has been incorporated.

18. The doctrine of presumption of constitutionality has its limitations

when we apply the test of proportionality. In a way the structured

proportionality places an obligation on the State at a higher level, as

it is a polycentric examination, both empirical and normative. While

55 [2019] 3 SCR 535 : (2019) 4 SCC 17.

56 [2019] 10 SCR 381 : (2019) 8 SCC 416.

57 R.K. Garg v. Union of India and Others, (1981) 4 SCC 675.

58 Ibid. See also Bhavesh D. Parish and Others v. Union of India and Others, (2000) 5 SCC 471, and

Directorate General of Foreign Trade and Others v. Kanak Exports and Another, [2015] 15 SCR 287 :

(2016) 2 SCC 226.

580 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

the courts do not pass a value judgment on contested questions of

policy, and give weight and deference to the government decision

by acknowledging the legislature’s expertise to determine complex

factual issues, the proportionality test is not based on preconceived

notion or presumption. The standard of proof is a civil standard or a

balance of probabilities;59 where scientific or social science evidence

is available, it is examined; and where such evidence is inconclusive

or does not exist and cannot be developed, reason and logic may

suffice.60

19. The right to vote is a constitutional and statutory right,61 grounded in

Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, as the casting of a vote amounts

to expression of an opinion by the voter.62 The citizens’ right to know

stems from this very right, as meaningfully exercising choice by

voting requires information. Representatives elected as a result of the

votes cast in their favour, enact new, and amend existing laws, and

when in power, take policy decisions. Access to information which

can materially shape the citizens’ choice is necessary for them to

have a say in how their lives are affected. Thus, the right to know

is paramount for free and fair elections and democracy.

20. The decisions in Association for Democratic Reforms (supra) and

People’s Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL) (supra) should not be

read as restricting the right to know the antecedents of a candidate

contesting the elections.63 The political parties select candidates who

contest elections on the symbol allotted to the respective political

parties64. Upon nomination, the candidates enjoy the patronage of

the political parties, and are financed by them. The voters elect a

candidate with the objective that the candidate’s political party will

come to power and fulfil the promises.

59 R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103.

60 See Libman v. Quebec (A.G.),  [1997] 3 SCR 569;  RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney

General),  [1995] 3 SCR 199; Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (A.G.),  [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877;  R.

v. Sharpe,  [2001] 1 SCR 45;  Harper v. Canada (A.G.),  [2004] 1 SCR 827, at paragraph 77;  R. v.

Bryan, [2007] 1 SCR 527, at paragraphs 16-19, 29; Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada

(Attorney General), [2015] 1 SCR 3, at paragraphs 143-144.

61 Article 326, Constitution.

62 Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms and Another, [2002] 3 SCR 696 : (2002) 5 SCC

294, and People’s Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL) and Another v. Union of India and Another, [2003] 2

SCR 1136 : (2003) 4 SCC 399.

63 Ibid.

64 The Representation of the People Act, 1951 permits candidates not set up by a recognized political party,

that is independent candidates, to contest elections as well.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 581

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

21. The Hon’ble Chief Justice has referred to the Tenth Schedule of

the Constitution. The Schedule incorporates a provision for the

disqualification of candidates on the ground of defection, which

reflects the importance of political parties in our democracy. Section

77 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, requires monetary

limits to be prescribed for expenditures incurred by candidates.65 As

political parties are at the helm of the electoral process, including its

finances, the argument that the right of the voter does not extend to

knowing the funding of political parties and is restricted to antecedents

of candidates, will lead to an incongruity. I, respectfully, agree with

Hon’ble the Chief Justice, that denying voters the right to know the

details of funding of political parties would lead to a dichotomous

situation. The funding of political parties cannot be treated differently

from that of the candidates who contest elections.66

22. Democratic legitimacy is drawn not only from representative democracy

but also through the maintenance of an efficient participatory

democracy. In the absence of fair and effective participation of all

stakeholders, the notion of representation in a democracy would be

rendered hollow. In a democratic set-up, public participation is meant

to fulfil three functions; the epistemic function of ensuring reasonably

sound decisions,67 the ethical function of advancing mutual respect

among citizens, and the democratic function of promoting “an inclusive

process of collective choice”.68 James Fishkin lists five criteria which

define the quality of a deliberative process.69 These are:

¾ Information (the extent to which participants are given access

to accurate and reliable information);

65 Under Explanation 1 to Section 77 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the expenditure

incurred by ‘leaders of political parties’ on account of travel for propagating the programme of the political

party, is not deemed to be election expenditure.

66 See observations of this court in Kanwar Lal Gupta v. Amar Nath Chawla & Ors., [1975] 2 SCR 259 :

(1975) 3 SCC 646.

67 This function is elaborated as to “produce preferences, opinions, and decisions that are appropriately

informed by facts and logic and are the outcome of substantive and meaningful consideration of relevant

reasons(...). Because the topics of these deliberations are issues of common concern, epistemically

well-grounded preferences, opinions, and decisions must be informed by, and take into consideration,

the preferences and opinions of fellow citizens”, Jane Mansbridge and others, ‘A Systemic Approach to

Deliberative Democracy’ in John Parkinson and Jane Mansbridge (eds), Deliberative Systems (1st edn,

Cambridge University Press 2012) 11.

68 Ibid at 12.

69 James S Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation (Oxford

University Press 2011) 33– 34.

582 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

¾ Substantive balance (the extent to which arguments offered by

one side are answered by considerations offered by those who

hold other perspectives);

¾ Diversity (the extent to which major positions in the public are

represented by participants);

¾ Conscientiousness, (the degree to which participants sincerely

weigh the merits of the arguments); and

¾ Equal consideration (the extent to which arguments offered by

all participants are considered on its merits regardless of who

offered them).70

23. The State has contested the writ petitions primarily on three grounds:

(i) Donors of a political party often apprehend retribution from other

political parties or actors and thus their identities should remain

anonymous. The Bonds uphold the right to privacy of donors

by providing confidentiality. Further, donating money to one’s

preferred political party is a matter of self-expression by the

donor. Therefore, revealing the identity invades the informational

privacy of donors protected by the Constitution.71 The identity

of the donor can be revealed in exceptional cases, for instance

on directions of a competent court, or registration of a criminal

case by any law enforcement agency.72

(ii) The Scheme, by incentivising banking channels and providing

confidentiality, checks the use of black or unaccounted money

in political contributions.73

(iii) The Scheme is an improvement to the prior legal framework. It

has inbuilt safeguards such as compliance of donors with KYC

norms, bearer bonds having a limited validity of fifteen days

and recipients belonging to a recognised political party that

has secured more than 1% votes in the last general elections.

24. Hon’ble the Chief Justice has rejected the Union of India’s submissions

by applying the doctrine of proportionality. This is a principle applied

70 This is equally important from the perspective of the test of proportionality.

71 See K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. (9J) (Privacy), (2017) 10 SCC 1.

72 Paragraph 7(4) of the Scheme.

73 See Arun Jaitley, ‘Why Electoral Bonds Are Necessary’, Press Information Bureau, 2018.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 583

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

by courts when they exercise their power of judicial review in cases

involving a restriction on fundamental rights. It is applied to strike an

appropriate balance between the fundamental right and the pursued

purpose and objective of the restriction.

25. The test of proportionality comprises four steps:74

(i) The first step is to examine whether the act/measure restricting

the fundamental right has a legitimate aim (legitimate aim/

purpose).

(ii) The second step is to examine whether the restriction has

rational connection with the aim (rational connection).

(iii) The third step is to examine whether there should have been

a less restrictive alternate measure that is equally effective

(minimal impairment/necessity test).

(iv) The last stage is to strike an appropriate balance between the

fundamental right and the pursued public purpose (balancing

act).

26. In Modern Dental College & Research Centre and Others v.

State of Madhya Pradesh and Others,

75 this Court had applied

proportionality in its four-part doctrinal form76 as a standard for

reviewing right limitations in India. This test was modified in K.S.

Puttaswamy (Retired) and Anr. (Aadhar) v. Union of India and

Anr. (5J),77 where this Court adopted a more tempered and nuanced

approach.78 The Court, inter alia, imposed a stricter test for the third

and fourth prongs, namely necessity and balancing stages of the

test of proportionality, as reproduced below.

“155. ...In order to preserve a meaningful but not unduly

strict role for the necessity stage, Bilchitz proposes the

74 See Aharon Barak, “Proportionality – Constitutional Rights and their Limitations”, Cambridge University

Press, 2012.

75 [2016] 3 SCR 579 : (2016) 7 SCC 353.

76 In Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha and Another v. State of Gujarat, (2020) 10 SCC 459, the Court added fifth

prong to proportionality test. It stipulated that the state should provide sufficient safeguards against the

abuse of such restriction. This was relied upon in Ramesh Chandra Sharma and Others v. State of U.P.

and Others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 162.

77 [2018] 8 SCR 1 : (2019) 1 SCC 1.

78 See David Bilchitz, “Necessity and Proportionality: Towards a Balance Approach?“, (Hart Publishing,

Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2016). Also see Aparna Chandra, “Proportionality: A Bridge to Nowhere?”,

(Oxford Human Rights Journal 2020).

584 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

following inquiry. First, a range of possible alternatives

to the measure employed by the Government must be

identified. Secondly, the effectiveness of these measures

must be determined individually; the test here is not whether

each respective measure realises the governmental

objective to the same extent, but rather whether it realises

it in a “real and substantial manner”. Thirdly, the impact

of the respective measures on the right at stake must be

determined. Finally, an overall judgment must be made as

to whether in light of the findings of the previous steps, there

exists an alternative which is preferable; and this judgment

will go beyond the strict means-ends assessment favoured

by Grimm and the German version of the proportionality

test; it will also require a form of balancing to be carried

out at the necessity stage.

156. Insofar as second problem in German test is

concerned, it can be taken care of by avoiding “ad hoc

balancing” and instead proceeding on some “bright-line

rules” i.e. by doing the act of balancing on the basis of

some established rule or by creating a sound rule... 

xx xx xx

158. ...This Court, in its earlier judgments, applied German

approach while applying proportionality test to the case at

hand. We would like to proceed on that very basis which,

however, is tempered with more nuanced approach as

suggested by Bilchitz. This, in fact, is the amalgam of

German and Canadian approach. We feel that the stages,

as mentioned in Modern Dental College & Research Centre

and recapitulated above, would be the safe method in

undertaking this exercise, with focus on the parameters as

suggested by Bilchitz, as this projects an ideal approach

that need to be adopted.”

27. The said test was also referred to in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union

of India and Others,

79 with the observation that the principle of

proportionality is inherently embedded in the Constitution under

79 [2020] 1 SCR 812 : (2020) 3 SCC 637.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 585

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

the doctrine of reasonable restriction. This means that limitations

imposed on a right should not be arbitrary or of excessive nature

beyond what is required in the interest of public. This judgment

thereupon references works of scholars/jurists who have argued that

if the necessity prong of the proportionality test is applied strictly,

legislations and policies, no matter how well intended, would fail the

proportionality test even if any other slightly less drastic measure

exists.80 Thereupon, the Court accepted the suggestion in favour of

a moderate interpretation of the necessity test. Necessity involves a

process of reasoning designed to ensure that only measures with a

strong relationship to the objective they seek to achieve can justify

an invasion of fundamental rights. The process thus requires a court

to reason through the various stages of moderate interpretation of

necessity in the following manner:

“(MN1) All feasible alternatives need to be identified, with

courts being explicit as to criteria of feasibility;

(MN2) The relationship between the government measure

under consideration, the alternatives identified in MN1 and

the objective sought to be achieved must be determined.

An attempt must be made to retain only those alternatives

to the measure that realise the objective in a real and

substantial manner;

(MN3) The differing impact of the measure and the

alternatives (identified in MN2) upon fundamental rights

must be determined, with it being recognised that this

requires a recognition of approximate impact; and

(MN4) Given the findings in MN2 and MN3, an overall

comparison (and balancing exercise) must be undertaken

between the measure and the alternatives. A judgment

must be made whether the government measure is the

best of all feasible alternatives, considering both the

degree to which it realises the government objective

and the degree of impact upon fundamental rights (“the

comparative component”).

28. Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, as his Lordship then was, in K.S.

80 Anuradha Bhasin (supra) at paragraph 71.

586 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Puttaswamy (5J)(Aadhar) (supra), had observed that the objective

of the second prong of rational connection test is essential to the

test of proportionality.81 Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J. in his concurring

opinion in K.S. Puttaswamy (9J) (Privacy) (supra) had held that

actions not only should be sanctioned by law, but the proposed

actions must be necessary in a democratic society for a legitimate

aim. The extent of interference must be proportionate to the need for

such interference and there must be procedural guarantees against

abuse of such interference.

29. The test of proportionality is now widely recognised and employed

by courts in various jurisdictions like Germany, Canada, SouthAfrica,

Australia and the United Kingdom.82 However, there isn’t uniformity

in how the test is applied or the method of using the last two prongs

in these jurisdictions.

30. The first two prongs of proportionality resemble a means-ends review

of the traditional reasonableness analysis, and they are applied

relatively consistently across jurisdictions. Courts first determine if the

ends of the restriction serve a legitimate purpose, and then assess

whether the proposed restriction is a suitable means for furthering the

same ends, meaning it has a rational connection with the purpose.

31. In the third prong, courts examine whether the restriction is necessary

to achieve the desired end. When assessing the necessity of the

measure, the courts consider whether a less intrusive alternative is

available to achieve the same ends, aiming for minimal impairment.

As elaborated above, this Court Anuradha Bhasin (supra), relying

on suggestions given by some jurists,83 emphasised the need to

employ a moderate interpretation of the necessity prong. To conclude

its findings on the necessity prong, this Court is inter alia required

to undertake an overall comparison between the measure and its

feasible alternatives.84

81 Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud was in minority in K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar) (supra), albeit his

observations on the objective of the second prong of rational connection are good and in consonance

with the law on the subject.

82 We will be referring to certain facets of the proportionality enquiry employed by these countries in our

judgment. The test is also employed in various other jurisdictions like Israel, New Zealand, and the

European Union.

83 See David Bilchitz at supra note 76.

84 In Anuradha Bhasin (supra), the Court stipulated the following requirement for a conclusion of findings

on the necessity prong: “…A judgment must be made whether the government measure is the best of all

feasible alternatives, considering both the degree to which it realises the government objective and the

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 587

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

32. We will now delve into the fourth prong, the balancing stage, in some

detail. This stage has been a matter of debate amongst jurists and

courts. Some jurists believe that balancing is ambiguous and valuebased.85 This stems from the premise of rule-based legal adjudication,

where courts determine entitlements rather than balancing interests.

However, proportionality is a standard-based review rather than a rulebased one. Given the diversity of factual scenarios, the balancing stage

enables judges to consider various factors by analysing them against the

standards proposed by the four prongs of proportionality. This ensures

that all aspects of a case are carefully weighed in decision-making.

This perspective finds support in the work of jurists who believe that

constitutional rights and restrictions/measures are both principles, and

thus they should be optimised/balanced to their fullest extent.86

33. While balancing is integral to the standard of proportionality, such

an exercise should be rooted in empirical data and evidence. In

most countries that adopt the proportionality test, the State places

on record empirical data as evidence supporting the enactment

and justification for the encroachment of rights.87 This is essential

because the proportionality enquiry necessitates objective evaluation

of conflicting values rather than relying on perceptions and biases.

Empirical deference is given to the legislature owing to their

institutional competence and expertise to determine complex factual

legislation and policies. However, factors like lack of parliamentary

deliberation and a failure to make relevant enquiries weigh in on

the court’s decision. In the absence of data and figures, there is

a lack of standards by which proportionality stricto sensu can be

degree of impact upon fundamental rights…”

85 See Jochen von Bernstroff, Proportionality Without Balancing: Why Judicial Ad Hoc Balancing is

Unnecessary and Potentially Detrimental to Realisation of Collective and Individual Self Determination,

Reasoning Rights – Comparative Judicial Engagement, (Ed. Liaora Lazarus); Bernhard Schlink,

‘Abwägung im Verfassungsrecht’, Duncker & Humblot, 1976, and Francisco J. Urbina, ‘Is It Really

That Easy? A Critique of Proportionality and Balancing as Reasoning’ Canadian Journal of Law and

Jurisprudence, 2014.

86 According to Robert Alexy, the ‘Law of Balancing’ is as follows: “…the greater the degree of nonsatisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, the greater must be the importance of satisfying the

other…” See Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Julian Rivers, trans. Oxford Univ. Press

2002).

87 For instance, in Canada, where the doctrine of proportionality is employed by courts, a cabinet directive

requires the standard to be incorporated into law-making. These guidelines stipulate that prior to

enactment of laws, the matter and its alternate solutions must be analysed, the relevant ministerial

department should engage in consultation with those who have an interest in the matter, and they should

analyse the impact of the proposed solution. See Cabinet Directive on Law-making in Guide to Making

Federal Acts and Regulations (2nd edn, Government of Canada).

588 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

determined. Nevertheless, many of the constitutional courts have

employed the balancing stage ‘normatively’88 by examining the

weight of the seriousness of the right infringement against the

urgency of the factors that justify it. Examination under the first three

stages requires the court to first examine scientific evidence, and

where such evidence is inconclusive or does not exist and cannot

be developed, reason and logic apply. We shall subsequently be

referring to the balancing prong during our application of the test

of proportionality.

34. In Germany, the courts enjoy a high judicial discretion. The parliament

and the judiciary in Germany have the same goal, that is, to realise the

values of the German Constitution.89 Canadian courts, some believe,

in practice give wider discretion to the legislature when a restriction

is backed by sufficient data and evidence.90 The constitutional court

in South Africa, as per some jurists, collectively applies the four

prongs of proportionality instead of a structured application.91 While

proportionality is the predominant doctrine in Australia, an alternate

calibrated scrutiny test is applied by a few judges.92 It is based on

the premise that a contextual, instead of broad standard of review,

is required to be adopted for constitutional adjudication.

35. Findings of empirical legal studies provide a more solid foundation for

normative reasoning93 and enhance understanding of the relationship

between means and ends.94 In our view, proportionality analyses

would be more accurate when empirical inquiries on causal relations

between a legislative measure under review and the ends of such a

measure are considered. It also leads to better and more democratic

governance. While one cannot jump from “is” to “ought”, to reach an

“ought” conclusion, one has to rely on accurate knowledge of “is”,

for “is” and “ought” to be united.95 While we emphasise the need

88 The first and second steps, legitimate aim and rational connection prong, and to some extent necessity

prong, are factual.

89 See Article 1 and 20, Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.

90 Niels Petersen, ‘Proportionality and judicial Activism: Fundamental Rights Adjudication in Canada,

Germany and South Africa, (CUP 2017).

91 Ibid.

92 See Annexure A.

93 See Yun-chien Chand & Peng-Hsiang Wang, The Empirical Foundation of Normative Arguments in Legal

Reasoning (Univ. Chicago Coase-Sandor Inst. For L. & Econ., Res. Paper No. 745, 2016).

94 Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, An Introduction to Empirical Legal Research 6 (2014).

95 See Joshua B. Fischman, Reuniting “Is” and “Ought” in Empirical Legal Scholarship, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 589

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

of addressing the quantitative/empirical deficit for a contextual and

holistic balancing analysis, the pitfalls of selective data sharing must

be kept in mind. After all, if a measure becomes a target, it ceases

to be a good measure.96

36. To avoid this judgment from becoming complex, I have enclosed as

an annexure a chart giving different viewpoints on the doctrine of

proportionality as a test for judicial review exercised by the courts to

test the validity of the legislation. The same is enclosed asAnnexure-A

to this judgment.97

37. When we turn to the reply or the defence of the Union of India in

the present case, which we have referred to above,98 the matter of

concern is the first submission made regarding the purpose and

rationale of the Scheme and amendments to the Finance Act of

2017. Lest remains any doubt, I would like to specifically quote from

the transcript of hearing dated 01.11.2023, where on behalf of the

Union of India it was submitted:

“..the bottom line is this. What was really found? That

what is the reason, why a person who contributes to a

political party chooses the mode of unclean money as

a payment mode and Your Lordships would immediately

agree with me if we go by the practicalities of life. What

happens is, suppose one state is going for an election.

There are two parties, there are multiple parties, but

by and large there are two parties which go neck to

neck. Suppose I am a contractor. I’m not a company or

anything. I am a contractor and I’m supposed to give

my political contribution to Party A and Party B or Party

A or Party B, as the case may be. But the fear was if

I give by way of accounted money or by clean money,

by way of cheque, it would be easily identifiable. If I

give to party A and Party B forms the Government, I

would be facing victimization and retribution and vice

117 (2013).

96 Marilyn Strathern, Improving Ratings: Audit in the British University System, European review, Vol. 5

Issue 3, pp. 305-321 (1997).

97 AnnexureAshould not be read as an opinion of this Court or even as obiter dicta expressed by this Court.

The Annexure is only for the purpose of pointing out different viewpoints on the test of proportionality.

98 See paragraph 23 of this judgment.

590 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

versa. If I give money to Party B and Party A continues

to be in Government, then I would be facing retribution

or victimization. Therefore, the safest course was to

pay by cash, so that none of the parties know what I

paid to which party, and both parties are happy that I

have paid something. So, that, the payment by cash

ensured confidentiality. Both parties would say that

one party would be given 100 crores, one party would

be given 40 crores, depending upon my assessment of

their winnability. But both would not know who is paid

what. My Lord, sometimes what used to happen is in

my business, I get only clean money or substantial

part of the clean money, but practicalities require that I

contribute to the political parties, and practicality again

requires that I contribute with a degree of confidentiality

so that I am not victimized in the future. And therefore

clean money used to be converted into unclean money.

White money is being converted into black money so

that it can be paid, according to them anonymously, and

according to me with confidentiality. And this is disastrous

for the economy when white money is converted into

black money.”

While introducing the Finance Act of 2017, the then Finance Minister

had elucidated that the main purpose of the Scheme was to curb the

flow of black money in electoral finance.99 This, it is stated, could be

achieved only if information about political donations and the donor

were kept confidential.100 It was believed that this would incentivise

donations to political parties through banking channels.

38. I am of the opinion that retribution, victimisation or retaliation cannot

by any stretch be treated as a legitimate aim. This will not satisfy the

legitimate purpose prong of the proportionality test. Neither is the

Scheme nor the amendments to the Finance Act, 2017, rationally

connected to the fulfilment of that purpose, namely, to counter

retribution, victimisation or retaliation in political donations. In our

opinion, it will also not satisfy the necessity stage of the proportionality

even if we have to ignore the balancing stage.

99 See Speech of Arun Jaitley, Minister of Finance, at paragraph 165, Budget 2017-18.

100 Ibid.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 591

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

39. Retribution, victimisation or retaliation against any donor exercising

their choice to donate to a political party is an abuse of law and

power. This has to be checked and corrected. As it is a wrong, the

wrong itself cannot be a justification or a purpose. The argument,

therefore, suffers on the grounds of inconsistency and coherence

as it seeks to perpetuate and accept the wrong rather than deal

with the malady and correct it. The inconsistency is also apparent

as the change in law, by giving a cloak of secrecy, leads to severe

restriction and curtailment of the collective’s right to information and

the right to know, which is a check and counters cases of retribution,

victimisation and retaliation. Transparency and not secrecy is the

cure and antidote.

40. Similarly, the second argument that the donor may like to keep his

identity anonymous is a mere ipse dixit assumption. The plea of

infringement of the right to privacy has no application at all if the

donor makes the contribution, that too through a banking channel, to

a political party. It is the transaction between the donor and the third

person. The fact that donation has been made to a political party

has to be specified and is not left hidden and concealed.101 What

is not revealed is the quantum of the contribution and the political

party to whom the contribution is made. Further, when a donor goes

to purchase a Bond, he has to provide full particulars and fulfil the

KYC norms of the bank.102 His identity is then asymmetrically known

to the person and the officers of the bank from where the Bond is

purchased.103 Similarly, the officers in the branch of the authorised

bank104 where the political party has an account and encashes the

Bond are known to the officers in the said bank.105

41. The argument raised by the Union of India that details can be

revealed when an order is passed by a court or when it is required for

investigation pursuant to registration of a criminal case106 overlooks the

fact that it is their stand that the identities of the contributors/donors

101 Section 182(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 requires companies to mention the total political contributions

made.

102 Paragraph 4 of the Scheme.

103 In terms of paragraph 2(b) of the Scheme, only State Bank of India and its specified branches are

allowed to issue Bonds.

104 Ibid.

105 Paragraph 3(4) of the Scheme.

106 See paragraph 7(4) of the Scheme.

592 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

should be concealed because of fear of retaliation, victimisation and

reprisal. That fear would still exist as the identity of the purchaser

of the Bond can always be revealed upon registration of a criminal

case or by an order/direction of the court. Thus, the fear of reprisal

and vindictiveness does not evaporate. The so-called protection

exists only on paper but in practical terms is not a good safeguard

even if we accept that the purpose is legitimate. It fails the rational

nexus prong.

42. The fear of the identities of donors being revealed exists in another

manner. Under the Scheme, political parties in power may have

asymmetric access to information with the authorised bank. They

also retain the ability to use their power and authority of investigation

to compel the revelation of Bond related information.107 Thus, the

entire objective of the Scheme is contradictory and inconsistent.

43. Further, it is the case of the Union of India that parties in power at

the Centre and State are the recipients of the highest amounts of

donations through Bonds. If that is the case, the argument of retribution,

victimisation and retaliation is tempered and loses much of its force.108

44. The rational connection test fails since the purpose of curtailing

black or unaccounted-for money in the electoral process has no

connection or relationship with the concealment of the identity of the

donor. Payment through banking channels is easy and an existing

antidote. On the other hand, obfuscation of the details may lead to

unaccounted and laundered money getting legitimised.

45. The RBI had objected to the Scheme since the Bonds could change

hands after they have been issued. There is no check for the same

as the purchaser who has completed the KYC, whose identity is

thereupon completely concealed, may not be the actual contributor/

donor. In fact, the Scheme may enable the actual contributor/donor

to not leave any traceability or money trail.

107 Ibid.

108 In Brown v. Socialist Workers Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982), the Supreme Court of the United States of

America held that disclosure laws requiring the reporting of names and addresses of every campaign

contributor could be waived when “specific evidence of hostility, threats, harassment and reprisals”

existed, thus adopting a case-by-case approach. Marshall J., delivering the opinion of the court observed

that the Socialist Workers Party, a minor political party had historically been the object of harassment by

government officials and private parties. Therefore, the court held that the government was prohibited

from compelling disclosures from the said party, a minor political party, since there existed a reasonable

probability that the compelled disclosures would subject their donors, if identified, to threats, harassment

or reprisals.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 593

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

46. Money laundering can be undertaken in diverse ways. Political

contributions for a quid pro quo may amount to money laundering,

as defined under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002109.

The Financial Action Task Force110 has observed that the signatory

States are required to check money laundering on account of

contributions made to political parties.111 Article 7(3) of the United

Nations Convention against Corruption, 2003 mandates the state

parties to enhance transparency in political funding of the candidates

and parties.112 The said convention is signed and ratified by India.

By ensuring anonymity, the policy ensures that the money laundered

on account of quid pro quo or illegal connection escapes eyeballs

of the public.

47. The economic policies of the government have an impact on

business and commerce. Political pressure groups promote different

agendas, including perspectives on economic policies. As long as

these pressure groups put forward their perspective with evidence

and data, there should not be any objection even if they interact with

elected representatives. The position would be different if monetary

contributions to political parties were made as a quid pro quo to

secure a favourable economic policy. This would be an offence

under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and also under the

PMLA. Such offences when committed by political parties in power

can never see the light of the day if secrecy and anonymity of the

donor is maintained.

48. In view of the aforesaid observations, the argument raised by the

petitioners that there is no rational connection between the measure

and the purpose, which is also illegitimate, has merit and should be

accepted.

49. On the question of alternative measures, that is the necessity prong

of the proportionality test, it is accepted that post the amendments

brought about by the Finance Act, 2017, political parties cannot

receive donations in cash for amounts above Rs.2,000/-. However,

political parties do not have to record the details and particulars of

109 For short, “PMLA”.

110 For short, “FATF”.

111 Paragraph 3, Section B, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of

Terrorism and Proliferation – The FATF Recommendations, 2012.

112 See also United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/S-32/1, 02.06.2021, para 12.

594 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

donations received for amounts less than Rs.20,000/-.113 Therefore,

the reduction of the upper limit of cash donations from Rs.20,000/-

to Rs.2,000/- serves no purpose. It is open to the political parties to

bifurcate the law and camouflage larger donations in smaller stacks.

There is no way or method to verify the donor if the amount shown

in the books of the political party is less than Rs.2,000/-.

50. It is an accepted position that the Electoral Trust Scheme114 was

introduced in 2013 to ensure the secrecy of contributors. As per

the Trust Scheme, contributions could be made by a person or

body corporate to the trust. The trust would thereafter transfer the

amount to the political party. The trust is, therefore, treated as the

contributor to the political party. Interestingly, it is the ECI that had

issued guidelines dated 06.06.2014 whereby the trusts were required

to specify and give full particulars to the ECI of the depositors with

the trust and amounts which were subsequently transferred as a

contribution to the political party. The guidelines were issued by the

ECI to ensure transparency and openness in the electoral process.115

51. The trust can have multiple donors. Similarly, contributions are made

by the trust to multiple political parties. The disclosure requirements

provided in ECI’s guidelines dated 06.06.2014 only impose disclosure

requirements at the inflow and outflow points of the trust’s donations,

that is, the trust is required to provide particulars of its depositors

and the amounts donated to political parties, including the names of

the political parties. Thus, the Trust Scheme protects the anonymity

of the donors vis-à-vis their contributions to the political party. When

we apply the necessity test propounded in Anuradha Bhasin

(supra)116, the Trust Scheme achieves the objective of the Union of

113 This is inapplicable to Bonds under proviso (b) to Section 13A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

114 For short, “Trust Scheme”.

115 Similarly, early campaign finance laws in the United Kingdom permitted trusts to donate to political

parties. It came to be disallowed since it was contrary to openness and accountability. See Suchindran

Bhaskar Narayan and Lalit Panda, Money and Elections – Necessary Reforms in Electoral Finance,

Vidhi 2018 at p. 19. See also Lord Neill of Bladen, QC, ‘Fifth Report of the Committee on Standards in

Public Life: The Funding of Political Parties in the United Kingdom’, 1998 pp 61-62.

116 As elaborated in paragraph 27] of this judgement, Anuradha Bhasin (supra) proposes a four sub-pronged

inquiry at the necessity stage of proportionality, that is (MN1) to (MN4). To arrive at the conclusion of

the necessity inquiry, this Court has proposed at (MN4) that: “…an overall comparison (and balancing

exercise) must be undertaken between the measure and the alternatives. A judgment must be made

whether the government measure is the best of all feasible alternatives, considering both the degree

to which it realises the government objective and the degree of impact upon fundamental rights (the

comparative component).”

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 595

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

India in a real and substantial manner and is also a less restrictive

alternate measure in view of the disclosure requirements, viz. the

right to know of voters. The Trust Scheme is in force and is a result

of the legislative process. In a comparison of limited alternatives, it

is a measure that best realises the objective of the Union of India

in a real and substantial manner without significantly impacting the

fundamental right of the voter to know. The ECI, if required, can

suitably modify the guidelines dated 06.06.2014.

52. I would now come to the fourth prong. I would begin by first referring

to the judgment cited by Hon’ble the Chief Justice in the case

of Campbell v. MGM Limited117. This judgment adopts double

proportionality standard to adequately balance two conflicting

fundamental rights. Double proportionality has been distinguished

from the single proportionality standard in paragraph 152 of the

judgment authored by Hon’ble the Chief Justice. Campbell (supra)

states that the single proportionality test and the principle of

reasonableness are applied to determine whether a private right claim

offers sufficient justification for the interference with the fundamental

rights. However, this test may not apply when two fundamental rights

are at conflict and one has to balance the application of one right

and restriction of the other.

53. In Campbell (supra), Baroness Hale has suggested a three-step

approach to balance conflicting fundamental rights, when two rights

are in play. The first step is to analyse the comparative importance

of the fundamental rights being claimed in the particular case. In the

second step, the court should consider the justification for interfering

with or restricting each of these rights. The third step requires the

application of a proportionality standard to both these rights.

54. In a subsequent decision, the House of Lords (Lord Steyn) in In

re.S118, distilled four principles to resolve the question of conflict of

rights as under:

“17. (...) First, neither article has as such precedence

over the other. Secondly, where the values under the two

articles are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative

importance of the specific rights being claimed in the

117 [2004] 2 AC 457.

118 [2005] 1 AC 593.

596 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

individual case is necessary. Thirdly, the justifications for

interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into

account. Finally, the proportionality test must be applied to

each. For convenience I will call this the ultimate balancing

test. This is how I will approach the present case.”

55. The fourth principle, that is, the ultimate balancing test, was elaborated

upon by Sir Mark Potter in In Re. W119 in the following terms:

“53. (...) each Article propounds a fundamental right which

there is a pressing social need to protect. Equally, each

Article qualifies the right it propounds so far as it may be

lawful, necessary and proportionate to do so in order to

accommodate the other. The exercise to be performed

is one of parallel analysis in which the starting point is

presumptive parity, in that neither Article has precedence

over or “trumps” the other. The exercise of parallel analysis

requires the court to examine the justification for interfering

with each right and the issue of proportionality is to be

considered in respect of each. It is not a mechanical

exercise to be decided upon the basis of rival generalities.

An intense focus on the comparative importance of the

specific rights being claimed in the individual case is

necessary before the ultimate balancing test in terms of

proportionality is carried out.”

56. Fundamental rights are not absolute, legislations/policies restricting

the rights may be enacted in accordance with the scheme of the

Constitution. However, it is now well settled that the provisions of

fundamentalrights inPart III of the Constitution are not independent silos

and have to be read together as complementary rights.120 Therefore, the

thread of reasonableness applies to all such restrictions.121 Secondly,

Article 14, as observed by the Hon’ble Chief Justice in his judgment122

includes the facet of formal equality and substantive equality. Thus,

the principle ‘equal protection of law’ requires the legislature and the

executive to achieve factual equality. This principle can be extended

119 [2005] EWHC 1564 (Fam).

120 Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248; K.S. Puttaswamy (9J) (Privacy) (supra),

and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Another, (1978) 1 SCC 248.

121 The test of single proportionality will apply.

122 See paragraphs 191 to 195 of the Hon’ble Chief Justice’s judgment.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 597

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

to any restriction on fundamental rights which must be reasonable

to the identified degree of harm. If the restriction is unreasonable,

unjust or arbitrary, then the law should be struck down. Further, it is

for the legislature to identify the degree of harm. I have referred to the

said observation in the context that there appears to be a divergent

opinion in K.S. Puttaswamy (9-J) (Privacy) (supra) as to whether

right of privacy is an essential component for effective fulfilment of

all fundamental rights or can be held to be a part or a component of

Article 21 and Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

57. When we apply the fourth prong, that is the balancing prong of

proportionality, I have no hesitation or doubt, given the findings

recorded above, that the Scheme falls foul and negates and

overwhelmingly disavows and annuls the voters right in an electoral

process as neither the right of privacy nor the purpose of incentivising

donations to political parties through banking channels, justify the

infringement of the right to voters. The voters right to know and

access to information is far too important in a democratic set-up so

as to curtail and deny ‘essential’ information on the pretext of privacy

and the desire to check the flow of unaccounted for money to the

political parties. While secret ballots are integral to fostering free

and fair elections, transparency—not secrecy—in funding of political

parties is a prerequisite for free and fair elections. The confidentiality

of the voting booth does not extend to the anonymity in contributions

to political parties.

58. In K.S. Puttasamy (9-J) (Privacy) (supra), all opinions accept that

the right to privacy has to be tested and is not absolute. The right

to privacy must yield in given circumstances when dissemination

of information is legitimate and required in state or public interest.

Therefore, the right to privacy is to be applied on balancing the

said right with social or public interest. The reasonableness of

the restriction should not outweigh the particular aspect of privacy

claimed.123 Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J., in his opinion in K.S. Puttasamy

(9-J) (Privacy) (supra), has said that restriction on right to privacy

may be justifiable and is subject to the principle of proportionality

when considering the right to privacy in relation to its function in

society.

123 While giving the aforesaid finding, we are applying the single proportionality test.

598 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

59. As observed above, the right to privacy operates in the personal

realm, but as the person moves into communal relations and activities

such as business and social interaction, the scope of personal space

shrinks contextually.124 In this context, the High Court of South Africa

in My Vote Counts NPC v. President of the Republic of South

Africa and Ors.125 observes that:

“(...) given the public nature of political parties and the

fact that the private funds they receive have a distinctly

public purpose, their rights to privacy can justifiably be

attenuated. The same principles must, as a necessary

corollary, apply to their donors. (...)”

(emphasis supplied)

60. The great underlying principle of the Constitution is that rights of

individuals in a democratic set-up is sufficiently secured by ensuring

each a share in political power.126 This right gets affected when a

few make large political donations to secure selective access to

those in power. We have already commented on pressure groups

that exert such persuasion, within the boundaries of law. However,

when money is exchanged as quid pro quo then the line between

persuasion and corruption gets blurred.

61. It is in this context that the High Court ofAustralia in Jeffery Raymond

McCloy and Others v. State of New South Wales and Another127,

observes that corruption can be of different kinds. When a wealthy

donor makes contribution to a political party in return of a benefit, it

is described as quid pro quo corruption. More subtle corruption arises

when those in power decide issues not on merits or the desires of

their constituencies, but according to the wishes and desires of those

who make large contributions. This kind of corruption is described as

‘clientelism’. This can arise from the dependence128 on the financial

support of a wealthy patron to a degree that it compromises the

124 See Bernstein and Ors. v. Bester NO and Others, (1996) ZACC 2, para 67.

125 My Vote Counts NPC v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Ors. (2017) ZAWCHC 105, para

67.

126 Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, p.329 (1902).

127 (2015) HCA 34.

128 James Madison in the Federalist Paper No. 52 notes that a government must “depend on the people

alone”. This condition, according to Professor Lawrence Lessig, has two elements – first, it identifies a

proper dependency (“on the people”) and second, it describes that dependence as exclusive (“alone”).

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 599

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

expectation, fundamental to representative democracy, that public

power will be exercised in public interest. This affects the vitality as

well as integrity of the political branches of government. While quid

pro quo and clientelistic corruption erodes quality and integrity of

government decision making, the power of money may also pose

threat to the electoral process itself. This phenomenon is referred

to as ‘war-chest’ corruption.129

62. In Jefferey Raymond (supra), the High Court of Australia had

referred to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Harper

v. Canada (Attorney General)130, which upheld the legislative

restriction on electoral advertising. In Harper (supra), the Supreme

Court of Canada has held that the State can provide a voice to

those who otherwise might not be heard and the State can also

restrict voices that dominate political discourse so that others can

be heard as well.

63. The Supreme Court of the United States in Buckley v. R Valeo131

has commented on the concern of quid pro quo arrangements and

its dangers to a fair and effective government. Improper influence

erodes and harms the confidence in the system of representative

government. Contrastingly, disclosure provides the electorate with

information as to where the political campaign money comes from

and how it is spent. This helps and aides the voter in evaluating

those contesting elections. It allows the voter to identify interests

which candidates are most likely to be responsive to, thereby

facilitating prediction of future performance in office. Secondly,

it checks actual corruption and helps avoid the appearance of

corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to

the light of publicity. Relying upon Grosjean v. American Press

Co.132, it holds that informed public opinion is the most potent of all

restraints upon misgovernment. Thirdly, record keeping, reporting

and disclosure are essential means of gathering data necessary to

detect violations of contribution limitations.

129 See Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982), where the

petitioners submitted: “...substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which

go with the corporate form of organization should not be converted into political “war chests” which could

be used to incur political debts from legislators who are aided by the contributions...”

130 [2004] 1 SCR 827.

131 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

132 297 U.S. 233 (1936).

600 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

64. In Nixon, Attorney General of Missouri, et al v. Shrink Missouri

Government PAC et al,

133 the Supreme Court of the United States

observes that large contributions given to secure a political quid pro

quo undermines the system of representative democracy. It stems

public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime

of large contributions. This effects the integrity of the electoral process

not only in the form of corruption or quid pro quo arrangements, but

also extending to the broader threat of the beneficiary being too

compliant with the wishes of large contributors.

65. Recently, a five judge Constitution Bench of this Court in Anoop

Baranwal v. Union of India134 has highlighted the importance of

purity of electoral process in the following words:

“215. …Without attaining power, men organised as political

parties cannot achieve their goals. Power becomes,

therefore, a means to an end. The goal can only be to govern

so that the lofty aims enshrined in the directive principles

are achieved while observing the fundamental rights as

also the mandate of all the laws. What is contemplated is

a lawful Government. So far so good. What, however, is

disturbing and forms as we understand the substratum of

the complaints of the petitioner is the pollution of the stream

or the sullying of the electoral process which precedes the

gaining of power. Can ends justify the means?

216.  There can be no doubt that the strength of a

democracy and its credibility, and therefore, its enduring

nature must depend upon the means employed to gain

power being as fair as the conduct of the Government after

the assumption of power by it. The assumption of power

itself through the electoral process in the democracy cannot

and should not be perceived as an end. The end at any

rate cannot justify the means. The means to gain power

in a democracy must remain wholly pure and abide by

the Constitution and the laws. An unrelenting abuse of the

electoral process over a period of time is the surest way

to the grave of the democracy. Democracy can succeed

133 528 U.S. 377 (2000).

134 [2023] 9 SCR 1 : (2023) 6 SCC 161.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 601

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

only insofar as all stakeholders uncompromisingly work at

it and the most important aspect of democracy is the very

process, the electoral process, the purity of which alone

will truly reflect the will of the people so that the fruits of

democracy are truly reaped.

217. The essential hallmark of a genuine democracy is

the transformation of the “Ruled” into a citizenry clothed

with rights which in the case of the Indian Constitution

also consist of fundamental rights, which are also being

freely exercised and the concomitant and radical change

of the ruler from an “Emperor” to a public servant. With

the accumulation of wealth and emergence of near

monopolies or duopolies and the rise of certain sections

in the Media, the propensity for the electoral process to

be afflicted with the vice of wholly unfair means being

overlooked by those who are the guardians of the rights

of the citizenry as declared by this Court would spell

disastrous consequences.”

66. The Law Commission of India in its 255th Report noted the concern

of financial superiority translating into electoral advantage.135 It was

observed that lobbying and capture give undue importance to big

donors and certain interest groups, at the expense of the ordinary

citizen, violating “the right of equal participation of each citizen in the

polity.”136 While noting the candidate-party dichotomy in the regulations

under Section 77 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,

the Law Commission of India recommends to require candidates

to maintain an account of contributions received from their political

party (not in cash) or any other permissible donor.

67. At this stage, we would like to refer to the data as available on the

website of the ECI and the data submitted by the petitioners for a

limited purpose and objective to support our reasoning while applying

balancing. We have not stricto sensu applied proportionality as the

data is not sufficient for us. I also clarify that we have not opened

the sealed envelope given by the ECI pursuant to the directions of

this Court dated 02.11.2023.

135 Law Commission of India, Electoral Reforms, Report No. 255, March 2015.

136 R.C.Poudyal v. Union of India and Others, [1993] 1 SCR 891 : (1994) Supp 1 SCC 324.

602 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

68. An analysis of the annual audit reports of political parties from 2017-

18 to 2022-23 showcases party-wise donations received through the

Bonds as reproduced below:

PARTY-WISE DONATION THROUGH BONDS (IN RS. CR)

Party 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23

BJP 210.00 1,450.890 2,555.000 22.385 1,033.7000 1294.1499

INC 5.00 383.260 317.861 10.075 236.0995 171.0200

AITC 0.00 97.280 100.4646 42.000 528.1430 325.1000

NCP 0.00 29.250 20.500 0.000 14.0000 --

TRS 0.00 141.500 89.153 0.000 153.0000 --

TDP 0.00 27.500 81.600 0.000 3.5000 34.0000

YSR-C 0.00 99.840 74.350 96.250 60.0000 52.0000

BJD 0.00 213.500 50.500 67.000 291.0000 152.0000

DMK 0.00 0.000 45.500 80.000 306.0000 185.0000

SHS 0.00 60.400 40.980 0.000 -- --

AAP* 0.00 -- 17.765 5.950 25.1200 45.4500

JDU 0.00 0.000 13.000 1.400 10.0000 --

SP 0.00 0.000 10.840 0.000 3.2100 0.0000

JDS 6.03 35.250 7.500 0.000 0.0000 --

SAD 0.00 0.000 6.760 0.000 0.5000 0.0000

AIADMK 0.00 0.000 6.050 0.000 0.0000 0.0000

RJD 0.00 0.000 2.500 0.000 0.0000 --

JMM 0.00 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.0000 --

SDF 0.00 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000

MGP 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.5500 --

TOTAL 221.03 2,539.170 3,441.324 325.060 2,664.8225 --

Asterisk (*) means that the AAP had declared their donations through Bonds/

Electoral Trust, but the party had not declared a separate amount for Bonds.

69. It is clear from the available data that majority of contribution through

Bonds has gone to political parties which are ruling parties in the

Centre and the States. There has also been a substantial increase

in contribution/donation through Bonds.

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 603

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

70. Petitioner no. 1 – Association for Democratic Reforms has submitted

the following table which showcases party-wise donation by corporate

houses to national parties:

PARTY-WISE CORPORATE DONATION

(NATIONAL PARTIES) (IN RS. Cr)

Party 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 Total

BJP 515.500 400.200 698.140 720.407 416.794 548.808 3,299.8500

INC 36.060 19.298 127.602 133.040 35.890 54.567 406.4570

NCP 6.100 1.637 11.345 57.086 18.150 15.280 109.5980

CPI(M) 3.560 0.872 1.187 6.917 9.815 6.811 29.1615

AITC 2.030 0.000 42.986 4.500 0.000 0.250 49.7660

CPI 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0055

BSP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000

TOTAL 563.253 422.010 881.260 921.950 480.649 625.716 3,894.8380

As per the said table, the data shows that the party-wise donation

by the corporate houses has been more or less stagnant from the

years 2016-17 to 2021-22. We do not have the comments or official

details in this regard from the Union of India or the ECI. The figures

support our conclusion, but I would not, without certainty, base my

analysis on these figures. However, we do have data of denomination/

sale of Bonds, as submitted by the petitioners, during the 27 phases

from March 2018 to July 2023, which is as under:

DENOMINATION WISE SALE OF EB DURING 27 PHASES

(MARCH, 2018-JULY, 2023)

Denomination No. of Electoral

Bonds Sold

Amount

(In Rupees)

1 Crore 12,999

(54.13%)

12,999 Crore

(94.25%)

10 Lakhs 7,618

(31.72%)

761.80 Crore

(5.52%)

1 Lakh 3,088

(12.86%)

30.88 Crore

(0.22%)

10 Thousand 208

(0.86%)

20.80 Lakh

(0.001%)

1 Thousand 99

(0.41%) 99,000

Total 24,012 13791.8979 Cr.

604 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Analysis of this data shows that more than 50% of the Bonds in

number, and 94% of the Bonds in value terms were for Rs.1 crore.

This supports our reasoning and conclusion on the application of

the doctrine of proportionality. This is indicative of the quantum of

corporate funding through the anonymous Bonds.

71. The share of income from unknown sources for national parties

rose from 66% during the years 2014-15 to 2016-17 to 72% during

the years 2018-19 to 2021-22. Between the years 2019-20 to

2021-22 the Bond income has been 81% of the total unknown

income of national parties. The total unknown income, that is

donations made under Rs.20,000/-, sale of coupons etc. has not

shown ebbing and has substantially increased from Rs.2,550

crores during the years 2014-15 to 2016-17 to Rs.8,489 crores

during the years 2018-19 to 2021-22. To this we can add total

income of the national political parties without other known

sources, which has increased from Rs.3,864 crores during the

years 2014-15 to 2016-17 to Rs.11,829 crores during the years

2018-19 to 2021-22. The Bonds income between the years 2018-

19 to 2021-22 constitutes 58% of the total income of the national

political parties.137

72. Based on the analysis of the data currently available to us, along

with our previous observation asserting that voters’ right to know

supersedes anonymity in political party funding, I arrive at the

conclusion that the Scheme fails to meet the balancing prong of the

proportionality test. However, I would like to reiterate that I have not

applied proportionality stricto sensu due to the limited availability of

data and evidence.

73. I respectfully agree with the reasoning and the finding recorded by

Hon’ble the Chief Justice, holding that the amendment to Section

182 of the Companies Act, deleting the first proviso thereunder

should be struck down. While doing so, I would rather apply the

principle of proportionality which, in my opinion, would subsume

the test of manifest arbitrariness.138 In addition, the claim of privacy

137 “Parties’ unknown income rise despite electoral bonds”, The Hindu, 02.11.2023, pg.7.

138 The proportionality test, as adopted and applied by us, essentially checks, invalidates and does not

condone manifest arbitrariness. Proportionality analysis recognizes the thread of reasonableness which

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 605

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

by a corporate or a company, especially a public limited company

would be on very limited grounds, restricted possibly to protect the

privacy of the individuals and persons responsible for conducting the

business and commerce of the company. It will be rather difficult for

a public (or even a private) limited company to claim a violation of

privacy as its affairs have to be open to the shareholders and the

public who are interacting with the body corporate/company. This

principle would be equally, with some deference, apply to private

limited companies, partnerships and sole proprietorships.

74. In consonance with the above reasoning and on application of

the doctrine of proportionality, proviso to Section 29C(1) of the

Representation of the People Act 1951, Section 182(3) of the

Companies Act 2013 (as amended by the Finance Act 2017),

Section 13A(b) of the Income Tax Act 1961 (as amended by the

FinanceAct 2017), are held to be unconstitutional. Similarly, Section

31(3) of the RBI Act 1934, along with the Explanation enacted by

the Finance Act 2017, has to be struck down as unconstitutional,

as it permits issuance of Bonds payable to a bearer on demand

by such person.

75. The petitioners have not argued that corporate donations should

be prohibited. However, it was argued by some of the petitioners

that coercive threats are used to extract money from businesses

as contributions virtually as protection money. Major opposition

parties, which may come to power, are given smaller amounts to

keep them happy. It was also submitted that there should be a cap

on the quantum of donations and the law should stipulate funds to

be utilised for political purposes given that the income of the political

parties is exempt from income tax. Lastly, suggestions were made

that corporate funds should be accumulated and the corpus equitably

distributed amongst national and regional parties. I have not in-depth

examined these aspects to make a pronouncement. However, the

issues raised do require examination and study.

is the underlying principle behind the first three prongs, legitimate aim, rational connection and necessity

test. The balancing analysis of the permissible degree of harm for a constitutionally permissible purpose

effectuates the guarantee of reasonableness. Therefore, any legislative action which is manifestly

arbitrary, would be disproportionate and will fall foul when we apply the principle of proportionality. See

also Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1, where the Court held at paragraph 95, that

rationality, logic and reasoning are the triple underpinnings of the test of manifest arbitrariness.

606 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

76. By an interim order dated 26.03.2021, this Court in the context of

contributions made by companies through Bonds had prima facie

observed that the voter would be able to secure information about

the funding by matching the information of aggregate sum contributed

by the company as required to be disclosed under Section 182(3) of

the Companies Act, as amended by the Finance Act 2017, with the

information disclosed by the political party. Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud,

Hon’ble the Chief Justice, rightly observes in his judgment that this

exercise would not reveal the particulars of donations, including the

name of the donor.

77. By the order dated 02.11.2023, this Court had asked for ECI’s

compliance with the interim order of this Court dated 12.04.2019.

Relevant portion whereof is reproduced below:

“In the above perspective, according to us, the just and

proper interim direction would be to require all the political

parties who have received donations through Electoral

Bonds to submit to the Election Commission of India in

sealed cover, detailed particulars of the donors as against

the each Bond; the amount of each such bond and the

full particulars of the credit received against each bond,

namely, the particulars of the bank account to which the

amount has been credited and the date of each such

credit.”

The intent of the order dated 12.04.2019 is that the ECI will continue

to maintain full particulars of the donors against each Bond; the

amount of each such Bond and the full particulars of the credit

received against each Bond, that is, the particulars of the bank

account to which the amount has been credited and the date of

each such credit. This is clear from paragraph 14 of the order

dated 12.04.2019 which had directed that the details mentioned

in paragraph 13 of the order dated 12.04.2019 will be furnished

forthwith in respect of the Bonds received by a political party till the

date of passing of the order.

78. In view of the findings recorded above, I would direct the ECI to

disclose the full particular details of the donor and the amount donated

to the particular political party through Bonds. I would restrict this

direction to any donations made on or after the interim order dated

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 607

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

12.04.2019. The donors/purchasers being unknown and not parties,

albeit the principle of lis pendens applies, and it is too obvious that

the donors/purchasers would be aware of the present litigation.

Hence, they cannot claim surprise.

79. I, therefore, respectfully agree and also conclude that:

(i) the Scheme is unconstitutional and is accordingly struck down;

(ii) proviso to Section 29C(1) of the Representation of the People

Act, Section 182(3) of the Companies Act, 2013, and Section

13A(b) of the Income TaxAct, 1961, as amended by the Finance

Act, 2017, are unconstitutional, and are struck down;

(iii) deletion of proviso to Section 182(1) to the Companies Act

of 2013, thereby permitting unlimited contributions to political

parties is unconstitutional, and is struck down;

(iv) sub-section (3) to Section 31 of the RBI Act, 1934 and the

Explanation thereto introduced by the Finance Act, 2017 are

unconstitutional, and are struck down;

(v) the ECI will ascertain the details from the political parties and

the State Bank of India, which has issued the Bonds, and the

bankers of the political parties and thereupon disclose the

details and names of the donor/purchaser of the Bonds and

the amounts donated to the political party. The said exercise

would be completed as per the timelines fixed by the Hon’ble

the Chief Justice;

(vi) Henceforth, as the Scheme has been declared unconstitutional,

the issuance of fresh Bonds is prohibited;

(vii) In case the Bonds issued (within the validity period) are with

the donor/purchaser, the donor/purchaser may return them

to the authorised bank for refund of the amount. In case the

Bonds (within the validity period) are with the donee/political

party, the donee/political party will return the Bonds to the

issuing bank, which will then refund the amount to the donor/

purchaser. On failure, the amount will be credited to the Prime

Ministers Relief Fund.

80. The writ petitions are allowed and disposed of in the above terms.

608 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Annexure - A

Standards of Review - Proportionality & Alternatives

Proportionality is a standard-based model. It allows factual and contextual

flexibility to judges who encounter diverse factual scenarios to analyse

and decide the outcome of factual clashes against the standards.

Proportionality, particularly its balancing prong, has been criticized by

jurists who contend that legal adjudication should be rule-based rather

than principle-based.139 They argue that this provides legal certainty by

virtue of rules being definitive in nature. In response, jurists in favour

of balancing contend that neither rules nor principles are definitive but

rather prima facie.

140 Therefore, both rights and legislations/policies are

required to be balanced and realized to the optimum possible extent.

This jurisprudential clash is visible in the various forms and structures

of adoptions of proportionality. Generally, two models can be

differentiated from works of jurists.

1) Model I – Firstly, the traditional two stages of the means–end

comparison is applied. After having ascertained the legitimate

purpose of the law, the judge asks whether the imposed

restriction is a suitable means of furthering this purpose (rational

connection). Additionally in this model, the judge ascertains

whether the restriction was necessary to achieve the desired end.

The reasoning focuses on whether a less intrusive means existed

to achieve the same ends (minimal impairment/necessity).

2) Model II – This model adds a fourth step to the first model,

namely the balancing stage, which weighs the seriousness

of the infringement against the importance and urgency of the

factors that justify it.

In the table provided below, we have summarised the different

models of proportionality and its alternatives, as propounded by jurists

and adopted by courts internationally. We have also summarized

other traditional standards of review like the means-ends test and

Wednesbury unreasonableness for contextual clarity. In the last

column we have captured the relevant criticisms, as propounded

by jurists, to each such model.

139 Francisco J. Urbina, A Critique of Proportionality, American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol 57, 2012. Also

see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Bloomsbury 2013), pp 41-42.

140 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (translated by Julian Rivers, first published 2002, OUP

2010), pp. 47-48.

[2024]

2 S.C.R. 609

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

Test/Model Scope of Test/Model Jurisdictions Applied Criticism

Four-stage

Proportionality

In this model, all the four prongs of

proportionality test are employed, including

the final balancing stage.

According to Robert Alexy, values and

interests (rights of citizens and objects of

legislations/policies) are both principles and

principles are optimization requirements.141

They are norms and hence their threshold of

satisfaction is not strict, and can happen in

varying degrees. They must be satisfied to

the greatest extent possible in the legal and

factual scenarios, as they exist. All stages

of the proportionality test therefore seek to

optimize relative to what is legally and factually

possible.

⇒ The rational connection and necessity

prongs of the proportionality test are

applicable to factual possibilities.

⇒ The balancing stage optimizes each

principle within what is legally possible, by

weighing the relevant competing principles.

Germany

Balancing was adopted by the

German Constitutional Court in the

1950s as a new methodology for

intensive judicial review of rightsrestricting legislation. It stems

from the belief that the German

Constitution posits an original idea

of values, and the government and

courts, both have a duty to realise

these values.142

The main premise of the criticisms

of balancing is the wide discretion

available to judges.

To capture three contemporary

criticisms in brief: (i) it leads to a

comparison of incommensurable

values; 143 (ii) it fails to create

predictability in the legal system and

is potentially dangerous for human

rights;144 and (iii) conversely, it is

equally intrusive from the perspective

of separation of powers.145

141 See Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Julian Rivers, trans. Oxford Univ. Press 2002).

142 See Article 1 and 20, Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.

143 See Francisco J. Urbina, ‘Is It Really That Easy? A Critique of Proportionality and Balancing as Reasoning’ Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 2014; and

Bernhard Schlink, ‘Abwägung im Verfassungsrecht’, Duncker & Humblot, 1976.

144 Jochen von Bernstroff, Proportionality Without Balancing: Why Judicial Ad Hoc Balancing is Unnecessary and Potentially Detrimental to Realisation of Collective

and Individual Self Determination, Reasoning Rights – Comparative Judicial Engagement, (Ed. Liaora Lazarus);

145 Ibid.

610 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Alexy proposes the ‘weight formula’,

which quantifies competing values (rights

of individuals) and interests (objective of

legislation/policy) by reducing them to

numbers. It is a method of thinking about

conflicting values/interests.

W1.2 = (I1 . W1 . R1 ) / (I2 . W2 . R2 )

⇒

W1.2 represents the concrete weight of

principle P1 relative to the colliding principle

P2.

⇒ I

1 stand for intensity of interference with

P1

. I

2 stands for importance of satisfying

the colliding principle P2

.

⇒

W1 and

W2 stand for abstract weights of

colliding principles (P1 and P2).

⇒  When abstract weights are equal, as in

case of collision of constitutional rights (W1

and

W2

) – they cancel each other out.

⇒

R1 and

R2 stands for reliability of empirical

and normative assumptions with regard

to the question of how intensive the

interpretation is.

The weight formula is thereupon reduced to

numbers on an exponential scale of 2.

(i) The scale assigns following values to

intensity of interference (I) and abstract

weights (W)- light (l), moderate (m), and

serious (s) – in numbers these are – 20,

21, 22 – i.e., 1, 2 and 4 respectively.

(ii) To reliability (R), i.e., the epistemic side,

the values assigned are – reliable (r),

plausible (p) and not evidently false (e) –

in numbers these are - 20, 2-1, 2-2 – i.e., 1,

0.5 and 0.25

[2024]

2 S.C.R. 611

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. Three-stage Proportionality This model proposes limiting the proportionality enquiry to its first three prongs, i.e., minus the balancing stage. Von Bernstorff argues against ad hoc balancing based on two principal reasons: (i) ad hoc balancing fails to erect stable and predictable standards of human rights protection, allowing even the most intensive infringements of civil liberties to be conveniently balanced out of existence when the stakes are high enough; and (ii) the lack of predictability leads to a situation where every act of parliament is threatened, however well intentioned, in the judicial balancing exercise and thus ad hoc balancing is potentially overly intrusive from a separation of powers perspective.146 He, however, defends the use of judicially established bright-line rules for specific cases where intensive interferences are at stake. The bright line rule brings clarity to a law or regulation that could be interpreted in multiple ways. Bright line rules constitute the ‘core’, ‘substance’ or ‘essence’ of a particular right, making human rights categorical instead of open-ended in nature. Canada Canada prefers to resolve cases in the first three prongs. Only in limited instances, does the Canadian Supreme Court decide that a measure survives the first three prongs but nevertheless fails at the final balancing stage.150 Despite this, past jurisprudence in Canada does affirm the significance of final balancing stage.151 (i) In absence of the balancing stage, the courts must be mindful of certain analytical weaknesses of the necessity stage that can be dealt with at the balancing stage.152 (ii) The core of the necessity test is whetheranalternatemeasureisas effective in achieving the purpose as the measure under challenge, while being less restrictive. But often, considerations of balancing may become disguised in the necessity prong, as the court must confront uncertainty in weighing the efficacy of the alternatives.153 (iii) Some jurists/courts have suggested a strict interpretation of necessity, where an alternate measure is only accepted as less restrictive when they prove to be as effective as the measure under challenge. 146 Jochen von Bernstroff, Proportionality Without Balancing: Why Judicial Ad Hoc Balancing is Unnecessary and Potentially Detrimental to Realisation of Collective and Individual Self Determination, Reasoning Rights – Comparative Judicial Engagement, (Ed. Liaora Lazarus); Also see Bernhard Schlink, ‘Abwägung im Verfassungsrecht’, Duncker & Humblot, 1976, pp. 192–219. 150 See Charterpedia, Department of Justice, Government of Canada, available at: https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/rfc-dlc/ccrf-ccdl/check/art1.html. Also see Niels Petersen (supra). 151 Ibid. Also see Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610, at paragraph 46; Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, and [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, at paragraphs 72-78. 152 Niels Petersen, ‘Proportionality and judicial Activism: Fundamental Rights Adjudication in Canada, Germany and South Africa, (CUP 2017).

153 Ibid.

612 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

A stricter evaluation of evidence becomes

crucial at the necessity stage for an objective

standard of review, in contrast to ad hoc

balancing.

In Canada for instance, the onus of proof is on

the person seeking to justify the limit, which

is generally the government.147

⇒ The standard of proof is the civil standard

or balance of probabilities.148

⇒ Where scientific or social science evidence

is available, it will be required;

⇒ Howeve r, where such evidence is

inconclusive, or does not exist and cannot

not be developed, reason and logic may

suffice.149

David Bilchitz has also proposed that

other alternatives must have both

characteristics – equal realization

of the purpose and lesser invasion/

restriction on the right in question.154

David Blichitz’s approach was

followed in Aadhar (5J) (Privacy)

(supra) case.This test was referenced

in Anuradha Bhasin (supra), which

applied a moderate interpretation of

the necessity test. To conclude the

findings of the necessity stage this

Court in Anuradha Bhasin (supra)

suggests that an overall comparison

be undertaken between the measure

and its feasible alternatives.

Means-ends

Test

The doctrine is similar to a reasonableness

inquiry, albeit with some variation.

In Australia, for instance, courts enquire

whether a law is ‘reasonably appropriate and

adapted’ to achieving a legitimate end in a

manner compatible with the constitutionally

prescribed system of representative and

responsible government.

Australia

The test was followed in Australia

before the development o f

proportionality and is not frequently

used in contemporary times.

The test is simplistic and gives limited

judicial flexibility. It does not account

for diverse factual scenarios.

147

R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.

148 Oakes (supra).

149 Libman v. Quebec (A.G.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569; RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199; Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada

(A.G.), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877; R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45; Harper v. Canada (A.G.), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, at paragraph 77; R. v. Bryan, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527,

at paragraphs 16-19, 29; Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 3, at paragraphs 143-144.

154 David Bilchitz, Necessity and Proportionality: Towards a Balance Approach?, (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2016).

[2024]

2 S.C.R. 613

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

Calibrated

Scrutiny

(evolved

means-ends

test)

The essential elements of the approach are

as follows:155

⇒ First, a judge determines the nature and

intensity of the burden on the right by the

challenged law;

⇒ Second, the judge calibrates ‘the

appropriate level of scrutiny to the risk

posed to maintenance of the constitutionally

prescribed system of representative and

responsible government;

⇒ Third, the judge isolates and assesses the

importance of constitutionally permissible

purpose of the prohibition; and

⇒ Finally the judge applies the appropriate

level of scrutiny so as to determine

whether the challenged law is justified

as reasonably appropriate and adapted

to achieve that purpose in a manner

compatible with the maintenance of the

constitutionally prescribed system of

government,

The test is similar to some prongs of the

proportionality test. However, it is more rule

oriented instead of being standard/principle

oriented.

Australia

While proportionality i s the

predominant doctrine in Australia,

this alternate test is applied by a

few judges. These judges raise

concerns about the application of a

test of structured proportionality and

suggest that it was best understood

as ‘a tool’ of analysis, or ‘a means

of setting out steps to a conclusion’,

‘not a constitutional doctrine’.

Critics of this approach have

emphasized that it takes away

from the flexibility that is required

while considering factually diverse

legal challenges. Therefore, the

test cannot substitute a contextually

guided judicial approach.156

155 Judgment by Gagler J. in Clubb v. Edwards, (2019) 93 ALJR 448; Also see Adrienne Stone, Proportionality and its Alternatives, Melbourne Legal Studies Research

Paper Series No. 848

156 See John Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: a Theory of Legal Certainty, Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 47 (2002).

614 [2024]

2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Strict Scrutiny

Test

This is considered one of the heightened forms

of judicial review that can be used to evaluate

the constitutionality of laws, regulations,

or other governmental policies under legal

challenge.157

Strict scrutiny is employed in cases of violation

of the most fundamental liberties guaranteed

to citizens in the United States of America.

For instance, it is employed in cases of

infringements on free speech.

The test places the burden o n the

government to show a compelling, or

strong interest in the law, and that the law

is either very narrowly tailored or is the

least speech-restrictive means available to

the government.

The usual presumption of constitutionality

is removed, and the law must also pass

the threshold of both – necessity/end and

means.

United States of America

The courts in the United States use

a tiered approach of review with strict

scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and

rational basis existing in decreasing

degree of intensity.

Only a limited number of laws survive

under the strict scrutiny test. Its

application is reserved for instances

where the most intensely protected

fundamental rights are affected.

157 See Jennifer L. Greenblatt, Putting the Government to the (Heightened, Intermediate, or Strict) Scrutiny Test: Disparate Application Shows Not All Rights and

Powers Are Created Equal, (2009) 10 Fla Coastal L Rev 421.

[2024]

2 S.C.R. 615

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

Unreasonableness

/ Wednesbury

Principles

Astandard of unreasonableness is used for the

judicial review of a public authority’s decision.

A reasoning or decision is unreasonable (or

irrational) when no person acting reasonably

could have arrived at it.

This test has two limbs:

(i) The court is entitled to investigate the

action to check whether the authority has

considered and decided on matters which

they ought not to have considered, or

conversely, have refused to consider or

neglected to consider matters which they

ought to have considered.

(ii) If the above query is answered in favour

of the local authority, it may be held that,

although the local authority has ruled

on matters which they ought to have

considered, the conclusion they have

arrived at is nonetheless so unreasonable

that no reasonable authority could ever

have arrived at it.

Associated Provincial Picture

Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury

Corporation158

The test i s simplistic and i s

traditionally only used for policies/

administrative decisions/delegated

legislation.

Please note that:-

(i) The above table briefly summarises the different standards of constitutional review and it does not

elaborate on the said tests in detail;

158 (1948) 1 KB 223.

616 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

(ii) the theories propounded by the jurists are not followed in

toto across the jurisdictions and this has been pointed out

appropriately; and

(iii) the table does not provide an exhaustive account of the full

range of standards of review employed internationally and is

restricted to the tests identified therein.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case:

Writ Petitions disposed of.