REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2911 OF 2022
M/s Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. ..Appellant
Versus
Shri Rajendra D. Harmalkar ..Respondent
J U D G M E N T
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order dated 29.06.2015 passed by the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay at Goa in Writ Petition No.660 of 2013
by which the High Court has partly allowed the said writ petition
preferred by the respondent herein (hereinafter referred to as the
“original writ petitioner”) directing the petitioner herein to
reinstate the original writ petitioner without any back wages and
other benefits by substituting the punishment of dismissal
1
imposed by the Disciplinary Authority, the employer – Indian Oil
Corporation Ltd. has preferred the present appeal.
2. The facts leading to the present appeal in a nutshell are as
under:
That the respondent herein original writ petitioner was
initially appointed in the year 1982 as a casual employee. He
moved an application seeking the position of Refueling Helper,
wherein under the heading of qualifications, he mentioned that
he has passed Secondary School Leaving Certificate (hereinafter
referred to as “SSLC”) in April, 1986 from Karnataka Secondary
Education Board. That he was thereafter appointed as Helper as
per the regularization policy regularizing the casual employees,
inter alia, subject to the contents prescribed in the application
form for employment being correct. At that stage also the original
writ petitioner submitted SSLC of Karnataka Board bearing
No.206271 dated 19.05.1986.
2.1 In the year 2003, the Chief Vigilance Officer of the
Corporation received a complaint that the original writ petitioner
had secured his job as Refueling Helper by submitting a false
and forged SSLC. Similar complaint was also made to the police
authorities also.
2
2.2 Despite repetitive requests and follow up by the authorities,
original writ petitioner did not submit the original SSLC
Certificate. On the contrary, the original writ petitioner sent a
communication wherein it was mentioned that the original SSLC
has been misplaced. Thereafter the Manager, ER advised original
writ petitioner to obtain a duplicate copy of the original SSLC and
to submit the same to the Manager, ER. However, he continued
evading submission of the original certificate or even the
Duplicate SSLC from Karnataka Board.
2.3 The Manager, ER thereafter requested the authorities of the
Secondary Board to check up their records and confirm whether
they had issued any marks certificate carrying details available
on the photocopy of the SSLC marks sheet issued by them. In
response to the same, the Board informed the authority that “as
per the record, SSLC statement of marks for the year March,
1986 bearing Registration No.206271 relate to one Agrahar
Jayant S/o Satyanarayana A.L. DOB – 15.02.1968 and does not
belong to Rajendra Dattaram Harmalkar S/o Datta Ram
Harmalkar, DOB – 08.12.1962”.
2.4 In the above circumstances, a departmental enquiry was
initiated against the original writ petitioner. The original writ
3
petitioner was served with the chargesheet containing two
charges which read as under:
“1. Wilful insubordination or disobedience
whether or not in combination with another, of
any lawful and reasonable order of a superior.
2. Giving false information regarding one's age,
father's name, qualifications or previous
service at the time of employment.”
2.5 The original writ petitioner replied to the chargesheet. The
Inquiry Officer held that both the aforesaid charges were proved
and proposed the punishment of dismissal. After giving an
opportunity to the original writ petitioner on having agreed with
the findings of the Inquiry Officer, and after taking into
consideration the gravity of the acts of misconduct proved, the
Disciplinary Authority imposed the punishment of dismissal from
services. The appeal preferred by the original writ petitioner
came to be dismissed.
2.6 At this stage it is required to be noted that the original writ
petitioner was also prosecuted by the Criminal Court, however
the learned Trial Court acquitted him by giving benefit of doubt
mainly on the ground that the original SSLC was not brought on
record.
4
2.7 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of
dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority confirmed by the
Appellate Authority, the original writ petitioner preferred the writ
petition before the High Court. It was the case on behalf of the
original writ petitioner that he admitted the alleged guilt of
misconduct on the assurance of a lenient view being taken by the
authorities. It was also argued that there was no minimum
educational qualification and age limit (minimum or maximum)
prescribed to secure the job or even for the promotion. It was
submitted that therefore in such circumstances, it cannot be said
that he had submitted a false and forged certificate with an
attempt to secure the job or promotion. That the certificate was
produced only for the purpose of record and there was no
dishonest intention to grab the job or promotion. It was also
urged that the Criminal Court had acquitted him and that he had
a good service record and that the first charge of insubordination
is not established. The High Court framed only one point for
determination, namely, whether the punishment imposed upon
the petitioner is grossly disproportionate to the misconduct
committed by the petitioner. By the impugned judgment and
order the High Court observed and held that the punishment
5
imposed upon the original writ petitioner was grossly
disproportionate to the misconduct and interfered with the order
of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority by
observing that the respondent was assured that on admission of
his guilt a lenient view may be taken while imposing the
punishment. The High Court also observed that the petitioner is
out of service from the year 2006 and as the counsel for the
petitioner had made a statement that he will forgive his back
wages and promotion, by the impugned judgment and order the
High Court allowed the said writ petitioner and the directed the
appellant to reinstate the original writ petitioner from the date of
dismissal from service in the post of Refueling Helper, however
without any back wages or benefits.
2.8 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court allowing the writ
petitioner and interfering with the order of punishment imposed
by the Disciplinary Authority, the Indian Oil Corporation –
employer – Disciplinary Authority has preferred the present
appeal.
3. Shri Rajiv Shukla, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant had vehemently submitted that in the facts and
6
circumstances of the case the High Court has committed a grave
error in interfering with the order of punishment imposed by the
Disciplinary Authority pursuant to the charge of giving false
information regarding his father’s name, his qualification by
producing a fake and false SSLC was held to be proved. It is
contended that the High Court materially erred in observing that
the punishment of dismissal imposed by the Disciplinary
Authority on the proved misconduct was disproportionate to the
misconduct established and proved.
3.1 It is urged that when an employee has produced a false and
forged SSLC of the Education Board the same can be said to be a
grave misconduct and therefore the Disciplinary Authority was
justified in imposing the punishment of dismissal.
3.2 It is further submitted by learned counsel for the appellant
that the grounds on which the High Court interfered with the
punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority namely that
original writ petitioner:
(i) has admitted the guilt on an assurance that a lenient
view shall be taken while imposing the punishment;
(ii) has been acquitted by the Criminal Court; and
7
(iii) that no minimum qualification or age limit was
prescribed for getting the job or promotion and that he
had a good service record, are all irrelevant and/or not
germane.
3.3 It is submitted that the High Court has not properly
appreciated the fact that the Criminal Court acquitted the
original writ petitioner by giving him a benefit of doubt and there
was no honorable acquittal.
3.4 It is contended that it is immaterial, whether, there was a
minimum qualification or age limit prescribed for the job or
promotion or not and therefore there was no intention to secure
the job by producing the fake/forged certificate. It is submitted
that it is a case of TRUST and therefore when the Disciplinary
Authority/employer loses the Confidence and TRUST in such an
employee who submitted a forged/fake certificate, the High Court
ought not to have interfered with the order of punishment
imposed by the Disciplinary Authority.
3.5 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Om
Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386; Union of India v. G.
Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463; Union of India v. Dwarka Prasad
Tiwari, (2006) 10 SCC 388; and Union of India v. Diler Singh,
8
(2016) 13 SCC 71, it is submitted that while interfering with the
order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority the
High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction while exercising its
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is
submitted that as per the settled position of law unless there is a
procedural irregularity in conducting the disciplinary proceedings
and/or the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate
to the proved misconduct, then and then only, the High Court
can exercise powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
and interfere with the order of punishment imposed by the
Disciplinary Authority.
3.6 It is further submitted that even denying the back wages on
the concession given by the employee cannot be said to be a
sufficient punishment imposed. It is submitted that in the
present case as such during the interregnum period the
respondent original writ petitioner was working with the
petroleum unit of Reliance Industries as a driver for the period
between 2006 to 2017. Therefore, denying the back wages and
promotion by the High Court by the impugned judgment and
order cannot be said to be any punishment at all.
9
3.7 Making the above submissions and relying upon the above
decisions, it is prayed to allow the present appeal.
4. The instant appeal is vehemently opposed by Ms. Suruchi
Suri, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent.
4.1 It is submitted by Ms. Suri, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondent – original writ petitioner that in the
present case the respondent – original writ petitioner did produce
the fake/forged SSLC. However, the same had no relevance for
securing the job as there was no minimum qualification or age
limit prescribed for getting the job or promotion. It is submitted
that the same was produced only for the purpose of record.
4.2 Further, the original writ petitioner admitted his guilt of
producing the fake/forge certificate on an assurance that a
lenient view would be taken at the time of imposing the
punishment.
4.3 It is submitted that even the respondent – original writ
petitioner has been acquitted by the Criminal Court for the
offences punishable under Sections 468 and 471 IPC regarding
the said SSLC produced by him.
4.4 It is further urged that even the respondent had an
unblemished and good service record. Therefore, considering the
10
aforesaid overall facts and circumstances, when the High Court
has interfered with the order of punishment imposed by the
Disciplinary Authority and has ordered reinstatement without
any back wages and promotion, the same is not required to be
interfered with by this Court in exercise of powers under Article
136 of the Constitution of India.
4.5 Making the above submissions it is prayed to dismiss the
present appeal.
5. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties.
6. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court, in
exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
has interfered with the order of punishment imposed by the
Disciplinary Authority and has ordered reinstatement without
back wages and other benefits by observing that order of
punishment of dismissal from the service imposed by the
Disciplinary Authority is disproportionate to the misconduct
proved.
Therefore, the short question which is posed for
consideration by this Court is, whether, in the facts and
circumstances of the case the High Court is justified in
11
interfering with the conscious decision taken by the Disciplinary
Authority while imposing the punishment of dismissal from
service, in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
7. On the question of judicial review and interference of the
courts in matters of disciplinary proceedings and on the test of
proportionality, a few decisions of this Court are required to be
referred to:
i) In the case of Om Kumar (supra), this Court, after
considering the Wednesbury principles and the doctrine of
proportionality, has observed and held that the question of the
quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is primarily for
the disciplinary authority to order and the jurisdiction of the
High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution or of the
Administrative Tribunals is limited and is confined to the
applicability of one or other of the wellknown principles known
as ‘Wednesbury principles’.
In the Wednesbury case, (1948) 1 KB 223, it was said that
when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a
decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. Lord
12
Greene further said that interference was not permissible unless
one or the other of the following conditions was satisfied, namely,
the order was contrary to law, or relevant factors were not
considered, or irrelevant factors were considered, or the decision
was one which no reasonable person could have taken.
ii) In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6
SCC 749, in paragraph 18, this Court observed and held as
under:
“18. A review of the above legal position would
establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal
the appellate authority, being factfinding authorities
have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a
view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the
discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping
in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The
High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of
judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own
conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty.
If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority or the appellate authority shocks the
conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would
appropriately mould the relief, either directing the
disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the
penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may
itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate
punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.”
iii) In the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Now
Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank) v. Rajendra Singh,
13
(2013) 12 SCC 372, in paragraph 19, it was observed and held
as under:
“19. The principles discussed above can be summed up
and summarised as follows:
19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an
enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a
particular case is essentially the domain of the
departmental authorities.
19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of
disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the
quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be
awarded, as this function is exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the competent authority.
19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with
the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority,
only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking
to the conscience of the court.
19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set
aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of
charges framed against the delinquent employee, the
appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back
to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority
with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The
court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the
penalty in such a case.
19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para
19.4 above, would be in those cases where the codelinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the
disciplinary authority even when the charges of
misconduct were identical or the codelinquent was
foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the
doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee
concerned and the codelinquent are equally placed.
However, there has to be a complete parity between the
two, not only in respect of nature of charge but
subsequent conduct as well after the service of chargesheet in the two cases. If the codelinquent accepts the
charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology,
lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.”
14
7.1 In the present case, the original writ petitioner was
dismissed from service by the Disciplinary Authority for
producing the fabricated/fake/forged SSLC. Producing the
false/fake certificate is a grave misconduct. The question is one
of a TRUST. How can an employee who has produced a fake and
forged marksheet/certificate, that too, at the initial stage of
appointment be trusted by the employer? Whether such a
certificate was material or not and/or had any bearing on the
employment or not is immaterial. The question is not of having
an intention or mens rea. The question is producing the
fake/forged certificate. Therefore, in our view, the Disciplinary
Authority was justified in imposing the punishment of dismissal
from service.
7.2 It was a case on behalf of the petitioner – original writ
petitioner before the High Court that he pleaded guilty and
admitted that he had submitted a forged and fake certificate on
the assurance that lesser punishment will be imposed. However,
except the bald statement, there is no further evidence on the
same. Nothing has been mentioned on record as to who gave him
such an assurance.
15
7.3 Even otherwise the conduct on the part of the original writ
petitioner is required to be considered.
As observed hereinabove, prior to the issuance of the
chargesheet and after the complaint was received by the
Vigilance Officer, there were repetitive requests and follow up by
the authorities requesting the original writ petitioner to produce
the original SSLC. Initially the original writ petitioner did not
even respond to the said requests. Thereafter, he came up with a
case that the original SSLC was misplaced. He was then called
upon to obtain a duplicate copy of the SSLC and to submit the
same to the Manager, ER. However, he continued to evade
obtaining the duplicate certificate from Karnataka Board. Only
thereafter the Manager, ER directly contacted the authorities of
the Board and requested the Education Board to check up from
their records and only thereafter it was revealed that the SSLC
produced by the original petitioner was forged and fake and
belonged to or related to some another student and it did not
belong to the original writ petitioner. This shows the malafide
intention on the part of the original writ petitioner.
7.4 Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the original writ
petitioner that he was acquitted by the Criminal Court for the
16
offences punishable under Sections 468 and 471 IPC in respect
of the same certificate is concerned, the said contention is neither
here nor there and is of no assistance to the original writ
petitioner. Apart from the fact that he was acquitted by the
Criminal Court by giving benefit of doubt and there was no
honourable acquittal, in the present case before the Disciplinary
Authority the original writ petitioner as such admitted that he
produced the fake and forged certificate. Therefore, once there
was an admission on the part of the respondent – original writ
petitioner, thereafter whether he has been acquitted by the
Criminal Court is immaterial.
7.5 Even from the impugned judgment and order passed by the
High Court it does not appear that any specific reasoning was
given by the High Court on how the punishment imposed by the
Disciplinary Authority could be said to be shockingly
disproportionate to the misconduct proved. As per the settled
position of law, unless and until it is found that the punishment
imposed by the Disciplinary Authority is shockingly
disproportionate and/or there is procedural irregularity in
conducting the inquiry, the High Court would not be justified in
interfering with the order of punishment imposed by the
17
Disciplinary Authority which as such is a prerogative of the
Disciplinary Authority as observed hereinabove.
7.6 From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High
Court, it appears that the High Court has denied the back wages
and other benefits and has ordered reinstatement on a
concession given by the learned counsel on behalf of the original
writ petitioner. However, it is required to be noted that for the
period between 2006 to 2017 i.e. during the pendency of the writ
petition the respondent was working in the Petroleum Division of
Reliance Industries. Therefore, he was aware that even otherwise
he is not entitled to the back wages for the aforesaid period.
Therefore, the concession given on behalf of the original writ
petitioner as such cannot be said to be a real concession. In any
case in the facts and circumstances of the case and for the
reasons stated above and considering the charge and misconduct
of producing the fake and false SSLC Certificate proved, when a
conscious decision was taken by the Disciplinary Authority to
dismiss him from service, the same could not have been
interfered with by the High Court in exercise of powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court has
exceeded in its jurisdiction in interfering with the order of
18
punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority while
exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
8. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court in
interfering with the order of punishment imposed by the
Disciplinary Authority of dismissing the original writ petitioner
from service and ordering reinstatement without back wages and
other benefits is hereby quashed and set aside. The order passed
by the Disciplinary Authority dismissing the original writ
petitioner from service on the misconduct proved is hereby
restored.
The present appeal is accordingly allowed. In the facts and
circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
…………………………………J.
(M. R. SHAH)
…………………………………J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)
New Delhi,
April 21, 2022.
19
