REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 2953 OF 2022
Ramveer Upadhyay & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Indira Banerjee, J.
This special leave petition is against a final judgment and order dated
7
th March 2022 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
dismissing the application filed by the Petitioner under Section 482 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 being case No.29704 of 2021, whereby the
Petitioner had challenged the order dated 17th September 2021 passed by
the 4th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hathras taking cognizance of
the complaint filed by the Respondent No.2 under Section 365 read with
Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 3(1)(Dha) of
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989,
hereinafter referred to as “the Atrocities Act”.
1
2. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the
Petitioners opened his arguments contending that this case is a classic
example of malicious prosecution of the petitioners, who have been
embroiled in a false criminal case, due to political animosity. The complaint
in the Court of the 2nd Additional District and Sessions Judge/Special
Judge under the Atrocities Act, under section 156 (3) of the CrPC , which
has given rise to these proceedings, has been filed by the Respondent No. 2
at the instance of Devendra Agarwal, ExMLA , a political opponent of the
Petitioner No. 1. The Petitioner No. 1 and the said Devendra Aggarwal had
fought elections against each other several times.
3. Earlier, on or about 1st January 2010, Smt. Meera Devi, wife of the
Respondent No.2 had filed a complaint before the District Magistrate,
Mahamaya Nagar District (now Hathras District) stating that the
Respondent No.2 had been abducted by the brothers of the Petitioner No. 1,
to forcibly make him vote in favour of their party, in the MLC election of
2010. In the said complaint it was alleged that the Petitioner had abused the
Respondent No.2 by his caste, using filthy language.
4. On the same day, that is, 1st January 2010, Devendra Aggarwal wrote
a letter to the District Magistrate for release of the Respondent No.2. In the
aforesaid letter, it was stated that the Petitioners had abused the
Respondent No.2 in filthy language by reference to his caste.
5. On 2nd January 2010, Meera Devi filed an application in the Court of
the Judicial Magistrate, Sadabad, Hathras under Section 156(3) of the Code
2
of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C ), being Complaint No. 412 of 2010 for
directions on the Station House Officer (SHO) at Chandappa Police Station
to register her Complaint of abduction of her husband.
6. A complaint was thereafter registered, pursuant to which Crime Case
No. 17/2010 was started. The case was investigated by the Circle Inspector
Sadabad, Hathras. After investigation, the Police filed a final report of
closure of the case, opining that no incident of abduction, as alleged had
taken place, and the complaint had been filed out of political animosity.
7. Meera Devi filed a Protest Petition which was dismissed. The High
Court did not interfere with the order of dismissal of her Protest Petition.
Meera Devi approached this Court. Pursuant to the orders of this court,
further investigation was held by the CB CID. The Investigating Officer filed
a final report dated 17.10.2018 in favour of the Petitioners. Meera Devi filed
a Protest Petition. By an order dated 5th September 2020, the Special Judge
under the Atrocities Act, Hathras rejected the Protest Petition filed by Meera
Devi in Case No. 17/2010.
8. In February 2017, the Petitioner had contested the Assembly elections
from Sadabad Constituency. Mr. Devendra Aggarwal also contested the
election from the same constituency as a candidate of a rival political party.
It is alleged that, on 8th February 2017, when the Petitioner No 1’s son was
campaigning for the Petitioner No 1, Devendra Aggarwal, who was then a
sitting MLA of the ruling party, attacked the Petitioner No 1’s son and his
supporters and opened fire indiscriminately.
3
9. One Pushpendra Singh, a supporter of the Petitioner No 1, was killed
in the incident. Pushpendra’s father, Ramhari Sharma lodged an FIR,
arraigning Devendra Aggarwal as Accused No.1, pursuant to which a
criminal case was started against Devendra Aggarwal and others, inter alia,
under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
10. It is stated that since Devendra Aggarwal was the sitting MLA of the
ruling party, the police did not take action to arrest him. The father of the
deceased Pushpendra, Ramhari Sharma filed a Criminal Misc. Writ Petition
No.2739/2017 in the High Court praying for action against Devendra
Aggarwal.
11. On 26th October 2017, the Respondent No.2 filed an application in the
Court of the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge SC/ST Act, Hathras
under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C alleging that the Petitioner No.1 along
with his Personal Assistant, Ranu Pandit, being the Petitioner No.2 and 67
other persons had abused him in filthy language and asked his associates to
drag him into the car which they could not do, as a crowd had gathered, and
there was resistance put up. The Respondent No.2 prayed for direction on
the SHO, Chandappa Police Station to register the case against the
Petitioners.
12. The relevant averments in the said complaint are extracted
hereinbelow for convenience:
4
“1. The applicant belongs to “Dhobi’ caste – a scheduled caste and is
former BDC Member.
2. ….
3. That on 01.09.2017, at about 2.45 or 3 P.M. in the afternoon, the
opposite party no.1 Ramveer Upadhyay came to VillageBisana along
with his convoy of vehicles and after seeing the Complainant started
abusing of his caste and on the road, he said that Saley dhobi you had
forgotten your position and your wings have come out and you are
running up to Supreme Court. You will be sent at a place from where
you will never come back. When the Complainant said you are doing
your work and I am doing my work, Ramveer Upadhyay said to his
associates that pull him and put him in the car, then opposite party
no.2 Ranu Pandit and 67 other unknown persons, who can be
identified by face, dragged the Complainant and with the intention to
kill tried to kidnap him but due to gathering of people on the road and
due to resistance shown by Annu R/o Jindpatti, Bisana, Pradeep R/o
Gambhirpatti, Bisana, they were not successful and went towards
Hathras in their vehicles. Due to this incident an environment of fear
and terror was created in the village.”
13. Pursuant to the aforesaid application, a case was registered and
numbered Complaint Case No.19/2018. The Respondent No.2 was
examined under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. The statement of the
Respondent No. 2 being the complainant was recorded under Section 200 of
the Cr.P.C. in the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge,
SC/ST Act, Hathras. The statements of one Annu son of Rukamal and one
Yogesh Gupta, son of Dhaniram Gupta were also recorded in the same
Court under Section 200 Cr.P.C.
14. In the meanwhile, in Writ Petition (Civil) No.699/2016 titled Ashwini
Kumar Upadhayay v. Union of India, a threeJudge Bench of this Court
5
presided over by the Chief Justice, passed an order dated 4.12.2018, taking
notice of the fact that there were 4122 cases pending against legislators
including former legislators, out of which 2324 cases were against sitting
legislators. A chart, presented in Court by the learned Amicus Curiae,
showed that there were 430 cases involving life sentence pending against
sitting as well as former legislators.
15. To expedite the disposal of the cases, this Court requested each High
Court to assign/allocate criminal cases involving former and sitting
legislators to as many as Sessions Courts and Magisterial Courts as each
High Court might consider fit and expedient. Pursuant to administrative
directions issued by the High Court, and pursuant to the directions of this
Court, Complaint Case No.19/2018 was transferred to the Additional
District and Sessions Judge Court No.4, Hathras, as the Petitioner No.1 was
a legislator/former legislator.
16. On being prima facie satisfied that the complaint case No.19/2018
made out a prime facie case against the Petitioners, the Additional District
and Sessions Judge, Court No.4, Hathras passed an order dated 17th
September 2021, taking cognizance of the charges against the Petitioners
and issuing summons to the Petitioners.
17. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 17th September 2021, the
Petitioners filed an application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C in the High
Court and prayed that entire proceedings in Complaint Case No. 19/2018 as
well as the cognizance order dated 17th September 2021 be quashed.
6
18. By an order dated 5th January 2022, the High Court admitted the
application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and stayed further proceedings
in Complaint Case No.19/2018 pending in the Court of Additional District
and Sessions Judge, Court No.4, Hathras.
19. However, on 7th March 2022, the High Court passed the impugned
judgment and order rejecting the application filed by the Petitioners under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
20. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the
Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the Additional District and
Sessions Judge, Court No.2, Hathras, to take cognizance of the offence in
Complaint Case No.19/2018.
21. Emphasizing Section 14 of the Atrocities Act, Mr. Ranjit Kumar
argued that only the Special Judge under the Atrocities Act was competent
to pass an order for issuance of summons. He argued that the order of the
Additional District and Sessions Judge, Court No.2, Hathras being without
jurisdiction the High Court should have quashed the same in exercise of its
power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Mr. Ranjt Kumar also argued that
Complaint Case No.19/2018 patently a case of malicious prosecution which
stemmed from political rivalry and was in gross abuse of the process of
Court.
7
22. In Shantaben Bhurabhai Bhuriya v. Anand Athabhai Chaudhari
and Ors.1
, Cited by Mr. Siddharth Dave, learned senior counsel, appearing
on behalf of the Respondent No.2, this Court rejected the contention that
only Special Court could take cognizance of offences under the Atrocities Act
and held:
23. Therefore, the issue/question posed for the consideration of this
Court is, whether in a case where cognizance is taken by the learned
Magistrate and thereafter the case is committed to the learned Special
Court, whether entire criminal proceedings can be said to have been
vitiated considering the second proviso to Section 14 of the Atrocities
Act which was inserted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016?
24. While considering the aforesaid issue/question, legislative history
of the relevant provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, more particularly, Section 14 preamendment and post amendment is required to be considered. Section
14 as stood preamendment and post amendment reads as under:
........
Provided that in Districts where less number of cases under this Act is
recorded, the State Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief
Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify for
such Districts, the Court of Session to be a Special Court to try the offences
under this Act;
Provided further that the Courts so established or specified shall
have power to directly take cognizance of offences under this Act.”
******
28. Considering the aforesaid legislative history which brought to
insertion of proviso to Section 14 of the Atrocities Act, by which, even the
Special Court so established or specified for the purpose of providing for
speedy trial the power to directly to take cognizance of offences under
the Atrocities Act, 1989, the issue/question posed whether in a case
where for the offences under Atrocities Act, the cognizance is taken by
the learned Magistrate and thereafter the case is committed to the Court
of Sessions/Special Court and cognizance is not straightway taken up
by the learned Special Court/Court of Session, whether entire criminal
proceedings for the offences under the Atrocities Act, 1989 can be said
1 2021 SCC Online SC 974
8
to have been vitiated, as so observed by the High Court in the impugned
judgment and order ?
29. On fair reading of Sections 207, 209 and 193 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and insertion of proviso to Section 14 of the
Atrocities Act by Act No. 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016, we are of the
opinion that on the aforesaid ground the entire criminal proceedings
cannot be said to have been vitiated. Second proviso to Section 14 of the
Atrocities Act which has been inserted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016
confers power upon the Special Court so established or specified for the
purpose of providing for speedy trial also shall have the power to
directly take cognizance of the offences under the Atrocities Act.
Considering the object and purpose of insertion of proviso to Section 14,
it cannot be said that it is not in conflict with the Sections 193, 207 and
209 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. It cannot be said that it
takes away jurisdiction of the Magistrate to take cognizance and
thereafter to commit the case to the Special Court for trial for the
offences under the Atrocities Act. Merely because, learned Magistrate
has taken cognizance of the offences and thereafter the trial/case has
been committed to Special Court established for the purpose of providing
for speedy trial, it cannot be said that entire criminal proceedings
including FIR and chargesheet etc. are vitiated and on the aforesaid
ground entire criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 452,
323, 325, 504, 506(2) and 114 of the Penal Code, 1860 and under
Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocities Act are to be quashed and set aside. It
may be noted that in view of insertion of proviso to Section 14 of the
Atrocities Act and considering the object and purpose, for which, the
proviso to Section 14 of the Atrocities Act has been inserted i.e. for the
purpose of providing for speedy trial and the object and purpose stated
herein above, it is advisable that the Court so established or specified in
exercise of powers under Section14, for the purpose of providing for
speedy trial directly take cognizance of the offences under the Atrocities
Act. But at the same time, as observed herein above, merely on the
ground that cognizance of the offences under the Atrocities Act is not
taken directly by the Special Court constituted under Section 14 of the
Atrocities Act, the entire criminal proceedings cannot be said to have
been vitiated and cannot be quashed and set aside solely on the ground
that cognizance has been taken by the learned Magistrate after
insertion of second proviso to Section 14 which confers powers upon the
Special Court also to directly take cognizance of the offences under the
Atrocities Act and thereafter case is committed to the Special
Court/Court of Session.
30. In support of the above conclusion, the words used in second
proviso to Section 14 are required to be considered minutely. The words
used are “Court so established or specified shall have power to
directly take cognizance of the offences under this Court”. The
word “only” is conspicuously missing. If the intention of the legislature
would have to confer the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences
9
under the Atrocities Act exclusively with the Special Court, in that case,
the wording should have been “that the Court so established or
specified only shall have power to directly take cognizance of
offences under this Act”. Therefore, merely because now further and
additional powers have been given to the Special Court also to take
cognizance of the offences under the Atrocities Act and in the present
case merely because the cognizance is taken by the learned Magistrate
for the offences under the Atrocities Act and thereafter the case has
been committed to the learned Special Court, it cannot be said that
entire criminal proceedings have been vitiated and same are required to
be quashed and set aside.”
23. In view of the judgment of this Court in Shantaben Bhurabhai
Bhuriya (supra), the Argument of Mr. Ranjit Kumar that the Additional
District Judge and Sessions Judge, Court No.4 Hathras had no jurisdiction
to take cognizance or issue summons/orders cannot be sustained.
24. There was apparently political rivalry between the Petitioner No.1 and
Devendra Aggarwal. However, Complaint Case No. 19/2018 has not been
lodged against the Petitioners, by Devendra Aggarwal, but by the
Respondent No.2, a Dhobi by caste, which is a scheduled caste. It cannot
be said that the allegations in the complaint do not make out offence under
the Atrocities Act. It is specifically alleged that the Petitioners had abused
the Respondent No.2 in filthy language by reference to his caste. The
allegations in the Complaint Case No.19 of 2018, if established, could result
in conviction under the relevant subsections of Section 3(1) of the Atrocities
Act.
10
25. Respondent No.2 being an employee of Devendra Aggarwal, it is
possible that Complaint Case No.19/2018 may have been prompted by
political vendetta against the Petitioner No.1. However, since as observed
above, the allegations in the complaint case make out an offence under
Section 3 of the Atrocities Act, it would not be proper to nip the complaint in
the bud, more so, when there are statements recorded in Court under
Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. The possibility of retaliation on the part of the
Petitioners by the acts alleged in the complaint, after closure of the earlier
complaint No.17 of 2010 cannot be ruled out. Quashing the criminal
proceedings at the very inception might result in injustice.
26. Section 482 of the Cr.P.C provides:
“482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.—Nothing
in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent
powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be
necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to
prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice.”
27. Even though, the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C., to interfere with criminal proceedings is wide, such power has
to be exercised with circumspection, in exceptional cases. Jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C is not to be exercised for the asking.
28. In Monica Kumar (Dr.) v. State of U.P2
., this Court held that
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C has to be exercised
2 (2008) 8 SCC 781
11
sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is
justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself.
29. In exceptional cases, to prevent abuse of the process of Court, the
High Court might in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482
quash criminal proceedings. However, interference would only be justified
when complaint did not disclose any offence, or was patently frivolous,
vexatious or oppressive, as held by this Court in Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R.
Prasanna Kumar3
.
30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated by reason of
political vendetta is not in itself ground for quashing the criminal
proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v.
State of Bihar and Others4
. It is a well established proposition of law that
a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified and based upon adequate
evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political
vendetta of the first informant or complainant. Though the view of
Bhagawti, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there
was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quote Krishna
Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh5
, “if the use of power is of
fulfilment of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation by malice is not
legicidal.”
3 AIR 1990 SC 494
4 (1987) 1 SCC 288
5 (1980) 2 SCC 471
12
31. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and
Ors.6
A threeJudge Bench of this Court held:
“6. It may be noticed that Section 482 of the present Code is the
ad verbatim copy of Section 561A of the old Code. This
provision confers a separate and independent power on the High
Court alone to pass orders ex debito justitiae in cases where
grave and substantial injustice has been done or where the
process of the court has been seriously abused. It is not merely a
revisional power meant to be exercised against the orders
passed by subordinate courts. It was under this section that in
the old Code, the High Courts used to quash the proceedings or
expunge uncalled for remarks against witnesses or other
persons or subordinate courts. Thus, the scope, ambit and range
of Section 561A (which is now Section 482) is quite different
from the powers conferred by the present Code under the
provisions of Section 397. It may be that in some cases there
may be overlapping but such cases would be few and far
between. It is well settled that the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the present Code can be exercised only when no
other remedy is available to the litigant and not where a specific
remedy is provided by the statute. Further, the power being an
extraordinary one, it has to be exercised sparingly. If these
considerations are kept in mind, there will be no inconsistency
between Sections 482 and 397(2) of the present Code.
7. The limits of the power under Section 482 were clearly
defined by this Court in Raj Kapoor v. State [(1980) 1 SCC 43 :
1980 SCC (Cri) 72] where Krishna Iyer, J. observed as follows:
[SCC para 10, p. 47: SCC (Cri) p. 76]
“Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law when a
specific provision is made: easy resort to inherent power is not right
except under compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of
jurisdiction but that inherent power should not invade areas set
apart for specific power under the same Code.”
. Another important consideration which is to be kept in mind is
as to when the High Court acting under the provisions of Section
6(1983) 1 SCC 1
13
482 should exercise the inherent power insofar as quashing of
criminal proceedings are concerned. This matter was gone into
in greater detail in Smt Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa
Konjalgi [(1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 507 : 1976 Supp
SCR 123 : 1976 Cri LJ 1533] where the scope of Sections 202
and 204 of the present Code was considered and while laying
down the guidelines and the grounds on which proceedings
could be quashed this Court observed as follows: [SCC para 5,
p. 741 : SCC (Cri) pp. 51112]
“Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an order
of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be
quashed or set aside:
(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the
statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken
at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused
or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an
offence which is alleged against the accused;
(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently
absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can
ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused;
(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing
process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no
evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or
inadmissible; and
(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects,
such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally
competent authority and the like.
The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and provide
sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High Court
can quash proceedings.”
9. Same view was taken in a later decision of this Court
in Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar [(1977) 1 SCC 505 :
1977 SCC (Cri) 132 : (1977) 2 SCR 357 : 1977 Cri LJ 1146]
where Bhagwati, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:
[SCC para 2, p. 506 : SCC (Cri) p. 133]
“It is now settled law that where the allegations set out in the
complaint or the chargesheet do not constitute any offence, it is
competent to the High Court exercising its inherent jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash
the order passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the
offence.
14
10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an
accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face
of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no
offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the
allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or
subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High
Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of
its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.”
32. As held by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Gourieshetty
Mahesh7
, the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Cr.P.C, would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry into whether the
evidence is reliable or not or whether there is reasonable possibility that the
accusation would not be sustained.
33. In Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttrakhand8
, this Court held:
“12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used
sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice.
Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends
14 upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential
ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged
by the High Court. …”
34. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao
Angre9
, a threeJudge Bench of this Court summarized the law with regard
7 (2010) 6 SCC 588
8 (2013) 11 SCC 673
9 (1988) 1 SCC 692
15
to quashing of criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. This
Court held:
“The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the
initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the
court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima
facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into
consideration any special features which appear in a particular
case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice
to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the
court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the
opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and,
therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a
criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into
consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding
even though it may be at a preliminary stage.”
35. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal10, this Court
observed:
“46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not
used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private
vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused.
On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the
opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an
inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts under
Section 482 CrPC though wide has to be exercised sparingly,
carefully and with caution and only when it is justified by the
tests specifically laid down in the statute itself and in the
aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal position, the
impugned judgment cannot be sustained.”
10 (2007) 12 SCC 1
16
36. In Kapil Agarwal & Ors. V. Sanjay Sharma & Others11, this Court
observed that Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is designed to achieve the purpose
of ensuring that criminal proceedings are not permitted to generate into
weapons of harassment.
37. In State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors.12, this Court
held:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the
principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of
decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power
under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of
the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we
give the following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any
precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report
or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose
a cogizable offence, justifying an investigation by police
officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of
the Code.
11 (2021) 5 SCC 524
121992 Suppl (1) SCC 335
17
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same
do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing
efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge.
103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power
of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very
sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of
rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking
upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or
otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint
and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer
an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its
whim or caprice.
18
37. Ends of justice would be better served if valuable time of the Court is
spent on hearing appeals rather than entertaining petitions under Section
482 at an interlocutory stage which might ultimately result in miscarriage of
justice as held in Hamida v. Rashid @ Rasheed and Others13
.
39. In our considered opinion criminal proceedings cannot be nipped
in the bud by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is
possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a
political opponent. However, such possibility would not justify
interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal
proceedings. As observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part
of the petitioners by the acts alleged, after closure of the earlier criminal
case cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute
offence under the Attrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or
untrue, would have to be decided in the trial. In exercise of power under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of
the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it
is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any
offence. The Complaint Case No.19/2018 is not such a case which
should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The High
Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
13 (2008) 1 SCC 474
19
40. For the reasons discussed above, we are not inclined to interfere
with the impugned judgment and order of the High Court. The special
leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
41. Documents have been brought on record by the Petitioners which
show that the Petitioner No.1 is a patient of lung cancer of an advanced
stage. He is on strong medication. Considering the condition of the health
of the Petitioner No.1, the Trial Court may consider exempting the personal
appearance of the Petitioner No.1, if such an application is made to the Trial
Court.
………………………………,J.
[ INDIRA BANERJEE ]
..
……………………………..,J.
[ A.S. BOPANNA ]
NEW DELHI ;
APRIL 20, 2022.
20
