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Friday, April 22, 2022

once the adoption deed is void , the adopted son is not entitled for appointment on compensatory ground of the deceased employee

 once the adoption deed is void , the adopted son is not entitled for appointment on compensatory ground of the deceased employeeOne of the essentials of a valid adoption is that the child being given in adoption should be below 15years of age. Section 10 (iv) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 makes this very clear. This section also shows that if there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties, this upper limit of 15 years is not applicable. In the case on hand, the petitioners have not pleaded let alone proved the existence of any custom or usage applicable either to the petitioner’s family or to his community in general. The existence of the custom and its applicability are matters of pleading and proof. The same are totally absent in the present case. The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 spells out the essential conditions for a valid adoption. Section 4 says that the Act will have overriding effect over any Act/Rule, interpretation of Hindu Act or any custom or usage which is prevalent by then. Any other existing law before the Act was also cease to apply and in addition, Section 5 which is to the following effect makes it clear that any adoption made after the Act except in accordance with the provisions of the shall be void. -not entitled for appointment as deceased 's dependent .

AP HIGH COURT ; AMARAVATHI

W.P.No.16602 of 2020

KONDAMURI VIJAY AMBEDKAR

Versus
THE STATE OF AP


HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE D.V.S.S.SOMAYAJULU

W.P.No.16602 of 2020

ORDER :

This writ petition is filed seeking a writ of Mandamus

declaring that the endorsement dated 19.06.2020 passed by

respondent No.3 rejecting the claim of the petitioner for

employment as illegal, unjust, contrary to the award passed by

the Legal Services Authority.

This Court has heard Sri S.A.Razzaak, learned counsel for

the petitioner and the Government Pleader for Social Welfare.

The petitioner before this Court claims to be the adopted

son of one late Sri K.Deena Dayal. Sri K.Deena Dayal was

murdered on 08.04.2013. A case was registered under section

302 IPC., but after the investigation, the Police closed the case

as undetectable and a final report dated 04.02.2016 was also

filed in the Court. The petitioner, who claims to be the adopted

son of the deceased, is claiming for compensation and also

employment as per the provisions of the Scheduled Caste,

Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and the

Amendment in 2015 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Apart

from that, he submits that he has also entered into a

compromise with the other legal heir of K.Deena Dayal in a Lok

Adalat and as per the compromise, the petitioner is entitled to

compassionate appointment under the provisions of the Act. 

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 Learned counsel for the petitioner argued the matter at

length and pointed out the various facts, the correspondence

that took place between the parties and argued that in view of

the amendment to the Act and Rules, the petitioner is entitled to

compassionate appointment. The contention of the learned

counsel is that the enactment itself and its amendments are

beneficial/welfare legislations which should be liberally

interpreted and would entitle the petitioner to seek

compassionate appointment under the relevant Government

Orders by which the rules have been framed. Learned counsel

argues that the award of the Lok Adalat is also binding on the

respondents and it is a valid compromise. He points out that

the petitioner, being the adopted son, is entitled to the

employment under G.O.Ms.No.3 dated 16.01.1996 as modified

later.

Relying upon the definition of ‘Family’ in G.O.Ms.No.43

dated 15.04.2015, the learned counsel argues that even if the

adoption is not correct, he fits within the definition of ‘family’

under clause 2 (e) since, he is Sri Deen Dayal’s brother's son.

The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is

therefore to the effect that the petitioner is entitled to

appropriate employment and the rejection of the same by the

respondent is not correct.

In reply to this, learned Government Pleader for Social

Welfare argues in line with the counter affidavit that has been

filed. It is his contention essentially that the provision of law on 

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which the petitioner is relying would only apply, if the adoption

is valid. In the case on hand, the learned Government Pleader

points out that the adoption deed is not valid and that on the

date of adoption, the petitioner was aged 18 years.

It is also his contention that after obtaining legal opinion,

the State has come to the conclusion that the petitioner is not

entitled to employment as the adoption itself is not valid. He

also submits that a declaration of “status” that is being sought

by the petitioner cannot be granted in a writ of this nature. The

validity of the adoption is the essential defense that is urged by

the learned Government Pleader for Social Welfare. The adoption

and its validity should be clearly pleaded and proved as per him

in an appropriate proceeding. He does not dispute the existence

of the provisions of the Act, or the facts which are detailed by

the petitioner. It is his essential contention that the adoption is

not valid and that consequently the petitioner is not entitled to

any relief in this writ.

This Court after hearing both the learned counsel notices

that the deed of adoption on which both the parties rely upon is

not really before this Court. The petitioner in his wisdom has

only challenged the action of the respondents in rejecting his

request for employment. He also pleaded in his writ affidavit

itself that the reliance on the age of the petitioner for deciding on

the validity of the adoption is not correct as the restriction of age

has no place in the community of Sudras to which the petitioner

belongs. He also argues that in the alternative, as the family 

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member and a relative by birth to the diseased K.Deena Dayal,

he is entitled to employment.

The fact that the deceased was murdered and the case was

closed is not in dispute. As far as the contention of the learned

counsel that age of the adopted child is not very material is

concerned, it is not supported by any law. The petitioner

admittedly is a Hindu. One of the essentials of a valid adoption

is that the child being given in adoption should be below 15

years of age. Section 10 (iv) of the Hindu Adoption and

Maintenance Act, 1956 makes this very clear.

 This section also shows that if there is a custom or usage

applicable to the parties, this upper limit of 15 years is not

applicable. In the case on hand, the petitioners have not

pleaded let alone proved the existence of any custom or usage

applicable either to the petitioner’s family or to his community in

general. The existence of the custom and its applicability are

matters of pleading and proof. The same are totally absent in

the present case.

 Even if the age of the petitioner is looked into, the writ is

filed in the year 2020 and he has been described as a person

aged about 32 years. This means he was born in 1988. As per

the parties the adoption is performed on 04.10.2004 which

means he was 16 on the date of the adoption. The Family

Members Certificate filed by the petitioner dated 24.05.2016

shows that he is aged 29 years on the date which means that he 

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was born in 1987 which makes him 17 years old by the time of

adoption in the year 2004. The representations on which the

Revenue Department relies upon states that he is aged 18 years.

Therefore, the available evidence and the documents do not

disclose clearly that the petitioner was aged below 15 years as

on the date of the alleged adoption.

The petitioner before this Court is challenging the order of

the State rejecting his claim for employment on the ground that

he did not fulfill his minimum age criteria prescribed under the

section mentioned above. Despite the rejection on this specific

ground, the petitioner did not plead or prove that the adoption is

valid and did not file any categorical proof of his age more so on

the date of adoption. Apart from this, this Court is also of the

opinion that the proof of adoption is necessary. The Hindu

Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 spells out the essential

conditions for a valid adoption. Section 4 says that the Act will

have overriding effect over any Act/Rule, interpretation of Hindu

Act or any custom or usage which is prevalent by then. Any

other existing law before the Act was also cease to apply and in

addition, Section 5 which is to the following effect makes it clear

that any adoption made after the Act except in accordance with

the provisions of the shall be void.

5. Adoptions to be regulated by this

Chapter- (1) No adoption shall be made after

the commencement of this Act by or to a

Hindu except in accordance with the

provisions contained in this Chapter, and any 

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adoption made in contravention of the said

provisions shall be void.

(2) An adoption which is void shall

neither create any rights in the adoptive

family in favour of any person which he or

she could not have acquired except by reason

of the adoption, nor destroy the rights of any

person in the family of his or her birth.

In addition, sections 6 to 11 deal with other requisites for a

valid adoption. In the opinion of this Court, since an adoption,

has the effect of disrupting the natural succession and has the

effect of conferring a certain status on the petitioner, it is a

matter of pleading and proof. The petitioner, whose claim has

been rejected on the ground that there is no valid adoption has

to necessarily establish his rights by adequate pleading and

proof that there was a valid adoption confirming to the legal and

factual requisites mentioned above and that there were actual

giving and taking of the child in adoption. These are matters of

pleading and evidence which will determine the status of the

individual and as such it is only a declaratory suit that can be

filed in a civil Court of competent jurisdiction and not a writ, in

the opinion of this Court, a writ petition is not a proper

proceeding for the relief sought.

Apart from these two issues, this Court finds that the

petitioner is also relying upon the decree passed in the Lok

Adalat between the daughter of late Deena Dayal and the

petitioner. It is important to note that the State is not a party

to this proceedings. The judgment/Award that was passed may 

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be binding between the parties to the said litigation, since it was

based upon some concessions. However, it cannot be said that

the same is conferring a right on the petitioner qua the State to

seek employment. The daughter of late Deena Dayal may not

have an objection and the award passed may operate as res

judicata/estoppel against her, but it does not confer right on the

person/petitioner to claim employment with the respondents.

The deed of adoption or its validity are not the subject matter of

the decision before the Lok Adalat. Therefore, this Court is of

the opinion that the award of the Lok Adalat is not binding on

the respondent-State.

Learned counsel for the petitioner also argued in the

alternative that even if the deed of adoption is not valid, the

petitioner is entitled to employment on the ground that he is a

blood relative and family member. He relies upon the definition

of ‘family’ clause (2)(e) of G.O.Ms.No.43 to support his argument.

However, a close reading of this G.O.Ms.No.43 shows that it is

passed/brought into existence only for the purpose of providing

funds for the purpose of compensation to the victims or their

dependents. These victims or their dependents suffer loss or

injury as a result of a crime and they require rehabilitation and

help. A dependant who is entitled to such help/assistance is

defined in section 2(b). The dependant must prove that he is

fully dependant on the victim before claiming the compensation.

Family also includes blood relations living in the same

household. In the opinion of this Court, Rule 7 of this G.O.

clarifies the procedure to be followed before the compensation is 

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to be granted. It is a matter of proof before the District Legal

Services Authority. The genuineness of the claim shall have to

be decided by the District Legal Services Authority. Section 9(a)

also provides upper limit or time period for filing of an

application. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that

G.O.Ms.No.43 will not confer any status on the petitioner to

claim the relief particularly in this writ petition. This G.O. came

into force on 15.04.2015 itself, but the petitioner did not pursue

his claim as per the said G.O.

Relying upon the Amendment Act in 2015 to the

Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)

Amendment Act, 2015 (Act 1 of 2016), learned counsel argues

that the petitioner falls within the definition of a victim as per

the amended clause 2(ec) which as follows:

(ec) “victim” means any individual who

falls within the definition of the ‘‘Scheduled

Castes and Scheduled Tribes’’ under clause

(c) of sub-section (1) of section 2, and who

has suffered or experienced physical, mental,

psychological emotional or monetary harm or

harm to his property as a result of the

commission, of any offence under this Act

and includes his relatives, legal guardian and

legal heirs;

However, this Court has to hold (after considering the

purpose for which this sub-section has been inserted) that it is

to confer a right to claim compensation on a victim and also his

relatives, legal guardian and legal heirs who have suffered or

experienced physical, mental, psychological or other harm. 

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Again in the opinion of this Court, this is a matter which has to

be established. The right to claim anything under this amended

section would arise if the petitioner is able to establish by virtue

of being a relative, he has suffered physical, mental or other

harm. The mere fact that the Act has an inclusive definition of

victim does not lead to irresistible conclusion that the petitioner

can claim employment on the basis of this definition.

Lastly, this Court notices that it is G.O.Ms.No.3 dated

16.01.1996 that gives a right to the petitioner to seek

employment. Annexure 1 to the G.O.Ms.No.3 deals with the

relief that can be granted for the various offences that are

described. Clause 21 deals with the murder and states that in

addition to the compensation payable for the murder, pension is

payable to the widow or other dependants of the deceased or

employment to one member of the family or provision of

agricultural land and houses. Therefore, this Rule by itself also

does not provide for an absolute right or confer an absolute right

on the petitioner to claim employment. In the opinion of this

Court, the definition of family in G.O.Ms.No.43 cannot also be

applied to the present case. Clause 21 gives the alternatives to

the State. The petitioner who wants to seek employment will

have to plead and prove that all the other sub sections would

not apply and that he fits within the definition of ‘member of a

family of the deceased’ for seeking employment. This basic

parameter is not met by the petitioner as he did not prove that

the adoption on which he relies is correct and is as per the law. 

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For all the above mentioned reasons, this Court is of the

opinion that the writ is not an appropriate proceeding and that

the petitioner has failed to prove that he has the necessary

status to claim employment. A declaration of status is the

proper remedy in this case. Unless and until the petitioner’s

status as the legal heir/adopted son is established in a

comprehensive civil suit, he is not entitled to any benefits.

The writ petition is misconceived and is dismissed. No

order as to costs.

As a sequel, the miscellaneous applications, pending if

any, shall stand dismissed.

________________________

D.V.S.S.SOMAYAJULU,J

Date : 15.06.2021

Note: L.R. copy be marked

KLP