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Monday, August 30, 2021

whether there exists statutorily, a distinction between “a Scheduled Indian Bank” and “a Scheduled Bank located in India” does not arise for consideration in this case, as the dispute primarily revolves around what was offered in Court by one of the parties, what was accepted in Court, and what was recorded in the Order and clarified later. If without any offer from the petitioner, an adjudication had been made by the Court directing the petitioner to 13 furnish bank guarantee of a particular type of bank and a dispute had been raised thereafter, it is only then that a question of law as to the status of such a bank with reference to the statutory provisions, would have arisen.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.4936-4937 OF 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) NOS. 11476-11477 OF 2021)

SEPCO ELECTRIC POWER CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION … Appellant(s)

 VERSUS

POWER MECH PROJECTS LTD. … Respondent(s)

O R D E R

Since we have not been able to agree, let the matter

forthwith be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for

appropriate directions.

 ………………………………………………………,J.

[INDIRA BANERJEE]

 ………………………………………………………,J.

[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN]

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 24, 2021

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal Nos. 4936-4937 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 11476-11477 OF 2021)

SEPCO ELECTRIC POWER

CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION …...Appellant(s)

Versus

POWER MECH PROJECTS LTD. ….Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Indira Banerjee, J.

Leave granted.

2. These appeals are against a judgment and order dated 27.11.2020,

passed by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court, dismissing the Appeal

being FAO(OS) (COMM) No.136 of 2019, filed by the Appellant under

Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, hereinafter

referred to, in short, as the “A & C Act” read with Section 13(1A) of the

Commercial Courts Act 2015, and affirming an order dated 16.05.2019

passed by the Commercial Division of the Delhi High Court in OMP(I)

(COMM) No.523/2017 under Section 9 of the A & C Act, whereby the Court

refused to recall its earlier order dated 09.04.2019, directing the Appellant

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to substitute an irrevocable Bank Guarantee, issued by the Industrial and

Commercial Bank of China Limited (ICBC), Mumbai Branch for Rs.30 Crores

furnished pursuant to an order dated 12.02.2019 of the Court, with a Bank

Guarantee of a “Scheduled Indian Bank” of the same amount. The

Appellant has also impugned a judgment and order dated 12.03.2021

passed by the Division Bench dismissing Review Petition No.5/2021 filed

by the Appellant for review of the said judgment and order dated

27.11.2020 dismissing the Appeal.

3. The short question in these Appeals is, whether the High Court was

right in refusing to accept a legally valid irrevocable Bank Guarantee of

Rs.30 Crores, issued by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China

Limited, Mumbai, hereinafter referred to as ‘ICBC’ which is a Scheduled

Bank included in the Second Schedule of the Reserve Bank of India Act,

1934, and insisting that the Appellant should furnish a fresh Bank

Guarantee of the same amount, with identical terms, issued by a

“Scheduled Indian Bank”, notwithstanding the expenditure incurred by the

Appellant in obtaining the Bank Guarantee from ICBC.

4. These Appeals are restricted only to the question of legality of the

direction of the High Court, requiring the Appellant to substitute a legally

valid irrevocable Bank Guarantee, issued by ICBC, which is a Scheduled

Bank, carrying on business in India, with a Bank Guarantee of equivalent

amount issued by a “Scheduled Indian Bank”. 

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5. The Appellant, an entity incorporated in China was awarded

contracts in relation to various coal based power projects in India and the

Respondent, a company incorporated in India was engaged as a subcontractor of the Appellant. Disputes and differences between the

Respondent and the Appellant were referred to Arbitration. The details of

the contract between the Appellant and the Respondent, or the disputes

and differences that arose therefrom, are irrelevant to the issues involved

in these Appeals. Suffice it to mention that the Arbitration culminated in

an Award dated 17.10.2017 of approximately Rs.1,42,00,00,000 (One

hundred and forty two crores) in favour of the Respondent.

6. On 03.12.2017, the Appellant filed an application under Section 34

of the A & C Act being O.M.P. (COMM) No. 432 of 2017 challenging the

Arbitral Award dated 17.10.2017 in the Commercial Division of the Delhi

High Court, which is pending.

7. On the other hand, the Respondent filed an application being OMP

(I) (COMM) No. 523/2017 in the Commercial Division of the High Court

under Section 9 of the A & C Act seeking, inter alia, directions on the

Appellant to secure the amount of the Arbitral Award.

8. On 12.02.2019, a Single Bench of the Commercial Court of the High

Court passed an order in O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) No. 523/2017 directing the

Appellant to furnish to the Registry of the High Court, a Bank Guarantee

for a sum of Rs.30 Crores, from a Scheduled Bank located in India. The

operative part of the order dated 12.02.2019 is set out hereinbelow:-

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“3. ….. It is ordered accordingly.

4. The Judgment Debtor will file the affidavit within two (2)

weeks; with a copy being furnished to the counsel for the Decree

Holder.

5. Insofar as the bank guarantee is concerned, it will be

furnished within 6 weeks as indicated by the counsel.

6. Further, the bank guarantee in the sum of Rs.30 crores will be

that of a scheduled bank located in India.

7. Renotify the matter on 31.7.2019.

8. In the meanwhile, the Judgment Debtor will continue to make

deposit with the Registry of this Court in terms of the order

dated 24.7.2018.”

9. On 22.03.2019, the Appellant got ICBC to issue an unconditional,

irrevocable Bank Guarantee for a sum of Rs.30 Crores payable on demand

to the Registrar General of the Delhi High Court. An electronic copy of

the Bank Guarantee was filed in the Registry on 26.03.2019.

10. Mr. K.V. Vishwanathan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf

of the Appellant submitted that the Appellant incurred expenditure of

Rs.30,00,000/- (Thirty Lakhs) approximately towards bank charges for

furnishing the Bank guarantee. Furthermore, an amount of

Rs.36,40,00,000/- was frozen in the Bank Account of the Appellant with

ICBC in China.

11. However, by an order dated 09.04.2019, the Single Bench directed

the Appellant to substitute the Bank Guarantee issued by ICBC, which had

been filed in the Registry of the High Court, by a Bank Guarantee of

equivalent amount from a Scheduled Indian Bank. The relevant

paragraphs of the said order are extracted hereinbelow:- 

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“5. Furthermore, Mr. Sethi says that in compliance of the order

dated 12.02.2019 which required the respondent to furnish a

bank guarantee of a Scheduled Bank, the respondent has

complied with the same and submitted a bank guarantee of

Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited (in short

“ICBC”).

6. However, a careful perusal of the order would show that Mr.

Sethi had offered to furnish a bank guarantee of a Scheduled

Indian bank and that while dictating the operative part of the

order, I had indicated that it would be a scheduled bank located

in India, therefore, the confusion, if any caused is now removed.

The respondent will substitute the bank guarantee filed with a

guarantee of a Scheduled Indian bank of an equivalent value.

7. Pending the substitution, the Registry will hold on to the bank

guarantee already submitted and the respondent will ensure

that the same is kept alive.

 8. As to whether the bank guarantee already filed is valid, the

matter will be placed before Joint Registrar (Judicial) on

23.04.2019.

 8.1 It is made clear that as and when the respondent is ready to

replace the bank guarantee furnished by ICBC with a bank

guarantee of a Scheduled Indian Bank, on a request being made

in that behalf via an appropriate application, the Joint Registrar

(Judicial) will release the bank guarantee furnished by ICBC

provided the request is backed by an undertaking of the duly

authorized representative of the respondent that it shall place

the bank guarantee of the Scheduled Indian Bank on record

within a defined time line not exceeding 10 days from the date

of the request.”

12. Pursuant to the direction of the Court, the Registrar (Judicial) of the

High Court scrutinized the Bank Guarantee furnished by the Appellant,

recorded the statement of Mr. Ayush Ganediwala, Vice President of ICBC,

who had appeared before him, and passed an order dated 03.05.2019,

recording that the said Bank Guarantee was valid with effect from

22.03.2019 till 19.03.2020.

13. Thereafter, the Appellant filed an application being IA No.7096 of

2019 for recall of the order dated 09.04.2019 of the Commercial Division

6

(Single Bench) of the High Court directing the Appellant to substitute the

Bank Guarantee issued by ICBC with a Bank Guarantee of equivalent

value of a Scheduled Indian Bank.

14. By an order dated 16.05.2019, the learned Single Bench dismissed

the said application, inter alia observing:-

“5. I may clarify, at the outset, that it is not this court’s

endeavour to doubt in any manner the credentials of ICBC. The

record, however, shows that the applicant/respondent had in

fact, on its own, offered to furnish a bank guarantee of a

Scheduled Indian Bank. The confusion, if any, in the mind of the

applicant/respondent, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Nigam, was

removed on 09.04.2019. The applicant/respondent has moved

this application after nearly four weeks of the clarification issued

in that behalf. Thus, having passed an order based, essentially,

on the offer made by the counsel for the applicant/respondent, I

do not see any good reason to recall the direction.”

15. From the orders dated 09.04.2019 and 16.05.2019, it appears that

the senior Counsel, representing the Respondent in the High Court had

vehemently objected to the Bank Guarantee of ICBC, arguing

emphatically, that the Appellant itself had, through Counsel, offered to

furnish a Bank Guarantee of a Scheduled Indian Bank, but had retracted

from its offer, taking advantage of an inadvertent typographical error in

Paragraph 6 of the order dated 12.02.2019, which read “Further the bank

guarantee in the sum of Rs.30 crores will be that of a scheduled bank

located in India”.

16. The direction in the operative part of the order dated 12.02.2019

was clear. It required the Appellants to furnish a Bank Guarantee of a

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Scheduled Bank located in India. The Appellant complied with the

direction and furnished a Bank Guarantee of a sum of Rs.30,00,000,00/-

(Thirty Crores) from the Mumbai Branch of ICBC.

17. May be, there was a mistake in passing the order dated 12.02.2019,

in the sense that the Court had intended to pass an order in terms of the

offer of the Appellant, to furnish a Bank Guarantee of a Scheduled Indian

Bank. In the order dated 09.04.2019, the learned Judge very fairly stated

that while dictating the operative part of the order, the learned Judge had

said that the Bank Guarantee would be of a Scheduled Bank located in

India. That is what the order read. A party cannot be faulted for acting in

terms of the order as issued, particularly when there was no patent or

obvious error in the direction to furnish a Bank Guarantee of a Scheduled

Bank, located in India.

18. It is true, that the order dated 12.02.2019 records the oral offer

made on behalf of the Appellant, through Counsel, to submit a bank

guarantee of a Scheduled Indian Bank. However, the direction in the

operative part of the order dated 12.02.2019 gives the impression, that

the offer of the Appellant to furnish a Bank Guarantee may have

persuaded the Court to secure the Arbitral Award by directing the

Appellant to furnish a Bank Guarantee of a Scheduled Bank located in

India.

19. As recorded in the order dated 09.04.2019, there may have been

some confusion by reason of the direction to furnish a Bank Guarantee of

8

a Scheduled Bank located in India. The language and tenor of the order

dated 12.02.2019, as also the fact that the Respondent did not make any

attempt to have the direction to furnish a Bank Guarantee of a Scheduled

Bank located in India rectified and/or altered, shows that use of the

expression ‘Scheduled Indian Bank’ may have been understood by all

concerned parties to include an Indian branch of a Scheduled Bank.

20. Contrary to the contention of the Respondent, as recorded in the

order dated 16.05.2019 of the Court, there was no typographical error in

the order dated 12.02.2019. One can say that there is a typographical

error when there is an inadvertent mistake in a figure or the spelling of a

word by reason of pressing a wrong key of the keyboard or the omission or

duplication of a word or phrase or even a sentence/sentences. A

typographical error is obvious. That was not the case here.

21. The direction to furnish a Bank Guarantee of a Scheduled Indian

Bank located in India, is perfectly legal. There was no reason for the

Appellant to proceed on the basis that the direction had been issued by

mistake. The Respondent also did not take any steps to get the direction

rectified or altered. The direction was allowed to remain intact for almost

two months. In the meanwhile, the Appellant furnished a Bank Guarantee

of an Indian Branch of ICBC, a Scheduled Bank in India.

22. In this case, perhaps the intention of the Court was not expressed

in the order accurately. However, the order was otherwise correctly

worded and legally valid. It is not uncommon for Courts to give directions,

9

which might be at variance with an oral offer. The Appellant having acted

in accordance with the order dated 12.02.2019 and changed his position

to his detriment by incurring an expenditure of about Rs.30 lakhs to

comply with the said order, it was not appropriate for the Court to change

the order.

23. From the order dated 09.04.2019, it is clear that even the Single

Bench accepted that there was a confusion due to the language and tenor

of the direction in Paragraph 6 of the said order. Thus the Court, in effect,

accepted that there may not have been any deliberateness on the part of

the Appellant in furnishing a Bank Guarantee issued by ICBC.

24. Being aggrieved by the order dated 16.05.2019 refusing to recall

the earlier order of the Court dated 09.04.2019, directing the Appellant to

replace the Bank Guarantee of ICBC, with a Bank Guarantee of a

Scheduled Indian Bank, the Appellant filed an appeal under Section 37 of

the A & C Act, read with Section 13 (1A) of the Commercial Courts Act,

2015. The appeal was dismissed by the order of the Division Bench dated

27.11.2020 impugned before this Court. The prayer of the Appellant, for

review of the Order dated 27.11.2020 was rejected by an order dated

12.03.2021, which is also under challenge before this Court.

25. There may not be any infirmity in the order dated 12.03.2021,

rejecting the prayer of the Appellant for review, having regard to the

limited scope of an application for review. A matter cannot be re-argued

in the garb of an application for review. Nor does the Review Court

10

exercise appellate powers. All applications for review are governed by the

principles enshrined in Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code

of Civil Procedure, 1908. A court is empowered to review its own order

only if the conditions precedent for a review, as laid down in Section 114

read with Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure exist. In this case

the prerequisites for a review did not exist. The appeal from the order

dated 12.03.2021, rejecting the application for review, is therefore,

dismissed.

26. Therefore, the question is whether the Division Bench, after having

held that the order impugned before it was appealable, should have

dismissed the appeal and allowed the direction on the Appellant to

substitute the Bank Guarantee of ICBC with a fresh bank guarantee of a

Scheduled Indian Bank, to stand.

27. Even in the proceedings before the Division Bench, the Respondent

only harped on the offer of the Appellant to furnish a Bank Guarantee of a

Scheduled Indian Bank and further contended that the Bank Guarantee of

ICBC being conditional, the Respondent feared that the purpose of the

Bank Guarantee might not be served.

28. Significantly, there is no finding of the Single Bench that the bank

guarantee is conditional. A copy of the Bank Guarantee is included in the

Paper Book. The Bank Guarantee reads:

“NOW THESE PRESENTS WITNESSETH THAT THE SAID BANK DOTH HEREBY

STAND SURETY IN PURSUANCE OF THE SAID ORDER DATED 12

TH

 FEBRUARY

2019 FOR THE SUM OF RS. 300,00,000/- (RUPEES THIRTY CRORES ONLY)

AND THE SAID BANK DOTH HEREBY GUARANTEE TO AND COVENANT WITH

THE REGISTRAR GENERAL, DELHI HIGH COURT THAT THE SAID BANK

11

SHALL FORTHWITH PAY THE SAID SUM OF RS. 300,00,000/-(RUPEES THIRTY

CRORES ONLY) TO THE REGISTRAR GENERAL, DELHI HIGH COURT IN

TERMS OF THE ORDER/JUDGEMENT OF THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF

DELHI ALLOWING THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARBITRAL AWARD DATED

17TH OCTOBER, 2017 AND AS PER ORDER/DIRECTION/JUDGMENT BY THE

HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI IN THE MATTER ARISING OUT OF ABOVE

MENTIONED LEGAL PROCEEDINGS.

AND THE SAID BANK DOTH HEREBY FURTHER COVENANT AND DECLARE

THAT THE BANK GUARANTEE HEREIN SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE UP TO AND

INCLUSIVE OF A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR AND THE SAID BANK SHALL IN

CIRCUMSTANCES AS ABOVE, WITHOUT ANY DEMUR OR DEMAND, ACTION,

NOTICE OR OBJECTION FORTHWITH PAY TO THE REGISTRAR GENERAL,

DELHI HIGH COURT THE SAID AMOUNT OF RS.300,00,000/-(RUPEES THIRTY

CRORES ONLY).

AND IT IS HEREBY FURTHER RECORDED THAT THE SAID BANK GUARANTEE

GIVEN HEREIN IS IRREVOCABLE AND SHALL NOT BE REVOKED BY NOTICE

OR OTHERWISE AND IT IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORDER DATED 12

TH

FEBRUARY, 2019 PASSED BY THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI IN

PETITION NO. O.M.P.(I) (COMM) NO.523/2017 TITLED M/S. POWER MECH

PROJECTS LTD. VS. SEPCO ELECTRIC POWER CONSTRUCTION

CORPORATION AND O.M.P. (COMM) NO.432/2017 TITLED SEPCO ELECTRIC

POWER CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION VS M/S. POWER MECH PROJECTS

LTD. NOTHWITHSTANDING ANYTHING CONTAINED HEREINABOVE THE

LIABILITY OF THE SAID BANK IS RESTRICTED TO THE SUM OF

RS.300,00,000/- (RUPEES THIRTY CRORES ONLY).

IN WITNESS WHEREOF WE, INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL BANK OF

CHINA LIMITED, MUMBIA BRANCH

NAME OF THE SCHEDULED BANK, BRANCH AND ADDRESS)

HAVE EXECUTED THESE PRESENT AT NEW DELHI

THIS 22

ND

 DAY OF MARH 2019.

THE GUARANTEE IS SUBJECT TO THE UNIFORM RULES FOR DEMAND

GUARANTEES(URDG) 2010 REVISION, ICC PUBLICATION NO.758.”

29. The ICBC has unequivocally agreed to honour the Bank Guarantee

on an order and/or judgment of the High Court allowing enforcement of

the Arbitral Award, and as per Order/Direction/Judgment by the High Court

in the pending legal proceedings. The statement that the Bank Guarantee

is subject to the Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees (URDG) 2010

Revision, does not dilute the terms of the Bank Guarantee. Nor does the

URDG render the Bank Guarantee any less effective. Furthermore, the

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High Court did not direct the Appellant to furnish an unconditional

guarantee.

30. The Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees (URDG) 758 is a set of

voluntary contractual rules, published by the International Chamber of

Commerce (ICC) with the aim of regularising and creating a set standard

of international banking practice on demand guarantees and counter

demand guarantees.

31. The URDG balances the legitimate and competing interests of the

applicant, the guarantor and the beneficiary and limits the risk of unfair

calls and demands on guarantors and counter-guarantors, just like the

ICC's Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) 600

which applies to Letters of Credit (LCs) and other documentary credits.

32. The URDG, being a voluntary instrument, lacks the force of law, and

must thus be expressly incorporated by the parties in order for it to apply

to a demand guarantee or counter-guarantee. Guarantees issued by

guarantors and counter-guarantors, which incorporate the URDG, are

entirely subject to their own terms, while incorporating beneficial terms of

the URDG.

33. It is important to note that the URDG may apply without the parties

expressly including it in certain instances, where it is in the general usage

of a particular trade, where the applicable law provides for its application;

or where it has been in consistent use in the course of a transaction or

dealings between the parties.

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34. The provisions of the URDG are limited to the scope of the matters

upon which the contracting parties are free to contract on, and is subject

to mandatory national laws of the governing jurisdiction, which is the law

and jurisdiction of the guarantor or counter-guarantor, unless otherwise

agreed by the parties.

35. Under the URDG, guarantees are completely independent of any

underlying relationship between the applicant and beneficiary, and

subject to only the terms contained in it, thereby limiting the liabilities and

rights of the guarantor bank to only matters to which it voluntarily

commits itself.

36. URDG 758 is a revised version of URDG 458. The revision was

conducted under the aegis of ICC Banking Commission and the ICC

Commission on Commercial Law and Practice.

37. The ICC Task Force on Guarantees, the standing expert body created

by ICC in 2003 to monitor international guarantee practice, acted as a

consultative body to the Drafting Group that produced five comprehensive

drafts during the two-and-a-half-year revision process.

38. The resulting URDG 758 were adopted unanimously by the ICC

Executive Board at its meeting in New Delhi on 3 December 2009,

following their endorsement by the members of the two sponsoring ICC

Commissions. They came into force on 1 July 2010, whereupon a

considerable number of demand guarantees and counter-guarantees

started being issued all over the world subject to the new URDG 758.

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39. It appears that all the concerned parties proceeded on the

understanding that there was no difference between a ‘Scheduled Indian

Bank’ and ‘Scheduled Bank located in India’, in the absence of any

specific definition of the expression ‘Scheduled Indian Bank’ in the RBI or

the Banking Regulation Act.

40. Incorporated on 01.01.1984, ICBC is a Chinese State-owned multi

national banking company, with capital provided by the Ministry of

Finance of China. ICBC is a banking company within the meaning of

Section 5(c) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, read with Section 45A

(a) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, hereinafter referred to as the

RBI Act. Sections 5(c) of the Banking Regulation Act and Section 45A(a) of

the RBI Act are set out hereinbelow for convenience”-

“Section 5(c) of Banking Regulation Act, 1949

5(c) “banking company” means any company which transacts

the business of banking in India ;

Explanation.—Any company which is engaged in the

manufacture of goods or carries on any trade and which

accepts deposits of money from the public merely for the

purpose of financing its business as such manufacturer or

trader shall not be deemed to transact the business of

banking within the meaning of this clause;

xxx xxx xxx

Section 45A (a) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934

45A(a) “banking company” means a banking company as

defined in Section 5 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, and

includes the State Bank of India, any subsidiary bank as defined

in the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959, any

corresponding new bank constituted by Section 3 of the Banking

Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970,

and any other financial institution notified by the Central

Government in this behalf,...”

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41. ICBC is also a Scheduled Bank within the meaning of Section 2 (e) of

the RBI Act, which defines a ‘Scheduled Bank’ to mean a bank included in

the Second Schedule to the RBI Act. ICBC has its branch office at the

Bandra Kurla Complex, Mumbai, India. The Mumbai branch of ICBC has

been granted license by RBI to carry on banking business in India

pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments

of India and China.

42. The Mumbai branch of ICBC commenced operations in September

2011 and was included in the Second Schedule to the RBI Act by

Notification DBOD IBD. No.8137/23.03.026/2011-12 dated 01.12.2011

published in the Gazette of India (Part III Section 4).

43. ICBC evidently continues to be in the Second Schedule to the RBI

Act till date. In this context, it may be pertinent to point out that some

banks have been excluded from the Second Schedule to the RBI Act by

Gazette Notifications.

44. Banks have been listed in the Second Schedule to the RBI Act, by

Gazette Notifications issued from time to time, under the following

categories:-

1. Scheduled Public Sector Banks

2. Scheduled Private Sector Banks.

3. Scheduled Small Finance Banks

4. Scheduled Payments Banks

5. Scheduled Regional Rural Banks

6. Scheduled Foreign Banks in India

16

45. In terms of Annexure-1 to the notification dated 13th April 2020,

mentioned in Paragraph 2(b) thereof the following Scheduled Commercial

Banks have been included in the Schedule to the RBI Act:-

“Annexure I

(Refer to para 2(b) of notification dated April 13, 2020)

List of Scheduled Commercial Banks

PUBLIC SECTOR BANKS PRIVATE BANKS

1 State Bank of India 1 Axis Bank Ltd.

2 Bank of Baroda

(Including Vijaya Bank and Dena Bank)

2 Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd.

3 Bank of India 3 City Union Bank Ltd.

4 Bank of Maharashtra 4 Development Credit Bank Ltd.

5 Canara Bank

(Including Syndicate Bank)

5 Dhanlaxmi Bank Ltd.

6 Central Bank of India 6 Federal Bank Ltd.

7 Indian Bank

(Including Allahabad Bank)

7 HDFC Bank Ltd.

8 Indian Overseas Bank 8 ICICI Bank Ltd.

9 Punjab National Bank (including

Oriental Bank of Commerce and United

Bank of India)

9 IndusInd Bank Ltd.

10 Punjab & Sind Bank 10 Jammu & Kashmir Bank Ltd.

11 Union Bank of India (including Andhra

Bank and Corporation Bank)

11 Karnataka Bank Ltd.

12 UCO Bank 12 Karur Vysya Bank Ltd.

13 Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

14 Lakshmi Vilas Bank Ltd.

15 Nainital Bank Ltd.

16 Ratnakar Bank Ltd.

17 South Indian Bank Ltd.

18 Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd.

19 Yes Bank Ltd.

20 Bandhan Bank

17

21 IDFC Bank Ltd.

22 IDBI Bank Ltd

FOREIGN BANKS

1 The Royal Bank of Scotland N.V. 23 Mizuho Corporate Bank Ltd.

2 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank Ltd. 24 Oman International Bank

3 Antewerp Diamond Bank N.V. 25 Societe Generale

4 Arab Bangladesh Bank Ltd. (AB Bank) 26 Sonali Bank

5 Bank International Indonesia 27 Standard Chartered Bank

6 Bank of America 28 State Bank of Mauritius

7 Bank of Bahrain & Kuwait B.S.C. 29 JSC-VTB Bank

8 Bank of Ceylon 30 UBS-AG

9 Bank of Nova Scotia 31 American Express Banking Corporation

10 Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Ltd. 32 First Rand Bank Ltd.

11 Barclays Bank 33 Commonwealth Bank of Australia

12 BNP Paribas 34 United Overseas Bank Ltd.

13 China Trust Bank 35 Credit Suisse A.G.

14 Shinhan Bank 36 Sberbank

15 Citibank N.A. 37 Australia and New Zealand Banking

Group Ltd.

16 Credit Agricole Corporate and

Investment Bank

38 Rabobank International

17 Deutsche Bank 39 National Australia Bank

18 DBS Bank Ltd. 40 Woori Bank

19 Hongkong and Shanghai Banking

Corpn. Ltd.

41 Industrial & Commercial Bank of China

20 J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N.A. 42 Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation

21 Krung Thai Bank 43 Westpac Banking Corporation

22 Mashreqbank 44 Doha Bank

46. As a Scheduled Bank and a banking company within the meaning of

the Banking Regulation Act, ICBC is governed by the regulatory provisions

of the RBI Act and the Banking Regulation Act and the Rules, Regulations,

Orders, Notifications etc. issued thereunder. The circulars and directives

of the Reserve Bank of India with regard to Bank Guarantees/ Demand

Guarantees are binding on ICBC.

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47. The RBI Act only defines ‘Scheduled Banks’ which includes

Scheduled Foreign Banks operating in India. The RBI Act or the Second

Schedule thereto does not segregate Scheduled Indian Banks. There is no

definition of Scheduled Indian Bank in the RBI Act. The regulatory

provisions of the RBI Act apply equally to all scheduled banks.

48. However, since there is a list of Scheduled Foreign Banks in India

categorized separately in the Second Schedule by Gazette Notifications, it

may be presumed that all other banks listed in the Second Schedule in the

various categories except the category of Scheduled Foreign Banks, that

is, Scheduled Public Sector Banks, Scheduled Private Sector Banks,

Scheduled Small Finance Banks, Scheduled Payments Banks, Scheduled

Regional Rural Banks are all Scheduled Indian Banks, even though

Scheduled Indian Banks do not constitute any distinct category in the

Second Schedule to the RBI Act. Since ICBC has its principal branch

registered in the People’s Republic of China and is listed in the category of

Scheduled Foreign Banks in India, the High Court made a distinction

between ICBC and a ‘Scheduled Indian Bank’.

49. The Annexures to the Special Leave Petition filed in this Court, which

form part of the Paper Book in these appeals show that ICBC is not only a

Scheduled Bank in India, but it also ranks very high in terms of asset value

in atleast three extremely authoritative lists being ‘The Banker’s Top 1000

World Banks 2018’, ‘The Forbes Global 2000 2019’ and ‘The Fortune

Global 500 Sub-list of Commercial Banks’. 

19

50. It is stated by the Appellant that ICBC realized a net profit of RMB

298.7 Billion in the year 2018 with the total value of its assets assessed at

27,699,540 (in RMB Millions). Mr. Vishwanathan submits that ICBC

continues to hold the largest total net profit in the global banking industry.

51. It appears that the Mumbai branch of ICBC has set up a fund for an

amount of 200 million US Dollars for investment in Indian Micro, Small and

Medium Enterprises (MSMEs). It is contended on behalf of the Appellant

that this establishes the credibility of ICBC within the Indian Commercial

Market.

52. In the Second Schedule to the RBI Act, ICBC is listed in the same

category of Scheduled Foreign Banks in India as Standard Chartered Bank,

Citi Bank, American Express Banking Corporation, HSBC Limited etc.

which are household names in India in the arena of banking. On the

other hand, Scheduled Indian Bank, as stated above would include all

categories of banks in the Second Schedule except those in the category

of Scheduled Foreign Banks. Scheduled Banks would therefore, include

Scheduled Private Sector Banks such as Bandhan Bank Limited, City Union

Bank Limited, Ratnakar Bank Limited, Dhanalaxmi Bank Limited, Kotak

Mahindra Bank Limited, Lakshmi Vilas Bank Limited, Nainital Bank Limited,

Yes Bank Limited etc.

53. Mr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel opposing these

appeals on behalf of the respondents could not demonstrate any real

prejudice likely to be caused by reason of furnishing of a Bank Guarantee

of ICBC in preference to Scheduled Indian Banks nor could he show any

20

plausible reason for preference of Scheduled Private Sector Banks in India

to Scheduled Foreign Banks like ICBC.

54. As pleaded in the appeal being FAO (OS) (COMM) No.136 of 2019

the Respondents have not been able to advert to a single instance of

default, fraud or any other malpractice of ICBC which could cast any doubt

over ICBC’s ability or inclination to honour the Bank Guarantee issued by

it.

55. It is incomprehensible why Scheduled Private Banks in India should

be preferred to Scheduled Foreign Banks in India with high global rating,

even though, some Scheduled Private Sector Banks have not even been

running well. It would perhaps not be out of place to take judicial notice of

reports that in March, 2020, Yes Bank, a private Sector bank, which was on

the brink of complete financial collapse, had to be placed under a

moratorium by RBI. Yes Bank has been cited by this Court as an example

only to illustrate the fallacy of insistence upon the Bank Guarantee of a

Scheduled Indian Bank in preference to that of Scheduled Foreign Bank in

India, and not to cast any aspersion on the present functioning of Yes bank

or any other Scheduled Bank in the Private Sector in India.

56. There can be no doubt that the Court has the discretion to insist on

a Bank Guarantee from any specific bank or class of banks to safeguard

the interests of the beneficiary of the Bank Guarantee. The Court may

legitimately disapprove a Bank Guarantee of a bank with a history which

raises doubts with regard to its credibility. In this case, there is nothing

21

on record to give rise to any doubts with regard to the credibility of ICBC

or its financial ability or willingness to honour guarantees.

57. In the absence of any adverse material against ICBC and in the light

of a plethora of reports showing its financial soundness, I am of the view

that the High Court erred in directing the Appellant to replace the Bank

Guarantee of ICBC, already furnished pursuant to an order of Court passed

on 12.02.2019, with another Bank Guarantee, oblivious of the practical

realities in the arena of banking activities, specially the difficulties in

obtaining a Bank Guarantee from banks with which the applicant has no

transaction and ignoring the cost already incurred by the Appellant by way

of bank charges for obtaining the guarantee.

58. Mr. Singhvi, more as an argument in desperation, submitted that the

Petitioner would not have incurred so much expenditure if it had complied

with the order dated 09.04.2019 instead of taking recourse to different

proceedings before Court. Prompt compliance with the order of

09.04.2019 may have saved the Appellant the costs of renewal of the

Bank Guarantee. However, the initial amount of about Rs.30 lakhs had

already been spent long before the order dated 09.04.2019 was passed.

59. As discussed above, all that is required for invocation of the Bank

Guarantee is an order of the High Court in the proceedings relating to the

Arbitral Award. The statement that the guarantee is subject to the URDG

does not dilute the guarantee or make it conditional. Mr. Singhvi’s client

has not been able to demonstrate how the URDG can cause any prejudice

to the beneficiary of the Bank Guarantee. Having passed an order on

22

12.02.2019 which directed “..Further, the bank guarantee in the sum of

Rs.30 crores will be that of a scheduled bank located in India...” on the

basis of which the Appellant altered its position to its detriment by

extending Rs.30 lakhs in obtaining a Bank Guarantee of ICBC. The High

Court was not justified in altering and/or modifying the said direction after

almost two months and after its compliance.

60. For the reasons discussed above, the appeal from the impugned

judgment and order of the Division Bench dated 27.11.2020 in FAO(OS)

(COMM) No. 136 of 2019 is allowed. The impugned judgment and order

of the Division Bench dated 27.11.2020 in FAO(OS) (COMM) No. 136 of

2019 and orders dated 09.04.2019 and 16.05.2019 in OMP (I) (COMM)

523/2017 are set aside.

….……………………………………. J.

 [INDIRA BANERJEE]

New Delhi;

August 24, 2021

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 11476­77 OF 2021

SEPCO ELECTRIC POWER

CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION             …              PETITIONER(S)

VERSUS

POWER MECH PROJECTS LTD.              …              RESPONDENT(S)

O R D E R

1. Despite a fine analysis by my learned sister, of the relevant

provisions of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 and the Banking

Regulation Act, 1949 and the fine distinction that the Hon’ble Judge

has brought out between a ‘scheduled Bank’ defined in the Act, in

contrast   to   a   ‘scheduled   Indian   Bank’   not   defined   anywhere

statutorily, I regret my inability to persuade myself to agree to the view

taken by my learned sister. In my considered view, the special leave

petitions deserve to be dismissed. The reasons are provided herein

below.

2. As pointed out by my sister, the award­debtor has come up with

these Special Leave Petitions challenging (i) the dismissal of an appeal

under   Section   37   of   the   Arbitration   and   Conciliation   Act,   1996

2

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’); and (ii) the dismissal of a review

petition arising there from. The appeal under section 37 of the Act

arose out of the rejection of a petition for recalling an order passed in

an application for interim measure under Section 9 of the Act.

3. The petitioner suffered an arbitration award dated 17.10.2017 in

a sum of Rs.142,41,14,499/­. The award is the subject matter of

challenge in a petition OMP(COMM.)No.432 of 2017 under Section 34

of   the   Act.   It   appears   that   the   petition   under   Section   34   was

accompanied by an application for stay of execution of the award, but

the same has not yet been finally disposed of.

4. However   the   respondent   filed   an   independent   petition   under

Section 9 of the Act, and sought a direction to the petitioner to secure

the award amount. In the said petition in I.A.No.11128 of 2018 in

OMP (I)(COMM.)No.523 of 2017, an order was passed on 12.02.2019.

Since the genesis of the dispute before us could be traced to the said

order, it is extracted as follows:­

“1. Mr.   Sethi,   learned   senior   counsel   for   the

respondent,   says   that   he   will   file   an   affidavit   stating

therein the following:

(i) The list of assets which find mention in the

valuers’   report   along   with   their   location   and

valuation given by the valuer.

(ii) The list of assets which, according to him,

the  valuer   has   not   valued.     In   respect   of   these

3

assets their location and approximate valuation will

also be given.

(iii) Furnish a bank guarantee in the sum of

Rs.30 crores of a scheduled Indian bank.

2. Learned senior counsel says that on account of the

spring festival in China, it could take at least  six (6)

weeks to furnish the bank guarantee.

3. Mr.   Sethi   says,   however,   the   affidavit   can   be

furnished within the next two (2) weeks.   It is ordered

accordingly.

4. The Judgment Debtor will file the affidavit within

two (2) weeks; with a copy being furnished to the counsel

for the decree holder.

5. Insofar as the bank guarantee is concerned, it will

be furnished within 6 weeks as indicated by the counsel.

6. Further,  the   bank   guarantee   in   the   sum   of

Rs.30   crores   will   be   that   of   a   scheduled   bank

located in India.

7. Renotify the matter on 31.7.2019.

8. In   the   meanwhile,   the   Judgment   Debtor   will

continue to make deposit with the Registry of this Court

in terms of the order dated 24.7.2018.”

5. Pursuant to the aforesaid order, the petitioner furnished a bank

guarantee issued by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China

Limited, Mumbai Branch dated 22.03.2019 (hereinafter referred to

ICBC).

6. It   appears   that   thereafter   the   respondent   moved   another

application in I.A.No.5185 of 2019 in OMP(I)(COMM.) No.523 of 2017

seeking     Garnishee   Orders   in   respect   of   the   amounts   that   the

4

petitioner   was   entitled   to   receive   under   a   settlement   agreement

entered into with one of their customers. While dealing with the said

application, the learned Judge found that instead of furnishing a bank

guarantee of a scheduled Indian bank, the petitioner had furnished

bank guarantee of ICBC, in view of the confusion created in paragraph

6 of the order dated 12.02.2019. Therefore, by an order passed on

09.04.2019, in I.A.No.5185 of 2019, the learned Judge directed the

petitioner to substitute the bank guarantee of ICBC, with a bank

guarantee of a scheduled Indian bank. The relevant portion of the

order   passed   by   the   learned   judge   in   I.A.No.5185   of   2019   dated

09.04.2019 reads as follows:­

“…                                    …                             …

5. Furthermore, Mr. Sethi says that in compliance of

the   order   dated   12.02.2019   which   required   the

respondent to furnish a bank guarantee of a Scheduled

Bank, the respondent has complied with the same and

submitted   a   bank   guarantee   of   Industrial   and

Commercial Bank of china Limited (in short “ICBC”)

6. However,  a   careful   perusal   of   the   order   would

show   that  Mr.   Sethi   had   offered   to   furnish   a   bank

guarantee of a Scheduled Indian bank and that while

dictating   the   operative   part   of   the   order,   I   had

indicated that it would be a scheduled bank located in

India, therefore, the confusion, if any caused is now

removed.   The   respondent   will   substitute   the   bank

guarantee filed with a guarantee of a Scheduled Indian

bank of an equivalent value.

      …                                  …                                …”

7. It is relevant to point out here that the order dated 09.04.2019

5

was passed by the very same Judge who passed the order dated

12.02.2019. The learned Judge was thus aware of what transpired in

court   on   12.02.2019   and   hence   recorded   in   the   order   dated

09.04.2019   as   to   what   happened   in   court   on   12.02.2019.   It   is

needless to emphasize that what is recorded in a judicial order about

what transpired during the hearing in court, is to be taken to be a

correct reflection of what transpired.

8. However, the petitioner filed an application in I.A.No.7096 of

2019 seeking to recall the directions contained in paragraph 6 of the

order   dated   09.04.2019.   The   main   grievance   as   projected   by   the

petitioner in the said petition was that the non­acceptance of the bank

guarantee furnished by ICBC may be taken as a reflection on the

reputation of the bank.

9. But by an order dated 16.05.2019, the learned Judge dismissed

I.A.No.7096 of 2019, clarifying that the credentials of ICBC are not at

all doubted and that what was sought to be done by the order dated

09.04.2019, was merely to correct an error that crept in the order

dated 12.02.2019. Paragraph 5 of the order dated 16.05.2019 reads

as follows:­

“…                            …                            …

5. I   may   clarify,   at   the   outset,   that   it   is   not   this

court’s endeavour to doubt in any manner the credentials

of   ICBC.    The   record,   however,   shows   that   the

6

applicant/respondent had in fact, on its own, offered

to   furnish   a   bank   guarantee   of   a   Scheduled   Indian

Bank.     The   confusion,   if   any,   in   the   mind   of   the

applicant/respondent,   as   rightly   pointed   out   by   Mr.

Nigam,   was   removed   on   09.04.2019.     The

applicant/respondent   has   moved   this   application   after

nearly   four   weeks   of   the   clarification   issued   in   that

behalf. Thus, having passed an order based, essentially,

on   the   offer   made   by   the   counsel   for   the

applicant/respondent, I do not see any good reason to

recall the direction. …”

10. Challenging the order dated 16.05.2019, passed in I.A.No. 7096

of   2019,   the   petitioner   moved   an   intra­court   appeal   in   FAO(OS)

(COMM.)No.136 of 2019 under Section 37 of the Act read with Section

13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. This appeal was dismissed by

the Division Bench by an order dated 27.11.2020 primarily on the

ground that the order under appeal was an interim one which is

largely discretionary and that the scope and power of the appellate

court in appeals against interim orders is limited to certain factors.

11. The   petitioner   thereafter   moved   an   application   for   review   in

R.P.No.5 of 2021 seeking a review of the order dated 27.11.2020.  The

review   petition   was   dismissed   by   an   order   dated   12.03.2021.

Therefore, challenging the dismissal of the appeal and the dismissal of

the review petition, the petitioner has come up with these Special

Leave Petitions.

12. Thus we have 2 Special Leave Petitions, one challenging the

7

dismissal of the appeal under section 37 and another challenging the

dismissal of the review petition. The SLP arising out of the order

passed in the review petition deserves to be thrown out without much

ado, since the refusal of a court to review its order due to the absence

of the parameters prescribed in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, cannot give rise

to a substantial question of law of public importance, warranting our

interference under Article 136.

13. In so far as the other SLP challenging the order passed in the

appeal under Section 37 of the Act is concerned, the same arises out

of an interim order passed under Section 9 of the Act. As rightly

observed by the Division Bench of the High Court, interim orders are

discretionary and there is no question of interference with the exercise

of the discretion, even in an intra­court appeal, much less in an SLP

under Article 136.

14. All that the learned Judge did on 09.04.2019, was to correct a

mistake that inadvertently crept in his order. The correction that the

learned Judge sought to make, was in tune with the very offer made

by the petitioner at the first instance on 12.02.2019. When an interim

order has been passed particularly in a fact situation arising out of an

offer made by one of the parties, especially by the very same learned

8

Judge, I fail to understand how the case can be elevated to the status

of   one   raising   a   substantial   question   of   law       warranting   our

interference under Article 136.

15. I have extracted in full, the first order dated 12.02.2019 and the

relevant portions of the orders dated 09.04.2019 and 16.05.2019. The

order dated 12.02.2019 shows (i) that it was not an adjudicatory order

but passed entirely on the basis of an offer made by the petitioner

herein; and (ii) that paragraphs 4 and 5 of the order gave two weeks

time to the petitioner to file an affidavit and six weeks time to furnish

bank guarantee. The statement of the learned senior counsel for the

petitioner to file an affidavit is recorded in paragraph 1 of the order

dated 12.02.2019. Paragraph 1 of the order dated 12.2.2019 indicates

three items with respect to which the petitioner undertook to file an

affidavit. Item no. (iii)  of paragraph 1 is very specific that one of the

contents of the affidavit should be to furnish a bank guarantee in a

sum   of   Rs.30   crores   of   a   ‘scheduled   Indian   bank’.   Paragraph   5

directs the petitioner  to  furnish  bank  guarantee  within  six  weeks

‘as indicated by the counsel’.

16. To a pointed question whether an affidavit containing all the

three items mentioned in paragraph 1 was filed or not, as directed in

9

paragraph 4 of the order dated 12.02.2019, the reply of Mr. K.V.

Vishwanathan, learned senior counsel for the petitioner was that an

affidavit containing the matters indicated in Item Nos. (i) and (ii) of

paragraph 1 of the order was filed and that in view of the directions

contained in paragraph 6 to furnish a bank guarantee of a scheduled

bank located in India, there was no necessity to incorporate in the

affidavit, the matter covered by Item No.(iii) of paragraph 1.

17. But I do not agree.  If a party to a proceeding invites an order by

making an offer, he is obliged to honour the commitment made in the

form of the offer. The contention of Mr. K.V. Vishwanathan that his

client’s   offer   in   paragraph   1(iii)   of   the   order   dated   12.02.2019   to

furnish a bank guarantee of a scheduled Indian bank stood modified

by paragraph 6 of the order, is not acceptable. This is for the reason

that   the   very   same   learned   Judge   from   whom   the   order   dated

12.02.2019 was invited, clarified on 09.04.2019 that what he had in

mind was what was actually offered by the petitioner. Once the same

learned Judge has clarified that there was no intention to accept the

offer made by the petitioner with a modification, it is not open to the

appellate court to upset the discretion exercised by the learned Judge.

18. Both in the orders dated 09.04.2019 and 16.05.2019, the very

same learned Judge had clarified (i) as to what transpired in court; (ii)

10

as to what was offered; and  (iii)  as to what was the purport of the

order dated 12.02.2019. Therefore, the matter should be allowed to

rest there.

19. Even the contention that the credentials of ICBC will be taken to

have been doubted, was considered by the learned Judge in his order

dated   09.04.2019   and   the   matter   was   clarified.     Therefore,   the

question of any harm to the reputation of ICBC does not arise.

20. Lastly it is contended by Mr. K.V. Vishwanathan, learned senior

counsel for the petitioner that the bank guarantee was taken by the

petitioner from ICBC, upon payment of a non­refundable charge of

Rs.30 lakhs and that therefore assuming that there was a mistake on

the part of the Court, it cannot be corrected by the Court resulting in

a financial loss of Rs.30 lakhs to the petitioner.   The maxim “actus

curiae neminem gravabit” is sought to be invoked by the learned senior

counsel for the petitioner.

21. But in my considered view the petitioner has to blame itself, for

the loss if any. The order dated 12.02.2019 gave (i) two weeks time to

the petitioner to file an affidavit incorporating all the three items of

matters indicated in paragraph 1 of the order dated 12.02.2019; and

(ii)  six weeks time to furnish bank guarantee  as   indicated  by   the

11

counsel.   Therefore   the   petitioner   ought   to   have   filed   an   affidavit

containing all the three ingredients, before taking the bank guarantee

from ICBC. If they had done so, the affidavit would have contained a

statement, in tune either with what was undertaken by them or with

what was mentioned in the order. The filing of an affidavit in such a

manner, would have given a wake up call to the respondents and

shown   the   bonafides   of   the   petitioner.   But   without   doing   so,   the

petitioner filed an affidavit containing only those matters covered by

Items   (i)   and   (ii)   of   paragraph   1   and   thereafter   furnished   a   bank

guarantee of ICBC. Since the petitioner did not adopt a course of action

as undertaken by them, it is not open to them to say that they were

misled by the direction in paragraph 6 of the order dated 12.02.2019

and   that   therefore   they   should   not   be   prejudiced   on   account   of   a

mistake committed by the court.

22. This is a case where the petitioner, after making  a clear offer to

furnish a bank guarantee of a scheduled Indian bank, has chosen to

take advantage of a mistake that crept in paragraph 6 of the order.

Therefore, he is not entitled to take advantage  of the  Latin maxim

“actus curiae neminem gravabit”.

23. In my humble considered view, these special leave petitions do not

12

deserve to be entertained under Article 136 of the Constitution of India

in view of the fact  (i) that the very same Judge who passed the first

Order dated 12.02.2019, clarified the same by his subsequent Order

dated   09.04.2019;  (ii)  that   the   same   learned   Judge   dismissed   on

16.05.2019, the petition to recall the Order dated 09.04.2019; (iii) that

the Commercial Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal

arising out of the Order dated 16.05.2019; and (iv) that the Commercial

Division Bench again reiterated its orders, by dismissing the review

petition.   We   must   remember   that   all   this   arose   out   of   an   interim

measure under Section 9 of the Act and the petitioner is seeking to

upset all of this in a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution as

though there is a substantial question of law of great importance.

24. The   question   whether   there   exists   statutorily,   a   distinction

between “a Scheduled Indian Bank” and “a Scheduled Bank located in

India” does not arise for consideration in this case, as the dispute

primarily revolves around what was offered in Court by one of the

parties, what was accepted in Court, and what was recorded in the

Order and clarified later. If without any offer from the petitioner, an

adjudication had been made by the Court directing the petitioner to

13

furnish bank guarantee of a particular type of bank and a dispute had

been raised thereafter, it is only then that a question of law as to the

status of such a bank with reference to the statutory provisions, would

have arisen.

25. Therefore, in my considered view and with the greatest of respect

for my learned Sister, I deem it fit to dismiss the Special Leave Petitions

as not giving rise to any substantial question of law warranting our

interference under Article 136 of the Constitution.   

……………………………….J.

(V. Ramasubramanian)

New Delhi

August  24, 2021