whether respondent is having personal bonafide necessity or not. Accordingly, impugned order passed by the Rent Appellate Tribunal is set aside.” (emphasis supplied) 15. Having held that, the High Court had two options: first either to remand the case to the Rent Appellate Tribunal for deciding the appeal afresh on 6 merits in accordance with law and second, to decide the matter itself on merits in accordance with law. 16. Since the High Court heard the matter in its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, it was not possible to examine the issue on facts in detail like an Appellate Court. It is for this reason, in our view, the High Court ought to have resorted to first option and remanded the case back to the Rent Appellate Tribunal for deciding the appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law. 17. The High Court, therefore, committed an error in not taking recourse to any option and without deciding the issue arising in the case on its merit, simply restored the order of the Rent Tribunal. 18. This approach of the High Court caused prejudice to the appellant (landlady) because there was no factual finding recorded either by the first 7 appellate Court or the High Court on the question of bona fide need.

      REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 10811 OF 2018
[Arising out of SLP (C) No. 9716 of 2018]
KALPANA VYAS ... Appellant
Versus
RAJ KUMAR RANGWANI … Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This   appeal   is   directed   against   the   final
judgment and order dated 02.01.2018 passed by the
High Court of Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur in S.B. Civil
Writ Petition No. 5403/2015 whereby the High Court
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has allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent
herein.
3. The issue involved in the appeal is short, as
also the facts of the case lie in a narrow compass,
which would be clear from the narration infra.
4. The   appellant   is   the   applicant,   whereas   the
respondent   is   the   non­applicant   in   the   eviction
petition   filed   by   the   appellant   against   the
respondent   before   the   Rent   Control   Tribunal,
Rajasthan out of which this appeal arises.
5. The appellant ­ a landlady of the suit premises
filed the eviction petition against the respondenttenant
of the suit premises under Section 9 of the
Rajasthan Rent Control Act (for short called “The
Act”)   before   the   Rent   Tribunal   Kota   (R­84/2005)
praying therein for respondent's eviction from the
tenanted suit premises.
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6. The   appellant   claimed   respondent's   eviction
from   the   suit   premises   on   the   ground   of   her
personal bona fide need for raising construction in
the   existing   suit   premises   to   be   used   for   her
children and for stay of appellant's guest in the suit
premises.
7. The   respondent   denied   the   appellant's   need
and,  inter alia,  contended that the appellant is in
possession of an alternative accommodation in the
city   and   hence   her   alleged   need   set   up   in   the
eviction petition can be accomplished by using the
alternative accommodation available in the city.
8. By  order dated  8.2.2011, the  Rent  Tribunal
dismissed the appellant's eviction petition holding
that appellant's need can be accomplished with an
alternative space available with her in the city.
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9. The appellant (landlady) felt aggrieved and filed
an appeal (144/2014) before the Appellate Tribunal.
The Appellate Tribunal by order dated 12.2.2015
allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Rent
Tribunal, decreed the appellant's eviction petition
and   passed   the   eviction   decree   against   the
respondent, in relation to the suit premises.
10. The respondent (tenant) felt aggrieved and filed
writ   petition   before   the   High   Court   of   Rajasthan
(Jaipur).   By   impugned   order,   the   learned   Single
Judge allowed the respondent's writ petition and set
aside   the   order   of   the   Appellate   Tribunal   and
restored the order of the Rent Tribunal which gives
rise to filing of the special leave to appeal in this
Court by the landlady.
11. So   the   short   question,   which   arises   for
consideration in this appeal, is whether the High
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Court   was   justified   in   allowing   the   respondent's
(tenant’s) writ petition thereby justified in setting
aside   the   appellate   order   of   the   Rent   Appellate
Tribunal and restoring that of the Rent Tribunal.
12. Heard Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned counsel for
the   appellant   and   Mr.   Purvish   Jitendra   Malkan,
learned counsel for the respondent.
13. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
are   inclined   to   allow   the   appeal,   modify   the
impugned order and remand the case to the Rent
Appellate   Tribunal   for   deciding   the   appeal
(144/2014) afresh on merits.
14. In our opinion, the need to remand the case to
the Rent Appellant Tribunal has occasioned because
the High Court, while allowing the respondent's writ
petition, came to a conclusion and accordingly held
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that   the   Rent   Appellate   Tribunal   allowed   the
appellant's   (landlady's)   appeal   with   a   casual
approach   and   failed   to   record   any   categorical
finding on the plea of bona fide need.  The operative
part of the High Court order reads as under:­
“Taking   into   consideration   the   fact
aforesaid,  I do  not find  any  reason  for Rent
Appellate Tribunal for setting aside the order
of   the   Rent   Tribunal.    The   perusal   of   the
impugned  order   shows  a  casual  approach  of
the Rent Appellate Tribunal in reversing the
finding   of   the   Rent   Tribunal,   that   too,
without   going   into   the   issue   of   personal
bonafide   necessity.     The   Rent   Appellate
Tribunal   was   expected   to   first   decide   the
issue   as   to   whether   respondent   is   having
personal   bonafide   necessity   or   not.
Accordingly,   impugned   order   passed   by   the
Rent Appellate Tribunal is set aside.”
          (emphasis supplied)
15. Having   held   that,   the   High   Court   had   two
options: first either to remand the case to the Rent
Appellate Tribunal for deciding the appeal afresh on
6
merits in accordance with law and second, to decide
the matter itself on merits in accordance with law.
16.  Since the High Court heard the matter in its
writ   jurisdiction   under   Article   227   of   the
Constitution,   it   was   not   possible   to   examine   the
issue on facts in detail like an Appellate Court.  It is
for this reason, in our view, the High Court ought to
have resorted to first option and remanded the case
back to the Rent Appellate Tribunal for deciding the
appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law. 
17.  The High Court, therefore, committed an error
in not taking recourse to any option and without
deciding the issue arising in the case on its merit,
simply restored the order of the Rent Tribunal. 
18. This   approach   of   the   High   Court   caused
prejudice to the appellant (landlady) because there
was no factual finding recorded either by the first
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appellate Court or the High Court on the question of
bona fide need. 
19. It is for this reason that we uphold the finding
of the High Court in relation to the approach and
the manner in which the Rent Appellate Tribunal
decided the appellant's appeal but consider it just
and proper to remand the case to the Rent Appellate
Tribunal   for   its   decision   on   merits   afresh   in
accordance with law.
20. In   view   of   foregoing   discussion,   the   appeal
succeeds   and   is   allowed.   Impugned   order   is
modified to the extent that the case is remanded to
the Rent Appellate Tribunal for deciding the appeal
(No. 144/2014)(Old No. 41/11) afresh on merits in
accordance with law.
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21. Since the matter pertains to  bona fide  need
and eviction, the Rent Appellate Tribunal will decide
the   appeal   within   six   months   as   an   outer   limit
strictly   in   accordance   with   law   without   being
influenced by any observations made by this Court
and the High Court.
22. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed
of.
     ………………………………..J.
     (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
           ..………………………………J.
    (INDU MALHOTRA)
New Delhi,
October 29, 2018
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