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appellant Nos.2 and 3 had knowledge that Zahida and Ishlam had been murdered and their dead bodies were dumped in the septic tank in the backyard of their house and yet, they did not disclose that fact with an intention to screen appellant No.1 – Asar Mohammed, the offender, from legal punishment. In other words, even though they cannot be made liable for the murder of Zahida and Ishlam for want of legal evidence in that regard, they would certainly be guilty of having committed offence under Section 201 IPC as established from the proved circumstances coupled with their abject failure to offer any explanation, much less cogent explanation, about their conduct. The inevitable and legitimate conclusion to be deduced is that they are guilty of offence punishable under Section 201 IPC for which they have been rightly convicted and sentenced by the trial court and which opinion of the trial court has been affirmed by the High Court.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL  APPEAL NO. 1617   OF  2011
Asar Mohammad and Ors.      …..Appellant(s)
:Versus:
The State of U.P.      ....Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. This appeal emanates from the judgment and order passed
by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated 30th  July,
2009 in Criminal Appeal No.1631 of 2008, whereby the High
Court upheld the conviction recorded against the appellants for
an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code   (IPC)   but   converted   the   sentence   of   death   into
imprisonment for life with fine, and confirmed the conviction
under   Section   201   of   the   IPC   and   sentence   of   2   years’
imprisonment and fine, as awarded by the Additional Sessions
Judge/Special Judge, J.P. Nagar in Sessions Trial No.155/2004.
2. Briefly stated, one Shababul (PW­7) gave information to the
Police Station, Dedoli on 24th  January, 2004 about one Zahida
Begum, the second wife of appellant No.3, Akhtar Mohammad,
son of Munshi, and their son Ishlam (aged about 11 years) who
had   gone   missing   from   the   village   for   the   last   two   months,
despite which their family members had not reported the matter
to the police. The appellant Nos.1 and 2, Asar Mohammad and
Asraf Mohammad respectively, are the two sons of appellant No.3
Akhtar Mohammad, from his first wife. Thus, deceased Zahida
Begum   is   the   step   mother   of   appellant   Nos.1   &   2,   Asar
Mohammad   and   Asraf   Mohammad.   On   the   basis   of   the
aforementioned report, the Head Constable Surendra Singh (PW10),
who was posted as Head Moharrar, made an entry in GD
No.32 (Ext. Ka­17).  Acting on that report, PW­9 Virendra Kumar
Tyagi, Station House Officer of Police Station, Dedoli, visited the
village along with SI Doonger Singh Verma (PW­6), Mangey Ram
Tomar,   Nath   Prakash   Gupta,   Constable   Asqar   Ali   and   SSI
Harendra Singh (PW­4).   On enquiries with Asar Mohammad
(appellant No.1/accused No.1), he disclosed that Zahida was his
step   mother   and   her   son   Ishlam   was   his   step   brother.   He
confessed that he, along with the other two appellants committed
the murder of both Zahida and Ishlam and thereafter, dumped
their dead bodies into the septic tank in the backyard of their
house.   He   then   led   the   police   party   to   the   septic   tank   and
removed the lid with the help of Mangat and Jagadish Valmiki
(PW­8), wherefrom the dead bodies were taken out. The dead
bodies   were   highly   decomposed   and   virtually   reduced   to
skeletons. The body of Zahida Begum was found tied with nylon
cord (Ext. Ka­18). Thereafter, the memo of recovery of the dead
bodies   was   prepared   by   Harendra   Singh   (PW­4).   SI   Doongar
Singh Verma (PW­6) conducted the inquest and gave the inquest
report. He also prepared the necessary papers concerning the
dead   bodies   and   drew   a   site   plan   of   the   place   of   recovery
(Ext.Ka­19).   The   dead   bodies   were   then   dispatched   for   postmortem
examination on the next day, i.e. 25th  January, 2004.
The   Investigating   Officer   then   recorded   the   statement   of   the
inquest   witnesses   and   proceeded   to   arrest   Asraf   Mohammad
(appellant No.2/accused No.2), whose statement was recorded on
the same day. The statements of Begum Banu (PW­1) and Akram
were       recorded   on   26th  January,   2004.   The   appellant   No.3
Akhtar came to be arrested on 10th  February, 2004. The postmortem
of the dead bodies was conducted by Dr. Kuldeep Singh
(PW­5) who noted that the body of Zahida Begum inter alia had
fracture of Hyoid bone and Hyoid Cartilage which, in his opinion,
was the cause of death due to asphyxia (fracture of Hyoid bone
and Thyroid Cartilage) and that the death had occurred more
than one month back. With regard to the dead body of Ishlam, he
inter alia  noted that the cause of death was due to asphyxia
(fracture of Hyoid bone). After completion of the investigation,
charge­sheet (Ext. Ka­21) was submitted before the jurisdictional
Court on 11th February, 2004. The said Court committed the case
to the Sessions Court at J.P. Nagar where it was registered as
Sessions Trial No.155/2004. The Sessions Court on 5th August,
2004 framed charges against the appellants as under:
“Charges
I, Mushaffey Ahmad, Addl. Sess. Judge, hereby charge
you, Asar Mohammad, Asraf and Akhtar as follows:­
That  you   on  two months   ago  from  24.1.2004  (date  of
information to the PS) at 1 am in the village of Panyati within
the limits of PS Didopli Distt. J.P. Nagar committed murder by
intentionally or knowingly causing the death of Smt. Zahida
and Ishlam and thereby committed an offence punishable under
Section­302   IPC   and   within   the   cognizance   of   this   court   of
session.
That you on above date, time and place having the reason
to believe that certain offence to with murder punishable with
death has been committed, did cause certain evidence of, the
said offence, to disappear, to with threw the dead bodies of
victims, into gutter with the intention of screening the said Asar
Mohammad,   Asraf   and   Akhtar   from   legal   punishment,   and
thereby committed an offence punishable u/s 201 of the Indian
Penal Code and within the cognizance of this court of Sessions.
And I hereby direct that you be tried on the said charge of
this court of session.”
3. The   prosecution   examined   10   witnesses,   namely,   PW­1
Begum Bano, PW­2 Haji Iqbal, PW­3 Nawab Jan, PW­4 Harendra
Singh, PW­5 Dr. Kuldeep Singh, PW­6 Doonger Singh Verma,
PW­7   Shababul,   PW­8   Jagdish,   PW­9   V.K.   Tyagi   and   PW­10
Surendra Singh.  The defence of the accused was of total denial.
They did not produce any evidence. The Sessions Court, after
evaluating the entire evidence on record, eventually found that
even   though   it   was   a   case   of   circumstantial   evidence,   the
prosecution   had   succeeded   in   establishing   the   guilt   of   the
accused beyond all reasonable doubt and found them guilty of
offences under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC. As aforesaid, the
Sessions Court vide judgment and order dated 1st March, 2008
awarded the death sentence with fine, for having committed the
offence under Section 302 of IPC, and 2 years of imprisonment
with fine in respect of offence under Section 201 of IPC to each of
the appellants.
4. All the three appellants carried the matter in appeal before
the High Court, being Criminal Appeal No.1631 of 2008, which
was heard along with the death reference received by the High
Court,   being   Reference   No.3   of   2008.   The   High   Court
reappreciated the evidence on record and affirmed the view taken
by the Trial Court, after referring to the relevant decisions cited
before it.  In conclusion, the High Court observed as follows:­
“27. We have scrutinized the submission of learned Counsel for
the appellants and also decision of the Apex Court in the case of
Aloke Nath Dutta (supra) in all its ramifications. Having gone
through the decision, we must say that the said decision has
been rendered in different facts and circumstances and flows
from different perspective. In the said case, the Apex Court had
rendered   verdict   acquitting   other   accused   persons   holding
quintessentially that there was no direct evidence from which it
could be deduced that other appellants also were part of the
said conspiracy and that their presence had not been noticed by
any of the witnesses and further that nobody saw them together
in the house and also that no body saw Mrinal Dutta coming to
the   house   even   once.   In   the   said   decision   accused   were
acquitted under section 120B I.P.C.  In  the  present  case  the
accused persons were residing in the same house and they
were very proximate relation of the deceased. Therefore, the
facts of the said case cannot be imported for application to the
facts of the present case.
28.  We have carefully scanned the evidence on record. In the
facts and  circumstances and evidence on record, it brooks
no   dispute   that   the   prosecution   has   proved   beyond
reasonable  doubt  that  the  deceased  died  homicidal  death.
The  doctor has clearly  held that  cause  of  death  of  Zahida
Begum   was   due   to   Asphyxia   (fracture   of  Hyoid   bone   and
Thyroid  cartilage)  and  the  death  of   Islam  was  also  due  to
Asphyxia   (fracture   of   Hyoid   bone).   The   prosecution   has
proved   its   case   beyond   reasonable   doubt.   Another
circumstance   unerringly   pointing   to   the   guilt   of   the
accused   is  that,  the  dead  bodies  were  recovered  from  the
septic tank situated inside the house of appellant that too,
on  the  pointing  out  of  Asar  Mohammad.  PW­3  Nawab  Jan
and PW­8 Jagdish minced no words to say that dead bodies
were   recovered   on   the  pointing   of   Asar  Mohammad   from
septic  tank, There  is no dispute  about the  identity of  the
deceased. Yet another circumstance pointing accused finger
at  the  appellants   is  that  the  appellants  did  not  lodge  any
report   about   the  missing   of   the   deceased   for   about   two
months  nor   offered   any   explanation   about   their  death   in
their statement under section 313 Cr.P.C….”
(emphasis supplied)
The High Court, however, noted that the facts and circumstances
of the present case would not come within the purview of a rarest
of rare case, for which reason it did not confirm the sentence of
death   awarded   to   the   appellants.   The   High   Court,   instead,
commuted the sentence to life imprisonment for offence under
Section 302 of the IPC. Thus, the appeal filed by the appellants
was partly allowed to that extent and the reference came to be
rejected vide the impugned judgment and order dated 30th July,
2009.
5. Feeling   aggrieved,   the   appellants   have   filed   the   present
appeal. The principal argument of the appellants is that although
it is  a case of  concurrent finding of facts recorded by the two
Courts   below,   the   same   is   replete   with   manifest   errors   and
cannot stand the test of judicial scrutiny. It is submitted that the
evidence produced by the prosecution falls short of the quality
evidence  required for  recording  a  finding  of  guilt  against  the
accused in a case of circumstantial evidence.  In that, the motive
behind the commission of crime has not been established at all.
No evidence is forthcoming in respect of identification of the two
dead bodies, much less to establish the fact that it was of none
other than the second wife of appellant No.3 and son of appellant
No.3 respectively. It is vehemently contended that the police has
set up PW­7 as the informant, who was an obliging informant of
the police.  If his evidence is to be discarded, the genesis of the
prosecution case must collapse and, in which case, the rest of
the circumstances or the evidence would be of no avail. It is
submitted that even the other reports prepared by the police
purportedly during the investigation of the crime, were tailored to
suit   the   prosecution   case.   That   ought   to   be   discarded.   It   is
submitted that the evidence produced by the prosecution, taken
as   a   whole   or   even   in   part,   by   no   stretch   of   imagination
establishes the complicity of the appellants in the commission of
crime. The hypothesis on which the prosecution case rests is
unsubstantiated. Further, the statement of the accused allegedly
made to the police, which is the fulcrum of the prosecution case,
is inadmissible in evidence and, at any rate, cannot be used
against the co­accused. For all these reasons, the finding of guilt
recorded against the appellants cannot be sustained either on
facts or in law.
6. The learned counsel for the State, however, supported the
judgment under appeal and would submit that no interference is
warranted against the concurrent findings of fact. He submits
that the prosecution has established the circumstances and the
chain   is   complete   in   all   respects,   pointing   towards   the
involvement of the appellants in commission of the crime and
ruling out any other possibility. He submits that the appeals
deserve to be dismissed.
7. We have heard Mr. S. K. Bhattacharya, learned counsel for
the appellants and Mr. Rajesh K. Singh, learned counsel for the
respondent. We have perused the entire record, including the
original record.
8. Before proceeding to consider the rival submissions, be it
noted   that   in   the   present  case,   no  direct  evidence   has   been
produced by the prosecution regarding the involvement of the
appellants in the commission of the crime.  The prosecution rests
its case solely on circumstantial evidence.  The legal position as
to how such matter should be examined has been expounded in
Padala Veera Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.1
in the following words:­
“10. ….. This Court in a series of decisions has consistently held
that   when   a   case   rests   upon   circumstantial   evidence   such
evidence must satisfy the following tests:
(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt
is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly
established;
(2) those   circumstances   should   be   of   a   definite
tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the
accused;
(3) the   circumstances,   taken   cumulatively,   should
form a chain so complete that there is no escape
from   the   conclusion   that   within   all   human
probability the crime was committed by the accused
and none else; and
(4) the   circumstantial   evidence   in   order   to   sustain
conviction   must   be   complete   and   incapable   of
explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the
guilt of the accused and such evidence should not
only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but
should   be   inconsistent   with   his   innocence.   (See
Gambhir v. State of Maharashtra2
.)
11.  See also  Rama Nand  v.  State of Himachal Pradesh3
,
Prem   Thakur  v.  State   of   Punjab4
,  Earabhadrapa   alias
Krishnappa  v.  State   of   Karnataka5
,  Gian   Singh  v.  State   of
Punjab6
, Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab.
7

9. In  Mulakh  Raj  &  Ors.  Vs.   Satish  Kumar  &  Ors.8
, the
Court succinctly restated the legal position in paragraph 4 as
1
  (1989) Supp. (2) SCC 706
2
  (1982) 2 SCC 351 ; AIR 1982 SC 1157
3
(1981) 1 SCC 511 ; AIR 1981 SC 738
4
(1982) 3 SCC 462 ; (1983) 1 SCR 822 ; AIR 1983 SC 61
5
(1983)Cri LJ 846 ; (1983) 2 SCC 330
6 1986 Supp (1) SCC 676 ; AIR 1987 SC 1921
7
(1987) 1 SCC 1 ; AIR 1987 SC 350
8
(1992) 3 SCC 43
under:
“4. ……Undoubtedly   this   case  hinges   upon   circumstantial
evidence. It is trite to reiterate that in a case founded on
circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must prove all the
circumstances connecting  unbroken  chain  of links leading
to   only   one   inference   that   the   accused   committed   the
crime. If any other reasonable hypothesis of the innocence
of   the   accused   can   be   inferred   from   the   proved
circumstances,   the   accused   would   be   entitled   to   the
benefit.   What   is   required   is   not   the   quantitative   but
qualitative,   reliable   and   probable   circumstances   to
complete the chain connecting the accused with the crime.
If   the   conduct   of   the   accused   in   relation   to   the   crime
comes into question the previous and subsequent conduct
are  also  relevant facts. Therefore, the  absence  of  ordinary
course of conduct of the accused and human  probabilities
of  the  case  also  would  be  relevant.  The  court  must  weigh
the evidence of the cumulative effect of the circumstances
and   if   it   reaches   the   conclusion   that   the   accused
committed the crime, the charge must be held proved and
the conviction and sentence would follow.”
(emphasis supplied)
10. Let us revert to the circumstances which commended to the
trial court and also the High Court to take the view that the
chain of proved circumstances left no manner of doubt that the
accused alone were involved in the commission of the offence in
question.     Those   proved   circumstances   can   be   delineated   as
follows :
(i) Information   regarding   the   missing   persons   (Zahida
and Ishlam) was given by the village watchman, viz.,
Shababul (P.W.7).
(ii) The fact that the two named persons had gone missing
for about two months was reinforced after the police
visited the village to verify the same and in particular
the   “admission   of   accused   ­   Asar   Mohammed
(appellant No.1)” that the two missing persons have
been murdered by him and the other two accused, viz.,
Asraf Mohammed and Akhtar  (appellant Nos.2 and 3
respectively) and “their dead bodies were dumped by
him in the septic tank in the backyard of their house.”
(iii) No ‘missing report’ was lodged by the appellants in
respect of Zahida and Ishlam, for reasons best known
to them.
(iv) Appellant No.1 told the police that he would show the
place where the dead bodies were dumped and he led
the police party to that spot in the backyard of the
house   of   the   appellants,   which   was   within   his
exclusive knowledge and opened the lid of the septic
tank   himself   to   facilitate   taking   out   the   two   dead
bodies   which   he   admitted   as   that   of   Zahida   and
Ishlam.
(v) One of the two dead bodies recovered from the septic
tank in the backyard of the house of the appellants
was of a full grown­up female around 32 years of age
and another of a male child of about 11 years of age
which corresponded with the age of Zahida and Ishlam
respectively.
(vi) The dead bodies were dumped more than one month
before the same were removed from the septic tank in
a highly decomposed condition.
(vii) Ante­mortem injuries were noticed on the vital part of
the neck on both the dead bodies which, according to
the medical evidence, was the cause of death due to
asphyxia and a case of homicidal death.
(viii) The accused neither disputed the identity of the two
dead   bodies   being   that   of   Zahida   and   Ishlam   nor
offered   any   explanation,   even   though   they   were
confronted with the incriminatory evidence.
(ix) No evidence has been produced nor any explanation
has been offered by the accused regarding the reason
as   to   why   they   did   not   lodge   a   ‘missing
complaint/report’   in   respect   of   Zahida   and   Ishlam,
who were closely related to them and were staying in
the same house; nor have they produced any evidence
that both of them were still alive and were residing
elsewhere.  Similarly, no explanation has been offered
by them regarding the cause of death of Zahida and
Ishlam, or for that matter, the circumstances in which
their dead bodies were found in the septic tank in the
backyard   of   their   house   and   also   about   the   antemortem
injuries noticed on the vital part of the dead
bodies which, as per the medical evidence, was the
cause of death due to asphyxia.
11. The trial court as well as the High Court, after analysing the
evidence on record including the evidence of PWs 4 to 10, had
discerned   the   above   circumstances   pointing   towards   the
involvement of the accused in the commission of the crime.  Both
the courts have taken note of the fact that Begum Bano (PW­1);
Haji Iqbal (PW­2); and Nawab Jan (PW­3) were declared hostile,
as a result of which the factum of motive behind the murder of
Zahida and Ishlam could not be established by the prosecution.
Notably,   even   these   hostile   witnesses   (PWs   1   to   3)   have   not
disputed the relationship of Zahida and Ishlam with the accused
and the fact that they were residing with the accused in the same
house before they went missing. Be that as it may, both the
courts have ruled that other proved circumstances emanating
from the evidence produced by the prosecution, coupled with the
abject silence of the accused including having failed to offer any
explanation   with   regard   to   the   incriminatory   circumstances
referred to above, was sufficient to bring home the guilt against
them and no other conclusion could be deduced except that the
accused were responsible for the murder of Zahida and Ishlam.
They were closely related to the deceased (as Zahida was the
second wife of accused Akhtar (appellant No.3) and Ishlam was
the son born in wedlock between them; and appellant nos.1 and
2 were the step sons of Zahida and step brothers of Ishlam).  All
of  them were residing in  the same house before Zahida and
Ishlam   went   missing   for   about   two   months.   That   fact   was
reported   by   Shababul   (PW­7)   to   the   police.     The   fact   that
Shababul is on the payroll of the police cannot be the basis to
disregard   the   proved   fact   that   Zahida   and   Ishlam   had   gone
missing for about two months before it was so reported to the
police.     None   of   the   appellants   have   either   disowned   their
relationship with Zahida and Ishlam or bothered to produce any
tittle of evidence in defence to show that Zahida and Ashlam were
still alive and residing elsewhere.  This Court in Nika Ram Vs.
State   of   Himachal   Pradesh9
,   noted   that   the   accused   and
deceased (his wife) resided together and as the accused failed to
offer any cogent explanation about the circumstances in which
his wife died, it pointed towards his guilt and thus, the Court
deduced such inference. Suffice it to observe that the fact that
PW­1, PW­2 and PW­3 became hostile and the prosecution could
not establish the factum of motive cannot be the basis to doubt
the correctness of the finding of guilt recorded by the two courts
against the accused on the basis of other proved circumstances
9
  (1972) 2 SCC 80
including the confession of the accused No.1 about the murder of
Zahida   Begum   and   Ishlam   and   more   importantly,   having
dumped the dead bodies in the septic tank in the backyard of
their house and to have led the police to that place from where
the two dead bodies, whose identity also has not been disputed,
came to be recovered, coupled with the medical evidence that the
cause of death of the two dead persons was due to the antemortem
injury caused on the neck resulting in their death due to
asphyxia and is a homicidal death.
12. After perusing the entire evidence and taking the totality of
the proved circumstances into account, we are in agreement with
the conclusion reached by the trial court, which came to be
affirmed by the High Court, regarding finding of guilt against
appellant No.1 – Asar Mohammed, who had confessed to the
police and also led the police party to the place where the dead
bodies were dumped. In Trimukh Moroti Kirkan Vs. State of
Maharashtra10, the Court explicated that if an offence takes
place inside the privacy of a house where the accused have all
the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and
in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for
the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the
10
 (2006) 10 SCC 681
accused   if   the   strict   principle   of   circumstantial   evidence,   is
insisted upon. The Court expounded thus:
“14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and
in   such   circumstances   where   the   assailants   have   all   the
opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in
circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for
the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the
accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as
noticed above, is insisted upon by the Courts.  A  Judge  does
not   preside   over   a   criminal   trial   merely   to   see   that   no
innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that
a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. (See
Stirland  v.  Director  of  Public  Prosecution11  ­  quoted  with
approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v. Karnail
Singh12). The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution
to   lead   evidence   of   such   character   which   is   almost
impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be
led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence
which   it   is  capable  of   leading,  having  regard  to  the   facts
and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep
in  mind Section  106  of  the  Evidence  Act which  says  that
when   any   fact   is   especially   within   the   knowledge   of   any
person,   the   burden   of   proving   that   fact   is   upon   him.
Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light
on the content and scope of this provision and it reads:
‘(b)  A   is  charged  with  traveling  on  a  railway  without
ticket.   The   burden  of  proving   that  he  had   a   ticket   is   on
him.’
15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy
inside   a   house,   the   initial   burden   to   establish   the   case
would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature
and   amount   of   evidence   to   be   led   by   it   to   establish   the
charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other
cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a
comparatively lighter character. In view of  Section  106 of
the  Evidence  Act there  will be  a  corresponding  burden  on
the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to
how  the  crime  was  committed.  The   inmates  of  the  house
cannot  get  away  by   simply  keeping  quiet  and  offering  no
explanation   on   the   supposed   premise   that   the   burden   to
establish   its   case   lies   entirely   upon   the   prosecution   and
there   is   no   duty   at   all   on   an   accused   to   offer   any
explanation.
11 1994 AC 315 ; (1994) 2 AII ER 13 (HL)
12
  (2003) 11 SCC 271
xxx  xxx xxx
21.  In   a   case   based  on   circumstantial   evidence  where  no
eye­ witness account is available, there is another principle
of   law  which  must  be  kept   in  mind.  The  principle   is  that
when an incriminating circumstance is put to the accused
and the said accused either offers no explanation or offers
an explanation which is found to be untrue, then the same
becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances to
make   it   complete.  This view has been taken in a catena of
decisions of this Court. [See State of Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran13
(SCC para 6); State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal14 (SCC
para 39 : AIR para 40); State of Maharashtra v. Suresh15 (SCC
para 27); Ganesh Lal v. State of Rajasthan16 (SCC para 15) and
Gulab Chand v. State of M.P.17 (SCC para 4).]
22. Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder
of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to
show that shortly before the commission of crime they were
seen together or the offence takes placed in the dwelling home
where   the   husband   also   normally   resided,   it   has   been
consistently   held   that   if   the   accused   does   not   offer   any
explanation   how   the   wife   received   injuries   or   offers   an
explanation   which   is   found   to   be   false,   it   is   a   strong
circumstance   which   indicates   that   he   is   responsible   for
commission of the crime. In  Nika Ram v. State of Himachal
Pradesh18 it was observed that the fact that the accused alone
was with his wife in the house when she was murdered there
with 'khokhri' and the fact that the relations of the accused with
her   were   strained   would,   in   the   absence   of   any   cogent
explanation by him, point to his guilt. In Ganeshlal v. State of
Maharashtra19 the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of
his wife which took place inside his house. It was observed that
when the death had occurred in his custody, the appellant is
under an obligation to give a plausible explanation for the cause
of her death in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.  The
mere denial of the prosecution case coupled with absence of
any   explanation   were   held   to   be   inconsistent   with   the
innocence   of   the   accused,   but   consistent   with   the
hypothesis   that   the   appellant   is   a   prime   accused   in   the
13
 (1999) 8 SCC 679
14 (1992) 3 SCC 300 ; AIR 1992 SC 2045
15 (2000) 1 SCC 471
16 (2002) 1 SCC 731
17 (1995) 3 SCC 574
18
  Supra @ Footnote 9
19
  (1992) 3 SCC 106
commission   of  murder   of   his   wife.  In  State  of U.P. v. Dr.
Ravindra Prakash Mittal20  the medical evidence disclosed that
the wife died of strangulation during late night hours or early
morning and her body was set on fire after sprinkling kerosene.
The   defence   of   the   husband   was   that   wife   had   committed
suicide by burning herself and that he was not at home at that
time. The letters written by the wife to her relatives showed that
the husband ill­treated her and their relations were strained
and further the evidence showed that both of them were in one
room in the night. It was held that the chain of circumstances
was   complete   and   it   was   the   husband   who   committed   the
murder of his wife by strangulation and accordingly this Court
reversed the judgment of the High Court acquitting the accused
and convicted him under Section 302 IPC. In  State of Tamil
Nadu v. Rajendran21  the wife was found dead in a hut which
had caught fire. The evidence showed that the accused and his
wife were seen together in the hut at about 9.00 p.m. and the
accused came out in the morning through the roof when the
hut had caught fire. His explanation was that it was a case of
accidental fire which resulted in the death of his wife and a
daughter. The medical evidence showed that the wife died due
to asphyxia as a result of strangulation and not on account of
burn injuries. It was held that there cannot be any hesitation to
come to the conclusion that it was the accused (husband) who
was the perpetrator of the crime.”
(emphasis supplied)
13. It is a settled legal position that the facts need not be selfprobatory
and the word “fact” as contemplated in Section 27 of
the   Evidence   Act   is   not   limited   to   “actual   physical   material
object”. The discovery of fact arises by reason of the fact that the
information given by the accused exhibited the knowledge or the
mental   awareness   of   the   informant   as   to   its   existence   at   a
particular place. It includes a discovery of an object, the place
from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to
its existence. It will be useful to advert to the exposition in the
20
  Supra @ Footnote 14
21 Supra @ Footnote 13
case of Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. State of Maharashtra22
, in
particular, paragraphs 23 to 29 thereof.  The same read thus :
“23. While accepting or rejecting the factors of discovery, certain
principles are to be kept in mind. The Privy Council in Pulukuri
Kotayya v. King Emperor23 has held thus: (IA p. 77)
“…  it   is   fallacious  to  treat  the   ‘fact  discovered’  within
the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact
discovered embraces the place from which the object is
produced and  the  knowledge  of  the  accused as  to  this,
and the information given must relate distinctly to this
fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the
object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting
in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in
custody that ‘I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of
my house’ does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives
were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery
of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the
informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to
have  been  used   in   the   commission  of  the  offence,   the
fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the
words be added ‘with which  I  stabbed  A’, these words are
inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the
knife in the house of the informant.”
24.  In  Mohd. Inayatullah  v.  State  of Maharashtra24, while
dealing with the ambit and scope of Section 27 of the Evidence
Act, the Court held that: (SCC pp. 831­32, paras 11­13)
“11. Although the interpretation and scope of Section 27 has
been the subject of several authoritative pronouncements, its
application   to   concrete   cases   is   not   always   free   from
difficulty. It will therefore be worthwhile at the outset, to
have a short and swift glance at the section and be reminded
of its requirements. The section says:
‘27. How much of information received from accused
may be proved.—Provided that, when any fact is deposed
to   as   discovered   in   consequence   of   information   received
from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a
police   officer,   so   much   of   such   information,   whether   it
amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the
fact thereby discovered, may be proved.’
12.   The   expression   ‘provided   that’   together   with   the
phrase ‘whether it amounts to a confession or not’ show that
the section is in the nature of an exception to the preceding
provisions   particularly   Sections   25   and   26.   It   is   not
necessary in this case to consider if this section qualifies, to
22 (2015) 1 SCC 253
23 AIR 1947 PC 67
24 (1976) 1 SCC 828 ; (1976) 1 SCR 715
any extent, Section 24, also. It will be seen that the  first
condition   necessary   for   bringing   this   section   into
operation   is   the  discovery   of  a   fact,   albeit   a   relevant
fact, in consequence of the information received from a
person   accused   of   an   offence.   The  second  is   that   the
discovery of such fact must be deposed to. The  third  is
that   at  the  time  of  the  receipt  of  the   information   the
accused must be in police custody. The last but the most
important   condition   is   that   only   ‘so   much   of   the
information’   as   relates  distinctly  to   the   fact  thereby
discovered is admissible. The rest of the information has
to   be   excluded.  The   word   ‘distinctly’   means   ‘directly’,
‘indubitably’, ‘strictly’, ‘unmistakably’. The word has been
advisedly used to limit and define the scope of the provable
information. The phrase ‘distinctly relates to the fact thereby
discovered’   is   the   linchpin   of   the   provision.   This   phrase
refers to that part of the information supplied by the accused
which is the direct and immediate cause of the discovery. The
reason   behind   this   partial   lifting   of   the   ban   against
confessions and statements made to the police, is that if a
fact   is   actually   discovered   in   consequence   of   information
given by the accused, it affords some guarantee of truth of
that part, and that part only, of the information which was
the clear, immediate and proximate cause of the discovery.
No such guarantee or assurance attaches to the rest of the
statement which may be indirectly or remotely related to the
fact discovered.
13.   At   one   time   it   was   held   that   the   expression   ‘fact
discovered’   in   the   section   is   restricted   to   a   physical   or
material fact which can be perceived by the senses, and that
it does not include a mental fact (see Sukhan v. Emperor25;
Ganu Chandra Kashid v. Emperor26). Now it is fairly settled
that   the   expression   ‘fact  discovered’   includes  not  only
the   physical   object   produced,   but   also   the   place   from
which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused
as   to   this  (see  Pulukuri Kotayya  v.  King Emperor27;  Udai
Bhan v. State of U.P.28).”
(emphasis in original)
25.  In  Aftab Ahmad Anasari  v.  State of Uttaranchal29  after
referring   to   the   decision   in  Pulukuri   Kotayya30,   the   Court
adverted   to   seizure   of   clothes   of   the   deceased   which   were
concealed by the accused. In that context, the Court opined
that (Aftab Ahmad Anasari case, SCC p. 596, para 40)
25
  AIR 1929 Lah 344
26 AIR 1932 Bom 286
27 Supra @ Footnote 23
28 AIR 1962 SC 1116 ; (1962) 2 Cri LJ 251 ; 1962 Supp (2) SCR 830
29 (2010) 2 SCC 583
30
  Supra @ Footnote 23
“40. … the part of the disclosure statement, namely, that the
appellant   was   ready   to   show   the   place   where   he   had
concealed the clothes of the deceased is clearly admissible
under   Section  27  of   the   Evidence  Act   because  the  same
relates   distinctly   to   the   discovery   of   the   clothes   of   the
deceased from that very place. The contention that even if it
is assumed for the sake of argument that the clothes of the
deceased were recovered from the house of the sister of the
appellant   pursuant  to   the   voluntary   disclosure   statement
made by the appellant, the prosecution has failed to prove
that the clothes so recovered belonged to the deceased and
therefore, the recovery of the clothes should not be treated
as an incriminating circumstance, is devoid of merits.”
26.  In  State   of   Maharashtra  v.  Damu31  it  has  been held as
follows: (SCC p.283, para 35)
“35. … It is now well settled that recovery of an object is not
discovery   of   a   fact   as   envisaged   in   [Section   27   of   the
Evidence Act, 1872]. The decision of the Privy Council in
Pulukuri   Kotayya  v.  King   Emperor32  is   the   most   quoted
authority   for   supporting   the   interpretation   that   the   ‘fact
discovered’ envisaged in the section embraces the place from
which   the   object   was   produced,   the   knowledge   of   the
accused   as   to   it,   but   the   information   given   must   relate
distinctly to that effect.”
The   similar   principle   has   been   laid   down   in  State   of
Maharashtra  v.  Suresh33
,  State   of   Punjab  v.  Gurnam   Kaur34
,
Aftab Ahmad Anasari v. State of Uttaranchal35
, Bhagwan Dass v.
State (NCT of Delhi)36
, Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi)37 and
Rumi Bora Dutta v. State of Assam38
.
27. In the case at hand, as is perceptible, the recovery
had   taken   place   when   the   appellant   was   accused   of   an
offence, he was in custody of a police officer, the recovery
had taken place in consequence of information furnished by
him  and   the  panch  witnesses  have   supported  the   seizure
and nothing has been brought on record to discredit their
testimony.
28. Additionally, another aspect can also be taken note of.
The fact that the appellant had led the police officer to find out
the spot where the crime was committed, and the tap where he
washed the clothes eloquently speak of his conduct as the same
is   admissible   in   evidence   to   establish   his   conduct.   In   this
context we may refer with profit to the authority in  Prakash
31 (2000) 6 SCC 269
32 Supra @ Footnote 23
33 (2000) 1 SCC 471
34 (2009) 11 SCC 225
35 (2010) 2 SCC 583
36
  (2011) 6 SCC 396
37
  (2010) 6 SCC 1
38
  (2013) 7 SCC 417
Chand v. State (Delhi Admn.)39 wherein the Court after referring
to   the   decision   in  H.P.   Admn.  v.  Om   Prakash40  held   thus:
(Prakash Chand case, SCC p.95, para 8)
“8. … There is a clear distinction between the conduct of
a  person   against  whom   an  offence   is  alleged,  which   is
admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, if such
conduct   is   influenced   by   any   fact   in   issue   or   relevant
fact  and  the  statement  made  to  a  police  officer   in  the
course of an investigation which is hit by Section 162 of
the Criminal Procedure Code. What is excluded by Section
162 of the Criminal Procedure Code is the statement made to
a police officer in the course of investigation and not the
evidence relating to the conduct of an accused person (not
amounting to a statement) when confronted or questioned by
a police officer during the course of an investigation. For
example, the evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that
an accused person led a police officer and pointed out the
place where stolen articles or weapons which might have
been   used   in   the   commission   of   the   offence   were   found
hidden, would be admissible as conduct, under Section 8 of
the Evidence Act, irrespective of whether any statement by
the accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such
conduct   falls   within   the   purview   of   Section   27   of   the
Evidence Act.”
29. In A.N. Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka41 it has been ruled
that: (SCC p.721, para9)
“9. By virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the conduct of
the accused person is relevant, if such conduct influences or
is   influenced   by   any   fact   in   issue   or   relevant   fact.  The
evidence   of   the   circumstance,   simpliciter,   that   the
accused   pointed   out   to   the   police   officer,   the   place
where the dead body of the kidnapped boy was found and
on  their  pointing  out  the  body  was  exhumed, would be
admissible   as   conduct   under   Section   8   irrespective   of
the   fact   whether   the   statement  made   by   the   accused
contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct
falls within the purview of Section 27 or not as held by
this   Court   in  Prakash   Chand  v.  State   (Delhi   Admn.).
Even if  we hold that the disclosure  statement made  by
the   appellants­accused   (Exts.   P­15   and   P­16)   is   not
admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, still it
is   relevant   under   Section   8.  The   evidence   of   the
investigating officer and PWs 1, 2, 7 and PW 4 the spot
mahazar witness that the accused had taken them to the
spot and pointed out the place where the dead body was
buried, is an admissible piece of evidence under Section 8 as
39
  (1979) 3 SCC 90
40
  (1972) 1 SCC 249
41
  (2005) 7 SCC 714
the conduct of the accused. Presence of A­1 and A­2 at a
place where ransom demand was to be fulfilled and their
action   of   fleeing   on   spotting   the   police   party   is   a
relevant circumstance and are admissible under Section
8 of the Evidence Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. Applying the principle expounded by this Court, we have no
hesitation   in   affirming   the   finding   of   guilt   recorded   against
appellant No.1 – Asar Mohammed.
15. The   question   is   whether   the   same   evidence   or   proved
circumstances can be used against the other two appellants,
namely,   Asraf   Mohammed   and   Akhtar   Mohammad.
Indisputably,   except   the   confession   of   the   co­accused   –   Asar
Mohammed (appellant No.1), the prosecution has not produced
any independent substantive evidence to even remotely suggest
that   appellant   Nos.2   and   3   were   involved   in   committing   the
murder of Zahida and Ishlam.   By now, it is well settled that
confession of the co­accused by itself cannot be the basis to
proceed  against  the  other  accused  unless  something  more  is
produced to indicate their involvement in the commission of the
crime.   This Court in  Kashmira   Singh   v.   State   of  Madhya
Pradesh42
,  relying upon  the  decision  of the  Privy Council  in
Bhuboni Sahu v. R.43
, Periaswami Moopan, In re44 as well as
42 1952 SCR 526
43 (1948­49) 76 IA 147
44 ILR (1931) 54 Mad 75
in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty45
, has explicated the
efficacy of confession of an accused person and whether it can be
used against the co­accused. The exposition in Kashmira Singh
has been approved by the Constitution Bench of this Court in
Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar46
, in particular paragraph
12 which reads thus :
“12.  As   we   have   already   indicated,   this   question   has   been
considered on several occasions by judicial decisions and it has
been consistently held that a confession cannot be treated as
evidence which is substantive evidence against a co­accused
person.    In   dealing   with   a   criminal   case   where   the
prosecution   relies   upon   the   confession   of   one   accused
person   against   another   accused   person,   the   proper
approach to adopt is to consider the other evidence against
such an accused person, and if the said evidence appears to
be  satisfactory  and  the  court   is   inclined  to  hold  that  the
said  evidence  may   sustain  the  charge   framed   against   the
said accused person, the court  turns to the confession with
a   view   to   assure   itself   that   the   conclusion   which   it   is
inclined to draw from the other evidence is right.   As was
observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in  Emperor v. Lalit Mohan
Chuckerbutty a confession can only be used to ‘lend assurance
to other evidence against a co­accused’.  In Periaswami Moopan,
In re Reilly, J., observed that the provision of Section 30 goes
not further than this :
‘…where   there   is   evidence   against   the   co­accused
sufficient,   if   believed,   to   support   his   conviction,   then
the  kind  of  confession  described   in  Section  30  may  be
thrown   into   the   scale   as   an   additional   reason   for
believing that evidence.’
In Bhuboni Sahu v. R. the Privy Council has expressed the same
view.   Sir John Beaumont who spoke for the Board, observed
that:
‘…A confession of a co­accused is obviously evidence of a
very weak type.  It does not indeed come within the definition
of ‘evidence’ contained in Section 3 of the Evidence Act.  It is
not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the
accused, and it cannot be tested by cross­examination.  It is
45 ILR (1911) 38 Cal 559
46 (1964) 6 SCR 623 ; AIR 1964 SC 1184
a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an
approver, which is not subject to any of those infirmities.
Section  30,  however,  provides  that  the   court  may   act;
but  the   section  does  not   say  that  the  confession   is  to
amount to proof.   Clearly there must be other evidence.
The confession is only one element in the consideration
of all the facts proved in the case; it can be put into the
scale and weighed with the other evidence.’
It would be noticed that as a result of the provisions contained
in Section 30, the confession has no doubt to be regarded as
amounting to evidence in a general way, because whatever is
considered by the court is evidence; circumstances which are
considered by the court as well as probabilities do amount to
evidence in that generic sense.  Thus, though confession may
be regarded as evidence in that generic sense because of the
provisions of Section 30, the fact remains that it is not evidence
as defined by Section 3 of the Act.   The result, therefore, is
that in dealing with a case against an accused person, the
court cannot start with the confession of a co­accused after
it  has   formed   its   opinion  with   regard   to   the   quality   and
effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to
the   confession   in   order   to   receive   assurance   to   the
conclusion   of   guilt   which   the   judicial   mind   is   about   to
reach on the said other evidence.  That, briefly stated, is the
effect of the provisions contained in Section 30.  The same view
has been expressed by this Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of
M.P.  where the decision of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu
case has been cited with approval.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. In view of the above, it is not permissible to proceed against
appellant nos.2 and 3 solely on the basis of the confession of
appellant No.1 made before the police, even if the relevant part of
the confession is admissible and has been duly proved.   As no
substantive evidence is forthcoming to show the involvement of
appellant nos.2 and 3 for having caused the murder of Zahida
and Ishlam, it is not open to convict them for offence punishable
under Section 302, IPC.  This is also because the charge, as has
been framed, is simpliciter for offence under Section 302 and not
for offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of
IPC or Section 302 read with Section 120­B of IPC. No evidence
has   been   produced   by   the   prosecution   in   this   regard.
Resultantly, the finding of guilt albeit concurrently recorded by
the   two   courts   against   appellant   nos.2   and   3   for   offence
punishable under Section 302 IPC cannot be sustained on facts
or in law.  These appellants, therefore, will have to be acquitted
in connection with offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.
17. The next question is whether appellant Nos.2 and 3 can be
held guilty for offence punishable under Section 201 IPC.   The
fact that appellant nos.2 and 3 cannot be convicted for offence
punishable under Section 302 IPC does not extricate them from
the  offence under  Section  201  IPC.   We  say  so because the
proved circumstances discerned from the record leave no manner
of doubt that Zahida and Ishlam were residing along with the
appellants in the same house.  Further, Zahida was the second
wife of appellant No.3 and Ishlam was none other than the son of
appellant No.3 born in wedlock with Zahida.   Zahida was the
step mother of appellant Nos.1 and 2 and Ishlam was their step
brother.  This relationship has not been disputed.  It is also an
established   fact   that   Zahida   and   Ishlam   had   suddenly   gone
missing for over two months. Obviously, no efforts were made by
appellant nos.2 and 3 to trace Zahida and Ishlam nor did they
think it necessary to report that fact to the local police.   This
indeed cannot be a natural behavior or conduct of appellant
No.3, the husband of Zahida and father of minor son Ishlam.
Further, appellant nos.2 and 3 have not challenged the identity
of two dead bodies found from the septic tank in the backyard of
their house at the instance of appellant No.1 – Asar Mohammed.
No explanation whatsoever has been offered by them as to why
they did not report about the sudden disappearance of Zahida
and Ishlam (until their bodies were recovered from the septic
tank   in   the   backyard   of   their   house   after   two   months).   The
concomitant is that appellant Nos.2 and 3 had knowledge that
Zahida and Ishlam had been murdered and their dead bodies
were dumped in the septic tank in the backyard of their house
and yet, they did not disclose that fact with an intention to
screen appellant No.1 – Asar Mohammed, the offender, from legal
punishment.  In other words, even though they cannot be made
liable for the murder of Zahida and Ishlam for want of legal
evidence in that regard, they would certainly be guilty of having
committed offence under Section 201 IPC as established from the
proved circumstances coupled with their abject failure to offer
any   explanation,   much   less   cogent   explanation,   about   their
conduct. The inevitable and legitimate conclusion to be deduced
is that they are guilty of offence punishable under Section 201
IPC for which they have been rightly convicted and sentenced by
the trial court and which opinion of the trial court has been
affirmed by the High Court.   As a result, the appeal filed by
appellant nos.2 and 3 would partly succeed only to the extent of
acquitting them for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.
18. In view of the above, the appeal filed by appellant No.1 –
Asar   Mohammed   is   dismissed.   Whereas,   the   appeal   filed   by
appellant   Nos.2   and   3   –   Asraf   Mohammed   and   Akhtar,
respectively, is partly allowed by setting aside the conviction and
sentence recorded against them for offence punishable under
Section   302   IPC   but   the   conviction   and   sentence   for   offence
punishable   under   Section   201   IPC   against   them   is   upheld.
Ordered accordingly. 
…………………………..….J.
        (A.M. Khanwilkar)
…………………………..….J.
       (L. Nageswara Rao)
New Delhi;
October 24, 2018.