advocatemmmohan

My photo

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN -  Practicing both IN CIVIL, CRIMINAL AND FAMILY LAWS,Etc.,

WELCOME TO LEGAL WORLD

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - FOR KNOWLEDGE IN LAW & FOR LEGAL OPINIONS - SHARE THIS

Wednesday, August 12, 2015

whether services rendered by the appellants in Kurukshetra University/Punjab University is qualifying service for the purpose of pension and can be added to the services rendered by them in the respondent no.1, i.e. Maharshi Dayanand University, Rohtak (hereinafter called “M.D. University”).benefit is not an ex gratia payment but a payment in recognition of past service, in our opinion, discrimination could not have been made between those employees who have been absorbed/allocated are entitled to count their services as qualifying service for the purpose of pension and not those who have been appointed directly. Fact remains that all these employees have served in Punjab University/Kurukshetra University/MD. University without any break. M.D. University, prior to its establishment, was the regional centre of Kurukshetra University. Expectation had arisen to compute the period of service rendered in Punjab University/Kurukshetra University which cannot be unreasonably deprived of. Merely because a person has been appointed and others have been absorbed/allocated makes no difference as to the service rendered. Even otherwise, it is a case of upward revision of benefit and the classification which is sought to be created by the aforesaid method of not extending benefit to persons appointed directly and by fixing cut-off date cannot be said to be intelligible one; same is discriminatory and thus, the appellants would be entitled for the benefit from the date decision has been taken on 24.12.2001 to compute the previous service rendered in Punjab University/Kurukshetra University as qualifying service. In other words, they would be entitled for the benefit prospectively from the date of issuance of memorandum dated 24.12.2001. The employees have expressed their willingness to deposit/adjustment of the employer’s contribution of CPF as required in the memorandum dated 24.12.2001. 28. In yet another case of M.D. University v. Dr. Jahan, this Court did not interfere in the decision of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh on 26.5.2009 in LPA No.27 of 2006, however, the question of law was kept open. Hence, we have examined the case on merits and found the case of the appellants on better footing as compared to Dr. Jahan and even otherwise the appellants are entitled for the benefit. 29. In view of aforesaid discussion, the appellants are entitled for the benefit of counting the services rendered in Punjab University/Kurukshetra University as qualifying service for the purpose of pension subject to fulfilment of the conditions specified in the memorandum dated 24.12.2001 etc. and in case the amount payable by the appellants towards contributory provident fund is less than the amount payable to them as pension, it would be adjusted by the respondents without insisting for its refund from the amount payable to the appellants. Let the exercise be completed within a period of three months from today. 30. The appeals are allowed, impugned judgment is set aside. We leave the parties to bear their own costs.

                                                                  Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CIVIL APPEAL NOS.626-627 OF 2008

A.N. Sachdeva (dead) by LRs. & Ors.                      ... Appellants

Vs.

Maharshi Dayanand University, Rohtak & Anr.        ... Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T

ARUN MISHRA, J.

1.    The question involved in  the  present  appeals  is  whether  services
rendered by the appellants in Kurukshetra  University/Punjab  University  is
qualifying service for the purpose of  pension  and  can  be  added  to  the
services rendered by them in the respondent  no.1,  i.e.  Maharshi  Dayanand
University, Rohtak (hereinafter called “M.D. University”).

2.    The appellants are receiving pension after their retirement from  M.D.
University, however, it is confined to the services rendered by them in  the
same university.    Deceased  A.N.  Sachdeva  and  Ram  Parshad  Saini  were
appointed in Punjab University. R.K. Tuteja, petitioner no.3 and Prem  Kumar
were appointed as Lecturer  and  Clerk  respectively.  They  were  appointed
without any break in M.D. University.

3.    A.N. Sachdeva, since deceased was appointed as Steno-Typist in  Punjab
University on 7.8.1961, thereafter as Private Secretary  to  Vice-Chancellor
in M.D. University on 1.5.1976, promoted  as  Deputy  Registrar  in  August,
1988 and retired from the service of M.D. University on 31.12.2000.

       Ram  Prashad  Saini  after  rendering  services  from  16.11.1962  to
14.1.1975 in Punjab University was  appointed  as  Asistant  in  Kurukshetra
University on 15.1.1975 and served till 11.5.1977 and on  12.5.1977  he  was
appointed in M.D. University and retired from service on 31.10.1999.

      R.K. Tuteja was appointed as Lecturer  in  Kurukshetra  University  on
29.7.1964, served  uninterruptedly  till  20.8.1979  and  was  appointed  on
21.8.1979 in the same capacity in M.D. University where he served  till  his
retirement on 31.12.2001.

      Prem Kumar Naveen was appointed Clerk  in  Kurukshetra  University  on
7.8.1961 and served  till  6.10.1976  and  next  day  on  7.10.1976  he  was
appointed in M.D. University.  He retired on 28.2.2000.

4.    The services  of  the  said  employees  rendered  by  them  in  Punjab
University/Kurukshetra University   have  not  been  counted  as  qualifying
service for the purpose of pension  by  the  M.D.  University.   Hence,  the
writ petition was filed by them in the High Court after rejection  of  their
representation.   The  appellants  submitted  that   M.D.   University   had
introduced pension scheme with effect from  1.4.1995.   The  appellants  had
opted for the same.   A  memorandum  dated  24.12.2001  was  issued  by  the
Haryana Government for counting of service rendered by employees  of  Punjab
University/Kurukshetra University/M.D. University as qualifying service  for
the purpose of pension.

5.    Haryana Government issued a memorandum dated  7.1.2002  confining  the
policy issued by it for the persons who  retired  after  7.1.2002,  however,
Finance Department issued clarification  dated  9.7.2003  that  instructions
contained in the  memorandum  dated  7.1.2002  are  not  applicable  to  the
employees of the university because the pension schemes  of  the  university
are  different.   Before  that  a  clarification  had  been  issued  by  the
Government of Haryana on 5.6.2002  mentioning  that  the  employees  of  the
Punjab University were subsequently  allocated  to  Kurukshetra  University,
Rohtak and M.D. University, Rohtak before its formation used to be  regional
centre of Kurukshetra University.  That being the  situation,  decision  was
taken to  treat  the  services  rendered  in  Punjab  University/Kurukshetra
University as qualifying service for the purpose of  pension  on  retirement
from M.D. University, Rohtak.  It was also clarified  that  as  regards  the
services rendered by the employees elsewhere  such  as  Central  Government/
State Government/Autonomous Body, the same is  not  to  be  counted  towards
qualifying service for the purpose of pension.

6.    The stand of the respondents is  that  the  retiral  benefits  of  the
employees are governed by the provisions of M.D. University Pension  Scheme,
1997  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “Pension  Scheme,  1997”).   The  past
services could not have been treated as qualifying service  for  pension  in
view of Rule 4(vii) of the Pension Scheme, 1997 introduced with effect  from
1.4.1995 in lieu of Contributory Provident Fund.    Option was given to  the
employees to opt for the contributory provident scheme or  for  the  pension
scheme.  In the pension scheme 1997  there  is  no  provision  for  counting
previous    service    rendered    by    the    appellants     in     Punjab
University/Kurukshetra  University.   Reliance  had  been  placed   on   the
clarification dated 5.6.2002 to contend that the employees who continued  in
the M.D. University on allocation/absorption with change  of  employer  were
entitled to count their  services  for  the  purpose  of  pension.   As  the
appellants were directly appointed in the respondent university,  they  were
not entitled to count the service qualifying for pension.

7.    The Division Bench of the High Court by  way  of  impugned  order  has
dismissed the writ application  on the ground that in view  of  Rule  4(vii)
of the Pension Scheme 1997, services rendered by the  appellants  in  Punjab
University/Kurukshetra University cannot  be  counted.   Reliance  has  also
been placed on  the  memorandum  dated  7.1.2002.   As  the  appellants  had
retired before 7.1.2002, they are not entitled to  count  the  past  service
rendered by them in the aforesaid universities as  qualifying   service  for
pension in M.D. University.  It has also been observed that  pension  scheme
provides for constitution of corpus  fund  by  transferring  the  university
contribution alongwith interest.  Even if memorandum dated 7.1.2002  is  not
applicable, as clarified by the Finance Department,  appellants  cannot  get
the benefit as they had retired prior to 7.1.2002.

8.    It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that  as  per  memorandum
dated 24.12.2001 and its clarification dated 5.6.2002,  the  appellants  are
entitled to count the services  rendered  in  Punjab  University/Kurukshetra
University as qualifying service for the purpose of pension. It is only  the
service rendered in other autonomous body etc. which is not  to  be  counted
towards the pensionary benefits.  The appellants were receiving pension  and
liberalised pension scheme has to  be  applied  to  the  employees  who  had
retired earlier.  It is  not  a  new  scheme,  but  an  upward  revision  of
existing benefits.  It is not a case of new  retiral  benefits.   Appellants
have  been  discriminated  vis-a-vis  the  other  employees  who  had   been
absorbed/allocated  in  the  services  of  M.D.   University   from   Punjab
University/Kurukshetra University, inasmuch as, their services  rendered  in
these universities have been counted as qualifying service for  the  purpose
of pension.  Even the services of the  employees  who  have  rendered  their
services  in  some  other  university  have  also   been   counted   towards
pensionable services.  In one of such case of Dr. Jahan  Singh,  this  Court
did not intervene in the special leave petition which was  dismissed.   Even
otherwise, the classification sought to be created  by  the  respondents  is
not impermissible in view of Articles 14 and 16 and  the  services  rendered
by the appellants in Punjab University/Kurukshetra University deserve to  be
counted as qualifying service for the purpose of pension as  has  been  done
in  the  case  of  employees  who  have  been  absorbed/allocated  to   M.D.
University.

9.     Per  contra,  the  respondents  would  contend  that  the  admissible
benefits under Pension Scheme,  1997  have  already  been  extended  to  the
appellants.  In view of the clarification dated 5.6.2002,  the  services  of
the employees who had been allocated/absorbed could have been  counted,  not
the past services of the employees who had been directly appointed  in  M.D.
University, appellants stood retired before 7.1.2002 as such they  were  not
entitled for benefit of counting of past services.  The memorandum  was  not
having retrospective effect.  Even if,  memorandum  dated  7.1.2002  is  not
applicable, the appellants are  not  entitled  for  the  benefit  under  the
Pension Scheme, 1997.  Other employees who have been given the  benefit  for
counting their past services, namely, K.L. Pahuja, Yudhvir Singh Dahiya  and
Sunder Singh Dahiya had  retired  on  30.9.2003,  31.5.2002  and  31.10.2002
respectively  whereas  appellants  stood  retired  before   7.1.2002.    The
decision in the case of Dr. Jahan Singh cannot be applied to the  appellants
as while dismissing the special leave petition,  this  Court  has  left  the
question of law open.  The employer’s share of CPF has to be transferred  to
the pension fund.  It was a case of a new scheme as such its benefits  could
not  have  been  extended  retrospectively.   The  appellants  cannot  claim
equality and complain of discrimination.

10.   It is not in dispute that the appellants had opted for  pension  under
Pension Scheme, 1997.  Para 4(vii) of the Pension Scheme, 1997 as  has  been
relied upon by the respondents reads thus:-

“(vii) The period of service rendered by an employee in any State  Govt.  or
Govt. aided Private College or in  any  University/autonomous  body  against
aided post prior to joining in the University shall not count as  qualifying
service for pensionary benefits.”



           However,  it  is  not  in  dispute  that  vide  memorandum  dated
24.12.2001 issued by the Government  of  Haryana,  the  pension  scheme  was
modified inasmuch as the  State  Government  has  agreed  for  counting  the
services of the employees of the  Punjab  University/Kurukshetra  University
on retirement from M.D. University as qualifying  service.   The  memorandum
dated 24.12.2001 is extracted hereunder:-

“From

      Higher Education Commissioner,
      Haryana Chandigarh.


To

      The Vice-Chancellor,
M.D. University
Rohtak.

Memo No.18/41-2001 UNP (1)

Dated : Chandigarh the 24.12.2001

Sub:  Implementation of Pension Scheme in M.D.U. Rohtak.

      The State Govt. has considered and  agreed  for  counting  of  service
rendered   by    the    employees    of    the    University    in    Punjab
University/Kurukshetra University/M.D. University as qualifying service  for
the purpose of pension subject to the following terms and conditions :

The service rendered by the said employees in these institutions is  without
any break and is continuous.

That the employer’s share of the CPF in respect of these employees has  been
transferred to the pension fund even with respect to  the  service  rendered
in Punjab University/Kurukshetra University as required  under  the  pension
rules of the  University.   Further,  that  all  other  requirement  of  the
pension rules are fulfilled in respect  of  these  employees.   Kindly  take
necessary action accordingly.


                                            Sd/- Deputy Director, College-I,
                                          For Higher Education Commissioner,
                                                       Haryana, Chandigarh”.


Another memorandum dated 7.1.2002 was issued by the  Government  of  Haryana
on the basis of which certain incorporation was made in the  Pension  Scheme
1997.  However, later on, the Finance Department on 9.7.2003  has  clarified
that memorandum dated 7.1.2002 is not applicable to  the  employees  of  the
University.

11.   Yet another memorandum  dated  5.6.2002  has  been  referred  to  with
respect   to   the   counting   of    the    services    of    the    Punjab
University/Kurukshetra  University  into  M.D.  University   as   qualifying
service for the purpose of pension.  Same is extracted hereunder :-

“From

      Higher Education Commissioner, Haryana,
     Chandigarh.

To

      Registrar,

Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra.
Maharshi Dayanand University, Rohtak.


Memo No.18/44-2001 UNP (1)

Dated : Chandigarh, the 6.6.2002

Subject:   Clarification  regarding  counting  of  previous  service/foreign
service towards Pension.

Kindly refer to the subject noted above.

The advice issued vide letter No.18/44-2001 UNP (1) dated 24.12.2001 was  in
respect  of  service  rendered  by  the  employees  of   Maharshi   Dayanand
University,  Rohtak  in  Kurukshetra  University,  Kurukshetra  and   Punjab
University.  It is as well as  known  that  initially,  it  was  Kurukshetra
University, Kurukshetra and what constitutes Maharshi  Dayanand  University,
Rohtak now was a regional  centre  of  Kurukshetra  University,  Kurukshetra
earlier.  Similarly the employees also has rendered service  in  the  Punjab
University  and  were  subsequently  allocated  to  Kurukshetra  University,
Rohtak.  That being the  situation  the  advice  was  with  regard  to  that
service which the employees had rendered initially in the Punjab  University
followed by Maharshi Dayanand University, Rohtak.  This pattern  follows  in
the same manner as the employees of the joining  Punjab  were  allocated  to
Haryana Govt. at the time of the creation of the Haryana State.   Hence  the
service rendered by these employees who continued  to  remain  in  suit  but
there was a change of employer on account of division of jurisdiction  after
a period of time.  In their case, the previous service rendered  was  agreed
to be countable for the purpose of pension in Maharshi Dayanand  University,
Rohtak.

To the extent the employees of Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra  fall  in
the same category, their service may also be  counted  for  the  purpose  of
pension at the time of retirement from Kurukshetra  University,  Kurukshetra
subject  to  fulfillment  of  the  conditions  mentioned  in  letter   dated
24.12.2001 (copy enclosed)  in  respect  of  Maharshi  Dayanand  University,
Rohtak.


As regards service rendered by  the  employees  elsewhere  such  as  Central
Govt./State Govt./Autonomous  Body,  the  same  is  not  countable  for  the
purpose of pensionary benefits as there is no provision to  this  effect  in
the pension scheme of Kurukshetra  University,  Kurukshetra.   In  case  the
Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra  is  keen  to  count  such  service  for
pensionary benefits, they should be advised to first consider  amendment  in
their pension scheme for which a separate self-contained proposal should  be
submitted for approval of the State Govt.



        It  is,  therefore  requested  that  the  cases   may   be   decided
accordingly.


                                              Sd/- 5.6.02
                             Deputy Director Colleges-I,
                                          For Higher Education Commissioner,
                                  Haryana, Chandigarh.”


12.   It is apparent from the memorandum  dated 24.12.2001  that  the  first
requirement to count the services rendered in Punjab  University/Kurukshetra
University/M.D.  University  by  the  appellants  were  without  break   and
continuous.  It is also not in dispute that after rendering the services  in
Punjab University/Kurukshetra University, the aforesaid employees  had  been
directly appointed on the very next day in M.D.  University.   Earlier,  the
employees of Punjab University were allocated to Kurukshetra University  and
it is not in dispute that present M.D. University used to  be  the  regional
centre of Kurukshetra University prior to its establishment as  full-fledged
University.

13.   Second requirement of the memorandum  dated  24.12.2001  is  that  the
employer’s share of the CPF has to be transferred to the pension  fund  with
respect to services rendered in  Punjab  University/Kurukshetra  University.
The appellants had expressed their willingness in  their  representation  to
fulfil  the  aforesaid  requirement  of  the  memorandum  dated   24.12.2001
including all other requirements of the pension scheme.

14.   The question which arises for consideration is whether it  is  a  case
of upward revision of existing benefits or  a  new  scheme  floated  by  the
respondents, while issuing the memorandum dated 24.12.2001.

      The appellants have placed reliance on a Constitution  Bench  decision
of this Court in D.S. Nakara & Ors. v. Union of India [1983 (1) SCC 305]  in
which  this  Court  has  laid  down  that   reasonable   classification   is
permissible.   The  classification  must  be  founded  on  an   intelligible
differentia and that must have a rational relation to the object  sought  to
be achieved. This Court has  laid  down  that  even  though  the  scheme  is
prospective, the benefit of liberalised pension  scheme  should  be  applied
equally to all and  they  are  required  to  be  paid  the  upward  revision
commencing from the specified date.  No  arrears  would  be  payable.   This
Court has laid down thus:-


“29. Summing up it can be said with confidence  that  pension  is  not  only
compensation for loyal service rendered in the past, but pension also has  a
broader significance, in that it is  a  measure  of  socio-economic  justice
which inheres economic security in  the  fall  of  life  when  physical  and
mental prowess is ebbing corresponding to aging process and, therefore,  one
is required to fall back on savings. One such saving in  kind  is  when  you
give your best in  the  hey-day  of  life  to  your  employer,  in  days  of
invalidity, economic security by way of periodical payment is  assured.  The
term has been judicially defined as a stated allowance or  stipend  made  in
consideration of past service or a surrender of rights or emoluments to  one
retired from service. Thus the pension payable to a government  employee  is
earned by rendering long and efficient service and therefore can be said  to
be a deferred portion of the compensation or for service  rendered.  In  one
sentence one can say that the most practical raison d’etre  for  pension  is
the inability to provide for oneself due to old age. One may live and  avoid
unemployment but not senility and penury if there is nothing  to  fall  back
upon.

                                  x x x x x

42. If it appears to be undisputable, as it does to us that  the  pensioners
for the purpose of pension benefits form a class, would its upward  revision
permit a homogeneous  class  to  be  divided  by     arbitrarily  fixing  an
eligibility    criteria    unrelated     to        purpose of revision,  and
would such  classification  be  founded  on  some  rational  principle?  The
classification has to be  based,  as  is  well  settled,  on  some  rational
principle and the rational principle must have nexus to the  objects  sought
to be achieved. We have set  out  the  objects  underlying  the  payment  of
pension. If the State considered it  necessary  to  liberalise  the  pension
scheme, we find no rational principle behind it for granting these  benefits
only to those who retired subsequent to  that  date  simultaneously  denying
the same to those who retired prior to that date. If the liberalisation  was
considered  necessary  for  augmenting  social  security  in  old   age   to
government servants then those who, retired  earlier  cannot  be  worst  off
than those who retire  later.  Therefore,  this  division  which  classified
pensioners into two classes is not based on any rational  principle  and  if
the rational principle is the one of dividing  pensioners  with  a  view  to
giving something more to persons  otherwise  equally  placed,  it  would  be
discriminatory. To illustrate, take two persons,  one  retired  just  a  day
prior and another a day just succeeding the specified  date.  Both  were  in
the same pay bracket, the average emolument was the same and  both  had  put
in equal number of years of service. How does a fortuitous  circumstance  of
retiring a day earlier or a day later will permit totally unequal  treatment
in the matter of pension? One  retiring  a  day  earlier  will  have  to  be
subject to ceiling of Rs 8100 p.a. and average emolument to  be  worked  out
on 36 months’ salary while the other will have a ceiling of Rs  12,000  p.a.
and average emolument will be computed on  the  basis  of  last  10  months’
average. The artificial division stares into face and is  unrelated  to  any
principle and whatever principle, if there be any, has absolutely  no  nexus
to the objects sought to be achieved by liberalising the pension scheme.  In
fact this arbitrary division has  not  only  no  nexus  to  the  liberalised
pension scheme but it is counter-productive and runs counter  to  the  whole
gamut of pension scheme. The equal treatment guaranteed  in  Article  14  is
wholly violated inasmuch as the pension rules being statutory in  character,
since the specified date, the rules accord differential  and  discriminatory
treatment to equals in the matter of commutation of  pension.  A  48  hours’
difference in matter of retirement would have a traumatic  effect.  Division
is thus both arbitrary and unprincipled. Therefore, the classification  does
not stand the test of Article 14.

43. Further the classification is wholly arbitrary because we do not find  a
single acceptable or persuasive reason for  this  division.  This  arbitrary
action violated the guarantee of Article 14. The next question  is  what  is
the way out?

                                  x x x x x

48. It was very seriously contended, remove the  event  correlated  to  date
and examine whether the  scheme  is  workable.  We  find  no  difficulty  in
implementing the scheme omitting the event  happening  after  the  specified
date retaining the more humane formula for computation of pension. It  would
apply to all existing pensioners and  future  pensioners.  In  the  case  of
existing pensioners, the pension will have to be recomputed by applying  the
rule of average emoluments as set out in Rule 34 and  introducing  the  slab
system and the amount worked out within the floor and the ceiling.

49. But we make it abundantly clear that arrears  are  not  required  to  be
made because to that  extent  the  scheme  is  prospective.  All  pensioners
whenever they retired would be covered by the  liberalised  pension  scheme,
because the scheme is a  scheme  for  payment  of  pension  to  a  pensioner
governed by 1972 Rules. The  date  of  retirement  is  irrelevant.  But  the
revised scheme would be operative from the date mentioned in the scheme  and
would bring under  its  umbrella  all  existing  pensioners  and  those  who
retired subsequent to that date. In case of pensioners who retired prior  to
the specified date, their pension would be  computed  afresh  and  would  be
payable in future commencing from the specified date. No  arrears  would  be
payable. And that would take care of the grievance  of  retrospectivity.  In
our opinion, it would make  a  marginal  difference  in  the  case  of  past
pensioners because the emoluments are not  revised.  The  last  revision  of
emoluments was as  per  the  recommendation  of  the  Third  Pay  Commission
(Raghubar  Dayal  Commission).  If  the  emoluments  remain  the  same,  the
computation of average emoluments  under  amended  Rule  34  may  raise  the
average emoluments, the period for averaging  being  reduced  from  last  36
months to last 10 months. The slab will provide slightly higher pension  and
if someone reaches the maximum the old lower ceiling will not deny him  what
is otherwise justly due on computation. The words “who were  in  service  on
March 31, 1979 and retiring from service on or after  that  date”  excluding
the date for commencement of revision are words  of  limitation  introducing
the mischief and are vulnerable  as  denying  equality  and  introducing  an
arbitrary fortuitous circumstance  can  be  severed  without  impairing  the
formula. Therefore, there  is  absolutely  no  difficulty  in  removing  the
arbitrary and discriminatory portion of the scheme  and  it  can  be  easily
severed”.


15.   In M.C. Dhingra v. Union of India &  Ors.  [1996  (7)  SCC  564],  the
question arose with respect to the counting  of  the  previous  service  for
grant  of  pension.   The  circular  dated  31.3.1982  which  came  up   for
consideration provided the benefit thereof only to the persons  retiring  on
or after the date of issuance of circular was  held to be  arbitrary.   This
Court has laid down thus:-

“4. It is seen that though the appellant had retired on 1-2-1973, since  the
question of tagging the previous service rendered in  the  State  Government
on temporary basis and the similar cases are  pending,  the  Government  had
taken a decision on 31-3-1982 to tag the previous  service  for  computation
of the pension. Learned counsel  appearing  for  the  respondents  contended
that clause 4 of the abovesaid circular  is  one  of  the  conditions  which
prescribes that it would  be  applicable  to  the  government  servants  who
retired from that date, namely, 31-3-1982. Since the appellant  had  retired
on 1-2-1973, he is not eligible. We find no force  in  the  contention.  All
the persons who rendered  temporary  service  prior  to  their  joining  the
Government of India Service have been given the benefit of fixation  of  the
pension payable by tagging  the  temporary  service.  The  cut-off  date  is
arbitrary violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Having  grouped
all the similarly circumstanced  employees,  fixing  the  cut-off  date  and
giving benefit to those who retired thereafter is  obviously  arbitrary.  In
similar circumstances, following the ratio in D.S. Nakara v. Union of  India
[1983 (1) SCC 305], this Court held in the case of R.L. Marwaha v. Union  of
India [1987 (4) SCC 31  that  such  a  restriction  is  arbitrary  violating
Article 14. On the facts and circumstances, we  find  that  the  restriction
imposed in clause 4 of the circular is  violative  of  Article  14.  It  is,
therefore, unconstitutional. However, the appellant will be entitled to  the
pro rata pension from March 1982”.

16.   In State of Punjab v. Justice S.S. Dewan (Retd.) & Ors. [1997 (4)  SCC
569], this Court held that benefit  extended  was  new  one.  However,  this
Court has observed thus:-

“7. Therefore, what we have to consider is what is the nature of the  change
made by the amendment. Is it by way  of  upward  revision  of  the  existing
pension scheme? Then obviously the ratio of  the  decision  in  D.S.  Nakara
case [1983 (1) SCC 305] would apply. If it is  held  to  be  a  new  retiral
benefit or a new scheme then the benefit of it cannot be extended  to  those
who retired earlier”.

17.    In State of Rajasthan & Anr. v. Prem Raj [1997 (10)  SCC  317],  this
Court rejected the submission that decision  in  D.S.  Nakara  (supra)   has
given a complete go-by.  This Court has laid down thus:-


“12. In State of W.B. v. Ratan Behari Dey [1993  (4)  SCC  62],  this  Court
considered the question whether in providing  a  pension  scheme  the  State
could fix up a particular date and make it applicable to those  who  retired
on or after that date. The Court distinguished Nakara  case  [1983  (1)  SCC
305] by holding that in Nakara case an artificial date  had  been  specified
classifying the retirees governed by the same rules and  similarly  situated
into two different classes depriving one such class of the  benefit  of  the
liberalised pension rules and  that  was  held  to  be  bad.  Following  the
decision of the Court in Krishena Kumar case [1990 (4) SCC 207] it was  held
that the State can specify a date with effect  from  which  the  Regulations
framed or amended conferring the pensionary benefits shall come  into  force
but the only condition is that the State cannot pick a date out of  its  hat
and the date has to be prescribed in a reasonable manner  having  regard  to
all the facts and circumstances.

13. In State of Rajasthan v. Sevanivatra  Karamchari  Hitkari  Samiti  [1995
(2) SCC 117] the provisions contained in Rule  268-H  of  Rajasthan  Service
Rules came up for consideration  as  to  whether  the  aforesaid  provisions
restructuring the rights of government servants in service on 29-2-1964  can
be held to be violative of Article 14. The Court applied  the  principle  in
Krishena Kumar case and Indian Ex-Services League case [1991  (2)  SCC  104]
and held that the fixation of 29-2-1964 as  the  cut-off  date  with  effect
from which the  new  liberalised  pension  scheme  in  Chapter  XXIII-A  was
introduced cannot be said to be arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of  the
Constitution.  As  has  been  stated  earlier  for  deciding   the   present
controversy it is not necessary for us to further delve  into  the  question
as to the extent to which the decision of this  Court  in  Nakara  case  has
been followed or explained. But suffice it to say that the contention of  Mr
Gupta, the learned counsel for the appellant,  that  the  decision  of  this
Court in Nakara case  has been given a complete go-by cannot be sustained”.


18.   In Dhan Raj & Ors. v. State of J&K & Ors.  [1998  (4)  SCC  30],  this
Court considered the case where the appellants  who  had  retired  from  the
services of  Corporation  prior  to  9.6.1981  claimed  to  be  entitled  to
pensionary benefits by virtue of G.O. dated  3.10.1986.  The  contention  of
the State that the benefit could not be  extended   to  the  appellants  was
rejected.  The relevant portion is extracted hereunder:-

“14. Even otherwise, we do not find any justifiable criteria for  the  State
Government to draw the line between those who retired earlier and those  who
retired after 9-6-1981. Both such set of employees were  equally  placed  in
the same Undertaking/Corporation  temporary  in  character  and  all  having
served in the organisations for more than 20 years. In fact, the  appellants
have served with the Government for more than 30 to  40  years.  The  person
serving for such a long period earns his legitimate expectation. It  is  not
something which he seeks with a begging bowl.  It  is  inappropriate  for  a
State Government to take up a  stand  to  get  its  own  order  to  be  held
illegal, by giving restrictive interpretation to deny  benefit  to  its  own
employees  who  had  worked  for  such  a  long  period.  In  fact,  in  the
Constitution Bench decision of this Court in D.S. Nakara v. Union  of  India
[1983 (1) SCC 305] this Court held that criterion of date of enforcement  of
the revised scheme entitling benefits of  the  revision  to  those  retiring
after specified date while depriving the benefits to  those  retiring  prior
to that date was violative of Article 14. Even otherwise, while  considering
the question of grant of pensionary benefits the State has to act  to  reach
the constitutional goal of setting up a socialist State as  stated  and  the
assurance as given in the Directive Principles of State  Policy.  A  pension
is a part and parcel of that goal, which secures to a  person  serving  with
the State after retirement of his livelihood. To deny such a right  to  such
a person, without any sound reasoning or any justifiable  differentia  would
be against the spirit of the Constitution. We find in the present  case  the
stand taken by the State Government to be contrary to the said  spirit.   In
the  aforesaid  D.S.  Nakara  this  Court  has  very  clearly  recorded  the
following:

“36. Having set out clearly the society which we  propose  to  set  up,  the
direction in which the State action must move, the welfare  State  which  we
propose to build up, the constitutional  goal  of  setting  up  a  socialist
State and  the  assurance  in  the  Directive  Principles  of  State  Policy
especially of security in old age  at  least  to  those  who  have  rendered
useful service during their active years, it is  indisputable,  nor  was  it
questioned, that pension as a retirement benefit is in consonance  with  and
in furtherance of the  goals  of  the  Constitution.  The  goals  for  which
pension is paid themselves give a fillip and push to the policy  of  setting
up a welfare State because by pension the  socialist  goal  of  security  of
cradle to grave is assured at least when  it  is  mostly  needed  and  least
available, namely, in the fall of life.””

19.   This Court in Union of India & Ors. v. K.G.  Radhakrishna  Panickar  &
Ors. [1998 (5 SCC 111] again considered the question of  classification  and
differential treatment.  It was held that conferment of new benefit  from  a
particular date cannot be held to be violative of Article 14.   The  benefit
in question was held to be a new benefit conferred  on  the  casual  labour.
This Court held that  :-

12. In its judgment dated 8-2-1991 the Tribunal has held that  exclusion  of
period of service  rendered  as  Project  Casual  Labour  before  they  were
regularly absorbed  prior  to  1-1-1981  results  in  such  employees  being
discriminated  against  as  compared  to  Project  Casual  Labour  who  were
employed subsequently and whose service as Project Casual  Labour  prior  to
absorption is counted for  the  purpose  of  qualifying  service.  The  said
finding of the Tribunal is based on the  decision  of  this  Court  in  D.S.
Nakara [1983 (1) SCC 305]. In  this  regard,  it  may  be  stated  that  the
Tribunal was in error in invoking the principle laid down in D.S. Nakara  in
the present case. The decision in D.S. Nakara has been  considered  by  this
Court in subsequent decisions and it has been laid down that  the  principle
laid down in D.S. Nakara can have application  only  in  those  cases  where
there is discrimination in the matter of existing  benefit  between  similar
set of employees and the said principle  has  no  application  where  a  new
benefit is being conferred with effect from a particular  date.  In  such  a
case the conferment of the  benefit  with  effect  from  a  particular  date
cannot be held to be violative of Article 14  of  the  Constitution  on  the
basis that such a benefit  has  been  conferred  on  certain  categories  of
employees on the basis of a particular date. (See: Krishena Kumar  v.  Union
of India [1990 (4) SCC 207]; State of W.B. v. Ratan  Behari  Dey  [1993  (4)
SCC 62] and State of Rajasthan  v.  Sevanivatra  Karamchari  Hitkari  Samiti
[1995 (2) SCC 117]) In the present case, the benefit of counting of  service
prior to regular employment as  qualifying  service  was  not  available  to
casual labour. The said benefit was granted to Open Line Casual  Labour  for
the first time under order dated 14-10-1980 since Open  Line  Casual  Labour
could be treated as  temporary  on  completion  of  six  months’  period  of
continuous service which period was subsequently reduced to 120  days  under
para 2501(b)(i) of  the  Manual.  As  regards  Project  Casual  Labour  this
benefit of being treated as temporary  became  available  only  with  effect
from 1-1-1981 under the scheme which was accepted by  this  Court  in  Inder
Pal Yadav [1985 (2) SCC 648]. Before  the  acceptance  of  that  scheme  the
benefit of temporary status was not available to Project Casual  Labour.  It
was thus a new benefit which was conferred on Project  Casual  Labour  under
the scheme as approved by this Court in Inder Pal Yadav and on the basis  of
this new benefit Project Casual Labour became entitled to count half of  the
service rendered as Project Casual Labour on the basis of  the  order  dated
14-10-1980 after being treated as temporary on the basis of  the  scheme  as
accepted in Inder Pal  Yadav.  We  are,  therefore,  unable  to  uphold  the
judgment of the Tribunal dated 8-2-1991 when it holds that service  rendered
as  Project  Casual  Labour  by  employees  who  were  absorbed  on  regular
permanent/ temporary posts prior to  1-1-1981  should  be  counted  for  the
purpose of retiral benefits and the said judgment as well  as  the  judgment
in which the said judgment has been followed  have  to  be  set  aside.  The
judgments in which the Tribunal  has  taken  a  contrary  view  have  to  be
affirmed.

20.   In V. Kasturi v. Managing Director, State Bank of India &  Anr.  [1998
(8) SCC 30],  this  Court  considered  the  prospective  amendment  and  the
question  whether  earlier  retirees  were  eligible  for  benefit  of  such
amendment.  It was held that where the amendment  enhanced  the  pension  or
provided for a new formula of pension even the earlier retirees who  at  the
time  of  retirement  were  eligible  for  pension  and  survived  till  the
amendment would be eligible for the benefit  from  the  date  it  came  into
effect, however, where the amendment extended the  benefit  of  the  pension
scheme to a new class of persons,  the  earlier  retirees  at  the  time  of
retirement who were not eligible for  pension  cannot  get  the  benefit  of
amendment.  This Court has laid down thus:-

“22. If the person retiring is eligible for  pension  at  the  time  of  his
retirement and if he survives till the time of subsequent amendment  of  the
relevant pension scheme, he would become eligible to  get  enhanced  pension
or would become eligible to get more pension  as  per  the  new  formula  of
computation  of  pension  subsequently  brought  into  force,  he  would  be
entitled to get the benefit of the amended pension provision from  the  date
of such order as he would be a member of the very same class  of  pensioners
when the additional benefit is being conferred on all of  them.  In  such  a
situation, the additional benefit available to the same class of  pensioners
cannot be denied to him on the ground that he had retired prior to the  date
on which the aforesaid additional benefit was conferred on all  the  members
of the same class of pensioners who had survived  by  the  time  the  scheme
granting additional benefit to these pensioners came into  force.  The  line
of decisions tracing their roots to the ratio of Nakara case [1983  (1)  SCC
305] would cover this category of cases”.

21.   In Subrata Sen & Ors. v. Union of India &  Ors.  [2001  (8)  SCC  71],
this Court has laid down thus:-

“18. Further, in All India Reserve Bank Retired Officers Assn. v.  Union  of
India [1992 supp. (1) SCC 664], Ahmadi, J. (as he then  was),  speaking  for
the Court in the aforesaid decision highlighted the observations  in  Nakara
case [1983 (1) SCC 305] found at  SCC  p.  333  para  46  to  the  following
effect:
“… the pension will have to be  recomputed  in  the  light  of  the  formula
enacted in the liberalised pension scheme and effective from  the  date  the
revised scheme comes into force. And beware that it is not a new scheme,  it
is only a revision of existing scheme. It is not a new retiral  benefit.  It
is an upward revision of an  existing  benefit.  If  it  was  a  wholly  new
concept, a new retiral benefit, one could have appreciated an argument  that
those who had already retired could not expect it.”

      The Court further observed:

“It must be realised that in the case of an employee  governed  by  the  CPF
(Contributory Provident Fund) Scheme his relations with  the  employer  come
to an end on his retirement and receipt of the CPF amount but  in  the  case
of an employee governed under the pension  scheme  his  relations  with  the
employer merely undergo a change but do not snap  altogether.  That  is  the
reason  why  this  Court  in  Nakara  case  drew   a   distinction   between
liberalisation of an existing benefit and  introduction  of  a  totally  new
scheme. In the case of pensioners it is  necessary  to  revise  the  pension
periodically as the continuous fall in the  rupee  value  and  the  rise  in
prices of essential commodities necessitates an adjustment  of  the  pension
amount but that is not the case of employees governed under the CPF  Scheme,
since they had received the lump sum payment which they were at  liberty  to
invest in a manner that would yield optimum return which would take care  of
the inflationary trends. This distinction between  those  belonging  to  the
pension scheme and those belonging  to  the  CPF  Scheme  has  been  rightly
emphasised by this Court in Krishena case [1990 (4) SCC 207]”.


22.    In John Vallamattom & Anr. v. Union of India [2003 (6) SCC 611],
this Court considered the decision in D.S. Nakara (supra)  and has observed
thus:-

“62. Article 14 of the Constitution states that the State shall not deny  to
any person equality before the law or  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws
within the territory  of  India.  The  first  part  of  Article  14  of  the
Constitution of India is a declaration of equality of civil rights  for  all
purposes  within  the  territory  of   India   and   basic   principles   of
republicanism and there will be no discrimination. The  guarantee  of  equal
protection embraces the entire realm of “State action”. It would extend  not
only when an individual is discriminated against in the matter  of  exercise
of his right or in the matter of imposing liabilities upon him, but also  in
the matter of granting privileges etc. In all these cases, the principle  is
the same, namely, that there should be no discrimination between one  person
and another if as  regards  the  subject-matter  of  the  legislation  their
position is the same. In my  view,  all  persons  in  similar  circumstances
shall be treated alike both  in  privileges  and  liabilities  imposed.  The
classification should not be arbitrary; it should be reasonable and it  must
be based on qualities and characteristics and not any  other  who  are  left
out, and those qualities or characteristics must have  reasonable  relations
to the object of the legislation.
                                  x x x x x

64. It has also been observed in the above judgment that in the very  nature
of things, the society being composed of  unequals,  a  welfare  State  will
have to strive by both executive and legislative action  to  help  the  less
fortunate in the society to ameliorate their condition so  that  the  social
and economic inequality in the society may be bridged and in the absence  of
the doctrine of classification such legislation is  likely  to  flounder  on
the bedrock of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution”.


23.   In State Bank of India v. L. Kannaiah &  Ors.  [2003  (10)  SCC  499],
this Court considered fixation of cut-off date for applicability of  pension
scheme.  Minimum service was prescribed 20 years and cut-off date  for  such
induction was fixed   as  1.1.1965.   This  Court  held  minimum  qualifying
service being  the  essential  consideration.   There  is  no  rationale  to
exclude employees confirmed earlier who have put in more than  20  years  of
service.  This Court has laid down thus:-

“6. Para 5 of the circular stipulated that the  age-limit  (viz.  not  being
over 35 years) for admission  to  Pension  Fund  shall  continue.  Thus  the
pensioned ex-service personnel were admitted  to  pensionary  benefits  with
effect from 1-1-1965 subject to the  restriction  of  the  age-limit  of  35
years (which was later on enhanced to 38 years) on that date.  As  the  date
of confirmation of  the  respondents  was  much  earlier  to  1-1-1965,  the
crucial date for admission to the Pension Fund would be  1-1-1965.  On  that
date, the confirmed employee of the Bank should not have exceeded  35  years
of age. That is the combined effect of Staff Circular No. 18 dated  8-4-1974
read with  the  Pension  Fund  Rules  referred  to  supra.  The  reason  for
prescribing the maximum age-limit of 35 or 38, as the case may be,  for  the
purpose of induction into Pension Fund  appears  to  be  that  the  employee
would be able to render minimum service of 20 years as contemplated by  Rule
22 of the Pension Fund Rules. However, there  does  not  appear  to  be  any
rationale or discernible basis for fixing  the  cut-off  date  as  1-1-1965,
notwithstanding their earlier confirmation in  bank  service.  True,  a  new
benefit has been conferred on the ex-servicemen  and  therefore,  a  cut-off
date could be fixed for extending this new benefit,  without  offending  the
ratio of the decision in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India [1983  (1)  SCC  305]
but, there could be no arbitrariness or irrationality in fixing  such  date.
Minimum  qualifying  service  being  the   essential   consideration,   even
according to the Bank, there is no reason why  the  ex-servicemen  like  the
respondents, who from the date of their confirmation had put  in  more  than
twenty years of service, even taking the retirement age  as  58,  should  be
excluded. No reason is forthcoming in the  counter-affidavit  filed  by  the
Bank for  choosing  the  said  date.  When  it  is  decided  to  extend  the
pensionary benefits to ex-servicemen drawing  pension,  the  denial  of  the
benefit to some of the serving employees should be  based  on  rational  and
intelligible criterion. In substance, that is the view  taken  by  the  High
Court and we see no reason to differ with that view”.

24.   In Union of India & Anr. v. SPS Vains [2008 (9) SCC 125], decision  of
this Court in D.S. Nakara has been followed.  It was held that  there  could
not be disparity of pension within the same rank.  It was held thus:-

“29. The Constitution  Bench  (in  D.S.  Nakara  [1983  (1)  SCC  305])  has
discussed in detail the  objects  of  granting  pension  and  we  need  not,
therefore, dilate any further on the said subject, but the decision  in  the
aforesaid case has been  consistently  referred  to  in  various  subsequent
judgments of this Court, to which we  need  not  refer.  In  fact,  all  the
relevant judgments delivered on the subject prior to  the  decision  of  the
Constitution Bench have been considered and dealt  with  in  detail  in  the
aforesaid case. The directions ultimately given by  the  Constitution  Bench
in the said case in order to resolve the dispute which  had  arisen,  is  of
relevance to resolve the dispute in this case also.

30. However, before we give such directions we must also  observe  that  the
submissions advanced on behalf of the Union of India cannot be  accepted  in
view of the decision in D.S. Nakara case. The object sought to  be  achieved
was not to create a class within a class, but to ensure  that  the  benefits
of pension were made available to all persons of the same class equally.  To
hold otherwise would cause violence to the provisions of Article 14  of  the
Constitution. It could not also have been the intention of  the  authorities
to equate the  pension  payable  to  officers  of  two  different  ranks  by
resorting to the step-up principle envisaged in the fundamental rules  in  a
manner where the other  officers  belonging  to  the  same  cadre  would  be
receiving a higher pension” .


25.   In K.J.S. Buttar v. Union of India & Anr. [2011 (11)  SCC  429],  this
Court  considered  the  question  when  some  new  retiral   benefits   were
introduced and measurement to calculate disability was changed  pursuant  to
recommendation made by the 5th Pay Commission and same was implemented  with
effect from 1.1.1996.  The appellant was denied retiral benefits on  account
of  his  retirement  in  1979.  This  Court  held  the   treatment   to   be
discriminatory and laid down that restriction of benefit  to  only  officers
who were invalided out of service after 1.1.1996 is violative of Article  14
of the Constitution and hence illegal.  In the  case  of  liberalisation  of
existing scheme all pensioners are to be  treated  equally.   The  appellant
was entitled to all retiral benefits with effect from 1.1.1996.  This  Court
has laid down thus:-

“11. In our opinion the appellant was entitled to the benefit  of  Para  7.2
of the Instructions dated 31-1-2001 according to which where the  disability
is assessed between 50% and 75% then the same should be treated as 75%,  and
it makes no difference whether he  was  invalided  from  service  before  or
after 1-1-1996. Hence the appellant was entitled to the said  benefits  with
arrears from 1-1-1996, and interest at 8% per annum on the same.

12. It may be mentioned that the Government of India,  Ministry  of  Defence
had been granting war injury pension to pre-1996 retirees also in  terms  of
Para 10.1 of the Ministry’s Letter No. 1(5)/87/D(Pen-Ser)  dated  30-10-1987
(p. 59, Para 8). The mode  of  calculation,  however,  was  changed  by  the
Notification dated 31-1-2001 which was  restricted  to  post-1996  retirees.
The appellant, therefore, was entitled to the war injury pension even  prior
to 1-1-1996 and especially in  view  of  the  Instructions  dated  31-1-2001
issued by the Government of India. The said instruction  was  initially  for
persons retiring after 1-1-1996 but later on by  virtue  of  the  subsequent
Notifications dated 16-5-2001 it was extended to pre-1996 retirees  also  on
rationalisation of the scheme”.

26.   Reliance has been placed by the respondents on a decision in State  of
Punjab & Anr. v. J.L. Gupta & Ors. [2000 (3) SCC 736] in  which  this  Court
referring to the decision in State of Punjab & Ors. v. Boota  Singh  &  Anr.
[2000 (3) SCC 733] held  that  when  financial  implication  is  there,  the
benefit conferred by notification dated 9.7.1985 can  be  claimed  by  those
who retired after the date of stipulation in the notification and those  who
have retired prior to the date of  stipulation,  as  the  notifications  are
governed by different rules.  It was a case of  pensionary  benefits,  i.e.,
pension, gratuity/DCRG, internal gratuity.  Hence, the decision  is  clearly
distinguishable.  Moreover, in the instant case, employees are  governed  by
same set of rules.

27.   Considering the principles enunciated under Articles 14 and 16 of  the
Constitution, and that the benefit  is  not  an  ex  gratia  payment  but  a
payment in recognition of  past  service,  in  our  opinion,  discrimination
could  not  have  been  made  between  those   employees   who   have   been
absorbed/allocated are  entitled  to  count  their  services  as  qualifying
service for the purpose of pension and not those  who  have  been  appointed
directly. Fact remains that  all  these  employees  have  served  in  Punjab
University/Kurukshetra University/MD. University without  any  break.   M.D.
University,  prior  to  its  establishment,  was  the  regional  centre   of
Kurukshetra University.  Expectation had arisen to  compute  the  period  of
service rendered in Punjab University/Kurukshetra  University  which  cannot
be unreasonably deprived of. Merely because a person has been appointed  and
others have been absorbed/allocated makes no difference as  to  the  service
rendered.  Even otherwise, it is a case of upward revision  of  benefit  and
the classification which is sought to be created by the aforesaid method  of
not extending benefit to persons appointed directly and  by  fixing  cut-off
date cannot be said to be  intelligible  one;  same  is  discriminatory  and
thus, the appellants would  be  entitled  for  the  benefit  from  the  date
decision has been taken  on  24.12.2001  to  compute  the  previous  service
rendered in Punjab University/Kurukshetra University as qualifying  service.
 In other words, they would be entitled for the benefit  prospectively  from
the date of issuance of memorandum dated  24.12.2001.   The  employees  have
expressed  their  willingness  to  deposit/adjustment  of   the   employer’s
contribution of CPF as required in the memorandum dated 24.12.2001.

28.   In yet another case of M.D. University v. Dr. Jahan,  this  Court  did
not interfere in the decision of the High Court of  Punjab  and  Haryana  at
Chandigarh on 26.5.2009 in LPA No.27 of 2006, however, the question  of  law
was kept open.  Hence, we have examined the case on  merits  and  found  the
case of the appellants on better footing as compared to Dr. Jahan  and  even
otherwise the appellants are entitled for the benefit.
29.   In view of aforesaid discussion, the appellants are entitled  for  the
benefit of counting the services rendered in  Punjab  University/Kurukshetra
University as qualifying service for  the  purpose  of  pension  subject  to
fulfilment of the conditions specified in the  memorandum  dated  24.12.2001
etc. and in case the amount payable by the appellants  towards  contributory
provident fund is less than the amount payable to them as pension, it  would
be adjusted by the respondents without insisting for  its  refund  from  the
amount payable to the appellants.  Let the exercise be  completed  within  a
period of three months from today.
30.   The appeals are allowed, impugned judgment is  set  aside.   We  leave
the parties to bear their own costs.
..........................................J.
                                        (M.Y. Eqbal)


New                                                                   Delhi;
..........................................J.
August 10, 2015.                                 (Arun Mishra)Ha


No comments:

Post a Comment

Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.