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Wednesday, August 12, 2015

“Aadhaar Card Scheme”= One of the grounds of attack on the scheme is that the very collection of such biometric data is violative of the “right to privacy”. Some of the petitioners assert that the right to privacy is implied under Article 21 of the Constitution of India while other petitioners assert that such a right emanates not only from Article 21 but also from various other articles embodying the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution of India. We are of the opinion that the cases on hand raise far reaching questions of importance involving interpretation of the Constitution. What is at stake is the amplitude of the fundamental rights including that precious and inalienable right under Article 21. If the observations made in M.P. Sharma (supra) and Kharak Singh (supra) are to be read literally and accepted as the law of this country, the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India and more particularly right to liberty under Article 21 would be denuded of vigour and vitality. At the same time, we are also of the opinion that the institutional integrity and judicial discipline require that pronouncement made by larger Benches of this Court cannot be ignored by the smaller Benches without appropriately explaining the reasons for not following the pronouncements made by such larger Benches. With due respect to all the learned Judges who rendered the subsequent judgments - where right to privacy is asserted or referred to their Lordships concern for the liberty of human beings, we are of the humble opinion that there appears to be certain amount of apparent unresolved contradiction in the law declared by this Court. 13. Therefore, in our opinion to give a quietus to the kind of controversy raised in this batch of cases once for all, it is better that the ratio decidendi of M.P. Sharma (supra) and Kharak Singh (supra) is scrutinized and the jurisprudential correctness of the subsequent decisions of this Court where the right to privacy is either asserted or referred be examined and authoritatively decided by a Bench of appropriate strength. 14. We, therefore, direct the Registry to place these matters before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.

                                             REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.494 OF 2012

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Another    …     Petitioners

Versus

Union of India & Others                            …     Respondents

                                    WITH



                   TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO.151 OF 2013

                   TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO.152 OF 2013

                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.829 OF 2013

                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.833 OF 2013

                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL)  NO.932 OF 2013

                  TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO.312 OF 2014

                  TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO.313 OF 2014

                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL)  NO.37 OF 2015

                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.220 OF 2015

                  TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO.921 OF 2015

         CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.144 OF 2014 IN WP(C) 494/2012

         CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.470 OF 2015 IN WP(C) 494/2012



                                  O R D E R

1.    In this batch of matters, a scheme propounded  by  the  Government  of
India popularly known as “Aadhaar Card Scheme” is under  attack  on  various
counts.  For the purpose of this order, it is not necessary  for  us  to  go
into the details of the nature of the  scheme  and  the  various  counts  on
which the scheme is attacked. Suffice it to say that under the  said  scheme
the Government of India is collecting and  compiling  both  the  demographic
and biometric data of the residents of this country to be used  for  various
purposes, the details of which are not relevant at present.

2.    One of  the  grounds  of  attack  on  the  scheme  is  that  the  very
collection of such biometric data is violative of the  “right  to  privacy”.
Some of the petitioners assert that the right to privacy  is  implied  under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India while other petitioners assert  that
such a right emanates not only from Article 21 but also from  various  other
articles embodying the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part-III  of  the
Constitution of India.

3.    When the matter was taken up for hearing, Shri Mukul Rohatgi,  learned
Attorney General made a submission that in view of  the  judgments  of  this
Court in M.P. Sharma & Others v. Satish Chandra & Others, AIR  1954  SC  300
and Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. & Others, AIR 1963 SC  1295,  (decided  by
Eight  and  Six  Judges  respectively)  the  legal  position  regarding  the
existence of the fundamental right to  privacy  is  doubtful.  Further,  the
learned Attorney General also submitted that in a  catena  of  decisions  of
this  Court  rendered  subsequently,  this  Court  referred  to  “right   to
privacy”,  contrary to the  judgments  in  the  abovementioned  cases  which
resulted  in  a  jurisprudentially  impermissible  divergence  of   judicial
opinions.

 “A power of search and  seizure  is  in  any  system  of  jurisprudence  an
overriding power of the State for the  protection  of  social  security  and
that power is necessarily regulated by law.  When  the  Constitution  makers
have  thought  fit  not  to  subject  such  regulation   to   constitutional
limitations by recognition of a fundamental right to privacy,  analogous  to
the American Fourth Amendment, we have no justification to import  it,  into
a  totally  different  fundamental  right,  by  some  process  of   strained
construction. [See: M.P. Singh & Others v.  Satish  Chandra  &  Others,  AIR
1954 SC 300, page 306 para 18]

“… Nor do we consider that Art. 21 has any relevance in the context  as  was
sought to be suggested by learned counsel for the  petitioner.   As  already
pointed out, the right of privacy  is  not  a  guaranteed  right  under  our
Constitution and therefore the attempt  to  ascertain  the  movement  of  an
individual which is merely a manner in which privacy is invaded  is  not  an
infringement of a fundamental right guaranteed by Part  III.”  [See:  Kharak
Singh v. State of U.P. & Others, AIR 1963 SC 1295, page 1303 para 20]

                                                      [Emphasis supplied]


4.    Learned Attorney General submitted that such impermissible  divergence
of opinion commenced with the judgment of this Court in Gobind v.  State  of
M.P. & Another, (1975) 2 SCC 148, which formed the basis for the  subsequent
decision of this Court wherein the “right to  privacy”  is  asserted  or  at
least referred to.  The most important of such  cases  are  R.  Rajagopal  &
Another v. State of Tamil Nadu & Others, (1994) 6 SCC 632  (popularly  known
as Auto Shanker’s case) and People’s Union for  Civil  Liberties  (PUCL)  v.
Union of India & Another, (1997) 1 SCC 301.

5.    All the judgments referred to above were rendered by  smaller  Benches
of two or three Judges.

6.    Shri K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel appearing for one  of  the
respondents submitted that the decision of this Court in Gobind  (supra)  is
not consistent with the decisions of this Court in M.P.  Sharma  and  Kharak
Singh.   He  submitted  that  such  divergence  is  also  noticed   by   the
academicians, Shri F.S. Nariman, Senior Advocate  of  this  Court  and  Shri
A.M. Bhattacharjee[1], Former Chief Justice,  High  Court  at  Calcutta  and
High Court at Bombay.

7.    Therefore, it is submitted by the learned Attorney  General  and  Shri
Venugopal that to settle the  legal  position,  this  batch  of  matters  is
required to be heard by a larger Bench of this Court as these matters  throw
up for debate important questions – (i)  whether  there  is  any  “right  to
privacy” guaranteed under our Constitution.  (ii) If such  a  right  exists,
what is the source and what are the contours of such a right as there is  no
express provision in the Constitution adumbrating the right to privacy.   It
is therefore submitted that these batch of matters are required to be  heard
and decided by a larger bench of  at  least  five  Judges  in  view  of  the
mandate contained under Article 145(3)[2] of the Constitution of India.

8.    On behalf of the petitioners Shri Gopal  Subramanium  and  Shri  Shyam
Divan, learned senior counsel very vehemently opposed  the  suggestion  that
this batch of matters is required to be heard by a larger bench.   According
to them:

(i)   The conclusions recorded by this Court in R. Rajagopal  and  PUCL  are
legally tenable for the reason that the observations  made  in  M.P.  Sharma
regarding the absence of right to privacy under  our  Constitution  are  not
part of ratio decidendi of  that  case  and,  therefore,  do  not  bind  the
subsequent smaller Benches.

(ii)  Coming to the case of Kharak Singh, majority in Kharak Singh did  hold
that the right of a person not to be  disturbed  at  his  residence  by  the
State and its officers is recognized to be a part  of  a  fundamental  right
guaranteed under Article 21 which is nothing but an aspect of privacy.   The
observation in para 20 of the majority judgment at  best  can  be  construed
only to mean that there is no  fundamental  right  of  privacy  against  the
State’s authority to keep surveillance on the activities of a person.   Even
such a conclusion cannot be good  law  any  more  in  view  of  the  express
declaration made by a seven-Judge bench decision of this  Court  in   Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India & Another, (1978) 1 SCC 248[3].

(iii) They further argued that both M.P. Sharma  (supra)  and  Kharak  Singh
(supra) came to be decided on an interpretation of  the  Constitution  based
on the principles expounded in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950  SC
27.  Such principles propounded  by  A.K.  Gopalan  themselves  came  to  be
declared wrong by a larger Bench of this Court in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper  v.
Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248.  Therefore,  there  is  no  need  for  the
instant batch of matters to be heard by a larger Bench.

9.    It is true that Gobind (supra) did not make a clear  declaration  that
there is a right to privacy flowing  from  any  of  the  fundamental  rights
guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution of India,  but  observed  that
“Therefore, even assuming that the right to personal liberty, the  right  to
move freely throughout the territory of India  and  the  freedom  of  speech
create an independent right of privacy as an emanation from them  which  one
can characterize as a fundamental right, we do not think that the  right  is
absolute”.  This Court proceeded to decide the case on such basis.

10.   However, the subsequent decisions in R.  Rajagopal  (supra)  and  PUCL
(supra), the Benches were more  categoric  in  asserting  the  existence  of
“right to privacy”.  While R. Rajagopal’s case[4] held that  the  “right  to
privacy” is implicit under Article 21 of the Constitution, PUCL’s case  held
that the “right to privacy” insofar as it pertains  to  speech  is  part  of
fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution[5].

11.   Elaborate submissions are made at the bar by the learned  counsel  for
the petitioners to demonstrate that world over in all  the  countries  where
Anglo-Saxon  jurisprudence  is  followed,  ‘privacy’  is  recognised  as  an
important aspect of the liberty of human beings.  It  is  further  submitted
that it is too late in the day for the Union of  India  to  argue  that  the
Constitution of India does  not  recognise  privacy  as  an  aspect  of  the
liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of  India.   At  least  to  the
extent that the right of a person to be secure in his house and  not  to  be
disturbed unreasonably by the State or its officers is expressly  recognized
and protected in Kharak Singh (supra) though the majority did  not  describe
that aspect of the liberty as a right of privacy,  it  is  nothing  but  the
right of privacy.

12.   We are of the opinion that  the  cases  on  hand  raise  far  reaching
questions  of  importance  involving  interpretation  of  the  Constitution.
What is at stake is the amplitude of the fundamental rights  including  that
precious and inalienable right under Article 21.  If the  observations  made
in M.P. Sharma (supra) and Kharak Singh (supra) are  to  be  read  literally
and accepted as the law of this country, the fundamental  rights  guaranteed
under the Constitution of India  and  more  particularly  right  to  liberty
under Article 21 would be denuded of  vigour  and  vitality.   At  the  same
time, we are also of  the  opinion  that  the  institutional  integrity  and
judicial discipline require that pronouncement made  by  larger  Benches  of
this Court cannot be ignored by the smaller  Benches  without  appropriately
explaining the reasons for not following the  pronouncements  made  by  such
larger Benches.  With due respect to all the  learned  Judges  who  rendered
the subsequent judgments - where right to privacy is  asserted  or  referred
to their Lordships concern for the liberty of human beings, we  are  of  the
humble  opinion  that  there  appears  to  be  certain  amount  of  apparent
unresolved contradiction in the law declared by this Court.

13.    Therefore,  in  our  opinion  to  give  a  quietus  to  the  kind  of
controversy raised in this batch of cases once for all, it  is  better  that
the ratio decidendi of M.P. Sharma  (supra)  and  Kharak  Singh  (supra)  is
scrutinized and the jurisprudential correctness of the subsequent  decisions
of this Court where the right to privacy is either asserted or  referred  be
examined and authoritatively decided by a Bench of appropriate strength.

14.   We, therefore, direct the Registry to place these matters  before  the
Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.




                                                            ………….…………………..J.

      (J. Chelameswar)



                                                            ………….…………………..J.
                                                            (S.A. Bobde)


                                                            ………….…………………..J.
                                                            (C. Nagappan)
New Delhi
August 11, 2015

                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.494 OF 2012

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Another    …     Petitioners

Versus

Union of India & Others                            …     Respondents

                                    WITH

                   TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO.151 OF 2013

                   TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO.152 OF 2013

                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.829 OF 2013

                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.833 OF 2013

                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL)  NO.932 OF 2013

                  TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO.312 OF 2014

                  TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO.313 OF 2014

                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL)  NO.37 OF 2015

                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.220 OF 2015

                  TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO.921 OF 2015

         CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.144 OF 2014 IN WP(C) 494/2012

         CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.470 OF 2015 IN WP(C) 494/2012













                                     -2-



                                  O R D E R

      Having regard to importance of the matter, it is desirable that the
matter be heard at the earliest.




                                                            ………….…………………..J.

      (J. Chelameswar)



                                                            ………….…………………..J.
                                                             (S.A. Bobde)


                                                            ………….…………………..J.
                                                             (C. Nagappan)
New Delhi
August 11, 2015

                                                   REPORTABLE

                 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                 CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

                 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.494 OF 2012



Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Another    …     Petitioners

Versus

Union of India & Others                            …     Respondents

                                  WITH



                   TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO.151 OF 2013

                   TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO.152 OF 2013

                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.829 OF 2013

                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.833 OF 2013

                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL)  NO.932 OF 2013

                  TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO.312 OF 2014

                  TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO.313 OF 2014

                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL)  NO.37 OF 2015

                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.220 OF 2015

                  TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO.921 OF 2015

         CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.144 OF 2014 IN WP(C) 494/2012

         CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.470 OF 2015 IN WP(C) 494/2012



                       I N T E R I M  O R D E R

      After the matter was referred for decision  by  a  larger  Bench,  the
learned counsel for the petitioners prayed for further interim orders.   The
last interim order in force is the  order  of  this  Court  dated  23.9.2013
which reads as follows:-

      “....

            All the matters require to be heard finally.  List  all  matters
for final hearing after the Constitution Bench is over.

            In the meanwhile, no person should suffer for  not  getting  the
Aadhaar card inspite of the fact that some authority had issued  a  circular
making it mandatory and when any person applies  to  get  the  Aadhaar  card
voluntarily, it may be checked whether that person is entitled for it  under
the law and it should not be given to any illegal immigrant.”



      It was  submitted  by  Shri  Shyam  Divan,  learned  counsel  for  the
petitioners that the petitioners having pointed  out  a  serious  breach  of
privacy in their submissions, preceding the reference, this Court may  grant
an injunction restraining the authorities from  proceeding  further  in  the
matter of obtaining biometrics etc. for an Aadhaar card.  Shri  Shyam  Divan
submitted that the biometric information of an individual can be  circulated
to other authorities or corporate bodies which, in turn can be used by  them
for commercial exploitation and, therefore, must be stopped.



      The learned Attorney General pointed out,  on  the  other  hand,  that
this Court has at no point of time, even  while  making  the  interim  order
dated 23.9.2013 granted an injunction restraining the Unique  Identification
Authority of India  from  going  ahead  and  obtaining  biometric  or  other
information from a citizen  for  the  purpose  of  a  Unique  Identification
Number, better known as “Aadhaar card”.  It was further submitted  that  the
respondents have gone ahead with the project and have issued  Aadhaar  cards
to about 90% of the population.  Also that a large amount of money has  been
spent by the Union Government on this project for issuing Aadhaar cards  and
that in the circumstances, none of the well-known  consideration  for  grant
of injunction are in favour of the petitioners.



      The learned Attorney General stated that the respondents do not  share
any personal information of an Aadhaar card  holder  through  biometrics  or
otherwise with any other person or authority.   This  statement  allays  the
apprehension for now, that there is a widespread breach of privacy of  those
to whom an Aadhaar card has  been  issued.   It  was  further  contended  on
behalf of the petitioners that there still is breach of privacy.  This is  a
matter which need not be gone into further at this stage.



      The learned Attorney General has further submitted  that  the  Aadhaar
card is of great benefit since it ensures  an  effective  implementation  of
several  social  benefit  schemes  of  the  Government  like  MGNREGA,   the
distribution of food, ration and kerosene through PDS system  and  grant  of
subsidies in the distribution of LPG.  It  was,  therefore,  submitted  that
restraining the respondents from issuing  further  Aadhaar  cards  or  fully
utilising  the  existing  Aadhaar  cards  for  the  social  schemes  of  the
Government should be allowed.



      The learned Attorney General further stated that the respondent  Union
of India would  ensure  that  Aadhaar  cards  would  only  be  issued  on  a
consensual basis after informing the public at large  about  the  fact  that
the  preparation  of  Aadhaar  card  involving  the  parting  of   biometric
information of the individual, which shall  however  not  be  used  for  any
purpose other than a social benefit schemes.



      Having considered the matter, we are of the view that the  balance  of
interest would be best served, till the  matter  is  finally  decided  by  a
larger Bench if the Union of India or the  UIDA  proceed  in  the  following
manner:-



1.    The Union of India shall give wide publicity  in  the  electronic  and
print  media  including  radio  and  television  networks  that  it  is  not
mandatory for a citizen to obtain an Aadhaar card;

2.    The production of an Aadhaar card will not be condition for  obtaining
any benefits otherwise due to a citizen;

3.    The Unique Identification Number or the Aadhaar card will not be  used
by the respondents for  any  purpose  other  than  the  PDS  Scheme  and  in
particular for the purpose of distribution of  foodgrains, etc. and  cooking
fuel, such as kerosene.  The Aadhaar card may also be used for  the  purpose
of the LPG Distribution Scheme;



4.     The  information  about  an  individual  obtained   by   the   Unique
Identification Authority of India while issuing an Aadhaar  card  shall  not
be used for any other purpose, save as above, except as may be  directed  by
a Court for the purpose of criminal investigation.

      Ordered accordingly.





                                                            ………….…………………..J.

       (J. Chelameswar)



                                                            ………….…………………..J.
                                                                 (S.A.
Bobde)


                                                            ………….…………………..J.
                                                                 (C.
Nagappan)
New Delhi
August 11, 2015















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[1]









        A.M.  Bhattacharjee  ,  Equality,  Liberty  &  Property  under   the
Constitution of India, (Eastern Law House, New Delhi, 1997)

[2]    Article 145(3). The minimum number of Judges who are to sit  for  the
purpose of deciding any case involving a substantial question of law  as  to
the interpretation of this Constitution or for the purpose  of  hearing  any
reference under Article 143 shall be five:

      Provided that, where the Court hearing an  appeal  under  any  of  the
provisions of this chapter other than Article  132  consists  of  less  than
five Judges and in the course of the hearing of  the  appeal  the  Court  is
satisfied that the appeal involves a substantial question of law as  to  the
interpretation of this Constitution the determination of which is  necessary
for the disposal of the appeal, such Court  shall  refer  the  question  for
opinion to a Court constituted as required by this clause  for  the  purpose
of deciding any case involving such a question and shall on receipt  of  the
opinion dispose of the appeal in conformity with such opinion

[3]     Para 5. .. It was in Kharak Singh v. State  of  U.P.,  AIR  1963  SC
1295 that the question as to the proper scope and meaning of the  expression
'personal liberty' came up pointedly for consideration for  the  first  time
before this Court. The majority of the Judges took the view "that  'personal
liberty' is used in the article as a  compendious  term  to  include  within
itself all the varieties of  rights  which  go  to  make  up  the  'personal
liberties' of man other than those- dealt with in  the  several  clauses  of
Article 19(1). In other words,  while  Article 19(1) deals  with  particular
species  or   attributes,   of   that   freedom,   'personal   liberty'   in
Article 21 takes  in  and  comprises  the  residue".  The  minority  judges,
however, disagreed with this view taken by the majority and explained  their
position  in  the  following  words:  "No  doubt  the  expression  'personal
liberty' is a  comprehensive  one  and  the  right  to  move  freely  is  an
attribute of personal liberty. It is said that the freedom  to  move  freely
is carved out of personal liberty and, therefore, the  expression  'personal
liberty' in Article 21 excludes that attribute. In our view, this is  not  a
correct approach. Both are independent fundamental rights, though  there  is
overlapping. There is no question of one being carved out  of  another.  The
fundamental right of life and personal liberty has many attributes and  some
of them are found in Article 19.  If  a  person's  fundamental  right  under
Article 21 is infringed, the State can  rely  upon  a  law  to  sustain  the
action, but that cannot be a complete answer unless the said  law  satisfies
the test laid down in Article 19(2) so far  as  the  attributes  covered  by
Article 19(1) are concerned". There can be no doubt  that  in  view  of  the
decision of this Court in R. C. Cooper  v.  Union  of  India, (1970)  2  SCC
298 the minority view must be regarded as  correct  and  the  majority  view
must be held to have been overruled.



[4]    Para 9.  “Right to privacy is not enumerated as a  fundamental  right
in our Constitution but has been inferred from Article 21.”

[5]     Para 18.  “The  right  to  privacy  —  by  itself  —  has  not  been
identified under the Constitution. As a concept it  may  be  too  broad  and
moralistic to define it judicially. Whether right to privacy can be  claimed
or has been infringed in a given case would depend on the facts of the  said
case. But the right to hold a  telephone  conversation  in  the  privacy  of
one’s home or office  without  interference  can  certainly  be  claimed  as
“right to privacy”. Conversations on the telephone are often of an  intimate
and confidential character. Telephone  conversation  is  a  part  of  modern
man’s life. It is considered so important that  more  and  more  people  are
carrying  mobile  telephone  instruments   in   their   pockets.   Telephone
conversation is an important  facet  of  a  man’s  private  life.  Right  to
privacy would certainly include telephone conversation  in  the  privacy  of
one’s home or office. Telephone-tapping would, thus, infract Article  21  of
the Constitution of  India  unless  it  is  permitted  under  the  procedure
established by law.
      19. Right to freedom of speech  and  expression  is  guaranteed  under
Article 19(1)(a) of the  Constitution.  This  freedom  means  the  right  to
express one’s convictions and opinions freely by  word  of  mouth,  writing,
printing, picture, or in any other manner.  When  a  person  is  talking  on
telephone, he is exercising his right to freedom of speech  and  expression.
Telephone-tapping unless it comes within the grounds of  restrictions  under
Article 19(2) would infract Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.”





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