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Sunday, May 4, 2014

This writ petition, under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, has been filed by the Union of India praying for quashing of letter dated 19.02.2014, issued by the Chief Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu to the Secretary, Government of India wherein the State of Tamil Nadu proposes to remit the sentence of life imprisonment and to release Respondent Nos. 1-7 herein who were convicted in the Rajiv Gandhi Assassination Case in pursuance of commutation of death sentence of Respondent Nos. 1-3 herein by this Court on 18.02.2014 in Transferred Case Nos. 1-3 of 2012 titled V. Sriharan @ Murugan & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. 2014 (2) SCALE 505. - Apex court placed the same before the constitution Bench - Union of India .... Petitioner(s) Versus V. Sriharan @ Murugan & Ors. .... Respondent(s) = 2014 ( April.Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41465

  This writ petition, under Article 32 of  the  Constitution  of  India,
has been filed by the Union of India praying for quashing  of  letter  dated
19.02.2014, issued by the Chief Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu  to  the
Secretary, Government of India wherein the State of Tamil Nadu  proposes  to
remit the sentence of life imprisonment and to release Respondent  Nos.  1-7
herein who  were  convicted  in  the  Rajiv  Gandhi  Assassination  Case  in
pursuance of commutation of death sentence of Respondent Nos. 1-3 herein  by
this Court on 18.02.2014 in Transferred Case Nos.  1-3  of  2012  titled  V.
Sriharan @ Murugan & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. 2014 (2) SCALE 505.=

     The following questions  are  framed  for  the  consideration  of  the
Constitution Bench:



(i)   Whether imprisonment for  life  in  terms  of  Section  53  read  with
      Section 45 of the Indian Penal Code meant imprisonment for rest of the
      life of the prisoner or a convict undergoing life imprisonment  has  a
      right to claim remission and whether as per the principles  enunciated
      in paras 91 to 93 of Swamy Shraddananda (supra), a special category of
      sentence may be made for the very few cases where  the  death  penalty
      might be substituted by the punishment of  imprisonment  for  life  or
      imprisonment for a term in excess of fourteen years and  to  put  that
      category beyond application of remission?

(ii)  Whether the “appropriate Government”  is  permitted  to  exercise  the
      power of remission  under  Section  432/433  of  the  Code  after  the
      parallel power has been exercised by the President under Article 72 or
      the Governor under Article 161 or by this Court in its  Constitutional
      power under Article 32 as in this case?

(iii) Whether Section 432(7) of  the  Code  clearly  gives  primacy  to  the
      executive power of the Union and excludes the executive power  of  the
      State where the power of Union is co-extensive?

(iv)  Whether the Union or the State has primacy  over  the  subject  matter
      enlisted in List III of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of  India
      for exercise of power of remission?

(v)   Whether there can be two  appropriate  Governments  in  a  given  case
      under Section 432(7) of the Code?

(vi)  Whether suo motu exercise of power of remission under  Section  432(1)
      is permissible in the scheme  of  the  section  if,  yes  whether  the
      procedure  prescribed  in  sub-clause  (2)  of  the  same  Section  is
      mandatory or not?

(vii) Whether the term “consultation” stipulated in Section  435(1)  of  the
      Code implies “concurrence”?

49)   All the issues raised  in  the  given  case  are  of  utmost  critical
concern for the whole of the country, as the decision on these  issues  will
determine the procedure for  awarding  sentences  in  the  criminal  justice
system. Accordingly, we direct to list Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 48  of  2014
before the Constitution Bench as  early  as  possible  preferably  within  a
period of three months.

50)   All the interim  orders  granted  earlier  will  continue  till  final
decision being taking by the Constitution  Bench  in  Writ  Petition  (Crl.)
No.48 of 2014.    

 2014 ( April.Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41465
P SATHASIVAM, RANJAN GOGOI, N.V. RAMANA

                                                     REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION


                    1 WRIT PETITION (CRL.) NO. 48 OF 2014



Union of India                                          .... Petitioner(s)

            Versus

V. Sriharan @ Murugan & Ors.                  .... Respondent(s)

                                      2


                                    WITH

                    WRIT PETITION (CRL.) NO. 105 OF 2008

            CRL. M.P. NO.4622 OF 2014 IN T.C. (CRL.) NO.1 OF 2012

           CRL. M.P. NO. 4623 OF 2014 IN T.C. (CRL.) NO. 2 OF 2012

           CRL. M.P. NO. 4624 OF 2014 IN T.C. (CRL.) NO. 3 OF 2012




                               J U D G M E N T

P. Sathasivam, CJI.



Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 48 of 2014

1)    This writ petition, under Article 32 of  the  Constitution  of  India,
has been filed by the Union of India praying for quashing  of  letter  dated
19.02.2014, issued by the Chief Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu  to  the
Secretary, Government of India wherein the State of Tamil Nadu  proposes  to
remit the sentence of life imprisonment and to release Respondent  Nos.  1-7
herein who  were  convicted  in  the  Rajiv  Gandhi  Assassination  Case  in
pursuance of commutation of death sentence of Respondent Nos. 1-3 herein  by
this Court on 18.02.2014 in Transferred Case Nos.  1-3  of  2012  titled  V.
Sriharan @ Murugan & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. 2014 (2) SCALE 505.

Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 105 of 2008

2)    In the above writ petition, the petitioner who  has  been  arrayed  as
Respondent No. 6 in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 48 of 2014 (filed by the  Union
of India) prays for quashing of G.O. No. 873 dated 14.09.2006, G.O. No.  671
dated 10.05.2007 and G.O. (D) No. 891 dated 18.07.2007 issued by  the  State
of Tamil Nadu,  Home  Department  as  the  same  are  unconstitutional.   In
effect, the petitioner prayed for  remission  of  his  sentence,  which  was
rejected by the Advisory Board.





Criminal M.P. Nos. 4622-24 of 2014

3)    When the State of  Tamil  Nadu,  in  their  letter  dated  19.02.2014,
sought for views of the Union of India for the release of Respondent Nos. 1-
7 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 48 of 2014  within  three  days  from  the
date of receipt of the same, the Union of India  filed  the  above  criminal
misc.  petitions  before  this  Court  praying  for  restraining  the  State
Government from passing any order  of  remission  and  releasing  them  from
prison.

Factual Background:

4)    Pursuant to  the  judgment  of  this  Court  dated  18.02.2014  in  V.
Sriharan @ Murugan (supra), the Government of Tamil Nadu took a decision  to
grant remission to Respondent Nos. 1 to 7. Accordingly,  the  Government  of
Tamil  Nadu  sent  a  letter  dated  19.02.2014  to  the  Secretary  to  the
Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, stating that it  proposes  to
remit the sentence of  life  imprisonment  on  V.  Sriharan  @  Murugan,  T.
Suthendraraja @ Santhan and A.G. Perarivalan @ Arivu and release  them.   In
that letter,  it  was  further  stated  that  four  other  persons,  namely,
Jayakumar, Robert Payas, S. Nalini and P.  Ravichandran,  convicted  in  the
same assassination would also procure similar  remission.  Besides,  it  was
asserted in the letter that since the crime was investigated by the  Central
Bureau of Investigation (CBI)  and  as  per  Section  435  of  the  Code  of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the Code”), the State Government,  while
exercising its  power  under  Section  432  of  the  Code,  must  act  after
consultation with the  Central  Government,  accordingly,  it  requested  to
indicate the views of the Union of India within three days on  the  proposal
to release the seven persons mentioned above.

5)    Accordingly, in these matters,  we  are  called  upon  to  decide  the
legitimacy of the proposal of the State  Government  to  release  Respondent
Nos. 1 to 7, who are facing life sentence. For the purpose  of  disposal  of
the issue in question, we reiterate the relevant provisions.   Sections  432
and 435 of the Code read as under:
      “432 - Power to suspend or remit sentences

      (1) When any person has been sentenced to punishment for  an  offence,
      the appropriate Government may, at any  lime,  without  conditions  or
      upon any conditions which the person sentenced  accepts,  suspend  the
      execution of his sentence or remit  the  whole  or  any  part  of  the
      punishment to which he has been sentenced.


      (2) Whenever an application is made to the appropriate Government  for
      the suspension or remission of a sentence, the appropriate  Government
      may require the presiding Judge of the Court before or  by  which  the
      conviction was had or confirmed, to state his opinion  as  to  whether
      the application should  be  granted  or  refused,  together  with  his
      reasons for such opinion and also to forward  with  the  statement  of
      such opinion a certified copy of the record of the trial  or  of  such
      record thereof as exists.


      (3) If any condition  on  which  a  sentence  has  been  suspended  or
      remitted is,  in  the  opinion  of  the  appropriate  Government,  not
      fulfilled, the appropriate Government may  cancel  the  suspension  or
      remission, and thereupon the person in whose favour the  sentence  has
      been suspended or remitted may, if at large, be arrested by any police
      officer, without warrant and remanded to undergo the unexpired portion
      of the sentence.


      (4) The condition on which a sentence is suspended or  remitted  under
      this section may be one to be fulfilled by the person in whose  favour
      the sentence is suspended or remitted, or one independent of his will.


      (5) The appropriate  Government  may,  by  general  rules  or  special
      orders, give directions as to the  suspension  of  sentences  and  the
      conditions on which petitions should be presented and dealt with:


      Provided that in the case of any sentence (other than  a  sentence  of
      fine) passed on a male person above the age of eighteen years, no such
      petition by the person sentenced or by any other person on his  behalf
      shall be entertained, unless the person sentenced is in jail, and,—


      (a) where such petition  is  made  by  the  person  sentenced,  it  is
      presented through the officer in charge of the jail; or


      (b) where such petition is made by any other  person,  it  contains  a
      declaration that the person sentenced is in jail.


      (6) The provisions of the above sub-sections shall also apply  to  any
      order passed by a Criminal Court under any section of this Code or  of
      any other law which restricts the liberty of any person or imposes any
      liability upon him or his properly.


      (7) In this section and in section 433,  the  expression  "appropriate
      Government" means,—


      (a) in cases where the sentence is for  an  offence  against,  or  the
      order referred to in sub-section (6) is passed under, any law relating
      to a matter to which the executive power of  the  Union  extends,  the
      Central Government;


      (b) in other cases the  Government  of  the  State  within  which  the
      offender is sentenced or the said order is passed.

      435  -  State  Government  to  act  after  consultation  with  Central
      Government in certain cases

      (1) The powers conferred by  sections  432  and  433  upon  the  State
      Government to remit or commute a  sentence,  in  any  case  where  the
      sentence is for an offence—


      (a) which was investigated by the Delhi Special  Police  Establishment
      constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25
      of 1946), or by any other agency empowered to make investigation  into
      an offence under any Central Act other than this Code, or


      (b) which involved the misappropriation or destruction of,  or  damage
      to, any property belonging to the Central Government, or


      (c) which was committed by a person in  the  service  of  the  Central
      Government, while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of  his
      official duty.


      shall  not  be  exercised  by  the  State  Government   except   after
      consultation with the Central Government.


      (2) No order of suspension,  remission  or  commutation  of  sentences
      passed by the State Government in relation to a person, who  has  been
      convicted of offences, some of which relate to matters  to  which  the
      executive power of the Union extends, and who has  been  sentenced  to
      separate terms of imprisonment which are to  run  concurrently,  shall
      have  effect  unless  an  order  for  the  suspension,  remission   or
      commutation, as the case may be, of such sentences has also been  made
      by the Central Government in relation to  the  offences  committed  by
      such person with regard to matters to which the executive power of the
      Union extends.”


6)    In addition to the above provisions of  the  Code,  we  are  concerned
with certain provisions of the  Constitution  of  India  also.   Article  73
speaks about the extent of executive power of  the  Union,  which  reads  as
under:
      “73 - Extent of executive power of the Union

      (1) Subject to the provisions  of  this  Constitution,  the  executive
      power of the Union shall extend--


      (a) to the matters with respect to which Parliament has power to  make
      laws; and


      (b) to the exercise of such rights, authority and jurisdiction as  are
      exercisable by the Government of India by  virtue  of  any  treaty  on
      agreement:


      Provided that the executive power referred to in sub-clause (a)  shall
      not, save as expressly provided in this Constitution  or  in  any  law
      made by Parliament, extend in any State to  matters  with  respect  to
      which the Legislature of the State has also power to make laws….”


7)    Article 162 of the Constitution deals with  the  extent  of  executive
power of the State, which reads as follows:
      “162 - Extent of executive power of State
      Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power of
      a State shall  extend  to  the  matters  with  respect  to  which  the
      Legislature of the State has power to make laws:
      Provided that in any matter with respect to which the Legislature of a
      State and Parliament have power to make laws, the executive  power  of
      the State shall be subject to, and limited  by,  the  executive  power
      expressly conferred  by  the  Constitution  or  by  any  law  made  by
      Parliament upon the Union or authorities thereof.”

8)    Heard Mr. Goolam E. Vahanvati, learned Attorney General of  India  for
the petitioner-Union of India, Mr. Ram Jethmalani,  learned  senior  counsel
and Mr. Yug Mohit Choudhary, learned counsel for Respondent Nos. 1-5  and  7
in W.P. (Crl.) No. 48 of 2014 and Mr. Sanjay R. Hegde, learned  counsel  for
the petitioner in W.P. (Crl.) No. 105 of 2008 and Respondent No. 6  in  W.P.
(Crl.) No. 48 of 2014 and Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi,  learned  senior  counsel  for
the State of Tamil Nadu.

Contentions of the Petitioner:

9)    At the outset, learned Attorney General appearing  for  the  Union  of
India submitted that what is proposed to be done by the State of Tamil  Nadu
in exercise of power of  remission  in  the  present  case  is  illegal  and
without jurisdiction for the following reasons:

a)    The State Government  is  not  the  ‘appropriate  Government’  in  the
present case.

b)    The State Government had no role to play in the present  case  at  any
stage.

c)     Alternatively,  without  prejudice,  the  proposal   by   the   State
Government is contrary to law, and does not follow  the  procedure  set  out
under the Code.

10)   Learned Attorney General pointed out that from a bare reading  of  the
definition of “appropriate Government” under  Section  432(7)  of  the  Code
reveals that in cases where the sentence is for an offence against  any  law
relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends,  the
“appropriate Government” in that respect would be  the  Central  Government.
It is the stand of the Union of India  that  this  provision  clearly  gives
primacy to the executive power of  the  Union  and  excludes  the  executive
power of the State where the power of the Union is co-extensive.

11)   It is further pointed out that as per the proviso to Article  73,  the
executive power of the Union referred to  in  Article  73(1)(a)  shall  not,
save as expressly provided in the Constitution or in any  law  made  by  the
Parliament, extend in any  State  to  matters  with  respect  to  which  the
Legislature of the State also has power to make laws.   It  is  argued  that
the proviso to Article 73 is excluded by Section 432(7) of the  Code  as  it
is only applicable where there is  no  express  provision  to  maintain  the
executive power of the Union. Similarly,  proviso  to  Article  162  of  the
Constitution limits the executive power of the State  with  respect  to  any
matter where both the Legislature of  the  State  and  the  Parliament  have
power to make  laws,  where  the  Constitution  or  any  law  has  expressly
conferred executive power upon the Union. Thus, it was  submitted  that  the
proviso contemplates that the executive power of the State may  be  overcome
by  the  executive  power  of  the  Union  through  the  provisions  of  the
Constitution or any  other  law  made  by  the  Parliament.   The  Code  is,
therefore, one avenue through which this may be done and has been  exercised
through Section 432(7) to give primacy to the executive power of the  Union.
  Learned Attorney General further submitted that  based  on  a  reading  of
Articles 73 and 162 read with Section 432(7) of the Code,  the  “appropriate
Government” in the present case would be  the  Central  Government,  as  the
Indian Penal Code falls under the concurrent List, to  which  the  executive
power of the Union also extends.

12)   Learned Attorney General further pointed out that Articles 73 and  162
must also be read subject to Article 254 of the  Constitution,  which  gives
primacy to the law made by the Parliament.  In  this  regard,  reliance  has
been placed by learned Attorney General on the decision  of  this  Court  in
S.R. Bommai vs. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1  and  he  asserted  that  the
above decision completely displaces the stand of the State  Government  with
regard to the Concurrent List.  Further, it was submitted  that  it  is  not
possible to split up the Sections under which the conviction was made  since
it would lead to a completely absurd situation where for some  offences  the
Central Government would be the appropriate Government, and  in  respect  of
others, the State Government would be the appropriate Government.

13)   In any case, it is the stand of the Union  of  India  that  since  the
State  Government  had  consented  for  the  case  to  be  investigated  and
prosecuted by the CBI via the consent order dated 22.05.1991  under  Section
6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946,  which  was  followed
by the Central Government Notification dated 23.05.1991, ensuing  which  the
entire investigation of the case was handed over to the CBI, at this  stage,
the State cannot claim that it  is  the  appropriate  Government.   In  this
regard, the Union of India relied on the observations of this Court  in  the
case of Lalu Prasad Yadav vs. State of Bihar, (2010) 5 SCC 1.

14)    Besides,  the  Union  of  India  further  submitted  that  the  State
Government, without considering the merits and facts of  the  case,  hastily
took a decision to remit the sentence and release seven  convicts  which  is
contrary to the statutory provisions and also to the law laid down  by  this
Court.  It is pointed out that application of  mind  has  been  held  to  be
necessary, which is entirely lacking in the  present  case.   There  are  no
cogent reasons  given  in  the  letter  dated  19.02.2014,  apart  from  the
reliance on the judgment of this Court.

15)   In addition, it is the stand of the Union  of  India  that  the  State
Government could not have suo motu, without an  application,  initiated  the
process of remitting the sentence  and  releasing  the  convicts.   In  this
regard, the Union of India relied on the decision of this Court in  Mohinder
Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2013) 3 SCC 294 wherein  this  Court  held  that
the exercise of power under Section 432(1) of the Code cannot be  suo  motu.
It was further held as under:
      “27.  … ….  We  are  of  the  view  that  exercise  of  power  by  the
      appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of  Section  432  of  the
      Code cannot be suo motu for the simple reason that  this  is  only  an
      enabling  provision  and  the  same  would  be  possible  subject   to
      fulfilment of  certain  conditions.  Those  conditions  are  mentioned
      either in the Jail Manual or in statutory rules. This Court in various
      decisions has held that the power of  remission  cannot  be  exercised
      arbitrarily. In other words, the decision to grant remission has to be
      well informed, reasonable and fair to all concerned….. “

Thus, it was submitted that the law laid down in para 27 of  Mohinder  Singh
(supra) cannot be sidelined by the State Government.

16)   Alternatively, it is submitted that assuming  Section  435(2)  of  the
Code is applicable, the use of the term ‘consultation’ under Section  435(1)
of the Code should be interpreted to mean ‘concurrence’. Reference  in  this
regard is made to the judgment of this Court in State of  Gujarat  vs.  R.A.
Mehta, (2013) 3 SCC 1, wherein it was held as under:

      “32.  However, in a situation where one of the consultees has  primacy
      of opinion under the  statute,  either  specifically  contained  in  a
      statutory provision, or by way of implication, consultation  may  mean
      concurrence.”

17)   In addition to all the above  submissions,  learned  Attorney  General
formulated an alternative contention  and  submitted  that  once  the  death
sentence of a convict has been commuted into  life  imprisonment,  the  same
has to be interpreted to mean  the  entire  life  of  the  convict  and  the
executive cannot exercise the power of  remission  of  sentence  thereafter.
In this regard, reliance was placed  on  Swamy  Shraddananda  vs.  State  of
Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767.

Contentions of Respondents:

18)   In reply to the above submissions, Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned  senior
counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu submitted that “appropriate  Government”
as defined in Section 432(7) of the Code is  the  State  Government  in  the
present case.

19)   Learned senior counsel  for  the  State  submitted  that  the  Central
Government is the appropriate Government where sentence is  for  an  offence
against any law relating to a matter to which the  executive  power  of  the
Union extends.  Likewise, Article 73 of  the  Constitution  of  India  makes
executive power of the  Union  co-extensive  with  Parliament’s  law  making
power and power relating to treaties/agreement.  However, it  is  the  stand
of the State that the proviso stipulates that  power  referred  to  in  sub-
clause (a) would not  extend  in  any  State  to  matters  relating  to  the
Concurrent List of the seventh Schedule of the Constitution save  where  the
Constitution or law of Parliament expressly  provides.  This  interpretation
of the proviso to Article 73 corresponds with the reading of the proviso  to
Article 162. It is the stand of the State of Tamil Nadu that Section 434  of
the Code is one such provision but it makes the Central  Government’s  power
in cases of sentence of death concurrent and  not  dominant.   There  is  no
other provision in Section ‘E’ of Chapter XXXII or  otherwise  of  the  Code
which subordinates the executive power of the State in the Concurrent  field
of legislation to the executive power of the Union in matters of  remission,
commutation, pardons etc.

20)   Learned senior counsel for the State pointed out  that  Article  72(3)
of the Constitution expressly saves the power of the  States  under  Article
161 and other laws to grant remission or commutation of  sentence  of  death
from the impact of Article 72(1)(c) which confers  power  on  the  President
qua all sentences of death.  On a plain reading of the  executive  power  of
the  State  under  Article  162,  the  same  being  co-extensive  with   the
legislative power would extend to the concurrent field under List III.

21)   Alternatively, Mr. Dwivedi submitted that Entry 1 of List III  of  the
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution  excludes  offences  against  law  with
respect to matters in List I and List II.  Indian Penal  Code  is  mentioned
in Entry 1 of List III.  IPC involves offences  which  relate  to  different
subject matters, some of which fall in List I  and  List  II.   Mr.  Dwivedi
submitted that in G.V. Ramanaiah vs. Supt. Of Central  Jail,  (1974)  3  SCC
531, since the subject matter was related to List I, the Central  Government
was held to be appropriate Government.   However,  he  highlighted  that  in
State of M.P. vs. Ratan Singh, (1976) 3 SCC 470 (paras  5  &  6),  State  of
M.P. vs. Ajit Singh, (1976) 3 SCC 616 (para 2) and Government  of  A.P.  vs.
M.T. Khan, (2004) 1 SCC 616 (para 10), it  was  held  that  the  appropriate
Government is the Government of that State alone where the  conviction  took
place and not where the convict is detained.

22)   Learned senior counsel for the  State  also  pointed  out  that  while
Section 55A(b) of IPC makes the State Government the appropriate  Government
relating to matter to which executive power of the State extends, it is  the
Government of that State within which the offender is  sentenced  and  under
Section 432(7)(b) of the Code   in  cases  other  than  those  mentioned  in
clause (a), the State Government is the  appropriate  Government.   However,
Section 432(7)(b) of the Code is wider  than  Section  55A(b)  of  IPC.   It
would cover matters in List III of the Seventh Schedule of the  Constitution
too.  Section 435(2) of the Code also is indicative  of  the  above.   In  a
case like the present one, some offences may relate to matters to which  the
executive power of the Union extends, while other offences may, in the  same
case and qua same person, relate to matters to which the executive power  of
the State extends.  If in  such  cases,  a  person  has  been  sentenced  to
separate terms of imprisonment which are to run  concurrently,  then  unless
an order has been made by the Central Government in relation to offences  to
which its executive power extends, the order of the State  Government  would
not be given effect to.  The Union could have referred to this provision  if
the separate terms of sentences under the other Central Acts  like  Passport
Act, Foreigners Act, Explosives  Act  etc.  were  still  operating  and  the
sentences had not been already served out.  Learned senior counsel  for  the
State submitted that in the present case, all other sentences of  2-3  years
have been fully served out.

23)   It is further submitted by Mr. Dwivedi that public safety is  part  of
public order generally unless it has the dimension of Defence  of  India  or
National Security or War.  It  is  followed  from  the  decision  in  Romesh
Thapar vs. State of  Madras  AIR  1950  SC  124  (para  5)  that  the  State
Government  of  Tamil  Nadu  is  the  appropriate  Government  to   consider
remission/commutation of sentence under Section 302 read with  Section  120B
of IPC.

24)   As regards the violation  of  procedural  requirements  under  Section
432(2), learned senior counsel for the State submitted that  it  involves  a
procedure which applies only to remission and  suspension  of  sentence  and
not to cases of commutation as under Section 433. Besides, he asserted  that
Section 432(2) is applicable only when an application is moved on behalf  of
the convict for obtaining remission or suspension of sentence.  It does  not
apply when the appropriate Government exercises  suo  motu  power.   It  was
further submitted  that  the  Parliament  has  thought  it  fit  to  confine
application of Section 432(2) to cases where an application is made  because
in such cases the State has not applied its mind and it may like  to  obtain
the opinion of  the  Presiding  Judge  of  the  Court  which  convicted  and
sentenced or the confirming court.  Hence, it is  the  stand  of  the  State
that the power under Section 432(1) is very wide and  it  can  be  exercised
suo motu by the appropriate Government.  When the  power  is  exercised  suo
motu then Section 432(2) is not applicable.

25)   Alternatively, Mr.  Dwivedi  submitted  that  Section  432(2)  is  not
mandatory.  He  elaborated  that  it  uses  the  expression  “may  require”.
Ordinarily, this expression involves conferment of discretion and makes  the
provision directory.  This  procedure,  therefore,  would  apply  where  the
Government feels the necessity to require  an  opinion  from  the  Presiding
Judge of the Court.

26)   As far as the compliance of Section 435 is concerned, it is the  stand
of the State of Tamil Nadu that it initiated  the  process  of  consultation
with  the  Central  Government  through   the   impugned   letter   as   the
investigation of the  given  case  was  done  by  the  CBI.  It  is  further
submitted  that  it  is  consultation  between   two   plenary   Governments
constituted under a Federal structure and the State of  Tamil  Nadu  intends
to engage  in  meaningful  and  effective  consultation  wherein  the  views
expressed by the Central Government during  the  consultation  process  will
certainly be given due consideration.  However,  it  is  the  stand  of  the
State that consultation does not mean concurrence since  the  power  of  the
State is a plenary power and States  are  not  subordinate  to  the  Central
Government.

27)   Thus, Mr. Dwivedi concluded by stating that  the  expression  used  in
Section  435(1)  is  “except  after  consultation”.   The   Parliament   has
deliberately not chosen the word “concurrence” as such interpretation  would
amount to depriving the State Government of its discretion. He  pointed  out
the following cases wherein it has been  held  that  consultation  does  not
mean concurrence:

1.    State of U.P. vs. Rakesh Kumar Keshari, (2011) 5 SCC 341 (para 33)

2.    L & T McNeil Ltd. vs. Government of Tamil Nadu 2001(3) SCC 170  (paras
41, 61)

3.    State of U.P. & Anr.  vs. Johri Mal, 2003(4) SCC 714 (para 55)

4.    Justice Chandrashekaraiah vs. Janekere C. Krishna, (2013)  3  SCC  117
(paras 134-138, 144, 153-155).



28)   With regard to the contention of the Union  of  India  that  once  the
power of commutation/remission has been exercised in a particular case of  a
convict by a Constitutional  forum  particularly,  this  Court,  then  there
cannot be a further exercise of the  Executive  Power  for  the  purpose  of
commuting/remitting the sentence of the said convict in the same  case,  Mr.
Dwivedi submitted that the said contention is  unacceptable  since  in  this
case this Court had exercised the judicial  power  of  commuting  the  death
sentence into life imprisonment by judgment dated  18.02.2014.   This  Court
was not exercising any executive power under the Constitution or  under  the
Code.  It was exercising its judicial power in  the  context  of  breach  of
Article 21. There is no  principle  of  law  put  forward  to  support  this
submission and the contention has been floated as if it is  an  axiom.   The
submission of the  Union  of  India,  if  accepted,  would  have  horrendous
consequences.  A convict whose death sentence  has  been  commuted  to  life
imprisonment by this Court on account of breach of Article 21 would have  to
remain imprisoned necessarily till the end  of  his  life  even  if  he  has
served out 30-50 years of sentence and has become old  beyond  75  years  or
may be terminally ill yet there would be no power to remit/commute.

29)   Besides, it is the stand of the State that when  this  Court  commuted
the death sentence into life imprisonment, it  did  not  bar  and  bolt  any
further exercise of commutation/remission power by the Executive  under  the
Constitution or under the Code.  In fact, it expressly envisaged  subsequent
exercise of remission power by the appropriate Government under Section  432
subject to procedural checks and Section 433A of the Code.

30)   Mr. Dwivedi, further pointed out that even in the absence of  such  an
observation in para 31 of the decision  of  this  Court  in  V.  Sriharan  @
Murugan (supra) the legal position would remain the same as this Court  does
not prevent the exercise of any available power under the  Constitution  and
the  statute.   In  fact  it  has  been  laid  down  in  Supreme  Court  Bar
Association vs. UOI, (1998) 4 SCC 409 and Manohar Lal Sharma  vs.  Principal
Secretary, (2014) 2 SCC 532 that even the power under Article 142 cannot  be
exercised against the statute much less the Constitution.  Hence,  according
to him, the State Government is the appropriate Government.

31)   Mr. Ram Jethmalani, learned senior counsel for Respondent Nos. 1 to  5
and  7  adopted  similar  arguments  and  emphasized  on  the   meaning   of
consultation.  He extensively referred to First  Judges’  case,  viz.,  S.P.
Gupta vs. Union of India, (1981) Supp SCC 87 (a seven-judge bench  judgment)
 and heavily relied on para 30 of the judgment:

      “30. … ….  But,  while  giving  the  fullest  meaning  and  effect  to
      “consultation”, it must be borne in mind that it is only  consultation
      which is provided by way of  fetter  upon  the  power  of  appointment
      vested in the Central Government and consultation  cannot  be  equated
      with concurrence.  We  agree  with  what  Krishna  Iyer,  J.  said  in
      Sankalchand Sheth case  (Union  of  India  vs.  Sankalchand  Himmatlal
      Sheth, (1977) 4 SCC 193 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 435; (1978) 1 SCR 423  :  AIR
      1977 C 2328) that “consultation is different from consentaneity.”

According to him, consultation does not mean concurrence though the  process
of  consultation  involves  consideration  of  both  -  the  entity  seeking
consultation and the consultee of the same. He further pointed out that  the
dominant object of the statute coupled with use of compelling words  may  in
some cases involve a different meaning.  As, for  example,  it  happened  in
the Supreme  Court  Advocates-on-Record  Association  vs.  Union  of  India,
(1993) 4 SCC 441, also known as the 2nd Judges’ Case.  In this judgment,  on
the facts and  the  language  used  as  well  as  on  consideration  of  the
controlling Article 50 of the Constitution mandating the separation  of  the
judiciary from the executive,  this  Court  held  that  in  the  process  of
consultation, the opinion  of  the  Chief  Justice  has  primacy.   No  such
compelling context leading to departure from  the  natural  meaning  of  the
word ‘consultation’ exists in Section 435(1) of the  Code.   In  the  above-
mentioned case, the following may be considered as the ratio:

      “438. The debate on primacy is intended to determine who  amongst  the
      constitutional functionaries involved in  the  integrated  process  of
      appointments is best equipped to discharge the greater burden attached
      to the role of primacy, of making the proper choice; and  this  debate
      is not to determine who between them is entitled to greater importance
      or is to take the winner’s prize at the end of the  debate.  The  task
      before us has to be performed with this perception.


      441. For this reason, it must be seen who is best equipped and  likely
      to be  more  correct  in  his  view  for  achieving  the  purpose  and
      performing the task satisfactorily. In other words, primacy should  be
      in him who qualifies to be treated  as  the  ‘expert’  in  the  field.
      Comparatively greater weight to his opinion may then be attached.”

32)   It is the submission of learned senior counsel  that  even  from  this
perspective, the view of the State Government on  a  question  of  remission
which involves knowledge of the  prisoner’s  conduct  whilst  in  jail,  his
usefulness to co-prisoners needing his help and assistance,  the  manner  in
which he has employed his time  in  jail,  his  psychiatric  condition,  and
family connections are more known to the State Government  rather  than  the
Union Government. These circumstances conclusively call for primacy  to  the
finding and decision/opinion of the State Government.

33)   In support of his claim that grant of remission is  a  State  subject,
Mr. Jethmalani relied on Entry 4 of List II,  State  List,  which  reads  as
under:

      “Prisons, reformatories, borstal institutions and  other  institutions
      of a like nature, and  persons  detained  therein;  arrangements  with
      other states for the use of prisons and other institutions.”

Section 59  of  the  Prisons  Act,  1894  specifically  empowers  the  State
Government to make rules on the following:

      “(5) For the award of marks and shortening of sentences;

      (21) For rewards for good conduct; …

      (27)  In  regard  to  the  admission,  custody,  employment,  dieting,
      treatment and release of prisoners.”

This  clearly  shows  that  granting  of  remission  for  good  conduct  and
determination of premature release is exclusively within the domain  of  the
State Government and falls squarely within Entry 4, List II.

34)   Mr. Jethmalani further elaborated that the correctness of the  closing
paragraph of judgment dated 18.02.2014 is  further  evidenced  by  the  fact
that  a  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court   in   Bhagirath   vs.   Delhi
Administration, (1985) 2 SCC 580 para 17 had employed the  same  formulation
in its closing  paragraph  while  disposing  of  the  petition  seeking  the
benefit of Section 428 of the Code for life convicts.  The Court had  stated
as follows:-

      “17. For these reasons, we allow the appeal and the writ petition  and
      direct that the period of  detention  undergone  by  the  two  accused
      before us as  undertrial  prisoners  shall  be  set  off  against  the
      sentence of  life  imprisonment  imposed  upon  them  subject  to  the
      provision contained in Section 433A and provided that orders have been
      passed by the appropriate authority under Section 432 or  433  of  the
      Cr.P.C (emphasis added)

35)   Mr. Jethmalani has also pressed into service  the  revised  Guidelines
on Remission by the National Human Rights Commission which reads as under:-

“4. Inability for Premature Release

      Deleted in view of new para 3.”

New para 3 in the revised guidelines is as follows:

      “3.  …Section  433(A)  enacted  to  deny  pre-mature  release   before
      completion of 14 years of actual incarceration  to  such  convicts  as
      stand convicted of a capital offence.  The commission is of  the  view
      that within this category a reasonable classification can be  made  on
      the basis of the magnitude, brutality and the gravity of  offence  for
      which  the  convict  was  sentenced  to  life  imprisonment.   Certain
      categories of convicted prisoners undergoing life  sentence  would  be
      entitled to be considered for pre-mature release only after undergoing
      imprisonment  for  20  years  including  remissions.   The  period  of
      incarceration inclusive of remissions in such cases should not  exceed
      25 years.  Following categories are mentioned in  this  connection  by
      way of illustration and are not to be taken as an exhaustive  list  of
      such categories.

      a. Convicts who have been imprisoned for life for  murder  in  heinous
      cases such as murder with rape, murder with dacoity, murder  involving
      an offence under the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955, murder  for
      dowry, murder of a child below 14  years  of  age,  multiple  murders,
      murder committed after conviction while inside the jail, murder during
      parole, murder in a terrorist incident, murder in smuggling operation,
      murder of a public servant on duty.

      b.  Gangsters,  contract   killers,   smugglers,   drug   traffickers,
      racketeers awarded life imprisonment for committing  murders  as  also
      the perpetrators of murder  committed  with  pre-meditation  and  with
      exceptional violence or perversity.

      c.  Convicts  whose  death  sentence  has  been   commuted   to   life
      imprisonment.”

Finally, he  concluded  by  asserting  that  the  State  Government  is  the
appropriate  Government  for  granting  of  remission.   Consequently,   the
proposal for release of Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 had been duly  considered  in
accordance with law.

Discussion:

36)   We have carefully  considered  the  rival  contentions,  examined  the
relevant Constitutional provisions alongside the apposite provisions in  the
Code. The issues raised in this case revolve around the  exercise  of  power
of remission  by  the  appropriate  Government.  The  commutation  of  death
penalty to life imprisonment can befall at two  stages:  firstly,  when  the
appellate Court  deems  it  fit  to  commute  the  death  sentence  to  life
imprisonment; and secondly,  when  the  executive  exercises  its  remission
power under Article 72  by  the  President  or  under  Article  161  by  the
Governor  or  under  Article  32  by  this  Court  in  its  judicial  review
jurisdiction.

37)   The primary question that arises for consideration  at  this  juncture
is whether in the first scenario specified above, the Court  has  the  power
to substitute the death penalty for imprisonment  for  life  (meaning  until
end of life) and put this category  beyond  the  application  of  remission.
Learned counsel for  both  the  petitioner  and  the  respondents  submitted
divergent views on this subject  relying  on  judicial  precedents  of  this
Court.

38)   Learned Attorney General referred to the three-Judges  Bench  decision
of this Court in Swamy Shraddananda (supra) to state that life  imprisonment
imposed on commutation of death penalty will mean  till  end  of  life  and,
thus, beyond the exercise of power of  remission.  Accordingly,  it  is  the
stand of the Union of India that Respondent Nos. 4 to 7  cannot  be  granted
remission as it is done in the given case.

39)   In Swamy Shraddananda (supra),  the  conviction  of  the  appellant  –
Swamy Shraddananda under Sections 302 and 201  IPC  had  attained  finality.
The Trial Court sentenced him to  death  for  the  offence  of  murder.  The
appellant’s appeal and the reference made by the Sessions Judge  were  heard
together by  the  Karnataka  High  Court.   The  High  Court  confirmed  the
conviction and the death sentence awarded to the appellant and  by  judgment
and order dated 19.09.2005 dismissed the  appellant’s  appeal  and  accepted
the reference made by the  Trial  Court  without  any  modification  in  the
conviction or sentence.  Against the High Court’s  judgment,  the  appellant
had come to this Court.  In view of conflicting views by two Judges of  this
Court, the matter was referred to three-Judges’  Bench.   After  considering
all factual details and various earlier  decisions,  this  Court  held  that
there is a good and strong basis for  the  Court  to  substitute  the  death
sentence by life imprisonment and directed that the  convict  shall  not  be
released from prison for the rest of his life.  While considering  the  said
issue, this Court adverted to various decisions granting remission  reducing
the period of sentence in those cases in which life sentence was awarded  in
lieu of death sentence.  This Court in paras 91 to 93 held as under:

      “91. The legal position as enunciated in  Pandit  Kishori  Lal,  Gopal
      Vinayak Godse, Maru Ram, Ratan Singh and Shri Bhagwan and the  unsound
      way  in  which  remission  is  actually  allowed  in  cases  of   life
      imprisonment make out a very strong case to make  a  special  category
      for the very few cases where the death penalty might be substituted by
      the punishment of imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term  in
      excess  of  fourteen  years  and  to  put  that  category  beyond  the
      application of remission.
      92. The matter may be looked at from a slightly different  angle.  The
      issue of sentencing has two aspects. A sentence may be  excessive  and
      unduly harsh or it may be highly disproportionately  inadequate.  When
      an appellant comes to this Court carrying a death sentence awarded  by
      the trial court and confirmed by the High Court, this Court may  find,
      as in the present appeal, that the case just falls short of the rarest
      of the rare category and may feel somewhat reluctant in endorsing  the
      death sentence. But at the same time, having regard to the  nature  of
      the crime, the Court  may  strongly  feel  that  a  sentence  of  life
      imprisonment subject to remission normally works out to a term  of  14
      years would be grossly  disproportionate  and  inadequate.  What  then
      should the Court do? If the Court’s option  is  limited  only  to  two
      punishments, one a sentence  of  imprisonment,  for  all  intents  and
      purposes, of not more than 14 years and the other death, the Court may
      feel tempted and find itself nudged into endorsing the death  penalty.
      Such a course would indeed be disastrous. A far more just,  reasonable
      and proper course would be to expand the  options  and  to  take  over
      what, as a matter of fact, lawfully belongs to the Court i.e. the vast
      hiatus between 14 years’  imprisonment  and  death.  It  needs  to  be
      emphasised that the Court would take recourse to the  expanded  option
      primarily because in the facts of the case, the sentence of 14  years’
      imprisonment would amount to no punishment at all.
      93. Further, the formalisation of  a  special  category  of  sentence,
      though for an extremely few number of  cases,  shall  have  the  great
      advantage of having the death penalty  on  the  statute  book  but  to
      actually use it as little as possible, really in the  rarest  of  rare
      cases. This would only be a  reassertion  of  the  Constitution  Bench
      decision in Bachan Singh besides  being  in  accord  with  the  modern
      trends in penology.”

40)   Relying on  the  aforesaid  decision  of  the  larger  Bench,  learned
Attorney General submitted that it is perfectly legal to commute  the  death
penalty into imprisonment for life (to mean the entire life of the  convict)
and deprive of remission in certain cases. As a  consequence,  the  exercise
of power of remission under Section 432 of the Code by the  State  of  Tamil
Nadu in the case of Respondent Nos. 4 to 7 is impermissible.

41)   Whereas it is the stand of learned senior counsel for the  State  that
the authority to exercise the  power  of  remission  even  in  such  special
category of cases still vests with the appropriate  Government,  relying  on
the  Constitution  Bench  decision  in  Bhagirath  (supra),  Mohinder  Singh
(supra) and various other case-laws.  Moreover, it was asserted  by  learned
senior counsel appearing for the State of  Tamil  Nadu  that  the  statutory
power of remission granted to the appropriate Government under  Section  432
of the Code cannot be taken away only in certain cases by  way  of  judicial
pronouncement.

 42)  Having given our most anxious consideration, we  are  of  the  opinion
that it will not be appropriate for a three Judges’  Bench  to  examine  and
decide the correctness of the verdict  of  another  three-Judges’  Bench  in
Swamy Shraddananda (supra).  Besides,  inevitability  the  decision  of  the
Constitution Bench in  Bhagirath  (supra)  would  also  be  required  to  be
examined. Thus, we deem it fit to refer this matter to a five Judges’  Bench
to reconcile the dispute emerged.

43)   The second stage is when the executive exercises its  remission  power
under Article 72 by the President or under Article 161 by  the  Governor  or
under Article 32 by this Court in its judicial review jurisdiction  and  the
commutation of death penalty into life imprisonment is permitted. It is  the
stand of the petitioner, i.e., Union of India that  once  death  penalty  is
commuted into  life  imprisonment  by  exercise  of  executive  power  under
Article 72/161 of the Constitution or by the judicial power  vested  by  the
Constitution  in  Article  32,  the  categories  are  beyond  the  power  of
remission and parallel exercise of the similar power by the executive  under
the Code is impermissible. Therefore, on this ground, the  learned  Attorney
General for the Union of India  contended  that  granting  of  remission  to
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 & 7 is  untenable  in  law.  Although,  the  Attorney
General heavily relied on this proposition to put forth  his  case  but  did
not place any substantial material for examination by this Court.

44)   Learned counsel for  the  State  countered  this  proposition  of  the
petitioner by stating that there is no material on record  to  validate  the
same, hence, remission granted to Respondent No. 7 is valid in law.  It  was
further  contended  that  the  commutation  of  death  sentence  into   life
imprisonment in case of Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 by  this  Court  was  not  by
exercising any executive power under the Constitution  or  under  the  Code,
but it was in exercise of its judicial power in the  context  of  breach  of
Article 21.  In other  words,  according  to  him,  even  after  this  Court
commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment, it did not  bar  and  bolt
any further exercise of commutation/remission power by the  executive  under
the Constitution or under the Code.

45)   The issue of such a nature has been raised for the first time in  this
Court, which has wide ramification in determining the scope  of  application
of power of remission by the executives  both  the  Centre  and  the  State.
Accordingly, we refer this matter to the Constitution Bench  to  decide  the
issue pertaining to whether once power of remission under Article 72 or  161
or by this  Court  exercising  Constitutional  power  under  Article  32  is
exercised, is there any scope for further  consideration  for  remission  by
the executive.

46)   Inasmuch as the issue vis-à-vis who is  the  ‘appropriate  Government’
under Section 432(7) of the Code to  exercise  the  power  of  remission  is
concerned, elaborate arguments had  been  advanced  by  both  sides  in  the
course of the proceedings and the parties raised  more  than  one  ancillary
questions to the main issue like which Government - the State or the  Centre
will have primacy over the subject  matter  enlisted  in  List  III  of  the
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of  India  for  exercise  of  power  of
remission. Another question  was  also  raised  whether  there  can  be  two
appropriate  Governments  in  one  case.  In  addition,  whether  the   term
“consultation” means “concurrence” under Section 435(1) of the  Code.  Since
the questions in the given case are contingent on the final decision  to  be
arrived at in the first issue,  we  unanimously  deem  it  appropriate  that
these issues be decided by the  Constitution  Bench.  Moreover,  considering
the wider interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution and the  Code
involved in the matter, we consider it  fit  to  refer  the  matter  to  the
Constitution Bench for an authoritative  interpretation  on  the  same.   In
fact, such a course of action is  mandated  by  the  provisions  of  Article
145(3) of the Constitution.

47)   Before framing the questions to be decided by the  Constitution  Bench
in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 48 of  2014,  we  intend  to  dispose  of  other
matters.  Since in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 105 of 2008, the  petitioner  is
one of the respondents (Respondent No. 6) in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 48  of
2014 and Mr. Sanjay R. Hegde, learned counsel  for  the  petitioner  is  not
pressing the same, the Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 105 of 2008 is dismissed  as
not pressed.  Likewise,  there  is  no  need  to  keep  the  Criminal  Misc.
Petitions pending, as the Union of India filed the substantive  petition  in
the form of Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 48 of  2014  giving  all  the  details.
Accordingly, Crl. M.P. Nos. 4622, 4623 and 4624 of 2014 in  T.C.(Crl.)  Nos.
1, 2 and 3 of 2012 respectively are dismissed.

48)   The following questions  are  framed  for  the  consideration  of  the
Constitution Bench:



(i)   Whether imprisonment for  life  in  terms  of  Section  53  read  with
      Section 45 of the Indian Penal Code meant imprisonment for rest of the
      life of the prisoner or a convict undergoing life imprisonment  has  a
      right to claim remission and whether as per the principles  enunciated
      in paras 91 to 93 of Swamy Shraddananda (supra), a special category of
      sentence may be made for the very few cases where  the  death  penalty
      might be substituted by the punishment of  imprisonment  for  life  or
      imprisonment for a term in excess of fourteen years and  to  put  that
      category beyond application of remission?

(ii)  Whether the “appropriate Government”  is  permitted  to  exercise  the
      power of remission  under  Section  432/433  of  the  Code  after  the
      parallel power has been exercised by the President under Article 72 or
      the Governor under Article 161 or by this Court in its  Constitutional
      power under Article 32 as in this case?

(iii) Whether Section 432(7) of  the  Code  clearly  gives  primacy  to  the
      executive power of the Union and excludes the executive power  of  the
      State where the power of Union is co-extensive?

(iv)  Whether the Union or the State has primacy  over  the  subject  matter
      enlisted in List III of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of  India
      for exercise of power of remission?

(v)   Whether there can be two  appropriate  Governments  in  a  given  case
      under Section 432(7) of the Code?

(vi)  Whether suo motu exercise of power of remission under  Section  432(1)
      is permissible in the scheme  of  the  section  if,  yes  whether  the
      procedure  prescribed  in  sub-clause  (2)  of  the  same  Section  is
      mandatory or not?

(vii) Whether the term “consultation” stipulated in Section  435(1)  of  the
      Code implies “concurrence”?

49)   All the issues raised  in  the  given  case  are  of  utmost  critical
concern for the whole of the country, as the decision on these  issues  will
determine the procedure for  awarding  sentences  in  the  criminal  justice
system. Accordingly, we direct to list Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 48  of  2014
before the Constitution Bench as  early  as  possible  preferably  within  a
period of three months.

50)   All the interim  orders  granted  earlier  will  continue  till  final
decision being taking by the Constitution  Bench  in  Writ  Petition  (Crl.)
No.48 of 2014.

                                  ….…………………………CJI.

                                  (P. SATHASIVAM)



                                  ….……………………………J.

                                        (RANJAN GOGOI)




                                  …………………………………J.

                                        (N.V. RAMANA)

NEW DELHI;
APRIL 25, 2014
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