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Wednesday, May 21, 2014

BOMB BLASTS AT REPUBLIC DAY - Ammonia nitrate when seized with fuse wires etc., amounts explosive substances - Test Identification parade - mere delay in conduct is not fatal when conducted with in one month after the arrest and when witnesses identified in court - Sanction and consent a District collector can give under explosive substance Act - Apex court confirmed the judgment of High court and that of lower court = Chandra Prakash … Appellant Versus State of Rajasthan …Respondent = 2014 (May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41535

  BOMB BLASTS AT REPUBLIC DAY - Ammonia nitrate when seized with fuse wires etc., amounts explosive substances - 
Test Identification parade - mere delay in conduct is not fatal when conducted with in one month after the arrest and when witnesses identified in court - Sanction and consent a District collector can give under explosive substance Act - Apex court confirmed the judgment of High court and that of lower court = 
      8.30 a.m., there was a blast  of  explosive  substances  between  Gate
      No.12 and Gate No. 13, towards the southern and eastern side of  Sawai
      Man Singh Stadium Jaipur, where the State level function  on  Republic
      Day was going to be celebrated.
Due to  the  sound
      caused by the explosion, one Ramgopal Choudhary, an  employee  of  the
      Public Works Department, who was  passing  nearby,  had  met  with  an
      injury on his ear for which he was immediately sent to  the  hospital.
      On the basis of the  FIR,  offences  under  Section  120-B  read  with
      Sections 307 and 427 IPC, under Section 3 of the Prevention of  Damage
      to Public Property Act, 1984 and under  Section  3  of  the  Explosive
      Substances Act, 1908 (for short “the 1908 Act”) and also under Section
      9B of the Explosive Act,  1884  (for  brevity  “the  1884  Act”)  were
      registered  and   the   investigation   commenced.  =
During the investigation, an  anonymous  letter  in  Urdu  language
        dated 1st June, 1997 was sent  to  the  Superintendent  of  Police,
        wherein some information was given -
In that letter, the names of some persons,  i.e.,
        Raies  Beg  of  Agra,  Dr.  Abdul  Hamid  of  Firozabad  and  Pappu
        Puncturewala were mentioned.  It was also mentioned that the ISI of
        Pakistan was behind the bomb-blast.   On  the  basis  of  the  said
        information,  the  investigating  officer  arrested  five  persons,
        namely, Abdul Hamid, Raies Beg, Abdul Mateen, Pappu  @  Saleem  and
        Chandra Prakash on various dates.
In the course of  the  investigation,
        accused Pappu @ Saleem filed an application under  Section  306  of
        the Code of Criminal Procedure (for brevity “the Code”) before  the
        Chief  Judicial  Magistrate  on  14.8.1997  who,  by  order   dated
        30.8.1997, authorized the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate  No.
        6 to record the statement of the said accused under Section 164  of
        the Code and  thereafter,  the  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  by  a
        reasoned order dated 20.9.1997,  allowed  the  application.   After
        carrying out the detailed investigation, the police laid the charge-
        sheet  against  the  arrested  accused  persons,  namely,   Chandra
        Prakash, Abdul Mateen, Raies Beg and Abdul Hamid.
The accused persons in their statements under Section 313  of  the
        Code took separate plea and hence, it is obligatory on our part  to
        record their pleas individually.  
Abdul Mateen admitted that he  is
        a Pakistani and he had remained as a Pakistani always; that he  had
        never come to India before his arrest; that he  did  not  know  any
        person in India; that he never visited the places, namely,  Jaipur,
        Farah, Roopwas, Agra Firozabad or any other city; and that  he  had
        never given any information to the police and no recovery was  made
        by the police at his instance  and  he  had  never  identified  any
        place. 
The  plea  of  Abdul  Hamid  was  that  he  never  gave  any
        information to the police during the investigation of the case  and
        he did not furnish any information about the shop of Mohit Jain, PW-
         30, situated at Delhi and he had been falsely  implicated.   
Raies
        Beg took the plea that due to communal riots he  had  been  falsely
        booked in the crime. 
Accused  Chandra  Prakash,  apart  from  false
        implication, denied any relationship with Pappu @ Saleem, PW-1, and
        further stated that no key was recovered from him and  he  did  not
        open any godown and room with his keys.  He  also  took  the  stand
        that he had not taken any room on rent in Krishi Upaz Mandi or  any
        shop near the power house on rent and disputed  the  recovery  from
        any shop. 
The trial court, appreciating the  oral  and  documentary
        evidence on record, by its judgment and order dated  22.04.2000  in
        Sessions Case no. 8/98, convicted all the accused and sentenced all
        of them individually in respect of all the specific charges  framed
        against them. 
Before Apex court -
a) The learned trial Judge as well as the High Court committed   grave
        error by coming to hold that sanction given under Section 7 of  the
        1908  Act  cannot  be  found  fault   with,  though  the   District
        Magistrate, Jaipur was not examined as a witness to prove the order
        of sanction.

     b) The recovery made from  the  appellant,  Chandra  Prakash,  at  the

        instance of information given by Pappu would not be  admissible  in
        evidence because at the time of giving information,  Pappu  was  an
        accused and had not been treated as  an  approver  which  was  done
        later on by virtue of the order of the Court.  The testimony of the
        approver is not creditworthy since he has deposed that he  was  not
        aware about the contents of the box that he was asked to  carry  by
        the other accused persons.

     c) The alleged recovery  of  ammonium  nitrate  from  the  custody  of

        accused, Chandra Prakash, either at the instance of Pappu @ Saleem,
        PW-1, or by the accused-appellant cannot be accepted  because Pappu
        @  Saleem,  PW-1  is  an  accomplice  and   in   absence   of   any
        corroboration, his evidence has to be thrown overboard and  further
        the case of  prosecution  that  at  the  instance  of  the  accused
        articles were discovered is to be rejected inasmuch as  Section  27
        of the Evidence Act, 1872 could not have been  made  applicable  to
        the facts of the present case, for Chandra  Prakash  had  not  been
        arrested by the time the alleged discovery took place.

     d) Assuming the ammonium nitrate was recovered  from  the  custody  of

        Chandra Prakash, the same would not make out any offence punishable
        under any of the provisions of the 1908 Act or the  1884  Act,  for
        the simple reason  that  it  does  not  come  under  the  statutory
        definition. Even if the language of Sections 2 and 3  of  the  1908
        Act as well as Section 9B of the 1884 Act are stretched,  it  would
        not bring in its sweep the simple act of sale  by  Chandra  Prakash
        without any intention or knowledge about its use.

     e) No independent charges were framed  against  the  accused-appellant

        under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the 1908 Act but along with Section  6
        of the 1908 Act and, therefore, conviction under the said provision
        is absolutely fallacious.
SANCTION -
Erram  Santosh
        Reddy  and  others  v.  State  of  Andhra   Pradesh[2]   would   be
        appropriate.  In the said case, the Court has observed as  follows:
        -
           “7. The last submission is that no sanction  was  obtained  from
           the Central Government as laid  down  under  Section  7  of  the
           Explosive Substances Act for prosecuting the appellants for  the
           offences under the Explosive Substances Act. From  the  judgment
           we do not find that any such objection was taken. In  any  event
           from the record we find that the  Collector  granted  permission
           and this must  be  pursuant  to  the  delegation  of  powers  as
           contemplated under Section 18(2) of the ‘TADA’.”
    25. From the aforesaid, we come to the  conclusion  that  the  District
        Magistrate had the authority to give consent for the prosecution.
CONSENT 
In State of Tamil Nadu v. Sivarasan alias Raghu alias
        Sivarasa and others[3], the Court, while dealing with the effect of
        Section 7 of the 1908 Act, has observed as follows: -
           “Section 7 does not require a  sanction  but  only  consent  for
           prosecuting  a  person  for  an  offence  under  the   Explosive
           Substances Act.  The object of using the word “consent”  instead
           of “sanction” in Section  7  is  to  have  a  purely  subjective
           appreciation of the matter before giving the necessary consent.”


    27. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to state as follows: -

           “We do not think that for obtaining consent of the Collector for
           prosecuting the accused for the  offence  punishable  under  the
           Explosive Substances Act it was necessary for the  investigating
           officer to submit the statements  of  witnesses  also,  who  had
           deposed about the movements of the accused and their activity of
           manufacturing bombs and grenades.  We, therefore, hold that  the
           consent given by the Collector was quite legal and valid.”


    28. In view of the  aforesaid,  the  approval/consent  granted  by  the
        District Magistrate in  the  obtaining  factual  matrix  cannot  be
        treated as vitiated.
TEST IDENTIFICATION PARADE -  AFTER ONE AND HALF YEAR
but done with in 3 weeks from the date of arrest
Recently, in Munna Kumar Upadhyay alias Munna Upadhyaya
        v. State of Andhra Pradesh through  Public  Prosecutor,  Hyderabad,
        Andhra Pradesh[7], a two-Judge Bench has observed thus: -
           “66. There was some delay in holding the identification  parade.
           But the delay per se cannot be fatal to the validity of  holding
           an identification parade, in all cases, without  exception.  The
           purpose of the identification parade is to provide corroborative
           evidence and is  more  confirmatory  in  its  nature.  No  other
           infirmity has been pointed out by the learned counsel  appearing
           for the appellant, in the holding of the identification  parade.
           The identification parade was held in accordance  with  law  and
           the witnesses had identified the accused from amongst  a  number
           of persons who had joined the identification parade.”
In view of the aforesaid, the submission that there has been  delay
        in holding the test identification parade does  not  really  affect
        the case of the  prosecution.   It  is  also  noteworthy  that  the
        witnesses had identified the accused persons in court  and  nothing
        has been elicited in the cross-examination even to create a  doubt.

RECOVERY OF AMMONIA NITRATE 

 What is evincible from the  seizure  report,  Ext.  P-42,
        apart from ammonium nitrate, fuse wire and empty  boxes  were  also
        seized.  That apart, 17 packs containing blue  coloured  fuse  wire
        kept in plastic (polythene) bags and  four  boxes  containing  blue
        coloured fuse wire, “Sun brand  safety  fuse”  numbered  as  40208,
        40158,  39937,  40203  respectively,  one  carton   of   explosives
        detonating fuse measuring 1500  meters  in  length  and  38  kg  in
        weight, containing four wooden logs of red colour, 375  meter  wire
        in each Gattha and black coloured cap fitted  on  the  tip  of  the
        wire, three cartons of explosive Belgelative  90  (Gulla  Dynamite)
        net weight of each being 25 Kg. with “Division I  Class  II  safety
        distance category ZZ Bharat Explosive Ltd.  9  KM  Lalitpur  (U.P.)
        Date of manufacturing 4.6.97 batch No. 2” written on each box, four
        packets of O.D. Detonator containing 1600 detonators,  a  substance
        of light yellow colour kept inside a carton of paer  in  a  plastic
        bag weighing nearly 5 kg and 16 empty cartons, one of gulla and  15
        of fuse wire, were seized.


    65. Section 2 of the 1908 Act has a deeming provision which states that
        explosive substance would include  any  materials  for  making  any
        explosive substance.  Similarly, Section 4(d) of the 1884 Act has a
        broader  spectrum  which  includes  coloured  fires  or  any  other
        substances, whether  single  chemical  compound  or  a  mixture  of
        substances.  That apart, as we find, apart  from  ammonium  nitrate
        other articles had been seized.  The combination of  the  same,  as
        per the evidence of the expert witness, was sufficient to prepare a
        bomb for the purpose of explosion.  In addition to the  same,  huge
        quantity of ammonium nitrate was seized and  it  was  seized  along
        with other items.  The cumulative effect is that the possession  of
        these articles in such  a  large  quantity  by  the  accused  gives
        credence  to  the  prosecution  version  that  the  possession  was
        conscious and it was intended to be used for  the  purpose  of  the
        blast.
Both appeals by accused and state were dismissed
   2014 (May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41535
K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, DIPAK MISRA

                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1155 OF 2014
                 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) 4419 of 2009)


      Chandra Prakash                              … Appellant


                                   Versus


      State of Rajasthan                                 …Respondent


                                    WITH


                    CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1156-1157 OF 2014
              (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) 3524-3525 of 2010)


      Abdul Hamid and another                            … Appellants


                                   Versus


      State of Rajasthan                                 …Respondent


                                    With


                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1160 OF 2014
               (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 4105 of 2014
                              CRLMP 22781/2012)


      Abdul Mateen                                       … Appellant


                                   Versus


      State of Rajasthan                                 …Respondent


                               J U D G M E N T


      Dipak Misra, J.

            On 26th January, 1996, a day of  celebration  and  conscientious
      remembrance of the “Red Letter Day” in the history  of  India  because
      26th January is the date in 1950, when our organic, inclusive,  humane
      and compassionate Constitution came into existence being given by  the
      people of this country to themselves and the nation has  been  obliged
      to jubilate  remembering  the  said  important  day  in  our  national
      history, for it  chartered  the  path  of  many  an  emancipation  and
      conferred on the people the highly cherished fundamental rights; about
      8.30 a.m., there was a blast  of  explosive  substances  between  Gate
      No.12 and Gate No. 13, towards the southern and eastern side of  Sawai
      Man Singh Stadium Jaipur, where the State level function  on  Republic
      Day was going to be celebrated.  Soon after the blast, Prahlad  Singh,
      the Station House Officer, Police Station lodged  an  FIR  about  9.30
      a.m. which was registered as FIR No. 39/1996.  As per  the  FIR,  when
      the blast took place, the people who had assembled were asked to leave
      the stadium so that there could be a check.  During the check, it  was
      found that due to the blast, a big size crater had come into existence
      at the scene of explosion.  That apart, by  the  said  explosion,  the
      sand hopped upward and fell on the places meant  for  sitting  in  the
      stadium and also on the roof.  The  glasses  of  the  windows  of  the
      pavilion near the explosion had broken into pieces. At the  time  when
      the explosion had occurred, only police  personnel  but  no  civilians
      were present in that part of the stadium. The public at  large,  which
      was present inside the Stadium, was informed to leave the  Stadium  so
      that the check and security could be carried out.   Due to  the  sound
      caused by the explosion, one Ramgopal Choudhary, an  employee  of  the
      Public Works Department, who was  passing  nearby,  had  met  with  an
      injury on his ear for which he was immediately sent to  the  hospital.
      On the basis of the  FIR,  offences  under  Section  120-B  read  with
      Sections 307 and 427 IPC, under Section 3 of the Prevention of  Damage
      to Public Property Act, 1984 and under  Section  3  of  the  Explosive
      Substances Act, 1908 (for short “the 1908 Act”) and also under Section
      9B of the Explosive Act,  1884  (for  brevity  “the  1884  Act”)  were
      registered  and   the   investigation   commenced.   Later   on,   the
      investigation of the case was transferred to C.I.D(C.B.).
     2. During the investigation, an  anonymous  letter  in  Urdu  language
        dated 1st June, 1997 was sent  to  the  Superintendent  of  Police,
        wherein some information was given which was alleged to  have  been
        gathered by the senders who described themselves  as  well  wishers
        while they were in custody in the Central Jail, Jaipur, in  respect
        of the bomb-blast that took place on 26th January, 1996 at the  SMS
        Stadium, Jaipur.  In that letter, the names of some persons,  i.e.,
        Raies  Beg  of  Agra,  Dr.  Abdul  Hamid  of  Firozabad  and  Pappu
        Puncturewala were mentioned.  It was also mentioned that the ISI of
        Pakistan was behind the bomb-blast.   On  the  basis  of  the  said
        information,  the  investigating  officer  arrested  five  persons,
        namely, Abdul Hamid, Raies Beg, Abdul Mateen, Pappu  @  Saleem  and
        Chandra Prakash on various dates.



     3. During the investigation, the investigating agency recovered a live
        time bomb from SMS Stadium and explosive items were recovered  from
        Roopwas, District Bharatpur.  In the course of  the  investigation,
        accused Pappu @ Saleem filed an application under  Section  306  of
        the Code of Criminal Procedure (for brevity “the Code”) before  the
        Chief  Judicial  Magistrate  on  14.8.1997  who,  by  order   dated
        30.8.1997, authorized the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate  No.
        6 to record the statement of the said accused under Section 164  of
        the Code and  thereafter,  the  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  by  a
        reasoned order dated 20.9.1997,  allowed  the  application.   After
        carrying out the detailed investigation, the police laid the charge-
        sheet  against  the  arrested  accused  persons,  namely,   Chandra
        Prakash, Abdul Mateen, Raies Beg and Abdul Hamid.


     4. All the accused persons abjured guilt,  pleaded  false  implication
        and, accordingly, faced trial.


     5. The learned trial Judge framed different charges against  the  four
        accused persons and we think that it would be apt to refer  to  the
        charges framed against each of them.  As far as Chandra Prakash  is
        concerned, the charges that were  framed  against  him  were  under
        Section 9B of the 1884 Act and under Sections 3,  4,  5  read  with
        Section 6 of the 1908 Act.  As far as Abdul Mateen is concerned, he
        was charged with the offences under Section 14  of  the  Foreigners
        Act, 1946, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the 1908 Act, under Section
        9B of the 1884 Act, under Section 3 of the Prevention of Damages to
        Public Properties Act and under Sections 307, 118, 435 and 456 IPC.
         As far as Raies Beg and Abdul Hamid are concerned, they were faced
        with similar charges, namely, under Section 9B  of  the  1884  Act,
        under Sections 3, 4 and 5 read with Section 6 of the 1908  Act  and
        under Sections 307/120B, 118/120B and 435/120B IPC.


     6. To  bring  home  the  charges  against  the  accused  persons,  the
        prosecution examined as many as 78 witnesses and brought on  record
        exhibits P-1 to P-296.  In defence,  no  witness  was  examined  on
        behalf  of  any  of  the  accused  persons.   However,  documentary
        evidence was produced by them, i.e., exhibits D-1 to D-5.  We shall
        refer to the  relevant  parts  of  the  testimonies  of  the  vital
        witnesses and advert to the documents which have been stressed  and
        emphasized upon by the prosecution at a later stage.

     7.  The accused persons in their statements under Section 313  of  the
        Code took separate plea and hence, it is obligatory on our part  to
        record their pleas individually.  Abdul Mateen admitted that he  is
        a Pakistani and he had remained as a Pakistani always; that he  had
        never come to India before his arrest; that he  did  not  know  any
        person in India; that he never visited the places, namely,  Jaipur,
        Farah, Roopwas, Agra Firozabad or any other city; and that  he  had
        never given any information to the police and no recovery was  made
        by the police at his instance  and  he  had  never  identified  any
        place. The  plea  of  Abdul  Hamid  was  that  he  never  gave  any
        information to the police during the investigation of the case  and
        he did not furnish any information about the shop of Mohit Jain, PW-
         30, situated at Delhi and he had been falsely  implicated.   Raies
        Beg took the plea that due to communal riots he  had  been  falsely
        booked in the crime. Accused  Chandra  Prakash,  apart  from  false
        implication, denied any relationship with Pappu @ Saleem, PW-1, and
        further stated that no key was recovered from him and  he  did  not
        open any godown and room with his keys.  He  also  took  the  stand
        that he had not taken any room on rent in Krishi Upaz Mandi or  any
        shop near the power house on rent and disputed  the  recovery  from
        any shop. The trial court, appreciating the  oral  and  documentary
        evidence on record, by its judgment and order dated  22.04.2000  in
        Sessions Case no. 8/98, convicted all the accused and sentenced all
        of them individually in respect of all the specific charges  framed
        against them. The offence for which each of them  had  faced  trial
        has been already mentioned hereinabove. All the  accused  had  been
        sentenced separately by the learned trial Judge.


     8. Accused Abdul Mateen was sentenced to undergo five  years  rigorous
        imprisonment and a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default  of  payment  of
        fine to  further  undergo  one  year’s  simple  imprisonment  under
        Section 14 of the Foreigners Act; ten years  rigorous  imprisonment
        and a fine of Rs.20,000, in default to further undergo  two  years’
        simple imprisonment under Section 4 of the Prevention of Damages to
        Public Property Act; three years rigorous imprisonment and  a  fine
        of Rs.3,000/-, in default to further  undergo  six  months’  simple
        imprisonment under Section 456 IPC; to undergo ten  years  rigorous
        imprisonment and a fine  of  Rs.10,000/-,  in  default  to  further
        undergo two years’ simple imprisonment under Section 307 read  with
        Section 120B IPC; seven years rigorous imprisonment and a  fine  of
        Rs.7,000/-, in default to  further  undergo  one  and  half  years’
        simple imprisonment under Section 435 read with Section  120B  IPC;
        five years rigorous imprisonment  and  a  fine  of  Rs.5,000/-,  in
        default to further undergo one  year’s  simple  imprisonment  under
        Section  118  read  with  Section  120B  IPC;  two  years  rigorous
        imprisonment and a  fine  of  Rs.2,000/-,  in  default  to  further
        undergo three months’ simple imprisonment under Section 9B  of  the
        1884 Act; imprisonment for  life  and  a  fine  of  Rs.20,000/-  in
        default to further undergo three years’ simple  imprisonment  under
        Section 3 of the 1908 Act; seven years rigorous imprisonment and  a
        fine of Rs.7,000/-, in default to  further  undergo  one  and  half
        years’ simple imprisonment under Section 4 of  the  1908  Act;  and
        five years rigorous imprisonment  and  a  fine  of  Rs.5,000/-,  in
        default to further undergo one  year’s  simple  imprisonment  under
        Section 5 of the 1908 Act.


     9. Accused Chandra Prakash was sentenced to undergo two years rigorous
        imprisonment and a  fine  of  Rs.2,000/-,  in  default  to  further
        undergo three months’ simple imprisonment under Section 9B  of  the
        1884 Act; ten years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.10,000/-
        , in default to further  undergo  two  years’  simple  imprisonment
        under Section 3 read with Section 6 of the 1908  Act;  seven  years
        rigorous imprisonment and a  fine  of  Rs.7,000/-,  in  default  to
        further undergo one  and  half  years’  simple  imprisonment  under
        Section 4 read with Section 6 of  the  1908  Act;  and  five  years
        rigorous imprisonment and a  fine  of  Rs.5,000/-,  in  default  to
        further undergo one year’s simple imprisonment under Section 5 read
        with Section 6 of the 1908 Act.


    10. Accused Abdul Hamid and Raies Beg were  sentenced  to  undergo  two
        years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default to
        further  undergo  three  months’  simple  imprisonment;  ten  years
        rigorous imprisonment and a fine  of  Rs.10,000/-,  in  default  to
        further undergo two years simple  imprisonment  under  Section  307
        read with Section 120B IPC; seven years rigorous imprisonment and a
        fine of Rs.7,000/-, in default to  further  undergo  one  and  half
        years’ simple imprisonment under Section 435 read with Section 120B
        IPC; five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5,000/-,  in
        default to further undergo one  year’s  simple  imprisonment  under
        Section  118  read  with  Section  120B  IPC;  ten  years  rigorous
        imprisonment and a fine  of  Rs.10,000/-,  in  default  to  further
        undergo two years’ simple imprisonment under Section  3  read  with
        Section 6 of the 1908 Act; seven years rigorous imprisonment and  a
        fine of Rs.7,000/-, in default to  further  undergo  one  and  half
        years’ simple imprisonment under Section 4 read with Section  6  of
        the 1908 Act; and five years rigorous imprisonment and  a  fine  of
        Rs.5,000/-,  in  default  to  further  undergo  one  year’s  simple
        imprisonment under Section 5 read with Section 6 of the 1908 Act.


    11. At this juncture, we think it appropriate  to  state  the  findings
        recorded by the learned trial Judge against each  of  the  accused.
        As far as Abdul Mateen is concerned, the trial court held  that  it
        was  clear  from  the  evidence  of  GPS  Wirk,  PW-69,   Assistant
        Commander, BSF, that Mhd. Ashlam Baba was the financial head  of  a
        terrorist organization by the name of “Harkat-ul-Ansar”, and during
        the course of investigation, the accused Abdul Mateen was  arrested
        from Srinagar and no passport or visa was found in his  possession.
        The offence punishable under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act which
        had been levelled against him  was  established  beyond  reasonable
        doubt.  The live time bomb was duly  recovered  and  accused  Abdul
        Mateen had exclusive knowledge and it was he who planted  the  time
        bomb at that place and it was proven from the  testimonies  of  the
        witnesses.  From the evidence  of  the  approver,  Pappu,  and  the
        information under Section 27 of  the  Evidence  Act,  it  could  be
        concluded that prior to 26.1.1996, two time bombs were implanted by
        accused Abdul Mateen.  It was clear from  the  testimonies  of  Jai
        Narayan, PW-6, and Gopal Saini, PW-7, that Abdul Mateen had led  to
        the recovery of the bomb and the charge of crime  punishable  under
        Section 9B of the Explosive Act levelled against the accused  Abdul
        Mateen has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.


    12. In respect of Raies Beg and Abdul Hamid, the trial court held  that
        Abdul Hamid had been visiting accused Chandra  Prakash  at  Roopbas
        quite frequently and both the accused persons  had  helped  accused
        Abdul Mateen in the commission of the offence.  They used  to  meet
        at the Madarsa of village Farah and  the  conspiracy  was  hatched.
        The learned trial Judge came to hold that the  involvement  of  the
        said accused persons in the commission of the crime was reflectible
        from the evidence of number of witnesses and  the  prosecution  had
        established their role beyond any shadow of doubt.

    13. Pertaining to  Chandra  Prakash,  the  Court  held  that  explosive
        substances including gelatin and dynamite  in  huge  quantity  were
        recovered from his possession on 1.8.1997.  Scanning the  evidence,
        it recorded that the dynamite was  used  in  both  the  bombs.   He
        further opined that Pappu @ Saleem,  PW-1,  was  an  associate  and
        colleague of accused Abdul Mateen and prior to  the  incident,  the
        explosive substance was brought from  Chandra  Prakash  in  village
        Farah, where Pappu @ Saleem used to live  with  him.   That  apart,
        Chandra Prakash was identified by Pappu and the key of  the  godown
        was with the accused and he opened the lock of the said godown from
        which 28 kattas of ammonium nitrate were recovered.   It  was  also
        clear from the evidence of Chetandass  Rawatani,  PW-34,  that  the
        goods which were recovered from the accused were utilized  for  the
        preparation of the explosive substance.


    14. On the basis of the aforesaid findings and conclusions, the learned
        trial Judge convicted the accused persons and sentenced them as has
        been stated hereinbefore.


    15. Being grieved by the aforesaid conviction and sentence, the accused
        persons preferred separate appeals before the High Court being D.B.
        Criminal (Jail) Appeal No. 318 of 2000, D.B. Criminal  Appeal  Nos.
        189 of 2000, 258  of  2000  and  369  of  2000.   The  State  filed
        application for grant of leave (D.B. Criminal Leave to  Appeal  No.
        26 of 2008) with an application for condonation of delay  of  seven
        years and nine months which was taken up  along  with  the  appeals
        preferred by the accused persons and the said appeal was  dismissed
        on the ground of delay.  However, it may be stated  here  that  the
        High Court also addressed to the merits of the case  of  the  State
        which pertained to enhancement of sentence and  did  not  find  any
        substance in the same.  As regards the  appeals  preferred  by  the
        accused persons, the appellate court did  not  perceive  any  merit
        and, resultantly, dismissed the same by way of judgment  and  order
        dated 3.2.2009.  Hence, the assail is to the judgment of conviction
        and  order  of  sentence  by  the  applications  of  special  leave
        petitions.

    16.  Leave granted in all the special leave petitions.

    17.  As all the appeals relate  to  defensibility  of  common  judgment
        passed by the High Court in respect of all the  accused-appellants,
        they are disposed of by a singular judgment.


    18. Mr. Sushil K. Jain, learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellants,
        criticizing the judgment of the trial court and that  of  the  High
        Court, has raised the following contentions: -

     a) The learned trial Judge as well as the High Court committed   grave
        error by coming to hold that sanction given under Section 7 of  the
        1908  Act  cannot  be  found  fault   with,  though  the   District
        Magistrate, Jaipur was not examined as a witness to prove the order
        of sanction.

     b) The recovery made from  the  appellant,  Chandra  Prakash,  at  the
        instance of information given by Pappu would not be  admissible  in
        evidence because at the time of giving information,  Pappu  was  an
        accused and had not been treated as  an  approver  which  was  done
        later on by virtue of the order of the Court.  The testimony of the
        approver is not creditworthy since he has deposed that he  was  not
        aware about the contents of the box that he was asked to  carry  by
        the other accused persons.

     c) The alleged recovery  of  ammonium  nitrate  from  the  custody  of
        accused, Chandra Prakash, either at the instance of Pappu @ Saleem,
        PW-1, or by the accused-appellant cannot be accepted  because Pappu
        @  Saleem,  PW-1  is  an  accomplice  and   in   absence   of   any
        corroboration, his evidence has to be thrown overboard and  further
        the case of  prosecution  that  at  the  instance  of  the  accused
        articles were discovered is to be rejected inasmuch as  Section  27
        of the Evidence Act, 1872 could not have been  made  applicable  to
        the facts of the present case, for Chandra  Prakash  had  not  been
        arrested by the time the alleged discovery took place.

     d) Assuming the ammonium nitrate was recovered  from  the  custody  of
        Chandra Prakash, the same would not make out any offence punishable
        under any of the provisions of the 1908 Act or the  1884  Act,  for
        the simple reason  that  it  does  not  come  under  the  statutory
        definition. Even if the language of Sections 2 and 3  of  the  1908
        Act as well as Section 9B of the 1884 Act are stretched,  it  would
        not bring in its sweep the simple act of sale  by  Chandra  Prakash
        without any intention or knowledge about its use.

     e) No independent charges were framed  against  the  accused-appellant
        under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the 1908 Act but along with Section  6
        of the 1908 Act and, therefore, conviction under the said provision
        is absolutely fallacious.


    19.  Mr.  Balaji  Srinivasan,  learned  counsel   appearing   for   the
        appellants, Abdul Hamid and Raies Beg, submitted as under:-
      (A)   The prosecution has failed to prove the nexus  of  the  accused-
           appellants with the co-accused Abdul Mateen  in  the  crime  and
           nothing has been brought on record to establish the allegations.
           The only evidence that has been   recorded is that  Abdul  Hamid
           used to meet Abdul Mateen frequently at village Farah.
      B) There is no recovery of explosive substance  or  any  incriminating
         materials from the appellant’s house and  in  the  absence  of  any
         recovery, the appellant cannot be roped in the crime.
      C) The allegation of the prosecution with regard to  the  relation  of
         the appellant with Abdul Mateen does not have any substance and, in
         any case, there is no proof to establish the same.
      D) The bomb blast at SMS Stadium, Jaipur took place on 26.01.1996  and
         the accused was arrested on 8.06.1997 and identification parade was
         conducted  on  25.06.1997  about  one  and  half  years  after  the
         incident.  This  aspect  vitiates  the  identification  parade  and
         creates a dent in  the  case  of  the  prosecution  for  which  the
         appellants should be given the benefit of doubt.




    20. Mr. Atul Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the  appellant  Abdul
        Mateen, in addition to the contentions raised by Mr. Jain  and  Mr.
        Balaji, has contended that no consent has been taken under  Section
        7 of the 1908 Act from the Central Government and hence, the entire
        trial is vitiated.

    21. Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Additional Advocate  General  appearing
        for the State of Rajasthan, supporting the  judgment  of  the  High
        Court, has submitted as follows: -

        i) The sanction given by the District  Magistrate,  on  a  perusal,
           would  show  application  of  mind  and,  by   no   stretch   of
           imagination, it can be regarded as invalid in law.

       ii) The recovery at the instance of an accused under Section  27  of
           the Indian Evidence  Act  is  admissible  in  evidence  and  the
           information given by Pappu, PW-1, which led to the  recovery  of
           huge quantity of  explosives  would  per  se  be  admissible  in
           evidence and this evidence is not to be treated as  inadmissible
           merely because the accused at the relevant  point  of  time  had
           subsequently become the approver.

      iii) The recovery of explosives by the accused, Chandra  Prakash,  by
           opening the keys of the godown would  be  a  relevant  fact  and
           admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, irrespective  of
           the fact that the conduct falls within the purview of Section 27
           of the Evidence Act.

       iv) The recovery of the explosive substance has  been  made  by  the
           police  vide  memo  Ex.  P-42  during  the  search  and  seizure
           operations. Chetan Das Rawatani, PW-34, Explosive  Expert,   has
           stated that the articles recovered in Ex.  P-42  were  explosive
           articles and the same has also been proved by  the  FSL  Report,
           Ex. P-234.

        v) The evidence of the  approver  Pappu,  PW-1,  is  admissible  as
           substantive evidence  u/s  133  of  the  Evidence  Act.  In  the
           evidence of  the  approver,  it  has  been  mentioned  that  the
           accused, Chandra Prakash, was engaged in the supply of materials
           for solicitation of money for the commission  of  offence  under
           the 1908 Act. Possession of huge quantity  of  ammonium  nitrate
           without  any  plausible  explanation  by  the  accused,  Chandra
           Prakash, corroborates the evidence of the approver.


    22. First, we shall deal with the issue of sanction.  Section 7 of  the
        1908 Act reads as follows: -
           “7. Restriction on trial of offences. – No Court  shall  proceed
           to the trial of any person  for  an  offence  against  this  Act
           except with the consent of the District Magistrate.”


    23. The learned counsel for Abdul Mateen has submitted that no  consent
        has been granted by the Central Government.  In  this  context,  we
        may refer to the decision in State of M.P. v.  Bhupendra  Singh[1].
        In the said case, the consent for the prosecution  was  granted  by
        the Additional District Magistrate by notification dated  24.4.1995
        issued by the State Government.  The High  Court  has  quashed  the
        proceeding as there was no sanction.  This Court concurred with the
        said view on the ground that  it  was  within  the  domain  of  the
        Central Government to delegate the  authority  and,  in  fact,  the
        Central Government vide notification dated 2.12.1978 has  entrusted
        to the District Magistrates in the  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh  its
        consent under Section 7 of the 1908  Act.   Thus,  there  could  be
        delegation by the Central Government to the District Magistrates.


    24. It is relevant to note here that  the  consent  was  given  by  the
        concerned District Magistrate as Ext. P-277/278.  His authority was
        not questioned.  What was urged before the Court was that there had
        been no application of mind inasmuch as the relevant materials were
        not placed before him while according sanction.  When such a  point
        was not raised, the consequences have to  be  different.   In  this
        regard, reference to a two-Judge Bench decision  in  Erram  Santosh
        Reddy  and  others  v.  State  of  Andhra   Pradesh[2]   would   be
        appropriate.  In the said case, the Court has observed as  follows:
        -
           “7. The last submission is that no sanction  was  obtained  from
           the Central Government as laid  down  under  Section  7  of  the
           Explosive Substances Act for prosecuting the appellants for  the
           offences under the Explosive Substances Act. From  the  judgment
           we do not find that any such objection was taken. In  any  event
           from the record we find that the  Collector  granted  permission
           and this must  be  pursuant  to  the  delegation  of  powers  as
           contemplated under Section 18(2) of the ‘TADA’.”
    25. From the aforesaid, we come to the  conclusion  that  the  District
        Magistrate had the authority to give consent for the prosecution.


    26. The next facet of the challenge pertaining to sanction is that  the
        sanctioning authority had not perused the relevant materials.   The
        learned trial Judge, upon scrutiny of Ext. P-277/278, has expressed
        the opinion that the approval had been granted after perusal of the
        materials  on  record.   The  High  Court  has  observed  that  the
        consent/sanction order is a self-speaking and detailed one.  It has
        also  been  held  that  all  the  facts  have   been   taken   into
        consideration by the District  Magistrate  and  the  entire  police
        diary  was  made  available  to  him  at  the  time  of  grant   of
        sanction/approval.  With regard to  the  authority  of  consent  as
        postulated in the 1908 Act, reference to certain authorities  would
        be fruitful.  In State of Tamil Nadu v. Sivarasan alias Raghu alias
        Sivarasa and others[3], the Court, while dealing with the effect of
        Section 7 of the 1908 Act, has observed as follows: -
           “Section 7 does not require a  sanction  but  only  consent  for
           prosecuting  a  person  for  an  offence  under  the   Explosive
           Substances Act.  The object of using the word “consent”  instead
           of “sanction” in Section  7  is  to  have  a  purely  subjective
           appreciation of the matter before giving the necessary consent.”


    27. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to state as follows: -
           “We do not think that for obtaining consent of the Collector for
           prosecuting the accused for the  offence  punishable  under  the
           Explosive Substances Act it was necessary for the  investigating
           officer to submit the statements  of  witnesses  also,  who  had
           deposed about the movements of the accused and their activity of
           manufacturing bombs and grenades.  We, therefore, hold that  the
           consent given by the Collector was quite legal and valid.”


    28. In view of the  aforesaid,  the  approval/consent  granted  by  the
        District Magistrate in  the  obtaining  factual  matrix  cannot  be
        treated as vitiated.


    29. The third aspect of challenge to the sanction is that the  District
        Magistrate has not been examined as a witness to prove the order of
        sanction.  On a perusal of the document, we find that the same  has
        been proven by the competent  person  and  the  document  has  been
        marked as Ext. P-277/278.  We are of the  considered  opinion  that
        the examination of the District Magistrate to prove his consent  is
        really not necessary.


    30. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the submission relating  to  the
        invalidity of the consent, as stipulated in Section 7 of  the  1908
        Act,  does  not  commend  us  and,  accordingly,  the  same  stands
        rejected.


    31. The next issue, to which we should advert to, pertains to the delay
        in holding the test identification parade.  The submission  of  Mr.
        Balaji Srinivasan, learned  counsel  appearing  for  accused  Abdul
        Hamid and Raies Beg, is that  there  has  been  enormous  delay  in
        conducting the test identification parade  in  respect  of  accused
        Abdul Hamid and Raies Beg.  There is no dispute that both  of  them
        were arrested on 8.6.1997 and the test  identification  parade  was
        held on 25.6.1997.  Thus, it is evident  that  they  were  arrested
        long after the occurrence but the test  identification  parade  was
        held within a period of three weeks from the date  of  arrest.   As
        the analysis of the trial court shows, they  could  not  have  been
        arrested as the materials could not be collected against  them  and
        things got changed at a later stage.  In this regard, we may  refer
        with profit to  the  decision  in  Ramanand  Ramnath  v.  State  of
        M.P.[4], wherein identification parade was held within a period  of
        one month from the date of arrest.  This Court observed that  there
        was no unusual delay in holding the test identification parade.


    32. That apart, the witnesses, namely Prem Prakash  Gupta,  PW-78,  and
        Mohit Jain, PW-30, have identified them in the Court.  In State  of
        Maharashtra v. Suresh[5], it has been held as follows: -
            “We  remind  ourselves  that  identification  parades  are  not
           primarily meant for the court. They are meant for  investigation
           purposes. The object of conducting a test identification  parade
           is  twofold.  First  is  to  enable  the  witnesses  to  satisfy
           themselves that the prisoner whom they suspect is really the one
           who was seen by them in connection with the  commission  of  the
           crime. Second is to satisfy the investigating  authorities  that
           the suspect is the real person whom the witnesses  had  seen  in
           connection with the said occurrence.”


    33. The said legal position has been reiterated in Anil Kumar v.  State
        of U.P.[6]  Recently, in Munna Kumar Upadhyay alias Munna Upadhyaya
        v. State of Andhra Pradesh through  Public  Prosecutor,  Hyderabad,
        Andhra Pradesh[7], a two-Judge Bench has observed thus: -
           “66. There was some delay in holding the identification  parade.
           But the delay per se cannot be fatal to the validity of  holding
           an identification parade, in all cases, without  exception.  The
           purpose of the identification parade is to provide corroborative
           evidence and is  more  confirmatory  in  its  nature.  No  other
           infirmity has been pointed out by the learned counsel  appearing
           for the appellant, in the holding of the identification  parade.
           The identification parade was held in accordance  with  law  and
           the witnesses had identified the accused from amongst  a  number
           of persons who had joined the identification parade.”


    34. In view of the aforesaid, the submission that there has been  delay
        in holding the test identification parade does  not  really  affect
        the case of the  prosecution.   It  is  also  noteworthy  that  the
        witnesses had identified the accused persons in court  and  nothing
        has been elicited in the cross-examination even to create a  doubt.
        Thus, we repel the submission advanced by the learned  counsel  for
        accused Abdul Hamid and Raies Beg.


    35. The next facet to be addressed is whether the evidentiary value  of
        the  testimony  of  approver  Pappu,  PW-1,  is  required   to   be
        considered.  Learned counsel for the State has drawn our  attention
        to Section 133 and illustration (b) to Section 114  of  the  Indian
        Evidence Act, 1872.  They read as under: -

           “133. Accomplice .- An accomplice shall be a  competent  witness
           against an accused person;  and  a  conviction  is  not  illegal
           merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony  of
           an accomplice."


           Illustration (b) to Section 114


           “(b) The Court may presume that an  accomplice  is  unworthy  of
           credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars.”



    36. The aforesaid two provisions came to be considered in  Bhiva  Doulu
        Patil v. State of Maharashtra[8] wherein the Court held as follows:
        -

                 “The combined effect of Sections 133 and  Illustration  (b)
           to Section 114, may be stated as follows:


                 According to the  former,  which  is  a  Rule  of  law,  an
           accomplice is competent to give evidence and  according  to  the
           latter, which is a Rule of practice it is almost  always  unsafe
           to convict upon  his  testimony  alone.  Therefore,  though  the
           conviction of an accused  on  the  testimony  of  an  accomplice
           cannot be said to be illegal yet the courts will, as a matter of
           practice, not accept the evidence  of  such  a  witness  without
           corroboration in material particulars.”



    37. In Mohd. Husain Umar Kochra etc. v. K.S. Dalipsinghji  and  another
        etc.[9], the Court observed thus: -
           “... The combined effect of  Sections 133 and 114,  Illustration
           (b) is that though a conviction based upon  accomplice  evidence
           is legal, the Court will not accept such evidence unless  it  is
           corroborated in material  particulars.  The  corroboration  must
           connect the  accused  with  the  crime.  It  may  be  direct  or
           circumstantial. It  is  not  necessary  that  the  corroboration
           should confirm  all  the  circumstances  of  the  crime.  It  is
           sufficient if the corroboration is in material particulars.  The
           corroboration must be from an independent source. One accomplice
           cannot corroborate another.”


    38. Having stated the legal  position  with  regard  to  the  statutory
        provisions, presently we shall proceed to  consider  the  requisite
        tests to be applied to accept the credibility of the  testimony  of
        the approver.  At this juncture, we may sit in a time  machine  and
        quote a passage from Sarwan Singh S/o  Rattan  Singh  v.  State  of
        Punjab[10] wherein it has been held as follows: -

           “...An accomplice is undoubtedly a competent witness  under  the
           Indian Evidence Act. There can be, however, no  doubt  that  the
           very fact that he has participated  in  the  commission  of  the
           offence introduces a serious stain in his  evidence  and  Courts
           are naturally reluctant to act on such tainted  evidence  unless
           it is corroborated in material particulars by other  independent
           evidence. It would not be right to expect that such  independent
           corroboration should cover the whole of the prosecution story or
           even all the material particulars. If such a view is adopted  it
           would render the evidence of the accomplice wholly  superfluous.
           On the other hand, it  would  not  be  safe  to  act  upon  such
           evidence merely because it is corroborated in minor  particulars
           or incidental details because, in  such  a  case,  corroboration
           does not afford the necessary  assurance  that  the  main  story
           disclosed by the approver can be reasonably and safely  accepted
           as true. But it must never be forgotten that  before  the  court
           reaches the stage of considering the question  of  corroboration
           and its adequacy or otherwise, the first initial  and  essential
           question to consider  is  whether  even  as  an  accomplice  the
           approver is a reliable witness. If the answer to  this  question
           is against the approver then there is an end of the matter,  and
           no question as to whether his evidence is  corroborated  or  not
           falls to be considered. In other words, the appreciation  of  an
           approver's evidence has to satisfy a double test.  His  evidence
           must show that he is a reliable witness and that is a test which
           is common to all witnesses. If this test is satisfied the second
           test which still remains to be applied is  that  the  approver's
           evidence must receive sufficient  corroboration.  This  test  is
           special to the cases of weak or tainted evidence  like  that  of
           the approver.


           8...Every person who is a competent witness is  not  a  reliable
           witness and the test of reliability has to be  satisfied  by  an
           approver all the more before the question  of  corroboration  of
           his evidence is considered by criminal courts”.



    39. In Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana[11], this Court has  observed
        that: -
           “An approver is a most unworthy  friend,  if  at  all,  and  he,
           having bargained for his immunity, must prove his worthiness for
           credibility in court. This test is fulfilled,  firstly,  if  the
           story  he  relates  involves  him  in  the  crime  and   appears
           intrinsically to be a natural and probable catalogue  of  events
           that had taken place. … Secondly, once that hurdle  is  crossed,
           the story given by an approver so far as the accused on trial is
           concerned, must implicate him in such a manner as to  give  rise
           to a conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.”


    40. Similar principles have been reiterated in Mrinal Das and  Ors.  v.
        State of Tripura[12].


    41. In A. Devendran v. State of T.N.[13], the Court has registered  the
        view  that  there  cannot  be  any  dispute  with  regard  to   the
        proposition that ordinarily  an  approver’s  statement  has  to  be
        corroborated in material particulars. Certain clinching features of
        involvement disclosed directly to an accused by an approver must be
        tested qua each accused from independent credible evidence  and  on
        being satisfied, the evidence of an approver can be  accepted.  The
        Court further observed that the extent  of  corroboration  that  is
        required before the acceptance of  the  evidence  of  the  approver
        would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case, however,
        the  corroboration  required  must  be  in   material   particulars
        connecting each of the accused with the offence, or in other words,
        the evidence of the approver implicating several accused persons in
        the commission  of  the  offence  must  not  only  be  corroborated
        generally but also qua each accused but that  does  not  mean  that
        there should  be  independent  corroboration  of  every  particular
        circumstance from an independent source.  The  court  proceeded  to
        state that all  that  is  required  is  that  there  must  be  some
        additional evidence rendering it probable that  the  story  of  the
        accomplice is true and the corroboration  could be both  by  direct
        or circumstantial evidence. Be it noted,  the  said  principle  was
        stated on the basis of pronouncements in Ramanlal  Mohanlal  Pandya
        v. State of Bombay[14], Tribhuvan Nath v. State of Maharashtra[15],
        Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab (supra), Ram  Narain  v.  State  of
        Rajasthan[16]   and   Balwant   Kaur   v.   Union   Territory    of
        Chandigarh[17].


    42. In Chandan and another v. State of Rajasthan[18],  the  Court  held
        that so far as the question  about  the  conviction  based  on  the
        testimony of the accomplice is concerned, the law is settled and it
        is established as a rule of prudence that the conviction could only
        be based on the testimony  of  the  accomplice  if  it  is  thought
        reliable as a whole  and  if  it  is  corroborated  by  independent
        evidence either direct or circumstantial,  connecting  the  accused
        with the crime.


    43. In Haroon Haji Abdulla v. State of  Maharashtra[19],  the  view  in
        this regard was expressed in the following terms: -
           “An accomplice is a competent witness and his evidence could  be
           accepted and a conviction  based  on  it  if  there  is  nothing
           significant to reject it as false. But  the  rule  of  prudence,
           ingrained in the consideration of accomplice evidence,  requires
           independent corroborative evidence first of the offence and next
           connecting the accused, against whom the accomplice evidence  is
           used, with the crime.”


    44. In Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay[20], it has  been  observed
        that this Court had never intended to lay down that the evidence of
        an approver and the corroborating  pieces  of  evidence  should  be
        treated in two different compartments, that is to  say,  the  court
        shall first have to consider the evidence of  the  approver  dehors
        the corroborated pieces of evidence and reject it if  it  comes  to
        the conclusion that his evidence is unreliable; but if it comes  to
        the conclusion that it is reliable, then it will have  to  consider
        whether that evidence is corroborated by any other evidence.




    45. In Renuka Bai alias Rinku alias  Ratan  and  another  v.  State  of
        Maharashtra[21], the Court held that the evidence of  the  approver
        is always to  be  viewed  with  suspicion  especially  when  it  is
        seriously suspected that he is suppressing some material facts.

    46. In Ranjeet Singh and another v. State of Rajasthan[22],  the  Court
        observed that while looking for corroboration, one must first  look
        at the broad spectrum of the approver’s version and then  find  out
        whether there is other evidence to lend assurance to that  version.
        The nature and extent of the  corroboration  may  depend  upon  the
        facts of each case and the corroboration need not be of any  direct
        evidence that the accused committed the  crime.  The  corroboration
        even by circumstantial evidence may be sufficient.



    47. Keeping in view  the  aforesaid  principles  which  relate  to  the
        acceptance of the evidence of an approver,  we  have  bestowed  our
        anxious consideration and carefully perused  the  judgment  of  the
        trial court and that of the High Court.  Learned  counsel  for  the
        parties have taken us through the evidence of Pappu @ Saleem, PW-1.
         He has clearly deposed that Abdul Mateen  who  is  also  known  as
        Iqbal, used to visit the Madarsa at village  Farah.   Abdul  Hameed
        and Abdul Mateen were seen at village Farah many times without  any
        reason before the incicent.  As far as Abdul Hameed and  Raies  Beg
        are concerned, he has deposed that both the accused used to  go  to
        the house of Chandra Prakash in Roopwas to collect the “masala”  in
        a cover box.  Both of them used to meet Abdul Mateen in the Madarsa
        at village Farah on a number of  occasions.   He  used  to  contact
        Abdul Mateen from Firozabad many times and the watches  fixed  with
        bombs as timers were given at Farah by Abdul  Hameed  to  make  the
        bomb.  It has also come out in his evidence that Pappu  along  with
        Accused Raies Beg @ Raies Ahmad and other accused persons  used  to
        visit the Madarsa at village Farah.  His evidence also  shows  that
        Raies Beg and Pappu used to bring explosive from Roopwas to village
        Farah and he has mentioned that Raies Beg had brought five boxes of
        “masala” for Rs.10,000/- from the  house  of  Chandra  Prakash  and
        those boxes were unloaded at the Madarsa in Farah.  Pappu was asked
        to carry the boxes along with Raies Beg and Abdul Hameed.   He  has
        clearly deposed about the  conspiracy  that  was  told  to  him  by
        accused Abdul Mateen.  As far as Chandra Prakash is  concerned,  it
        had come in the evidence that though Pappu used to visit his  house
        at Roopwas along with other accused persons, yet he  used  to  stay
        outside the house of Chandra Prakash and the others used to  go  to
        bring “masala” from the house  of  Chandra  Prakash.   The  alleged
        “masala” used to be brought in boxes  from  time  to  time  to  the
        associates of Raies Beg and  Abdul  Hameed  who  used  to  come  to
        Madarsa at Farah.


    48. From the analysis of the aforesaid evidence, it is clear that Pappu
        as approver has implicated himself in the crime.  He has  not  made
        any effort to give any statement  which  is  exculpatory.   He  has
        spoken quite graphically about the involvement of all  the  accused
        persons.  Mr.  Jain,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the
        appellant, would contend that he has used the word “masala” but not
        ammonium nitrate, but Pappu has clarified that though  he  was  not
        aware what was contained in the boxes, yet he was told by the other
        accused persons  later  on  that  it  contained  certain  explosive
        substances.  The said  aspect  has  been  corroborated  from  other
        ocular evidence as well as the seizure.
    49. Presently, we shall advert to the various facets  of  corroboration
        in evidence against the accused persons.  As far as Chandra Prakash
        is concerned, on the basis of  the  approver  Chandra  Prakash  was
        arrested  on  1.8.1997  vide  Ext.P-37.   On  the  basis   of   the
        information of the  accused,  Chandra  Prakash,  the  Investigating
        Officer searched his house and godown and  recovered  28  boxes  of
        ammonium nitrate.  It has come out in  the  evidence  that  Chandra
        Prakash opened the lock of the godown the key of which was  in  his
        possession.  Bhup Singh, PW-32,  eye  witness  to  the  seizure  of
        articles from the godown  of  Chandra  Prakash,  has  categorically
        stated that the accused Chandra Prakash led to the recovery of  red
        and blue coloured bundles from the godown  of  the  building.   The
        office of PW-32 was also in the said building.   From  the  godown,
        fuse wires and five kilograms of grey coloured  material  was  also
        recovered.  The Investigating Officer, M.M. Atray, PW-71, has  also
        proven the factum of recovery.  Shivnath  Kuriya,  PW-22,  who  had
        accompanied the investigating team, has deposed that the  explosive
        which was used in the live  bomb  had  ammonium  nitrate/gelaltine.
        Chetan Das Rawatani, PW-34, who is an expert witness in respect  of
        explosives, approved his report Ext. P-49 and has deposed that  the
        ammonium nitrate that was seized from the godown of Chandra Prakash
        was in such a condition that it could be used to prepare a bomb.


    50. Mr. Jain, as has been  stated  earlier,  has  seriously  criticized
        about the recovery from Chandra Prakash on the ground that when  he
        led to the discovery of the articles seized, he was  not  arrested.
        In this context, we refer with profit to the decision in Mohd. Arif
        alias Ashfaq v. State (NCT of Delhi)[23] wherein the  Court  opined
        thus: -
           “The essence of the proof of a discovery under Section 27 of the
           Evidence Act is only that it should be credibly proved that  the
           discovery made was  a  relevant  and  material  discovery  which
           proceeded in  pursuance  of  the  information  supplied  by  the
           accused in the custody. How the prosecution proved it, is to  be
           judged by the court but if the court  finds  the  fact  of  such
           information having been given  by  the  accused  in  custody  is
           credible and acceptable even in  the  absence  of  the  recorded
           statement and in pursuance of  that  information  some  material
           discovery has been effected then the aspect  of  discovery  will
           not suffer from any vice and can be acted upon.”


    51. In this context, we may refer to the authority in Vikram Singh  and
        others v. State of Punjab[24], wherein while  interpreting  Section
        27 of the Evidence Act, the Court opined that a bare reading of the
        provision would reveal that  a  “person  must  be  accused  of  any
        offence” and that he must be “in the custody of a  police  officer”
        and it is not essential that such an accused must be  under  formal
        arrest.


    52. In this regard, a passage from the Constitution Bench  decision  in
        State of Uttar Pradesh v. Deoman Upadhyaya[25] is reproduced below:
        -
           “The expression, "accused of any offence" in s. 27, as in s. 25,
           is also descriptive of the person  concerned,  i.e.,  against  a
           person who is accused  of  an  offence,  s. 27 renders  provable
           certain statements made by him while he was in the custody of  a
           police officer. Section 27 is founded on the principle that even
           though the evidence relating to confessional or other statements
           made by a person, whilst he  is  in  the  custody  of  a  police
           officer, is tainted and therefore inadmissible, if the truth  of
           the information given by him is assured by the  discovery  of  a
           fact, it may be  presumed  to  be  untainted  and  is  therefore
           declared provable in so far as it distinctly relates to the fact
           thereby discovered. Even  though  s. 27 is  in  the  form  of  a
           proviso to s. 26, the two sections do not necessarily deal  with
           the evidence of the same character. The ban imposed by  s. 26 is
           against the  proof  of  confessional  statements.  Section 27 is
           concerned with the proof of information whether it amounts to  a
           confession or not, which leads to discovery of facts. By  s. 27,
           even if a fact is deposed to as  discovered  in  consequence  of
           information received, only  that  much  of  the  information  is
           admissible as distinctly relates to the fact discovered.”


    53. In Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan[26], after  referring  to  the
        decisions in Madan Singh v. State of Rajasthan[27], Mohd. Aslam  v.
        State of Maharashtra[28], Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor[29],  Prabhoo
        v.  State  of  U.P.[30]  and  Mohd.   Inayatullah   v.   State   of
        Maharashtra[31], this Court summed up the following principles:-
           “16. The various requirements of the section can be summed up as
           follows:


           1) The fact of which evidence is sought  to  be  given  must  be
              relevant to the issue. It must be  borne  in  mind  that  the
              provision has nothing to do with the question  of  relevancy.
              The relevancy of the  fact  discovered  must  be  established
              according to the prescriptions relating to relevancy of other
              evidence connecting it with the crime in order  to  make  the
              fact discovered admissible.


           2) The fact must have been discovered.



           3)  The  discovery  must  have  been  in  consequence  of   some
              information  received  from  the  accused  and  not  by   the
              accused’s own act.



           4) The person giving the information  must  be  accused  of  any
              offence.



           5) He must be in the custody of a police officer.



           6) The  discovery  of  a  fact  in  consequence  of  information
              received from an accused in custody must be deposed to.



           (7)   Thereupon only  that  portion  of  the  information  which
                 relates distinctly or strictly to the fact  discovered  can
                 be proved. The rest is inadmissible.”


    54. In this context, it would be fruitful to refer  to  the  ruling  in
        State of Maharashtra v. Damu[32] wherein it has been observed that:
        -
              “35. The basic idea embedded in Section 27  of  the  Evidence
              Act is the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events. The
              doctrine is founded on the principle  that  if  any  fact  is
              discovered  in  a  search  made  on  the  strength   of   any
              information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery  is  a
              guarantee that the information supplied by  the  prisoner  is
              true.  The  information  might  be   confessional   or   non-
              inculpatory in nature, but if it results in  discovery  of  a
              fact it becomes a reliable information. Hence the legislature
              permitted  such  information  to  be  used  as  evidence   by
              restricting the admissible portion to the minimum.”


    55. In Aftab Ahmad Anasari v. State of Uttaranchal[33], after referring
        to earlier decisions, a two-Judge Bench, appreciating the  material
        brought on record, came to hold that when the accused was ready  to
        show the place where he had concealed the clothes of the  deceased,
        the same was clearly admissible under Section 27  of  the  Evidence
        Act because the same related distinctly to  the  discovery  of  the
        clothes of the deceased from that very place.


    56. In Bhagwan Dass  v.  State  (NCT  of  Delhi)[34],  relying  on  the
        decisions in Aftab Ahmad Anasari (supra) and Manu Sharma  v.  State
        (NCT of Delhi)[35], the Court opined  that  when  the  accused  had
        given a statement that related to the discovery of an electric wire
        by which the crime was committed, the said disclosure statement was
        admissible as evidence.


    57. As the material brought on record would show, the  accused  was  in
        the custody of the investigating agency and the fact whether he was
        formally arrested or not will not vitiate the factum of leading  to
        discovery.  However, it may be stated that  the  accused  was  also
        arrested on that day.  We have dealt with  the  issue  that  formal
        arrest is not necessary as Mr. Jain has  seriously  contended  that
        the arrest was done after the recovery.  As we have  clarified  the
        position in law, the same would not make any difference.


    58. As regards recovery from accused Abdul Mateen is concerned,  it  is
        borne out from the record that after his arrest  on  28.6.1997,  he
        gave information at 6.00 a.m. as contained  in  Ext.  P-255,  about
        another  bomb  and  on  the  basis  of  the  said  information  the
        Investigating Officer, PW-71,  visited  the  spot  along  with  the
        accused and at his instance a live bomb  was  recovered  which  was
        underneath the earth. In  the  said  information  the  accused  had
        stated that the two bombs were inside the SMS Stadium and he  could
        verify the places by going inside the stadium. In the  evidence  of
        Jai Narain, PW-6, Gopal Singh, PW-7 and  Shivnath,  PW-22,  it  has
        come on record that the bombs were recovered  at  the  instance  of
        accused Abdul Mateen on 28.6.1998.  This fact has been corroborated
        by Vinod Sharma, PW-16 and Gordhan, PW-10 who also accompanied  the
        investigating team.  Shivnath, PW-22, had clearly stated  that  the
        bomb recovered was high explosive time bomb  and  the  battery  was
        inside the timer and the  same  was  switched  on  and  he  further
        confirmed that electric detonator was  used  in  the  bomb.   Vinod
        Kumar, PW-16, also stated that the electric detonator was found  in
        the bomb and the same was neutralized.  Suresh Kumar Saini,  PW-67,
        in his deposition, gave description  of  loss  caused  due  to  the
        explosion of the time bomb.  He had further  deposed  that  lid  of
        stainless steel of casio watch had been recovered from the scene of
        crime.


    59. On appreciating the aforesaid material, it is clear as crystal that
        the said accused has stated about the fact of planting of bomb at a
        particular site in the stadium and led to the said place from which
        the bomb was recovered.  The submission of Mr. Jain  is  that  such
        material cannot be put against the accused  being  inadmissible  in
        evidence.  In this context, we  may  refer  to  a  two-Judge  Bench
        decision in  Prakash  Chand  v.  State  (Delhi  Administration)[36]
        wherein the Court, after referring  to  the  decision  in  Himachal
        Pradesh Administration v. Om Prakash[37], opined thus: -
           “There is a clear distinction between the conduct  of  a  person
           against whom an offence is alleged, which  is  admissible  under
           Section 8 of the Evidence Act, if such conduct is influenced  by
           any fact in issue or relevant fact and the statement made  to  a
           Police Officer in the course of an investigation which is hit by
           Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code. What is excluded  by
           Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code is the statement made to  a
           Police Officer in  the  course  of  investigation  and  not  the
           evidence, relating to the conduct  of  an  accused  person  (not
           amounting to a statement) when confronted  or  questioned  by  a
           Police Officer  during  the  course  of  an  investigation.  For
           example, the evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that  an
           accused person led a Police Officer and pointed  out  the  place
           where stolen articles or weapons which might have been  used  in
           the commission of  the  offence  were  found  hidden,  would  be
           admissible as conduct, under Section  8  of  the  Evidence  Act,
           irrespective  of  whether   any   statement   by   the   accused
           contemporaneously with  or  antecedent  to  such  conduct  falls
           within the purview of Section 27 of the Evidence Act.”


    60. The said principle  has  been  reiterated  in  A.N.  Venkatesh  and
        another v. State of Karnataka[38].


    61. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid enunciation of  law,  the
        submission of Mr. Jain leaves us unimpressed and we are inclined to
        hold that the said fact is a relevant fact which is  admissible  in
        evidence.


    62. The next aspect that is to be adverted to is that ammonium  nitrate
        not being an explosive substance, mere possession cannot bring  the
        accused Chandra Prakash within the ambit of any offence.   In  this
        regard, we may refer to Section 4(d) of the 1884 Act.  It reads  as
        follows: -
           “(d)  “explosive” means gunpowder, nitroglycerine,  nitroglycol,
           guncotton, di-nitro-toluene, tri-nitro-toluene, picric acid, di-
           nitro-phenol,  tri-nitro-resorcinol  (styphnic   acid),   cyclo-
           trimethylene-tri-nitramine,       penta-erythritol-tetranitrate,
           tetryl, nitro-guanidine, lead azide, lead styphynate,  fulminate
           of mercury or any other metal,  diazo-di-nitro-phenol,  coloured
           fires or any other substance whether a single chemical  compound
           or a mixture of substances, whether solid or liquid  or  gaseous
           used or manufactured with a view to produce a  practical  effect
           by explosion or pyrotechnic effect;  and  includes  fog-signals,
           fireworks,   fuses,   rockets,   percussion-caps,    detonators,
           cartridges, ammunition of all descriptions and every  adaptation
           or preparation of an explosive as defined in this clause;”


    63. Section 2 of the 1908 Act, which deals with definitions,  reads  as
        follows: -

           “2. Definitions. - In this Act--


           (a)   the expression "explosive substance" shall  be  deemed  to
                 include any materials for making any  explosive  substance;
                 also any apparatus, machine, implement or material used, or
                 intended to be used, or adapted for causing, or  aiding  in
                 causing, any explosion in or with any explosive  substance;
                 also any part of any such apparatus, machine or implement;


           (b)   the  expression  "special  category  explosive  substance"
                 shall be deemed to include research  development  explosive
                 (RDX), penta erythritol tetra nitrate (PETN), high  melting
                 explosive (HMX), tri nitro toluene (TNT),  low  temperature
                 plastic explosive (LTPE), composition exploding (CE) (2, 4,
                 6 phenyl methyl nitramine or  tetryl),  OCTOL  (mixlure  of
                 high melting explosive  and  tri  nitro  toluene),  plastic
                 explosive kirkee-1 (PEK-1) and RDX/TNT compounds and  other
                 similar type of explosives and a  combination  thereof  and
                 remote control devices  causing  explosion  and  any  other
                 substance and  a  combination  thereof  which  the  Central
                 Government may, by notification in  the  Official  Gazette,
                 specify tor the purposes of this Act.”

    64. Keeping in view the broad definitions of  both  the  Acts,  we  are
        required to see what has  been  seized  from  the  accused  Chandra
        Prakash.  What is evincible from the  seizure  report,  Ext.  P-42,
        apart from ammonium nitrate, fuse wire and empty  boxes  were  also
        seized.  That apart, 17 packs containing blue  coloured  fuse  wire
        kept in plastic (polythene) bags and  four  boxes  containing  blue
        coloured fuse wire, “Sun brand  safety  fuse”  numbered  as  40208,
        40158,  39937,  40203  respectively,  one  carton   of   explosives
        detonating fuse measuring 1500  meters  in  length  and  38  kg  in
        weight, containing four wooden logs of red colour, 375  meter  wire
        in each Gattha and black coloured cap fitted  on  the  tip  of  the
        wire, three cartons of explosive Belgelative  90  (Gulla  Dynamite)
        net weight of each being 25 Kg. with “Division I  Class  II  safety
        distance category ZZ Bharat Explosive Ltd.  9  KM  Lalitpur  (U.P.)
        Date of manufacturing 4.6.97 batch No. 2” written on each box, four
        packets of O.D. Detonator containing 1600 detonators,  a  substance
        of light yellow colour kept inside a carton of paer  in  a  plastic
        bag weighing nearly 5 kg and 16 empty cartons, one of gulla and  15
        of fuse wire, were seized.


    65. Section 2 of the 1908 Act has a deeming provision which states that
        explosive substance would include  any  materials  for  making  any
        explosive substance.  Similarly, Section 4(d) of the 1884 Act has a
        broader  spectrum  which  includes  coloured  fires  or  any  other
        substances, whether  single  chemical  compound  or  a  mixture  of
        substances.  That apart, as we find, apart  from  ammonium  nitrate
        other articles had been seized.  The combination of  the  same,  as
        per the evidence of the expert witness, was sufficient to prepare a
        bomb for the purpose of explosion.  In addition to the  same,  huge
        quantity of ammonium nitrate was seized and  it  was  seized  along
        with other items.  The cumulative effect is that the possession  of
        these articles in such  a  large  quantity  by  the  accused  gives
        credence  to  the  prosecution  version  that  the  possession  was
        conscious and it was intended to be used for  the  purpose  of  the
        blast.
    66. The next aspect which needs to be adverted  to  is  non-framing  of
        specific charge.  On a perusal of the  record,  we  find  that  the
        learned trial Judge has framed the charges specifically by  putting
        the charges to the accused.  The purpose of framing of  charges  is
        that the accused should be informed with certainty and accuracy  of
        the charge brought against him.  There  should  not  be  vagueness.
        The accused must know the scope and particulars in detail.  In this
        context, we may refer to decision in Santosh  Kumari  v.  State  of
        Jammu and Kashmir and others[39],  wherein  it  has  been  held  as
        follows: -
           “17. Like all procedural laws, the Code of Criminal Procedure is
           devised to subserve the ends of justice  and  not  to  frustrate
           them by mere technicalities. It regards some of  its  provisions
           as vital but others not, and a breach of the latter is a curable
           irregularity unless the accused is prejudiced thereby. It places
           errors in the charge, or even a total absence of a charge in the
           curable class. That is why we have provisions like Sections  215
           and 464 in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.


           18. The object of the charge is to give the  accused  notice  of
           the matter he is charged with and does not  touch  jurisdiction.
           If, therefore, the necessary information is conveyed to  him  in
           other ways and there is no prejudice, the framing of the  charge
           is not invalidated. The essential part of this part  of  law  is
           not any technical formula of words but the reality, whether  the
           matter was explained to the accused and  whether  he  understood
           what he was being tried  for.  Sections  34,  114  and  149  IPC
           provide for criminal liability viewed from different  angles  as
           regards actual participants, accessories and men actuated  by  a
           common object or a common intention; and as explained by a five-
           Judge Constitution Bench  of  this  Court  in  Willie  (William)
           Slaney v. State of M.P.[40] SCR at p.  1189,  the  charge  is  a
           rolled-up  one  involving   the   direct   liability   and   the
           constructive  liability  without  specifying  who  are  directly
           liable and who are sought to be made constructively liable.”


    67. In K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa  Rao[41],  the  Court  opined
        that though the charge specifically under Section 306 IPC  was  not
        framed, yet all  the  ingredients  constituting  the  offence  were
        mentioned in the statement of charges.  In that context,  a  three-
        Judge Bench of this Court ruled that mere  omission  or  defect  in
        framing  of  charge  does  not  disable  the  criminal  court  from
        convicting the accused for the offence which is found to have  been
        proved on the evidence on record.   The  said  principle  has  been
        reiterated in Dalbir Singh v. State of U.P.[42], State of  U.P.  v.
        Paras Nath Singh[43] and Annareddy  Sambasiva  Reddy  v.  State  of
        A.P.[44].


    68. In the case at hand, as has been stated earlier, the  charges  have
        been framed and we do not find any vagueness.  That apart,  neither
        any prejudice has been caused nor has there  been  any  failure  of
        justice.  Thus, the submission of Mr. Jain in this regard leaves us
        unimpressed.


    69. The next facet which deserves  to  be  addressed  pertains  to  the
        criminal conspiracy.  The submission of the learned counsel for the
        appellants is that the learned trial Judge has  inappositely  drawn
        certain inferences to show that there was a criminal conspiracy and
        the High Court has, without delving deep into the matter, concurred
        with the same. As per the evidence brought on record, it  is  clear
        as crystal that accused Abdul Mateen, Abdul  Hamid  and  Raies  Beg
        used to meet quite frequently at the Madarsa at village Farah.   It
        is also evident from the deposition of Kanchan Singh,  PW-11,  Shri
        Chand, PW-12, Murari Lal Sharma, PW-13,  and  Ashok  Kumar,  PW-17,
        that the accused Abdul Mateen, Raies Beg and Abdul  Hamid  used  to
        meet at the Madarsa at village Farah.   That apart, Pappu had  also
        deposed implicating himself that when there used to  be  discussion
        at madarsa in the  village  Farah  about  the  suitable  place  for
        planting the bomb, the timer of the bomb was supplied by Dr.  Abdul
        Hamid.  The chain of events and the participation  of  the  accused
        persons which had the genesis in the discussion and  the  meetings,
        the purchase of ammonium nitrate and other items, carrying  of  the
        boxes to the Madarsa and all other factors cumulatively  show  that
        there was conspiracy.


    70. While dealing with the facet of criminal conspiracy, it has  to  be
        kept in mind that in case of a  conspiracy,  there  cannot  be  any
        direct evidence.  Express agreement between the parties  cannot  be
        proved.   Circumstances  proved  before,  during  and   after   the
        occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity  of
        the accused.  Such a conspiracy  is  never  hatched  in  open  and,
        therefore, evaluation of proved circumstances play a vital role  in
        establishing the criminal conspiracy.   In  this  context,  we  may
        refer with profit to a passage from  Yogesh  alias  Sachin  Jagdish
        Joshi v. State of Maharashtra[45]: -
           “20. The basic ingredients of the offence of criminal conspiracy
           are: (i) an agreement between two  or  more  persons;  (ii)  the
           agreement must relate to doing or causing to be done either  (a)
           an illegal act; or (b) an act which is not illegal in itself but
           is done by illegal means. It is, therefore, plain  that  meeting
           of minds of two or more persons for doing or causing to be  done
           an illegal act or an act by illegal means is  sine  qua  non  of
           criminal  conspiracy.  Yet,  as  observed  by  this   Court   in
           Shivnarayan Laxminarayan Joshi v.  State  of  Maharashtra[46]  a
           conspiracy is always hatched in secrecy and it is impossible  to
           adduce  direct  evidence  of  the  common   intention   of   the
           conspirators.  Therefore,  the   meeting   of   minds   of   the
           conspirators can be inferred from the  circumstances  proved  by
           the prosecution, if such inference is possible.”


    71. The same  principles  have  been  stated  in  Pratapbhai  Hamirbhai
        Solanki v. State of Gujarat and another[47].


    72. In Yakub Abdul Razak Menon v. The  State  of  Maharashtra,  through
        CBI,  Bombay[48],  analyzing  various  pronouncements,  this  Court
        opined thus: -
           “68. For an offence Under Section 120B Indian  Penal  Code,  the
           prosecution need not necessarily  prove  that  the  conspirators
           expressly agreed to do or cause to be done the illegal act,  the
           agreement may be proved by  necessary  implication.  It  is  not
           necessary that each member of the conspiracy must know  all  the
           details of the conspiracy. The offence  can  be  proved  largely
           from the inferences drawn from  the  acts  or  illegal  omission
           committed by the conspirators in pursuance of a  common  design.
           Being a continuing offence,  if  any  acts  or  omissions  which
           constitute  an  offence  are  done  in  India  or  outside   its
           territory, the conspirators continuing to be the parties to  the
           conspiracy and since part of the acts were done in  India,  they
           would obviate the need to obtain the  sanction  of  the  Central
           Government. All of  them  need  not  be  present  in  India  nor
           continue to remain in India. The entire agreement must be viewed
           as a whole and it has to be ascertained as to what in  fact  the
           conspirators intended  to  do  or  the  object  they  wanted  to
           achieve. (Vide: R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Administration[49], Lennart
           Schussler and Anr. v. Director  of  Enforcement  and  Anr.[50],
           Shivanarayan   Laxminarayan   Joshi v. State   of    Maharashtra
           and Mohammad Usman Mohammad Hussain Maniyar and Anr. v. State of
           Maharashtra[51]).”


    73. Testing the present factual matrix on the anvil  of  the  aforesaid
        enunciation of law, we are of the considered view that the  opinion
        expressed by the learned trial Judge as well as by the  High  Court
        that there has been conspiracy between the parties  to  commit  the
        blast on a particular day cannot be found fault with.


    74. Presently, we shall engage ourselves to deal with the conviction of
        accused Abdul Mateen for  the  offence  under  Section  14  of  the
        Foreigners Act, 1946.  The said provision reads as under: -
           “14. Penalty for contravention of provisions of the Act, etc.  -
           whoever –


           a) Remains in any area in  India  for  a  period  exceeding  the
              period for which the visa was issued to him;



           b) does any act in violation of the conditions of the valid visa
              issued to him from his entry and stay in India  or  any  part
              thereunder;




           c) contravenes the provisions of this Act or of any  order  made
              thereunder or any direction given in pursuance of this Act or
              such order for which no specific punishment is provided under
              this Act, shall be punished  with  imprisonment  for  a  term
              which may extend to five years and shall also  be  liable  to
              fine; and if he has entered  into  a  bond  in  pursuance  of
              clause (f) of sub-section (2) of section 3, his bond shall be
              forfeited, and any person bound thereby shall pay the penalty
              thereof or show cause to the satisfaction of  the  convicting
              court why such penalty should not be paid by him.




              Explanation.  –  For  the  purposes  of  this  section,   the
              expression “visa” shall have the same meaning as assigned  to
              it under the Passport (Entry into  India)  Rules,  1950  made
              under the Passport  (Entry  into  India)  Act,  1920  (34  of
              1920).”



    75. The learned trial Judge, analyzing the material on record, has come
        to hold that the said Abdul Mateen is a resident of Pakistan and he
        had no valid document to be  in  India.   In  his  statement  under
        Section 313 of the Code, he had not disputed that he was not having
        passport or visa and he is  of  Pakistan  nationality.   Thus,  the
        offence under the said Act has been held to be  proved.   The  High
        Court has concurred with the said view.  In our considered opinion,
        the offence under the said Act has been  proved  beyond  reasonable
        doubt.


    76. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we conclude and  hold  that  the
        grounds assailing the judgment  of  conviction  and  the  order  of
        sentence have no legal substantiality and,  accordingly,  they  are
        rejected.




    77. The factual scenario of the instant case compels us to  state  that
        these kinds of activities by anyone breeds  lawlessness,  fear  and
        affects the fundamental unity of our great country.  A nation  with
        a desire to prosper is required to maintain high degree of law  and
        order   situation   apart   from   respecting    “imperatives    of
        internationalism”.   Certain  individuals  harbouring  unacceptable
        notions and  inexcusable  philosophy  and,  on  certain  occasions,
        because of enormous avarice, try to  jeopardize  the  cohesive  and
        collegial fabric of the State.  This leads to  national  decay  and
        gives rise to incomprehensible anarchy.  It reflects  non-reverence
        for humanity.  Be it categorically stated, every  citizen  of  this
        country is required to remember that national patriotism is founded
        on the philosophy of public  good.   Love  for  one’s  country  and
        humanity at large are eternally  cherished  values.   The  infamous
        acts of the appellants are really condemnable not only  because  of
        the  dent  they  intended  to  create  in  the  social  peace   and
        sovereignty of the nation, but also from the humane point  of  view
        as  they  are  founded  on  greed,  envy,  baseless  anger,  pride,
        prejudice and perverse feelings towards mankind.


    78. We have, in agony and anguish, have expressed thus because  when  a
        devastating activity like the present one occurs  on  the  Republic
        Day of our country Bharat, it injures the nationality, disturbs the
        equilibrium of each individual citizen, creates a concavity in  the
        equanimity of the peace of the  State,  generates  a  stir  in  the
        sanctity and divinity of law and order situation which is paramount
        in any civilized State, attempts to endanger the economic growth of
        a country and, in the ultimate eventuate, destroys  the  conceptual
        normalcy of any habitat.  Law cannot remain silent to this  because
        it is the duty of law to resist  such  attacks  on  peace.   It  is
        manifest that the accused-appellants had conspired to send a savage
        stir among the citizenry of this country on the Republic Day.   The
        great country like ours cannot succumb to this  kind  of  terrorist
        activity as it is nationally as well as internationally  obnoxious.
        Such tolerance would tantamount to acceptance of defeat.  The  iron
        hands  of  law  has  to  fall  and  in  the  obtaining  facts   and
        circumstances, as the charges have been  proved  beyond  reasonable
        doubt, the law has rightly visited the appellants and, accordingly,
        we concur with the same.

    79. Consequently,  all  the  appeals,  being  bereft  of  merit,  stand
        dismissed.


                                                              ………………………………J.
                                                        [K.S. Radhakrishnan]






                                                              ………………………………J.
                                                               [Dipak Misra]
      New Delhi;
      May 9, 2014.






                 -----------------------
[1]    (2000) 1 SCC 555
[2]    (1991) 3 SCC 206
[3]    (1997) 1 SCC 682
[4]    (1996) 8 SCC 514
[5]    (2000) 1 SCC 471
[6]    (2003) 3 SCC 569
[7]    (2012) 6 SCC 174
[8]    AIR 1963 SC 599
[9]    (1969) 3 SCC 429
[10]   AIR 1957 SC 637
[11]   (1975) 3 SCC 742
[12]   AIR 2011 SC 3753
[13]   (1997) 11 SCC 720
[14]   AIR 1960 SC 961
[15]   (1972) 3 SCC 511
[16]   (1973) 3 SCC 805
[17]   (1988) 1 SCC 1
[18]   (1988) 1 SCC 696
[19]   AIR 1968 SC 832
[20]   AIR 1961 SC 1762
[21]   (2006) 7 SCC 442
[22]   (1988) 1 SCC 633
[23]   (2011) 13 SCC 621
[24]   (2010) 3 SCC 56
[25]   AIR 1960 SC 1125
[26]   (2004) 10 SCC 657
[27]   (1978) 4 SCC 435
[28]   (2001) 9 SCC 362
[29]   AIR 1947 PC 67
[30]   AIR 1963 SC 1113
[31]   (1976) 1 SCC 828
[32]   (2000) 6 SCC 269
[33]   (2010) 2 SCC 583
[34]   (2011) 6 SCC 396
[35]   (2010) 6 SCC 1
[36]   (1979) 3 SCC 90
[37]   (1972) 1 SCC 249
[38]   (2005) 7 SCC 714
[39]   (2011) 9 SCC 234
[40]   AIR 1956 SC 116
[41]   (2003) 1 SCC 217
[42]   (2004) 5 SCC 334
[43]   (2009) 6 SCC 372
[44]   (2009) 12 SCC 546
[45]   (2008) 10 SCC 394
[46]   (1980) 2 SCC 465
[47]   (2013) 1 SCC 613
[48]   2013 (3) SCALE 565
[49]   AIR 1962 SC 1821
[50]   (1970) 1 SCC 152
[51]   AIR 1981 SC 1062


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