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Tuesday, May 20, 2014

T.P.Act sec.106(3) - Notice - short fall of time - but suit filed after more than 6 months from the date of eviction notice -valid - Court receiver filed suit for the tenanted House property - suit decreed - high court confirm the same - Apex court held that We have noticed that the High Court duly considered the question of notice and correctly came to the conclusion that the Legislature wanted to plug the loopholes and to redress the mischief by making a change in the law. Therefore, if the notice is short of the period specified in sub-section (1) but the suit or proceeding is filed after the expiry of the period mentioned in sub-section (1), the notice shall not be deemed to be invalid. Clearly, in this matter, the notice was issued on July 26, 2001 and the suit was actually filed on February 6, 2002 – after six months and, therefore, the notice cannot be declared or deemed to be invalid.= Shree Ram Urban Infrastructure Ltd. (Formerly known as Shree Ram Mills Ltd.) ….. Appellant :Versus: The Court Receiver, High Court of Bombay …… Respondent= 2014 (May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41533

T.P.Act sec.106(3) - Notice - short fall of time - but suit filed after more than 6 months from the date of eviction notice -valid - Court receiver filed suit for the tenanted House property - suit decreed - high court confirm the same - Apex court held that We have noticed that the High Court duly considered the question  of  notice and correctly came to the conclusion that the  Legislature  wanted  to  plug the loopholes and to redress the mischief by making a  change  in  the  law. Therefore, if the notice is short of the  period  specified  in  sub-section (1) but the suit or proceeding is filed  after  the  expiry  of  the  period mentioned in sub-section (1), the notice shall not be deemed to be  invalid. Clearly, in this matter, the notice was issued on  July  26,  2001  and  the suit was actually filed  on  February  6,  2002  –  after  six  months  and, therefore, the notice cannot be declared or deemed to be invalid.=


An immovable property  known  as  “Dev
Ashish” is a tenanted property situated at Padam Tekri, Peddar Road,  Bombay
(hereinafter referred to as the “suit property”). The respondent herein  was
appointed by the Bombay High Court to take charge of the  suit  property  in
Suit No.234 of 1987, which was filed on the  original  side  of  the  Bombay
High Court, in terms of prayer clause (a) of  the  Notice  of  Motion  which
reads as follows:

            “(a)  That pending the hearing and final disposal of above suit,
      the Court Receiver, High Court, Bombay or some other  fit  and  proper
      person be appointed as a Receiver of an immovable  property  known  as
      “Dev Ashish” situate on Sub-Plot No.1 of Plot  No.C.S.S.755  at  Padam
      Tekdi, Pedder Road, Bombay 400 026, with all powers  under  Order  XL,
      Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, including  the  owner  to
      recover, receive and collect the rent, income and profits thereof.”


3.    The respondent, being  the  Court  Receiver  in  the  aforesaid  suit,
issued  Notice  dated  July  26,  2001  to  the  appellant  herein  to   pay
compensation at the rate of RS.1,75,000/- per month  from  1.4.2000  and  to
vacate the suit premises. 
The appellant replied to the said  notice  of  the
respondent stating that the respondent has been  appointed  to  control  the
suit premises and has no right and power to determine  the  tenancy  of  the
appellant. Meanwhile, the appellant was declared as  a  sick  company  under
the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions)  Act,  1985  (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the SICA’).

4.    The respondent  instituted  a  suit  against  the  appellant-defendant
before the Court of Small Causes, Bombay which was decreed in favour of  the
respondent. =


 We have duly considered the said  question,
and we find that the suit was filed after six months from the  date  of  the
notice issued under Section 106 of the Transfer  of  Property  Act,  by  the
Receiver and furthermore, 
after the amendment of Section 106(3) which  reads
as follows:



      “(3)  A notice under sub-section (1) shall not be deemed to be invalid
      merely because the period mentioned therein falls short of the  period
      specified under that sub-section, where a suit or proceeding is  filed
      after the expiry of the period mentioned in that sub-section.”

We have noticed that the High Court duly considered the question  of  notice
and correctly came to the conclusion that the  Legislature  wanted  to  plug
the loopholes and to redress the mischief by making a  change  in  the  law.

Therefore, if the notice is short of the  period  specified  in  sub-section
(1) but the suit or proceeding is filed  after  the  expiry  of  the  period
mentioned in sub-section (1), the notice shall not be deemed to be  invalid.

Clearly, in this matter, the notice was issued on  July  26,  2001  and  the
suit was actually filed  on  February  6,  2002  –  after  six  months  and,
therefore, the notice cannot be declared or deemed to be invalid.

17.   The third question which is tried  to  be  urged  before  us,  in  our
opinion,  has  no  substance  since  the  Court  Receiver  is  holding   the
properties as custodia legis and has  acted  in  the  matter  as  reasonable
prudent trustees used to do in this matter and such action on  the  part  of
the Court Receiver is nothing  but  for  preservation  of  the  property  in
question, therefore, the contention of  Mr.  Ranjit  Kumar  on  that  ground
also, cannot have  any  substance.  [See  Harinagar  Sugar  Mills  Co.  Ltd.
(supra)].

18.   Although the point tried to be taken  by  Mr.  Ranjit  Kumar,  learned
senior counsel, is that the appellant is a sick company but we do  not  find
that such point was ever urged before the High Court  and,  furthermore,  it
appears that admittedly the tenancy  was  about  the  residential  premises.
Therefore, in our opinion, such point cannot  have  any  substance  at  this
stage.

19.   In these circumstances, we find that the reasoning given by  the  High
Court does not warrant any interference by this Court. Accordingly, we  find
no merit in this appeal and the same is  hereby  dismissed.  However,  there
shall be no order as to costs.

   2014 (May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41533
CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE

                                                              Reportable


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.5528     OF 2014
                  [Arising out of SLP(C) No.30298 of 2010]

Shree Ram Urban Infrastructure Ltd.
(Formerly known as Shree Ram Mills Ltd.)     ….. Appellant

                                  :Versus:

The Court Receiver, High Court of Bombay     …… Respondent








                               J U D G M E N T


Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.

1.    Leave granted.
2.    This appeal has been preferred against the Judgment  and  order  dated
16th September, 2010 passed by the High Court of  Judicature  at  Bombay  in
Civil Revision Application No.452 of 2009,  dismissing  the  Civil  Revision
Application filed by the appellant-tenant. The brief  facts,  necessary  for
the disposal of this appeal are thus: An immovable property  known  as  “Dev
Ashish” is a tenanted property situated at Padam Tekri, Peddar Road,  Bombay
(hereinafter referred to as the “suit property”). The respondent herein  was
appointed by the Bombay High Court to take charge of the  suit  property  in
Suit No.234 of 1987, which was filed on the  original  side  of  the  Bombay
High Court, in terms of prayer clause (a) of  the  Notice  of  Motion  which
reads as follows:



            “(a)  That pending the hearing and final disposal of above suit,
      the Court Receiver, High Court, Bombay or some other  fit  and  proper
      person be appointed as a Receiver of an immovable  property  known  as
      “Dev Ashish” situate on Sub-Plot No.1 of Plot  No.C.S.S.755  at  Padam
      Tekdi, Pedder Road, Bombay 400 026, with all powers  under  Order  XL,
      Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, including  the  owner  to
      recover, receive and collect the rent, income and profits thereof.”


3.    The respondent, being  the  Court  Receiver  in  the  aforesaid  suit,
issued  Notice  dated  July  26,  2001  to  the  appellant  herein  to   pay
compensation at the rate of RS.1,75,000/- per month  from  1.4.2000  and  to
vacate the suit premises. The appellant replied to the said  notice  of  the
respondent stating that the respondent has been  appointed  to  control  the
suit premises and has no right and power to determine  the  tenancy  of  the
appellant. Meanwhile, the appellant was declared as  a  sick  company  under
the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions)  Act,  1985  (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the SICA’).

4.    The respondent  instituted  a  suit  against  the  appellant-defendant
before the Court of Small Causes, Bombay which was decreed in favour of  the
respondent.  Being aggrieved by the  said  decree,  the  appellant-defendant
filed an appeal before the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court,  being
Appeal No.837 of 2003. This appeal  was  dismissed  by  judgment  and  order
dated June 12, 2009. The appellant-defendant, therefore,  filed  a  revision
petition before the High Court of Bombay under Section 115 of  the  Code  of
Civil Procedure, being Civil Revision Application No.452 of 2009.  The  said
civil revision application was dismissed by the Bombay High Court  vide  its
judgment and order dated 16.9.2010.  Aggrieved  by  the  said  judgment  and
order dated 16.9.2010, this appeal, by special leave,  has  come  up  before
this Court.


5.    Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing on  behalf  of  the
appellant, challenged the order on the  grounds,  firstly,  that  the  Court
Receiver did not obtain leave of the court in filing the  suit  and  without
such leave, the eviction suit  is  liable  to  be  dismissed.  Secondly,  he
contended that the notice was issued on July 26, 2001 asking  the  appellant
to  vacate  the  suit  premises  immediately,  therefore,  the  notice   was
defective in view of the provisions  of  Section  106  of  the  Transfer  of
Property Act. On this ground also, he contended that the suit is  liable  to
be dismissed. Thirdly, he contended that the suit  is  also  bad  since  the
owners are the trustees and are not made parties to the suit.

6.    In support of his contention with regard to the first point  that  the
suit was liable to be dismissed as  it  was  filed  by  the  Court  Receiver
without obtaining leave of the Court, he relied upon  the  decision  of  the
courts in C.T. Davis & Ors. vs. Drobomoyi Gupta & Ors.[1]   He  also  relied
upon the decisions in Ram Ranjan Chakravarti  vs.  A.B.  Miller[2],  Everest
Coal Company (P) Ltd. vs. State of Bihar  &  Ors.[3],  Anthony  C.  Leo  vs.
Nandlal Bal Krishnan & Ors.[4], Krishna  Kumar  Khemka  vs.  Grindlays  Bank
P.L.C. & Ors.[5], Balkrishna Gupta  &  Ors.  vs.  Swadeshi  Polytex  Ltd.  &
Anr.[6], and Harinagar Sugar Mills  Ltd., vs. M.W. Pradhan[7].

7.    Lastly, Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel, contended  that  the
Board for Industrial Financial Reconstruction (hereinafter  referred  to  as
‘the BIFR’) declared the appellant-company  as  a  sick  company  under  the
SICA. Therefore, without obtaining permission from the BIFR, the suit  could
not be proceeded with. Learned senior counsel further pointed  out  that  in
the case of Ram Ranjan Chakravarti  (supra),  it  has  been  held  that  the
Receiver of the High Court does not represent the owner of an estate. He  is
an officer of the Court and as such, cannot  sue  or  be  sued  except  with
permission of the Court. In Shyam Lal Gomatwala vs. Nand Lal &  Ors.[8],  it
had been concluded by the  Court  that  the  permission  of  the  Court  was
necessary before institution of a suit by the Court Receiver.

8.    Mr. Ranjit  Kumar,  learned  senior  counsel,  also  relied  upon  the
decisions in Mt. Mahrana Kunwar vs. E.V.  David,  Official  Receiver[9]  and
C.T. Davis & Ors. vs. Drobomoyi Gupta & Ors. (supra) and contended  that  in
the said decisions it has been held: firstly, that the action for  ejectment
from the suit property cannot be maintained by only some of  the  owners  of
the undivided estate; and secondly, it has been held that to  authorize  the
Court Receiver to issue Court notices determining the tenancy, an  authority
has to be obtained from the Court. However, in  the  case  of  Everest  Coal
Co.(P) Ltd.(supra), it has been held that when a court puts  a  Receiver  in
possession of property, the property comes under the custody  of  the  Court
and the Receiver merely acts as an agent of the Court.  The  Court  Receiver
represents neither party, being an  officer  of  the  court,  and  for  this
reason ordinarily the court accords the permission to  sue  and  failure  to
secure such leave to sue till the end of lis may prove fatal. He  also  drew
our attention to a decision reported  in  Shanta  Ram  Hirachand  Danez  vs.
Narayan Bapusa Fulpagar[10]. In  the  said  decision  the  court  held  that
filing of the suit without obtaining leave of the court is  an  irregularity
and can be cured in law and is not fatal. But the suit filed  by  the  Court
Receiver without obtaining permission does not  render  the  proceedings  in
the suit ultra vires if leave is obtained even after filing of the  suit  by
the Court Receiver. He tried to  contend  on  the  question  of  service  of
notice that Section 106 is restricted to cases where the Court Receiver  has
let out the premises and further the Court Receiver cannot have the  implied
authority to sue a protected tenant in occupation and according to  him,  it
is necessary to have the leave from the court before filing the suit and  it
can also be overcome only if the leave is obtained when the lis is  pending.



9.    With regard to the trust property, his contention is  that  the  trust
property vests in all the trustees. It is, therefore, apparent that all  the
trustees have to decide whether or not the suit is to be filed on behalf  of
the trust. In the present case,  it  is  not  disclosed  anywhere  that  the
notice of termination was served at the  behest  of  all  the  trustees.  He
further pointed out that it is to be noted that  the  order  appointing  the
Receiver as already recorded by the court  that  prima  facie  there  was  a
dispute in respect of  appointment  of  trustees  on  the  Trust  and  about
dealing of the property by the Trust and in these circumstances,  the  court
thought it fit to  appoint  a  Court  Receiver  considering  the  facts  and
circumstances of this case.




10.   Per contra, Mr. Soli Sorabjee, learned  senior  counsel  appearing  on
behalf of the respondent-Court Receiver, submitted that the  Court  Receiver
has a right to take all steps in the matter since  the  Court  Receiver  has
been appointed  with  full  powers  to  administer  the  property  which  is
custodia legis and furthermore, he has acted in the matter in  his  capacity
as a Receiver. He also drew our attention to Order XL Rule 1 of the Code  of
Civil Procedure, 1908, which is reproduced hereinbelow:





      “1. Appointment of receivers.- (1) Where it appears to the court to be
      just and convenient, the court may by order—

      (a) appoint a receiver  of  any  property,  whether  before  or  after
      decree;
      (b) remove any person from the possession or custody of the property;
      (c) commit the same to the possession, custody or  management  of  the
      receiver; and
      (d) confer upon the receiver all  such  powers,  as  to  bringing  and
      defending suits  and  for  the  realization,  management,  protection,
      preservation and improvement of the property, the  collection  of  the
      rents and profits thereof, the application and disposal of such  rents
      and profits, and the execution of documents as the owner himself  has,
      or such of those powers as the court thinks fit….”






11.   He pointed out that Order XL Rule  1(d)  has  specifically  given  all
such powers as to bringing and defending the suits and for the  realization,
management, protection and preservation of the property which  the  Receiver
held on behalf of the court.  According  to  Mr.  Sorabjee,  learned  senior
counsel, the Court Receiver should be able to take all  steps  necessary  to
preserve and protect the property as a prudent owner of the  property  would
take. He also drew our attention to the order appointing  the  Receiver  and
contended that if a tenant is in arrears of rent or if the  leased  property
after recovery of possession can fetch more income to the estate, the  Court
Receiver is entitled to take steps in the matter and can  file  a  suit  for
recovery of possession. He further contended that in the instant  case,  the
suit premises are outside the purview of the Rent Act. He also  relied  upon
the old decisions in Huri Dass Kundu  vs.  J.C.  Macgregor,  Receiver,  High
Court[11] and submitted that the court held that  the  terms  of  the  order
appointing the Receiver are sufficient to confer on him the power  to  bring
a suit to eject a tenant. He also relied on the  decision  in  Jagat  Tarini
Dasi vs. Naba Gopal Chaki[12], wherein it was held as follows:





      “The receiver, as an officer of the Court, which has taken control  of
      the property, is for the time  being,  and  for  the  purpose  of  the
      administration of  the  assets,  the  real  party  interested  in  the
      litigation; there is no substantial reason, therefore,  why  the  suit
      should not be instituted in his own name.  We  may  further  add  that
      there are numerous cases in the books, from which it  appears  that  a
      receiver, who has authority to sue, has been allowed to do so  in  his
      own name without  any  objection  raised  on  that  ground;  see,  for
      instance, Shunmugam v. Moidin [(1884) ILR 8 Mad 229], Gopala  Sami  v.
      Sankara [(1885) ILR 8 Mad 418],  Sundaram v. Sankara [(1886) ILR 9 Mad
      334], Drobomoyi Gupta [318] v. C.T. Davis [(1887)  ILR  14  Cal  323],
      Huri Dass Kundu v. J.C. Macgregor [(1891) ILR 18  Cal  477]  and  W.R.
      Fink v. Buldeo Dass [(1899) ILR 26 Cal 715].  It  follows,  therefore,
      that the view, that a Court may authorize a receiver to sue in his own
      name, and that a receiver,  who  is  authorized  to  sue,  though  not
      expressly in his own name, may do so by virtue of his appointment with
      full powers  under  section  503  of  the  Civil  Procedure  Code,  is
      supported by principle and authority, and is consistent with  existing
      practice. We must, consequently, hold that the second ground taken  on
      behalf of the appellant cannot be sustained.”


12.   A Division Bench of the Calcutta High  Court  in  Kassim  Mamooji  vs.
K.B. Dutt & Anr.[13], has held that the present Code empowers the  Court  to
confer upon a Receiver all such powers as to bringing  and  defending  suits
as the owner himself has. It would suffice to quote the following:





      “Originally a Receiver could not sue; this is shown by the decision of
      Phear, J., in Wilkinson v. Gangadhar Sirkar [1871  6  Beng.  LR  486].
      That decision was in 1871. In 1877,  however,  was  passed  the  Civil
      Procedure Code of that year; and in it  was  contained  the  provision
      which now finds a place in O. 40 R. 1, of the present Code (see S. 503
      of the Code 1877). The present Code empowers the Court to confer  upon
      a Receiver all such powers as to bringing and defending suits  as  the
      owner himself has.”




13.   In the aforesaid decisions, it has been held that the words  of  Order
XL Rule 1 cannot give any narrower construction for holding  that  the  Code
does not empower the Receiver to bring a suit for recovery of possession  of
immovable  property.  In  support,  he  has  relied  on  all  the  aforesaid
decisions.

14.   After considering and analyzing all the decisions, in our opinion,  we
cannot give a narrower construction  with  regard  to  the  rights/authority
given to the Receiver under Order XL Rule 1(d). We have also considered  the
appointment order in the present case. In  our  opinion,  the  Receiver  was
given full powers under the provision of  Order  XL  Rule  1(d)  as  rightly
shown by Mr. Sorabjee, learned senior counsel  and,  therefore,  the  ruling
relied upon by Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for  the  appellant,
cannot be of any help to him and, accordingly, we reject such contention  of
Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel, and hold that  in  the  facts  and
circumstances of this case, the Receiver has acted in  the  matter  for  the
purpose of administering the property. Even we have seen  that  the  Supreme
Court in Harinagar Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. (supra)  has held  that  a  Receiver
was appointed pending a suit for partition and the Receiver filed a winding-
up petition for realization of debt. It was contended that the Receiver  had
no power to institute a petition for winding-up of a  company.  The  Supreme
Court conceding that winding-up order is not a  normal  alternative  to  sue
but held that it is a form of equitable execution covered by clause  (d)  of
Rule 1(1) of Order XL of the Code and as such steps could be  taken  by  the
Receiver. It is also to be noted that the power must  be  conferred  on  the
Receiver by the Court either expressly or by necessary implication,  as  the
case may be. In the facts of this case, the Receiver acted to safeguard  the
interest of the trustees for preserving the estate. We also  feel  that  the
Receiver acted in the matter as ought to have been done by the  trustees  to
preserve the estate.

15.   In Kurapati Venkata Mallayya & Anr. vs. Thondepu  Ramaswami  &  Co.  &
Anr.[14], a four-Judge Bench of this Court held  that  the  Receiver  has  a
right to institute a suit when the authority has been given to the  Receiver
to preserve the estate.  Such  authority  is  wide  enough  to  empower  the
Receiver, as he thought  necessary,  for  preserving  the  estate  and  such
authority, in our opinion, includes to institute a suit. as  has  been  held
by this Court.

16.   We have considered all the points which have been urged by Mr.  Ranjit
Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant.  We  are
not able to accept his contention that the Receiver  without  leave  of  the
court, cannot file a suit in the factual matrix of this case. We  have  also
taken into account that obtaining of leave of the  court  before  filing  of
the suit cannot be fatal and the same can be cured in law and is  merely  an
irregularity. We  have  also  considered  the  decision  of  this  Court  in
Kurapati Venkata Mallayya & Anr. (supra) and find that  when  authority  has
been given  to  the  Receiver  to  preserve  the  estate,  it  empowers  the
Receiver, i.e., for preserving the estate, he has a right to  institute  the
suit and, accordingly, in the light of the said  judgment,  we  express  our
opinion and accept the reasoning given by the High Court that  the  Receiver
had the authority to institute a suit for preserving the estate.  Therefore,
we do not  accept  the  contention  of  Mr.  Ranjit  Kumar,  learned  senior
counsel, on such question. The second  point  urged  by  Mr.  Ranjit  Kumar,
learned senior counsel, is that the suit is bad with regard to  Section  106
of the Transfer of Property Act. We have duly considered the said  question,
and we find that the suit was filed after six months from the  date  of  the
notice issued under Section 106 of the Transfer  of  Property  Act,  by  the
Receiver and furthermore, after the amendment of Section 106(3) which  reads
as follows:



      “(3)  A notice under sub-section (1) shall not be deemed to be invalid
      merely because the period mentioned therein falls short of the  period
      specified under that sub-section, where a suit or proceeding is  filed
      after the expiry of the period mentioned in that sub-section.”



We have noticed that the High Court duly considered the question  of  notice
and correctly came to the conclusion that the  Legislature  wanted  to  plug
the loopholes and to redress the mischief by making a  change  in  the  law.
Therefore, if the notice is short of the  period  specified  in  sub-section
(1) but the suit or proceeding is filed  after  the  expiry  of  the  period
mentioned in sub-section (1), the notice shall not be deemed to be  invalid.
Clearly, in this matter, the notice was issued on  July  26,  2001  and  the
suit was actually filed  on  February  6,  2002  –  after  six  months  and,
therefore, the notice cannot be declared or deemed to be invalid.

17.   The third question which is tried  to  be  urged  before  us,  in  our
opinion,  has  no  substance  since  the  Court  Receiver  is  holding   the
properties as custodia legis and has  acted  in  the  matter  as  reasonable
prudent trustees used to do in this matter and such action on  the  part  of
the Court Receiver is nothing  but  for  preservation  of  the  property  in
question, therefore, the contention of  Mr.  Ranjit  Kumar  on  that  ground
also, cannot have  any  substance.  [See  Harinagar  Sugar  Mills  Co.  Ltd.
(supra)].

18.   Although the point tried to be taken  by  Mr.  Ranjit  Kumar,  learned
senior counsel, is that the appellant is a sick company but we do  not  find
that such point was ever urged before the High Court  and,  furthermore,  it
appears that admittedly the tenancy  was  about  the  residential  premises.
Therefore, in our opinion, such point cannot  have  any  substance  at  this
stage.

19.   In these circumstances, we find that the reasoning given by  the  High
Court does not warrant any interference by this Court. Accordingly, we  find
no merit in this appeal and the same is  hereby  dismissed.  However,  there
shall be no order as to costs.


                                  …………………..…………………J.
                                  (Chandramauli Kr. Prasad)



                                  …………………..…………………J.
                                  (Pinaki Chandra Ghose)
New Delhi;
May 9, 2014.



-----------------------
[1]     (1887) ILR 14 Cal 323
[2]     (1884) ILR 10 Cal 1014
[3]     (1978) 1 SCC 12 = 1958 SCR 333
[4]     1996 (11) SCC 376
[5]     1990 (3) SCC 669
[6]     1985 (2) SCC 167
[7]     1966 (3) SCR 948
[8]     AIR 1944 All 220
[9]     AIR 1924 All. 40
[10]    AIR 1999 Bom 16
[11]    (1891) ILR 18 Cal 478
[12]    (1907) ILR 34 Cal 305
[13]    AIR 1916 Cal 51
[14]    AIR 1964 SC 818

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