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Friday, December 13, 2013

Sec.138, 142 N.I.Act Sec.482 Cr.P.C. - Limitation - pending trial - petition for quash of complaint - cheque presented 25/10/08 - bounced 27/10/08 - issued notice 27/10/08 - no reply - again presented 10-11-08 - again bounced 10-11-08 - again issued notice 27-12-08 - filed complaint 07-01-09 - No bar to present the cheque several times with 6 / 3 months from the date of cheque - Limitation of 30 days starts from the date of information of cheque bounce - the complainant admitted in his complaint that cheque was bounced on 10-11-2008 - Complaint filed 07-01-2009 = beyond 30 days from the date of cheque bounce - though two witnesses were examined - is not a bar to quash the complaint - High court committed wrong - Apex court allowed the appeal and quashed the complaint = Kamlesh Kumar …..Appellant Vs. State of Bihar & Anr. ….Respondents = Published in / Cited in / Reported in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41067

Sec.138, 142 N.I.Act Sec.482 Cr.P.C. - Limitation - pending trial - petition for quash of complaint - cheque presented 25/10/08 - bounced 27/10/08 - issued notice 27/10/08 - no reply - again presented 10-11-08 - again bounced 10-11-08 - again issued notice 27-12-08 - filed complaint 07-01-09 - No bar to present the cheque several times with 6 / 3 months from the date of  cheque - Limitation  of 30 days starts from the date of information of cheque bounce - the complainant admitted in his complaint that cheque  was bounced on 10-11-2008 - Complaint filed 07-01-2009 = beyond 30 days from the date of cheque bounce - though two witnesses were examined - is not a bar to quash the complaint - High court committed wrong - Apex court allowed the appeal and quashed the complaint =

a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing of the order  dated
28.10.2009 whereby the Court of  Magistrate  had  taken  cognizance  of  the
complaint filed by the respondent No.2  =
The solitary  reason  given  by  the  High  Court
while dismissing the petition is that trial has already  commenced  and  two
witnesses have already been examined and discharged.  Hence, at  this  stage
it would not be proper to interfere with  the  trial. =

 The cheque in question was presented  on  25.10.2008.   
After  it  was
dishonoured, complainant issued notice dated 27.10.2008  to  the  appellant.
The appellant did not accede to the demand contained  in  the  said  notice.
Even the complainant chose not to file any complaint under  Section  138  of
the N. I. Act at that time.  
Instead, he presented same  very  cheque  again for encashment through his banker on 10.11.2008.  
It bounced  this  time  as well because of insufficient funds.  Another legal notice  dated  17.12.2008
was sent to the appellant.  
As this legal notice also  did  not  invoke  any
positive response from the appellant, this time the  complainant  filed  the
complaint  dated  7.01.2009. 

In the present case, the complainant had not filed  the  complaint  on
the dishonor of the cheque in the first instance,  but  presented  the  said
cheque again for encashment.  This right of the  complainant  in  presenting
the same very cheque for the second time  is  available  to  him  under  the
aforesaid provision.  This aspect is already authoritatively  determined  by
this Court
 in MSR Leathers vs.  S.Palaniappan  &  Anr.  (2013)  1  SCC  177.

 “Whether the payee or holder  of  a  cheque  can  initiate
           prosecution for an offence under Section 138  of  the  Negotiable
           Instruments Act, 1881 for its dishonor for the second time, if he
           had not initiated any action on the earlier cause of action?”


This question was answered by the three Judge Bench in  the  aforesaid
matter in the following manner:

                 “What is important is that neither Section 138 nor Section
           142 or any other provision  contained  in  the  Act  forbids  the
           holder or payee of the cheque  from  presenting  the  cheque  for
           encashment on any number of occasions  within  a  period  of  six
           months of its  issue  or  within  the  period  of  its  validity,
           whichever is earlier.  That such presentation will  be  perfectly
           legal and justified was not disputed before us even at the Bar by
           the learned counsel appearing for the parties and rightly  so  in
           the light of the judicial pronouncements on that  question  which
           are all unanimous.  Even Sadanandan case, the correctness whereof
           we are examining, recognized that the holder or the payee of  the
           cheque has the right to present the same any number of times  for
           encashment during the period of six months or during  the  period
           of its validity, whichever is earlier.” =


 Normally,  we  would  have
called upon the parties to prove their respective versions before the  trial
court by leading their evidence.  However, in the present case,  as  rightly
pointed  out  by  the  learned  senior  counsel  for  the   appellant,   the
complainant has accepted in the complaint itself that he  had  gone  to  the
bank for encashment of cheque on 10.11.2008 and the cheque was not  honoured
due to insufficient of funds, thereby admitting that he came to  know  about
the dishonor of the cheque on 10.11.2008 itself.

 For the purposes of   limitation,
in so far as legal notice is concerned, it is to be served  within  30  days
of the receipt of information by the drawyee from  the  bank  regarding  the
return of the cheque as unpaid.  
Therefore, after  the  cheque  is  returned
unpaid,  notice  has  to  be  issued  within  30  days  of  the  receipt  of
information in this behalf.  
That is the period of limitation  provided  for
issuance of legal notice calling upon the drawer of the cheque to  make  the
payment.  
After the sending of this notice 15 days time is to  be  given  to
the noticee, from the date of  receipt  of  the  said  notice  to  make  the
payment, if that is  already  not  done.   
If  noticee  fails  to  make  the
payment, the offence can be said to have been committed and  in  that  event
cause of action for filing the complaint would  accrue  to  the  complainant
and he is given one month time from the date of cause of action to file  the
complaint.-
It is, thus, clear from the aforesaid averment made by the complainant
himself that he had gone to the bank for encashing the cheque on  10.11.2008
and found that because  of  unavailability  of  sufficient  balance  in  the
account, the cheque was bounced.  
Therefore, it becomes obvious that he  had
come to know  about  the  same  on  10.11.2008  itself.   In  view  of  this
admission in the complaint about the information  having  been  received  by
the complainant about the bouncing of the cheque on  10.11.2008  itself,  no
further enquiry is needed on this aspect.

14.   It is, thus, apparent that  he  received  the  information  about  the
dishonor of the cheque on 10.11.2008 itself.  
However, he did not  send  the legal notice within 30 days therefrom.   
 We, thus, find that the  complaint
filed by him was not maintainable as it was  filed  without  satisfying  all
the three conditions laid down in Section 138 of the N. I. Act as  explained
in para 12 of the judgment in the case of  MSR  Leathers,  extracted  above.


15.   We have, thus, no hesitation  in  allowing  this  appeal  and  setting
aside the impugned order of the High  Court.   
As  a  consequence,  petition
filed by the petitioner under Section 482, Cr.P.C.  is also allowed and  the
complaint of the complainant is dismissed.


                                                            [REPORTABLE]

                       IN THE SUPREME COURT O F INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2083/2013
              (arising out of SLP(Criminal) No. 10056 of 2012)


Kamlesh Kumar                                       …..Appellant

                 Vs.

State of Bihar & Anr.                            ….Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T



A.K.SIKRI,J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    The appellant    herein is facing trial  in  the  complaint  filed  by
respondent No.2 under Section 138 of the Negotiable  Instruments  Act  (N.I.
Act for short).  According to  the  appellant,  criminal  complaint  is  not
maintainable and no such proceedings could be  launched  against  him.   He,
therefore, approached the High Court of Judicature at Patna in the  form  of
a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing of the order  dated
28.10.2009 whereby the Court of  Magistrate  had  taken  cognizance  of  the
complaint filed by the respondent No.2  issued  summons  to  the  appellant.
This petition, however, has been dismissed by the High Court  vide  impugned
judgment dated 1.11.2012.  The solitary  reason  given  by  the  High  Court
while dismissing the petition is that trial has already  commenced  and  two
witnesses have already been examined and discharged.  Hence, at  this  stage
it would not be proper to interfere with  the  trial.   Various  contentions
which were raised by the appellant questioning the very  maintainability  of
the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act are not  gone  into  by  the
High Court with the observations that those contentions would  be  available
to the appellant  before  the  trial  court,  subject  to  the  rebuttal  of
respondent No.2.

3.    Mr.  Mishra,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant
submitted that even on admitted facts the complaint was untenable as it  was
clearly time barred and not filed within the  stipulated  period  prescribed
in law and therefore the High  Court  could  not  have  scuttled  the  issue
raised by the appellant by merely relegating  the  appellant  to  the  trial
court when the issue could be decided on  the  admitted  facts  on  records.
He, further, submitted that the appellant  had  approached  the  High  Court
without loss of any time and if during the pendency of  the  petition  filed
by the  appellant  under  Section  482,  Cr.P.C.,  two  witnesses  had  been
examined in the meantime, that factor could not  have  weighed  against  the
appellant.

4.    In order to understand the controversy, we may give basic facts  which
are undisputed.

 5.   The complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is filed by respondent
No.2 on the basis of cheque bearing No.003285 drawn on Bank of India,  Mahua
Branch where the  appellant  holds  Bank  Account  bearing  No.23371.   This
cheque was for a sum of Rs.3,45,000/-.  The complainant had  presented  this
cheque on 25.10.2008 which  was  returned  dishonoured  by  the  Bank.  
The
defence on merits set up by  the  appellant  is  that  he  is  a  doctor  by
profession who is having his  private  practice.  
 He  found  that  certain
cheques, some signed and some unsigned, were  missing  from  his  clinic  in
December 2006 in respect to which he had even given information to the  Sub-
Divisional Officer, Mahua, on 30th December 2006.   Cheque  No.  003285  was
also one of those stolen cheques.  
We  have  stated  this  defence  of  the
appellant just for record and are not going into  this  explanation  of  the
appellant or influenced by it.  We only tend to examine  as  to  whether  on
admitted      events,       complaint       is       not       maintainable.


 6.   The cheque in question was presented  on  25.10.2008.  
After  it  was
dishonoured, complainant issued notice dated 27.10.2008  to  the  appellant.
The appellant did not accede to the demand contained  in  the  said  notice.
Even the complainant chose not to file any complaint under  Section  138  of
the N. I. Act at that time.
Instead, he presented same  very  cheque  again for encashment through his banker on 10.11.2008. 
It bounced  this  time  as well because of insufficient funds.  Another legal notice  dated  17.12.2008
was sent to the appellant.
As this legal notice also  did  not  invoke  any
positive response from the appellant, this time the  complainant  filed  the
complaint  dated  7.01.2009.   
The  summary   of   the   aforesaid   events,
accordingly,  is as under:-







 |           Date                      |Events                               |
|           25.10.2008                |Cheque presented                     |
|           27.10.2008                |Legal Notice                         |
|           10.11.2008                |2nd presentation                     |
|            17.12.2008               |Legal Notice                         |
|            07.01.2009               |Complaint filed                      |



7.    On the basis of the aforesaid facts, the submission of Mr. Mishra  was
that the complaint was not filed  within  the  limitation  prescribed  under
Section 138 read with Section 142 of the N.  I.  Act.   To  appreciate  this
contention, we first state the aforesaid provision which reads as under:

                  “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency,etc. of  funds
        in the account.-Where any cheque drawn by  a person on  an  account
        maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of  money
        to another person from out of that account for  the  discharge,  in
        whole or in part, of any debt or other liability,  is  returned  by
        the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing  to
        the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque  or
        that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by
        an agreement made with that bank, such person shall  be  deemed  to
        have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other
        provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment   for  a  term
        which  may be extended to two years, or with fine  which may extend
        to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:

        Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless-

        (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within  a  period  of
        six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the  period
        of its validity, whoever is earlier;

        (b) the payee or the holder in due course of  the  cheque,  as  the
        case may be , makes a demand for the payment of the said amount  of
        money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of  the  cheque,
        [within thirty days] of the receipt of information by him from  the
        bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and

        (c) the drawyer of such cheque fails to make  the  payment  of  the
        said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may  be,  to  the
        holder in due course of the cheque,  within  fifteen  days  of  the
        receipt of the said notice.

        142. Cognizance of offences.- Notwithstanding anything contained in
        the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)-

        (a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable  under
        section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the  payee
        or, as the case may be. The holder in due course of the cheque;

        (b) such complaint is made within one month of the  date  on  which
        the cause of action arises under  clause  (c)  of  the  proviso  to
        Section 138:

        [Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be  taken  by  the
        Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the
        Court that he had sufficient  cause  for  not  making  a  complaint
        within such period.]

        (c) no court inferior to that of a  Metropolitan  Magistrate  or  a
        Judicial Magistrate of  the  first  class  shall  try  any  offence
        punishable under section 138.]”




8.    In the present case, the complainant had not filed  the  complaint  on
the dishonor of the cheque in the first instance,  but  presented  the  said
cheque again for encashment.  This right of the  complainant  in  presenting
the same very cheque for the second time  is  available  to  him  under  the
aforesaid provision.  This aspect is already authoritatively  determined  by
this Court in MSR Leathers vs.  S.Palaniappan  &  Anr.  (2013)  1  SCC  177.
Specific question which was formulated for consideration by  the  Court  and
referred to three Judge Bench in  that  case,  the  following  question  for
determination was as under:

                 “Whether the payee or holder  of  a  cheque  can  initiate
           prosecution for an offence under Section 138  of  the  Negotiable
           Instruments Act, 1881 for its dishonor for the second time, if he
           had not initiated any action on the earlier cause of action?”




      This question was answered by the three Judge Bench in  the  aforesaid
matter in the following manner:

                 “What is important is that neither Section 138 nor Section
           142 or any other provision  contained  in  the  Act  forbids  the
           holder or payee of the cheque  from  presenting  the  cheque  for
           encashment on any number of occasions  within  a  period  of  six
           months of its  issue  or  within  the  period  of  its  validity,
           whichever is earlier.  That such presentation will  be  perfectly
           legal and justified was not disputed before us even at the Bar by
           the learned counsel appearing for the parties and rightly  so  in
           the light of the judicial pronouncements on that  question  which
           are all unanimous.  Even Sadanandan case, the correctness whereof
           we are examining, recognized that the holder or the payee of  the
           cheque has the right to present the same any number of times  for
           encashment during the period of six months or during  the  period
           of its validity, whichever is earlier.”




9.    To this extent, there cannot  be  any  quarrel  and  the  act  of  the
complainant in presenting the cheque  again  cannot  be  questioned  by  the
appellant.  However, we find that when the cheque was presented second  time
on 10.11.2008 and was returned unpaid, legal notice for  demand  was  issued
only on 17.12.2008 which was not within  30  days  of  the  receipt  of  the
information by him from the Bank regarding  the  return  of  the  cheque  as
unpaid.   Non-issuance  of  notice  within  the  limitation  prescribed  has
rendered the complaint as not maintainable.

10.   In MSR  Leathers  (supra),  this  Court  analyzed  the  provisions  of
Sections 138 and 142 of the N.I. Act in the following manner:

                “The proviso to Section 138, however, is all important  and
           stipulates three distinct conditions  precedent,  which  must  be
           satisfied before the dishonor  of  a  cheque  can  constitute  an
           offence and become punishable.
The first condition  is  that  the
           cheque ought to have been presented to the bank within  a  period
           of six months from the date on which it is drawn  or  within  the
           period of of its validity,  whichever  is  earlier.
  The  second
           condition is that the payee or the holder in due  course  of  the
           cheque, as the case may be,  ought  to  make  a  demand  for  the
           payment of the said  amount  of  money  by  giving  a  notice  in
           writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days  of  the
           receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the  return
           of the cheque as unpaid.
The third condition is that  the  drawer
           of such a cheque should have failed to make payment of  the  said
           amount of money to the payee or as the case may, to the holder in
           due course of the cheque within fifteen days of  the  receipt  of
           the said notice.
It is only upon  the  satisfaction  of  all  the
           three  conditions   mentioned  above  and  enumerated  under  the
           proviso to Section 138 as clauses (a), (b) and (c)  thereof  that
           an offence under Section 138 can be said to have  been  committed
           by the person issuing the cheque.




                Section 142  of  the  Negotiable  Instruments  Act  governs
           taking of cognizance  of  the  offence  and  starts  with  a  non
           obstante clause. 
It provides that no court shall take  cognizance
           of any  offence  punishable  under  Section  138  except  upon  a
           complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may  be,
           by the holder in due course and such complaint is made within one
           month of the date on which  the  cause  of  action  arises  under
           clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138.
In terms of clause (c)
           to Section 142, no count  inferior  to  that  of  a  Metropolitan
           Magistrate or  a  Judicial  Magistrate  of  the  First  Class  is
           competent to try any offence punishable under Section 138.

                 A  careful  reading  of  the  above  provisions  makes  it
           manifest that a complaint under Section 138  can  be  filed  only
           after cause of action to do so has accrued in terms of clause (c)
           of the proviso to Section 138 which, as noticed earlier,  happens
           no sooner than when the  drawer of the cheque fails to  make  the
           payment of the cheque amount to the payee or the  holder  of  the
           cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the notice required to be
           sent in terms of clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of  the
           Act.

                The presentation of the cheque and dishonor thereof  within
           the period of its validity or a period of six months is just  one
           of the three requirements  that  constitutes  “cause  of  action”
           within the meaning of Sections 138 and 142 (b)  of  the  Act,  an
           expression that is more commonly used in civil law than in  penal
           statutes. For a dishonor to culminate into the commission  of  an
           offence of which a court may take cognizance, there are two other
           requirements, namely, (a) service of a notice upon the drawer  of
           the cheque to make payment of the amount covered by  the  cheque,
           and (b) failure of the drawer to make any such payment within the
           stipulated period of 15 days of the receipt of such a notice.  It
           is only when the  said  two  conditions  are  superadded  to  the
           dishonor of the  cheque  that  the  holder/payee  of  the  cheque
           acquires the right to institute proceedings for prosecution under
           Section 138 of the Act, which right remains  legally  enforceable
           for a period of 30 days counted from the date on which the  cause
           of action accrued to him. Therefore, there  is,  nothing  in  the
           proviso to Section 138 or Section 142 for that matter, to  oblige
           the holder/payee of a dishonoured cheque to  necessarily  file  a
           complaint even when he has acquired an indefeasible right  to  do
           so. The fact that an offence is  complete  need  not  necessarily
           lead to launch of prosecution especially when the offence is  not
           a cognizable one. It follows that the complainant may, even  when
           he has the immediate  right  to  institute  criminal  proceedings
           against the drawer of the cheque, either at the  request  of  the
           holder/payee of the cheque or on his own volition,  refrain  from
           instituting the proceedings based on the cause of action that has
           accrued to him. Such a  decision  to  defer  prosecution  may  be
           impelled by several considerations but more importantly it may be
           induced by an assurance which the drawer extends to the holder of
           the cheque that given  some  time  the  payment  covered  by  the
           cheques would be arranged,  in  the  process  rendering  a  time-
           consuming and generally expensive legal recourse unnecessary.  It
           may also be induced by a belief that a fresh presentation of  the
           cheque  may  result  in  encashment  for  a  variety  of  reasons
           including the vicissitudes of trade and business  dealings  where
           financial accommodation given by the parties to each other is not
           an unknown phenomenon. Suffice it to say that there is nothing in
           the provisions of the Act that forbids the  holder/payee  of  the
           cheque to demand by service of a fresh notice under clause (b) of
           the proviso to Section 138 of the Act, the amount covered by  the
           cheque, should there be a second or a successive dishonor of  the
           cheque on its presentation.”




11.   It is thus clear that period of limitation is not to be  counted  from
the date when the cheque in question was presented in the first instance  on
25.10.2008 or the legal notice was issued on  27.10.2008,  inasmuch  as  the
cheque was presented again on 10.11.2008.  For the purposes of   limitation,
in so far as legal notice is concerned, it is to be served  within  30  days
of the receipt of information by the drawyee from  the  bank  regarding  the
return of the cheque as unpaid.
Therefore, after  the  cheque  is  returned
unpaid,  notice  has  to  be  issued  within  30  days  of  the  receipt  of
information in this behalf.  
That is the period of limitation  provided  for
issuance of legal notice calling upon the drawer of the cheque to  make  the
payment.  
After the sending of this notice 15 days time is to  be  given  to
the noticee, from the date of  receipt  of  the  said  notice  to  make  the
payment, if that is  already  not  done.   
If  noticee  fails  to  make  the
payment, the offence can be said to have been committed and  in  that  event
cause of action for filing the complaint would  accrue  to  the  complainant
and he is given one month time from the date of cause of action to file  the
complaint.

12.   Applying the aforesaid principles, in the present case, we  find  that
cheque was presented, second time, on 10.11.2008. The complainant,  however,
sent the legal notice on 17.12.2008 i.e. much after the  expiry  of  the  30
days.  It is clear from the complaint filed by the complainant himself  that
he had gone to the bank for encashment the  cheque  on  10.11.2008  but  the
cheque was not honoured due to the unavailability  of  the  balance  in  the
account.   13.     The  crucial  question  is  as  to  on  which  date   the
complainant received the information about the dishonour of the cheque.   As
per the  appellant  the  complainant  received  the  information  about  the
dishonour  of  the  cheque  on  10.11.2008.   However,  the  respondent  has
disputed the same. However, we would  like  to  add  that  at  the  time  of
arguments the aforesaid submission of the appellant was not refuted.   After
the judgment was reserved, the complainant has filed the affidavit  alleging
therein that he received  the  bank  memo  of  the  bouncing  of  cheque  on
17.11.2008 and therefore legal notice  sent  on  17.12.2008  is  within  the
period 30 days from the  date  of  information.   Normally,  we  would  have
called upon the parties to prove their respective versions before the  trial
court by leading their evidence.  However, in the present case,  as  rightly
pointed  out  by  the  learned  senior  counsel  for  the   appellant,   the
complainant has accepted in the complaint itself that he  had  gone  to  the
bank for encashment of cheque on 10.11.2008 and the cheque was not  honoured
due to insufficient of funds, thereby admitting that he came to  know  about
the dishonor of the cheque on 10.11.2008 itself.   It  is  for  this  reason
that appellant has filed reply affidavit  stating  that  this  is  an  after
thought plea as no material has been filed before the court  below  to  show
that the bank had issued memo about the return of cheque which was  received
by the complainant  on  17.11.2008.   
The  specific  averment  made  in  the complaint in this behalf is as under:



                  “Subsequently the complainant again  went  to  encash  the
           cheque given by the accused on 10.11.2008 which again bounced due
           to unavailability of balance in the accused account.”







      It is, thus, clear from the aforesaid averment made by the complainant
himself that he had gone to the bank for encashing the cheque on  10.11.2008
and found that because  of  unavailability  of  sufficient  balance  in  the
account, the cheque was bounced.  Therefore, it becomes obvious that he  had
come to know  about  the  same  on  10.11.2008  itself.   In  view  of  this
admission in the complaint about the information  having  been  received  by
the complainant about the bouncing of the cheque on  10.11.2008  itself,  no
further enquiry is needed on this aspect.

14.   It is, thus, apparent that  he  received  the  information  about  the
dishonor of the cheque on 10.11.2008 itself.  However, he did not  send  the
legal notice within 30 days therefrom.    We, thus, find that the  complaint
filed by him was not maintainable as it was  filed  without  satisfying  all
the three conditions laid down in Section 138 of the N. I. Act as  explained
in para 12 of the judgment in the case of  MSR  Leathers,  extracted  above.


15.   We have, thus, no hesitation  in  allowing  this  appeal  and  setting
aside the impugned order of the High  Court.   As  a  consequence,  petition
filed by the petitioner under Section 482, Cr.P.C.  is also allowed and  the
complaint of the complainant is dismissed.



                                             ……………………………..J.
                                             (K.S.Radhakrishnan)



                                             ……………………………..J.
                                             (A.K.Sikri)


New Delhi,

December 11, 2013





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