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Monday, December 2, 2013

Jurisdiction of courts under Reg.Trademarks Act & Copy Rights Act = Original jurisdiction Sec. 20 of C.P.C., Or. 2 , rule 3 of C.P.C - where the cause of action arose , there the case has to be filed under Registration of Trademarks Act : Special Jurisdiction under sec.62(2) of Copy Rights Act - Confirming on the courts where the plaintiff resides = Clubbing of both causes of actions in one suit - is a composite suit - When it is a composite suit, the court where the defendants goods are not available , nor do the defendants carry on business and reside within the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court, that court holds no jurisdiction under Registration of Trademarks Act simply because the plaintiff is residing : but the same court holds jurisdiction under sec.62(2) of Copy right Act for copyright violation suit = M/s. Paragon Rubber Industries …Appellant VERSUS M/s. Pragathi Rubber Mills & Ors. ...Respondents = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41036

   Jurisdiction of courts under Reg.Trademarks Act & Copy Rights Act =   Original jurisdiction Sec. 20 of C.P.C., Or. 2 , rule 3 of C.P.C - where the cause of action arose , there the case has to be filed under Registration of Trademarks Act : Special Jurisdiction under sec.62(2) of Copy Rights Act - Confirming on the courts where the plaintiff resides   =   Clubbing  of both  causes of actions in one suit - is a composite suit -   When it is a composite suit, the court where the defendants goods are not available ,  nor do the defendants  carry  on  business  and  reside  within  the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court, that court holds no jurisdiction under Registration of Trademarks Act simply because the plaintiff is residing : but the same court holds jurisdiction under sec.62(2) of Copy right Act for copyright violation suit = 
The Plaintiff is 
       engaged in the business  of  manufacturing  and
      marketing of footwear since 1975, under the registered  trademark  for
      which it also possesses the registered  copyright.  
The  Plaintiff  is located in Kerala. 
The  Defendant,  which  is  located  in  Jalandhar,
      Punjab,  also  manufactures  and  markets  its  footwear   under   the
      registered trademark and copyright PRAGATI/PARAGATI with a  device  of  lion.

      4. On 19th March, 2001, the Plaintiff filed a suit being O.S. No. 2 of
      2001 at District Courts in Kottayam, Kerala  against  the  defendants,
      claiming relief under the Copyright Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to
      as  “1957  Act”)  and  the  Trade  and  Merchandise  Marks  Act,  1958
      (hereinafter referred to as the “1958 Act”)
The suit  is  pending  in the trial court. 
The defendant filed I.A. No. 322 of 2004, under order
      VII Rule XI CPC, with a prayer for rejection of  plaint  for  want  of
      territorial jurisdiction.  - Lower court dismissed the petition holding it's jurisdiction - but the high court set aside the order of lower court and allowed the petition giving an opportunity to the plaintiff to amend the plaint suitable to hold jurisdiction under sec. 62(2) of Copyright Act = Apex court confirmed the High court order and dismissed the both appeal and counter appeal filed by both parties question the High court order = 

  “Though the defendants goods are not available in Kottayam,  nor
           do the defendants  carry  on  business  and  reside  within  the
           jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court, yet this Hon’ble  Court  has
           the jurisdiction to try and  entertain  this  suit  at  Kottayam
           having  regard  to  the  provisions  of  Section  62(2)  of  the
           Copyright Act for the plaintiff carries on business and  resides
           within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court.”

    We are, however, of the opinion that the  High  Court  has
      correctly held that the provision contained in Section 134 of the 1999
      Act, would not come to the aid of the plaintiff.  
Although,  the  1999
      Act was enacted on 30th December, 1999, it came  into  force  on  15th
      September,  2003  vide  S.O.  1048(E),  dated  15th  September,  2003,
      published in the  Gazette  of  India,  Extra.,  Pt.  II,  Sec.  3(ii),
             dated 15th September, 2003.  Since the suit in  this  case  was
      filed on 19th March, 2001, it would be adjudicated under the 1958 Act.
      The 1958 Act does not contain a provision  similar  to  the  provision
      contained in         Section 62(2) of the 1957 Act.  Parliament  being
      aware of the provisions of the 1957 Act still did not incorporate  the
      same in the 1958 Act. Therefore, it can not be read into the 1958  Act
      by implication. The High Court had correctly concluded that  the  suit
      of the plaintiff (appellant) was a composite one.
       22. Having said this, we are still not inclined  to  interfere  with
           the order passed by the High Court permitting the  plaintiff  to
           amend the plaint.  
The High Court was mindful of the  fact  that
           under the 1999 Act, a composite suit could be filed and would be
           maintainable by the Court at Kottayam.  
The Court was aware that
           the plaintiff has filed the suit on 19th March,  2001,  but  the
           1999 Act was not enforced till  15th  September,  2003.  
In  our
           opinion, the High Court has passed the order in exercise of  its
           discretionary powers taking into consideration the entire  facts
           and circumstances of the case.  
The discretion exercised by  the
           High Court can not be said to be either erroneous  or  perverse.
           It has been exercised only to avoid multiplicity of  litigation.
           
The defendant (respondent) could not dispute that in so  far  as
           suit predicated on the Copy Right is  concerned,  the  Court  at
           Kottayam  is  having  requisite  jurisdiction  in  view  of  the
           provisions of Section 62(2) of the Copy Right  Act.   
Therefore,
           had the suit been filed for violation of copy right  alone,  the
           Court  at  Kottayam  could  validly  entertain  the  same. 
   By
           permitting the plaintiff to amend the plaint so as that the suit
           will be maintainable before the  District  Court,  Kottayam,  no
           error was committed by the High Court.






      23.        In view of the observations made above,  both  the  appeals
      are dismissed with no order as to costs.
       

       REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.10745 OF 2013
                 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 22280 of 2011)


      M/s. Paragon Rubber Industries            …Appellant
      VERSUS
      M/s. Pragathi Rubber Mills & Ors.         ...Respondents
                                    With
                        Civil Appeal No.10746 of 2013
                 (Arising out of SLP (C)  No. 33453 of 2011)


      M/s. Pragathi Rubber Mills & Ors.            …Appellants
      VERSUS
      M/s. Paragon Rubber Industries               ...Respondent


                               J U D G M E N T
      SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.
     1. Leave granted.

     2. This judgment shall dispose of  C.A.No.10745  of  2013  @  SLP  (C)
        No.22280 of 2011 and C.A.No. 10746 of 2013 @ SLP  (C)  No.33453  of
        2011. Both the appeals impugn the judgment of  the  High  Court  of
        Kerala at Ernakulam dated  15th  March,  2011,  rendered  in  Civil
        Revision Petition No.1417 of 2004.

     3. Since these are cross appeals, the parties shall be referred to  as
        plaintiff  and  defendant.  The  facts  at  the  centre   of   this
        controversy are as follows:

         
The Plaintiff is 
       engaged in the business  of  manufacturing  and
      marketing of footwear since 1975, under the registered  trademark  for
      which it also possesses the registered  copyright.  
The  Plaintiff  is located in Kerala. 
The  Defendant,  which  is  located  in  Jalandhar,
      Punjab,  also  manufactures  and  markets  its  footwear   under   the
      registered trademark and copyright PRAGATI/PARAGATI with a  device  of  lion.

      4. On 19th March, 2001, the Plaintiff filed a suit being O.S. No. 2 of
      2001 at District Courts in Kottayam, Kerala  against  the  defendants,
      claiming relief under the Copyright Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to
      as  “1957  Act”)  and  the  Trade  and  Merchandise  Marks  Act,  1958
      (hereinafter referred to as the “1958 Act”).
The suit  is  pending  in the trial court. 
The defendant filed I.A. No. 322 of 2004, under order
      VII Rule XI CPC, with a prayer for rejection of  plaint  for  want  of
      territorial jurisdiction.
The trial court dismissed the application on
      22nd March, 2004, with the observations that the issue of jurisdiction
      will be decided at the final stage of the suit.
The  defendant  filed
      CRP No.363 of 2004 in the High Court against the aforesaid order.  The
      High Court by order dated 16th June, 2004, allowed the civil  revision
      and directed the trial court to determine  the  issue  of  territorial
      jurisdiction afresh.

     5. In view of the aforesaid directions issued by the High  Court,  the
        trial court treated the issue with regard to  the  jurisdiction  as
        the preliminary issue.
Upon consideration  of  the  entire  matter
        again the trial court in its order dated  6th  October,  2004  held
        that it has the jurisdiction to  entertain  the  suit  in  view  of
        Section 62(2) of  the  1957  Act.
The  petitioner  challenged  the
        aforesaid order in the High Court by  filing  C.R.P.  No.  1417  of
        2004.
The High Court, upon consideration of the matter has, by the
        impugned order dated 15th March, 2011, held  as under:-

           “The court below held in the order impugned  that  the  suit  as
           such is maintainable before the District Court, Kottayam.   That
           finding is not correct in view of the decisions of  the  Supreme
           Court referred to above.  Accordingly, the order passed  by  the
           court below is set aside.  The plaintiff  is  given  liberty  to
           amend the plaint, so that the suit will be  maintainable  before
           the District Court, Kottayam, in the  light  of  the  principles
           laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions.  When
           an application is filed for amendment of the plaint,  the  court
           below shall consider the same on the merits, after affording  an
           opportunity of being heard to both sides.

           The Civil Revision Petition is allowed as above.”

      6. A perusal of the above shows that the High Court,  having  come  to
      the  correct  conclusion  that  a  composite   suit   would   not   be
      maintainable, has set aside the  order  passed  by  the  trial  court.
      Thereafter, the Plaintiff has been given liberty to amend  the  plaint
      so that the suit will  be  maintainable  before  the  District  Court,
      Kottayam.

The plaintiff aggrieved by the aforesaid  order  has  filed
      SLP (C) No.22280 of 2011 giving rise to C.A.No.10745 of 2013.




      7.  The  defendant/petitioner  in  SLP  (C)  No.  33453  of  2011  has
      challenged the impugned order on the ground that having  come  to  the
      conclusion that a composite suit under the 1957 Act and 1958  Act  was
      not maintainable, the High Court erred in permitting the plaintiff  to
      amend the plaint rather than rejecting the same on the ground of  lack
      of jurisdiction.

      8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

      9. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the Plaintiff
that  the
      suit  was  maintainable  before  the  District  Judge,  Kottayam   for
      violation of the copyright in view of Section 62(2) of the  1957  Act,
      which permits the filing of the suit at the place where the  plaintiff
      resides. 
It is further submitted by the learned counsel that the  High
      Court has wrongly held that a composite suit claiming relief under the
      1957 Act and the 1958 Act would not be  maintainable.
Mr.  Siddhartha
      Dave, learned counsel appearing for the  plaintiff  further  submitted
      that the relief claimed under the 1958 Act in the suit  filed  by  the
      plaintiff under the 1957 Act was  incidental  to  the  relief  claimed
      under the 1957 Act. Such  a  composite  suit  would  be  maintainable.
      According to the learned counsel, this Court in  the  case  of  Dhodha
      House vs. S.K.Maingi[1] examined and only partly answered the question
      as to whether a composite suit seeking relief of injunction under both
      the 1957 Act and the 1958 Act is maintainable when filed in the  court
      where the plaintiff resides.  In  support  of  the  submissions  made,
      learned counsel relied on para 54 and 55 of the judgment.

      10.        Learned counsel further submitted that this  Court  in  the
      case of Dabur India Ltd. Vs. K.R.Industries[2] answered  the  question
      as to what would be meant by a composite suit?
Answering the aforesaid
      question, this Court has held that the ratio in  the  case  of  Dhodha
      House (supra) is that the provisions contained in Section 62(2) of the
      1957 Act have been specially designed to confer an extra benefit  upon
      the  parties  who  were  not  in  a  position  to  initiate  copyright
      proceedings in two different courts. 
In other words, it prescribes  an
      additional ground for attracting the jurisdiction of  the  court  over
      and above the normal grounds as laid down in Section 20 of the Code of
      Civil Procedure, 1908.
Mr. Dave also pointed  out  that  there  is  an
      earlier judgment of this Court in Exphar SA vs. Eupharma  Laboratories
      Ltd.[3]
in which it has been held that  a  composite  suit  would  be
      maintainable where the plaintiff resides in view of the provisions  of
      the 1957 Act.
In Dabur India’s Case, it has been incorrectly  observed
      that the case of Exphar SA (supra) was not considered in Dhodha  House
      (supra).
Therefore, according to  the  learned  counsel,  there  is  a
      slight confusion and conflict  between  the  decision  in  Exphar  and
      Dhodha House on the one hand and Dabur  case  on  the  other.
It  is, therefore, submitted that the aforesaid three  decisions  need  to  be clarified and referred to a larger bench.

      11.        In the alternative, it is submitted that the relief claimed
      under the 1958 Act was only incidental to the relief claimed under the
      1957 Act and such a composite suit would be maintainable  in  view  of
      the ratio of law laid down in the case of Dhodha House Case as well as
      in the Dabur Case. 
Additionally, it is submitted that under the  Trade
      Marks Act, 1999, (hereinafter referred  to  as  the  ‘1999  Act’)  the
      provisions  similar  to  Section  62(2)  of  the  1957  Act  has  been
      incorporated thereby conferring the jurisdiction on  the  court  where
      the plaintiff resides.
 In view of this provision, even though the  Act
      was enforced with effect from 15th September,  2003,  the  High  Court
      ought to have allowed the proceedings to continue in  Kottayam  rather
      than truncating the suit, which would  otherwise  have  to  be  partly
      tried in Kottayam and partly in Jalandhar.

      12.        On the other hand, the defendant submitted  that  the  suit
      filed by the plaintiff is in the nature of composite suit. It has been
      admitted by the plaintiff that the defendant’s goods are not available
      in Kottayam, nor do the defendant reside or carry on  business  within
      the jurisdiction of that Court. The plaintiffs have chosen to file the
      suit at Kottayam only on the ground that  the  jurisdiction  would  be
      vested in the District Court of Kottayam by virtue of Section 62(2) of
      the 1957 Act. It is further submitted
that the reliance placed by  the
      plaintiff on the provisions contained in Section 134 of the  1999  Act
      is misplaced. The defendant also placed reliance on Section 159(4)  of
      the 1999 Act and submitted that the proceedings  initiated  under  the
      1958 Act would  be  governed  by  the  same  Act  notwithstanding  the
      provisions contained in the 1999 Act.

      13.        We have considered the  submissions  made  by  the  learned
      counsel for the parties.
In our opinion,  the  issues  raised  in  the
      present proceedings are no longer res integra  being  covered  by  the ratio of judgments of this Court in the case of Dhodha  House  (supra) and Dabur India (supra).

      14.         It is not disputed before us that in the plaint itself  it
      is pleaded as under :

           “Though the defendants goods are not available in Kottayam,  nor
           do the defendants  carry  on  business  and  reside  within  the
           jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court, yet this Hon’ble  Court  has
           the jurisdiction to try and  entertain  this  suit  at  Kottayam
           having  regard  to  the  provisions  of  Section  62(2)  of  the
           Copyright Act for the plaintiff carries on business and  resides
           within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court.”

      15.        The aforesaid averments make  it  abundantly  clear  that
      even the plaintiff was aware that the court at Kottayam will have no
      jurisdiction under the 1958 Act, but tried to camouflage the same by
      confusing it and mixing it up or intermingling it  with  the  relief
      contained under the 1957 Act.
From the averments made in the plaint,
      it is apparent that the plaintiff had filed a composite suit. Such a
      suit would not be maintainable unless the court has jurisdiction  to
      entertain the suit in relation to the entire cause of action and the
      entire relief.

      16.        We have noticed earlier that the issue is no  longer  res
      integra. The same issue has been examined in Dhodha  House  (supra).
      In  paragraph  43,  this   Court   formulated   the   question   for
      consideration which is as under:

           “43. The short question which arises for consideration is as  to
           whether causes of action in terms of both the 1957 Act  and  the 1958 Act although may be different, would a suit be maintainable in a court only because it has the jurisdiction to entertain the same in terms of Section 62(2) of the 1957 Act?”




      17.        It was answered as follows :-
           “44. A cause of action in a given case both under the  1957  Act
           as also under the 1958 Act may be overlapping  to  some  extent.
           The territorial jurisdiction conferred upon the court  in  terms
           of the provisions of the Code of  Civil  Procedure  indisputably
           shall apply to a suit or proceeding under the 1957 Act  as  also
           the 1958 Act. Sub-section (2) of Section  62  of  the  1957  Act
           provides for an additional  forum.  
Such  additional  forum  was
           provided so as to enable the author to file a suit who  may  not
           otherwise be in a position to file a suit  at  different  places
           where his copyright was violated.
 Parliament while enacting  the
           Trade and Merchandise Marks Act in the year 1958  was  aware  of
           the provisions of the 1957 Act. It still did not choose to  make
           a similar provision therein. 
Such an omission may be held to  be
           a conscious action on the part of Parliament. The  intention  of
           Parliament in not providing for an additional forum in  relation
           to the violation of  the  1958  Act  is,  therefore,  clear  and
           explicit. 
Parliament while enacting the Trade  Marks  Act,  1999
           provided for such an additional forum  by  enacting  sub-section
           (2) of Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act. 
The court shall  not,
           it  is  well  settled,  readily   presume   the   existence   of
           jurisdiction of a court which was not conferred by the  statute.
           
For the purpose of attracting the jurisdiction  of  a  court  in
           terms of sub-section (2) of Section 62  of  the  1957  Act,  the
           conditions precedent specified therein must  be  fulfilled,  the
           requisites wherefore are that the plaintiff  must  actually  and
           voluntarily reside to carry on business or personally  work  for
           gain.


           For the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction  of  a  court  only
           because two causes of action joined in terms of  the  provisions
           of the Code of Civil Procedure, the same  would  not  mean  that
           thereby the jurisdiction can be conferred upon a court which had
           jurisdiction to try only the suit in respect  of  one  cause  of
           action and not the other.  
Recourse  to  the  additional  forum,
           however, in a given case, may be taken if  both  the  causes  of
           action  arise  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court   which
           otherwise had the  necessary  jurisdiction  to  decide  all  the
           issues.”




      18.        This legal position has been  reiterated  in  the  case  of
      Dabur India (supra) as under:-
           “34. What then would be meant by a composite suit?
A  composite
           suit would not entitle a court to entertain a  suit  in  respect
           whereof it has no jurisdiction, territorial or otherwise.
Order
           2 Rule 3 of the Code specifically states so and, thus, there  is
           no reason as to why the same should be ignored.
A composite suit
           within the provisions of the 1957 Act as  considered  in  Dhodha
           House1, therefore, would mean  the  suit  which  is  founded  on
           infringement of a copyright and wherein the incidental power  of
           the court is required to be invoked.  A  plaintiff  may  seek  a
           remedy which can otherwise be granted by the court. It was  that
           aspect of the matter which had not  been  considered  in  Dhodha
           House but it never meant that two suits having different  causes
           of action can be clubbed together as a composite suit.”


      19.        We see no conflict in the ratio of law  laid  down  in  the
      aforesaid two cases. In both the cases, it has been held that for  the
      purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of the court in a composite suit,
      both the causes of action must arise within the  jurisdiction  of  the
      court which otherwise had the necessary jurisdiction to decide all the
      issues.
However, the jurisdiction cannot be conferred by  joining  two
      causes of action in the same suit when the court has  jurisdiction  to
      try the suit only in respect of one cause of action and not the other.
      In Dabur India (supra) the ratio in Dhodha House has  been  explained.
      In Dhodha House, the law was stated in the following terms:
           “54. For the purpose of invoking the  jurisdiction  of  a  court
           only because two  causes  of  action  joined  in  terms  of  the
           provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the  same  would  not
           mean that thereby the jurisdiction can be conferred upon a court
           which had jurisdiction to try only the suit in  respect  of  one
           cause of action and not the other. Recourse  to  the  additional
           forum, however, in a given case, may be taken if both the causes
           of action arise within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  which
           otherwise had the  necessary  jurisdiction  to  decide  all  the
           issues.


           55. In this case we have not examined the question as to whether
           if a cause of action arises under the 1957 Act and the violation
           of the provisions of the Trade Marks Act is only  incidental,  a
           composite suit will lie or not, as  such  a  question  does  not
           arise in this case.”




      20.         In  our  opinion,  the  aforesaid  observation   is   self
      explanatory and need no further clarification. We also do not find any
      substance in the submission of Mr. Dave that  there  is  any  conflict
      between the law laid down in Dabur (supra) and Exphar SA  (supra).  In
      the case of Dabur  (supra),  this  Court  distinguished  the  judgment
      Exphar SA in the following terms :
           “31. Exphar SA cannot be said to have  any  application  in  the
           instant case. The question which arose for consideration therein
           was as to whether the jurisdiction of a court under  sub-section
           (2) of Section 62 of the 1957 Act is  wider  than  that  of  the
           court specified under the Code of Civil  Procedure  and  thus  a
           person instituting a suit having any claim on the  ownership  of
           the copyright which has been infringed, would not  be  a  ground
           for holding that he would not come within the  purview  of  sub-
           section (2) Section 62 of the 1957 Act, as he  had  been  served
           with a “cease and desist” notice, opining: (SCC p. 693, para 13)


                 “13. It is, therefore, clear that the object and reason for
                 the introduction of sub-section (2) of Section 62  was  not
                 to restrict the owners of the copyright to  exercise  their
                 rights but to remove any impediment from  their  doing  so.
                 Section 62(2) cannot be read as limiting  the  jurisdiction
                 of the District  Court  only  to  cases  where  the  person
                 instituting the suit or other proceeding,  or  where  there
                 are more than one such persons, any of  them  actually  and
                 voluntarily resides or carries  on  business  or  presently
                 works for gain. It  prescribes  an  additional  ground  for
                 attracting the jurisdiction of a court over and  above  the
                 ‘normal’ grounds as laid down in Section 20 of the Code.”


           32. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that Parliament  having inserted sub-section (2) in Section 62  of  the  1957  Act,  the  jurisdiction of the court there under would be wider than the one under Section 20  of  the  Code.
The  object  and  reasons  for
           enactment of sub-section (2) of Section  62  would  also  appear
           from the report of the Committee, as has been  noticed  by  this
           Court being a provision which has  been  specially  designed  to
           confer an extra benefit upon the  authors  who  were  not  in  a
           position to instate copyright infringement proceeding before the
           courts. It is in the aforementioned context the law laid down by
           this Court in para 13 of Dhodha House must be understood.


           33. If the impediment is sought to be removed  by  inserting  an
           incidental provision, there cannot be any doubt the court  could
           be entitled to pass an interim order, but the same by no stretch
           of imagination can be extended to a cause  of  action  which  is
           founded on separate set of facts as also rights and  liabilities
           of a party under a different  Act.  In  Dhodha  House,  although
           Exphar Sa was not noticed, the  distinction  would  be  apparent
           from the following: (Dhodha House case, SCC p. 56, paras 50-51)


                 “50. In this case, the Delhi  High  Court  could  not  have
                 invoked its jurisdiction in terms  of  the  1957  Act.  The
                 primary ground upon which the jurisdiction of the  Original
                 Side of the High Court was invoked was the violation of the
                 1958 Act, but in relation thereto, the provisions  of  sub-
                 section (2) of Section 62 of the  1957  Act  could  not  be
                 invoked.
           51. The plaintiff was not a resident of Delhi. It has  not  been
           able to establish that it carries on any business at Delhi.  For
           our purpose, the question as to whether the defendant  had  been
           selling its produce in Delhi or not is wholly irrelevant  (sic).
           It is possible that the goods manufactured by the plaintiff  are
           available in the market of Delhi or they are sold in  Delhi  but
           that by itself would not mean that the plaintiff carries on  any
           business in Delhi.”


      21.         We are, however, of the opinion that the  High  Court  has
      correctly held that the provision contained in Section 134 of the 1999
      Act, would not come to the aid of the plaintiff.
Although,  the  1999
      Act was enacted on 30th December, 1999, it came  into  force  on  15th
      September,  2003  vide  S.O.  1048(E),  dated  15th  September,  2003,
      published in the  Gazette  of  India,  Extra.,  Pt.  II,  Sec.  3(ii),
             dated 15th September, 2003.  Since the suit in  this  case  was
      filed on 19th March, 2001, it would be adjudicated under the 1958 Act.
      The 1958 Act does not contain a provision  similar  to  the  provision
      contained in         Section 62(2) of the 1957 Act.  Parliament  being
      aware of the provisions of the 1957 Act still did not incorporate  the
      same in the 1958 Act. Therefore, it can not be read into the 1958  Act
      by implication. The High Court had correctly concluded that  the  suit
      of the plaintiff (appellant) was a composite one.
       22. Having said this, we are still not inclined  to  interfere  with
           the order passed by the High Court permitting the  plaintiff  to
           amend the plaint.  
The High Court was mindful of the  fact  that
           under the 1999 Act, a composite suit could be filed and would be
           maintainable by the Court at Kottayam.  
The Court was aware that
           the plaintiff has filed the suit on 19th March,  2001,  but  the
           1999 Act was not enforced till  15th  September,  2003.  
In  our
           opinion, the High Court has passed the order in exercise of  its
           discretionary powers taking into consideration the entire  facts
           and circumstances of the case.  
The discretion exercised by  the
           High Court can not be said to be either erroneous  or  perverse.
           It has been exercised only to avoid multiplicity of  litigation.
         
The defendant (respondent) could not dispute that in so  far  as
           suit predicated on the Copy Right is  concerned,  the  Court  at
           Kottayam  is  having  requisite  jurisdiction  in  view  of  the
           provisions of Section 62(2) of the Copy Right  Act.  
Therefore,
           had the suit been filed for violation of copy right  alone,  the
           Court  at  Kottayam  could  validly  entertain  the  same.
   By
           permitting the plaintiff to amend the plaint so as that the suit
           will be maintainable before the  District  Court,  Kottayam,  no
           error was committed by the High Court.






      23.        In view of the observations made above,  both  the  appeals
      are dismissed with no order as to costs.






                                             ...………………….….….J.
                                                      [Surinder  Singh
                                             Nijjar]








                                             ………………………….J.
                                             [A.K.Sikri]
        New Delhi;
        November 29, 2013.


ITEM NO.1A               COURT NO.9             SECTION XIA
            S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A
                         RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal No.10745/2013 @
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).22280/2011

M/S PARAGON RUBBER INDUSTRIES                  Petitioner(s)

                 VERSUS

M/S PRAGATI RUBBER MILLS & ORS.                Respondent(s)
WITH Civil Appeal No.10746/2013 @
SLP(C) NO. 33453 of 2011

Date: 29/11/2013  These matters were called on for
pronouncement of Judgment today.
For Petitioner(s)
                     Mr. A. Raghunath,Adv.

                        Mr. Atul Jha, Adv.
                        Ms. Divya Balasundaram, Adv.
                        Mr. Sandeep Jha, Adv.
                     Mr. Dharmendra Kumar Sinha
For Respondent(s)
                        Mr. Atul Jha, Adv.
                        Ms. Divya Balasundaram, Adv.
                        Mr. Sandeep Jha, Adv.
                     Mr. Dharmendra Kumar Sinha,Adv.

                     Mr. A. Raghunath

           UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following
                               O R D E R
                 Leave granted.
                 Hon'ble Mr. Justice Surinder Singh  Nijjar  pronounced  the
        Judgment of the  Bench  comprising  His  Lordship  and  Hon'ble  Mr.
        Justice A.K. Sikri.
                 For the reasons recorded in the signed Reportable Judgment,
        both the Appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs.
|(Vishal Anand)                        | |(Indu Bala Kapur)                   |
|Court Master                          | |Court Master                        |


             (Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)

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[1]      (2006) 9 SCC 41
[2]      (2008) 10 SCC 595
[3]      (2004) 3 SCC 688

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