advocatemmmohan

My photo

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN -  Practicing both IN CIVIL, CRIMINAL AND FAMILY LAWS,Etc.,

WELCOME TO LEGAL WORLD

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - FOR KNOWLEDGE IN LAW & FOR LEGAL OPINIONS - SHARE THIS

Monday, July 29, 2013

Doctrine of Equality in awarding punishment in departmental proceedings , is applicable or not has to be decided by the appellant authority but not by High court as the High court has no power to issue such a directions = Doctrine of Equality = The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarized as follows: (a) When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities; (b) The Courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority; (c) Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the Court; - (d) Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The Court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. (e) The only exception to the principle stated in para (d) above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct was identical or the co- delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the Doctrine of Equality when it is found that the concerned employee and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge sheet in the two cases. If co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology lesser punishment to him would be justifiable. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, we may observe that, no doubt the charges in respect of two sets of employees were identical. Though the other set of employee accepted the charges on the first day of enquiry, a factor which is to be kept in mind, that even those employees had denied the charges in the first instance and accepted these charges only in the departmental enquiry, that too after realizing that similar charges had been proved against the respondents herein in the departmental enquiry. Therefore, it was not a case where those employees had expressed the unconditional apology in the first instance. This may be a mitigating circumstance for the appellants herein. At the same time, we are of the opinion that all these aspects are to be considered by the appellate authority. The High Court did not look into all these aspects and mandated the appellate authority to pass orders imposing a specific penalty only. This direction of the High Court is, accordingly, set aside and the matter is remitted back to the appellate authority to take a decision imposing - appropriate penalty on the respondents herein. We are confident that the mitigating circumstances pointed out by the respondents herein would be given due consideration by the appellate authority, keeping in view the ratio of Rajendra Yadav’s case as well. It would be open to the respondents herein to make representation in this behalf to the appellate authority on the basis of which the respondents want to contend that they should be given same treatment as meted out to other three employees. Such a representation will be given 15 days from today. Appellate Authority shall pass appropriate orders deciding the appeals afresh within 2 months from today. 19. Appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms. No costs.

                            published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40604                       
         (REPORTABLE)




                          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                         CIVIL APPEAL NOs…6142/2013
      (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.10025 of 2012)




      Lucknow K.Gramin Bank  (Now
      Allahabad,U.P.Gramin Bank) & Anr.                 …..Appellant (s)


                                                 Vs.

      Rajendra Singh                                          …..Respondent
      (s)

      With

      C.A.Nos. 6143 & 6144/2013 (@ SLP (C) Nos.11211 of 2012 & 11451 of 2012





                                  J U D G M E N T

      A.K.Sikri, J.




      1.    Leave granted.

      2.    These appeals arise out of the decision dated 19th December 2011
      rendered by High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, whereby three  Writ
      Petitions filed by the respondents in these appeals have been disposed
      of with certain directions.

      -

      3.    Before we point out the directions of  the  High  Court  in  the
      impugned judgment and the grievance of the appellant thereto, it would
      be proper to traverse the seminal facts which are largely undisputed.

      4.    The appellant-Bank had  issued  separate  charge-sheets  to  six
      employees leveling identical charges. 
 Three respondents before us  in
      these appeals were the three employees out of those six  employees  to
      whom  these  charge-sheets  were  issued.   
All  the  six   employees,
      including the respondents herein, filed their replies to  the  charge-
      sheets denying the charges.

      5.    For certain unknown reasons, the appellant-Bank initially  chose to proceed and conduct the enquiry only against the respondents herein and appointed an enquiry officer.  
After conducting the enquiry,  the
      enquiry officer submitted his enquiry report, returning  the  findings
      that charges leveled against  the  respondents  stood  proved.  
After
      giving the opportunity to the respondents to file their  response  and
      objections to the enquiry report, the Disciplinary  Authority  imposed
      the punishment  of  dismissal  from  service  vide  order  dated  15th
      February 2008 in respect of all the three respondents,  though  orders
      were passed separately in each case.
These -

      respondents filed departmental appeals which were  also  dismissed  by
      the Appellate Authority vide orders dated 28th April, 2008.

      6.    Aggrieved by the orders of the Disciplinary Authority as well as
      the Appellate Authority, the respondents approached the High Court  by
      way of Writ Petitions.

      7.    It so happened that
though 
the other three employees had  denied
      the charges and the enquiry officer was also appointed in their  cases
      (of course after the finding of guilt  was  recorded  by  the  enquiry
      officer in the case of the respondents) before  the  enquiry  officer,
      the  said  three  employees  admitted   the   charges   and   tendered
      unconditional apology.  
They also gave undertaking that they would not
      commit any such misconduct in future.  
The enquiry  officer  recording
      this, forwarded his report to the Disciplinary Authority  and  keeping
      in view that those employees had tendered unconditional apologies with
      the assurance, as aforesaid,
all three  of  them  were  inflicted  the
      penalty of reduction of his basic pay by one stage for one  year  with
      cumulative effect” under Regulation 38(1)(b)(ii)  by  separate  orders
      dated 25th June 2008, 26th June 2008 and 30th June 2008.  This is a -

      major penalty as per the aforesaid Regulations though in the  impugned
      order, 
High Court has termed it as “minor punishment”

      8.    Be that as it may, when the three Writ Petitions  filed  by  the
      respondents herein came up for hearing  before  the  High  Court,  the
      counsel who appeared on behalf of  the  respondents  pointed  out  the
      orders of punishment passed by the Disciplinary Authority in the  case
      of aforesaid three employees and made a statement that the respondents
      were  also  willing  to  tender  unconditional  apologies  for   their
      misconduct with assurance that they would  not  repeat  the  same  and
      would not give any cause of grievance to the Bank in future.
The High
      Court directed the counsel for the Bank to  seek  instructions  as  to
      whether the Appellate Authority (which is the Board  of  Directors  in
      these cases) was willing to reconsider the  unconditional  apology  of
      the respondents and award the same punishment which had  been  awarded
      to other persons charged for the same  misconduct.  
Counsel  for  the
      Bank took the instructions and on the next date  of  hearing  informed
      the High Court that he had received a letter  from  the  Bank  to  the
      effect that since the Appellate Authority was the Board  of  Directors
      which had also decided  their  appeals  and  confirmed  the  order  of
      punishment, it could reconsider the matter only if  the  Court  issues
      such a direction.
Taking note of the aforesaid -

      instructions which the appellant-Bank had given to  its  counsel,  the
      High Court disposed of the Writ Petitions by setting aside  the  order
      of  the  punishment  passed  by  the  Appellate  Authority  with   the
      directions that these appeals  of  the  respondents  be  reconsidered.
      However, while giving the  directions  for  reconsideration  the  High
      Court also specifically ordered that  the  Appellate  Authority  shall
      take a decision and award “minor punishment” as had been done  in  the
      case of other three employees.
Exact nature of this  direction  given
      by the High Court in the impugned order reads as under:

                 “The petitioners shall file before the appellate authority
           the notarized affidavits, tendering unconditional apology in the
           same terms as has been filed before this Court and the appellate
           authority shall take a  decision  and  pass  appropriate  orders
           accordingly awarding minor punishments, as has been done in  the
           case of other office-bearers of the Bank’s Union.  This shall be
           done in the first meeting of the Boards of Directors,  which  is
           to take place hereinafter or in any case within next two months,
           whichever is earlier.”




           It is this specific direction to the Appellate Authority,  which
      is the bone of contention.

      9.    Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned senior counsel for the Bank,  submitted
      that once the matter was referred back to the Appellate Authority  for
      reconsideration, it was to be left to the discretion of the  Appellate
      Authority -

      to take an appropriate view in the matter and it was not open  to  the
      Court to spell out and suggest the exact nature of penalty  which  the
      Appellate Authority is supposed to pass.
His submission was  that  by
      issuing such a direction, the Court itself assumed  the  role  of  the
      Appellate Authority which was  impermissible.
 He  further  submitted
      that  even  when  the  charges  leveled  against  six  employees  were
      identical, the circumstances under which the penalty  was  imposed  on
      the  other  three  employees   were   totally   different   than   the
      circumstances of the three respondents herein.  
In  this  behalf,  he
      pointed out that whereas the  said  three  employees  who  were  given
      lesser punishment, had accepted the charges  on  the  very  first  day
      before the enquiry officer and tendered unconditional apology as well.
     
On the other hand, in so far as these respondents are concerned, they
      denied the charges even  in  the  enquiry  proceedings  which  led  to
      conduct full-fledged departmental enquiry.
Not only this, even  after
      the findings of the enquiry officer the respondents adopted  the  same
      posture of denial and took the matter  further  before  the  Appellate
      Authority.
Pointing out this distinction Mr. Mehta’s  submission  was
      that case of the respondents could not be treated at  par  with  other
      three officials and it was permissible for the Appellate Authority  to
      consider these circumstances and take a decision to -

      impose penalty at variance with  the  punishment  imposed  upon  those
      employees who had accepted the  charges  at  the  outset.  
Mr.  Mehta
      referred to the judgment of this Court in the case of Obettee (P) Ltd.
      Vs. Mohd. Shafiq Khan (2005) 8 SCC 46
wherein identical  features,  as
      prevailing in  this  case,  were  held  as  distinctive  features  and
      different and higher punishment  was  held  to  be  justified  in  the
      following manner:

                 “On consideration of the rival stands  one  thing  becomes
           clear that Chunnu and Vakil stood on a different footing so  far
           as the respondent workman is concerned. He had, unlike the other
           two, continued  to  justify  his  action.  That  was  clearly  a
           distinctive feature which the High Court unfortunately failed to
           properly  appreciate.  The  employer  accepted  to  choose   the
           unqualified apology given and regrets expressed  by  Chunnu  and
           Vakil. It cannot be said that the employer had discriminated  so
           far as the respondent workman  is  concerned  because  as  noted
           above he had tried to justify his action for which  departmental
           proceedings were initiated.  It is not  that  Chunnu  and  Vakil
           were totally exonerated. On the contrary, a  letter  of  warning
           dated 11.4.1984 was issued to them.

                      In Union of India vs. Parma Nanda the  Administrative
           Tribunal had modified the punishment  on  the  ground  that  two
           other persons were let off with  minor  punishment.  This  Court
           held that
when all  the  persons  did  not  stand  on  the  same footing, the same yardstick cannot be applied.  Similar  is  the position in the present case.  

Therefore, the High Court’s order
           is clearly unsustainable and is set aside.”




      -

      10.        Per contra Mr. Rajeev Singh, the learned counsel  appearing
      for  the  respondent  in  one  of  these  appeals  argued   that   the
      circumstances of the two sets  of  cases  were  almost  identical  and
      therefore in the facts of this case, the directions of the High  Court
      were perfectly  in  order.   He  pointed  out  that  the  other  three
      employees had also denied the charges in the first instance, in  their
      replies to the charge  sheets  served  upon  them.  For  some  curious
      reasons the appellant-Bank did not hold any common enquiry  even  when
      the charges leveled in all six charge-sheets were  identical.  Instead
      the Bank first picked up only the respondents  herein,  and  held  the
      enquiry against them.  It is only after in  the  enquiry  the  charges
      were  established  against  the  respondents  and  the  punishment  of
      dismissal was imposed on them, that  the  enquiry  against  the  other
      three employees was commenced. At this  stage,  knowing  the  fate  of
      their cases, those three employees accepted the charges  and  tendered
      unconditional apologies.  The learned counsel argued that the Bank had
      given definite advantage to those three employees by  deferring  their
      enquiries enabling them to make up their mind after knowing the result
      in the case of the respondents.  He, thus, argued that  it  cannot  be
      said that those three  employees  had  accepted  the  charges  at  the
      outset.  His  submission  was  in  such  circumstances  imposition  of
      different and higher -

      penalty to the respondents herein would clearly  amount  to  invidious
      discrimination, as held by this Court in Rajendra Yadav vs.  State  of
      M.P. & Ors. 2013 (2) SCALE 416.  
 In  that  case  two  employees  were
      served with charge sheets who were involved in the same  incident.   A
      person who had more serious role was inflicted comparatively a lighter
      punishment than the appellant in the said case.  This was held  to  be
      violative of doctrine of Equality Principles enshrined  under  Article
      14 of the Constitution of India.
The discussion which  ensued,  while
      taking this view, reads as under:

                 “We have gone through the inquiry report placed before  us
           in respect of the appellant as well as Constable  Arjun  Pathak.
           The inquiry clearly reveals the role of  Arjun  Pathak.  It  was
           Arjun Pathak who had demanded and received the money, though the
           facit approval of the appellant was proved in the  inquiry.  The
           charge leveled against Arjun Pathak was more  serious  than  the
           one charged against the appellant.  Both  appellants  and  other
           two persons as well as Arjun Pathak were involved  in  the  same
           incident.  After having found  that  Arjun  Pathak  had  a  more
           serious role and, in  fact,  I  was  he  who  had  demanded  and
           received the money, he was  inflicted  comparatively  a  lighter
           punishment.  At the  same  time,  appellant  who  had  played  a
           passive role was inflicted with a  more  serious  punishment  of
           dismissal from service which, in our view, cannot be sustained.

                 We are of the view the principle laid down  in  the  above
           mentioned judgments also would apply to the facts of the present
           case.  We  have  already  indicated  that  the  action  of   the
           Disciplinary  Authority   imposing   a   comparatively   lighter
           punishment to the co-delinquent Arjun Pathak and at the same -

           time, harsher punishment to the appellant cannot be permitted in
           law,  since  they  were  all  involved  in  the  same  incident.
           Consequently, we are inclined to allow  the  appeal  by  setting
           aside the punishment of dismissal from service  imposed  on  the
           appellant and order that he be reinstated in service  forthwith.
           Appellant is, therefore, to be  re-instated  from  the  date  on
           which Arjun Pathak was re-instated and be given  all  consequent
           benefits as was given  to  Arjun  Pathak.  Ordered  accordingly.
           However, there will be no order as to costs.”




                Learned counsel for the respondents made a fervent plea that
      the respondents herein were also entitled to the same treatment.

      11.   The question that falls for determination is as to
whether  the
      High Court is justified in giving such a mandamus or  it  should  have
      referred the matter back to the Bank with  the  direction  to  take  a
      fresh decision in the matter?

      12.  Indubitably, the well ingrained principle of law is  that  it  is
      the Disciplinary Authority, or  the  Appellate  Authority  in  appeal,
      which is to  decide  the  nature  of  punishment  to  be  given  to  a
      delinquent employee keeping in view the seriousness of the  misconduct
      committed by such an employee.
Courts cannot  assume  and  usurp  the
      function of the Disciplinary Authority.
 In  the  matter  of  Apparel
      Export Promotion Council vs. -

      A.K.Chopra reported in 1999 (1) SCC 759 this principle  was  explained
      in the following manner:

           “22   …….The  High  Court  in  our  opinion  fell  in  error  in
                 interfering with the punishment, which  could  be  lawfully
                 imposed by the departmental authorities on  the  respondent
                 for his proven misconduct.   …..The High Court  should  not
                 have substituted its own discretion for that the authority.
                 What punishment was required to be imposed,  in  the  facts
                 and circumstances of the case,  was  a  matter  which  fell
                 exclusively  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the   competent
                 authority and did not warrant any interference by the  High
                 Court.  The entire approach of  the  High  Court  has  been
                 faulty. The impugned order of  the  High  Court  cannot  be
                 sustained on this ground alone. …..”




           Yet again, in the case of State of Meghalaya &  Ors.  Vs.  Mecken
      Singh N.Marak reported in 2008 (7) SCC 580, this Court reiterated  the
      law by stating:

           “14.  In the matter of imposition  of  sentence,  the  scope  of
                 interference is very limited and restricted to  exceptional
                 cases. The jurisdiction of the  High  Court,  to  interfere
                 with the quantum of punishment is  limited  and  cannot  be
                 exercised  without  sufficient  reasons.  The  High  Court,
                 although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to  consider
                 the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it
                 has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the
                 High Courts, in exercise of powers under  Article  226,  do
                 not interfere with the quantum of punishment  unless  there
                 exist sufficient reasons therefor. The punishment -

           imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority
                 unless shocking to the conscience of the court,  cannot  be
                 subjected to judicial review. In the impugned order of  the
                 High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated to why
                 the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure  to
                 give  reasons  amounts  to  denial  of  justice.  The  mere
                 statement that it is disproportionate  would not suffice.




           15&16  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx




           17.    Even  in  cases  where  the  punishment  imposed  by  the
                 disciplinary authority is  found  to  be  shocking  to  the
                 conscience  of  the  court,   normally   the   disciplinary
                 authority or the appellate authority should be directed  to
                 reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The  High
                 Court in  this  case  has  not  only  interfered  with  the
                 punishment imposed  by  the  disciplinary  authority  in  a
                 routine  manner  but  overstepped   its   jurisdiction   by
                 directing the  appellate  authority  to  impose  any  other
                 punishment short of removal. By fettering the discretion of
                 the appellate authority to  impose  appropriate  punishment
                 for serious misconducts committed by  the  respondent,  the
                 High Court  totally  misdirected  itself  while  exercising
                 jurisdiction under Article 226. Judged in  this  background
                 the conclusion of the Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court
                 cannot be regarded as proper at all.  The  High  Court  has
                 interfered with the punishment  imposed  by  the  competent
                 authority in a casual manner  and,  therefore,  the  appeal
                 will have to be accepted.”




      13.   As is clear from the above  that  the  Judicial  Review  of  the
      quantum of punishment is available with a very limited scope.   It  is
      only when the -

      penalty imposed appears to be shocking disproportionate to the  nature
      of misconduct that the Courts would frown upon. Even in such  a  case,
      after setting aside the penalty  order,  it  is  to  be  left  to  the
      disciplinary/Appellate Authority to take a decision afresh and  it  is
      not for the court  to  substitute  its  decision  by  prescribing  the
      quantum of punishment.   In the present case, however,  we  find  that
      the High Court has, on the one hand directed the  appellate  authority
      to take a decision and in the same breath, snatched the discretion  by
      directing the Appellate  Authority  to  pass  a  particular  order  of
      punishment.   In  normal  course,  such  an  order  would  clearly  be
      unsustainable, having regard to the legal position outlined above.

      14.   The peculiar feature, however, is that the High Court  has  done
      so proceeding on the presumption  that  these  three  respondents  are
      equally and identical placed as the  other  three  employees  who  had
      admitted the charges, though this parity is not  spelled  out  in  the
      impugned order. Whether this approach of the High  Court  is  tenable,
      looking into the facts of this case, is the moot question.

       15.  If there is a complete parity in the two sets of cases  imposing
      different  penalties  would  not  be  appropriate  as  inflicting   of
      any/higher penalty in one -

      case would be discriminatory and would amount  to  infraction  of  the
      doctrine of Equality enshrined in Article 14 of  the  Constitution  of
      India. That is the ratio of Rajendra Yadav’s case, already taken  note
      above.  On the other hand, if  there  is  some  difference,  different
      penalty can be meted out and what should be the quantum is to be  left
      to  the  appellate  authority.   However,  such   a   penalty   should
      consumerate with the gravity of misconduct and  cannot  be  shockingly
      disproportionate. As per the ratio of Obettee (P) Ltd.  Case  even  if
      the nature of misconduct committed by the two  sets  of  employees  is
      same, the conduct of one set  of  employee  accepting  the  guilt  and
      pleading for lenient view would justify lesser punishment to them than
      the other employees who remained adopted the mode of denial, with  the
      result that charges stood proved ultimately in a full-fledged  enquiry
      conducted against them.  In that event, higher penalty can be  imposed
      upon such delinquent employees. It would follow that choosing to  take
      a chance to contest the charges such employees thereafter cannot  fall
      back and say that the penalty in their cases cannot be more  than  the
      penalty which is imposed upon those employees who accepted the charges
      at the outset by tendering unconditional apology.

      -

      16.   This, according to  us,  would  be  the  harmonious  reading  of
      Obettee (P) Ltd. and Rajendra Yadav cases.

            The principles discussed above can be summed up  and  summarized
      as follows:

  (a)   When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an  enquiry  the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is
  essentially the domain of the departmental authorities;

(b)     The   Courts   cannot    assume    the    function    of
   disciplinary/departmental authorities  and  to  decide  the
      quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be  awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction  of the competent authority;

           (c)  Limited judicial review is available to interfere with  the
 punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority,  only  in
  cases where such penalty is found to  be  shocking  to  the
conscience of the Court;

           -

           (d)   Even in such a case when the punishment is set  aside   as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed
 against the  delinquent employee, the appropriate course of
  action is to remit the  matter  back  to  the  disciplinary
authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass
 appropriate order of penalty. 
The Court  by  itself  cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case.

           (e)   The only exception to the  principle stated  in  para  (d)
                 above, would be  in those cases where the co-delinquent  is  awarded lesser punishment  by  the  disciplinary  authority
  even when the charges of misconduct was identical or the co-
  delinquent was foisted with  more  serious  charges.   This
  would be on the Doctrine of Equality when it is found  that
  the concerned employee and the  co-delinquent  are  equally
      placed.  
However, 
there has to be a complete parity between
                 the two, not only  in  respect  of  nature  of  charge  but
                 subsequent conduct as well  after  the  service  of  charge
                 sheet in the  two  cases.   If  co-delinquent  accepts  the
                 charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.

      -

      17.   It is made clear that such a comparison is permissible only when
      the  other  employee(s)  who  is  given  lighter  punishment  was  co- delinquent. 
Such a comparison is not permissible by citing  the  cases of  other  employees,  as  precedents,  in  all   together  different departmental  enquiries.

      18.   Applying these principles to the facts of the present  case,  we
      may observe that, no doubt the charges  in  respect  of  two  sets  of
      employees were identical.
Though the other set of  employee  accepted
      the charges on the first day of enquiry, a factor which is to be  kept
      in mind, that even those employees had denied the charges in the first
      instance and accepted these charges only in the departmental  enquiry,
      that too after realizing that similar charges had been proved  against
      the respondents herein in the departmental enquiry.
Therefore, it  was
      not a case where  those  employees  had  expressed  the  unconditional
      apology in the first instance.
This may be a mitigating  circumstance
      for the appellants herein.  
At the same time, we are of  the  opinion
      that  all  these  aspects  are  to  be  considered  by  the  appellate
      authority.
The High Court did not look  into  all  these  aspects  and
      mandated the appellate authority to pass orders  imposing  a  specific
      penalty only.
This direction of the High Court  is,  accordingly,  set
      aside and the matter is remitted back to the  appellate  authority  to
      take a decision imposing - appropriate penalty on the respondents herein.
We are confident  that
      the mitigating circumstances pointed out  by  the  respondents  herein
      would be given due consideration by the appellate  authority,  keeping
      in view the ratio of Rajendra Yadav’s case as well.
 It would be  open
      to the respondents herein to make representation in this behalf to the
      appellate authority on the basis of  which  the  respondents  want  to
      contend that they should be given same treatment as meted out to other
      three employees.  Such a representation will be  given  15  days  from
      today.  Appellate Authority shall pass appropriate orders deciding the
      appeals afresh within 2 months from today.

      19.   Appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms.  No costs.




                                                   …………………….J.
                                                   (Anil R. Dave)






                                                   …………………….J.
                                                   (A.K.Sikri)




      New Delhi,

      Dated:  July 29, 2013






No comments:

Post a Comment

Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.