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Sunday, February 17, 2013

“transportation for life” A sentence of transportation for life or imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as transportation or imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted person's natural life. The petitioner – a life convict has filed this contempt petition against the respondents – the State of West Bengal and its officers for disobeying the order dated 24.11.2010 passed by this Court by not complying with the same within the prescribed period of eight weeks and failure to release him in accordance with the statute. - “The life convict was convicted on 18.01.1990 under Section 302/34 IPC and detained in connection with S.T. No. 01 of June 1989. He was released on parole from Presidency Correctional Home on 29.04.2005 in compliance with Hon’ble Supreme Court’s order in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 279 of 2004. The police authority vehemently opposed the premature release of the life convict on the following grounds: (a) He was a notorious fellow in the area before his conviction. (b) He still maintains relationship with his old associates. 20Page 21 (c) He is within the age of 52 years with sound health. (d) His socio economic condition is not sound. (e) In case of his premature release there is every possibility of his reverting to criminality. (f) During his parole he has been technically serving life imprisonment binding him to refrain from criminal activities for the time being. There is every possibility of his committing further crimes. Considering the above fact, the Review Board did not find any reason to recommend premature release of the life convict now on parole.” It is seen that after careful consideration of all the aspects, the Review Board in its meeting held on 27.01.2011 did not recommend the petitioner for his premature release. The recommendation of the Review Board was placed before the State Government and the State Government accepted the recommendation of the State Sentence Review Board. The decision of the State Government was communicated to the petitioner vide letter No. 790-J dated 09.02.2012. In view of the decision of the State Sentence Review Board, approval by the State Government and the principles enunciated in various decisions of this Court including the decision of the Constitution Bench in Gopal Vinayak Godse’s case (supra), we find no merit in the contempt petition, consequently, the same is dismissed.


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        REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                           ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CONTEMPT PETITION (C) No. 363 OF 2011
IN
WRIT PETITION (CRL.) No. 279 OF 2004
Life Convict Bengal @ Khoka
@ Prasanta Sen   .... Petitioner (s)
Versus
B.K. Srivastava & Ors.                         .... Alleged Contemnors/
Respondent(s)
   
J U D G M E N T
P.Sathasivam,J.
1) The petitioner – a life convict has filed this contempt
petition against the respondents – the State of West Bengal
and its officers for disobeying the order dated 24.11.2010
passed by this Court by not complying with the same within
the prescribed period of eight weeks and failure to release
him in accordance with the statute.
1Page 2
2) Brief facts:
(a) Prior to the above contempt petition, the petitioner filed
a writ of Habeas Corpus being W.P. (Crl.) No. 279 of 2004 -
for his immediate release in which it was stated that as per
his  calculation,  he  has  undergone  total  sentence  of
imprisonment for a period of 22 years 2 months and 16 days
including earned remission.  According to him, even as per
the  stand  taken  by  the  respondents  in  their  counter
affidavits, he had undergone sentence for a period of 20
years 1 month and 17 days including remission and set off
as  on  31.12.2004.   In  other  words,  according  to  the
petitioner,  he  has  already undergone  full sentence  of 20
years with remission.
(b) By order dated 24.11.2010, this Court disposed of W.P.
(Crl.) Nos. 20 and 279 of 2004 with the following directions:
“In  the  light  of  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  State  of
Haryana  &  Ors. vs.  Jagdish,  2010  (4)  SCC  216  and
considering the relief prayed in both the writ petitions, we
dispose of the writ petitions by the following directions:
The State of West Bengal is directed to consider the
claim of both the writ petitioners, life convicts and proceed
to conclude the sentence for the purpose of consideration
of remission as per the Statute/Policy applicable on the
date of conviction and pass appropriate orders in terms of
2Page 3
the above decision within a period of eight weeks from the
date of the receipt of the copy of this order.
The Writ Petitions are disposed of.
Sd/-
            (P.Sathasivam,J.)
   Sd/-
                (Dr. B.S.ChauhanJ.)”
3) It is the claim of the petitioner that in spite of the said
order of this Court dated 24.11.2010 and in view of the West
Bengal Correctional Services Act, 1992 (West Bengal Act 32
of  1992)  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  W.B.Act”),  the
respondents have not released him which necessitated him
to file the above contempt petition.
4) Pursuant to the notice issued by this Court, Mr. B.K.
Srivastava, respondent No.1, Secretary to the Government of
West  Bengal,  Judicial  Department  has  filed  the  counter
affidavit highlighting their stand.  In addition to the same,
Dr.  G.D.  Gautama,  respondent  No.2,  Additional  Chief
Secretary  to  the  Government  of  West  Bengal,  Home
Department  and  Mr.  Biplab  Das  -  respondent  No.3,
Superintendent of the Presidency Correctional Home have
filed  counter  affidavits  reiterating  their  stand.   In  these
counter  affidavits,  the  State  Government  has  highlighted
3Page 4
that on going into the period of custody, other particulars
and the provisions of the West Bengal Act, it rejected the
prayer of the petitioner for his premature release, hence,
according  to  them,  there  is  no  violation  of  order  dated
24.11.2010 passed by this Court and prayed for dismissal of
the present contempt petition.
5) We heard Mr. B.S. Malik, learned senior counsel for the
petitioner and Mr. Avijit Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for
the respondents.
Discussion:
6) In order to appreciate the claim of both the parties, it is
useful  to  refer  relevant  provisions  relating  to  release  of
prisoners under the W.B. Act.  Section 2(c) of the W.B. Act
defines “correctional home” which reads as under:
“2(c)  “correctional  home”  means  any  place  used
permanently or temporarily under the orders of the State
Government for detention of persons, whether under-trial
or convicted, in accordance with any order for confinement
under any law providing for preventive detention or any
other law for the time being in force, but does not include a
place for confinement of a person under the custody of the
police;”
Chapter XVII of the said Act deals with remission, release
and parole.  Section 58 speaks about remission, Section 59
4Page 5
relates to special remission to examinees and Section 61,
with which we are concerned, speaks about release.  Section
61 contains 6 sub-sections and thereafter Explanation has
been appended to.  Mr. B.S. Malik, learned senior counsel for
the petitioner heavily relied on the Explanation to Section 61
which reads as under:
“Explanation – For the purpose of calculation of the total
period of imprisonment under this section, the period of
imprisonment for life shall be taken to be equivalent to the
period of imprisonment for 20 years.”
7) Relying on the Explanation and in view of the fact that
even according to the State, the petitioner has crossed 20
years in correctional home (prison), according to the learned
senior counsel, as per order of this Court dated 24.11.2010,
the respondents ought to have released the petitioner on
completion of a period of 20 years.  The above claim was
resisted by Mr. Avijit Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the
respondents.  According to him, it cannot be construed that
the  period  of  imprisonment  for  life  is  equivalent  to
imprisonment for 20 years.  He further pointed out that in
the absence of remission order for the whole period by the
State Government, the petitioner cannot be released.
5Page 6
8) Even  at  the  outset,  Mr.  B.S.  Malik,  learned  senior
counsel for the petitioner, relied on a decision rendered by
this Court on 16.09.2011 in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 38 of 2011
titled Harpal Singh vs. State of Haryana & Another.  The
said writ petition, under Article 32 of the Constitution, was
filed by one Harpal Singh for issuing a writ of Habeas Corpus
and to set him at liberty forthwith from his illegal detention
in the prison beyond 20 years of his sentence.  This Court,
after going into the Jail Custody Certificate dated 28.08.2011
issued  by  the  Superintendent  Central  Jail,  Ambala  and
finding that the petitioner had undergone imprisonment of
more than 20 years with remissions, allowed the writ petition
and directed the authorities to release him forthwith from
the jail unless his presence in jail is needed with reference to
any other case.
9) After going into the relevant provisions, viz., Section 57
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”), Sections 2(c)
and 61 of the W.B. Act as well as various decisions of this
6Page 7
Court on this point, we are unable to accept the claim of the
petitioner for the following reasons.
10) Before adverting to  various decisions,  it is useful to
reproduce Section 57 of IPC which reads as under:
“57.  Fractions of term of punishment – In calculating
fractions of  terms of punishment, imprisonment for life
shall be reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for twenty
years.”
11) At the foremost, it is useful to refer the decision of the
Constitution Bench of this Court in  Gopal  Vinayak  Godse
vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 600.
In  that  case,  a  writ  petition,  under  Article  32  of  the
Constitution, was filed for an order in the nature of Habeas
Corpus claiming that the petitioner therein has justly served
his sentence and should, therefore, be released forthwith.
Among other questions, the main question considered by the
Constitution Bench was whether there is any provision of law
whereunder a sentence for life imprisonment, without any
formal  remission  by  appropriate  Government,  can  be
automatically  treated  as  one  for  a  definite  period?   The
Constitution Bench, in an answer to the above question, said
7Page 8
“No”.  The following discussion and ultimate conclusion are
relevant:
“5………… No such provision is found in the Indian Penal
Code,  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  or  the  Prisons  Act.
Though the Government of India stated before the Judicial
Committee in the case cited supra that, having regard to
Section  57  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code,  20  years'
imprisonment  was  equivalent  to  a  sentence  of
transportation  for  life,  the  Judicial  Committee  did  not
express  its  final  opinion  on  that  question.  The  Judicial
Committee observed in that case thus at p. 10:
“Assuming that the sentence is to be regarded as
one of twenty years, and subject to remission for
good conduct, he had not earned remission sufficient
to  entitle  him  to  discharge  at  the  time  of  his
application, and it was therefore rightly dismissed,
but in saying this, Their Lordships are not to be taken
as meaning that a life sentence must in all cases be
treated as one of not more than twenty years, or that
the convict is necessarily entitled to remission.”
Section  57  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  has  no  real
bearing  on  the  question  raised  before  us.  For
calculating  fractions  of  terms  of  punishment  the
section provides that transportation for life shall be
regarded as equivalent to imprisonment for twenty
years. It does not say that transportation for life shall
be deemed to be transportation for twenty years for
all purposes; nor does the amended section which
substitutes  the  words  “imprisonment  for  life”  for
“transportation for life” enable the drawing of any
such  all  embracing  fiction.  A  sentence  of
transportation for life or imprisonment for life must
prima  facie  be  treated  as  transportation  or
imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period
of the convicted person's natural life.
“7. It is common case that the said rules were made
under the Prisons Act, 1894 and that they have statutory
force. But the Prisons Act does not confer on any authority
a power to commute or remit sentences; it provides only
for  the  regulation  of  prisons  and  for  the  treatment  of
prisoners confined therein. Section 59 of the Prisons Act
8Page 9
confers a power on the State Government to make rules,
inter  alia, for  rewards  for  good  conduct.  Therefore,  the
rules made under the Act should be construed within the
scope of the ambit of the Act. The rules, inter alia, provide
for three types of remissions by way of rewards for good
conduct, namely, (i) ordinarily, (ii) special and (iii) State.
For  the working  out of the said remissions, under Rule
1419(c), transportation for life is ordinarily to be taken as
15  years'  actual  imprisonment.  The  rule  cannot  be
construed  as  a  statutory  equation  of  15  years'  actual
imprisonment for transportation for life. The equation is
only for a particular purpose, namely, for the purpose of
“remission  system”  and not  for  all  purposes.  The  word
“ordinarily” in the rule also supports the said construction.
The  non  obstante  clause  in  sub-rule  (2)  of  Rule  1447
reiterates that notwithstanding anything contained in Rule
1419  no  prisoner  who  has  been  sentenced  to
transportation for life shall be released on completion of
his  term  unless  orders  of  the  Government  have  been
received on a report submitted to it. This also indicates
that the period of 15 years' actual imprisonment specified
in  the  rule  is  only  for  the  purpose  of  calculating  the
remission  and that the  completion  of  the  term on that
basis does not ipso facto confer any right upon the prisoner
to release. The order of the Government contemplated in
Rule  1447  in  the  case  of  a  prisoner  sentenced  to
transportation for life can only be an order under Section
401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for in the case of a
sentence  of  transportation  for  life  the  release  of  the
prisoner can legally be effected only by remitting the entire
balance of the sentence. Rules 934 and 937(c) provide for
that contingency. Under the said rules the orders of an
appropriate  Government  under  Section  401  Criminal
Procedure Code, are a pre-requisite for a release. No other
rule  has  been  brought  to  our  notice  which  confers  an
indefeasible right on a prisoner sentenced to transportation
for  life  to  an  unconditional  release  on  the  expiry  of  a
particular term including remissions. The rules under the
Prisons  Act  do  not  substitute  a  lesser  sentence  for  a
sentence of transportation for life.
8. Briefly stated the legal position is this: Before Act 26
of  1955  a  sentence  of  transportation  for  life  could  be
undergone by a prisoner by way of rigorous imprisonment
for life in a designated prison in India. After the said Act,
such a convict shall be dealt with in the same manner as
one  sentenced  to  rigorous  imprisonment  for  the  same
9Page 10
term. Unless the said sentence is commuted or remitted by
appropriate authority under the relevant provisions of the
Indian Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure, a
prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is bound in law to
serve the life term in prison. The rules framed under the
Prisons Act enable such a prisoner to earn remissions —
ordinary, special and State — and the said remissions will
be given credit towards his term of imprisonment. For the
purpose  of  working  out  the  remissions  the  sentence  of
transportation for life is ordinarily equated with a definite
period, but it is only for that particular purpose and not for
any other purpose. As the sentence of transportation for
life or its prison equivalent, the life imprisonment, is one of
indefinite  duration,  the  remissions  so  earned  do  not  in
practice help such a convict as it is not possible to predict
the time of his death. That is why the Rules provide for a
procedure to enable the appropriate Government to remit
the sentence under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure  on  a  consideration  of  the  relevant  factors,
including the period of remissions earned. The question of
remission  is  exclusively  within  the  province  of  the
appropriate Government; and in this case it is admitted
that,  though  the  appropriate  Government  made  certain
remissions  under  Section  401  of  the  Code  of  Criminal
Procedure,  it  did  not  remit  the  entire  sentence.  We,
therefore, hold that the petitioner has not yet acquired any
right to release.”
From the above decision, it is clear that in the absence of
subsequent  order  of  remission  by  the  competent
Government either based on Section 57 of IPC or any other
provision  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  1973,  the  life
convict  cannot  be  released.   The  above  decision  of  the
Constitution Bench has been followed in various subsequent
decisions.
10Page 11
12) In  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh vs.  Ratan  Singh  &
Ors.,  (1976)  3  SCC  470,  following  the  decision  of  the
Constitution  Bench  in  Gopal  Vinayak Godse’s  case
(supra), this Court held as under:
“4. As regards the first point, namely, that the prisoner
could be released automatically on the expiry of 20 years
under the Punjab Jail Manual or the Rules framed under the
Prisons Act, the matter is no longer res integra and stands
concluded by a decision of this Court in  Gopal Vinayak
Godse v. State of Maharashtra where the Court, following a
decision of the Privy Council in Pandit Kishori Lal v. KingEmperor,AIR 1945 PC 64 observed as follows:
“Under that section, a person transported for life
or any other term before the enactment of the said
section would be treated as a person sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for life or for the said term.
If so, the next question is whether there is any
provision  of  law  whereunder  a  sentence  for  life
imprisonment,  without  any  formal  remission  by
appropriate  Government,  can  be  automatically
treated  as  one  for  a  definite  period.  No  such
provision is found in the Indian Penal Code, Code of
Criminal Procedure or the Prisons Act.
* * *
A  sentence  of  transportation  for  life  or
imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as
transportation or imprisonment for the whole of the
remaining period of the convicted person's natural
life.”
The Court further observed thus:
“But  the  Prisons  Act  does  not  confer  on  any
authority a power to commute or remit sentences; it
provides only for the regulation of prisons and for the
treatment of prisoners confined therein. Section 59
of  the  Prisons  Act  confers  a  power  on  the  State
Government to make rules, inter alia, for rewards for
good conduct. Therefore, the rules made under the
Act  should  be  construed  within  the  scope  of  the
11Page 12
ambit of the Act.... Under the said rules the orders of
an appropriate Government under Section 401 of the
Criminal  Procedure  Code,  are  a  prerequisite  for  a
release. No other rule has been brought to our notice
which  confers  an  indefeasible  right  on  a  prisoner
sentenced  to  transportation  for  life  to  an
unconditional release on the expiry of a particular
term  including  remissions.  The  rules  under  the
Prisons Act do not substitute a lesser sentence for a
sentence of transportation for life.
The question of remission is exclusively within the
province of the appropriate Government; and in this
case  it  is  admitted  that,  though  the  appropriate
Government made certain remissions under Section
401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it did not
remit the entire sentence. We, therefore, hold that
the  petitioner  has  not  yet  acquired  any  right  to
release.”
It is, therefore, manifest from the decision of this Court
that the Rules framed under the Prisons Act or under the
Jail Manual do not affect the total period which the prisoner
has  to  suffer  but  merely  amount  to  administrative
instructions regarding the various remissions to be given to
the  prisoner  from  time  to  time  in  accordance  with  the
rules. This Court further pointed out that the question of
remission of the entire sentence or a part of it lies within
the exclusive domain of the appropriate Government under
Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and neither
Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code nor any Rules or local
Acts  can  stultify  the  effect  of  the  sentence  of  life
imprisonment given by the court under the Indian Penal
Code. In other words, this Court has clearly held that a
sentence for life would enure till the lifetime of the accused
as  it  is  not  possible  to  fix  a  particular  period  of  the
prisoner's  death  and  remissions  given  under  the  Rules
could not be regarded as a substitute for a sentence of
transportation for life. In these circumstances, therefore, it
is clear that the High Court was in error in thinking that the
respondent  was  entitled  to  be  released  as  of  right  on
completing the term of 20 years including the remissions.
For these reasons, therefore, the first contention raised by
the Learned Counsel for the appellant is well founded and
must prevail.
12Page 13
9. From  a  review  of  the  authorities  and  the  statutory
provisions  of the Code of Criminal Procedure  the following
propositions emerge:
“(1) that a sentence of imprisonment for life does not
automatically expire at the end of 20 years including
the remissions, because the administrative rules framed
under the various Jail Manuals or under the Prisons Act
cannot supersede the statutory provisions of the Indian
Penal Code. A sentence of imprisonment for life means
a sentence for the entire life of the prisoner unless the
appropriate  Government  chooses  to  exercise  its
discretion to remit either the whole or a part of the
sentence  under Section  401  of the  Code  of  Criminal
Procedure;
(2)  that  the  appropriate  Government  has  the
undoubted discretion to remit or refuse to remit the
sentence and where it refuses to remit the sentence no
writ can be issued directing the State Government to
release the prisoner;
(3)  that  the  appropriate  Government  which  is
empowered to grant remission under Section 401 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure is the Government   of
the State where the prisoner has been convicted and
sentenced, that is to say, the transferor State and not
the transferee State where the prisoner may have been
transferred  at  his  instance  under  the  Transfer  of
Prisoners Act; and
(4) that where the transferee State feels that the
accused  has  completed  a  period  of  20  years  it  has
merely to forward the request of the prisoner to the
concerned  State  Government,  that  is  to  say,  the
Government  of  the  State  where  the  prisoner  was
convicted  and  sentenced and even  if  this  request is
rejected  by  the  State  Government  the  order  of  the
Government cannot be interfered with by a High Court
in its writ jurisdiction.”
After holding so, this Court set aside the order of the High
Court  releasing  the  prisoner  therein  from  Central  Jail,
Amritsar.
13Page 14
13) In Kartar Singh & Ors.  vs. State of Haryana, (1982)
3  SCC  1,  a  Bench  of  three  Judges  of  this  Court  while
considering the similar claim held as under:
“6……Further,  Section  57  IPC  or  the  remission  rules
contained in Jail Manual (e.g. para 516-B of Punjab/Haryana
Jail Manual) are irrelevant in this context. Section 57 IPC
provides that imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as
equivalent to imprisonment for 20 years for the specific
purpose  mentioned  therein,  namely,  for  the  purpose  of
calculating fractions of terms of punishment and not for all
purposes;  similarly  remission  rules  contained  in  Jail
Manuals cannot override statutory provisions contained in
the Penal Code and the sentence of imprisonment for life
have to be regarded as a sentence for the remainder of the
natural  life  of  the  convict.  The  Privy  Council  in  Pandit
Kishori Lal case and this Court in Gopal Godse case have
settled this position once and for all by taking the view that
a sentence for transportation for life or imprisonment for
life must be treated as transportation or imprisonment for
the  whole  of  the  remaining  period  of  the  convicted
person's natural life. This view has been confirmed and
followed by this Court in two subsequent decisions — in
Ratan Singh case,  and Maru Ram case In this view of the
matter life convicts would not fall within the purview of
Section 428 CrPC.”
The Bench also considered Gopal Godse case  (supra) and
the decision of the Privy Council in Pandit Kishori Lal vs.
King Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 64.
14) In Laxman Naskar vs. Union of India & Ors., (2000)
2 SCC 595, this Court reiterated the same proposition.
15) The last decision which is directly on the point similar to
the case on hand is  Mohd. Munna vs.  Union of India  &
14Page 15
Ors. etc. (2005) 7 SCC 417.  The said case arose in a writ
petition filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution.  According to
the  petitioner  therein,  the  length  of  duration  of
imprisonment for life is equivalent to 20 years’ imprisonment
and that too subject to further remission admissible under
law.  It was further pointed out that on completion of this
term, he was liable to be released under Rule 751(c) of the
West Bengal Jail Code.  The petitioner relied on Explanation
to Section 61 of the West Bengal Correctional Services Act,
1992  (West  Bengal  Act  32  of  1992)  whereunder
imprisonment  for  life  is  equated  to  a  term  of  20  years’
imprisonment.  As said earlier, it is a case identical to the
case on hand.  Here again, Explanation to Section 61 of the
West Bengal Act was pressed into service.  After going into
the very same provisions and considering the decision of the
Privy Council in Pandit Kishori Lal’s case  (supra) as well
as the decision of the Constitution Bench in Gopal Vinayak
Godse’s case (supra), this Court concluded thus:
“13. The counsel contended that by virtue of Rule 751(c) of
the West Bengal Jail Code, the petitioner was liable to be
released  from  jail on completion  of  twenty years.  He  also
relied on the Explanation to Section 61 of the West Bengal
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Correctional Services Act, 1992 (W.B. Act 32 of 1992) wherein
the imprisonment for life is equated to a term of twenty years'
simple imprisonment for the purpose of remission. But there
is no provision either in the Indian Penal Code or in the Code
of  Criminal  Procedure  whereby  life  imprisonment  could  be
treated as fourteen years or twenty years without there being
a formal remission by the appropriate Government. Section
57 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
“57.  Fractions  of  terms  of  punishment.—In
calculating  fractions  of  terms  of  punishment,
imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as equivalent to
imprisonment for twenty years.”
The  above  section  is  applicable  for  the  purpose  of
remission  when  the  matter  is  considered  by  the
Government under the appropriate provisions. This very
plea was placed before the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council in  Kishori Lal v.  Emperor5 and the Privy
Council held as under: (AIR p. 67)
“Assuming that the sentence is to be regarded as
one  of  20  years,  and  subject  to  remission  for  good
conduct,  he  had  not  earned  remission  sufficient  to
entitle him to discharge at the time of his application
and it was therefore  rightly  dismissed but, in saying
this, Their Lordships are not to be taken as meaning
that a life sentence must and in all cases be treated as
one of not more than 20 years or that the convict is
necessarily entitled to remission.”
14. The Prisons Rules are made under the Prisons Act and
the  Prisons  Act by  itself does  not  confer  any authority  or
power to commute or remit sentence. It only provides for the
regulation of the prisons and for the terms of the prisoners
confined  therein.  Therefore,  the  West  Bengal  Correctional
Services Act or the West Bengal Jail Code do not confer any
special right on the petitioner herein.
15. In  Godse case6, the Constitution Bench of this Court
held that the sentence of imprisonment for life is not for any
definite  period  and  the  imprisonment  for  life  must,  prima
facie,  be  treated  as  imprisonment  for  the  whole  of  the
remaining period of the convicted person's natural life. It was
also held in AIR para 5 as follows: (SCR pp. 444-45)
“It does not say that transportation for life shall be
deemed to be transportation for twenty years for all
purposes;  nor  does  the  amended  section  which
substitutes  the  words  ‘imprisonment  for  life’  for
‘transportation for life’ enable the drawing of any such
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all-embracing fiction. A sentence of transportation for
life or imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated
as transportation or imprisonment for the whole of the
remaining period of the convicted person's natural life.”
16. Summarising the decision, it was held in AIR para 8 as
under: (SCR p. 447)
“Briefly stated the legal position is this: Before Act 26
of 1955 a sentence of transportation for life could be
undergone  by  a  prisoner  by  way  of  rigorous
imprisonment for life in a designated prison in India.
After the said Act, such a convict shall be dealt with in
the  same  manner  as  one  sentenced  to  rigorous
imprisonment  for  the  same  term.  Unless  the  said
sentence  is  commuted  or  remitted  by  appropriate
authority  under the  relevant provisions  of the  Indian
Penal  Code  or  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  a
prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is bound in law
to serve the life term in prison. The Rules framed under
the  Prisons  Act  enable  such  a  prisoner  to  earn
remissions — ordinary, special and State — and the said
remissions  will  be  given  credit  towards  his  term  of
imprisonment.  For  the  purpose  of  working  out  the
remissions  the  sentence  of  transportation  for  life  is
ordinarily equated with a definite period, but it is only
for  that  particular  purpose  and  not  for  any  other
purpose. As the sentence of transportation for life or its
prison  equivalent,  the  life  imprisonment,  is  one  of
indefinite duration, the remissions so earned do not in
practice  help  such a convict  as it is  not possible  to
predicate the time of his death. That is why the Rules
provide  for  a  procedure  to  enable  the  appropriate
Government to remit the sentence under Section 401 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure on a consideration of
the relevant factors, including the period of remissions
earned. The question of remission is exclusively within
the province of the appropriate Government; and in this
case  it  is  admitted  that,  though  the  appropriate
Government made certain remissions under Section 401
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it did not remit the
entire sentence. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner
has not yet acquired any right to release.”
We  are  bound  by  the  above  dicta  laid  down  by  the
Constitution Bench and we hold that life imprisonment is not
17Page 18
equivalent to imprisonment for fourteen years or for twenty
years as contended by the petitioner.
17. Thus, all the contentions raised by the petitioner fail
and the petitioner is not entitled to be released on any of the
grounds urged in the writ petition so long as there is no order
of remission passed by the appropriate Government in his
favour. We make it clear that our decision need not be taken
as expression of our view that the petitioner is not entitled to
any remission at all. The appropriate Government would be at
liberty  to  pass  any  appropriate  order  of  remission  in
accordance with law.”
16) It is clear that neither Section 57 IPC nor Explanation to
Section 61 of the W.B. Act lays down that a life imprisonment
prisoner has to be released after completion of 20 years.  20
years mentioned in Explanation to Section 61 of the W.B. Act
is only for the purpose of ordering remission.  If the State
Government  taking  into  consideration  various  aspects
refused  to  grant  remission  of  the  whole  period  then  the
petitioner cannot take advantage of the above Explanation
and even Section 57 IPC and seek for pre-mature release.
Further the question of remission of the entire sentence or a
part of it lies within the exclusive domain of the appropriate
Government  under  Section  401  of  the  Code  of  Criminal
Procedure, 1973 and neither Section 57 of the IPC nor any
rules or local Acts (in the case on hand W.B. Act) can stultify
the effect of the sentence of life imprisonment given by the
18Page 19
Court  under  the  IPC.   To  put  it  clear,  once  a  person  is
sentenced  to  undergo  life  imprisonment  unless
imprisonment  for  life  is  commuted  by  the  competent
authority, he has to undergo imprisonment for the whole of
his life.  It is equally well settled that Section 57 of the IPC
does not, in any way, limit the punishment of imprisonment
for life to a term of 20 years.
17) In the case on hand, it is highlighted by the learned
counsel for the respondents that in West Bengal there is a
duly  constituted  Review  Board  for  consideration  of
applications for premature release made by life convicts.  It
consists of:
1. Additional  Chief  Secretary,  Home  Department  –
Chairman of the Review Board;
2. Commissioner of Police, Kolkata – Member
3. Chief Probation Officer, West Bengal – Member
4. Inspector General of Prisons, West Bengal – Member
5. Judicial Secretary, West Bengal – Convener
6. Director General and Inspector General of Police, West
Bengal – Member
7. Principal  Secretary,  Jails  Department,  West  Bengal  –
Member
19Page 20
On receipt of the application for premature release except
under  Article  161  of  the  Constitution,  the  Review  Board
would  go  into  all  the  details  and  place  it  before  the
Government.  Ultimately on approval of the Hon’ble Chief
Minister, the convict is prematurely released under Section
432  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  1973.   Insofar  as
application under Article 161 is concerned, it was explained
that the procedure followed remains the same but the file is
finally  placed  before  His  Excellency  the  Governor  of  the
State through the Hon’ble Chief Minister.
18) In the counter affidavits filed by the State, it is pointed
out  that  regarding  the  case  of  the  petitioner  –Khoka  @
Prasanta  Sen,  the  Sentence  Review  Board  observed  as
under:
“The  life  convict  was  convicted  on  18.01.1990  under
Section 302/34 IPC and detained in connection with S.T.
No. 01 of June 1989.  He was released on parole from
Presidency  Correctional  Home  on  29.04.2005  in
compliance  with  Hon’ble  Supreme  Court’s  order  in Writ
Petition (Criminal) No. 279 of 2004.  The police authority
vehemently  opposed  the  premature  release  of  the  life
convict on the following grounds:
(a) He  was  a  notorious  fellow  in  the  area  before  his
conviction.
(b) He still maintains relationship with his old associates.
20Page 21
(c) He is within the age of 52 years with sound health.
(d) His socio economic condition is not sound.
(e) In  case  of  his  premature  release  there  is  every
possibility of his reverting to criminality.
(f) During his parole he has been technically serving life
imprisonment binding him to refrain from criminal
activities  for  the  time  being.   There  is  every
possibility of his committing further crimes.
Considering the above fact, the Review Board did not
find any reason to recommend premature release of
the life convict now on parole.”
It is seen that after careful consideration of all the aspects,
the Review Board in its meeting held on 27.01.2011 did not
recommend the petitioner for his premature release. The
recommendation of the Review Board was placed before the
State Government and the State Government accepted the
recommendation of the State Sentence Review Board.  The
decision of the State Government was communicated to the
petitioner vide letter No. 790-J dated 09.02.2012.  
19) In view of the decision of the State Sentence Review
Board, approval by the State Government and the principles
enunciated in various decisions of this Court including the
decision  of  the  Constitution  Bench  in  Gopal  Vinayak
Godse’s  case (supra), we find no merit in the contempt
petition, consequently, the same is dismissed.  
21Page 22
………….…………………………J.
                (P. SATHASIVAM)                                
        ………….…………………………J.
               (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 13, 2013.
22