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Sunday, February 17, 2013

Land Acquisition Act, - Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) was issued on 5.3.1963 in respect of the land admeasuring 139 bighas and 2 biswas including the aforesaid land of the appellant. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made in respect of the said land on 22.8.1963. The Land Acquisition Collector made the award under the Act on 29.11.1963. However, no award was made in respect of the land measuring 23 bighas and 7 biswas including the suit land as it had been shown to be the land of Central Government. However, the possession of the land in respect of which the award was made and the land transferred to the appellant was also taken and the Union of India handed it over to 2Page 3 Delhi Electric Supply Units (for short ‘DESU’) for the construction of staff quarters on 5.7.1966. The appellant claimed to have been deprived of the land without paying any compensation whatsoever, thus, there was a regular correspondence by the appellant - In a welfare State, statutory authorities are bound, not only to pay adequate compensation, but there is also a legal obligation upon them to rehabilitate such persons. The nonfulfillment of their obligations would tantamount to forcing the said uprooted persons to become vagabonds or to indulge in anti-national activities as such sentiments would be born in them on account of such ill-treatment. Therefore, it is not permissible for any welfare State to uproot a person and deprive him of his 9Page 10 fundamental/constitutional/human rights, under the garb of industrial development. The appellants have been deprived of their legitimate dues for about half a century. In such a fact-situation, we fail to understand for which class of citizens, the Constitution provides guarantees and rights in this regard and what is the exact percentage of the citizens of this country, to whom Constitutional/statutory benefits are accorded, in accordance with the law”. 11. The instant case is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment in Tukaram’s case (supra) and thus, entitled for restoration of possession of the land in dispute. However, considering the fact that the possession of the land was taken over about half a century ago and stood completely developed as Ms. Ahlawat, learned counsel has submitted that a full-fledged residential colony of employees of DESU has been constructed thereon, therefore, it would be difficult for respondent no.1 to restore the possession. 12. In such a fact-situation, the only option left out to the respondents is to make the award treating Section 4 notification as, on this date, i.e. 12.2.2013 and we direct the Land Acquisition Collector to make the award after hearing the parties within a period of four 1Page 11 months from today. For that purpose, the parties are directed to appear before Land Acquisition Collector, C/o The Deputy Commissioner, South M.B. Road, Saket, New Delhi on 26.2.2013. The appellant is at liberty to file a reference under Section 18 of the Act and to pursue the remedies available to him under the Act. Needless to say that the appellant shall be entitled to all statutory benefits. 13. With these directions, the appeals are allowed. The judgments impugned herein are set aside. C.A. No. 203/2004 14. In view of the order passed in C.A. Nos. 204-205/2004, the appeal is dismissed.


Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.  204-205  OF 2004
Bhimandas Ambwani (D) Thr. Lrs.                   …Appellant
Versus
Delhi Power Company Limited                     …Respondents
with
C.A. No. 203/2004
O R D E R
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.  204-205  OF 2004
1. These  appeals  have  been  preferred  against  the  impugned
judgment  and  order  dated  22.3.2002,  passed  by  Delhi  High
Court in LPA No.46 of 1983 and judgment and order dated
21.5.2002 passed in Review Application C.M. No.893 of 2002
therein by way of which the appeal filed by the respondents
Page 2
against  the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge
dated 26.11.1982 had been allowed.
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that :-
A. The appellant had been conferred title over the land in Khasra
No.307 admeasuring 3 bighas and 3 biswas situate in the revenue
estate of village Kilokri, Delhi and the Conveyance Deed for the same
was registered on behalf of the President of India in favour of the
appellant on 6.6.1962.
A Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) was issued on 5.3.1963 in
respect of the land admeasuring 139 bighas and 2 biswas including the
aforesaid land of the appellant.  A declaration under Section 6 of the
Act was made in respect of the said land on 22.8.1963.  The Land
Acquisition Collector made the award under the Act on 29.11.1963.
However, no award was made in respect of the land measuring 23
bighas and 7 biswas including the suit land as it had been shown to be
the land of Central Government. However, the possession of the land
in respect of which the award was made and the land transferred to the
appellant was also taken and the Union of India handed it over to
2Page 3
Delhi Electric Supply Units (for short ‘DESU’) for the construction of
staff  quarters  on  5.7.1966.   The  appellant  claimed  to  have  been
deprived of the land without paying any compensation whatsoever,
thus, there was a regular correspondence by the appellant  and in view
thereof Section 4 Notification under the Act was issued on 7.10.1968
in respect of the land admeasuring 31 bighas and 15 biswas including
the land in dispute.  The said Notification under Section 4 was not
acted upon, but a supplementary award No. 1651-A dated 16.2.1974,
was  made  in  respect  of  the  land  in  dispute,  making  reference  to
Section 4 Notification dated 5.3.1963.
B. Aggrieved, the appellant filed Writ Petition No.307 of 1972
before Delhi High Court and the said writ petition was disposed of
vide  judgment  and  order  dated  26.11.1982  making  it  clear  that
acquisition proceedings emanating from Notification dated 5.3.1963
came to an end rather stood superseded by second Notification dated
7.10.1968  and  therefore,  supplementary  award  No.1651-A  dated
16.2.1974 was illegal and without jurisdiction and thus, the award was
quashed.   The  respondents  were  directed  to  handover  the  vacant
possession  of  the  suit  property  to  the  appellant  by  31.12.1983.
However, liberty was given to the State to issue a fresh Notification
3Page 4
under Section 4 of the Act within a period of one year and till then the
possession could be retained by the respondents.
C. It  was  in  view  thereof,  a  Notification  dated  26.3.1983  was
issued under Section 4 of the Act in respect of the suit land and in the
meanwhile, the respondents preferred LPA No.46 of 1983 against the
said judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 26.11.1982.
D. Declaration under Section 6 of the Act dated 30.5.1983 was
issued in respect of the suit land and the respondents did not complete
the acquisition proceedings rather abandoned the same.
E. The Division Bench allowed the said LPA vide judgment and
order dated 22.3.2002.  Review Petition against the said LPA filed by
the appellant was dismissed on 21.5.2002.
Hence, these appeals.
3. Shri Arvind Kumar and Ms. Henna George, learned counsel
appearing  for  the  appellant  have  submitted  that  there  had  been  3
successive Notifications under Section 4 of the Act.  Therefore, the
second  Notification superseded  the first  and  the  third  Notification
superseded the second notification.  In response to the first Section 4
4Page 5
Notification there was no award as the Land Acquisition Collector
considered that the suit land belonged to the Central Government. The
supplementary award was made subsequent to the second Section 4
Notification making reference to the first Section 4 Notification dated
5.3.1963 which had already elapsed.  The learned Single Judge has
rightly decided the issue and in pursuance of the same once the third
Section  4  Notification  was  issued  on  26.3.1983  and  no  further
proceedings were taken, it also stood elapsed.  Therefore, in law, there
had been no proceedings regarding acquisition of the land in dispute.
The respondent-authorities cannot be permitted to encroach upon the
land of the appellant without resorting to the procedure prescribed by
law.  The Division Bench  erred in reversing  the  judgment  of the
learned Single Judge under the misconception that there was a valid
award in respect of the land in dispute as it could be made referable to
Notification  under  Section  4  dated  7.10.1968  and  therefore,  the
appeals deserve to be allowed.
4. Per contra, Ms. Avnish Ahlawat, learned counsel appearing for
the  respondent  no.1  and  Shri  Vishnu  Saharya,  learned  counsel
appearing for DDA have opposed the appeal contending that their
5Page 6
land had been acquired by the Union of India and handed over to the
respondent  no.1 after taking the amount of compensation from it.
Therefore, the said respondent cannot be penalised at such a belated
stage for the reason that DESU has deposited a sum of Rs.10,16,400/-
towards the price of land on 24.5.1966.  The judgment of the High
Court does not require to be interfered with and thus, the appeals are
liable to be dismissed.
5. We  have  considered  the  rival  submissions  made  by learned
counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6. There cannot be any dispute to the settled legal proposition that
successive Notifications under Section 4 or successive Declarations
under Section 6 of the Act can be made, however, the effect of the
same would be that earlier notification/declaration stands obliterated/
superseded and in such a fact-situation, it would not be permissible for
either of the parties to make any reference to the said notifications/
declarations which stood superseded.
7. In  Bhutnath Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal & Ors.,
(1969)  3  SCC  675,  this  Court  held  that  where  second  Section  4
Notification has been issued, the market value is to be determined in
6Page 7
terms of the later notification for the reason that there was an intention
to supersede the previous notification and if the Government did not
choose to explain the reasons which persuaded it to issue the second
notification, the court is justified in inferring that it was intended to
supersede the earlier notification by the later notification.
8. In  Land Acquisition Officer-cum-RDO, Chevella Division,
Ranga Reddy District v. A. Ramachandra Reddy & Ors., AIR
2011 SC 662, while dealing with the same issue, this Court held:    
“….. the Government after considering the facts
and circumstances, with a view to avoid further
challenge,  issued  a  fresh  notification  dated
9.9.1993  (gazetted  on  19.11.1993)  followed  by
final  declaration  dated,  16.2.1994.  The  State
Government did not subsequently cancel/rescind/
withdraw  the  notifications  dated  9.9.1993  and
16.2.1994.  The  State  Government  had  clearly
abandoned  the  earlier  notifications dated
3.1.1990 and 10.l.1990 by issuing the subsequent
notifications dated  9.91993  and  16.2.1994.  The
appellant cannot therefore contend that the second
preliminary notification is redundant or that first
preliminary  notification  continues  to  hold
good…..” (Emphasis added)
(See also : Raghunath & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR
1988 SC 1615; Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd. & Anr. vs. Special Deputy
Collector  (Land  Acquisition),  AIR  1990  SC  731;  and  Raipur
7Page 8
Development Authority v. Anupan Sahkari Griha Nirman Samiti
& Ors., (2000) 4 SCC 357).
9. In view of the above, Section 4 Notification dated 26.3.1983
and  Declaration  under  Section  6  dated  13.5.1983  superseded  all
earlier notification/declaration.  However, no proceedings were taken
in pursuance of the said notification/declaration issued in the year
1983 and after commencement of the Amendment Act 1987, the said
notification/declaration made in the year 1983 stood elapsed as no
award had been  made within the period stipulated under the Act.
Thus, there can be no sanctity to any of the acquisition proceedings
initiated  by  the  respondents  so  far  as  the  suit  land  is  concerned,
though the appellant stood dispossessed from his land in pursuance of
the Notification under Section 4 dated 5.3.1963.  Thus, we have no
hesitation  in  making  a  declaration  that  the  appellant  had  been
dispossessed  without  resorting  to  any  valid  law  providing  for
acquisition of land.  The Court is shocked as the appellant had been
dispossessed from the land during the period when right to property
was a fundamental right under Articles 31A and 19 of the Constitution
of India and subsequently became a constitutional and human right
under Article 300A.
8Page 9
10. This Court dealt with a similar case in Tukaram Kana Joshi &
Ors.  thr.  Power  of  Attorney  Holder  v.  Maharashtra  Industrial
Development Corporation & Ors., (2013) 1 SCC 353, and held :
“……There is a distinction, a  true and  concrete
distinction,  between  the  principle  of  "eminent
domain" and "police power" of the State. Under
certain  circumstances,  the  police  power  of  the
State may be used temporarily, to take possession
of property but the present case clearly shows that
neither of the said powers have been exercised. A
question then arises with respect to the authority or
power  under  which  the  State  entered  upon  the
land. It is evident that the act of the State amounts
to encroachment, in exercise of "absolute power"
which in common parlance is also called abuse of
power or use of  muscle power. To further clarify
this position, it must be noted that the authorities
have  treated  the  land  owner  as  a  'subject'  of
medieval  India,  but  not  as  a  'citizen'  under  our
constitution.
xx xx xx
Depriving the appellants of their immovable
properties, was a clear violation of Article 21 of
the  Constitution.
  In  a  welfare  State,  statutory
authorities are  bound,  not  only  to  pay  adequate
compensation, but there is also a legal obligation
upon them to rehabilitate such persons. 
The nonfulfillment of their obligations would tantamount
to  forcing  the  said  uprooted  persons  to  become
vagabonds or to indulge in anti-national activities
as  such  sentiments  would  be  born  in  them  on
account of such ill-treatment. Therefore, it is not
permissible   for  any  welfare  State  to  uproot  a
person  and  deprive  him  of  his
9Page 10
fundamental/constitutional/human rights, under the
garb of industrial development.  
The appellants have been deprived of their
legitimate dues for about half a century. In such a
fact-situation, we fail to understand for which class
of  citizens,  the  Constitution  provides guarantees
and rights in this regard  and what is the exact
percentage of the citizens of this country, to whom
Constitutional/statutory  benefits  are  accorded,  in
accordance with the law”. 
11. The instant case is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment
in  Tukaram’s case  (supra)  and  thus,  entitled  for  restoration  of
possession of the land in dispute.  However, considering the fact that
the possession of the land was taken over about half a century ago and
stood  completely  developed  as  Ms.  Ahlawat,  learned  counsel  has
submitted  that  a  full-fledged  residential  colony  of  employees  of
DESU has been constructed thereon, therefore, it would be difficult
for respondent no.1 to restore the possession.
12. In  such  a  fact-situation,  the  only  option  left  out  to  the
respondents is to make the award treating Section 4 notification as, on
this date, i.e. 12.2.2013 and we direct the Land Acquisition Collector
to make the award after hearing the parties within a period of four
1Page 11
months from today.  For  that  purpose,  the  parties are directed  to
appear  before  Land  Acquisition  Collector,  C/o  The  Deputy
Commissioner, South M.B. Road, Saket, New Delhi on 26.2.2013.
The appellant is at liberty to file a reference under Section 18 of the
Act  and  to  pursue  the  remedies  available  to  him  under  the  Act.
Needless to say that the appellant shall be entitled to all statutory
benefits.
13. With these directions, the appeals are allowed. The judgments
impugned herein are set aside. 
C.A. No. 203/2004
14. In view of the order passed in C.A. Nos. 204-205/2004, the
appeal is dismissed.
..………………………….J.
(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)
   .…………………………..J.
(V. GOPALA GOWDA)
New Delhi;
February 12, 2013
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