Land Acquisition Act = whether the officers of the Union Territory of Chandigarh other than the Administrator could issue notifications under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the 1894 Act, = Notification dated 1.10.2002 cannot be saved at this belated stage and the Competent Authority cannot issue declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act after 11 years of the issue of notification under Section 4(1). - In the result, the appeals are allowed, the impugned order is set aside and Notifications dated 1.10.2002 and 29.9.2003 are quashed insofar as the same relate to the lands of the appellants. The parties are left to bear their own costs.

                          reported in     http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40587                 
              NON-REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.5885   OF 2013
                  (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 27221 of 2011)

Gurbinder Kaur Brar and another                          ...Appellants

                                   versus
Union of India and others
...Respondents
                                    With
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.5884  OF 2013
                  (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 25387 of 2011)
Sardar Milkha Singh                                      ...Appellant
                                   versus
Union of India and others
...Respondents

                               J U D G M E N T
G.S. SINGHVI, J.
1.    Leave granted.

2.    These appeals are directed against order  dated  18.3.2011  passed  by
the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High  Court  whereby  the  writ
petitions filed by the appellants for  quashing  the  acquisition  of  their
land were dismissed along with a batch of other petitions.

3.    At the outset, we may mention that the impugned order  was  set  aside
by this Court in Surinder Singh Brar  and  others  v.  Union  of  India  and
others (2013) 1 SCC 403 and  Notifications  dated  26.6.2006,  2.8.2006  and
28.2.2007 issued by the Chandigarh Administration under  Sections  4(1)  and
6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the 1894 Act’)  for  the
acquisition of  land  for  Phase-III  of  Chandigarh  Technology  Park  were
quashed.

4.    By Notification dated 1.10.2002 issued under Section 4(1) of the  1894
Act, the Chandigarh Administration proposed the acquisition of  71.96  acres
land for various purposes including  the  Chandigarh  Technology  Park.  
The
appellants filed detailed objections under Section 5A(1) because their  land
were also included in Notification dated 1.10.2002.
After making a show  of
hearing the  objectors,  the  Land  Acquisition  Officer,  Union  Territory,
Chandigarh submitted report with the recommendation that the  land  notified
on 1.10.2002 may be acquired. 
The report of  the  Land  Acquisition  Officer
was  accepted  by  the  officers  of  the  Chandigarh   Administration   and
declaration dated 29.9.2003 was issued under Section 6(1) of  the  1894  Act
for 56.76 acres land.

5.    The appellants challenged the acquisition of their land in Civil  Writ
Petition No.8545/2004 titled Gurbinder Kaur Brar and  another  v.  Union  of
India and others and Civil Writ Petition No.12779/2004 titled  Milkha  Singh
v. Union of India and others.

6.    Similar petitions were filed by other landowners whose land  had  been
acquired for Phases-II and III of Chandigarh Technology Park. All  the  writ
petitions were dismissed by the Division Bench of  the  High  Court  by  the
impugned order.

7.    In Surinder Singh Brar  and  others  v.  Union  of  India  and  others
(supra), this Court reversed the order of the High  Court  and  quashed  the
acquisition of land for Phase-III of Chandigarh Technology Park and  various
other purposes specified in  Notifications  dated  26.6.2006,  2.8.2006  and
28.2.2007. While dealing with the  question
whether  the  officers  of  the
Union Territory of Chandigarh  other  than  the  Administrator  could  issue
notifications under Sections 4(1) and 6(1)  of  the  1894  Act,
this  Court
referred to  Article  239  of  the  Constitution  (unamended  and  amended),
Notifications dated 8.10.1968, 1.1.1970 and 14.8.1989  issued  under  Clause
(1)  of  that  Article,  Notification  dated   25.2.1988   issued   by   the
Administrator, Union Territory of  Chandigarh  under  Section  3(1)  of  the
Chandigarh (Delegation of Powers) Act, 1987 (for short, ‘the 1987 Act’)  and
observed:

           “The unamended  Article  239  envisaged  administration  of  the
           States specified  in  Part  C  of  the  First  Schedule  of  the
           Constitution by the President through a Chief Commissioner or  a
           Lieutenant Governor to  be  appointed  by  him  or  through  the
           Government of a neighbouring State. This was  subject  to  other
           provisions of Part VIII of the Constitution.  As  against  this,
           amended Article 239 lays down that subject to any law enacted by
           Parliament every Union Territory shall be  administered  by  the
           President acting through an Administrator appointed by him  with
           such designation as he may specify. In terms of  clause  (2)  of
           Article 239 (amended), the President can appoint the Governor of
           a State as an Administrator of an adjoining Union territory  and
           on his appointment, the Governor is  required  to  exercise  his
           function as an Administrator independently  of  his  Council  of
           Ministers. The difference in the language of the  unamended  and
           amended Article 239 makes it clear that prior to 1-11-1956,  the
           President  could  administer  Part  C  State  through  a   Chief
           Commissioner or a Lieutenant Governor, but, after the amendment,
           every Union Territory is required  to  be  administered  by  the
           President through an Administrator appointed by  him  with  such
           designation as he may specify. In terms of clause (2) of Article
           239  (amended),  the  President  is  empowered  to  appoint  the
           Governor of State as the Administrator  to  an  adjoining  Union
           Territory and once appointed, the Governor, in his  capacity  as
           Administrator, has  to  act  independently  of  the  Council  of
           Ministers of the State of which he is the Governor.

           A reading of the Notification issued on 1-11-1966  (set  out  in
           para 42) shows that in exercise of the power vested in him under
           Article 239(1), the President directed  that  the  Administrator
           shall exercise the power and  discharge  the  functions  of  the
           State Government under the laws which were in force  immediately
           before formation of the Union Territory of Chandigarh. This  was
           subject to the President’s own control and until further orders.
           By another notification issued on the same  day,  the  President
           directed that all orders and other instruments made and executed
           in the name of the Chief  Commissioner  of  Union  Territory  of
           Chandigarh shall be  authenticated  by  the  signatures  of  the
           specified officers. These notifications clearly brought out  the
           distinction between the position of the  Administrator  and  the
           Chief Commissioner insofar as the Union Territory of  Chandigarh
           was  concerned.  Subsequently,  the  President   appointed   the
           Governor of Punjab as Administrator of the  Union  Territory  of
           Chandigarh  and   separate   notifications   were   issued   for
           appointment  of  Adviser  to  the  Administrator.  The  officers
           appointed as  Adviser  are  invariably  members  of  the  Indian
           Administrative Service.

           After about 2 years of the issuance of  the  first  notification
           under Article 239(1) of the Constitution, by  which  the  powers
           and functions exercisable by the State Government under  various
           laws were generally entrusted to the Administrator, Notification
           dated 8-10-1968 (set out in para 44) was issued and the  earlier
           notification was modified insofar as it related to the  exercise
           of powers and functions by the Administrator under the  Act  and
           the President directed that subject to  his  control  and  until
           further orders, the powers and  functions  of  “the  appropriate
           Government” shall  also  be  exercised  and  discharged  by  the
           Administrator. The Notification dated 8-10-1968  was  superseded
           by the Notification dated 1-1-1970 (set out in para 45) and  the
           President directed that subject to his control and until further
           orders, the powers and functions of “the appropriate Government”
           shall also be exercised and discharged by the  Administrator  of
           every Union territory whether known as  the  Administrator,  the
           Chief  Commissioner  or  the  Lieutenant  Governor.   The   last
           Notification in the series was issued on 14-8-1989 (set  out  in
           para 46) superseding all previous notifications. The language of
           that  notification  is  identical  to  the   language   of   the
           Notification dated 1-1-1970.

           There is marked distinction in the language of the notifications
           issued  under  Article  239(1)  of  the  Constitution.  By   the
           Notification dated 1-11-1966 (set out in para 42), the President
           generally delegated  the  powers  and  functions  of  the  State
           Government under various laws in force immediately before  1-11-
           1966 to the Administrator. By all other notifications, the power
           exercisable by “the appropriate Government” under  the  Act  and
           the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 were  delegated  to
           the Administrator. It is not too difficult to fathom the reasons
           for  this  departure  from  Notification  dated  1-11-1966.  The
           Council of Ministers whose advice constitutes the foundation  of
           the decision taken by the President was very much  conscious  of
           the fact that compulsory acquisition of land, though  sanctioned
           by the  provisions  of  the  Act  not  only  impacts  lives  and
           livelihood of the farmers and other small landholders, but  also
           adversely affects the agriculture, environment  and  ecology  of
           the area. Therefore, with a view to  avoid  any  possibility  of
           misuse of power  by  the  executive  authorities,  it  has  been
           repeatedly ordained that powers and  functions  vested  in  “the
           appropriate Government” under the Act and the 1963  Rules  shall
           be  exercised  only  by  the  Administrator.  The  use  of   the
           expression “shall also  be  exercised  and  discharged”  in  the
           Notifications dated 8-10-1968, 1-1-1970 and 14-8-1989 is a clear
           pointer in  this  direction.  The  seriousness  with  which  the
           Central Government has viewed such type of acquisition  is  also
           reflected from the decision taken by the Home Minister on  23-9-
           2010 (set out in para 35) in the context of the  report  of  the
           Special Auditor and the one-man committee. Thus, the acquisition
           of land for and on behalf  of  the  Union  Territories  must  be
           sanctioned  by  the  Administrator  of  the   particular   Union
           territory and no other officer  is  competent  to  exercise  the
           power vested in “the appropriate Government” under the  Act  and
           the Rules framed thereunder.

           We may now advert to the Notification dated 25-2-1988  (set  out
           in para 47) issued under Section 3(1)  of  the  1987  Act,  vide
           which the Administrator directed that any  power,  authority  or
           jurisdiction or any duty which he could exercise or discharge by
           or under the provisions of any  law,  rules  or  regulations  as
           applicable  to  the  Union  Territory  of  Chandigarh  shall  be
           exercised or discharged by the Adviser except in cases or  class
           of cases enumerated in the Schedule. There  is  nothing  in  the
           language of Section 3(1) of the 1987 Act from which  it  can  be
           inferred  that  the  Administrator  can   delegate   the   power
           exercisable by “the appropriate Government” under the Act  which
           was specifically entrusted to him by the President under Article
           239(1) of the Constitution. Therefore, the Notification dated 25-
           2-1988  cannot  be  relied  upon   for   contending   that   the
           Administrator  had  delegated  the  power  of  “the  appropriate
           Government” to the Adviser.”



The Court then considered the question whether the reports submitted by  the
Land Acquisition Officer under Section  5A(2)  were  vitiated  due  to  non-
consideration of the objections filed by the  landowners  and  answered  the
same in affirmative by recording the following observations:

           “A cursory reading of  the  reports  of  the  LAO  may  give  an
           impression that he had applied  mind  to  the  objections  filed
           under Section 5A(1) and assigned reasons  for  not  entertaining
           the same, but a careful analysis thereof leaves  no  doubt  that
           the officer concerned  had  not  at  all  applied  mind  to  the
           objections of the landowners and  merely  created  a  facade  of
           doing  so.   In  the  opening  paragraph   under   the   heading
           “Observations”, the LAO recorded that he had  seen  the  revenue
           records and conducted spot inspection. He  then  reproduced  the
           Statement of Objects and Reasons contained in the Bill which led
           to the enactment of the Punjab New Capital  (Periphery)  Control
           Act, 1952 and proceed to extract some  portion  of  reply  dated
           31.7.2006 sent by the Administrator to Surinder Singh Brar.

           In the context of the statement contained in the first  line  of
           the paragraph titled “Observations”, we  repeatedly  asked  Shri
           Sudhir Walia, learned counsel assisting Dr. Rajiv Dhawan to show
           as to when the LAO had summoned the revenue records and when  he
           had conducted spot inspection but the learned counsel could  not
           produce any document to substantiate the statement contained  in
           the two reports of the LAO.  This leads to an inference that, in
           both the reports, the  LAO  had  made  a  misleading  and  false
           statement  about  his  having  seen  the  revenue  records   and
           conducted spot  inspection.  That  apart,  the  reports  do  not
           contain any iota of consideration of the objections filed by the
           landowners. Mere reproduction of the substance of the objections
           cannot be equated with objective consideration  thereof  in  the
           light of the submission made by the objectors during the  course
           of hearing. Thus, the violation of the mandate of Section  5A(2)
           is writ large on the face of the reports prepared by the LAO.

           The reason why the LAO did not apply his mind to the  objections
           filed by the appellants and other landowners is obvious. He  was
           a minion in the hierarchy of the  administration  of  the  Union
           Territory of Chandigarh and  could  not  have  even  thought  of
           making recommendations contrary to what  was  contained  in  the
           letter sent by the Administrator to Surinder Singh Brar.  If  he
           had  shown  the  courage  of  acting  independently   and   made
           recommendation against the acquisition of land,  he  would  have
           surely been shifted from that post and  his  career  would  have
           been jeopardized.  In the system of  governance  which  we  have
           today, junior officers in the administration cannot  even  think
           of, what to say of, acting against the wishes/dictates of  their
           superiors. One who violates this unwritten code of conduct  does
           so at his own peril and is described as a foolhardy. Even  those
           constituting higher strata of services follow the path of  least
           resistance and find it most convenient to tow the line of  their
           superiors.  Therefore, the LAO cannot be blamed for having acted
           as  an  obedient  subordinate  of  the   superior   authorities,
           including  the  Administrator.  However,  that   cannot   be   a
           legitimate ground to approve the reports prepared by him without
           even a semblance of consideration of the objections filed by the
           appellants and other landowners and we  have  no  hesitation  to
           hold that the LAO failed to discharge the  statutory  duty  cast
           upon him to prepare a report after objectively  considering  the
           objections filed under Section 5A(1) and submissions made by the
           objectors during the course of personal hearing.”



The Court also analysed the provisions of Sections 4(1),  5A,  6(1)  of  the
1894 Act, referred to several judgments and observed:

           “What needs to be emphasised is  that  hearing  required  to  be
           given under Section 5-A(2) to a  person  who  is  sought  to  be
           deprived of his land and who has filed objections under  Section
           5-A(1) must  be  effective  and  not  an  empty  formality.  The
           Collector who is enjoined with the task of hearing the objectors
           has the freedom of  making  further  enquiry  as  he  may  think
           necessary. In either eventuality,  he  has  to  make  report  in
           respect  of  the  land  notified  under  Section  4(1)  or  make
           different reports in respect of different parcels of  such  land
           to the appropriate Government containing his recommendations  on
           the objections and submit the same to the appropriate Government
           along with the  record  of  proceedings  held  by  him  for  the
           latter’s decision. The  appropriate  Government  is  obliged  to
           consider the report, if any, made under Section 5-A(2) and  then
           record its satisfaction that the particular land is needed for a
           public  purpose.  This  exercise  culminates   into   making   a
           declaration that the land is needed for a public purpose and the
           declaration is to be signed by a Secretary to the Government  or
           some other officer duly authorised to certify  its  orders.  The
           formation of opinion on the issue of need of land for  a  public
           purpose and suitability thereof is sine qua non for issue  of  a
           declaration under Section 6(1). Any violation of the substantive
           right of the landowners and/or other interested persons to  file
           objections or denial of opportunity of personal hearing  to  the
           objector(s) vitiates the recommendations made by  the  Collector
           and the decision taken by the  appropriate  Government  on  such
           recommendations.  The  recommendations  made  by  the  Collector
           without duly considering the objections filed under  Section  5-
           A(1) and submissions made at the hearing given under Section  5-
           A(2) or failure of the appropriate Government to take  objective
           decision on such objections in the light of the  recommendations
           made  by  the  Collector  will  denude  the  decision   of   the
           appropriate  Government  of  statutory  finality.  To   put   it
           differently,  the  satisfaction  recorded  by  the   appropriate
           Government that the particular  land  is  needed  for  a  public
           purpose and the declaration made  under  Section  6(1)  will  be
           devoid of legal sanctity  if  statutorily  engrafted  procedural
           safeguards are not adhered to by the  authorities  concerned  or
           there is violation of the principles  of  natural  justice.  The
           cases before us are illustrative of flagrant  violation  of  the
           mandate of Sections 5-A(2) and 6(1).”



8.    Shri Sudhir Walia, learned counsel for the  Chandigarh  Administration
made valiant effort to convince us that the view  taken  in  Surinder  Singh
Brar and others v. Union of India and others (supra) on  the  interpretation
of the provisions of the 1987 Act needs reconsideration but we do  not  find
any valid ground to accept the submission of the  learned  counsel.  In  our
view, Section 3(1) of the 1987 Act does not  empower  the  Administrator  to
delegate the functions of the “appropriate government”  to  any  officer  or
authority specified in the notification issued under  that  section  because
the Presidential notification does not provide for such delegation.

9.    We also agree with the learned counsel for  the  appellants  that  the
report of the Land Acquisition  Officer  was  vitiated  due  to  total  non-
application of mind by the concerned officer to large number of  substantive
objections raised by the appellants under  Section  5A(1).  He  mechanically
rejected  the   objections   and   senior   officers   of   the   Chandigarh
Administration accepted the report of the Land Acquisition  Officer  despite
the fact that the same had been prepared in violation of Section 5A(2).

10.   Shri Walia made a last  ditched  effort  to  save  Notification  dated
1.10.2002 and for this purpose he relied upon order dated  27.2.2013  passed
by the coordinate Bench in Civil Appeal No. 1964/2013 titled Lajja  Ram  and
others v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and others.  
We  have  carefully  gone
through that order and are of the view
that
Notification  dated  1.10.2002
cannot be saved at this belated stage and  the  Competent  Authority  cannot
issue declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act after 11 years of the  issue
of notification under Section 4(1).  
We may add that  in  view  of  the  law
laid down by the Constitution Bench in Padma Sundara Rao v. State  of  Tamil
Nadu (2002) 3 SCC 533, 
which was followed in a large  number  of  judgments,
the Chandigarh Administration cannot now issue a declaration  under  Section
6(1) after rectifying the  illegalities  committed  in  the  preparation  of
report under Section 5A(2) and issue of the earlier declaration.

11.   In the result, the appeals are allowed,  the  impugned  order  is  set
aside and Notifications dated 1.10.2002 and 29.9.2003  are  quashed  insofar
as the same relate to the lands of the appellants. The parties are  left  to
bear their own costs.


..........................................J.
                                             (G.S. SINGHVI)




..........................................J.
                                             (V. GOPALA GOWDA)
New Delhi;
July 22, 2013.






      -----------------------
11

Land Acquisition Act = The reference court like an appellant authority enhanced the compensation basing on the award of land acquisition officer even though the claimants not adduced any evidence and passed separate awards . High court set aside the award of lower court , Apex court granted an opportunity to adduce evidence to the claimants with conditions and remanded the matter to the trail court = The failure or the omission to lead evidence to prove the claim appears in the above context to be a case of some kind of misconception about the legal requirement as to evidence needed to prove cases of enhancement of compensation. We do not in that view see any reason to deny another opportunity to the landowners to prove their cases by adducing evidence in support of their claim for enhancement. Since, however, this opportunity is being granted ex debito justitiae, we deem it fit to direct that if the Reference Court eventually comes to the conclusion that a higher amount was due and payable to the appellant-owners, such higher amount including solatium due thereon would not earn interest for the period between the date of the judgment of the Reference Court and the date of this order. These appeals are with that direction allowed, the judgments and orders impugned in the same modified to the extent that while the enhancement order by the Reference Court shall stand set aside, the matters shall stand remanded to the Reference Court for a fresh disposal in accordance with law after giving to the landowners opportunity to lead evidence in support of their claims for higher compensation. No costs.

              published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40531                   

                 REPORTABLE







                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.5160  OF 2013
                 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.354 of 2012)


Ramanlal Deochand Shah                  …Appellant

                 Versus

The State of Maharashtra & Anr.              …Respondents

                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.5161  OF 2013
                 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.395 of 2012)


Kantilal Manikchand Shah                     …Appellant
(since deceased by his L.Rs.)



                 Versus

The State of Maharashtra & Anr.              …Respondents







                               J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    These appeals arise out of two separate but similar orders dated  14th
June, 2011 and 16th March, 2011 passed by the High Court  of  Judicature  at
Bombay whereby First Appeal Nos.179 of 1992 and 751 of  1992  filed  by  the
respondent-State of Maharashtra have  been  allowed  and  the  judgment  and
order passed by the Reference Court enhancing  the  amount  of  compensation
payable to the appellants-land  owners  to  Rs.85/-  per  square  meter  set
aside.

3.    In SLP (C) No.354 of 2012 the appellants  prayed  for  enhancement  of
compensation payable towards compulsory acquisition of plots no.33,  34,  45
and 46 measuring 1366 square meters  each,  situated  at  village  Saidapur,
Taluq-Karad, District Satara, Maharashtra.  The  public  purpose  underlying
the acquisition was the setting up of a Polytechnic Engineering  College  at
Karad. The appellant-land owners claimed compensation @ Rs.25/- per sq.  ft.
The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Satara, however, made an  Award  dated
14th March, 1988 determining the compensation @ Rs.26.25 per sq. mtr.  only.
Dissatisfied with the award made by the Collector the appellant-land  owners
got the matter referred to the Civil Court for determination of  the  market
value of the land under Section 18  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  besides
solatium and interest payable on the same.  A  similar  reference  was  also
made in SLP (C) No.395 of 2012 for plot no. 47 admeasuring  1366  sq.  mtrs.
of the same village.

4.    The claim made by the  appellant-land  owners  was  contested  by  the
respondent-State giving rise to the following issues in Reference  No.12  of
1988 relevant to SLP (C) No.354 of 2012:

(i)   Is the claimant entitled to Rs.9,27,064/- in addition to Rs.2,31,716/-
       from the opponent-referee by way of compensation as claimed?

(ii)  Is the claimant entitled for interest at the rate of 15% p.a.  on  the
      amount of compensation as claimed?

(iii) Is the claimant entitled to solatium as claimed?

(iv)  What order?

5.    Similar issues were framed in the connected  Reference  No.4  of  1988
relevant to SLP (C) No.395 of 2012, save and except that  the  total  amount
claimed in the same was lower having regard to the lesser  number  of  plots
acquired in that case.

6.    The Reference Court answered the issues in favour  of  the  appellants
and enhanced the compensation payable  to  them  to  Rs.85/-  per  sq.  mtr.
besides interest at the stipulated rates  by  similar  but  separate  Awards
both dated 31st January, 1991.
While doing so, the  Reference  Court  relied
entirely upon certain observations made by Special Land Acquisition  Officer
and the Draft Award prepared by him. 
The Reference Court held that from  the
discussion contained in the Draft Award it was  not  clear  as  to  how  the
Special Land Acquisition Officer had awarded  compensation  @  Rs.26.25  per
sq. mtr.
Relying  upon  the  discussion  in  the  Draft  Award  and  taking
advantage of an apparent conflict between the discussion  contained  therein
and the amount actually awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer  the Reference Court enhanced  the  compensation  to  Rs.85/-  per  sq.  mtr.  as already noticed above.  
The High Court has, in  the  appeals  filed  by  the
State Government against the enhancement of compensation, reversed the  view
taken by the Reference Court on the ground  that  the  enhancement  was  not
justified in the absence of any evidence to show that the  market  value  of
the property in question was higher than what was  awarded  by  the  Special
Land Acquisition Officer.
The High Court declared  that  claimants  were  in
the position of plaintiffs and the  burden  to  prove  that  the  amount  of
compensation awarded  by  the  Special  Land  Acquisition  Officer  was  not
adequate lay upon them.
It  was  only  if  that  burden  was  satisfactorily
discharged by cogent and reliable evidence that the  Reference  Court  could
direct enhancement.
No such evidence having been adduced by the  landowners,
the High Court set aside  the  order  passed  by  the  Reference  Court  and
answered the reference in the negative thereby dismissing the claim made  by
the landowners.

7.    We have heard learned counsel for the parties at some  length.
 It  is
trite that in a reference under Section 18 of the Land  Acquisition  Act  on
the question of adequacy of compensation determined by  the  collector,  the
burden to prove that the collector’s award does not correctly determine  the
amount  of  compensation  payable  to  the  landowner  is  upon  the   owner
concerned.  It is for the claimant to prove that the amount awarded  by  the
Collector needs enhancement, and if so, to what extent.
The claimant can  do
so by adducing evidence, whether oral or  documentary  which  the  Reference
Court would evaluate having regard to the provisions of Sections 23  and  24
of the Land Acquisition Act while determining the  compensation  payable  to
the owners.
To that extent the claimant is in the position  of  a  plaintiff
before the Court.  
In the absence of any evidence to prove that  the  amount
of award by the Collector does not represent the true market  value  of  the
property as on the date  of  the  preliminary  notification,  the  Reference
Court  will  be  helpless  and  will  not  be  justified  in  granting   any
enhancement.
The  Court  cannot  go  by  surmises  and  conjectures   while
answering the reference nor can it assume the role  of  an  Appellate  Court
and enhance the  amount  awarded  by  reappraising  the  material  that  was
collected and considered by the Collector.
What is  important  to  remember
is that a reference to a Civil Court is not in the nature of an appeal  from
one forum to the other where the appellate forum takes a view based  on  the
evidence before the forum below.
The  legal  position  is  settled  by  the
decisions of this Court to which we may at this stage refer.
 In  Chimanlal
Hargovinddas v. Spcl. Land Acquisition Officer & Anr. (1988) 3 SCC 751,  the
controversy related to a correct valuation of  a  piece  of  land  that  was
under acquisition.
This Court found that the Reference Court had  virtually
treated the award to be a judgment under appeal hence  fallen  in  error  on
the fundamental question of the approach to be  adopted  while  answering  a
reference.
The Court observed:

        1) A reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is  not
           an appeal against the award  and  the  court  cannot  take  into
           account the material relied upon by the Land Acquisition Officer
           in his award unless the same material  is  produced  and  proved
           before the court.




        2) So also the award of the Land Acquisition Officer is not  to  be
           treated as a judgment of the trial  Court  open  or  exposed  to
           challenge before the court hearing the reference. It  is  merely
           an offer made by the Land Acquisition Officer and  the  material
           utilised by him for making his valuation cannot be  utilised  by
           the court unless produced and proved before it. It  is  not  the
           function of the court  to  sit  in  appeal  against  the  award,
           approve or disapprove its reasoning, or  correct  its  error  or
           affirm, modify or reverse the conclusion  reached  by  the  Land
           Acquisition Officer, as if it were an appellate court.




        3) The court has to treat the reference as an  original  proceeding
           before it and determine the market value afresh on the basis  of
           the material produced before it.




        4) The claimant is in the position of a plaintiff who has  to  show
           that the price offered for his land in the award  is  inadequate
           on the basis of the materials produced in court. Of  course  the
           materials placed and proved by the other side can also be  taken
           into account for this purpose.”

                                             (emphasis supplied)



8.    In the Spcl. Land Acquisition Officer & Anr.  etc.  etc.  v.  Siddappa
Omanna Tumari & Ors. etc., 1995 Supp (2) SCC 168, a three  Judge  Bench  was
dealing with a case where the  question  that  fell  for  determination  was
whether it was open  to  a  Reference  Court  to  determine  the  amount  of
compensation exceeding the amount of compensation determined  in  the  award
without recording a  finding  on  consideration  of  the  relevant  material
therein, that the amount of  compensation  determined  in  the  award  under
Section 11 was inadequate.  Answering the  question  this  Court  considered
the entire legislative scheme  underlying  the  Act  and  clarified  that  a
claimant was in the position of a  plaintiff  on  whom  lay  the  burden  of
proving his  case  that  the  compensation  awarded  by  the  Collector  was
inadequate. The following passage in this regard is apposite:

           “When the Collector makes the reference  to  the  Court,  he  is
           enjoined by Section 19 to state the  grounds  on  which  he  had
           determined the amount of compensation if the objection raised as
           to the acceptance of award of the Collector under  Section 11 by
           the claimant was as regards the amount of  compensation  awarded
           for the land thereunder. The Collector has to state the  grounds
           on which he had determined the amount of compensation where  the
           objection  raised  by  the  claimant  in  his  application   for
           reference under Section 18 was as to inadequacy of  compensation
           allowed by the award  under  Section 11,  as  required  by  Sub-
           section (2) of  Section 18 itself.  Therefore,  the  legislative
           scheme contained in Sections 12, 18 and 19 while on the one hand
           entitles the  claimant  not  to  accept  the  award  made  under
           Section 11 as  to  the  amount  of  compensation  determined  as
           payable for his acquired land and seek a reference to the  court
           for determination of the amount of compensation payable for  his
           land, on the other hand requires him to  make  good  before  the
           Court the objection raised by him as regards the  inadequacy  of
           the amount of compensation allowed for his land under the  award
           made under Section 11, with  a  view  to  enable  the  Court  to
           determine the amount of compensation  exceeding  the  amount  of
           compensation allowed by the award under  Section 11,  be  it  by
           reference to the improbabilities inherent in the award itself or
           on the evidence aliunde adduced by him to that effect.  That  is
           why, the position of a claimant in a reference before the Court,
           is considered to be that of the +plaintiff in a  suit  requiring
           him to discharge the initial burden of proving that  the  amount
           of compensation determined in  the  award  under  Section 11 was
           inadequate, the same having not been determined on the basis  of
           relevant material and by application of  correct  principles  of
           valuation, either with reference to the contents  of  the  award
           itself or with  reference  to  other  evidence  aliunde  adduced
           before the Court. Therefore, if the initial  burden  of  proving
           the amount of compensation allowed in the award of the Collector
           was inadequate, is not discharged, the award  of  the  Collector
           which is made final and conclusive evidence under Section 12, as
           regards matters contained therein will stand unaffected. But  if
           the claimant succeeds in  proving  that  the  amount  determined
           under the award of the Collector was inadequate, the  burden  of
           proving the correctness of the award shifts on to the  Collector
           who has to adduce sufficient evidence in that behalf to  sustain
           such award. Hence, the Court which is  required  to  decide  the
           reference  made  to  it  under  Section 18 of  the  Act,  cannot
           determine the amount of compensation payable to the claimant for
           his land exceeding the amount determined in  the  award  of  the
           Collector made under Section 11 for the  same  land,  unless  it
           gets  over  the  finality  and  conclusive   evidentiary   value
           attributed to it under Section 12, by  recording  a  finding  on
           consideration of relevant material therein that  the  amount  of
           compensation determined under the award was inadequate  for  the
           reasons that weighed with it.”

                                                       (emphasis supplied)




9.    In Major Pakhar Singh Atwal and Ors. v. State of   Punjab  and   Ors.,
1995 Supp (2) SCC 401  also  this  Court  reiterated  the  position  that  a
reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition  Act  is  not  an  appeal
against the award of the LAO. It merely is an offer. The  proceeding  before
the Reference Court is of such nature that it places  the  claimant  in  the
position of a plaintiff and the Reference  Court  is  akin  to  a  court  of
original jurisdiction. The Court observed:

           “… … It is now settled law  that  the  award  is  an  offer  and
           whatever amount was determined by the Collector is an offer  and
           binds the Improvement Trust.  However,  the  Collector  also  is
           required to collect the relevant material and award compensation
           on the basis of  settled  principles  of  determination  of  the
           market  value  of  an  acquired  land.  The  Improvement  Trust,
           therefore, cannot go behind the award  made  by  the  Collector.
           Reference is not an appeal. It is an original proceeding. It  is
           for  the  claimants  to  seek  the   determination   of   proper
           compensation by producing sale deeds and examining  the  vendors
           or the vendees as to passing of consideration  among  them,  the
           nearness of the lands sold to the acquired lands,  similarly  of
           the lands sold and acquired  and  also  by  adduction  of  other
           relevant and acceptable evidence. In this case,  for  the  Court
           under Section  18 of  the  Act,  the  Tribunal  is  constituted.
           Therefore, if the claimants intend to seek  higher  compensation
           to the acquired land, the burden is  on  them  to  establish  by
           proof that the compensation  granted  by  the  Land  Acquisition
           Officer  is  inadequate  and  they  are   entitled   to   higher
           compensation. That could be established  only  by  adduction  of
           evidence  of  the  comparable  sale  transactions  of  the  land
           acquired or the lands in the neighbourhood possessed of  similar
           potentiality or advantages. … … … No doubt, in the award itself,
           the Land Acquisition Officer referred to the sale  transactions.
           Since the Land Acquisition Officer is  an  authority  under  the
           Act, he collected the evidence to determine the compensation  as
           an offer. Though that award may be a  material  evidence  to  be
           looked into, but  the  sale  transactions  referred  to  therein
           cannot  be  relied  upon  implicitly,  if  the   party   seeking
           enhancement resists the claim by adducing evidence independently
           before the Court or the Tribunal. In this case, since  no  steps
           were taken to place the sale transaction referred in the  award,
           they cannot be evidence. So they can neither be relied upon  nor
           can be looked into as evidence.”

                                                    (emphasis supplied)




10.   It is not in dispute that the landowners, appellants  before  us,  did
not lead any evidence in support of their claim before the  Reference  Court
to prove that the market value of the land acquired from the  ownership  was
more than what was awarded as compensation by  the  Collector.  Neither  the
order passed by the Reference Court nor that passed by the High  Court  make
any  reference  to  such  evidence.  Absence  of  any  such  evidence   was,
therefore, bound to go against the appellants.  So long  as  the  appellants
failed to discharge the burden cast on them, there was no  question  of  the
Reference Court granting any enhancement. The High Court was, in that  view,
justified in holding that the enhancement granted  in  the  absence  of  any
evidence was unjustified.

11.   It was argued by learned counsel for the appellants that  although  no
evidence was adduced by the claimants to prove that the market value of  the
acquired land was higher than what  was  awarded  by  the  Land  Acquisition
Collector, the claimants  could  rely  on  the  documents  produced  by  the
respondent-State before the Collector. If that be  so,  the  Sale  Deeds  to
which the Draft Award made a reference, could  be  referred  to  and  relied
upon. There is, in our opinion, no merit in that  contention.  While  it  is
true that the claimant can always place reliance upon the evidence that  may
be adduced by a defendant in a  suit  to  the  extent  the  same  helps  the
plaintiff, but the documents that have  not  been  relied  upon  before  the
Court by the defendants  cannot  be  referred  to  or  treated  as  evidence
without proper proof of the  contents  thereof.  In  the  present  case  the
defendants-respondents did not produce any documents  before  the  Reference
Court in support of its case.  There was indeed no occasion for them  to  do
so  in  the  absence  of  affirmative  evidence  from  the   claimants.   We
specifically asked learned counsel for the  respondents  whether  copies  of
any Sale Deeds had been produced by  the  defendants  before  the  Reference
Court. The answer was in the negative. That being so,  it  is  difficult  to
appreciate how  the  appellants  could  have  referred  to  a  document  not
produced or relied upon by the defendants before the Reference  Court.  Even
if the documents had been produced by the defendants, unless the  same  were
either admitted by the plaintiff or properly proved  and  exhibited  at  the
trial, the same could not by themselves  constitute  evidence  except  where
such documents were public documents  admissible  by  themselves  under  any
provision. Sale Deeds executed between third  parties  do  not  qualify  for
such admission. The same had, therefore, to be formally  proved  unless  the
opposite party admitted the execution and contents, thereby, in which  event
no proof may have been necessary for what is admitted, need not  be  proved.


12.   Suffice it to say that in the facts and circumstances of  the  present
case no evidence having been adduced by the defendants-respondents,
whether
documentary or otherwise, there was no question  of  the  appellant  relying
upon  such  non-existent  evidence.
Merely  because  some  documents   were
referred to in the Draft Award by the  Collector,  did  not  make  the  said
documents admissible by them to enable the plaintiffs to refer  to  or  rely
upon the same in support of a  possible  enhancement.  
If  a  document  upon
which the plaintiffs placed reliance was available, there was no reason  why
the same should not have been produced or relied upon. 
Inasmuch as  no  such
attempt was made by the plaintiffs, they were  not  entitled  to  claim  any
enhancement.

13.   The next question then is
whether the appellants-  landowners  can  be
given another opportunity to adduce evidence at this  stage  and  if  so  on
what terms.
The Reference Court, it is noteworthy, was of the  opinion  that
the Special Land Acquisition Officer had in the cases at  hand  relied  upon
two sale deeds to record a finding that the true market price  of  the  land
under acquisition was  Rs.85/-  per  square  meter.
Having  said  that  the S.L.A.O had for no reason awarded an amount of  Rs.26.25  per  square  meter
only.
This  was  according  to  the  Reference  Court  inexplicable.
 The
Reference Court observed:

           “According to the S.L.A.O. the said rate is fair and  reasonable
           but actually he has not awarded  the  compensation  accordingly.
           He has awarded it at the rate of  Rs.26.25  ps.  per  sq.  mtrs.
           This abstruse to understand as to how the  S.L.A.O  has  awarded
           the compensation accordingly, when he had already arrived at the
           conclusion in respect of reasonable rate  of  the  compensation.
           Considering all these things, I hold that the compensation ought
           to have been awarded at least at the rate  of  Rs.85/-  per  sq.
           mtrs. for the lands under acquisition.  For the same  reason,  I
           also hold that the claimant is entitled for compensation at  the
           rate of Rs.85/- per sq. mtrs. for the lands under acquisition.”




14.   The failure or the omission  to  lead  evidence  to  prove  the  claim
appears in the above context to be a case  of  some  kind  of  misconception
about the legal  requirement  as  to  evidence  needed  to  prove  cases  of
enhancement of compensation. 
We do not in that view see any reason  to  deny
another opportunity to the landowners  to  prove  their  cases  by  adducing
evidence in support of their claim for  enhancement.  
Since,  however,  this
opportunity is being granted ex debito justitiae, we deem it fit  to  direct that if the Reference Court  eventually  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  a higher amount was due and  payable  to  the  appellant-owners,  such  higher amount including solatium due  thereon  would  not  earn  interest  for  the period between the date of the judgment of the Reference Court and the  date
of this order. 
These appeals are with that direction allowed, the  judgments
and orders impugned in the same  modified  to  the  extent  that  while  the enhancement order by the Reference Court shall stand set aside, the  matters shall stand remanded  to  the  Reference  Court  for  a  fresh  disposal  in accordance with law after giving  to  the  landowners  opportunity  to  lead evidence in support of their claims for higher compensation. No costs.





                                             ......................………..……J.
                                        (T.S. THAKUR)






                                             ......................………..……J.
New Delhi                               (GYAN SUDHA MISRA)
July 5, 2013

LAND ACQUISITION ACT, = Whether the High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can compel the State to complete the acquisition proceedings initiated under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (for short ‘the Act’), is one of the short questions arising for consideration in these cases. Another short question is – Whether writ can be issued compelling the Land Acquisition Collector/Officer to implement the instruction issued to him by the Government otherwise than under the procedure under the Act? Act is a complete code as far as such decisions are concerned and Government is well within their jurisdiction to act as per the scheme provided under the Act. Even otherwise, the writ petition was wholly misconceived. The prayer is for direction to the land acquisition collector to act in terms of letter issued to the land acquisition collector by the secretary to the Government. Even otherwise, the writ petition was wholly misconceived. The prayer is for direction to the land acquisition collector to act in terms of letter issued to the land acquisition collector by the secretary to the Government. If a subordinate authority in the Government does not act in terms of the direction or instruction issued by the superior authority, it is not for the Court to compel that subordinate authority to comply with the instruction or direction issued by the superior authority, if it is not otherwise governed by a statutory procedure. Court is not the executing forum of the instruction issued by the Government to its subordinates. That jurisdiction lies elsewhere under the scheme of the Constitution. Therefore, on that count also, the writ petition was liable to be dismissed. = Yet with all these, the fact remains that the residential houses of the petitioners are in the seepage affected area in Mukundur village coming under 6th District Minor Hemavathi Left Bank Canal. Despite decades long efforts made by the petitioners, it appears even the cement concrete lining to the canal has been done only recently and that too in order to avoid the acquisition for which twice notifications had already been issued. It has to be noted that the agricultural land of the petitioners had already been acquired and what remained was only the residential part. Petitioners had the grievance that on account of the seepage, there was dampness resulting also in cracks on the building. In view of the miseries suffered by these poor persons, we are of the view that it will not be just and fair to relegate them to workout their remedies before the civil court for damages, at this instance of time. Therefore, in the interests of justice and in order to do complete justice, we order that each of the petitioners shall be paid a lump sum amount of Re.1 lakh each towards damages for the hardships they have already undergone on account of seepage resulting in dampness and cracks to their residential buildings. The respondents 7/8 shall see that the amount as above is deposited in the bank account of the respective petitioner within three months. We, however, make it clear that this Judgment shall not stand in the way of the respondents, if so required or warranted in public interest, acquiring the disputed lands. 12. Subject to the above, the appeals are dismissed. No costs.

Page 1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS._4345-4429_/2013
[Arising out of S.L.P.(Civil) Nos. 10230-10314/2012]
JAYAMMA & ORS. … APPELLANTS
VERSUS
THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
HASSAN DIST., HASSAN AND ORS. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
KURIAN, J.:
Leave granted.
2. Whether the High Court, under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, can compel the State to
complete the acquisition proceedings initiated under
Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (for short ‘the
Act’), is one of the short questions arising for
consideration in these cases. Another short question
is – Whether writ can be issued compelling the Land
Acquisition Collector/Officer to implement the
1
REPORTABLEPage 2
instruction issued to him by the Government
otherwise than under the procedure under the Act? 
SHORT FACTS
3. The writ petitioners/appellants herein having their
property in Mukundur village, Hassan Taluk in
Karnataka State approached the High Court for
following directions:
“Issue Writ of Mandamus directing Deputy
Commissioner and Land Acquisition Officer to pass
the award as per the directions of the Principal
Secretary, Revenue Department, Government of
Karnataka and the decision of State Government
dated 19.11.2009.”
4. The letter dated 19.11.2009 from the Principal
Secretary to Government, Revenue Department,
addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, Hasan
District, reads as under:
“Sir,
Sub:- Framing award in respect of
Mukundooru, Gaddebindenahalli and
Chikkagondanahalli villages which are
acquired as seepage affected villages at
Hassan District - Reg.
Ref:- Your Letter No. BhuSwaSa-150:2008-09
dated 11.09.2009.
With regard to the above subject, your
attention is attracted towards your letter. As it is
already decided in the order No. RD 120 REH 1992
2Page 3
dated 15.04.1999 to shift these villages with
regard to seepage, due to Hemavathi Irrigation
canal project, it was already informed in the
earlier letter dated 16.03.1999 that, there is no
necessity to submit the same afresh before high
level committee presided by the Regional
Commissioner and further to frame award in
respect of these villages.
In furtherance, it is clearly ordered by the
Hon’ble Chief Minister to frame award with regard
to Mukundooru village and disburse compensation
amount, it is already informed in the letter dated
30.07.2009 bearing No. RD 113 BhuSwaHa 2009
to initiate action as per the said order. Wherefore,
I am directed to inform you to initiate action as
already directed by the Governor (sic
Government).”
5. The petitioners’ case was that on account of the
seepage from the distributory canal of the reservoir,
they had suffered serious damage to their houses
and, on their representations, the Government had
already taken a decision to acquire the property. The
land acquisition officer, according to the petitioners,
had on 15.04.1999, initiated proceedings under
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and, thereafter,
Section 6 Declaration was issued. However, the
proceedings got lapsed since no award was passed
within the period prescribed under Section 11A of the
Act.
3Page 4
6. It is seen as per Annexure-P2 – Notification dated
27.10.2007, that the Land Acquisition Collector had
initiated proceedings under Section 4(1) of the Act
for acquiring the lands of the petitioners and it was
followed by Section 6 declaration dated 15.10.2008
published on 23.10.2008. Since, no serious steps
were taken to complete the acquisition by passing
the awards, it appears, the petitioners approached
the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India in 2011 for a direction to compel the land
acquisition collector to act as per the instruction
issued by the Government and to complete the
acquisition proceedings. The learned Single Judge, by
order dated 07.03.2011 disposed of the writ petitions
directing the land acquisition collector and the State
to pass awards in the case of the petitioners and a
few others within four weeks from the receipt of the
Order. There was also a further direction that the
petitioners should vacate the property if they were
still in possession and that they should handover
possession prior to the receipt of the compensation.
4Page 5
7. Aggrieved, land acquisition collector, State and
others filed Writ Appeals leading to the impugned
Judgment dated 09.12.2011. It was contended that
the hardships on account of seepage could be
resolved by constructing ‘a drainage canal’ and
acquisition for that reason was not necessary and not
in contemplation also. The Judgment of the Single
Judge was set aside and the Appeals were disposed
of with the direction to complete the canal project
within three months. It was also clarified that the
petitioners were free to initiate appropriate legal
action in case there was still seepage. Thus,
aggrieved, the writ petitioners filed the Special Leave
Petitions.
8. Under Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, the
Collector is to pass the award under Section 11 within
a period of two years from the date of the publication
of the declaration and, in case no award is made
within that period, the entire proceedings for
acquisition of the land would lapse. In the instant
case, the declaration under Section 6 dated
5Page 6
15.10.2008 published on 23.10.2008 had already
lapsed by the time the writ petitioners had
approached the High Court. This crucial factual
position, unfortunately, has not been taken note of
by the High Court. The Court cannot compel the land
acquisition collector to pass awards in respect of the
land acquisition proceedings which had already
lapsed. That apart, under the scheme of the Land
Acquisition Act, the Government is at liberty to
withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which
possession has not been taken at any stage prior to
the passing of the award. In case the owner, in
consequence of such withdrawal, has suffered any
damages, he is entitled to compensation in that
regard, under Section 48 of the Act, which reads as
follows:
“48. Completion of acquisition not
compulsory, but compensation to be
awarded when not completed.-(1) Except in
the case provided for in section 36, the
Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from
the acquisition of any land of which possession has
not been taken.
(2) Whenever the Government withdraws from any
such acquisition, the Collector shall determine the
amount of compensation due for the damage
6Page 7
suffered by the owner in consequence of the
notice or of any proceedings thereunder, and shall
pay such amount to the person interested,
together with all costs reasonably incurred by him
in the prosecution of the proceedings under this
Act relating to the said land.
(3) The provisions of Part III of this Act shall apply,
so far as may be, to the determination of the
compensation payable under this section.”
9. In the case on hand, there is no question of any such
Notification on withdrawal since the proceedings had
already lapsed. Admittedly, no possession had been
taken. Therefore, Section 36 does not apply. Whether
to acquire a particular property or not is for the
Government to decide. It is not within the jurisdiction
of the Court to compel the Government to acquire
any property, otherwise than as per the Land
Acquisition Act. No doubt, the High Court exercises
judicial review of administrative action or inaction.
But having regard to the various facts and
circumstances or factors, it is for the Government to
consider at the permissible stage as to whether a
particular property is to be acquired or whether an
Award is to be passed pursuant to proceedings
already initiated under Section 4(1) of the Act. The
7Page 8
Act is a complete code as far as such decisions are
concerned and Government is well within their
jurisdiction to act as per the scheme provided under
the Act. Even otherwise, the writ petition was wholly
misconceived. The prayer is for direction to the land
acquisition collector to act in terms of letter issued to
the land acquisition collector by the secretary to the
Government.
10. Even otherwise, the writ petition was wholly
misconceived. The prayer is for direction to the land
acquisition collector to act in terms of letter issued to
the land acquisition collector by the secretary to the
Government.
If a subordinate authority in the
Government does not act in terms of the direction or
instruction issued by the superior authority, it is not
for the Court to compel that subordinate authority to
comply with the instruction or direction issued by the
superior authority, if it is not otherwise governed by a
statutory procedure. Court is not the executing forum
8Page 9
of the instruction issued by the Government to its
subordinates. That jurisdiction lies elsewhere under
the scheme of the Constitution. Therefore, on that
count also, the writ petition was liable to be
dismissed. 
11. Yet with all these, the fact remains that the
residential houses of the petitioners are in the
seepage affected area in Mukundur village coming
under 6th District Minor Hemavathi Left Bank Canal.
Despite decades long efforts made by the petitioners,
it appears even the cement concrete lining to the
canal has been done only recently and that too in
order to avoid the acquisition for which twice
notifications had already been issued. It has to be
noted that the agricultural land of the petitioners had
already been acquired and what remained was only
the residential part. Petitioners had the grievance
that on account of the seepage, there was dampness
resulting also in cracks on the building. In view of the
miseries suffered by these poor persons, we are of
the view that it will not be just and fair to relegate
9Page 10
them to workout their remedies before the civil court
for damages, at this instance of time. Therefore, in
the interests of justice and in order to do complete
justice, we order that each of the petitioners shall be
paid a lump sum amount of Re.1 lakh each towards
damages for the hardships they have already
undergone on account of seepage resulting in
dampness and cracks to their residential buildings.
The respondents 7/8 shall see that the amount as
above is deposited in the bank account of the
respective petitioner within three months. We,
however, make it clear that this Judgment shall not
stand in the way of the respondents, if so required or
warranted in public interest, acquiring the disputed
lands. 
12. Subject to the above, the appeals are dismissed. No
costs.
………………………………J.
(G.S. SINGHVI)
………………………………J.
1Page 11
(KURIAN JOSEPH)
New Delhi;
May 6, 2013.
1

Land Acquisition Act, - Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) was issued on 5.3.1963 in respect of the land admeasuring 139 bighas and 2 biswas including the aforesaid land of the appellant. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made in respect of the said land on 22.8.1963. The Land Acquisition Collector made the award under the Act on 29.11.1963. However, no award was made in respect of the land measuring 23 bighas and 7 biswas including the suit land as it had been shown to be the land of Central Government. However, the possession of the land in respect of which the award was made and the land transferred to the appellant was also taken and the Union of India handed it over to 2Page 3 Delhi Electric Supply Units (for short ‘DESU’) for the construction of staff quarters on 5.7.1966. The appellant claimed to have been deprived of the land without paying any compensation whatsoever, thus, there was a regular correspondence by the appellant - In a welfare State, statutory authorities are bound, not only to pay adequate compensation, but there is also a legal obligation upon them to rehabilitate such persons. The nonfulfillment of their obligations would tantamount to forcing the said uprooted persons to become vagabonds or to indulge in anti-national activities as such sentiments would be born in them on account of such ill-treatment. Therefore, it is not permissible for any welfare State to uproot a person and deprive him of his 9Page 10 fundamental/constitutional/human rights, under the garb of industrial development. The appellants have been deprived of their legitimate dues for about half a century. In such a fact-situation, we fail to understand for which class of citizens, the Constitution provides guarantees and rights in this regard and what is the exact percentage of the citizens of this country, to whom Constitutional/statutory benefits are accorded, in accordance with the law”. 11. The instant case is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment in Tukaram’s case (supra) and thus, entitled for restoration of possession of the land in dispute. However, considering the fact that the possession of the land was taken over about half a century ago and stood completely developed as Ms. Ahlawat, learned counsel has submitted that a full-fledged residential colony of employees of DESU has been constructed thereon, therefore, it would be difficult for respondent no.1 to restore the possession. 12. In such a fact-situation, the only option left out to the respondents is to make the award treating Section 4 notification as, on this date, i.e. 12.2.2013 and we direct the Land Acquisition Collector to make the award after hearing the parties within a period of four 1Page 11 months from today. For that purpose, the parties are directed to appear before Land Acquisition Collector, C/o The Deputy Commissioner, South M.B. Road, Saket, New Delhi on 26.2.2013. The appellant is at liberty to file a reference under Section 18 of the Act and to pursue the remedies available to him under the Act. Needless to say that the appellant shall be entitled to all statutory benefits. 13. With these directions, the appeals are allowed. The judgments impugned herein are set aside. C.A. No. 203/2004 14. In view of the order passed in C.A. Nos. 204-205/2004, the appeal is dismissed.

Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.  204-205  OF 2004
Bhimandas Ambwani (D) Thr. Lrs.                   …Appellant
Versus
Delhi Power Company Limited                     …Respondents
with
C.A. No. 203/2004
O R D E R
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.  204-205  OF 2004
1. These  appeals  have  been  preferred  against  the  impugned
judgment  and  order  dated  22.3.2002,  passed  by  Delhi  High
Court in LPA No.46 of 1983 and judgment and order dated
21.5.2002 passed in Review Application C.M. No.893 of 2002
therein by way of which the appeal filed by the respondents
Page 2
against  the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge
dated 26.11.1982 had been allowed.
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that :-
A. The appellant had been conferred title over the land in Khasra
No.307 admeasuring 3 bighas and 3 biswas situate in the revenue
estate of village Kilokri, Delhi and the Conveyance Deed for the same
was registered on behalf of the President of India in favour of the
appellant on 6.6.1962.
A Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) was issued on 5.3.1963 in
respect of the land admeasuring 139 bighas and 2 biswas including the
aforesaid land of the appellant.  A declaration under Section 6 of the
Act was made in respect of the said land on 22.8.1963.  The Land
Acquisition Collector made the award under the Act on 29.11.1963.
However, no award was made in respect of the land measuring 23
bighas and 7 biswas including the suit land as it had been shown to be
the land of Central Government. However, the possession of the land
in respect of which the award was made and the land transferred to the
appellant was also taken and the Union of India handed it over to
2Page 3
Delhi Electric Supply Units (for short ‘DESU’) for the construction of
staff  quarters  on  5.7.1966.   The  appellant  claimed  to  have  been
deprived of the land without paying any compensation whatsoever,
thus, there was a regular correspondence by the appellant  and in view
thereof Section 4 Notification under the Act was issued on 7.10.1968
in respect of the land admeasuring 31 bighas and 15 biswas including
the land in dispute.  The said Notification under Section 4 was not
acted upon, but a supplementary award No. 1651-A dated 16.2.1974,
was  made  in  respect  of  the  land  in  dispute,  making  reference  to
Section 4 Notification dated 5.3.1963.
B. Aggrieved, the appellant filed Writ Petition No.307 of 1972
before Delhi High Court and the said writ petition was disposed of
vide  judgment  and  order  dated  26.11.1982  making  it  clear  that
acquisition proceedings emanating from Notification dated 5.3.1963
came to an end rather stood superseded by second Notification dated
7.10.1968  and  therefore,  supplementary  award  No.1651-A  dated
16.2.1974 was illegal and without jurisdiction and thus, the award was
quashed.   The  respondents  were  directed  to  handover  the  vacant
possession  of  the  suit  property  to  the  appellant  by  31.12.1983.
However, liberty was given to the State to issue a fresh Notification
3Page 4
under Section 4 of the Act within a period of one year and till then the
possession could be retained by the respondents.
C. It  was  in  view  thereof,  a  Notification  dated  26.3.1983  was
issued under Section 4 of the Act in respect of the suit land and in the
meanwhile, the respondents preferred LPA No.46 of 1983 against the
said judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 26.11.1982.
D. Declaration under Section 6 of the Act dated 30.5.1983 was
issued in respect of the suit land and the respondents did not complete
the acquisition proceedings rather abandoned the same.
E. The Division Bench allowed the said LPA vide judgment and
order dated 22.3.2002.  Review Petition against the said LPA filed by
the appellant was dismissed on 21.5.2002.
Hence, these appeals.
3. Shri Arvind Kumar and Ms. Henna George, learned counsel
appearing  for  the  appellant  have  submitted  that  there  had  been  3
successive Notifications under Section 4 of the Act.  Therefore, the
second  Notification superseded  the first  and  the  third  Notification
superseded the second notification.  In response to the first Section 4
4Page 5
Notification there was no award as the Land Acquisition Collector
considered that the suit land belonged to the Central Government. The
supplementary award was made subsequent to the second Section 4
Notification making reference to the first Section 4 Notification dated
5.3.1963 which had already elapsed.  The learned Single Judge has
rightly decided the issue and in pursuance of the same once the third
Section  4  Notification  was  issued  on  26.3.1983  and  no  further
proceedings were taken, it also stood elapsed.  Therefore, in law, there
had been no proceedings regarding acquisition of the land in dispute.
The respondent-authorities cannot be permitted to encroach upon the
land of the appellant without resorting to the procedure prescribed by
law.  The Division Bench  erred in reversing  the  judgment  of the
learned Single Judge under the misconception that there was a valid
award in respect of the land in dispute as it could be made referable to
Notification  under  Section  4  dated  7.10.1968  and  therefore,  the
appeals deserve to be allowed.
4. Per contra, Ms. Avnish Ahlawat, learned counsel appearing for
the  respondent  no.1  and  Shri  Vishnu  Saharya,  learned  counsel
appearing for DDA have opposed the appeal contending that their
5Page 6
land had been acquired by the Union of India and handed over to the
respondent  no.1 after taking the amount of compensation from it.
Therefore, the said respondent cannot be penalised at such a belated
stage for the reason that DESU has deposited a sum of Rs.10,16,400/-
towards the price of land on 24.5.1966.  The judgment of the High
Court does not require to be interfered with and thus, the appeals are
liable to be dismissed.
5. We  have  considered  the  rival  submissions  made  by learned
counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6. There cannot be any dispute to the settled legal proposition that
successive Notifications under Section 4 or successive Declarations
under Section 6 of the Act can be made, however, the effect of the
same would be that earlier notification/declaration stands obliterated/
superseded and in such a fact-situation, it would not be permissible for
either of the parties to make any reference to the said notifications/
declarations which stood superseded.
7. In  Bhutnath Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal & Ors.,
(1969)  3  SCC  675,  this  Court  held  that  where  second  Section  4
Notification has been issued, the market value is to be determined in
6Page 7
terms of the later notification for the reason that there was an intention
to supersede the previous notification and if the Government did not
choose to explain the reasons which persuaded it to issue the second
notification, the court is justified in inferring that it was intended to
supersede the earlier notification by the later notification.
8. In  Land Acquisition Officer-cum-RDO, Chevella Division,
Ranga Reddy District v. A. Ramachandra Reddy & Ors., AIR
2011 SC 662, while dealing with the same issue, this Court held:    
“….. the Government after considering the facts
and circumstances, with a view to avoid further
challenge,  issued  a  fresh  notification  dated
9.9.1993  (gazetted  on  19.11.1993)  followed  by
final  declaration  dated,  16.2.1994.  The  State
Government did not subsequently cancel/rescind/
withdraw  the  notifications  dated  9.9.1993  and
16.2.1994.  The  State  Government  had  clearly
abandoned  the  earlier  notifications dated
3.1.1990 and 10.l.1990 by issuing the subsequent
notifications dated  9.91993  and  16.2.1994.  The
appellant cannot therefore contend that the second
preliminary notification is redundant or that first
preliminary  notification  continues  to  hold
good…..” (Emphasis added)
(See also : Raghunath & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR
1988 SC 1615; Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd. & Anr. vs. Special Deputy
Collector  (Land  Acquisition),  AIR  1990  SC  731;  and  Raipur
7Page 8
Development Authority v. Anupan Sahkari Griha Nirman Samiti
& Ors., (2000) 4 SCC 357).
9. In view of the above, Section 4 Notification dated 26.3.1983
and  Declaration  under  Section  6  dated  13.5.1983  superseded  all
earlier notification/declaration.  However, no proceedings were taken
in pursuance of the said notification/declaration issued in the year
1983 and after commencement of the Amendment Act 1987, the said
notification/declaration made in the year 1983 stood elapsed as no
award had been  made within the period stipulated under the Act.
Thus, there can be no sanctity to any of the acquisition proceedings
initiated  by  the  respondents  so  far  as  the  suit  land  is  concerned,
though the appellant stood dispossessed from his land in pursuance of
the Notification under Section 4 dated 5.3.1963.  Thus, we have no
hesitation  in  making  a  declaration  that  the  appellant  had  been
dispossessed  without  resorting  to  any  valid  law  providing  for
acquisition of land.  The Court is shocked as the appellant had been
dispossessed from the land during the period when right to property
was a fundamental right under Articles 31A and 19 of the Constitution
of India and subsequently became a constitutional and human right
under Article 300A.
8Page 9
10. This Court dealt with a similar case in Tukaram Kana Joshi &
Ors.  thr.  Power  of  Attorney  Holder  v.  Maharashtra  Industrial
Development Corporation & Ors., (2013) 1 SCC 353, and held :
“……There is a distinction, a  true and  concrete
distinction,  between  the  principle  of  "eminent
domain" and "police power" of the State. Under
certain  circumstances,  the  police  power  of  the
State may be used temporarily, to take possession
of property but the present case clearly shows that
neither of the said powers have been exercised. A
question then arises with respect to the authority or
power  under  which  the  State  entered  upon  the
land. It is evident that the act of the State amounts
to encroachment, in exercise of "absolute power"
which in common parlance is also called abuse of
power or use of  muscle power. To further clarify
this position, it must be noted that the authorities
have  treated  the  land  owner  as  a  'subject'  of
medieval  India,  but  not  as  a  'citizen'  under  our
constitution.
xx xx xx
Depriving the appellants of their immovable
properties, was a clear violation of Article 21 of
the  Constitution.
  In  a  welfare  State,  statutory
authorities are  bound,  not  only  to  pay  adequate
compensation, but there is also a legal obligation
upon them to rehabilitate such persons. 
The nonfulfillment of their obligations would tantamount
to  forcing  the  said  uprooted  persons  to  become
vagabonds or to indulge in anti-national activities
as  such  sentiments  would  be  born  in  them  on
account of such ill-treatment. Therefore, it is not
permissible   for  any  welfare  State  to  uproot  a
person  and  deprive  him  of  his
9Page 10
fundamental/constitutional/human rights, under the
garb of industrial development.  
The appellants have been deprived of their
legitimate dues for about half a century. In such a
fact-situation, we fail to understand for which class
of  citizens,  the  Constitution  provides guarantees
and rights in this regard  and what is the exact
percentage of the citizens of this country, to whom
Constitutional/statutory  benefits  are  accorded,  in
accordance with the law”. 
11. The instant case is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment
in  Tukaram’s case  (supra)  and  thus,  entitled  for  restoration  of
possession of the land in dispute.  However, considering the fact that
the possession of the land was taken over about half a century ago and
stood  completely  developed  as  Ms.  Ahlawat,  learned  counsel  has
submitted  that  a  full-fledged  residential  colony  of  employees  of
DESU has been constructed thereon, therefore, it would be difficult
for respondent no.1 to restore the possession.
12. In  such  a  fact-situation,  the  only  option  left  out  to  the
respondents is to make the award treating Section 4 notification as, on
this date, i.e. 12.2.2013 and we direct the Land Acquisition Collector
to make the award after hearing the parties within a period of four
1Page 11
months from today.  For  that  purpose,  the  parties are directed  to
appear  before  Land  Acquisition  Collector,  C/o  The  Deputy
Commissioner, South M.B. Road, Saket, New Delhi on 26.2.2013.
The appellant is at liberty to file a reference under Section 18 of the
Act  and  to  pursue  the  remedies  available  to  him  under  the  Act.
Needless to say that the appellant shall be entitled to all statutory
benefits.
13. With these directions, the appeals are allowed. The judgments
impugned herein are set aside. 
C.A. No. 203/2004
14. In view of the order passed in C.A. Nos. 204-205/2004, the
appeal is dismissed.
..………………………….J.
(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)
   .…………………………..J.
(V. GOPALA GOWDA)
New Delhi;
February 12, 2013
1