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Sunday, February 17, 2013

death penalty converted in to life sentence -“Brutality of the manner in which a murder was perpetrated may be a ground but not the sole criterion for judging whether the case is one of the “rarest of rare cases” as indicated in, Bachan Singh’s case, (AIR 1980 SC 898), in a way every murder is brutal, and the difference between one from the other may be on account of mitigating or aggravating features surrounding the murder.” - Thus, Section 31(1) of the Cr. P.C. empowers the Court to inflict sentences of imprisonment for more than one offence to run either consecutively or concurrently. In Kamalanantha & Ors. vs. State of T.N. [(2005) 5 SCC 194], this Court has held that the term “imprisonment” in Section 31 of the Cr. P.C. includes the sentence for imprisonment for life. Considering the facts of this case, we are of the opinion that the appellant is liable under Section 302, IPC for imprisonment for life for each of three offences of murder under Section 300, IPC and the imprisonments for life should not run concurrently but consecutively and such punishment of consecutive sentence of imprisonment for the triple murder committed by the appellant will serve the interest of justice. - but convert the sentence from death to sentence for rigorous imprisonment for life for each of the three offences of murder and direct that the sentences of imprisonment for life for the three offences will run consecutively and not concurrently.


Page 1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 94-95 of 2011
Sanaullah Khan                             …… Appellant
Versus
State of Bihar                                               …..
Respondent
               
J U D G M E N T
A. K. PATNAIK, J.
This  is  an  appeal  against  the  judgment  dated
16.12.2009 of the Patna High Court in Death Reference
Case No. 1 of 2007 and Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 379 of
2007.
FACTS:
2. The  facts  very  briefly  are  that  a  fardbeyan was
lodged on 17.12.2002 by one Sanju Kumar (hereinafter
referred to as Informant), resident of Village Mathura, P.S.Page 2
Bidupur, District Vaishali.  In the fardbeyan, it was stated:
Father  of  the  informant,  namely  Ravindra  Prasad,  was
running a tea stall near the Eastern gate of the GPO.  For
the tea stall he required about 25 Litres of milk everyday
and this milk was being supplied by Sanaullah Khan, the
appellant  herein,  for  about  a  month.   Sanaullah  Khan
started mixing water with the milk and the customers of
the tea stall started making complaints about the quality
of tea.  On 02.12.2002 at about 2.00 p.m. Sanaullah Khan
along with Md. Hamid and Arvind came to the tea stall and
demanded  the  dues  for  the  supply  of  milk.   After
calculation it was found that the dues amounted to Rs.
1,000/- and Ravindra Prasad gave Sanauallah Khan Rs.
500/- and told him that the rest of the amount will be paid
later.  Ravindra Prasad, however, informed Sanaullah Khan
that the milk supplied by him was not up to the mark and
therefore he will no longer purchase milk from his Khatal.
Sanaullah Khan got annoyed and told him that he will not
allow him to run the tea stall.  Ravindra Prasad retorted
that he had seen many persons like him at his tea stall.
Sanaullah  Khan  said  that  he  will  have  to  face  serious
2Page 3
consequences and that he will teach him a lesson within
two to four days.  Thereafter, Sanaullah Khan, Hamid and
Arvind went away.  On 16.12.2002 at about 8.00 p.m.
Arvind, who was working with Sanaullah Khan came and
told Ravindra Prasad that his master was calling him for
some urgent work and Ravindra Prasad went along with
Arvind and did not return for an hour.  Arvind again came
and told his brother Sunny Kumar, who was in the tea
stall, that his master was calling him and that Ravindra
Prasad was in the Khatal.  Sunny Kumar also accompanied
Arvind.  Ravindra Prasad and Sunny Kumar, however, did
not return till the next morning.  The Informant became
suspicious and started searching for his father and his
brother.  He went to the Khatal of the appellant, but found
it to be closed.  He suspected that the appellant, Hamid
and Arvind had kidnapped his father and younger brother.
3. The fardbeyan given by the Informant was registered
as  FIR No.451 of 2002 at Kotwali, P.S. for the offence of
kidnapping under Section 364 read with Section 34 of the
Indian  Penal  Code,  1860,  (for  short  ‘the  IPC’).  When
investigation was done by the police, three dead bodies
3Page 4
were found concealed in husk in a room on the eastern
verandah  of  Pearl  Cinema  and  the  dead  bodies  were
seized and a seizure list was prepared in which Parimal
Kumar and Baleshwar Ram signed as witnesses.  Two of
the dead bodies were identified by the informant as those
of Ravindra Prasad and Sunny Kumar.  Inquest reports and
postmortem reports of the dead bodies were prepared.
Later the third body was identified to be that of Arvind by
Ramanand  Ram,  father  of  Arvind.   The  appellant  was
arrested and pursuant to the confession of the appellant,
the shoes, sandal and gamchha of the three deceased
persons,  a rope,  a small plastic bag and a knife were
recovered  from  the  garbage  situated  in  north-east  of
Khatal and were seized and Parimal Kumar and Baleshwar
Ram signed the seizure list.  Offences under Sections 302,
120B and 201 IPC were added and a charge-sheet was
filed against the appellant and Hamid and the case was
committed to the Court of Sessions.
4. At  the  trial,  altogether  eight  witnesses  were
examined.    The  Trial  Court  held  that  the  chain  of
circumstances  is  complete  and  does  not  leave  any
4Page 5
reasonable  ground  for  conclusion  consistent  with  the
innocence of the appellant and it goes to show that in all
human  probabilities,  the  offences  must  have  been
committed by the appellant.   The trial court,  however,
acquitted Hamid of the charges.  After hearing on the
question of sentence, the trial court took the view that the
appellant should be hanged by the neck till death as he
had  killed  three  helpless  persons  brutally  after
premeditation and if he is allowed to continue to live in the
present society, he will be a threat to his co-human beings
and this was one of those rarest of rare cases in which the
appellant deserves the capital punishment of death.  The
trial court accordingly referred the sentence of death to
the High Court.
5. The appellant also filed a criminal appeal against the
judgment of the trial court.  On 03.07.2006, the High Court
directed recording of additional evidence on two points in
exercise of its powers under Section 391 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 (for short ‘the Cr.P.C.’).  Pursuant to
the direction of the High Court the confessional statement
of the appellant was marked as an exhibit through the
5Page 6
investigating  officer  (PW-8)  after  his  recall  by  the  trial
court and the knife which was seized and listed as item 10
in  the  seizure  list  was  also  marked  as  an  exhibit.
Thereafter, the High Court heard the appeal and held that
the prosecution has been able to bring home the guilt of
the appellant with regard to the murder of the 3 deceased
persons by exhibiting four circumstances and these are (i)
that  the  appellant  was  selling  milk  to  the  deceased
Ravindra Prasad and Ravindra Prasad stopped buying the
milk (ii) the appellant summoned the deceased Ravindra
Prasad and deceased Sunny Kumar through the deceased
Arvind who was working with the appellant (iii) the dead
bodies  of  the  three  deceased  persons  were  recovered
from the room belonging to the appellant and (iv) the
weapons used in the murder of three deceased persons
were  recovered  pursuant  to  the  confession  of  the
appellant.   The  High  Court  also  confirmed  the  death
sentence of the appellant saying that the tests laid down
by this Court in Macchhi Singh vs. State of Punjab [(1983)
3 SCC 470] regarding the cases in which death penalty
should  be  imposed  were  present  in  the  facts  and
6Page 7
circumstances  of  the  present  case.   Aggrieved  by  the
judgment of the High Court, the appellant has filed this
appeal.
CONTENTIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE
PARTIES:
6. Mr.  Amarendra  Sharan,  learned  senior  counsel
appearing for the appellant, submitted that there is no eye
witness to the murder of the three deceased persons and
the finding of the High Court that the prosecution has
been able to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt are based on 4 circumstances is not
correct.
7. Mr. Sharan relied on the evidence of PW-3 to the
effect that Arvind had a dairy (khatal) at Old Bakri Bazar
and also on the evidence of PW-4 that the appellant never
had  any  business  of  milk  but  had  a  business  of  bakri
(goat).  He submitted that the first circumstance which
was  the  motive  for  the  appellant  to  kill  the  deceased
Ravindra Prasad and Sunny Kumar is itself not established
in this case.
7Page 8
8. Mr.  Sharan  submitted  that  there  is  absolutely  no
evidence to establish the second circumstance that the
appellant  summoned  the  deceased  persons  Ravindra
Prasad and Sunny Kumar.  He submitted that the trial
court and the High Court has relied on the evidence of PW-
6  to  hold  that  the  appellant  summoned  the  deceased
persons Ravindra Prasad and Sunny Kumar through his
servant Arvind but PW-6 was not present at the tea stall.
He submitted that the evidence of PW-7 would show that
PW-6  was  in  the  house  of  PW-7  on  16.12.2002  and
remained there till the morning of 17.12.2002 and thus
PW-6 was not present at the tea stall on 16.12.2002 when
Arvind is alleged to have told Ravindra Prasad and Sunny
Kumar that they have been summoned by the appellant.
9. Mr.  Sharan  next  submitted  that  the  third
circumstance that dead bodies were recovered from the
room belonging to the appellant is also not proved in as
much  as PW-7 has said in  his evidence that the dead
bodies were in fact recovered in front of the Pearl Cinema.
He submitted that the two seizure witnesses PW-1 and
PW-2 have clearly said that recovery of the dead bodies
8Page 9
and the weapon with which the offence was committed
and other incriminating materials were not made in their
presence.  He argued that Rajender Tiwari, the officer who
made the recoveries has also not been examined.  He
submitted that the recoveries were made from the pile of
the garbage and not from the drain by the side of Sona
Medical Hall as is alleged to have been  stated by the
appellant in his confession.  He submitted that, therefore,
the fourth circumstance that the incriminating materials
were  recovered  pursuant  to  the  confession  of  the
appellant is also not established.
10. Mr. Sharan relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs.
State of Maharashtra [(1984) 4 SCC 116] in which this
Court has laid down the tests to be satisfied before the
court  convicts  an  accused  on  the  basis  of  only
circumstantial evidence.  He argued that in this case these
tests are not satisfied and therefore the conviction of the
appellant by the trial court as maintained by the High
Court should be set aside.  He also cited the decision of
this  Court  in  Javed  Masood  and  Another vs.  State  of
Rajasthan [(2010) 3 SCC 538] to argue that the evidence
9Page 10
of prosecution witnesses was binding on the prosecution.
He submitted that the evidence of PW3, PW4 and PW7
relied upon by the appellant to establish his innocence,
therefore, is binding on the prosecution.
11. Mr. Samir Ali Khan, learned counsel appearing for
the State, on the other hand, submitted that the evidence
of  PW-6  is  consistent  and  if  the  evidence  of  PW-6  is
considered along with the recovery of the dead bodies
from the room belonging to the appellant as well as the
recovery of the weapons and other incriminating materials
pursuant to the confessional statement of the appellant
marked Ex.1, the Court will arrive at the only conclusion
that it is the appellant who has committed the murder of
three deceased persons.  He submitted that though the
appellant retracted his confession before the trial court
when his statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. was
recorded,  the  appellant  has  not  led  any  evidence  to
establish his innocence.  He submitted that the trial court
and the High Court, therefore, have rightly held that the
prosecution  has  been  able  to  prove  the  guilt  of  the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
10Page 11
FINDINGS OF THE COURT:
12. The evidence of PW-6 on which both the trial court
and  the  High  Court  have  relied  on  is  clear  that  on
16.12.2002 at about 8.00 p.m. when he was present at the
tea stall, Arvind, servant of the appellant came and called
Ravindra Prasad saying that the appellant wanted to talk
to him on certain issues and that Ravindra Prasad left with
Arvind.  PW-6 has also stated in his evidence that after
about  an  hour  Arvind  came  again  and  told  that  the
appellant was calling Sunny also and Sunny went along
with Arvind and thereafter PW-6 closed the shop and went
to his house.  No suggestion has also been made to PW-6
in his cross-examination by the defence that PW-6 was not
present  at  the  tea  stall  on  16.12.2002.   Mr.  Sharan,
however, referred to the evidence of PW-7 that PW-6 has
come to his house on 16.12.2002 and stayed at his house
at Patna itself in the night and left in the morning but PW-
7 has not stated the time when PW-6 had come to his
house on 16.12.2002.  Hence, the evidence of PW-7 does
not contradict the evidence of PW-6 that he was at the tea
stall  at  8.00  p.m.  on  16.12.2002  when  Arvind  told
11Page 12
Ravindra Prasad and Sunny Kumar that they were being
called by the appellant.
13. There is also evidence to show that the dead bodies
of  Ravindra  Prasad,  Sunny  Kumar  and  Arvind  were
recovered from the Khatal of the appellant.  Though, the
seizure witnesses PW-1 and PW-2 stated that nothing was
seized in their presence, PW-6 has stated that when the
Khatal (cattle shed) of the appellant was opened, he saw
some splashes of blood  and the dead bodies were found
in another room and these dead bodies were of Ravindra
Prasad, Sunny Kumar and Arvind.  He has also stated that
the  inquest  reports  of  all  the  three  dead  bodies  were
prepared at the place of occurrence itself and he put his
signature on it and all the three signatures are his and
these have been marked as Ex.1/5, 1/6 and 1/7.  In cross
examination  by  the  defence,  PW-6  has  denied  the
suggestion that the dead bodies had not been recovered
in  his  presence  and  that the  inquest  reports  were  not
prepared in  his presence and that he had not put his
signatures on the inquest reports.
12Page 13
14. Mr. Sharan relied on the evidence of PW-7 to submit
that the three dead bodies were not recovered from the
Khatal but we find that PW-7 has also stated that the three
dead  bodies  were  recovered  from  the  room  of  Pearl
Cinema where the Khatals of the appellant were situated.
PW-7  has,  however,  admitted  in  cross-examination  on
behalf of the defence that he had not seen with his own
eyes  as  to  from  which  place  the  dead  bodies  were
recovered.  Thus the evidence of PW-7 may not establish
the place from which the dead bodies were recovered but
the evidence of PW-6 clearly proves that the bodies were
recovered from a room in the verandah of Pearl Cinema,
which  was  in  occupation  of  the  appellant  and  this
evidence  of  PW-6  has  not  been  contradicted  by  the
evidence of PW-7.
15. PW-8, the I.O. who inspected the place of occurrence
has stated in his deposition that Pearl Cinema is situated
to the east of the tea stall in Budh Marg and was closed
for a long period and there is a verandah to the east of the
cinema hall which is divided into many rooms and the
rooms  situated  to  the  north  is  in  possession  of  the
13Page 14
appellant.  He has further stated in his evidence that in
the western portion of the floor of this room, blood was
found in huge quantity which had already clotted and the
stains of blood were found on the western wall also.  PW-8
has further stated that to the north of this room and near
the door there is a vacant place which is fitted with the
grill gate and to the north of this place there is another
room in which there is heap of straw and the three dead
bodies were found concealed in this very heap of husk
which were recovered and the husk was found sticking to
the injuries on the dead bodies of the deceased persons.
PW-8 has further stated that the three dead bodies were
recovered from the place of occurrence itself.  He has also
stated that Rajender Tiwari, the SI of Police prepared the
inquest reports of all the three dead bodies and he put his
signatures on all the three inquest reports which have
been marked as Ex.5, 5/1 and 5/2 respectively.
16. PW-8 has also stated in his evidence that in course of
investigation, after the appellant had surrendered in court,
he  took  him  on  police  remand  and  in  course  of
investigation  he  gave  his  confessional  statement,  and
14Page 15
pursuant to information the appellant divulged, he seized
two pair of blood stained plastic shoes, a blood stained
white  gamcha  (towel  of  Indian  type),  a  blood  stained
chequerred  gamcha,  a  plastic  rope  of  green  colour,  a
blood stained piece of plastic, a blood stained old sack, a
small sack of blood, a blood stained green small plastic
sack, a blood stained small container made of plastic, a
knife of 16 inches used for slaughtering goat.  PW-8 has
also stated that a seizure list of all these articles which
were recovered were prepared by Rajender Tiwari and he
had identified the writing and signature of Rajender Tiwari
and the seizure list is marked as Ex.6/1.  Section 27 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, states that when any fact is
deposed to as discovered in consequence of information
received from a person accused of any offence, in the
custody of a police officer, so much of such information,
whether  it  amounts  to  a  confession  or  not,  as  relates
distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.
Hence,  the  information  received  from  the  appellant
pursuant to which the aforesaid incriminating materials
15Page 16
were recovered is not only admissible but also has been
proved.
17. Thus, three circumstances have been established by
the prosecution.  The first circumstance established by the
prosecution  is  that  Arvind  came  to  the  tea  stall  on
16.12.2002 at about 8.00 p.m. and told Ravindra Prasad
that he was being called by the appellant and Ravindra
Prasad went with Arvind and within an hour thereafter
Arvind again came to the tea stall and told Sunny Kumar
that  he  was  being  called  by  the  appellant  and  Sunny
Kumar went along with Arvind.  The second circumstance
that has been established by the prosecution is that on
17.12.2002 the dead bodies of Ravindra Prasad, Sunny
Kumar  and  Arvind  were  recovered  from  a  room  in
occupation  of  the  appellant  in  the  verandah  of  Pearl
Cinema.  The  third  circumstance  which  has  been
established  by  the  prosecution  is  that  pursuant  to  the
information divulged by the appellant the incriminating
materials were recovered by the I.O.  These three chain of
circumstances establish beyond reasonable doubt that it
16Page 17
was the appellant who had eliminated the three deceased
persons.
18.  In  Sharad  Birdhichand  Sarda vs.  State  of
Maharashtra (supra), cited by Mr. Sharan, the following 5
golden principles were laid down for a proof of guilt on the
basis of circumstantial evidence (i) the circumstance from
which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be
fully established; (ii) the facts so established should be
consistent  only with  the hypothesis of  the guilt of the
accused; (iii) the circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature  and  tendency;  (iv)  they  should  exclude  every
possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (v)
there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to
leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent
with the innocence of the accused and must show that in
all human probability the act must have been done by the
accused.  Considering the chain of three circumstances
which have been fully established by the prosecution, the
5 golden principles laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda
vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) apply in this case and the
only hypothesis that we can conclude from the chain of
17Page 18
three circumstances is that it is the appellant who has
committed the murder of the three deceased persons.
19. In Javed Masood and Another vs. State of Rajasthan
(supra) cited by Mr. Sharan, this Court relying on its earlier
decision in Mukhtiar Ahmed Ansari vs. State [(2005) 5 SCC
258] has held that it was open to the defence to rely on
the evidence led by the prosecution.  In this case, we have
found that the evidence of PW-7 does not contradict the
evidence of PW-6 and does not support the defence.  It,
however, appears from the evidence of PW-3 that it was
Arvind who had a Khatal at Old Bakri Bazar.  We have
perused the evidence of PW-3 and we do not find that PW-
3 has stated that the appellant did not have a Khatal on
the verandah of the Pearl Cinema.  Of course, PW4 has
stated that the appellant runs business of bakri (sheep
goat) and never ran milk business but in the evidence of
PW-4  there  is  nothing  to  show  that  the  room  on  the
verandah of Pearl Cinema was not in the occupation of the
appellant.  At best the defence can rely on PW-4 to argue
that  the  appellant  did  not  carry  on  milk  business  and
therefore the motive for committing the offence did not
18Page 19
exist.  The evidence of PW4 may thus create some doubt
with regard to the motive of the appellant to kill Ravindra
Prasad and Sunny  Kumar.   Where  other  circumstances
lead  to  the  only  hypothesis  that  the  accused  has
committed  the  offence,  the  Court  cannot  acquit  the
accused of the  offence merely because the motive for
committing the offence has not been established in the
case.  In Ujjagar Singh v. State of Punjab [(2007) 13 SCC
90, this Court has held:
“It is true that in a case relating to
circumstantial evidence motive does
assume great importance but to say
that  the  absence  of  motive  would
dislodge the entire prosecution story
is perhaps giving this one factor an
importance which is not due and (to
use the cliche) the motive is in the
mind of the accused and can seldom
be  fathomed  with  any  degree  of
accuracy”.
SENTENCE:
20.  On the question of sentence, the trial court has
recorded special reasons under Section 354(3) Cr.P.C. for
awarding death sentence to the appellant.  The trial court
has held that the appellant has killed Ravindra Prasad and
19Page 20
Sunny  Kumar  on  an  issue  of  petty  amount  and  the
appellant has also not spared his servant, Arvind.  The trial
court has also found from the post mortem reports of the
three  deceased  persons  that  they  have  been  brutally
murdered after premeditation.  The trial court has further
held that if the appellant is allowed to continue to live in
society, he will be a great threat to his co-human beings.
For the aforesaid reasons, the trial court took the view
that the appellant should be awarded the death sentence.
21.  While  confirming  the  death  sentence,  the  High
Court has held in the impugned judgment that the present
case clearly falls under the yardstick laid down in Machhi
Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab [AIR 1983 SC 957].  The
reasons, which weighed with the High Court in confirming
the death sentence, are that the appellant did not hesitate
to  take  away  three  lives  for  petty  monetary  gain;  the
tender age of Sunny was of no concern to him; either
Ravindra or Sunny had to undergo the trauma of watching
the father or the son being killed first in front of the other
and their hands and feet were tied and a butchering knife
was used to cause multiple murders and the nature of the
20Page 21
assault upon  the deceased Arvind to  do  away with  all
evidence whatsoever was dastardly.
22.  We have, however, noticed that the motive for the
appellant to commit the murder of three persons has not
been established in this case.  Hence, one of the reasons
given  by  the  trial  court  and  the  High  Court  that  the
murders were committed for petty monetary gain is not
substantiated by evidence.  We have also found that there
is no eyewitness to the manner in which the appellant
committed the murder of three persons and the culpability
of the appellant has been established only by a chain of
three circumstances established by the prosecution.  The
finding of the High Court, therefore, that either Ravindra
or  Sunny  had  to  undergo  the  trauma  of  watching  the
father or the son being killed first in front of the other is a
pure surmise.  Similarly, the finding of the High Court that
the hands and feet were tied and a butchering knife was
used to cause multiple murders is an inference drawn by
the High Court from the post mortem report.  What exactly
happened leading to the murder of three persons by the
appellant is not known, but what appears from the  post
21Page 22
mortem reports is that the three deceased persons were
brutally killed by the appellant.  It has, however, been held
by this Court in Subhash Ramkumar Bind @ Vakil & Anr. v.
State  of  Maharashtra [AIR  2003  SC  269]  that  brutality
would be a relevant factor but how the same did take
place  is  also  a  relevant  and  necessary  material  to  be
considered  while  deciding  whether  to  award  life
imprisonment  or  death  for  the  offence  of  murder.
Moreover, in Panchhi & Ors. v. State of U.P. [AIR 1998 SC
2726] a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held:
“Brutality of the manner in which a murder
was perpetrated may be a ground but not the
sole criterion for judging whether the case is
one of the “rarest of rare cases” as indicated
in,  Bachan Singh’s case, (AIR 1980 SC 898),
in  a  way  every  murder  is  brutal,  and  the
difference between one from the other may
be on account of mitigating or aggravating
features surrounding the murder.”
23.     The  trial  court,  however,  has  held  that  as  the
appellant  has  eliminated  the  three  deceased,  if  the
appellant is allowed to continue to live in society, he will
be a great threat to his co-human beings.  This reason for
awarding the extreme penalty of death is based on an
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apprehension  and  may  not  be  enough  to  impose  the
extreme  penalty  of  death.   As  has  been  held  by  the
majority of four Judges in Bachan Singh’s case (supra), the
extreme penalty of death can be inflicted only in gravest
cases of extreme culpability and in making choice of the
sentence, in addition to the circumstances of the offence,
due  regard  must  be  paid  to  the  circumstances  of  the
offender  also.   In  the  present  case,  we  do  not  find
evidence  to  establish  the  gravest  case  of  extreme
culpability  of  the  appellant  and  we  do  not  also  have
evidence to establish the circumstances of the appellant.
24.   We have, however, sufficient evidence to establish
the  culpability  of  the  appellant  for  three  offences  of
murder as defined in Section 300, IPC, and for each of the
three offences of murder,  the appellant is liable under
Section  302,  IPC  for  imprisonment  for  life  if  not  the
extreme penalty of death.  Section 31(1) of the Cr.P.C.
provides that when a person is convicted at one trial of
two  or  more  offences,  the  Court  may,  subject  to  the
provisions  of  Section  71  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code,
sentence  him  for  such  offences,  to  the  several
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punishments  prescribed  therefor  which  such  Court  is
competent to inflict; such punishments when consisting of
imprisonment to commence the one after the expiration of
the other in such order as the Court may direct, unless the
Court  directs  that  such  punishments  shall  run
concurrently.   Thus,  Section  31(1)  of  the  Cr.  P.C.
empowers the Court to inflict sentences of imprisonment
for more than one offence to run either consecutively or
concurrently.  In  Kamalanantha & Ors. vs.  State of T.N.
[(2005) 5 SCC 194], this Court has held that the term
“imprisonment” in Section 31 of the Cr. P.C. includes the
sentence for imprisonment for life.  Considering the facts
of this case, we are of the opinion that the appellant is
liable under Section 302, IPC for imprisonment for life for
each of three offences of murder under Section 300, IPC
and the imprisonments for life should not run concurrently
but  consecutively  and  such  punishment  of  consecutive
sentence of imprisonment for the triple murder committed
by the appellant will serve the interest of justice.  
25.  In the result, we maintain the conviction of the
appellant for three offences of murder under section 302,
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IPC, but convert the sentence from death to sentence for
rigorous  imprisonment  for  life  for  each  of  the  three
offences  of  murder  and  direct  that  the  sentences  of
imprisonment  for  life  for  the  three  offences  will  run
consecutively and not concurrently.  Thus, the appeals are
allowed only on the question of sentence, and dismissed
as regards conviction. 
.……………………….J.
                                                           (A. K. Patnaik)
………………………..J.
(Madan B. Lokur)
New Delhi,
February 15, 2013.  
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