Where an employee applies for retirement on medical grounds within the period prescribed under a compassionate appointment scheme and the employer fails to process the application or communicate procedural deficiencies until after expiry of the prescribed age limit, the employer cannot rely upon the consequences of its own delay to deny compassionate appointment. A public authority is bound to administer beneficial schemes fairly and within a reasonable time, and administrative inaction cannot defeat an otherwise valid claim.

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2026 INSC 710

Rahul S/o. Ramnarayan Madankar & Anr. v. The New India Assurance Company Ltd. & Ors.

HEAD NOTES

A. Compassionate Appointment — Medical Retirement — Employer's delay — Effect.

(Paras 21 to 30)

Held, where an employee applies for voluntary retirement on medical grounds before attaining the prescribed age limit and supports the application with a Government medical certificate, the employer is under a duty to scrutinise the application within a reasonable time. The employer cannot keep the application pending, communicate deficiencies only after the employee crosses the age limit and thereafter deny compassionate appointment by relying upon the consequences of its own delay.

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B. Compassionate Appointment Scheme — Strict adherence to Scheme — Fair implementation.

(Paras 15 to 18)

Held, compassionate appointment is governed entirely by the applicable scheme and cannot be granted dehors its provisions. However, strict adherence to the scheme does not absolve the employer from administering the scheme fairly, reasonably and within a reasonable time. Administrative inaction cannot be permitted to defeat a legitimate claim arising under the scheme.

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C. Compassionate Appointment — Medical Board Certificate — Delay in communicating requirement — Effect.

(Paras 23 to 26)

Held, where the employer considers the medical certificate initially produced by the employee to be insufficient, it must communicate such deficiency promptly. Failure to require a Medical Board certificate before expiry of the prescribed age limit disentitles the employer from relying upon the delayed production of such certificate to reject the dependent's claim.

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D. Administrative Law — Public Authorities — No authority can take advantage of its own wrong.

(Paras 20 to 26)

Held, a public authority cannot derive advantage from its own omission or delay. Where the authority's failure to act within a reasonable time results in prejudice to the citizen, such delay cannot be used as a ground to defeat the statutory or policy benefit otherwise available.

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E. Compassionate Appointment — Beneficial Scheme — Interpretation.

(Paras 26 & 30)

Held, beneficial schemes providing compassionate appointment must receive a fair and purposive construction consistent with their object. The scheme cannot be interpreted in a manner that places the beneficiary's rights at the mercy of administrative delay or procedural inaction.

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F. Compassionate Appointment — Relief — Direct grant instead of remand.

(Paras 27 to 33)

Held, where the rejection of compassionate appointment is found wholly unsustainable, the claimant has diligently pursued the remedy for several years and remand would only prolong injustice, the Court may direct grant of compassionate appointment instead of remitting the matter for fresh consideration. Necessary age relaxation may also be granted where the claimant has crossed the prescribed age during pendency of litigation.

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Analysis of Facts

The father of the first appellant, an employee of the respondent insurance company, applied for voluntary retirement on medical grounds before attaining the age of fifty-five years and enclosed a medical certificate issued by the Civil Surgeon certifying permanent incapacity.

Although the application, supporting documents and repeated reminders were submitted before the prescribed age limit, the employer neither processed the application nor informed the employee that a Medical Board certificate was required. The requirement was communicated only after the employee crossed fifty-five years of age.

The employee immediately obtained the Medical Board certificate and complied with the employer's directions. Nevertheless, the employer rejected the dependent's claim for compassionate appointment solely on the ground that the employee had actually retired after attaining the age of fifty-five years. The High Court upheld the rejection.

The Supreme Court found that the delay resulting in crossing the age limit was attributable entirely to the employer's inaction and not to any default on the part of the employee.

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Analysis of Law

The Court reaffirmed the following principles:

1. Compassionate appointment is an exception to the normal rule of public employment and must strictly conform to the governing scheme.

2. The employer is equally bound to administer the scheme fairly, reasonably and within a reasonable time.

3. Administrative delay cannot be permitted to defeat an otherwise valid claim under a beneficial scheme.

4. No public authority can be allowed to take advantage of its own omission or default.

5. Procedural requirements such as production of a Medical Board certificate must be communicated promptly, particularly where eligibility depends upon compliance within a prescribed time.

6. Where prolonged litigation has resulted solely from the employer's unjustified action, the Court may grant final relief instead of remanding the matter.

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Ratio Decidendi

Where an employee applies for retirement on medical grounds within the period prescribed under a compassionate appointment scheme and the employer fails to process the application or communicate procedural deficiencies until after expiry of the prescribed age limit, the employer cannot rely upon the consequences of its own delay to deny compassionate appointment. A public authority is bound to administer beneficial schemes fairly and within a reasonable time, and administrative inaction cannot defeat an otherwise valid claim.

Where constituent acts of the offence of money laundering occur in different territorial jurisdictions, each jurisdiction acquires concurrent competence to try the offence under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act. If the connected scheduled offence has been transferred to another competent jurisdiction and part of the money laundering activity has also occurred there, the connected PMLA proceedings may be transferred to the same Special Court to give effect to Section 44(1) of the Act and to secure the ends of justice.

 

2026 INSC 702

Amit Katyal v. Union of India & Anr.

HEAD NOTES 

A. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 — Ss. 43, 44 & 46 — Territorial Jurisdiction — Special Court — Place of trial.

(Paras 7 to 11)

Held, an offence under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act comprises one or more processes connected with the "proceeds of crime", including its derivation, acquisition, possession, concealment, use or projection as untainted property. Consequently, prosecution under Section 4 of the Act may be instituted before any Special Court within whose territorial jurisdiction any part of such process or activity has taken place.

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B. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 — Ss. 43 & 44 — Transfer of PMLA proceedings — Scheduled offence transferred to another State — Effect.

(Paras 10 & 11)

Held, where the scheduled offence has been transferred to another jurisdiction and part of the offence of money laundering, including concealment or attachment of the proceeds of crime, has also occurred within that jurisdiction, transfer of the connected PMLA proceedings to the same Special Court is justified to give effect to Section 44(1) of the Act and to secure the ends of justice.

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C. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 — Ss. 43, 44 & 46 — Simultaneous territorial jurisdiction — More than one Special Court.

(Paras 8 to 11)

Held, where different components of the offence of money laundering are committed in different local areas, simultaneous territorial jurisdiction may vest in more than one Special Court. The Special Court having jurisdiction over any part of the offence is competent to try the prosecution.

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D. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S.178(d) — Offence consisting of several acts committed in different local areas — Application to PMLA proceedings.

(Para 8)

Held, by virtue of Sections 46 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act and 178(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, where an offence consists of several acts committed in different local areas, the Court having jurisdiction over any of those areas is competent to inquire into and try the offence, unless excluded by the special statute.

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E. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 — Transfer of proceedings — Convenience not sole consideration — Ends of justice.

(Paras 10 & 11)

Held, transfer of proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act is not governed merely by the convenience of the accused or witnesses. Where statutory requirements, territorial jurisdiction and the need for joint trial of the scheduled offence and the money laundering offence justify transfer, the Court may direct transfer in the interests of justice.

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F. Precedents — Applicability — Ratio decidendi — Facts of each case.

(Para 10)

Held, the ratio of a judicial precedent cannot be applied as a rigid formula divorced from the facts of the case. A decision rendered on materially different facts does not govern a case involving distinct statutory and factual considerations.

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Analysis of Facts

The petitioner, a promoter of a real estate company developing the "Krrish World" project at Gurugram, sought quashing of the prosecution complaint under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). During the hearing, however, the relief was confined to transfer of the PMLA proceedings from the Special Court at Gurugram to the Special Court under the PMLA at Delhi.

The Enforcement Directorate opposed the transfer, contending that the proceeds of crime originated from fraudulent diversion of approximately ₹503 crores collected from homebuyers in Gurugram and that substantial immovable properties constituting proceeds of crime had been attached there.

The petitioner relied upon the fact that the principal scheduled offence (FIR No. 439 of 2024) had already been transferred by the Supreme Court from Gurugram to Delhi and argued that the connected PMLA proceedings should also be tried at Delhi.

The Supreme Court found that while substantial parts of the proceeds of crime originated at Gurugram, part of the money laundering activity, including concealment and attachment of assets, had also taken place at Delhi, thereby conferring concurrent territorial jurisdiction on both Special Courts.

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Analysis of Law

The Court interpreted Sections 43, 44 and 46 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act in conjunction with Section 178(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and reiterated the following principles:

1. The offence of money laundering is a continuing offence comprising several processes connected with the proceeds of crime.

2. Territorial jurisdiction under the PMLA extends to every place where any constituent activity relating to the proceeds of crime has occurred.

3. Multiple Special Courts may simultaneously possess territorial jurisdiction where different components of the offence occur in different places.

4. Section 44(1) of the PMLA contemplates that the offence of money laundering and the connected scheduled offence should ordinarily be tried by the same Special Court.

5. Transfer of proceedings may be ordered where necessary to achieve the statutory object of coordinated trial and to secure the ends of justice.

6. Judicial precedents on transfer petitions must be applied with reference to their own facts and cannot be mechanically extended to materially different situations.

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Ratio Decidendi

Where constituent acts of the offence of money laundering occur in different territorial jurisdictions, each jurisdiction acquires concurrent competence to try the offence under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act. If the connected scheduled offence has been transferred to another competent jurisdiction and part of the money laundering activity has also occurred there, the connected PMLA proceedings may be transferred to the same Special Court to give effect to Section 44(1) of the Act and to secure the ends of justice.

Where unexplained delay in forwarding the First Information Report to the jurisdictional Magistrate is coupled with investigative lapses, contradictions in contemporaneous records, doubtful conduct of witnesses and circumstances suggestive of ante-timing or embellishment, the cumulative effect of such infirmities renders the prosecution case unreliable. In such circumstances, the accused is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt, and conviction cannot be sustained.

2026 INSC 707

Deo Prasad & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh

HEAD NOTES

A. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S.157 — First Information Report — Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate — Effect.

(Paras 43 to 53)

Held, delay in forwarding the First Information Report to the jurisdictional Magistrate is not, by itself, fatal to the prosecution. However, where such delay is accompanied by circumstances indicating possible ante-timing, unexplained investigative lapses, contradictions in the prosecution evidence or other suspicious features, it assumes considerable significance. The prosecution case must then be examined on the cumulative effect of all surrounding circumstances to determine its authenticity.

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B. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss.154 & 157 — FIR — Ante-timing — Circumstances creating doubt.

(Paras 43 to 53)

Held, where an FIR allegedly registered on the date of occurrence reaches the Magistrate after an unexplained delay of two days, coupled with contradictions regarding its lodging, unexplained delay in post-mortem and unusual investigative conduct, the possibility of ante-timing, embellishment or subsequent manipulation cannot be excluded, thereby seriously impairing the credibility of the prosecution case.

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C. Evidence Act, 1872 — Appreciation of Evidence — Interested eyewitnesses — Reliability.

(Paras 21 to 42)

Held, consistency of eyewitnesses on broad features alone is insufficient to sustain conviction. Their evidence must inspire confidence when tested against contemporaneous documentary evidence, medical evidence and surrounding circumstances. Material contradictions affecting the genesis of the prosecution case warrant cautious judicial scrutiny.

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D. Criminal Investigation — Delay in Inquest and Post-mortem — Effect.

(Paras 44 & 45)

Held, failure of the investigating agency to preserve the dead body, postponement of the inquest proceedings and unexplained delay of nearly forty-eight hours in conducting the post-mortem constitute serious investigative lapses. In the absence of satisfactory explanation, such lapses lend support to the defence and weaken the prosecution case.

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E. Evidence Act, 1872 — Medical Evidence vis-à-vis Ocular Evidence.

(Paras 31, 32 & 41 to 53)

Held, medical evidence is essentially corroborative. Where medical evidence, documentary record and surrounding circumstances collectively cast doubt upon the prosecution version, ocular testimony cannot be accepted mechanically and must be subjected to careful judicial scrutiny.

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F. Criminal Jurisprudence — Benefit of Doubt.

(Paras 41 to 53)

Held, the prosecution must establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Where the cumulative effect of the evidence raises genuine doubt regarding the genesis of the occurrence, fairness of investigation or authenticity of the First Information Report, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt.

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Analysis of Facts

The prosecution alleged that six accused persons, armed with deadly weapons, assaulted the deceased in broad daylight. The conviction recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court rested principally upon the testimony of three alleged eyewitnesses corroborated by medical evidence.

The defence questioned the genuineness and timing of the First Information Report, the unexplained delay in forwarding the FIR to the Magistrate, the delay in holding the inquest and conducting the post-mortem, the existence of prior political rivalry and admitted enmity, material contradictions in the testimony of eyewitnesses and serious lapses in investigation.

The Supreme Court examined not merely individual discrepancies but the cumulative effect of all surrounding circumstances and found that the suspicious features appearing in the prosecution case substantially affected its credibility.

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Analysis of Law

The Court reiterated the settled principles governing appreciation of criminal evidence:

1. Prompt forwarding of the FIR to the jurisdictional Magistrate is an important safeguard against fabrication and subsequent manipulation.
2. Mere delay in forwarding the FIR does not by itself vitiate the prosecution case.
3. Where such delay is accompanied by suspicious circumstances indicating ante-timing, embellishment or manipulation, it assumes considerable evidentiary significance.
4. The credibility of eyewitnesses must be tested in the light of contemporaneous documentary evidence, medical evidence and the natural conduct of the parties.
5. Serious investigative lapses, when considered along with other suspicious circumstances, may render the prosecution version unsafe for sustaining conviction.
6. A criminal conviction can be sustained only when the prosecution proves its case beyond reasonable doubt.

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Ratio Decidendi

Where unexplained delay in forwarding the First Information Report to the jurisdictional Magistrate is coupled with investigative lapses, contradictions in contemporaneous records, doubtful conduct of witnesses and circumstances suggestive of ante-timing or embellishment, the cumulative effect of such infirmities renders the prosecution case unreliable. In such circumstances, the accused is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt, and conviction cannot be sustained.

Complaint Case—Offence exclusively triable by Court of Session—Section 244 Cr.P.C.—Inapplicability. Where a complaint discloses offences exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the Magistrate is not required to record prosecution evidence under Section 244 Cr.P.C. before committing the case under Section 209 Cr.P.C. The Magistrate's function at the stage of commitment is confined to statutory compliance and commitment of the case. (Paras 6–13) Section 209 Cr.P.C.—Commitment proceedings—Nature of Magistrate's jurisdiction. The role of the Magistrate at the stage of commitment under Section 209 Cr.P.C. is administrative and ministerial in character. The Magistrate is not expected to undertake an evaluation of the merits of the prosecution case or hold a pre-trial inquiry before committing the case to the Court of Session. (Paras 10–13)

 Case: Neeraj Gupta v. Pardeep Kumar Bansal & Ors.

Citation: 2026 INSC 660 | Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 776 of 2026 | Decided on 01.07.2026.

Headnotes

1. Complaint Case—Offence exclusively triable by Court of Session—Section 244 Cr.P.C.—Inapplicability.
   Where a complaint discloses offences exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the Magistrate is not required to record prosecution evidence under Section 244 Cr.P.C. before committing the case under Section 209 Cr.P.C. The Magistrate's function at the stage of commitment is confined to statutory compliance and commitment of the case. (Paras 6–13)
2. Section 209 Cr.P.C.—Commitment proceedings—Nature of Magistrate's jurisdiction.
   The role of the Magistrate at the stage of commitment under Section 209 Cr.P.C. is administrative and ministerial in character. The Magistrate is not expected to undertake an evaluation of the merits of the prosecution case or hold a pre-trial inquiry before committing the case to the Court of Session. (Paras 10–13)
3. Section 244 Cr.P.C.—Scope.
   Section 244 Cr.P.C. applies only to warrant cases instituted otherwise than on a police report which are triable by a Magistrate. It has no application where the offences are exclusively triable by the Court of Session. (Paras 7–9, 13)
4. Commitment Proceedings—No duplication of evidence.
   Acceptance of the view that prosecution evidence under Section 244 Cr.P.C. must be recorded even in Sessions triable complaint cases would unnecessarily compel witnesses to depose twice regarding the same facts, contrary to the legislative intent of expeditious criminal trials. (Para 9)
5. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—Legislative scheme—Abolition of elaborate committal inquiry.
   The 1973 Code consciously abolished the elaborate committal inquiry contemplated under the Code of 1898. The Legislature intended to eliminate delay by restricting the Magistrate's role and leaving consideration of evidence and framing of charge to the Sessions Court. (Paras 12–13)
6. Magistrate—No adjudication on merits at commitment stage.
   At the stage of Sections 207 to 209 Cr.P.C., the Magistrate cannot examine the sufficiency of evidence, assess guilt, or determine whether additional accused should be added or excluded. Such questions fall within the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court. (Paras 10–12)
7. High Court—Remand to Magistrate for recording evidence under Section 244 Cr.P.C.—Unsustainable.
   The High Court erred in remanding the matter to the Magistrate for compliance with Section 244 Cr.P.C. The impugned order was set aside as being contrary to the statutory scheme governing commitment of Sessions triable offences. (Paras 13–14)
8. Revision—Challenge to discharge and framing of charge—Remand.
   Upon setting aside the erroneous remand order, the Supreme Court directed the High Court to decide afresh both the complainant's revision challenging discharge of two accused and the revision filed by the accused challenging the framing of charge, independently and expeditiously. (Paras 14–15)

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Cases Referred

• Ajoy Kumar Ghose v. State of Jharkhand — distinguished; Section 244 applicable to Magistrate-triable warrant cases. (Para 8.1)
• Sunil Mehta v. State of Gujarat — distinguished. (Para 8.3)
• Harinarayan G. Bajaj v. State of Maharashtra — distinguished. (Para 8.2)
• Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab — followed on the limited role of the Magistrate at the commitment stage. (Para 10)
• Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Ashutosh Ghosh — followed; no evidence required before commitment. (Para 11)
• State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi — followed on the legislative object behind Section 209 Cr.P.C. and abolition of committal inquiry. (Para 12.1)
• Rattiram v. State of Madhya Pradesh — followed regarding the restricted role of the Magistrate in commitment proceedings. (Para 12.2)

BNSS—Sections 193(3), 193(8) and 230—Construction. Section 193(3) prescribes the essential contents of the police report; Section 193(8) requires filing of additional copies for supply to the accused; and Section 230 fixes the timeline for furnishing copies. Non-compliance with Section 193(8) or delay in supplying copies under Section 230 does not equate to non-filing of the police report for the purpose of default bail. (Paras 17–23) Default Bail—Right under Article 21—Nature. The right to default bail is an indefeasible statutory right flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution. However, the right is conditional and survives only until a valid police report is filed within the prescribed statutory period. (Paras 20–23) Charge-sheet—Incomplete filing of documents—Effect. Even where all documents relied upon by the prosecution do not accompany the charge-sheet, the police report is not rendered invalid. Such omission neither vitiates the charge-sheet nor revives the right to default bail. (Paras 22–25)

 ase: Shaurya Sunil Kumar Singh v. Central Bureau of Investigation

Citation: 2026 INSC 666 | Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4333 of 2026 | Decided on 01.07.2026.

Headnotes

1. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023—Section 187(3)—Default Bail—Scope.
   The indefeasible right to default bail arises only upon failure of the investigating agency to file the police report/charge-sheet within the prescribed period of sixty or ninety days. Once a charge-sheet complying with Section 193(3) BNSS is filed within the statutory period, the right to default bail stands extinguished. (Paras 19–23, 26)
2. BNSS—Section 193(8)—Non-filing of additional copies of charge-sheet—Effect.
   Failure to file additional indexed copies of the police report and accompanying documents as contemplated under Section 193(8) BNSS does not invalidate the charge-sheet and does not confer any right to default bail under Section 187(3) BNSS. (Paras 21–25, 27)
3. BNSS—Sections 193(3), 193(8) and 230—Construction.
   Section 193(3) prescribes the essential contents of the police report; Section 193(8) requires filing of additional copies for supply to the accused; and Section 230 fixes the timeline for furnishing copies. Non-compliance with Section 193(8) or delay in supplying copies under Section 230 does not equate to non-filing of the police report for the purpose of default bail. (Paras 17–23)
4. Default Bail—Right under Article 21—Nature.
   The right to default bail is an indefeasible statutory right flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution. However, the right is conditional and survives only until a valid police report is filed within the prescribed statutory period. (Paras 20–23)
5. Charge-sheet—Incomplete filing of documents—Effect.
   Even where all documents relied upon by the prosecution do not accompany the charge-sheet, the police report is not rendered invalid. Such omission neither vitiates the charge-sheet nor revives the right to default bail. (Paras 22–25)
6. Interpretation of procedural provisions—Section 193(8) BNSS.
   The requirement to furnish additional copies of the police report under Section 193(8) BNSS is procedural and cannot be construed so as to enlarge the scope of Section 187(3) BNSS relating to default bail. (Paras 23–25)
7. Default Bail—Cognizance taken—Effect.
   Where a charge-sheet complying with Section 193(3) BNSS has been filed within limitation and cognizance has been taken by the competent court, the accused cannot seek default bail on the ground that copies of the charge-sheet were supplied subsequently. (Paras 26–27)
8. Default Bail and Regular Bail—Distinct considerations.
   Consideration of default bail is independent of the merits of the prosecution case. Rejection of default bail does not preclude the accused from seeking regular bail, which must be considered independently on its own merits. (Para 28)

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Cases Referred

• Saravanan v. State — right to default bail under Article 21. (Para 20)
• Fakhrey Alam v. State of Uttar Pradesh — default bail as an indefeasible right. (Para 20)
• State v. T. Gangi Reddy — object of default bail. (Para 20)
• Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain v. State of Maharashtra — right ceases on filing of charge-sheet. (Para 20)
• SFIO v. Rahul Modi — filing of charge-sheet extinguishes default bail. (Para 20)
• Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam — application for default bail may be oral. (Para 20)
• Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab — liberal approach in matters of personal liberty. (Para 20)
• Judgebir Singh v. National Investigation Agency — filing of police report extinguishes right to default bail. (Para 21)
• Central Bureau of Investigation v. Kapil Wadhawan — non-filing of all documents does not invalidate charge-sheet. (Para 22)
• Central Bureau of Investigation v. R.S. Pai — requirement to file supporting documents is directory. (Para 24)
• Narendra Kumar Amin v. Central Bureau of Investigation — filing of police report complying with statutory requirements defeats claim for default bail. (Para 25)