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Universities – Appointment of Vice-Chancellors in 35 State-aided Universities in the State of West Bengal – Dispute between the State Government and the Governor of West Bengal-Chancellor of subject Universities, as regards the appointment of regular Vice-Chancellors – No consensus between the authorities in the matter of constitution and composition of Search Committees for shortlisting the candidates for appointment as Vice Chancellors – Neither regular Vice-Chancellors nor interim or ad-hoc Vice-Chancellors permitted to be appointed – Invocation of power u/Art. 142: Held: Order passed for constitution of Search-cum-Selection Committee for all the subject Universities – It is resolved to constitute Search-cum-Selection Committee(s) of the same composition so as to avoid any confusion – Endeavour is to infuse transparency, independence, fairness, and impartiality so as to ensure that the persons possessing the highest level of competence and integrity and are capable of leading the University – Experts who are eminent scientists, educationists, jurists, subject experts, and administrators in their own right, are shortlisted – Appointment of Hon’ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Former Chief Justice of India as Chairperson of the Search-cum-Selection Committees for all the Universities in West Bengal – Chairperson authorized to constitute separate or joint Search-cum-Selection Committees for one or more Universities, keeping in view the nature of subjects/disciplines in which education is being imparted therein – Chairperson to nominate 4 persons out of the empaneled experts, whom he finds capable of short-listing suitable names for appointment as Vice-Chancellors – Chairperson to constitute the Search-cum-Selection Committees for the group or the individual Universities as early as possible – Chairperson to be paid an honorarium of Rs. 3 lakhs for every effective day of proceedings of the Search Committee, until the entire process is completed – The Chief Minister, State of West Bengal to recommend the shortlisted names in order of preference for appointment as Vice-Chancellors – In case the Chief Minister has reasons to believe that any short-listed person is unsuitable for appointment as Vice-Chancellor, the remarks to this effect to be put up before the Chancellor – In cases where said objection is not acceptable to the Chancellor or where the Chancellor has objection against empanelment of any particular name for which he has assigned his own reasons, all such files to be put up before this Court – Final decision in this regard to be taken by this Court after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the objectors – State of West Bengal to file the Status Report in respect to compliance of the directions issued – West Bengal University Laws (Amendment) Act,2012 – West Bengal Laws (Amendment) Act,2014 – Constitution of India – Art.142. [Paras 10,12,14-20]

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[2024] 7 S.C.R. 69 : 2024 INSC 469


The State of West Bengal v. Dr. Sanat Kumar Ghosh and Ors.

(Special Leave To Appeal (Civil) No. 17403 of 2023)


08 July 2024


[Surya Kant* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration


Matter pertains to the appointment of Vice-Chancellors in the State-aided Universities in the State of West Bengal.


Headnotes


Universities – Appointment of Vice-Chancellors in 35 State-aided Universities in the State of West Bengal – Dispute between the State Government and the Governor of West Bengal-Chancellor of subject Universities, as regards the appointment of regular Vice-Chancellors – No consensus between the authorities in the matter of constitution and composition of Search Committees for shortlisting the candidates for appointment as Vice Chancellors – Neither regular Vice-Chancellors nor interim or ad-hoc Vice-Chancellors permitted to be appointed – Invocation of power u/Art. 142:


Held: Order passed for constitution of Search-cum-Selection Committee for all the subject Universities – It is resolved to constitute Search-cum-Selection Committee(s) of the same composition so as to avoid any confusion – Endeavour is to infuse transparency, independence, fairness, and impartiality so as to ensure that the persons possessing the highest level of competence and integrity and are capable of leading the University – Experts who are eminent scientists, educationists, jurists, subject experts, and administrators in their own right, are shortlisted – Appointment of Hon’ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Former Chief Justice of India as Chairperson of the Search-cum-Selection Committees for all the Universities in West Bengal – Chairperson authorized to constitute separate or joint Search-cum-Selection Committees for one or more Universities, keeping in view the nature of subjects/disciplines in which education is being imparted therein – Chairperson to nominate 4 persons out of the empaneled experts, whom he finds capable of short-listing suitable names for appointment as Vice-Chancellors – Chairperson to constitute the Search-cum-Selection Committees for the group or the individual Universities as early as possible – Chairperson to be paid an honorarium of Rs. 3 lakhs for every effective day of proceedings of the Search Committee, until the entire process is completed – The Chief Minister, State of West Bengal to recommend the shortlisted names in order of preference for appointment as Vice-Chancellors – In case the Chief Minister has reasons to believe that any short-listed person is unsuitable for appointment as Vice-Chancellor, the remarks to this effect to be put up before the Chancellor – In cases where said objection is not acceptable to the Chancellor or where the Chancellor has objection against empanelment of any particular name for which he has assigned his own reasons, all such files to be put up before this Court – Final decision in this regard to be taken by this Court after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the objectors – State of West Bengal to file the Status Report in respect to compliance of the directions issued – West Bengal University Laws (Amendment) Act,2012 – West Bengal Laws (Amendment) Act,2014 – Constitution of India – Art.142. [Paras 10,12,14-20]


List of Acts


West Bengal University Laws (Amendment) Act, 2012; West Bengal Laws (Amendment) Act, 2014; Calcutta University Act, 1979; Constitution of India; University Grants Commission Act, 1956; University Grants Commission’s Regulations, 2018.


List of Keywords


Universities; Appointment of Vice-Chancellors; State-aided Universities in West Bengal; Appointment of regular Vice-Chancellors; Constitution and composition of Search-cum-Selection Committees; Interim or ad-hoc Vice-Chancellors; Powers u/Art. 142; Appointment of Hon’ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Former Chief Justice of India as Chairperson of the Search-cum-Selection Committees for Universities in West Bengal; Honorarium of Rs. 3 lakhs to Chairperson; Filing of Status Report.


Case Arising From


CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave To Appeal (Civil) No.17403 of 2023


From the Judgment and Order dated 28.06.2023 of the High Court at Calcutta in WPA(P) No.272 of 2023


Appearances for Parties


Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Jaideep Gupta, Sr. Advs., Sanjay Basu, Ms. Astha Sharma, Amit Bhandari, Nipun Saxena, Piyush Agarwal, Ms. Shrivalli Kajaria, Srisatya Mohanty, Ms. Anju Thomas, Sanjeev Kaushik, Ms. Mantika Haryani, Shreyas Awasthi, Himanshu Chakravarty, Ms. Ripul Swati Kumari, Bhanu Mishra, Ms. Muskan Surana, Archit Adlakha, Ms. Soumya Saxena, Aditya Raj Pandey, Ms. Lihzu Shiney Konyak, Simranjeet Singh Rekhi, Ms. Pratibha Yadav, Abhijit Pattanaik, Advs. for the Petitioner.


Gopal Shankarnarayan, Rana Mukherjee, Sr. Advs., Dr. Chaples Bandyopadhyay, Subhasish Bhowmick, Ms. Gargy Basu, Ms. Ananda Mayee, Ms. Manisha Pandey, Rahul Kushwaha, Ms. Neerja Sharma, Reegan S. Bel, Joydeep Mazumdar, P. Sil, B.K. Pandit, Ms. Shalini Kaul, Chandrashekhar A. Chakalabbi, Pijush Biswas, S.K. Pandey, Awanish Kumar, Anshul Rai, Abhinav Garg (For M/S. Dharmaprabhas Law Associates), Shyam D. Nandan, Rohit Bohra, Priyanshu Upadhyay, Viraat Tripathi, Abeer Gobind Shandilya, Anilendra Pandey, Manoj Ranjan Sinha, Deepak Sain, Ms. Nisha, Mrigank Prabhakar, Ms. Sakshi Banga, Anand Varma, Ayush Gupta, Soumya Dutta, Ms. Aditi Gupta, Kunal Chatterji, Ms. Maitrayee Banerjee, Rohit Bansal, Advs. for the Respondent.


Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court


Order


Surya Kant, J.


There are approximately [35] state-aided Universities in the State of West Bengal. The appointment of their Vice-Chancellors is the hallmark of this controversy. It seems that the Petitioner-State of West Bengal appointed 24 Vice-Chancellors in the year 2022. These appointments, along with the West Bengal University Laws (Amendment) Act, 2012 and the West Bengal Laws (Amendment) Act, 2014, were challenged before the High Court in a Public Interest Litigation. The High Court vide judgement dated 14.03.2023 held that the Search Committee constituted by the State Government for the selection of those 24 Vice-Chancellors did not have any Member nominated by the Chairman of the University Grants Commission (UGC) and since the said Search Committee was in violation of the UGC’s Act, the appointment of 24 Vice-Chancellors was unsustainable in law. The Division Bench judgment was upheld by this Court.


2.It further seems that the State of West Bengal thereafter made certain amendments in the State Universities Act in tune with the UGC’s Regulations, 2018. However, instead of resorting to the statutorily prescribed procedure for appointment of regular Vice-Chancellors, the Minister-in-charge of the Department of Higher Education, Government of West Bengal, sent a proposal on 18.05.2023 to the Chancellor for extending the tenure of 27 Vice-Chancellors whose tenure was about to expire. The Chancellor, on the other hand, appointed ‘Interim Vice-Chancellors’ and as many as 28 professors were given such assignments. The appointments of these interim/ad-hoc/caretaker Vice-Chancellors came to be challenged by Respondent No. 1 through a Public Interest Litigation, which the High Court not only dismissed vide impugned judgment dated 28-06-2023 but also conferred perks and other monetary benefits on its own to these acting Vice-Chancellors, a benefit which the Chancellor himself had not granted to them.


3.The Division Bench order, to the extent of granting pay, allowance, perks or facilities admissible to a regular Vice-Chancellor, was consequently stayed by this Court vide order dated 06.10.2023.


4.The rift between the State Government, on the one hand, and the Governor of West Bengal, who happens to be the Chancellor of subject Universities, on the other, is the root cause of stalemate in the appointment of regular Vice-Chancellors. To elaborate further, there is no consensus between the two sets of authorities in the matter of constitution and composition of Search Committees for shortlisting the candidates for appointment as Vice Chancellors.


5.Since we, prima facie, disapproved the Chancellor’s action of appointing interim Vice-Chancellors without consulting the State Government, all such further appointments were stayed vide order dated 06.10.2023.


6.The chaos has further deepened as neither there are regular Vice-Chancellors nor interim or ad-hoc Vice-Chancellors are permitted to be appointed. Regardless thereto, the Chancellor has assigned the powers of Vice-Chancellors to various persons — not necessarily all of them are academicians. The State of West Bengal has strongly protested against such a recourse. We, however, do not deem it necessary to dwell on that issue at this stage for the reasons stated hereinafter:


(I)On 15-09-2023, the learned Senior Counsel for the State of West Bengal, as well as learned counsel for the Chancellor, very fairly suggested that, pending multiple controversies, the Search Committee may be constituted by this Court. In order to explore that possibility, this Court on 27.09.2023 directed the learned senior counsel/counsel for the parties to submit, in a tabulated chart, the details of the Universities, the description of their subjects/disciplines, existing provisions for constitution of Search Committees, as well as the new provision which the State of West Bengal had proposed in the Bill awaiting assent of the Governor. Counsel for the intervenors were also granted liberty to suggest the names of renowned scientists, technocrats, administrators, educationists, jurists or any other eminent person for the purpose of nomination to the Search Committee.


(II)On 06.10.2023, the parties sought time to replace certain names earlier suggested by them for nomination to the Search Committees.


(III)On 20.11.2023, learned senior counsel for the parties agreed to submit a consolidated list of the names proposed by the State Government/Chief Minister/Chancellor/UGC and other prescribed authorities for the purpose of constituting Search Committees.


(IV)On 01.12.2023, learned Attorney General for India entered appearance on behalf of the Chancellor. He assured that the names to be suggested by the Chancellor for the constitution of Search Committees will be shared with counsels for the petitioner/intervenors. Besides granting time in this regard, we also impressed upon the learned Attorney General to use his good offices to explore an amicable mode of appointment of the Vice-Chancellors, in conformity with the Statutes governing such appointments.


(V)It seems that pursuant to the initiative taken by learned Attorney General, some meetings were held on 04.12.2023, 13.03.2024 and 14.03.2024. These meetings, however, did not yield the desired results.


(VI)On 16.04.2024, learned Attorney General, however, very fairly stated that six posts of the Vice-Chancellors will be filled up out of the list recommended by the State Government. Eventually, on 17.05.2024, we were informed that the State Government had sent a list of 15 names for appointment of Vice-Chancellors in 15 Universities. The learned Chancellor found 07 of them unsuitable and apparently had no objection against the remaining 08 persons. We, therefore, directed that those 08 names be appointed within 10 days. In order to instill confidence on both sides, it was observed that the Chief Minister of the State may send names of some more eminent persons to fill up the 07 vacancies of Vice-Chancellors.


(VII)We have no reason to doubt that the Chief Minister must have sent a few more names of eminent personalities and the Chancellor hopefully has accorded his approval for their appointment. As regard to the left-out Universities, we agreed on 17.05.2024, on the joint request of learned senior counsel for the parties, that a Search-cum-Selection Committee shall be constituted by this Court before the next date of hearing.


7.This is how we are tasked to constitute the Search-cum-Selection Committees.


8.Learned senior counsel/counsel for the parties are ad idem that the appointment of Vice-Chancellors in all the Universities are regulated by different Statutes. The academic qualification, teaching experience, and some other distinct features also vary from university to university, depending upon the speciality of the subjects being taught thereby. The (i) names of the University Acts; (ii) existing provision for appointment of Vice-Chancellors; (iii) amended provision for appointment of Vice-Chancellor under the ordinance of 2023; and (iv) subjects/disciplines which are being taught in a University, have been consequently provided to us in a tabulated form. On a cursory look, we find that every statute, broadly speaking, provides that the Vice-Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor on the recommendations of a Search-cum-Selection Committee, who shall hold the office upto the age of 65 years and should be a person possessing the highest level of competence, integrity, morals and institutional commitment. The Vice-Chancellor must also be a distinguished academician with 10 years of experience as a Professor in a University or a well-reputed research/academician organization.


9.On an illustrative basis, we deem it appropriate in this regard to reproduce Section 8 of the Calcutta University Act, 1979, which reads as follows:


“8. (1) The Vice-Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor on the unanimous recommendation of the Senate. If the Senate fails to make any such recommendation, the Vice-Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor in consultation with the Minister from a panel of three persons to be elected by the Senate in accordance with the system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote.


(2) (a) The Vice-Chancellor shall hold office for a period of four years or till he attains the age of 65 years, whichever is earlier, and shall, subject to the provisions of this section, be eligible for re-appointment for a period not exceeding four years.


(b) The Chancellor may, notwithstanding the expiration of the term of the office of the Vice-Chancellor or his attaining the age of 65 years, allow him to continue in office till a successor assumes office, provided that he shall not continue as such for any period exceeding one year.


(3) The Vice-Chancellor shall be a whole-time officer of the University and shall be paid from the University Fund a salary of three thousand and five hundred rupees per month and such allowances as the Chancellor may decide.


(4) The Vice-Chancellor may resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Chancellor.


(5) If—


(a) the Vice-Chancellor is, by reason of leave, illness or other cause, temporarily unable to exercise the powers and perform the duties of his office, or


(b) a vacancy occurs in the office of the Vice-Chancellor by reason of death, resignation or expiry of the term of his office, removal or otherwise,


then, during the period of such temporary inability or pending the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor, as the case may be, the Pro-Vice- Chancellor for Academic Affairs shall exercise the powers and perform the duties of the Vice-Chancellor.


(6) The vacancy in the office of the Vice-Chancellor occurring by reason of death, resignation or expiry of the term of his office, removal or otherwise shall be filled up by appointment of a Vice-Chancellor in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) within a period of six months from the date of occurrence of the vacancy.”


10.We may hasten to add at this stage that notwithstanding some variance in the provisions of the Acts under which Vice-Chancellors are to be appointed, especially with regard to composition of the Search-cum-Selection Committee, we deem it appropriate to invoke our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice in this matter and pass this common order for constitution of Search-cum-Selection Committee for all the subject Universities. Hence, we resolve to constitute Search-cum-Selection Committee(s) of the same composition so as to avoid any confusion, irrespective of the fact that the relevant provision of the Statute of the concerned University may contain slight variations. Our endeavour is to infuse transparency, independence, fairness, and impartiality so as to ensure that the persons possessing the highest level of competence and integrity and are capable of leading the University by example are shortlisted. In this regard, we have made an effort to shortlist experts who are eminent scientists, educationists, jurists, subject experts, and administrators in their own right. We have further attempted to set out that nominees of the Chancellor, Chief Minister, UGC, State Government, the Higher Education Department of West Bengal the intervenors etc. are adequately represented.


11.While shortlisting the experts for composition of the Search-cm-Selection Committee, we have been further guided by the nature of subjects and disciplines in which education is being imparted in different Universities. We find that, broadly, all the Universities can be categorized as follows:


i)Universities with faculties predominantly in arts and science:


a)West Bengal State University


b)Sidho Kanhi Birsha University


c)Burdwan University


d)Jadavpur University


e)Gour Banga University


f)Bankura University


g)Presidency University


h)Cooch Behar Panchanan Barma University


i)Sadhu Ram Chand Murmu University of Jhargram


j)Alipurduar University


k)Raiganj University


l)Diamond Harbour Women’s University


m)Murshidabad University


n)Mahatma Gandhi University


o)Dakshin Dinajpur University


ii)Universities with faculties predominantly in commerce and science:


a)North Bengal University


b)Kalyani University


iii)Universities with faculties predominantly in arts:


a)Kanyashree University


b)Rabindra Bharati University


c)Harichand Guruchand University


d)Hindi University


e)Biswa Bangla Biswabidyalaya


f)Darjeeling Hills University


iv)Universities with faculties predominantly in science:


a)Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad University of Technology


b)Aliah University


c)West Bengal University of Health Sciences


d)West Bengal University of Animal and Fishery Sciences


e)Kazi Nazrul University


f)Rani Rashmoni Green University


v)Other miscellaneous and multi-disciplinary universities:


a)Calcutta University


b)Sanskrit College and University


c)Baba Saheb Ambedkar Education University


d)Vidyasagar University


e)Netaji Subhas Open University


f)Uttar Banga Krishi Vishwavidyalaya


g)Bidhan Chandra Krishi Vishwavidyalaya


12.We hereby appoint Hon’ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Former Chief Justice of India as Chairperson of the Search-cum-Selection Committees for all the Universities.


13.Following is the list of eminent educationists, scientists, jurists, subject experts and administrators etc. who have been short-listed for the purpose of empanelment on Search-cum-Selection Committee(s):


(i)Arts & Humanities


a)Prof. Sabyasachi Basu Ray Chaudhury, Ex. V.C., Rabindra Bharti University. Address: 56A, BT Road, Kolkata - 700500.


b)Prof. Siuli Sarkar, Principal, Lady Brabourne College.


c)Prof. Sibaji Pratim Basu, Professor, Vidyasagar University. Address: Department of Political Science with Rural Administration, Vidyasagar University, Midanpore – 721102.


d)Professor Ujjwal K Singh, Department of Political Science, University of Delhi. Email: ujjwalksingh@gmail.com; Phone no: 8800788862.


(ii)History


a)Prof. Tapati Guha Thakurta, Prof. in Social Sciences, Centre for Studies in Social Sciences. Address: C D 157, Salt Lake, Sector I, Kolkata – 700064.


b)Prof. Amit De, Ashutosh Chair Professor of History, Calcutta University.


c)Prof. Sajal Nag, Retd. Professor, Assam University.


d)Prof. Rajat Kanta Roy, Former VC, Visva Bharati.


e)Prof. Raghuvendra Tanwar, Chairman, Indian Council for Historical Research. Email: chairman@ichr.ac.in; Phone no: 9896219909.


(iii)Sociology & Anthropology


a)Prof. Ramanuj Ganguly, Professor, WBSU. Address: Flat: A-106, Mall Enclave, 13, KB Sarani, Kolkata – 700080.


b)Prof. Tanka Bahadur Subba, Ex VC, Sikkim Central University.


c)Prof. Ravinder Kaur, Professor of Sociology, IIT Delhi, email: ravinder.iitd@gmail.com.


(iv)Economics


a)Prof. Abhirup Sarkar, Professor, Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta. Address: 10 Mandeville Gardens, Flat 802, Kolkata – 700019.


b)Prof. Saibal Kar, RBI Chair Professor of Economics, Centre for Studies in Social Sciences. Address: R1, BP Township, Kolkata – 700094.


c)Prof. (Dr.) Ram Singh, Director, Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi, Delhi. Email: ramsingh@econdse.org; Phone number: 9971863030.


(v)Law


a)Prof. Rathin Bandyopadhyay, Professor of Law, Department of Law, NBU. Address: Department of Law, University of North Bengal, Siliguri – 734013.


b)Justice G. Raghuram, former Judge, Andhra Pradesh High Court and former Director, National Judicial Academy.


(vi)English


a)Prof. Debnarayan Bandyopadhyay, Ex VC Bankura University. Address: 20 Chandranath Chatterjee Street, Kolkata 700025.


b)Prof. Anindyo Roy, Associate Professor Emeritus, Department of English, Colby College, Waterville. Email: aroy@colby.edu.


c)Prof. (Dr.) Meena T. Pillai – Dean, Faculty of Arts and Professor, Institute of English and Director, Centre for Cultural Studies of University of Kerala.


(vii)Hindi


a)Prof. T.V. Kattimani, VC, Central Tribal University, Andhra Pradesh.


b)Dr. Chander Trikha, Director, Urdu Cell, Sahitya Academy, Haryana, R/o of House No.345, Sector 22A, Chandigarh (Mob. No.09417004423).


(viii)Bengali


a)Prof. Mir Rejaul Karim, Professor, Aliah University. Address: Department of Bengali, Aliah University, Park Circus Campus, 17 Gorachand Road, Kolkata-700014


b)Prof. Tapadhir Bhattacharya, former VC, Assam University.


(ix)Chemistry


a)Prof. Abhijit Chakrabarti, Retired Professor, Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics. Email: abhijit1960@gmail.com.


b)Prof. Dhrubajyoti Chattopadhyay, VC, Sister Nibedita University.


c)Prof. Uday Maitra, FNA Deprtment of Organic Chemistry, Indian Institute of Sciences, Bangalore. Email: maitra@iisc.ac.in.


d)Prof. Ramesh Chandra, VC, Maharaja Surajmal Brij University, Bharatpur. Email: acbrdu@hotmail.com.


e)Prof. Siva Umapathy, Physical Chemistry, Indian Institute of Sciences, Bangalore. Email: umapathy@iisc.ac.in


(x)Physics


a)Swami Atmapriayanand, VC, Ramakrishna Mission Vivekananda Educational and Research Institute.


b)Prof. Amitava Mukhapadhyay, Professor, NBU.


c)Prof. Amitabha Roy Chaudhuri, Deptt of Physics, CU.


d)Prof. A.N. Basu, former VC, JU and distinguished Professor of Physics.


(xi)Biology


a)Prof. Subhra Chakraborty, Director, Genomics Research Centre, Delhi.


b)Prof. B.A. Chopade, VC – AKS University, Satna, Former VC, Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Marathwada University, Aurangabad.


c)Prof. (Dr.) Navin Sheth – former VC, Gujarat Technological University.


d)Prof. Emeritus. Prof. V. S. Chauhan, Ph.D., D.Phil. (Oxon), FNA, FNASc, TWAS, Former UGC Chairman. Email: viranderschauhan@gmail.com. Phone No.: 9811292058.


(xii)Botany and Zoology


a)Prof. Subhas Chandra Roy, Professor, NBU


b)Prof. Dipak Kumar Kar, ex VC, SKB University. Address: 409 Lake Gardens, Kolkata 700045; Phone No.: 7044577044


(xiii)Mathematics


a)Prof. Kallol Paul, Professor, Jadavpur University. Address: 188 Raja SC Mallik Road, Kolkata 700032.


b)Prof. Suparna De Sarkar, Senior Professor, NBU.


c)Prof. Tarun Das, Department of Mathematics, University of Delhi. Email: tarukd@gmail.com; Phone No.: 9911854923.


(xiv)Computer Science


a)Prof. Amlan Chakraborty, Calcutta University.


b)Prof. Anupam Basu, Director NIT, Durgapur.


c)Shri Raj Shekhar Joshi, Group Head (Digital Technology & Transformation), Joint President, Aditya Birla Group.


(xv)Electrical Engineering


a)Prof. Bhaskar Gupta, Professor, Jadavpur University. Address: 19C/1, Kalibari Lane, Kolkata - 700032.


b)Prof. Ajoy Roy, IIT Kharagpur.


c)Dr. Prith Banerjee, Chief Technology Officer of Ansys.


(xvi)Chemical and Biochemcal Engineering


a)Prof. Chiranjib Bhattacharya, ex Pro-VC, JU


b)Prof. S.E. Hasnain, Padma Shree Awardee, National Science Chair, SERB, Department of Biochemical Engineering and Biotechnology, IIT Delhi.


c)Prof. RC Kuhad, Former Vice-Chancellor, Central University of Haryana, and retired Professor of Bio-Chemistry. Email: kuhad85@gmail.com; Phone no.: 9817813027.


(xvii)Civil and Mechanical Engineering


a)Prof. Deepankar Choudhury, T. Kant Chair Professor and Head of Civil Engineering department at IIT Bombay.


b)Prof. Sunil Kumar, VC- Rajiv Gandhi Proudyogiki Vishwavidyalay, Bhopal.


(xviii)Minerals and Agricultural Engineering


a)Prof. Indranil Manna, JC Bose Fellow, FTWAS, FNA, FNAE, FNASc, FASc, MAPAM, FIE(I), FEMSI, FAScT, Professor, IIT Kharagpur, Former Director, CSIR- Central Glass & Ceramic Institute, VC Birla Institute of Technology, Mesra.


b)Prof. (Dr.) Virendra Kumar Tiwari, Director, IIT Kharagpur.


(xix)International Relations


a)Prof. Om Prakash Mishra, ex PVC, IGNOU & ex VC, NBU


(xx)Statistics & Information Science


a)Prof. Sabuj Kumar Chodhury, Professor, Department of Library & Information Science. Address: Third Floor, Asutosh Building, 87/1, College Street, Kolkata – 700073.


b)Prof. Bimal Kumar Roy, Head, RC Bose Centre for Cryptology and Security, ISI Kolkata.


(xxi)Physiology


a)Prof. Gautam Pal, Pro VC, Kalyani University


(xxii)Geology


a)Prof. S.K Tandon, former Pro Vice-Chancellor and retired Professor University of Delhi. Email: sktand@iiser.ac.in; Phone no: 9810437365.


(xxiii)Business and Management


a)Prof. Sujit Kumar Basu, former VC, Visva Bharati University.


b)Professor Errol D’Souza (former Director IIMA), Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad. Email: errol@iimahd.ernet.in Phone No.: 9558820604


(xxiv)Environment and Climate


a)Prof. Jayanta Bandopadhya, Retd. Professor, IIM Kolkata Environmental Studies.


b)Mr. Anirban Ghosh, Eminent Technocrat & Head, Centre for Sustainability, Mahindra University.


(xxv)Human Resource


a)Mr. Saptarshi Roy, Technocrat & Director (HR) NTPC Ltd., New Delhi.


(xxvi)Miscellaneous


b)Dr. S.K. Pattanayak, IAS (Retd.), Former Secretary, Deparment of Agriculture, GOI, New Delhi.


c)Mr. Parimal Rai, IAS (Retd.), Former Chief Secretary, Goa. Address: 60, Poorvi Marg, Third Floor, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi. Phone no: 09779866666/09810533311.


14.The learned Chairperson is hereby authorized to constitute separate or joint Search-cum-Selection Committees for one or more Universities, keeping in view the nature of subjects/disciplines in which education is being imparted in such pooled Universities. The Chairperson is requested to nominate 4 persons out of the empaneled experts, whom he finds capable of short-listing suitable names for appointment as Vice-Chancellors. Learned Chairperson shall preside over every Search-cum-Selection Committee and thus, composition of each such Committee shall be five. The Search-cum-Selection Committee shall prepare a panel of at least 03 names (alphabetically and not in order of merit) for each University.


15.The learned Chairperson is requested to constitute the Search- cum-Selection Committees for the group or the individual Universities as early as possible and preferably within two weeks. The Department of Higher Education, Government of West Bengal is hereby nominated as the nodal department of the State Government to issue advertisements giving vide publicity to invite applications for the posts of Vice-Chancellors. Such advertisements shall contain the details of the requisite qualification and other eligibility conditions, with a specific reference to this Court’s order so as to infuse confidence, leaving no uncertainty in the minds of the meritorious aspirants in submitting their claims. The advertisements shall give four weeks’ time to submit the applications. Such applications shall be scrutinized by the concerned department of the State Government within one week and shall thereafter the entire set of all applications be placed before the learned Chairperson of the Search-cum-Selection Committee, who in turn, will get the dossier of each candidate prepared for consideration of the Search-cum-Selection Committee. The Search Committee may endeavour to complete their task within three months from today.


16.The learned Chairperson shall be paid an honorarium of Rs. 3 lakhs for every effective day of proceedings of the Search Committee, until the entire process is completed. The State Government, in addition to honorarium, provide the Chairperson with a suitable office and full secretarial assistance, along with transit accommodation at Kolkata. The learned Chairperson shall also be provided with an official vehicle and necessary paraphernalia forthwith, commensurate to the constitutional position held by him in the past.


17.The members of the Search-cum-Selection Committee shall be entitled to such allowance, perks, and facilities as may have been prescribed under the Statutes or by the State Government. If nothing has been prescribed, in that case, the petitioner-State shall apprise this Court of the status on the next date of hearing to enable us to pass appropriate order in this regard. Meanwhile, State Government is directed to reimburse their air fare (economy class) lodging and boarding expenses within one week of submission of such claims.


18.The recommendations made by the Search-cum-Selection Committee, duly endorsed by the learned Chairperson, shall be put up before the Chief Minister (and not the Minister-in-charge of a Department) for necessary consideration. In case the Chief Minister, State of West Bengal has reasons to believe that any short-listed person is unsuitable for appointment as Vice-Chancellor, the remarks to this effect along with supporting material and the original record of the recommendation made by the Search-cum-Selection Committee, shall be put up before the learned Chancellor within two weeks. The Chief Minister shall be entitled to recommend the shortlisted names in order of preference for appointment as Vice-Chancellors.


19.The learned Chancellor on the receipt of record from the Chief Minister of the State, shall appoint the Vice-Chancellors out of the empaneled names, in the same order of preference as recommended by the Chief Minister of the State. In case the learned Chancellor has any reservation against the empaneled names and/or the remarks made by the Chief Minister of the State against any short-listed candidate, the learned Chancellor shall be entitled to put up his own opinion on file, duly supported with reasons and relevant material.


20.The learned Chancellor shall accord his approval (save and except when there is a difference of opinion) within two weeks of receipt of file from the Chief Minister of the State. The Department of Higher Education, Government of West Bengal or any other concerned Department of the State Government are hereby directed to notify the appointment within one week from the date of receipt of approval from the learned Chancellor of the University.


21.In the case(s) where the Chief Minister of the State has objected to the inclusion of any name in the panel and such objection is not acceptable to the Chancellor or where the Chancellor has an objection against empanelment of any particular name for which he has assigned his own reasons, all such files shall be put up before this Court. We make it clear that a final decision in this regard shall be taken by this Court after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the objectors.


22.The State of West Bengal shall file the Status Report in respect to compliance of the directions issued here-in-above before the next date of hearing. We make it clear that since the constitution and composition of Search-cum-Selection Committee is at the instance and with the consent of the parties, we will not entertain any objection from any side for non-compliance.


Result of the case: Directions issued.


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Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s. 19 – Previous sanction necessary for prosecution – On facts, the trial court summoned the respondent-public servant u/s 319 CrPC to face the trial for the offences u/s. 7/13(2) of the P C Act – High Court set aside the order of the trial court as sanction u/s. 19 was not sought – Correctness: Held: Respondent is a ‘Public Servant’ as defined u/s. 2(c) of the P.C Act – Words and phrases used in s. 19(1) of the P.C Act itself make it evident that the provision is mandatory in nature – Courts cannot take cognizance against any public servant for offences committed u/ss. 7, 11, 13 and 15 of the P.C. Act, even on an application u/s. 319 CrPC, without first following the requirements of s. 19 – On facts, the correct procedure should have been for the prosecution to obtain sanction u/s. 19 from the appropriate Government, before formally moving an application before the Court u/s. 319 CrPC – In fact, the trial court too should have insisted on the prior sanction, which it did not – In absence of the sanction the entire procedure remains flawed – Thus, the impugned order passed by the High Court does not call for interference – ss. 7, 11, 13 and 15 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 319. [Paras 7, 10, 11]

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[2024] 7 S.C.R. 62 : 2024 INSC 483


The State of Punjab v. Partap Singh Verka

(Criminal Appeal No. 1943 of 2024)


08 July 2024


[Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration


Correctness of the order passed by the High Court setting aside the order of the trial court which had summoned respondent u/s 319 CrPC to face the trial for the offences u/s. 7/13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, as sanction u/s. 19 of the P.C. Act was not sought.


Headnotes


Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s. 19 – Previous sanction necessary for prosecution – On facts, the trial court summoned the respondent-public servant u/s 319 CrPC to face the trial for the offences u/s. 7/13(2) of the P C Act – High Court set aside the order of the trial court as sanction u/s. 19 was not sought – Correctness:


Held: Respondent is a ‘Public Servant’ as defined u/s. 2(c) of the P.C Act – Words and phrases used in s. 19(1) of the P.C Act itself make it evident that the provision is mandatory in nature – Courts cannot take cognizance against any public servant for offences committed u/ss. 7, 11, 13 and 15 of the P.C. Act, even on an application u/s. 319 CrPC, without first following the requirements of s. 19 – On facts, the correct procedure should have been for the prosecution to obtain sanction u/s. 19 from the appropriate Government, before formally moving an application before the Court u/s. 319 CrPC – In fact, the trial court too should have insisted on the prior sanction, which it did not – In absence of the sanction the entire procedure remains flawed – Thus, the impugned order passed by the High Court does not call for interference – ss. 7, 11, 13 and 15 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 319. [Paras 7, 10, 11]


Case Law Cited


Dilawar Singh v. Parvinder Singh [2005] Supp. 5 SCR 83 : (2005) 12 SCC 709; Paul Varghese v. State of Kerala [2007] 4 SCR 1155 : (2007) 14 SCC 783; Surinderjit Singh Mand v. State of Punjab [2016] 5 SCR 653 : (2016) 8 SCC 722 – referred to.


List of Acts


Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.


List of Keywords


Previous sanction; Public servant; Mandatory in nature.


Case Arising From


CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.1943 of 2024


From the Judgment and Order dated 02.08.2018 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRR No. 2317 of 2017


Appearances for Parties


Vivek Jain, D.A.G., Ms. Nupur Kumar, Abhinav Jain, Advs. for the Appellant.


R.P. Nagrath, Sr. Adv., Manuj Nagrath, Raktim Gogoi, Kartikeya Singh, Shivam Sharma, S Vinod, Advs. for the Respondent.


Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court


Judgment


Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.


1.The State of Punjab is in appeal here against the judgment and order dated 02.08.2018, passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana setting aside the order dated 20.05.2017 of the Trial Court which had summoned respondent Pratap Singh Verka under Section 319 of Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’) to face the trial for the offences under sections 7/13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘P.C Act’).


2.Brief facts of the case are that on 25.04.2016, an FIR u/s 7/13 (2) of the P.C Act was lodged against Respondent- Dr. Partap Singh Verka and another co-accused i.e. ‘Vikas’, at Police Station Vigilance Bureau, Amritsar. It was disclosed in the FIR that the present respondent was working as a doctor in Guru Nanak Hospital at the relevant point of time when complainant-Gurwinder Singh sought treatment for his brother who was in jail. The complainant alleged that on 20.04.2016 the Respondent took a bribe of Rs.10,000 from the complainant through the accused-Vikas for admitting the complainant’s brother in his hospital, as he was otherwise reluctant to treat a prisoner. Again on 24.04.2016, the respondent demanded another Rs.10,000/- to keep the patient in the hospital for further treatment and asked the complainant to give that amount to the other accused i.e. ‘Vikas’ in two installments of Rs.5,000 each. The complainant, however, contacted the Vigilance Bureau instead and the officials of Vigilance laid a trap to catch the culprits. On 25.04.2016, the accused-Vikas (ward attendant) was caught red-handed in the parking lot of the hospital receiving Rs.5000 from the complainant. On the same day, the respondent was also arrested from his office.


3.In May 2016, both the accused were released on bail. A chargesheet dated 22.12.2016 was later filed only against the other accused-Vikas. The present respondent was not named in the charge-sheet as an accused.


4.However, during the course of the trial, the complainant-Gurwinder Singh deposed as PW-1 on 12.05.2017 and in his examination-in-chief, he said that it was the present Respondent who had demanded the bribe and it was on his behalf that the other accused, Vikas had received the bribe amount. The trial Court deferred the hearing on the request of the Public Prosecutor of the State who then wanted to move an application under Section 319 of the CrPC for summoning the respondent as an accused. Consequently, an application was moved by the State on 18.05.2017 under Section 319 CrPC, which was allowed on 20.05.2017 and Dr. Partap Singh Verka was summoned to face the trial.


5.The accused Respondent challenged this order of the Trial Court before the High Court which has set aside the order of the Trial Court, as sanction under Section 19 of the P.C Act had not been taken.


6.We have heard the counsel for the Appellant-State as well as for the Respondent and have also perused the material before us.


7.There is no dispute on the fact that the Respondent is a ‘Public Servant’ as defined under Section 2(c) of the P.C Act. Section 19 of the P.C Act puts a bar on Courts to take cognizance of an offence under Sections 7, 11, 13 and 15, without the previous sanction of the State Government, Central Government or the competent authority, as the case may be. The relevant portion of Section 19 of the P.C Act is as follows:


“19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.—(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction save as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (1 of 2014)—


(a) in the case of a person who is employed, or as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government;


(b) in the case of a person who is employed, or as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government;


(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office.”


8.While allowing the Section 319 (CrPC) application moved by the Public Prosecutor, the Trial Court did not consider the question of sanction. Before this Court the stand of the State of Punjab is that there was no need for this sanction as cognizance was taken in the Court itself under Section 319 of the CrPC.


In Dilawar Singh v. Parvinder Singh, [(2005) 12 SCC 709], this Court while explaining the provisions of Section 19 of the P.C Act and also the provisions under Section 319 Cr.PC., said as under:


“This section creates a complete bar on the power of the court to take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction of the competent authority enumerated in clauses (a) to (c) of this sub-section. If the sub-section is read as a whole, it will clearly show that the sanction for prosecution has to be granted with respect to a specific accused and only after sanction has been granted that the court gets the competence to take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by such public servant…”


(para 4)


Further, in regard to the relation between Section 19 of P.C Act and the provisions of cognizance under CrPC, this Court laid down the law in the following words:


“…….the provisions of Section 19 of the Act will have an overriding effect over the general provisions contained in Section 190 or 319 CrPC. A Special Judge while trying an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, cannot summon another person and proceed against him in the purported exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC if no sanction has been granted by the appropriate authority for prosecution of such a person as the existence of a sanction is sine qua non for taking cognizance of the offence qua that person.”


(para 8)


9.In Paul Varghese v. State of Kerala, (2007) 14 SCC 783, this Court again reiterated this provision and held:


“As has been rightly held by the High Court in view of what has been stated in Dilawar Singh case [(2005) 12 SCC 709 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 727] the trial court was not justified in holding that Section 319 of the Code has to get preference/primacy over Section 19 of the Act, and that matter stands concluded.”


(para 4)


10.The words and phrases used in Section 19(1) of the P.C Act itself make it evident that the provision is mandatory in nature. In Surinderjit Singh Mand v. State of Punjab (2016) 8 SCC 722, although this court was dealing with the issue of sanction under Section 197 of CrPC but while doing so it referred to various judgments including the two cases discussed above and emphasized the provision of prior sanction:


“The law declared by this Court emerging from the judgments referred to hereinabove, leaves no room for any doubt that under Section 197 of the Code and/or sanction mandated under a special statute (as postulated under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act) would be a necessary prerequisite before a court of competent jurisdiction takes cognizance of an offence (whether under the Penal Code, or under the special statutory enactment concerned). The procedure for obtaining sanction would be governed by the provisions of the Code and/or as mandated under the special enactment. The words engaged in Section 197 of the Code are,


“… no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with previous sanction…”.


Likewise sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act provides—


“19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.—(1) No court shall take cognizance … except with the previous sanction ….”


The mandate is clear and unambiguous that a court “shall not” take cognizance without sanction. The same needs no further elaboration. Therefore, a court just cannot take cognizance without sanction by the appropriate authority. Thus viewed, we find no merit in the second contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the respondents that where cognizance is taken under Section 319 of the Code, sanction either under Section 197 of the Code (or under the special enactment concerned) is not a mandatory prerequisite.”


11.It is a well settled position of law that courts cannot take cognizance against any public servant for offences committed under Sections 7,11,13 & 15 of the P.C. Act, even on an application under section 319 of the CrPC, without first following the requirements of Section 19 of the P.C Act. Here, the correct procedure should have been for the prosecution to obtain sanction under Section 19 of the P.C Act from the appropriate Government, before formally moving an application before the Court under Section 319 of CrPC. In fact, the Trial Court too should have insisted on the prior sanction, which it did not. In absence of the sanction the entire procedure remains flawed. We are completely in agreement by the decision of the High Court and therefore are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court and accordingly this appeal is hereby dismissed.


Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.


Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.


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Evidence – Test identification parade – Relevance – Non-conduct of Test Identification Parade-TIP, effect on prosecution case – On facts, in a brutal murder of a teenager girl allegedly by the main accused and co-accused, conviction and sentence u/s. 302/34, ss. 449, 404 and 201 r/w 302 IPC – Appeal by the co-accused, wherein the High Court upheld the conviction and sentence, in absence of TIP, where accused is a stranger to a witness and there was dock identification made by witness in court during trial – Correctness: Held: In cases where accused is a stranger to a witness and there has been no TIP, the trial court should be very cautious while accepting the dock identification by such a witness – On facts, TIP was not conducted – All the prosecution witnesses who identified the accused in the court were not known to the appellant – They had not seen the appellant prior to the said incident – He was a stranger to both of them – More importantly, both of them have seen the appellant on the date of the crime and that too from a distance while he was wearing a monkey cap which majorly covers the face – Under these circumstances, TIP had become necessary particularly when both the accused, who are alleged to have committed this murder were arrested within two days – No explanation whatsoever has been given by the prosecution and the Investigating Officer as to why TIP was not conducted – High Court also recorded this flaw in the investigation – Not conducting a TIP was a fatal flaw in the police investigation and in the absence of TIP, the dock identification of the appellant will always remain doubtful – Doubt always belongs to the accused – Prosecution has not been able to prove the identity of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt – Not conducting TIP is fatal for the prosecution – Identification of the accused before the court ought to have been corroborated by the previous TIP which was not done – Thus, the identity of the appellant is in doubt – Appellant could not have been convicted on the basis of a very doubtful evidence as to the appellant’s identity – Impugned order of the High Court set aside – Penal Code, 1860 – s. 302/34, s. 449, 404 and 201 r/w 302. [Paras 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16]

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[2024] 7 S.C.R. 87 : 2024 INSC 474


P. Sasikumar v. The State Rep. by the Inspector of Police

(Criminal Appeal No. 1473 of 2024)


08 July 2024


[Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration


High Court, if justified in upholding the conviction of the appellant u/s. 302/34 as well as u/ss. 449, 404 and 201 r/w 302 IPC, in absence of test identification parade, where accused is a stranger to a witness and the trial court accepted the dock identification by such a witness.


Headnotes


Evidence – Test identification parade – Relevance – Non-conduct of Test Identification Parade-TIP, effect on prosecution case – On facts, in a brutal murder of a teenager girl allegedly by the main accused and co-accused, conviction and sentence u/s. 302/34, ss. 449, 404 and 201 r/w 302 IPC – Appeal by the co-accused, wherein the High Court upheld the conviction and sentence, in absence of TIP, where accused is a stranger to a witness and there was dock identification made by witness in court during trial – Correctness:


Held: In cases where accused is a stranger to a witness and there has been no TIP, the trial court should be very cautious while accepting the dock identification by such a witness – On facts, TIP was not conducted – All the prosecution witnesses who identified the accused in the court were not known to the appellant – They had not seen the appellant prior to the said incident – He was a stranger to both of them – More importantly, both of them have seen the appellant on the date of the crime and that too from a distance while he was wearing a monkey cap which majorly covers the face – Under these circumstances, TIP had become necessary particularly when both the accused, who are alleged to have committed this murder were arrested within two days – No explanation whatsoever has been given by the prosecution and the Investigating Officer as to why TIP was not conducted – High Court also recorded this flaw in the investigation – Not conducting a TIP was a fatal flaw in the police investigation and in the absence of TIP, the dock identification of the appellant will always remain doubtful – Doubt always belongs to the accused – Prosecution has not been able to prove the identity of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt – Not conducting TIP is fatal for the prosecution – Identification of the accused before the court ought to have been corroborated by the previous TIP which was not done – Thus, the identity of the appellant is in doubt – Appellant could not have been convicted on the basis of a very doubtful evidence as to the appellant’s identity – Impugned order of the High Court set aside – Penal Code, 1860 – s. 302/34, s. 449, 404 and 201 r/w 302. [Paras 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16]


Evidence – Test identification parade – Relevance of:


Held: Test identification parade-TIP is only a part of Police investigation – Identification in TIP of an accused is not a substantive piece of evidence – Substantive piece of evidence, or what can be called evidence is only dock identification that is identification made by witness in Court during trial – In cases where accused is a stranger to a witness and there has been no TIP, the trial court should be very cautious while accepting the dock identification by such a witness – In a given case, TIP may not be necessary – Non-conduct of a TIP may not prejudice the case of the prosecution or affect the identification of the accused – It would all depend upon the facts of the case – It is possible that the evidence of prosecution witness who has identified the accused in a court is of a sterling nature, thus TIP may not be necessary – It is the task of the investigation team to see the relevance of a TIP in a given case. [Paras 12, 13]


Case Law Cited


Kunjumon v. State of Kerala [2012] 9 SCR 1032 : (2012) 13 SCC 750; Rajesh v. State of Haryana [2020] 14 SCR 1 : (2021) 1 SCC 118; Ravi Kapur v. State of Rajasthan [2012] 10 SCR 229 : (2012) 9 SCC 284; Malkhansingh and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2003] Supp. 1 SCR 443 : (2003) 5 SCC 7462; Jayan v. State of Kerala (2021) 20 SCC 38; Amrik Singh v. State of Punjab [2022] 7 SCR 451 : (2022) 9 SCC 402 – referred to.


List of Acts


Penal code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.


List of Keywords


Test identification parade; Dock identification by witness; Non-conduct of Test Identification Parade; Police investigation.


Case Arising From


CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1473 of 2024


From the Judgment and Order dated 12.01.2017 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in CRLA No. 574 of 2016


Appearances for Parties


Jayanth Muth Raj, Sr. Adv., C. K. Sasi, Mrs. Malavika Jayanth, Ms. Anupriya, Advs. for the Appellant.


V. Krishnamurthy, Sr. A.A.G., D. Kumanan, Mrs. Deepa. S, Sheikh F. Kalia, Ms. Richa Vishwakarma, Advs. for the Respondent.


Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court


Judgment


Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.


1.The appellant before us has challenged the order dated 12.01.2017 of the High Court of Madras which has upheld the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’) as well as under Section(s) 449, 404 and 201 r/w 302 IPC. He has been, inter alia, sentenced for life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC.


2.It was a brutal murder of a 14-year-old girl committed inside her house on the night of 13.11.2014, allegedly by two accused, one of them being the present appellant before this Court. There is no direct evidence of the crime although there is both ocular as well as forensic evidence placed by the prosecution to prove the murder of the 14-year-old girl, at the hands of the present appellant and another accused, who is accused no.1 and also the main accused. The present accused is accused no.2.


3.The case of the prosecution is largely based on circumstantial evidence. FIR No.408/2014 was lodged on 13.11.2014 at police station Alagapuram by PW-1 Durairaj, who is the father of the deceased. The complainant states that he is working as a Manager at JSP Granite Company at Salem, Tamil Nadu and he has two daughters. The elder daughter had studied engineering from Mahendra Engineering College and is now working in L&T Company, Chennai. His younger daughter was studying in the 8th standard in a local school in Salem. His wife is working as an accountant in a private company. On 13.11.2014 his wife had gone to Chennai to meet their elder daughter as she was not well. The younger daughter (deceased) was alone in the house. That day he had called his younger daughter about 2-3 times, in order to remind her to receive her tiffin but she did not answer his call. He had then made up his mind to return to his house early. When he was climbing the stairs of his house at about 07:15 p.m., after parking his scooter, he saw a person aged about 25 years, walking down the stairs. This man had a helmet in his hand, which he immediately wore on seeing the complainant. He found the door of his house open and his daughter was bleeding profusely from her neck. Meanwhile, neighbors had gathered on hearing his cries and they informed him that two persons had come to his house who had brutally killed his daughter. The deceased was still alive was rushed to the hospital where she was declared dead.


4.The post mortem was conducted on the body of the deceased by Dr. K. Gokularamanan (PW-14) at 10:30 a.m. next day on 14.11.2014 and the following antemortem injuries were found on the deceased –


“1. A well extended broad cut injury on the front side of neck and on both sides extending up to the upper side of Thyroid ligament bone measuring a depth of 14 x 6 up to the depth of the bone and the neck spinal bone present in the underside of injury, Adams apple, muscles and blood vessels were seen on the edges of the injury and blood outflow was seen in the surrounding areas.


2. On the right hand side of the aforesaid injury a cut injury on the lower and outer side was seen which extended up to the backside of neck measuring 12 x 4 depths in the muscles and blood outflow was seen in the surrounding areas. No other injuries were seen on the external parts of the body.”


According to the postmortem report, the cause of death was shock due to the antemortem injuries on the neck and profuse bleeding and the time of death was 12-18 hours prior to the post mortem.


5.Meanwhile the FIR was registered as Case Crime No.408/2014. The two accused were apprehended by the Police on 15.11.2014, at about 10 p.m.


6.Recoveries were made during the investigation on their pointing out which is as follows :-


From the pointing out of accused No. 1 :-


A black colour Pulsar Vehicle without registration number, a black colour helmet, a black colour cell phone with broken glass, a knife with a maroon handle and a checkered blood-stained shirt were recovered.


From pointing out of accused No. 2 i.e. present appellant :-


A dark green monkey cap, a Samsung Galaxy Pro Cell Phone, a blood-stained elephant-coloured jeans and a white/green shirt were recovered.


7.At this juncture, we must also record that although there are two accused in the case and, both were charged for the above offences and faced the trial and were convicted by the Trial Court under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC apart from other offences such as 449, 404 and 201 r/w 302 IPC, yet there is no record, before this Court of any appeal being filed before the High Court by accused no. 1 who also stands convicted and sentenced for the same offences like the present appellant. This is also mentioned by the High Court while deciding the appeal that they have before them only the criminal appeal of accused No. 2 i.e. the present appellant- Sasikumar, and the court is not aware of any Criminal Appeal being filed by accused no.1 – Yugadhithan. Before us, thus, is only accused no. 2. Accused no.1, who is the main accused inasmuch as it was accused no.1 against whom the prosecution additionally has a case of motive to commit this murder.


8.The prosecution case is that when Harini (PW2)-the elder sister of the deceased was a student in Mahendra Engineering College, accused no. 1 (Yugadhithan) was also studying in the same college and was totally infatuated by her. His feelings were never reciprocated by the elder sister of the deceased. It is because of this reason that he was enraged and had even started stalking the elder sister of the deceased. He had even reached her present place of work L&T Company at Chennai, causing much anxiety to her. PW2 had also complained against accused no. 1 to the principal of Mahendra Engineering College earlier stating that he had been harassing her. The prosecution case further, is that accused no. 1 had threatened the elder sister of the deceased warning her that if she does reciprocate his feelings, he would kill her entire family.


9.But the one who is before us today and whose conviction stands confirmed by the High Court is not accused No.1 but accused no.2. The entire question before us here is of identification of accused no. 2. From all available evidences which the prosecution has placed before the Trial Court, inter alia, in the form of PW-1 and PW-5 have stated that accused No.2 i.e., the present appellant was seen by them wearing a “green colored monkey cap”. When this accused had entered the premises, when he knocked the door of the house of the deceased, when he was coming down from the stairs along with accused no.1 and at all other relevant times the witnesses who have seen and identified the accused no.2 i.e., the present appellant, had seen the appellant for the first time on 13.11.2014 while he was wearing a green colored monkey cap. None of them had seen him earlier. PW-5 who is the closest witness in this case states as under :-


“…I know Duraiaj. It could be 6.30 hours in the evening on 13.11.2014. At that time I was taking good water in balcony at that time a person went wearing monkey cap. Another person went wearing a helmet. The time could be 6.35, 640 hrs in the evening. They both knocked the door of Tejashree house and went inside the house. They both were found talking inside in a sofa. They are the present accused. They were asking phone number with Tejashree for that Tejashree has told them that father has gone out and he has to come. Both the accused and Tejashree were found to be talking. After taking water I went to my home. I informed my house by around 7.00 hrs in the evening that I am going to super market. Later I came back by 7 .25 hrs at that time Sun News was under broadcast when I parked my vehicle and climbed stairs Durairaj came behind me. When I placed the articles in home within 5 minutes I heard the sound of Durairaj. Immediately I went to Durairaj House. After tearing the cloth he was shouting from the place where his daughter was lying. I told Durairaj that 2 person came and went half an hour prior to that. I told Durairaj that they both kept Tejashree sitting and was talking with her. Immediately call was made to ambulance…”


PW-5 is said to have identified the accused later when both the accused were apprehended by the police and were in the hospital. In other words, while these two accused persons were in the custody of the police this particular witness PW-5 was taken to the hospital where he had identified the two accused. This so-called identification, on which much reliance has been placed by the prosecution, was made by PW-5 in the hospital by way of a statement to the police, and it can only be read as a statement under Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code which can only be used for the limited purpose as provided under Section 162 of the CrPC itself.


The case of the prosecution is that both the accused were apprehended on 15.11.2014 near the Salem-Coimbatore bye pass fly over. The recovery of incriminating material such as motor bike, weapon, the monkey cap, helmet, clothes etc. were made on the same day. In other words, when the accused were in judicial custody, there is nothing on record to suggest that the investigating officer or the investigating team had taken any permission from the Magistrate for the release of the accused for these recoveries. These recoveries therefore, have no relevance. At this juncture, we must reiterate that our observation in this case and our finding and conclusions are based only on the evidences and the material which is available against the present appellant, it should not be construed in any manner as a finding or a comment on the case of accused no. 1 who is not before us and evidently against whom the prosecution has some more material, including motive. There is also no motive against the present appellant. In fact, the Pulsar bike which has been recovered on pointing out of accused no.1 does not belong to the appellant but was purchased by a person named ‘Satish’ from the showroom and this person ‘Satish’ has never been questioned by the police or produced as a prosecution witness during the trial.


10.The admitted position in this case is that the test identification parade (hereinafter referred to as ‘TIP’) was not conducted. All the prosecution witnesses who identified the accused in the Court such as PW-1 and PW-5 were not known to the present appellant i.e., accused no.2. They had not seen the present appellant prior to the said incident. He was a stranger to both of them. More importantly, both of them have seen the appellant/accused No. 2 on the date of the crime while he was wearing a “green colour monkey cap”!


11.Now, as one is familiar a monkey cap covers the entire face, chin and cheek of a person, leaving only his eyes and nose and part of forehead exposed. These two witnesses (PW-1 and PW-5), had seen the appellant wearing a monkey cap and that too from a distance. Under these circumstances, TIP had become necessary particularly when both the accused, who are alleged to have committed this murder were arrested within two days. The incident is of about 7:00 pm on 13.11.2014 and both of them were arrested at around 10 pm on 15.11.2014. The case of the prosecution is that while they were being arrested, they received injuries as they tried to escape and consequently, they were taken to the Hospital for treatment. It was in the hospital, that PW-1 i.e. father of the deceased and the complainant and PW-5 were taken by the Investigating Officer who are said to have identified the two accused as the one who had committed the crime. No explanation whatsoever has been given by the prosecution as to why TIP was not conducted in this case before a Magistrate as it ought to have been done. In fact, the High Court has recorded this flaw in the investigation at more than one place in its judgment. It has again observed that the Investigating Officer (PW-24) was before the Court and in spite of being questioned as to what the reasons were for not holding TIP in this case, no satisfactory reply was given by him.


12.It is well settled that TIP is only a part of Police investigation. The identification in TIP of an accused is not a substantive piece of evidence. The substantive piece of evidence, or what can be called evidence is only dock identification that is identification made by witness in Court during trial. This identification has been made in Court by PW-1 and PW-5. The High Court rightly dismisses the identification made by PW-1 for the reason that the appellant i.e., accused no.2 was a stranger to PW-1 and PW-1 had seen the appellant for the first time when he was wearing a monkey cap, and in the absence of TIP to admit the identification by PW-1 made for the first time in the Court was not proper. However, the High Court has believed the testimony of PW-5 who has identified accused no.2 under similar circumstances! The appellant was also stranger to PW-5 and PW-5 had also seen the accused i.e., the present appellant for the first time on that fateful day i.e. on 13.11.2014 while he was wearing a green colour monkey cap. The only reason assigned for believing the testimony of PW-5 is that he is after all an independent witness and has no grudge to falsely implicate the appellant. This is the entire reasoning. We are afraid the High Court has gone completely wrong in believing the testimony of PW-5 as to the identification of the appellant. In cases where accused is a stranger to a witness and there has been no TIP, the trial court should be very cautious while accepting the dock identification by such a witness (See: Kunjumon v. State of Kerala (2012) 13 SCC 750).


13.After considering the peculiar facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that not conducting a TIP in this case was a fatal flaw in the police investigation and in the absence of TIP in the present case the dock identification of the present appellant will always remain doubtful. Doubt always belongs to the accused. The prosecution has not been able to prove the identity of the present appellant i.e. A-2 beyond a reasonable doubt.


The relevance of a TIP, is well-settled. It depends on the fact of a case. In a given case, TIP may not be necessary. The non conduct of a TIP may not prejudice the case of the prosecution or affect the identification of the accused. It would all depend upon the facts of the case. It is possible that the evidence of prosecution witness who has identified the accused in a court is of a sterling nature, as held by this Court in the case of Rajesh v. State of Haryana (2021) 1 SCC 118 and therefore TIP may not be necessary. It is the task of the investigation team to see the relevance of a TIP in a given case. Not conducting TIP in a given case may prove fatal for the prosecution as we are afraid it will be in the present case.


14.The relevance of TIP has been explained by this Court in a number of cases (Please see: Ravi Kapur v. State of Rajasthan (2012) 9 SCC 284 1, Malkhansingh and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2003) 5 SCC 746 2).


15.In the facts of the present case, the identification of the accused before the court ought to have been corroborated by the previous TIP which has not been done. The emphasis of TIP in a given case is of vital importance as has been shown by this Court in recent two cases of Jayan v. State of Kerala (2021) 20 SCC 38 and Amrik Singh v. State of Punjab (2022) 9 SCC 402. In Jayan (supra), this Court disbelieved the dock identification of the accused therein by a witness and while doing so, this Court discussed the aspect of TIP in the following words:


“It is well settled that TI parade is a part of investigation and it is not a substantive evidence. The question of holding TI parade arises when the accused is not known to the witness earlier. The identification by a witness of the accused in the Court who has for the first time seen the accused in the incident of offence is a weak piece of evidence especially when there is a large time gap between the date of the incident and the date of recording of his evidence. In such a case, TI parade may make the identification of the accused by the witness before the Court trustworthy….”


(Para 18)


16.Under these circumstances, we hold that the identity of the present appellant is in doubt. The appellant could not have been convicted on the basis of a very doubtful evidence as to the appellant’s identity. The appeal is allowed and the impugned order of the High Court dated 12.01.2017 is hereby set aside. The appellant has been in jail for about 8 years as we have been told at the Bar, he shall be released forthwith unless he is required in some other case. We make it absolutely clear that this decision of acquittal is based on the evidence, or lack thereof, which the prosecution has against accused no. 2 i.e. the present appellant. This will absolutely have no bearing on the case of accused no.1.


Result of the case: Appeal allowed.


1 Para 35


2 Para 16


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Evidence – Test Identification Parade (TIP) – Absence of – When fatal – As per the prosecution, the appellant and the co-accused (now deceased) broke into the house of PW-1 and PW-3 to commit robbery when they were not at home and killed their old mother – However, this was witnessed by PW-1 when she returned home at around 12:30 in the afternoon but, she could not enter the room as it was locked from inside – On raising alarm, PW-2, a neighbour came and they both peeped through the window of the bedroom and saw the incident – TIP not conducted, PW-1 and PW-2 identified accused in Court – Trial Court acquitted the accused persons – Acquittal reversed by High Court – Correctness: Held: As per the eyewitnesses, PW-1 and PW-2 they saw the two accused strangulating PW-1’s mother by pulling both ends of the rope – However, their evidence does not corroborate with the post mortem report – The report does suggest that the deceased was indeed strangulated to death but, it could not be in the manner as seen by PW-1 and PW-2 as the ligature mark extended only from one angle of the mandible to the other and no such mark was seen at the back of the neck – Absence of any reasonable explanation as to how PW-1 reached her house in a short span of time of 21/2 hours, after leaving home at 10:00 AM, creates doubt on the prosecution story – Furthermore, appellant was not known to any of the witnesses and more pertinently, the two eyewitnesses – Co-accused was related to the complainant and was thus, known to the eyewitnesses – Hence, there was no requirement of TIP as regards him – But, the appellant was a total stranger to PW-1 and PW-2 – His name ‘Vishwanatha’ came to their knowledge, only after co-accused called him by name exhorting him to run – The identification of an accused in court is acceptable without a prior TIP and absence of TIP may not be fatal for the prosecution – It would depend on facts of each case – In a case where the identity of the accused is not known and TIP has not been conducted, the court has to see if there was any description of the accused either in the FIR or in any of the statement of witness recorded during the investigation – There was none in the present case – There were six persons by the name of ‘Vishwanatha’ in the locality and when there is doubt on the presence of the two star witnesses PW-1 and PW-2 (who identified the accused), the identity of the present appellant remained in doubt – Not safe to convict the appellant solely only on the basis of the testimony of PW1 and PW2 – Prosecution not able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt – Appellant acquitted by giving him the benefit of doubt – Impugned judgment set aside as far as it relates to the conviction of the appellant. [Paras 13-17, 19]

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[2024] 7 S.C.R. 50 : 2024 INSC 482


Vishwanatha v. The State of Karnataka by the Secretary, Home Department

(Criminal Appeal No. 129 of 2012)


08 July 2024


[Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Prasanna B. Varale,JJ.]

Issue for Consideration


High Court reversing the order of acquittal found the appellant along with co-accused (now deceased) guilty of offences under Sections 302 and 450 read with Section 34 of Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced them. In view of doubt as regards the identity of the appellant, whether it was the accused persons who were responsible for the death of PW-1 and PW-3’s mother.


Headnotes


Evidence – Test Identification Parade (TIP) – Absence of – When fatal – As per the prosecution, the appellant and the co-accused (now deceased) broke into the house of PW-1 and PW-3 to commit robbery when they were not at home and killed their old mother – However, this was witnessed by PW-1 when she returned home at around 12:30 in the afternoon but, she could not enter the room as it was locked from inside – On raising alarm, PW-2, a neighbour came and they both peeped through the window of the bedroom and saw the incident – TIP not conducted, PW-1 and PW-2 identified accused in Court – Trial Court acquitted the accused persons – Acquittal reversed by High Court – Correctness:


Held: As per the eyewitnesses, PW-1 and PW-2 they saw the two accused strangulating PW-1’s mother by pulling both ends of the rope – However, their evidence does not corroborate with the post mortem report – The report does suggest that the deceased was indeed strangulated to death but, it could not be in the manner as seen by PW-1 and PW-2 as the ligature mark extended only from one angle of the mandible to the other and no such mark was seen at the back of the neck – Absence of any reasonable explanation as to how PW-1 reached her house in a short span of time of 21/2 hours, after leaving home at 10:00 AM, creates doubt on the prosecution story – Furthermore, appellant was not known to any of the witnesses and more pertinently, the two eyewitnesses – Co-accused was related to the complainant and was thus, known to the eyewitnesses – Hence, there was no requirement of TIP as regards him – But, the appellant was a total stranger to PW-1 and PW-2 – His name ‘Vishwanatha’ came to their knowledge, only after co-accused called him by name exhorting him to run – The identification of an accused in court is acceptable without a prior TIP and absence of TIP may not be fatal for the prosecution – It would depend on facts of each case – In a case where the identity of the accused is not known and TIP has not been conducted, the court has to see if there was any description of the accused either in the FIR or in any of the statement of witness recorded during the investigation – There was none in the present case – There were six persons by the name of ‘Vishwanatha’ in the locality and when there is doubt on the presence of the two star witnesses PW-1 and PW-2 (who identified the accused), the identity of the present appellant remained in doubt – Not safe to convict the appellant solely only on the basis of the testimony of PW1 and PW2 – Prosecution not able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt – Appellant acquitted by giving him the benefit of doubt – Impugned judgment set aside as far as it relates to the conviction of the appellant. [Paras 13-17, 19]


Case Law Cited


Mulla v. State of U.P. [2010] 2 SCR 633 : (2010) 3 SCC 508; Malkhansingh v. State of M.P. [2003] Supp. 1 SCR 443 : (2003) 5 SCC 746 – relied on.


List of Acts


Penal Code, 1860.


List of Keywords


Test identification parade; Absence of test identification parade; Order of acquittal reversed; Doubt as regards the identity of the accused; Robbery; Stareyewitnesses; Identity of accused not known; Identification of accused in court; Prior TIP; Description of accused either in FIR/ statement of witness; Benefit of doubt; Case not proved beyond reasonable doubt.


Case Arising From


CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.129 of 2012


From the Judgment and Order dated 06.06.2009 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRLA No. 1217 of 2002


Appearances for Parties


X M Joseph, Omanakuttan K. K., Antony Ignatius M J, Advs. for the Appellant.


R Nedumaran, D. L. Chidananda, Advs. for the Respondent.


Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court


Judgment


Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.


1.The appellant in this Criminal Appeal challenges judgement and order dated 06.06.2009 passed by the High Court of Karnataka which has allowed the Criminal Appeal of the State; thereby reversing the order of acquittal of the Trial Court, thus convicting the present appellant of offences under Sections 302 and 450 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him, inter alia, to life imprisonment, under Section 302 of IPC.


2.The case of the prosecution is that Rohini (PW-1) and Rohithaksha (PW-3) were residing with their mother Devaki (deceased; aged 86 y/o) at Kudupu, Mangalore. Devaki was strangulated to death by the present appellant and co-accused Ravikumar. On 26.12.2000 when PW-1, PW-3 and PW-4 (wife of PW-3) were not present in their home, and their 86-year-old mother was alone, the present appellant and the co-accused broke into their house with the intention to commit robbery and killed Devaki. A written complaint was filed before the police at 2:30 p.m. by PW-1 which formed the basis of the FIR which was registered at PS: Mangalore Rural Circle at approximately 3:00 p.m, in which the two accused Ravikumar and the present appellant Vishwanatha were named.


3.In the FIR, it was mentioned that on that fateful day (26.12.2000), she (i.e. PW-1/Complainant), had gone out for some work and when she returned home at about 12:30 in the afternoon, she heard some sound coming from inside her house which alerted her, but she could not enter the room as it was locked from inside. PW-1 then raised an alarm and as a result PW-2, who is a neighbour came for her help. Then both PW-1 and PW-2 managed to peep through the window of the bedroom, where they saw that the accused had twisted a cloth around the neck of the deceased (PW-1’s 86-year-old mother), which they were pulling at the two ends, each holding one end of the rope. PW-1 recognised the first accused as Ravikumar as he was the nephew of PW-4 (the daughter-in-law of the deceased). PW-1 called Ravikumar by name which alerted the two and they escaped.


4.The police submitted its chargesheet on 05.03.2001 against both the accused, who were caught the same day. The case was committed to Sessions and ultimately assigned to the Court of IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Mangalore who framed charges against the accused on 20.09.2001 under sections 450 and 302 read with 34 of IPC. The prosecution examined 18 witnesses and 11 documents as exhibits placed by the prosecution. The Sessions Judge passed its order on 18.12.2001 acquitting both the accused.


5.What weighed with the Sessions Court was the apparent contradictions between the oral testimony and autopsy report. PW-1 and PW-2 who were eye-witnesses to the crime and had identified both the accused and had deposed that the two had committed the murder of Devaki. Dr. Bhaskar Alva, (PW-6) Sr. Specialist in Wedlock District Hospital, Mangalore who conducted the post-mortem of deceased-Devaki on 26.12.2000 had given his opinion that the cause of death was asphyxia as a result of strangulation. The Sessions Court observed that PW-1 and 2 had deposed that cloth was tied around the neck of the deceased which was used to strangulate her, however, PW-6 had deposed there were no ligature marks on the back of the neck of the deceased. Under these circumstances, the Sessions Court discredited the two eye-witnesses, PW-1 and PW-2 and also noted the discrepancies in the deposition of PW-1 as regards the identity of the appellant and consequently his role in the crime.


6.The appeal of the State against this acquittal was allowed by the High Court on 06.06.2009, which reversed the order of acquittal, and found both the accused guilty of offences under Sections 302 and 450 read with Section 34 of IPC and sentenced them to Rigorous Imprisonment for 5 years and Rigorous Imprisonment for life along with fine of Rs. 5,000/- respectively. The High Court held that the contradictions in the case of prosecution were minor and not material enough to warrant acquittal of the accused persons. These were the observations made by the High Court at paragraph 27 of the Impugned Judgement:


“27. Test Identification Parade not being conducted for the identification of accused No. 2 is also not fatal to the prosecution because by 6’O clock in the evening both accused Nos. 1 and 2 were apprehended and produced before the investigating officer P.W.18. It is also apparent on record that when accused No. 1 uttered the name of accused No. 2 both P.Ws. 1 and 2 learnt the name and they had seen exactly what was happening inside the bedroom. Therefore, question of mistaking in identifying accused Nos. 1 and 2 does not arise. However, both P.Ws. 1 and 2 identified accused Nos. 1 and 2 before the Court. The time gap between the date of crime and the evidence being only 10 months, we are of the opinion that it was quite possible for any who witnesses and especially P.W.1 to remember the details of the assailants who took the life of her mother. Therefore, this discrepancy also would not come in the way of the prosecution.”


7.Shortly after the Judgement was passed by the High Court, Ravikumar, who was accused no. 1 passed away. The present criminal appeal thus has been filed on behalf of the remaining accused Vishwanatha.


8.The learned counsel on behalf of the appellant would argue that PW-1 and PW-2 are not credible witnesses pointing again towards the contradictions in their testimony and autopsy report. He would submit that there has been no test identification parade (hereinafter referred to as ‘TIP’) to establish the identity of the appellant who was a total stranger to the two witnesses and in the absence of TIP, the appellant cannot be convicted, as then it cannot be said that the prosecution has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.


9.The learned counsel for the State would argue that the High Court has rightly observed that this is not a case of mistaken identity. Further, TIP is not a substantive piece of evidence and absence of TIP would not be fatal for the prosecution case as PW-1 & PW-2 had already identified the accused before the court. As far as discrepancies in the testimonies of the witnesses are concerned, they are minor in nature and do not affect the case of prosecution in any manner.


10.We have heard the submissions of the learned counsel of the State and that of the State and also perused the material on record.


11.In the present case, there are concurrent findings by both the courts below as to the death of the deceased Devaki, being a homicidal death and these findings are corroborated by the testimony of PW-6, the doctor who conducted the autopsy and issued the post-mortem report on 26.12.2000. There cannot be any doubt that the death of the deceased was homicidal and the only question for determination before this Court is whether it is the accused persons who were responsible for this death?


12.PW-1 and PW-2 are the star witnesses of the prosecution. They had deposed during the trial that the two accused had strangulated the deceased to death. PW-1 had said that on the day of the incident, she left home at around 9:30 in the morning and when she returned at 12:30 in the afternoon she found that her room was bolted from inside and then she heard her mother screaming. It was then that she called PW-2 for help. PW-1 further states that she saw through the window both the accused strangulating her mother by pulling the rope at the two ends. She further states, that when PW-1 called one of the accused Ravikumar by name, who she immediately recognised being their relative, Ravikumar called the name of the other accused i.e., the present appellant and the two escaped. The relevant extract of the deposition given by PW-1 on 22.10.2001 before the trial court is reproduced below:


“…When I came to courtyard of our house I heard sound full of pain and scream. I found that both the bolts of the house was locked inside. Immediately I called my neighbour Rajesh. He came there. Since Northern side of window was kept opened my self and Rajesh peeped inside the room…………we saw in the western side of the room and found Accused Ravi, who is standing before the Court now and he used to twist the cloth rope and put round the neck and caught one end of rope. Another end of the rope was in the hands of another person. They were tightening the rope, which was round the neck of my mother. I made a big noise. I addressed Accused Ravi “what he is doing” (In Tulu ‘Dane Malpuva’). What is he doing, I asked. Immediately he (Accused Ravi) told Accused Vishwananth that “the work is spoiled”, you run (In Tulu ‘KelasaKettand’). Said accused ran through the back door of the house, after unlocking bolts. My neighbour Rajesh followed them in the back of them……..when seeing my mother I found her right leg and right hand was in twisting condition and found no clothes on the body of my mother and found little temperature in the body. Immediately called Dr.K.B Shetty by phone…..After 10 minutes from my phone call, doctor came there. After coming to our house, said doctor examined my mother and told us that she was dead….”


PW-2 also claimed to have seen the incident from the window along with PW-1 and he then narrates his unsuccessful attempt to catch the accused persons. The relevant portion of PW-2’s examination-in-chief is as follows:


“When seeing through the window we found mother of Rohini (PW-1), Smt. Devaki (deceased) was on the cot. On the right side of Devaki, Ravikumar was standing and in another side another accused was standing. We found cloth was rolled round neck of Devaki. The one end of cloth rope was found in the hands of 1st Accused and cloth ropes another end was found in the hands of 2nd Accused. Both accused were, found dragging the cloth rope on both sides…………Accused ran away through back door of the house.”


13.The above evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, all the same, does not corroborate with the post mortem report, which shows that the ligature marks, though round the neck, but are missing on the back of the neck. If the testimony of PW-1 and PW-2 is to be believed then the ligature marks should have been all round the neck, including the back. The ante mortem injuries in the post mortem report are as follows:


“On examination, I found the following external injuries:


(i)Ligature mark round the neck above the thyroid cartilage, extending from 1 angle of mandible to the other- size 8”× ¾”


(ii)Finger nail marks over the tip of the nose.


(iii)Fracture of both legs below the knee and fracture of right forearm below the elbow”


The report does suggest that the deceased was indeed strangulated to death. But it could not be in the manner as seen by PW-1 and PW-2 (who had seen the two accused strangulating the 86 years old woman by pulling both ends of the rope) as the ligature mark extended only from one angle of the mandible to the other and no such mark was seen at the back of the neck. Had the strangulation been in the manner as described by PW-1 and PW-2, the ligature marks would have been different.


14.The aspect which perhaps weighed heavily in the mind of the Trial Court which had acquitted the two accused was the fact that the first complaint, inquest report, the ‘autopsy report’ and the ocular evidence of PW-1 (also of PW-2) did not match. Having regard to the positioning of the bed on which the deceased was allegedly strangulated, the trial court has given a finding that it would be highly improbable for two persons to strangulate the deceased by pulling the two ends of the rope of cloth from behind, since the cot was touching the northern and western walls. Moreover, the fact that Dr. K.B Shetty, (who was the first doctor to examine the deceased within 10 minutes of the incident), was never examined by the prosecution. The absence of any reasonable explanation as to how PW-1 reached her house in a short span of time of 21/2 hours, after leaving home at 10:00 AM1, creates doubt on the prosecution story. Trial Court also expressed its doubt as to the involvement of the present appellant (Accused No.2), as no TIP was conducted. This aspect was argued at length before this Court as well, since it goes to the very root of any criminal trial. Admittedly, no TIP was conducted in the present case. This Court in Mulla v. State of U.P., (2010) 3 SCC 508 had emphasized the scope and object of TIP as follows:


“55. The identification parades are not primarily meant for the court. They are meant for investigation purposes. The object of conducting a test identification parade is twofold. First is to enable the witnesses to satisfy themselves that the accused whom they suspect is really the one who was seen by them in connection with the commission of the crime. Second is to satisfy the investigating authorities that the suspect is the real person whom the witnesses had seen in connection with the said occurrence.”


15.This Court in Malkhansingh v. State of M.P (2003) 5 SCC 746 2 has held that:


“The evidence of mere identification of the accused person at the trial for the first time is from its very nature inherently of a weak character. The purpose of a prior test identification, therefore, is to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. It is accordingly considered a safe rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in court as to the identity of the accused who are strangers to them, in the form of earlier identification proceedings.”


In the case at hand, it is an admitted position that the Appellant was not known to any of the witnesses and more pertinently, the two eyewitnesses, PW1 and PW2.


16.Coming back to the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is an admitted fact that Ravikumar (Accused No.1, now deceased) was known to the eyewitnesses and was also related to the complainant. Hence, there was no requirement of TIP as regard to Ravikumar (accused no.1). But the case of appellant- Vishwananth stands on a different footing. He was a total stranger to the two eye witnesses i.e. PW-1 and PW-2. The name ‘Vishwanath’ came to their knowledge, only after Ravikumar (Accused no. 1) called his co-accused, by name exhorting him to run. In a case where the identity of the accused is not known and TIP has not been conducted, the court has to see if there was any description of the accused either in the FIR or in any of the statement of witness recorded during the investigation. There is none in the present case.


The identification of an accused in court is acceptable without a prior TIP and absence of TIP may not be fatal for the prosecution. It would depend on facts of each case. In the case at hand, though the appellant was identified in court by PW-1 and PW-2, the Trial Court did not attach much weight to it, as no identification proceedings were conducted, and the Court found it unsafe to acknowledge the identity merely on the basis of identification in the Court.


In the present case, where there are six persons by the name of ‘Vishwanatha’ in the locality and where this Court has doubts on the presence of the two star witnesses PW-1 and PW-2 (who have identified the accused), we are of the opinion that the identity of the present appellant remained in doubt.


17.Another fact which casts a doubt on the identity of the present appellant, is that there is no description in the FIR of ‘Vishwanatha’ except that his name is mentioned. He then becomes the first of the two to be arrested by the police. Learned counsel of the appellant would submit that there were six persons by the name of ‘Vishwanantha’ in Kudupu village at the relevant point of time, a fact which was placed by the defence during trial, which has not been confronted. In such a situation, it was the duty of the prosecution to show as to how and on what basis, the appellant came to be apprehended by the police. The Sub-Inspector, PS-Mangalore Rural (PW-19), who apprehended the appellant, had also failed to explain how he came to apprehend the appellant without any information regarding his description. In his examination-in-chief, the Sub-Inspector (PW-19) explained the arrest of the appellant in the following manner:


“2. In respect of this case, crime no.388-2000 on 26.12.2000 my inspector instructed me to find out the accused. The same day myself and my staff taken into custody the accused Vishwananth at 4:30 PM near Goraksha Jnana Mandira, Near Kadri Park, Mangalore. Said accused is before the Court. I identify him. With the help of Vishwanath we had arrested another accused, Ravi Kumar at 5 P.M in a ‘Galli’ near State Bank of Mysore, Silver gate, Kulashekara, Mangalore…”


A perusal of the testimony of the Sub-Inspector/PW-19 indicates that there is not even a whisper as to what formed the basis of the appellant’s arrest. He was cross-examined and what was gathered from his cross-examination is that the appellant was arrested in absence of any independent witnesses and without preparing any arrest memo. All these facts combined together cast a doubt on the identity of the appellant. Thus, it is not safe to convict the appellant solely only on the basis of the testimony of PW1 and PW2, which itself.


18.Another aspect which needs to be considered is that the prosecution case rests primarily on the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, who were the star witnesses. The admitted case of the prosecution is that PW-1, who is the daughter of the deceased, had gone out for some household work and there was no one in the house when the crime was committed. First, PW-1 had gone to a place named ‘Kulshekara’ and then to the Post Office, and in the end to her uncle’s house at ‘Ullal’. The distance between her residence at Kudupu and Ullal is about 20 km. She first walks some distance and then catches a bus to reach Kulshekara and from there she went to the post office, and after attending to her work, she takes a bus to go to her uncle’s house at Ullal. Finally, she returned home in Kudupu and all of this was done by her within a period of 2½ hours. But this is not enough, as per the prosecution version, she also reached her house at the very moment when the deceased was being strangulated and then peeping through the window pane, she witnessed the two accused pulling the two ends of the rope. She called Accused no. 1-Ravikumar by his name, which led to the two accused fleeing from the spot and PW-2 who is the neighbour, chased them but in vain. This whole story of the prosecution is unbelievable for more reasons than one. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that PW-1 had reached the house at the exact time when the crime was being committed, the testimony to the effect that her mother was strangulated to death by a rope-like material, in the manner narrated by her, is not corroborated by the post-mortem report where ligature marks on the neck were not found to be encircling the neck in a round manner, as it should have been in such a case of strangulation. There were no ligature marks on the back of the neck. As discussed earlier, the marks were only on the front side extending from one angle of the mandible to the other. We therefore conclude that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.


19.In view of the above, we allow this appeal and acquit the appellant in this case by giving him the benefit of doubt. Consequently, the impugned judgment and order dated 06.06.2009 is set aside as far as it relates to the conviction of the appellant, and the order of acquittal of the Trial Court is upheld qua the appellant. The appellant, who is already on bail, need not surrender. His bail bonds and sureties stand discharged.


Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.


Result of the case: Appeal allowed.


1 The complaint (Ex.P1) given by PW-1 to the PSI on the spot, mentions that she left her house at around 10.00 am, whereas in her deposition before the Trial Court, she mentions the time as 9.30 am.


2 Para 7.


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Evidence – Extra-judicial confession – Dying declaration – Reliance upon, when – Murder case wherein prosecution case based on the evidence of eyewitnesses, extra-judicial confession made by the appellant-accused to his employer, and the dying declaration made by the victim to one of the prosecution witness – Though few prosecution witnesses who were eyewitnesses turned hostile, courts below relied upon certain parts of their testimony – High Court disbelieved the testimony of the appellant’s employer and the prosecution witness to whom dying declaration was made – Conviction and sentence of the appellant for offence punishable u/s. 302 IPC – Correctness: Held: Normal rule of human conduct is that a person would confess the commission of a serious crime to a person in whom he has implicit faith – It is unnatural that the appellant-accused would call his employer-prosecution witness with whom he worked barely for five months on the phone and confess, and further call him to the Bus Station – Furthermore, the employer admittedly did not disclose to the police the telephone number from which he allegedly received a call from the appellant – No investigation was made to ascertain the said phone number as also the phone number from which the employer called PSI – It was necessary for the prosecution to collect evidence on these aspects and place it before the Court – Though the employer stated that the appellant again made extra-judicial confession at the Bus Station in the presence of PSI, the prosecution did not examined PSI as a witness – Statement of PSI not recorded during the investigation – Alleged confession made by the appellant before PSI could not be proved against the appellant – Hence, the prosecution’s evidence regarding extra-judicial confession cannot be believed – It was PSI who took the appellant into custody – Hence, PSI was a crucial witness – Vital prosecution witness was withheld from the Court – Moreover, the manner in which the appellant was taken into custody becomes highly suspicious as it was not even recorded in the arrest panchnama that PSI arrested the appellant – Thus, not possible to rely upon the evidence of the employer – Prosecution case regarding the dying declaration made to one of the prosecution witness does not inspire confidence at all – Also, on perusal of the evidence of the hostile prosecution witnesses, nothing in the evidence to be relied upon by the prosecution for connecting the appellant with the murder of the deceased – Appellant’s conviction cannot be sustained – Conviction and sentence of the appellant set aside – Penal Code, 1860 – s. 302 – Evidence Act, 1872. [Paras 7, 8, 10, 14, 15]

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[2024] 7 S.C.R. 41 : 2024 INSC 475


Lal Mohammad Manjur Ansari v. The State of Gujrat

(Criminal Appeal No. 3524 of 2023)


08 July 2024


[Abhay S. Oka* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration


Conviction and sentence of the appellant for offence punishable u/s. 302 IPC, if justified.


Headnotes


Evidence – Extra-judicial confession – Dying declaration – Reliance upon, when – Murder case wherein prosecution case based on the evidence of eyewitnesses, extra-judicial confession made by the appellant-accused to his employer, and the dying declaration made by the victim to one of the prosecution witness – Though few prosecution witnesses who were eyewitnesses turned hostile, courts below relied upon certain parts of their testimony – High Court disbelieved the testimony of the appellant’s employer and the prosecution witness to whom dying declaration was made – Conviction and sentence of the appellant for offence punishable u/s. 302 IPC – Correctness:


Held: Normal rule of human conduct is that a person would confess the commission of a serious crime to a person in whom he has implicit faith – It is unnatural that the appellant-accused would call his employer-prosecution witness with whom he worked barely for five months on the phone and confess, and further call him to the Bus Station – Furthermore, the employer admittedly did not disclose to the police the telephone number from which he allegedly received a call from the appellant – No investigation was made to ascertain the said phone number as also the phone number from which the employer called PSI – It was necessary for the prosecution to collect evidence on these aspects and place it before the Court – Though the employer stated that the appellant again made extra-judicial confession at the Bus Station in the presence of PSI, the prosecution did not examined PSI as a witness – Statement of PSI not recorded during the investigation – Alleged confession made by the appellant before PSI could not be proved against the appellant – Hence, the prosecution’s evidence regarding extra-judicial confession cannot be believed – It was PSI who took the appellant into custody – Hence, PSI was a crucial witness – Vital prosecution witness was withheld from the Court – Moreover, the manner in which the appellant was taken into custody becomes highly suspicious as it was not even recorded in the arrest panchnama that PSI arrested the appellant – Thus, not possible to rely upon the evidence of the employer – Prosecution case regarding the dying declaration made to one of the prosecution witness does not inspire confidence at all – Also, on perusal of the evidence of the hostile prosecution witnesses, nothing in the evidence to be relied upon by the prosecution for connecting the appellant with the murder of the deceased – Appellant’s conviction cannot be sustained – Conviction and sentence of the appellant set aside – Penal Code, 1860 – s. 302 – Evidence Act, 1872. [Paras 7, 8, 10, 14, 15]


List of Acts


Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872.


List of Keywords


Extra-judicial confession; Dying declaration; Eyewitnesses.


Case Arising From


CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 3524 of 2023


From the Judgment and Order dated 05.03.2013 of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in CRLA No. 2436 of 2005


Appearances for Parties


Rajat Bhardwaj, Mohd.Ainul Ansari, Manoj Kumar Goyal, Ms. Ankita M.Bhardwaj, Rishabh Goyal, Kaustubh Khanna, Advs. for the Appellant.


Ms. Swati Ghildiyal, Ms. Devyani Bhatt, Advs. for the Respondent.


Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court


Judgment


Abhay S. Oka, J.


1.The appellant-accused has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’) by the Sessions Court. By the impugned judgment, the High Court has confirmed the appellant’s conviction. The appellant has been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment.


FACTUAL ASPECT


2.The appellant raised a plea of juvenility. By the order dated 10th April 2023, this Court directed the Trial Court to hold an inquiry into the plea of juvenility. Accordingly, an order was made by the learned Trial Judge on 8th April 2023. The learned Trial Judge held that the appellant was not a juvenile in conflict with the law on the date of the commission of the offence. After that, leave was granted, and the appeal was heard on merits.


3.The incident occurred on 6th September 2004. The accused was staying in room no. 3 rented to him by PW-3 - Alimuddin Amiruddin Shaikh. According to the prosecution, the deceased – Mohmed Akhtar Gafur Ansari, was also staying in the room no. 3, along with the appellant. There was a dispute between them about playing music. The dispute led to an altercation in which the appellant attacked the deceased. The injuries sustained by the deceased caused his death. The prosecution case is based on the evidence of eyewitnesses PW-3 to PW-9, extra-judicial confession by the appellant made to PW-19 - Mohammad Afroz and dying declaration made by the deceased to PW-24 - Mohd. Rafiq. Though PW-3 to PW-9 were declared hostile, the Trial Court and High Court have relied on certain parts of their testimony. The High Court has believed the testimony of PW-19 and PW-24.


SUBMISSIONS


4.The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has taken us through the testimony of hostile eyewitnesses. By pointing out the findings of the High Court, he submitted that, firstly, certain statements made by the eyewitnesses out of context could not be relied upon by the prosecution. Secondly, the testimony of the said witnesses does not support the prosecution. Pointing out the evidence of PW-19, he submitted that according to the witness, he was the appellant’s employer. According to him, the appellant made a phone call to him at 3.30 p.m. on the date of the incident and informed him that he had murdered his roommate. He pointed out that no investigation has been made about the phone from which this call was made. Moreover, he pointed out that though PW-19 claims that he informed PSI Mishra of Limbayat Police Station about the confession and called him to Central Bus Station, PSI Mishra has not been examined as a witness. He pointed out that according to the prosecution’s case, even at Central Bus Sation, the appellant allegedly made the second extra-judicial confession in the presence of PSI Mishra. Therefore, the omission to examine PSI Mishra becomes fatal to the prosecution case. He pointed out that the prosecution case was that it was PSI Mishra who took the appellant into custody and produced before PW-25. The version of PW-25, the Investigating Officer, appears to be doubtful. He submitted that the entire prosecution case cannot be believed.


5.The learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that though the eyewitnesses were declared hostile, their testimony cannot be entirely discarded. She submitted that the evidence of the said witnesses brings on record the fact that at the time of the murder of the deceased, he, along with the appellant, were staying together in room no. 3 of the building owned by PW-3. Learned counsel pointed out the evidence of PW-4 (Salehabanu). In the cross-examination made by the learned public prosecutor, the witness stated that she first saw the appellant running towards the stairs from the lobby, and immediately after that, the deceased was found in a heavily bleeding condition. She pointed out that the witness’s evidence proved that the appellant and the deceased were quarrelling. The witness heard shouts of “save, save” from the appellant’s room. She also pointed out that even the evidence of PW-7 - Najma brings on record that she had seen the deceased bleeding in the gallery of the building and was shouting “save, save” at that time. The witness saw the appellant coming down from the building and was seen cleaning blood stains from his shirt. She pointed out that even the evidence of PW-14 – Sagufta Parvin shows that the deceased was murdered in room no. 3 where the deceased, along with the appellant, were staying together. She further submitted that PW-19 was the appellant’s employer; therefore, it was natural that the appellant would confide with his employer about his guilt. She submitted that there is no reason to discard the testimony of PW-19, which proves extra-judicial confession. Similarly, there is no reason to discard the testimony of PW-24 before whom a dying declaration was made by the deceased that the appellant murdered him. The learned counsel submitted that there is no reason to interfere with the impugned judgments, which contain elaborate findings recorded after making a detailed analysis of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses.


CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS


6.We have minutely scanned the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. Firstly, we will deal with evidence of PW-19, who claims that the deceased made an extra-judicial confession before him. Even though this witness was declared hostile, the prosecution relied upon a part of his testimony. We are summarising the statements made by PW-19 in his examination-in-chief, in his cross-examination made by the learned public prosecutor after he was declared hostile and in the cross-examination made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant. The summary of his version is as follows:


a)The appellant worked in his textile store for five months in 2004 till the first week of September 2004;


b)In September 2004, he received a call from the appellant around 3.30 p.m. and on the phone, the appellant informed him that he had killed his room partner;


c)The appellant called PW-19 to the Central Bus Station near Surat Railway Station;


d)Thereafter, PW-19 made a phone call to PSI Mishra of Limbayat Police Station and called him to the Central Bus Station;


e)PSI Mishra came to the Central Bus Station, where they met the appellant. The appellant again reiterated that there was a quarrel between him and his room partner over playing a tape recorder, and that he had murdered his room partner;


f)PW-19 stated that though the appellant had told him the name of the person who was murdered, he was unable to recollect the name;


g)In the cross-examination by the learned public prosecutor, he was confronted with the relevant part of his statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘CrPC’). He accepted of having made the statement. He stated that the appellant had told him that he had murdered Mohmed Akhtar Gafur Ansari;


h)In the cross-examination made by learned counsel appearing for the appellant, he stated that PSI Mishra took the appellant with him, and there were two or three policemen with him;


i)He did not remember whether he stated to the police the phone number from which he made a phone call to PSI Mishra; and


j)He admitted that he did not disclose the phone number from which the appellant called him.


7.The normal rule of human conduct is that a person would confess the commission of a serious crime to a person in whom he has implicit faith. The appellant had worked in PW-19’s shop only for five months in 2004. The appellant was otherwise not known to PW-19. Therefore, it is unnatural that the appellant would call the deceased on the phone and confess. Moreover, PW-19 stated that the appellant called him to the Central Bus Station after confessing on the phone. Even this conduct is very unnatural. Furthermore, PW-19 admittedly did not disclose to the police the telephone number from which he allegedly received a call from the appellant. As can be seen from the testimony of PW-25, Investigating Officer, no investigation was made to ascertain the phone number on which PW-19 received a call from the appellant and the phone number from which PW-19 called PSI Mishra. It was necessary for the prosecution to collect evidence on these aspects and place it before the Court. Though PW-19 stated that the appellant again made extra-judicial confession at the Central Bus Station in the presence of PSI Mishra, the prosecution has not examined PSI Mishra as a witness. According to the testimony of PW-25, statement of PSI Mishra was not recorded during the investigation. In any event, the alleged confession made by the appellant before PSI Mishra cannot be proved against the appellant in view of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Hence, the prosecution’s evidence regarding extra-judicial confession cannot be believed.


8.PW-19 stated that PSI Mishra and two to three other constables took the appellant away. Thus, it was PSI Mishra who took the appellant into custody. Hence, PSI Mishra was a crucial witness. A vital prosecution witness has been withheld from the Court. Nothing is placed on record to show that PSI Mishra made any official record to show that he had taken the appellant into custody. PW-25, the Investigating Officer, stated that PSI Mishra and other police personnel were tracing the appellant in the market as he was working there. He further noted that PSI Mishra produced the appellant at the police station and was shown as arrested at 9.30 p.m. on that day. Thus, PW-25 did not state that PSI Mishra went to the Central Bus Station upon receiving a phone call from PW-19, and that he nabbed the appellant at the Bus Station. The version of PW-25 is entirely different. In the cross-examination, PW-25 specifically admitted that he did not record the statement of PSI Mishra. He stated that he arrested the appellant when PSI Mishra produced him. Further, in the cross-examination, PW-25 stated that in the panchnama of arrest, it is not mentioned that PSI Mishra produced the appellant before him. He stated that he had no information about the time, in whose presence and from which place PSI Mishra arrested the appellant. In further cross-examination, he stated that he was not aware that PSI Mishra met the appellant at Central Bus Station in the presence of the appellant’s employer. He denied that PSI Mishra kept the appellant in custody and produced the appellant before him. Thus, it is impossible to believe the testimony of PW-19 that he conveyed the appellant’s extra-judicial confession to PSI Mishra. Moreover, the manner in which the appellant was taken into custody becomes highly suspicious as it is not even recorded in the arrest panchnama that PSI Mishra arrested the appellant. Apart from the fact that it is very difficult to believe that the appellant confessed before PW-19, the further part of the testimony of PW-19 makes his testimony extremely doubtful as the prosecution has withheld PSI Mishra from the Court. Therefore, it is not possible to rely upon the evidence of PW-19.


9.Now, we come to the theory of dying declaration made by the deceased before PW-24. In the examination-in-chief, PW-24 stated that after he heard that his friend (deceased) was injured, he rushed to the site and found that the deceased was fully covered in blood, and he disclosed that the appellant was the author of the injuries. In the cross-examination by the learned public prosecutor, he denied having made such a statement before the police. In the cross-examination by the learned public prosecutor, the witness was confronted with his prior statement recorded by the police. The relevant part of the cross-examination reads thus:


“Such has not happened and been dictated by me in my statement before police that, ‘Therefore, when I was coming downstairs, I saw Lal Mohammad, staying with Mohammad Akhtar, running on the road towards Limbayat Police Station.


…Therefore, I called rickshaw and landlord Alimuddin Shaikh and I took Mohammad Akhtar for treatment in the rickshaw and at that time, I saw Mohammad Akhtar had sustained injuries on throat and head and it was bleeding continuously. At that time, I asked Mohammad Akhtar and he told me, I had an altercation and quarrel with Lal Mohammad, staying with me, regarding playing a tape recorder and therefore, Lal Mohammad caused injuries to me using a knife and ran away.”


…………………………………………………………..”


Thus, the witness stated that he did not dictate to the police the statement with which he was confronted. In the cross-examination by the advocate for the appellant, he admitted that when he informed Limbayat Police Station, a policeman came in an auto-rickshaw. The policeman, along with two or three other persons, brought the deceased down and put him in the auto-rickshaw. The police personnel and the other two to three persons were not examined as witnesses. He stated that the deceased was unconscious at that time. So, when the deceased was put in the auto-rickshaw, he was not in a position to speak.


10.At this stage, we may also refer to the testimony of PW-3, who was the complainant and landlord of the appellant. He stated that when he went to the place where the deceased was lying in a heavily bleeding condition, the deceased did not disclose anything to him, and there was no conversation when the deceased was taken by him by an auto-rickshaw to the hospital. Therefore, the prosecution story regarding the dying declaration made to PW-24 does not inspire confidence at all.


11.Now, we turn to the evidence of the eyewitnesses who were declared hostile. PW-3, according to the prosecution, was the witness before whom the deceased made a dying declaration while he was being carried in an auto-rickshaw. PW-3 did not support the prosecution on this aspect, and PW-24 claimed that when the deceased was put in an auto-rickshaw, he was not conscious. PW-3 stated that he heard a quarrel between the appellant and the deceased. When the witness was confronted with his police statement in the cross-examination, he denied having made such a statement. PW-4 was declared as hostile. When he was confronted with relevant part of his police statement, he denied to have made the statement.


12.The High Court has relied upon the testimony of PW-7, who was again declared hostile. In the cross-examination made by the public prosecutor, PW-7 accepted that she informed the police that she saw the appellant going down, and while going down, he was cleaning the blood off his clothes. However, in the cross-examination made by the advocate for the accused, she stated that except for seeing the deceased in injured condition, she had not seen anything else and that she was not aware of the persons who were involved in the incident.


13.The High Court held that the evidence of PW-9 Kalu Shaikh, another hostile witness, proves the appellant’s presence at the time of the incident. In cross-examination by the advocate for the accused, PW-9 stated that he did not know the appellant and the deceased before the incident. He stated that he was unable to identify the appellant. He stated that except for hearing the shouts “save, save,” he knew nothing.


14.Therefore, after having carefully perused the evidence of the hostile prosecution witnesses (PW-3 to PW-9), we find that there is nothing in the evidence which could be relied upon by the prosecution for connecting the appellant with the murder of the deceased.


15.Thus, the appellant’s conviction cannot be sustained for the above reasons. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence of the appellant are set aside, and the appellant is acquitted of the offence alleged against him in Sessions Case No. 80 of 2005, decided by the 3rd Fast Track Court, Surat arising out of CR No. I/142/2004 of Limbayat Police Station. The appellant shall be set at liberty unless he is required to be detained in connection with any other case.


Result of the case: Appeal allowed.


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