Order IX Rule 9 is extracted hereunder:- 9. Decree against plaintiff by default bars fresh suit (1) Where a suit is wholly or partly dismissed un - der rule 8, the plaintiff shall be precluded from bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action. But he may apply for an order to set the dismissal aside, and if he satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order setting aside the dismissal upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit. (2) No order shall be made under this rule unless notice of the application has been served on the opposite party.= In view of the aforesaid, High Court erred in law in holding that the subsequent suit was based on different cause of action, as such it was maintainable. The impugned judgment and order is patently illegal. Thus, it is set aside and the suit is ordered to be dismissed as it was not maintainable. The purchaser is sailing in the same boat as that of the original plaintiffs, he cannot be said to be having better rights than the original plaintiffs.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL  NO(S). 6424/2019
(ARISING FROM  SLP(C) No. 6330/2018)
MAYANDI                                            APPELLANT(S)
                                VERSUS
PANDARACHAMY & ANR.                                RESPONDENT(S)
         O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. The judgment and decree passed by the High Court is liable to
be set aside on the short and singular ground that in the previous
suit   i.e.   Original   Suit   No.85/1996   a   similar   relief   was   prayed   by
Pechimuthu   S/o.   Arumgasamy   Thevar,   Minor   Manimegalai   D/o.
Pechimuthu,   Thilagavathi   (Minor)   D/o.   Pechimuthu   and   Arul   Pandian
(Minor) D/o. Pechimuthu.   Prayer was made for declaration of title
and for permanent injunction on the basis of Will dated 05.12.2004
executed by Sadaiyappa Konar which became operative on his death on
20.02.1995. O.S. No.85 of 1996 was filed in which following prayer
was made:-
�A. declaring   the   plaintiffs   2   to   4   is   title   to
the plaint 1 st
 schedule property.
B. granting the consequential relief of permanent
prohibitary   injunction   restraining   the   defendants
from   disturbing   the   plaintiffs   title,   possession
and enjoyment of the plaint 1 st
 schedule property.
C. granting   permanent   prohibitary   injunction
restraining the  defendants from  sub letting  the 2 nd
schedule   house   without   the   written   permission   of
the plaintiff.
D.  awarding   the   costs   of   this   suit   to   the
plaintiffs.�
3. It   was   on   the   basis   of   the   Will,   Civil   Suit   No.85/1996   was
filed.   It   was   dismissed   vide   order   dated   16.03.2001,   when   the
counsel   for   the   plaintiffs   was   absent   and   the   counsel   for   the
defendants was present in the Court.
1

4.  Plaintiff   Nos.2,   3   and   4   filed   the   second   suit   i.e.   Suit
No.1106/2004   against   the   defendants.     The   prayer   was   made   for
permanent   injunction   on   the   basis   of   the   Will   only.     After   filing
of   the   suit,   Respondent   No.1   purchased   the   property   from   the
original plaintiffs.
5. The   High   has   decreed   the   suit   of   the   plaintiffs   by   the
impugned judgment and decree, while allowing the second appeal.
6. After hearing  learned counsel  for the  parties, it  is apparent
from the order of dismissal of the prior suit that it was dismissed
under   the   provisions   of   Order   IX   Rule   8   of   the   CPC   as   the   counsel
for   defendants   was   present   and   counsel   for   the   plaintiffs   was
absent.     In   view   of   the   provisions   contained   in   Order   IX   Rule   9
decree against plaintiffs by default bars fresh suit. Order IX Rule
9 is extracted hereunder:-
�9. Decree against plaintiff by default bars fresh 
suit
(1) Where a suit is wholly or partly dismissed un -
der   rule   8,   the   plaintiff   shall   be   precluded   from
bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause
of action. But he may apply for an order to set the
dismissal aside, and if he satisfies the Court that
there   was   sufficient   cause   for   his   non-appearance
when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court
shall   make   an   order   setting   aside   the   dismissal
upon   such   terms   as   to   costs   or   otherwise   as   it
thinks fit,  and shall  appoint a  day for  proceeding
with the suit.
(2)   No   order   shall   be   made   under   this   rule   unless
notice   of   the   application   has   been   served   on   the
opposite party.�
7. In   view   of   the   aforesaid,   High   Court   erred   in   law   in   holding
that the subsequent suit was based on different cause of action, as
such   it   was   maintainable.     The   impugned   judgment   and   order   is
patently illegal.  Thus, it is set aside and the suit is ordered to
be dismissed as it was not maintainable.   The purchaser is sailing
in   the   same   boat   as   that   of   the   original   plaintiffs,   he   cannot   be
said to be having better rights than the original plaintiffs.
8. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.
2

9. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
...........................J.
[ARUN MISHRA]
...........................J.
[M.R. SHAH]
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 19, 2019.
3

ITEM NO.53               COURT NO.4               SECTION XII
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C)  No(s).  6330/2018
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated  10-10-2017
in SAMD No. 51/2014 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Madras at Madurai)
MAYANDI                                            PETITIONER(S)
                                VERSUS
PANDARACHAMY & ANR.                                RESPONDENT(S)
(IA No. 33847/2018 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.)
Date : 19-08-2019 These matters were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MISHRA
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.R. SHAH
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Abhinav Ramkrishna, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. Parijat Kishore, AOR
(Appearance slip not given)
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
Leave granted.
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.
(NARENDRA PRASAD)                        (JAGDISH CHANDER)
  COURT MASTER                                COURT MASTER 
(Signed order is placed on the file)
4 

quashed-complaint-alleging wrongful mutation of revenue records by Thasildar etc.,-The accused No.2 and the Tehsildar, accused No.3 mechanically acted the sanctioned the mutation No.1600 on 12.06.95, which they had the knowledge to believe that the mutation No.1600 was incorrect to the extent of non incollusion of the name of Satish Kumar or the children of Satish Kumar, as laid down in section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act...." -apex court held that Be that as it may, the allegation against the appellant is only that he acted mechanically. There is no allegation of mens rea of committing a crime. Therefore, no criminal offence is made out and we are of the view that it would not in the interest of justice to continue with the criminal complaint against the appellant.

quashed-complaint-alleging wrongful mutation of revenue records by Thasildar etc.,-The   accused   No.2   and   the Tehsildar, accused No.3 mechanically acted the sanctioned   the   mutation   No.1600   on   12.06.95, which   they   had   the   knowledge   to   believe   that the   mutation   No.1600   was   incorrect   to   the extent   of   non   incollusion   of   the   name   of Satish  Kumar  or  the  children  of  Satish  Kumar, as   laid   down   in   section   15   of   the   Hindu Succession Act...." -apex court held that Be   that   as   it   may,   the   allegation   against   the appellant is only that he acted mechanically. There is no allegation   of   mens   rea   of   committing   a   crime.   Therefore, no   criminal   offence   is   made   out   and   we   are   of   the   view that it would not in the interest of justice to continue with   the   criminal   complaint   against   the   appellant.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal  No(s).423 OF 2011
JYOTI RAM                                   APPELLANT(S)
                                VERSUS
PRITO                                       RESPONDENT(S)
       O R D E R
A complaint was filed by Preeto Devi widow of Satish
Kumar   alleging   that   one   mutation   no.1600   of   27.05.1995
was   sanctioned   on   12.06.1995   whereby   the   property   of   her
mother-in-law   Bharanwa   Bai   was   mutated   in   the   names   of
Jagdish  Kumar,   Man  Singh,   Ram  Pal,   sons  of   Bharanwa  Bai,
and   Santosh   Kumari   daughter   of   Bharanwa   Bai.   The
allegation   was   that,   in   fact,   the   husband   of   the
complainant,   Satish   Kumar   was   the   predeceased   son   of
Bharanwa   Bai   and   all   this   was   done   to   deprive   the
complainant   of   the   property   which   should   have   fallen   to
her share. 
We   are   not   going   into   the   other   aspects   of   the
matter  but   the  allegation   qua  the   appellant,  who   was  the
kanoongo (girdwar) of the area is as follows:
"That   being   dishonest   and   having   property,   to
conceal   dishonestly   and   to   grab   fraudulently
the   property   of   Smt.   Bharawan   Bai   as   a   whole
and they were not ready to sequester any part
of the property in favour of the complainant's
Children,   therefore,   all   the   accused   nos.1   to
7   fell   into   a   conspiracy   knowingly   and
1

willfully   and   the   accused   No.1   registered   the
mutation   No.1600   on   27.05.1995   inspite   of   the
knowlege,   which   he   had   from   the   record   that
except   the   accused   No.4   to   7,   there   was   one
Satish Kumar son of Bharawan Bai and likewise,
the   girdwar.   The   accused   No.2   and   the
Tehsildar, accused No.3 mechanically acted the
sanctioned   the   mutation   No.1600   on   12.06.95,
which   they   had   the   knowledge   to   believe   that
the   mutation   No.1600   was   incorrect   to   the
extent   of   non   incollusion   of   the   name   of
Satish  Kumar  or  the  children  of  Satish  Kumar,
as   laid   down   in   section   15   of   the   Hindu
Succession Act...." 
It   is   not   disputed   that   this   mutation   was   later
rectified   and   the   names   of   legal   representatives   of
Satish Kumar were entered in the revenue record.
Be   that   as   it   may,   the   allegation   against   the
appellant is only that he acted mechanically. There is no
allegation   of   mens   rea   of   committing   a   crime.   Therefore,
no   criminal   offence   is   made   out   and   we   are   of   the   view
that it would not in the interest of justice to continue
with   the   criminal   complaint   against   the   appellant.   The
same   is,   accordingly,   quashed   as   far   as   appellant   before
us   is   concerned.   The   order   of   the   High   Court   is   set
aside.
The appeal is allowed accordingly.
...................J.
  (DEEPAK GUPTA)
...................J.
    (ANIRUDDHA BOSE)
New Delhi
September 24, 2019
2

ITEM NO.104               COURT NO.13               SECTION II-B
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Criminal Appeal No(s).423/2011
JYOTI RAM                                          Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
PRITO                                              Respondent(s)
Date : 24-09-2019 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIRUDDHA BOSE
For Appellant(s)
Mr. B.S. Bedi, Adv.
Mr. Subhasish Bhowmick, Adv.
Mr. Dinesh Verma, Adv.
Ms. Simar Bedi, Adv.
Mr. R. V. Kameshwaran, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s)
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.
Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(ARJUN BISHT)                                   (RENU KAPOOR)
COURT MASTER (SH)                               BRANCH OFFICER
(signed order is placed on the file)
3 

Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978= We, however, do not see the need to examine them as, according to us, the appellant is disentitled to any relief on the short ground of having knocked the doors of the concerned authorities three decades after the SC & ST Act came into force. =private respondents which compelled them to file a civil suit being OS No.5875/1994 on 25.6.1994 before the City Civil Court, Bangalore. A decree was passed for permanent injunction in favour of the private respondents and against the persons claiming similar rights as the appellant before us (who is in the line of succession of the original two ladies, namely, Smt. Gundamma and Smt. Siddamma) opining that the private respondents before us have proved their lawful possession of the property and were entitled to a permanent injunction. Aggrieved by the said decree, the defendants in that suit, who are grandchildren of G. Ramaiah and Gundamma laid a challenge in the first appeal before the High Court which was also dismissed on 19.03.2004 albeit on the ground of delay.

REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.4367-4372 OF 2016
JAGADISH                                             � Appellant
VERSUS
STATE OF KARNATAKA  & ORS.                         � Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J .
1. Smt.   Gundamma   and   Smt.   Siddamma,   both   widows   of   Late
Ramaiah,   were   holding   the   land   as   permanent   tenants   under   the
Inamdar, B.K. Nagaraj.  These lands are situated in Sy.Nos.77/1, 77/2
and 77/3 of Agrahara Dasarahalli Village, Bangalore.  The enactment
of   Mysore   (Personal   and   Miscellaneous)   Inams   Abolition   Act,   1954
(for   short,   the   Inams   Abolition   Act)   which   was   brought   into   force
with   effect   from   1.2.1959   abolished   such   personal   inams   and   the
land   stood   vested   with   the   State   of   Karnataka   free   from   all
encumbrances   under   Section   1(4)   of   the   Inams   Abolition   Act.
However,   certain   class   of   persons   were   entitled   to   apply   for
occupancy   rights   including   the   class   of   permanent   tenants   and

2
thereby   obtain   ownership   of   lands   upon   payment   of   specified
premium to  the Government.   It is in pursuance to these provisions
that Smt. Gundamma and Smt. Siddamma filed two applications for
grant of occupancy rights under Section 5 of the Inams Abolition Act.
2. Before this aspect stood concluded, on 17.7.1961, late Papaiah
purchased   the   land   in   Sy.   No.77   measuring   37  guntas   from   Smt.
Gundamma   and   her   son   Sri   Ramaiah.     The   father   of   the   private
respondents,   one   Nanjusa   purchased   this   land   from   late   Papaiah.
The remaining extent of 03 acres and 11 guntas of land in Sy.No.77
was also purchased directly by the father of the private respondents.
3. It was only  on  4.8.1962 that the Special  Deputy  Commissioner
for   Inams   Abolition   passed   the   order   on   the   applications   filed   by
Smt. Gundamma and Smt. Siddamma registering them as occupants
khatedar   under   Section   10   of   the   Inams   Abolition   Act.     The   rights
were,   thus,   perfected   and   they   being   already   in   possession   of   the
land, improvements were made on the same including setting up of
a weaving factory by the sons of Respondent No.4.  
4. The   next   development   which   may   be   taken   note   of   was   the
coming into force of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes   (Prohibition   of   Transfer   of   Certain   Lands)   Act,   1978
(hereinafter   refers   to   as   �the   SC   &   ST   Act�)   which   was   brought   into

3
force   on   01.01.1979.     The   constitutional   validity   of   this   Act   was
upheld   in  Manchegowda   &   Ors.   vs.  State   of   Karnataka   &   Ors. 1
.     It
should   be useful  to  reproduce some  of the  discussions  made in   the
judgment with regard to the SC & ST Act, more specifically in para 7
of the judgment, which reads as under :-
�7.   The   validity   of   the   Act   has   been   challenged
mainly   because   of   the   provisions   contained   in
Sections   4   and   5   of   the   Act   which   purport   to
declare   transfers   of   �granted   land�   made   either
before   or   after   the   commencement   of   the   Act   in
contravention   of   the   terms   of   the   grant   of   such
land   or   the   law   providing   for   such   grant   null   and
void   and   confer   powers   on   the   authority   to   take
possession   of   such   land   after   evicting   all   persons
in possession thereof and to restore   such lands to
the original grantee or his legal heirs and where it
is   not   reasonably   practicable   to   so   restore   the
land   to   a   person   belonging   to   the   Scheduled
Castes or Scheduled Tribes in accordance with the
rules relating to the grant of such land. It may be
noted   that   the   validity   of   the   Act   insofar   as   it
imposes   prohibition   on   transfer   of   granted   land
after the commencement of the Act has not been
challenged   and   the   principal   objection   to   the
validity   of   the   Act   is   taken   because   of   the
provisions   in   the   Act   seeking   to   nullify   the
transfers   of   granted   lands   effected   before   the
commencement of the Act.�
5. The aforesaid discussion would, thus, show that the controversy
arose   on   account   of   the   provisions   of   the   SC   &   ST   Act   being   made
applicable even  to  grants made  prior  to  the  commencement of this
Act.  It is in that context that in para 24, it was observed as under :-
1 (1984) 3 SCC 301

4
�24. Though we have come to the conclusion that
the   Act   is   valid,   yet,   in   our   opinion,   we   have   to
make   certain   aspects   clear.   Granted   lands   which
had been transferred after the expiry of the period
of   prohibition   do   not   come   within   the   purview   of
the   Act,   and   cannot   be   proceeded   against   under
the   provisions   of   this   Act.   The   provisions   of   the
Act   make   this   position   clear,   as   Sections   4   and   5
become   applicable   only   when   granted   lands   are
transferred   in   breach   of   the   condition   relating   to
prohibition   on   transfer   of   such   granted   lands.
Granted   lands   transferred   before   the
commencement   of   the   Act   and   not   in
contravention of prohibition on transfer are clearly
beyond the scope and purview of the present Act.
Also   in   case   where   granted   lands   had   been
transferred   before   the   commencement   of   the   Act
in   violation   of   the   condition   regarding   prohibition
on   such   transfer   and   the   transferee   who   had
initially   acquired   only   a   voidable   title   in   such
granted   lands   had   perfected   his   title   in   the
granted   lands   by   prescription   by   long   and
continuous  enjoyment   thereof   in   accordance   with
law   before   the   commencement   of   the   Act,   such
granted   lands   would   also   not   come   within   the
purview   of   the   present   Act,   as   the   title   of   such
transferees   to   the   granted   lands   has   been
perfected   before   the   commencement   of   the   Act.
Since   at   the   date   of   the   commencement   of   the
Act the title of such transferees had ceased to be
voidable   by   reason   of   acquisition   of   prescriptive
rights   on   account   of   long   and   continued   user   for
the   requisite   period,   the   title   of   such   transferees
could   not   be   rendered   void   by   virtue   of   the
provisions   of   the   Act   without   violating   the
constitutional   guarantee.   We   must,   therefore,
read   down   the   provisions   of   the   Act   by   holding
that   the   Act   will   apply   to   transfers   of   granted
lands   made   in   breach   of   the   condition   imposing
prohibition   on   transfer   of   granted   lands   only   in
those   cases   where   the   title   acquired   by   the
transferee   was   still   voidable   at   the   date   of   the
commencement   of   the   Act   and   had   not   lost   its

5
defeasible   character   at   the   date   when   the   Act
came   into   force.   Transferees   of   granted   lands
having a perfected and not a voidable title at the
commencement   of   the   Act   must   be   held   to   be
outside   the   pale   of   the   provisions   of   the   Act.
Section  4 of the  Act must be so  construed  as  not
to   have   the   effect   of   rendering   void   the   title   of
any transferee which was not voidable at the date
of the commencement of the Act.�
6. In   a   recent   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   context   of   the   same
Act,   this   aspect   has   been   referred   to   in  Satyan   vs.  Deputy
Commissioner & Ors.
2
.
7. One of the aspects debated in
Satyan  (supra), is whether in the
context   of   the   aforesaid   legal   position,   settled   transactions   should
be permitted to be disturbed after a long period of time.  The various
judgments were referred to in this behalf albeit the suo motu power
be   exercised   by   the   Commissioner�s   office   in   paragraph   12   of
Satyan�s
 case (supra).  The said paragraph is extracted as under :-
�12.   The   second   limb   of   the   submission   of   Mr.
Dave,   learned   senior   counsel   for   the   appellant,
was that settled transactions cannot be disturbed
after a long period of time. The transactions were
of   the   year   1997.   They   were   sought   to   be
unsettled   after   almost   eight   (8)   years,   by
preferring   an   application   in   the   year   2005.   To
support   this   plea,   he   referred   to   the   following
judicial pronouncements:
a.
Ibrahimpatnam   Taluk   Vyavasaya   Coolie
Sangham
 v. K. Suresh Reddy & Ors.,  (2003) 7 SCC
2 AIR 2019 SC 2797

6
667 11, � the question posed to be decided in the
appeal   is   referred   to   in   para   1   and   the   question
has   been   answered   in   para   19.   Both   paras   1   and
19 are read as under: �1. In all these appeals, the
following question of law arises for consideration:
�Whether   the   Collector   can   exercise   suo
motu power under sub-section (4) of Section
50-B of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area)
Tenancy   and   Agricultural   Lands  Act,   1950   at
any   time   or   such   power   is   to   be   exercised
within a reasonable time.�
�  �  �  � 
�19. It is also necessary to note that the suo
motu   power   was   sought   to   be   exercised   by
the Joint Collector after 13-15 years. Section
50-B   was   amended   in   the   year   1979   by
adding   sub-section   (4),   but   no   action   was
taken   to   invalidate   the   certificates   in
exercise   of   the   suo   motu   power   till   1989.
There is no convincing explanation as to why
the authorities waited for such a long time. It
appears   that   sub-section   (4)   was   added   so
as   to   take   action   where   alienations   or
transfers were made to defeat the provisions
of the Land Ceiling Act. The Land Ceiling Act
having   come   into   force   on   1-1-1975,   the
authorities   should   have   made   inquiries   and
efforts so as to exercise the suo motu power
within   reasonable   time.   The   action   of   the
Joint   Collector   in   exercising   suo   motu   power
after several years and not within reasonable
per;iod   and   passing   orders   cancelling
validation certificates given by the Tahsildar,
as   rightly   held   by   the   High   Court,   could   not
be sustained.�
The ratio, thus, is that such suo moto powers
have to be exercised within a reasonable period of
time.
b.  Situ   Sahu   &   Ors .   v.  State   of   Jharkhand   &   Ors.,

7
(2004)   8   SCC   340   �   the   exercise   of   power   in
respect   of   transactions,   which   required   prior   12
sanction   of   the   Deputy   Commissioner   was   again
observed   to   be   one   which   had   to   be   exercised
within a reasonable period of time.
c.  Chhedi   Lal   Yadav   &   Ors.   v.   Hari   Kishore   Yadav
(Dead)   through   Legal   Representatives   &   Ors.
(2018)   12   scc   527
  �   the   view   expressed   is   the
same   as   in   the   aforesaid   two   judgments   in   para
13, as under:
13.  In   our   view,   where   no   period   of
limitation   is   prescribed,   the   action   must   be
taken,   whether   suo   motu   or   on   the
application   of   the   parties,   within   a
reasonable   time.   Undoubtedly,   what   is
reasonable   time   would   depend   on   the
circumstances of each case and the purpose
of the statute. In the case before us, we are
clear   that   the   action   is   grossly   delayed   and
taken   beyond   reasonable   time,   particularly,
in   view   of   the   fact   that   the   land   was
transferred  several times during this period,
obviously,   in   the   faith   that   it   is   not
encumbered by any rights.
d. 
Vivek   M.   Hinduja   v.  M.   Aswatha   &   Ors.   (cIVIL
Appeal   No.2166/2009,   decided   on   6.12.2017
(reported   in   2019   (1)   Kant   LJ   819   (SC)   �   the
provisions of the said Act were in issue, where suo
moto   action   was   sought   to   be   taken   in   1998,   in
respect   of   transactions   of   the   vintage   1967,   and
this   was   held   to   be   a   long   delay,   which   did   not
warrant the exercise of such power.
8. We have discussed the aforesaid aspect in some detail as it has
a direct bearing to the factual controversy in the present case.
9. Now,   once   again,   let   us   turn   back   to   the   factual   matrix.     It
appears   that   there   was   an   endeavour   to   disturb   the   possession   of

8
the   private   respondents   which   compelled   them   to   file   a   civil   suit
being   OS   No.5875/1994   on   25.6.1994   before   the   City   Civil   Court,
Bangalore.   A decree was passed for permanent injunction in favour
of the private respondents and against the persons claiming similar
rights as the appellant before us (who is in the line of succession of
the   original   two   ladies,   namely,   Smt.   Gundamma   and   Smt.
Siddamma)     opining   that   the   private   respondents   before   us   have
proved their lawful possession of the property and were entitled to a
permanent injunction.  Aggrieved by the said decree, the defendants
in   that   suit,   who   are   grandchildren   of   G.   Ramaiah   and   Gundamma
laid a challenge in the first appeal before the High Court which was
also dismissed on 19.03.2004 albeit on the ground of delay.
10. The   appellant   before   us,   as   a   legal   heir   of   the   original
beneficiaries   being   Smt.   Gundamma   and   Smt.   Siddamma,   sought
directions   from   the   deputy   Commissioner   to   enquire   about   the
violation of the provisions of the SC & ST  Act.    This application  was
filed by the appellant on 13.10.2009.  Thus, this is the first time that
the appellant has sought to claim exercise of rights under the SC &
ST Act.
11. On   enquiry,   the   Assistant   Commissioner,   vide   order   dated
09.09.2010   opined   in   his   favour.     The   challenge   laid   by   the   private

9
respondent   Nos.   4   to   9   also   did   not   succeed.     It   was   deemed
appropriate to take recourse to a remedy of appeal.  The appeal was
thereafter dismissed by the Deputy Commissioner on 8.10.2010 and
once   again   a   writ   petition   was   filed   by   them   before   the   High   Court
but vide order dated 16.8.2011, the learned Single Judge dismissed
the   writ   petition.     It   is   thereafter   that   the   private   respondents   fate
took   a   turn   for   the   better   when   they   succeed   in   the   writ   appeal   in
terms   of   order   dated   5.7.2013.     The   appellant   has,   thus,   filed   the
present appeal.
12. There are number of issues raised before us calling for the inter
se play   of   the   Inams   Abolition   Act   and   the   SC   &   ST   Act.     We,
however, do not see the need to examine them as, according to us,
the   appellant   is   disentitled   to   any   relief   on   the   short   ground   of
having   knocked   the   doors   of   the   concerned   authorities   three
decades after the SC & ST Act came into force.  It is this very aspect
which forms subject matter of debate in a number of judgments and
finally   in  Satyans   case   (supra),   (they   have   been   discussed   Para   12
extracted   hereinabove).     It   was   recognized   that   there   was   no
limitation   of   time   prescribed   but   it   should   be   exercised   within   a
reasonable   period   of   time.     It   is   in   that   context   that   period   of   20
years   have   been   said   to   be   too   long   a   period   for   calling   for
interference by the concerned authorities.   Leave the said period, in

10
the present case, we are confronted with the factual situation of 30
years period between the rights accruing and the exercise of rights.
In   the   meantime,   the   lands   have   been   developed   by   the   private
respondents who, according to us, is bona fide purchaser of the land
and   created   infrastructure   on   the   same.     It   does   seem   now   an
endeavour   of   the   appellant   to   only   extract   some   amount   knowing
fully  well  the  kind   of establishment  which   has come  up  on  the  land
in question.   We cannot be a part to such endeavour.   We are, thus,
of the view that in the conspectuous of the legal position discussed
aforesaid and the facts referred to by us, the appellant is disentitled
to any relief on this short ground of an inordinate delay in seeking to
avail of their remedy in limine.  Insofar as the other aspects raised in
the present appeals are concerned, we are leaving the questions of
law   open   since   we   are   not   required   to   comment   on   the   same   for
adjudication of the present controversy.
13. The   appeals   are   accordingly   dismissed   leaving   the   parties   to
bear their own costs.
��������������,J.
(Sanjay Kishan Kaul)
��������������,J.
(K.M. Joseph)
New Delhi;
August 29, 2019

ITEM NO.102               COURT NO.11               SECTION IV-A
S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal  No(s).  4367-4372/2016
JAGADISH                                           Appellant(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF KARNATAKA  & ORS.                         Respondent(s)
(LIST THE APPEALS IN THE MONTH OF AUGUST, 2019(R/P 8.2.2019) )
Date : 29-08-2019 These appeals were called on for hearing today.
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.M. JOSEPH
For Appellant(s) Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Shailesh Madiyal, AOR
Mr. Sudhanshu Prakash, Adv.
Mr. Kartik Anand, Adv.
For Respondent(s) Mr. Jayant Bhushan, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Aman Lekhi, Adv.
Vamshi Chendarellu, Adv.
Mr. Sudhir Naagar, AOR
Mr. V. N. Raghupathy, AOR
Mr. Md. Afzal Ansari, Adv.
Mr. Mandndra Pal Gupta, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
The appeals are dismissed in terms of the signed reportable
judgment leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
(GULSHAN KUMAR ARORA)                           (ANITA RANI AHUJA)
COURT MASTER                                  COURT MASTER
(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file) 

when remand occurs - failure of complete examination of evidence and documents =When 6 witnesses were examined and number of dcouments were marked - High court by merely examaining Ex.D14 and D10 came to conclusion that the case of the plaintiff is not correct and dismissed the suit granted by the trial court = we are of the view that in this case the High Court has not dealt with the appeal in the manner which is contemplated in law. The contentions of the parties and the evidence which has been adduced, be it, oral or documentary has not been discussed. In view of this, interest of justice requires that the impugned judgment be set-aside and the matter be remanded back to the High Court so that the appeal may be heard and decided afresh.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.4422 OF 2008
IRAPPA & ORS.                           Appellant(s)
VERSUS
CHIDANANDAPPA & ORS.   Respondent(s)
O R D E R
This   appeal   is   filed   against   the   judgment   of   the
High   Court   of   Karnataka   in   R.F.A.   No.488   of   2004,   by
which   the   learned   Single   Judge   allowed   the   appeal   filed
by   the   defendants,   in   the   suit,   and   dismissed   the   suit
which has been decreed by the trial Court.
Appellants, who were the plaintiffs in the suit and
respondents   before   the   High   Court,   claimed   that   the   land
was   their   ancestral   property   and   belonged   to   one
Hanumanthappa   s/o   Basayya.   The   genealogy,   on   which   the
appellants claimed their right, is as follows:
Veerappa
(Propositus)
?
           ?                                                                             ?
 Basappa Basayya
     ?                    ?
Nanajappa Hanumanthappa
     ?          ?
  ?     ?          Gangappa
Nagappa    Kotravva (died unmarried and
 issueless)
1

The   brief   facts   according   to   appellants   is   as
follows.   One   Veerappa   was   propositus   of   the   family.   He
had  two   sons,  namely,   Basappa  and   Basayya.  Basappa   had  a
son   know   as   Nanajappa.   Basayya   had   a   son   called
Hanumanthappa.   On   the   death   of   Basayya   his   son
Hanumanthappa became owner of the property. Hanumanthappa
had only one son called Gangappa.  Hanumanthappa also died
about   35   years   ago.   After   his   death,   properties   devolved
to   his   only   son   Gangappa,   who   died   untimely   about   25
years   ago.   His   mother   predeceased   him.   Upon   Gangappa's
death   his   branch   of   the   family   came   to   an   end.   In   other
branch,   under   which   the   appellants   claim,   Basappa   had   a
son   by   name   Nanjappa   and   a   daughter   Kotravva.   Kotravva
was   also   given   in   marriage   to   one   Nagappa   and   she   died
issueless.   The   appellants   are   the   children   of   Nagappa.
After   the   death   of   Gangappa,   4th   plaintiff,   Shivappa
started   cultivating   the   lands.   The   further   case   is   that,
on   the   death   of   Gangappa,   the   plaintiffs   have   succeeded
to the suit properties being Class-II heirs in accordance
with   Hindu   Succession   Act   and   became   the   owners.   There
are   other   allegations   with   which   we   are   not   concerned
having   regard   to   the   course   we   intend   to   adopt   in   this
case.
2

Apparently,   the   respondents,   who   are   defendants   in
the   suit,   on   the   other   hand   denied   the   title   of   the
appellants.   It   is   their   case   that   Hanumanthappa   s/o
Basappa   alias   Basayya   has   expired   and   he   has   brothers
called as Basappa, Bhimappa and a sister Basamma. Basamma
is not alive. Hanumanthappa s/o Basappa alias Basayya has
children   named   as   (1)   Channabasappa,   (2)   Gangamma,   (3)
Mahalingappa   and   (4)   Gowramma.   Channabasappa,   Gangamma
and   Mahalingappa   had   expired.   Among   them   Channabasappa
had   children   named   (1)   Revakka,   (2)   Chennamma,   (3)
Rudramma,   (4)   Chidanandappa,   (5)   Chennaveereppa   and   (6)
Kalaveerappa.  Chennamma's   husband  is   stated  to   be  the   2 nd
plaintiff.   In   short,   the   case   appears   to   be   that   apart
from   Gangappa   s/o   Hanumanthappa   there   were   other
children. Thus on the death of Gangappa it is not, as if,
the   plaintiffs   could   claim   any   right   as   Clause-II   heirs
under the Hindu Succession Act. 
On   the   side   of   plaintiffs,   the   first   plaintiff   was
got   examined   as   PW1.   Besides   PW2   and   PW3   were   also
examined.   Documents   were   marked   as   Ex.P1   to   Ex.P23.   On
the   side   of   defendants,   first   defendant   was   examined   as
DW1.   DW2   and   DW3   were   also   examined   and   the   defendants
got marked as Exs.D1 to D30.
3

On   a   consideration   of   evidence,   trial   Court   found
that   plaintiffs   have   made   out   a   case   for   decreeing   the
suit.   Accordingly,   it   was   declared   that   the   plaintiffs
were   the   absolute   owners   of   the   suit   schedule   property.
It is ordered that they are in possession and cultivation
of   the   suit   properties   and   a   permanent   injunction   is
hereby   passed   restraining   any   person   from   interfering
with   peaceful   possession   and   cultivation   of   the   suit
schedule properties by the plaintiffs.
In the impugned judgment, the High Court holds inter
alia as follows: 
"The   defendants   in   evidence,   have   marked
Ex.D14-Gift   Deed   executed   by   Hanumanthappa   who
is   none   other   than   the   cousin   brother   of
Nanjappa.   The   recitals   of   the   deed   discloses
that Nagappa is their son-in-law and not a son.
The   deed   further   states   that   one   Kotravva   d/o
Nanjappa was married to Nagappa. The issue born
out   of   wedlock,   predeceased   Kotravva   and
Nagappa.   Nagappa   was   totally   devoted   towards
the   welfare   of   Hanumanthappa.   Therefore,   he
gets   another   lady   married   to   Nagappa   and
donates   all   her   properties   to   Nagappa   with   a
hope that he will take care of her welfare and
also   attend   to   her   obsequies   after   her   demise.
The   reading   of   contents   of   Ex.D-14   in   between
lines   disclose   that   Hanumanthappa   and   Nanjappa
had   no   son   by   name   Nagappa.   Nagappa   mentioned
in the deed is only her son-in-law. Ex.D10 is a
partition   deed   executed   between   Chennabasappa
4

and   Mahalingappa   claiming   to   be   the   sons   of
Hanumanthappa.   Ex.D10   is   produced   by   the
plaintiff. The said documents clearly establish
that Hanumanthappa had two sons and in the year
1980,   they   entered   into   partition.   The
contention   that   the   suit   property   is   not   the
subject   matter   of   the   partition   deed   is   beside
the   point.   The   fact   remains   that   by   Ex.D10   it
establishes   that   Hanumanthappa   had   two   sons
namely Chennabasappa and Mahalingappa. However,
Hanumanthappa   dies   leaving   behind   sons   and
daughters.   The   plaintiffs   cannot   under   any
circumstances claim the right of inheritance to
the   property   of   Hanumanthappa.   It   is   pertinent
to   note   that   under   section   8   of   the   Hindu
Succession Act, brothers sons and sisters son
are also categorised as Class II heirs.
The   High   Court   further   notes   the   argument   that
Nagappa   is   the   son   of   Nanjappa   who   is   only   a   cousin   of
Hanumanthappa.   Cousin   and   cousins   children   are   not
entitled   to   any   inheritance   under   Section   8   of   the   Hindu
Succession   Act.   It   is   stated   that   in   that   view   of   the
matter, the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim the title
to   the   property   by   inheritance.   It   is   further   found   that
there   is   no   evidence   produced   by   way   of   land   revenue
records   to   prove   possession   and   cultivation   by   the
plaintiffs. When the suit was instituted, the trial Court
granted   interim   injunction   which   was   later   vacated.   The
plaintiffs   were   not   found   entitled   to   the   relief   of
5

declaration and injunction and the appeal is allowed with
costs throughout and the suit is dismissed.
Heard   learned   counsel   for   the   parties   and   perused
the record.
Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the
judgment   of   the   High   Court   would   reveal   departure   from
the   manner   in   which   the   Court   contemplates   an   appeal
filed   under   Section   96   of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure
should  be   dealt  with.   The  appellate   court  is   to  consider
appeal   by   re-apprising   the   evidence.   In   this   case,   as
many   as   six   witnesses   were   examined,   out   of   which   three
were from the side of the plaintiffs and three were from
the   side   of   the   defendants.   Several   documents   were
marked. 
After   hearing   the   learned   counsel   for   the   parties,
we   are   of   the   view   that   in   this   case   the   High   Court   has
not   dealt   with   the   appeal   in   the   manner   which   is
contemplated   in   law.   The   contentions   of   the   parties   and
the   evidence   which   has   been   adduced,   be   it,   oral   or
documentary   has   not   been   discussed.   In   view   of   this,
interest   of   justice   requires   that   the   impugned   judgment
be set-aside and the matter be remanded back to the High
Court so that the appeal may be heard and decided afresh.
Accordingly,   we   allow   the   appeal,   set-aside   the   judgment
6

of the High Court and we request the High Court that the
appeal be decided within a period of four months from the
date of production of this order. Parties are directed to
bear their own costs. 
...................J.
(ASHOK BHUSHAN)
...................J.
(K.M. JOSEPH)
New Delhi
January 24, 2019
7

ITEM NO.109               COURT NO.13               SECTION IV-A
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal  No(s).4422/2008
IRAPPA & ORS.                                      Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
CHIDANANDAPPA & ORS.                               Respondent(s)

Date : 24-01-2019 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK BHUSHAN
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.M. JOSEPH
For Appellant(s)
                    Mr. Rajesh Mahale, AOR
Mr. Krutin R. Joshi, Adv.
                 
For Respondent(s)
                    Mr. S. N. Bhat, AOR
Mr. Priyank Jain, Adv.
Mr. D.P. Chaturvedi, Adv.
Mr. Tarun Thakur, Adv.
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
Appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.
Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(ARJUN BISHT)                                   (RENU KAPOOR)
COURT MASTER (SH)                               BRANCH OFFICER
(signed order is placed on the file)
8 

suit for specific performance = Validity of Evidence of Power of Attorney Holder of the Plaintiff = It is an undisputed fact that the suit property stood redeemed from mortgage on 04.07.1989. The appellant sent due intimation by registered post to the respondent on 27.07.1989 and also provided him with a photocopy of the release deed, requiring the respondent to take steps for execution of the sale deed. The respondent by reply dated 02.08.1989 insisted on the no­dues certificate, denying receipt of the release deed. The respondent then gave a power of attorney on 02.11.1989 to PW­1. The witness was naturally unaware of the preceding events and denied receipt of the notice dated 27.07.1989 itself. The witness was therefore also incompetent to deny receipt of photocopy of the release documents by the respondent. It was for the respondent to establish his readiness and willingness for execution of the agreement by entering the witness box and proving his capacity to pay the balance consideration amount. Except for the solitary statement in the plaint no evidence whatsoever was led on behalf of the respondent with regard to the same, if PW­1 was competent to depose with regard to the same because these were facts which had to be personal to the knowledge of the respondent alone. Had the witness even led any documentary evidence on behalf of the respondent, in support of the plea for readiness and willingness on part of the respondent, different considerations may have arisen. The witness also sought to deny any knowledge regarding the cancellation of the agreement on 01.09.1989. Without Declaration - Specific Performance is not maintainable = As could be seen from the prayer sought for in the original suit, the Plaintiff has not sought for declaratory relief to declare the termination of Agreement of Sale as bad in law. In the absence of such prayer by the Plaintiff the original suit filed by him before the trial court for grant of decree for specific performance in respect of the suit schedule property on the basis of Agreement of Sale and consequential relief of decree for permanent injunction is not maintainable in law. Therefore, we have to hold that the relief sought for by the Plaintiff for grant of decree for specific performance of execution of sale deed in respect of the suit schedule property in his favour on the basis of non existing Agreement of Sale is wholly unsustainable in law….” Readiness and willingness can not be inferred - it should be proved by the plaintiff = merely because the respondent may not have been satisfied by the intimation given by the appellant regarding release of the property from mortgage, it cannot be construed as readiness and willingness on part of the respondent and his capacity to perform his obligations under the agreement, particularly when he is stated to have subsequently migrated to America and in which circumstance he executed the power of attorney in favour of PW­1. The relief of specific performance being discretionary in nature, the respondent cannot be held to have established his case for grant of such relief. The conclusions of the High Court, both on aspects of readiness and willingness of the respondent and lack of due intimation by the appellant to the respondent regarding redemption of the mortgage are held to be sunsustainable.

suit for specific performance =  
Validity of Evidence of Power of Attorney Holder of the Plaintiff = It is an undisputed fact that the suit property stood redeemed from mortgage on 04.07.1989. The appellant sent due
intimation by registered post to the respondent on 27.07.1989 and also provided him with a photocopy of the release deed, requiring the respondent to take steps for execution of the sale
deed. The respondent by reply dated 02.08.1989 insisted on the no­dues   certificate,   denying   receipt   of   the   release   deed. The respondent then gave a power of attorney on 02.11.1989 to PW­1. The witness was naturally unaware of the preceding events and denied receipt of the notice dated 27.07.1989 itself. The witness was therefore also incompetent to deny receipt of photocopy of the   release   documents   by   the   respondent.   It   was   for   the respondent   to   establish   his   readiness   and   willingness   for execution   of   the   agreement   by   entering   the   witness   box   and proving his capacity to pay the balance consideration amount. Except   for   the   solitary   statement   in   the   plaint   no   evidence whatsoever was led on behalf of the respondent with regard to the same, if PW­1 was competent to depose with regard to the same because these were facts which had to be personal to the knowledge of the respondent alone. Had the witness even led any documentary evidence on behalf of the respondent, in support of the plea for readiness and willingness on part of the respondent, different   considerations   may   have   arisen.   The   witness   also sought to deny any knowledge regarding the cancellation of the agreement on 01.09.1989. 
Without Declaration - Specific Performance is not maintainable  =
 As could be seen from the prayer sought for in the original suit, the Plaintiff has not
sought   for   declaratory   relief   to   declare   the termination of Agreement of Sale as bad in law. In the absence of such prayer by the Plaintiff the original suit filed by him before the trial
court   for   grant   of   decree   for   specific performance   in   respect   of   the   suit   schedule
property on the basis of Agreement of Sale and consequential   relief   of   decree   for   permanent injunction is not maintainable in law. Therefore, we have to hold that the relief sought for by the Plaintiff for grant of decree for specific performance of execution of sale deed in respect of the suit schedule property in his   favour   on   the   basis   of   non   existing Agreement of Sale is wholly unsustainable in law….” 
Readiness and willingness can not be inferred from in action of the defendant - it should be pleaded and  proved by the plaintiff =                                                                                                 merely because the respondent may not have been satisfied by the intimation given
by the appellant regarding release of the property from mortgage, it cannot be construed as readiness and willingness on part of the respondent and his capacity to perform his obligations under the   agreement,   particularly   when   he   is   stated   to   have subsequently migrated to America and in which circumstance he executed the power of attorney in favour of PW­1. The relief of specific   performance   being   discretionary   in   nature,   the respondent cannot be held to have established his case for grant of such relief. 
The conclusions of the High Court, both on aspects of readiness and willingness of the respondent and lack of due intimation   by   the   appellant   to   the   respondent   regarding redemption of the mortgage are held to be sunsustainable.   

NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 2869­2870 OF 2010
MOHINDER KAUR ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SANT PAUL SINGH      ...RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
NAVIN SINHA, J.
The defendant is in appeal, aggrieved by the concurrent
findings decreeing the suit for specific performance filed by the
respondent.
2. An   agreement   for  sale  with  regard  to  House  no.3343/3,
situated   in   Rupnagar   Municipality   was   executed   between   the
parties   on   16.03.1988   for   an   agreed   consideration   of
Rs.1,50,000/­.  At the time of execution, a sum of Rs.15,000/­
was paid. As the suit property stood mortgaged to the education
department, a further agreement dated 20.06.1988 was executed
between the parties, that the sale deed would be executed within
1
15 days of the defendant obtaining release of the property from
mortgage, giving due intimation to the plaintiff.  A further sum of
Rs.53,000/­ and cash of Rs.2,000/­ was paid to the defendant.
The appellant after redemption of the mortgage, intimated the
respondent on 27.07.1989 in accordance with the agreement,
requiring payment of balance consideration and execution of the
sale   deed.   The   respondent   disputed   the   redemption   requiring
proof of the same. The appellant, after due notice cancelled the
agreement   for   sale   on   01.09.1989   and   forfeited   the   earnest
money. The plaintiff then filed the instant suit seeking specific
performance of the agreement by the defendant. The suit was
decreed   and   the   appeal   preferred   by   the   defendant   was   also
dismissed. The second appeal of the defendant having also been
dismissed, the present appeal has been lodged before this Court.
3. Shri Neeraj Kumar Jain, learned senior counsel appearing
for the appellant, submitted that indisputably due intimation was
given to the respondent after redemption of the mortgage, as
required under the agreement. The respondent raised frivolous
objections and failed to perform its obligations by payment of the
2
balance consideration amount and to take steps for execution of
the   sale   deed.   The   appellant,   after   due   notice   cancelled   the
agreement and confiscated the amount paid, for lapses of the
respondent.   Relying   on  I.S.   Sikandar   (D)   by   L.Rs.     vs.   K.
Subramani and Ors., (2013) 15 SCC 27, it was submitted that
the suit for specific performance simpliciter was not maintainable
in absence of any challenge to the cancellation of the agreement,
and   seeking   consequential   declaratory   relief.   It   was   next
submitted that the respondent did not enter the witness box to
establish his readiness and willingness to perform his obligations
under the agreement for sale. PW­1 was a power of attorney
holder from the respondent by execution on 02.11.1989. She was
not competent to depose with regard to events prior to the same,
especially with regard to facts personal to the knowledge of the
respondent. Reliance was placed on  Janki  Vashdeo  Bhojwani
and Ors. vs. Indusind Bank Ltd. and Ors., (2005) 2 SCC 217.
Mere bald assertions in the plaint, were not sufficient, in absence
of any evidence to establish readiness and willingness. Relaince
was placed on  Vijay  Kumar  and  Ors.  vs.  Om  Parkash,  2018
(15) SCALE 65. 
3
4. Shri   Vineet   Bhagat,   learned   counsel   for   the   respondent,
submitted   that   the   appellant   did   not   give   proper   intimation
regarding the redemption from mortgage of the suit property. The
respondent   was   always   ready   and   willing   to   perform   his
obligations   under   the   agreement,   but   was   hindered   by   the
conduct   of   the   appellant   in   not   placing   correct   and   relevant
information in accordance with the agreement.
5. We   have   considered   the   submissions   on   behalf   of   the
parties.   It is an undisputed fact that the suit property stood
redeemed from mortgage on 04.07.1989. The appellant sent due
intimation by registered post to the respondent on 27.07.1989
and also provided him with a photocopy of the release deed,
requiring the respondent to take steps for execution of the sale
deed. The respondent by reply dated 02.08.1989 insisted on the
no­dues   certificate,   denying   receipt   of   the   release   deed.   The
respondent then gave a power of attorney on 02.11.1989 to PW­1.
The witness was naturally unaware of the preceding events and
denied receipt of the notice dated 27.07.1989 itself. The witness
4
was therefore also incompetent to deny receipt of photocopy of
the   release   documents   by   the   respondent.   It   was   for   the
respondent   to   establish   his   readiness   and   willingness   for
execution   of   the   agreement   by   entering   the   witness   box   and
proving his capacity to pay the balance consideration amount.
Except   for   the   solitary   statement   in   the   plaint   no   evidence
whatsoever was led on behalf of the respondent with regard to
the same, if PW­1 was competent to depose with regard to the
same because these were facts which had to be personal to the
knowledge of the respondent alone. Had the witness even led any
documentary evidence on behalf of the respondent, in support of
the plea for readiness and willingness on part of the respondent,
different   considerations   may   have   arisen.   The   witness   also
sought to deny any knowledge regarding the cancellation of the
agreement on 01.09.1989. 
6. In  Janki   Vashdeo  (supra), it was held that  a power of
attorney holder, who has acted in pursuance of the said power,
may depose on behalf of the principal in respect of such acts but
cannot depose for the principal for the acts done by the principal
5
and not by the power of attorney holder.  Likewise, the power of
attorney holder cannot   depose  for  the  principal  in   respect  of
matters   of   which   the   principal   alone   can   have   personal
knowledge and in respect of which the principal is entitled to be
cross­examined.  In our opinion, the failure of the respondent to
appear in the witness box can well be considered to raise an
adverse presumption against him as further observed therein as
follows :
“15.   Apart   from   what   has   been   stated,   this
Court in the case of  Vidhyadhar  v.  Manikrao
observed at SCC pp. 583­84, para 17 that:
“17. Where a party to the suit does not
appear in the witness box and states his
own   case   on   oath   and   does   not   offer
himself to be cross­examined by the other
side, a presumption would arise that the
case set up by him is not correct….”
7. The   agreement   was   cancelled   by   the   appellant   on
01.09.1989 and the consideration already paid confiscated under
intimation to the respondent. The respondent never challenged
the communication of cancellation. In  Sikandar  (supra) it was
observed as follows:
“37. As could be seen from the prayer sought
for in the original suit, the Plaintiff has not
6
sought   for   declaratory   relief   to   declare   the
termination of Agreement of Sale as bad in law.
In the absence of such prayer by the Plaintiff
the original suit filed by him before the trial
court   for   grant   of   decree   for   specific
performance   in   respect   of   the   suit   schedule
property on the basis of Agreement of Sale and
consequential   relief   of   decree   for   permanent
injunction is not maintainable in law.
38. Therefore, we have to hold that the relief
sought for by the Plaintiff for grant of decree
for specific performance of execution of sale
deed in respect of the suit schedule property in
his   favour   on   the   basis   of   non   existing
Agreement of Sale is wholly unsustainable in
law….” 
8. We are of the considered opinion that merely because the
respondent may not have been satisfied by the intimation given
by the appellant regarding release of the property from mortgage,
it cannot be construed as readiness and willingness on part of
the respondent and his capacity to perform his obligations under
the   agreement,   particularly   when   he   is   stated   to   have
subsequently migrated to America and in which circumstance he
executed the power of attorney in favour of PW­1. The relief of
specific   performance   being   discretionary   in   nature,   the
respondent cannot be held to have established his case for grant
of such relief. The conclusions of the High Court, both on aspects
7
of readiness and willingness of the respondent and lack of due
intimation   by   the   appellant   to   the   respondent   regarding
redemption of the mortgage are held to be unsustainable. 
9. We are therefore unable to sustain the impugned orders
under appeal which are accordingly set aside.  The appeals are
allowed.
…………...................J.
[NAVIN SINHA]
…………...................J.
[INDIRA BANERJEE]
NEW DELHI
OCTOBER 01, 2019
8