the plea of insanity under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short ‘the IPC’).= Another factor which goes against the appellant accused is that he himself was examined as a defence witness No.3. According to learned trial Judge, as a witness, he made his statement clearly and cogently and it was also observed that he was meticulously following the court proceedings, acting suitably when the records were furnished for perusal. The trial Judge has also pointed out that during the entire proceedings, the accused has nowhere stated that he was insane earlier to the date of incident. The trial Judge, after noting his answers in respect of the questions under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has concluded that the accused could not be termed as an “insane” person. - there is no evidence as to the unsoundness of mind of the appellant-accused at the time of the occurrence, namely, on 05.11.2001 and also taking note of the fact that the accused failed to discharge the burden as stated in Section 105 of the Evidence Act, we fully agree with the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court and affirmed by the High Court.

Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 926 OF 2009
Mariappan .... Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Tamil Nadu .... Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
P.Sathasivam, J.
1) This appeal has been filed against the final judgment
and order dated 17.10.2006 passed by the Madurai Bench of
the Madras High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1556 of 2003,
whereby the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the
appellant herein and confirmed the order dated 29.08.2003
passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast
Track Court No. IV), Madurai at Periakulam in S.C. No. 390 of
2002.
1Page 2
2) Brief facts
a) The case on hand relates to the death of a woman in
her house over a land dispute by the appellant-accused,
claiming the plea of insanity under Section 84 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (in short ‘the IPC’). Parvathi @ Kili (the
deceased), her husband Parasivam Chettiar (PW-6) and their
grand daughters viz., Chellakili (PW-1) and Parmala (PW-2)
were living together at Ammapatti village. The deceased
was the paternal aunt of the appellant-accused.
b) There was a dispute between the family of the
appellant-accused and the deceased over a portion of land
belonging to one Chinnamanur Pillayar Kovil, which was
taken on lease by PW-6 through one Chinnamanur Karuvaya
Pillai. The family of the appellant-accused claimed that the
said land was only leased out to them. When the family of
the appellant-accused demanded to handover the disputed
land, PW-6, in turn, after the death of the said Chinnamanur
Karuvaya Pillai, handed over the land to one Karuppaya Pillai
(PW-11), son of Karuvaya Pillai which resulted in strained
2Page 3
relationship between both the families as the appellantaccused was demanding money for the same.
c) One day prior to the date of occurrence, i.e., on
04.11.2001, when PWs 1 and 2 were also at home, the
appellant-accused came to the house of the deceased and
questioned about the whereabouts of PW-6 and also told her
that they have taken their land and money and threatened
to kill them. At that time, PW-5, brother-in-law of PW-6 came
there and pacified the appellant-accused. Thereafter, the
appellant-accused left the place by saying that he would
come again tomorrow and warned that if the money is not
paid, he would kill her and her husband.
d) On 05.11.2001, at 8.00 a.m., while the deceased was in
the kitchen, the appellant-accused entered into the house
and closed the door from inside. When PWs 1 & 2 asked
about the conduct of the appellant-accused, he said that if
the deceased and her husband are not paying his money, he
is going to kill them and went to the kitchen. Thereafter, the
appellant-accused pulled the tuft of the deceased in his left
hand and gave a cut on her neck with Aruval and when she
3Page 4
warded off with her right hand, it resulted into injuries to her
fingers. At that time, PWs 1 & 2 requested the accused to
leave her. Again, the accused caught hold of the tuft of her
in his left hand and gave repeated Aruval blows on her head
as a result of which she died instantaneously. Thereafter,
the accused left the place with Aruval in his hand and after
opening the door he said that he is going to kill PW-6 also.
On raising hue and cry by PWs 1 & 2, the neighbors came
there. PW-1 along with PW-5 went to the Uthamapalayam
Police Station and after recording the statement given by
PW-1 the sub-Inspector of Police (PW-16) registered a case
being Crime No. 386 of 2001 for the offence punishable
under Section 302 of the IPC. On the same day, at 4.30 p.m.,
the appellant-accused was arrested and the dead body was
also sent for post mortem. After completion of the
investigation, a charge sheet was filed and the case was
committed to the Court of Additional District and Sessions
Judge, (Fast Track Court No. IV) Madurai at Periakulam and
numbered as Sessions Case No. 390/2002.
4Page 5
e) The Additional District and Sessions Judge, by order
dated 29.08.2003, convicted the appellant-accused under
Sections 449 and 302 of IPC and sentenced him to undergo
RI for 5 years under Section 449 of IPC along with a fine of
Rs.5,000/-, in default, to further undergo RI for 1 (one) year
and to undergo RI for life for the offence under Section 302
of IPC alongwith a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default, to further
undergo RI for 5 years.
f) Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant filed an
appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 1556 of 2003 before the
Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court. By impugned
judgment dated 17.10.2006, the High Court dismissed the
appeal and confirmed the order dated 29.08.2003 passed by
the Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court
No. IV), Madurai.
g) Against the said order, the appellant-accused has filed
this appeal by way of special leave petition.
5Page 6
3) Heard Mr. Anil Shrivastav, learned counsel for the
appellant and Mr. M. Yogesh Khanna, learned counsel for the
respondent-State.
4) The one and only contention projected by learned
counsel for the appellant-accused is that at the time of the
alleged incident, the accused was suffering from “Paranoid
Schizophrenia” and, hence, he is entitled to the benefit of
exception under Section 84 of IPC.
Discussion:
5) Before considering the above issue, it is to be noted
that whether the prosecution has established the guilt
against the accused by examining PWs 1 and 2, the grand
daughters of the deceased Parvathi, as eye-witnesses. It is
the evidence of PW-6 – husband of the deceased that one
day before the date of incident, when PWs 1 and 2 were at
home along with his wife-Parvathi, the appellant-accused
came to their house and demanded money and also
threatened her before leaving the place that he would come
again tomorrow and if money is not paid, he would kill both
6Page 7
the deceased and her husband PW-6. It is also stated by
PWs 1 and 2 that on the next day, at 8.00 a.m., when the
deceased was cooking food in the kitchen, the accused
trespassed into the house, bolted the door from inside and,
thereafter, caused fatal injuries to the deceased with the
Aruval. It is further stated that on raising hue and cry, PWs 3
and 4, the neighbours, came at the spot and saw the
accused running from the house with aruval.
6) The evidence of PWs 3 and 5-the neighbours, proves
the occurrence that had happened one day prior to the date
of the incident and also the shoutings of the accusedappellant threatening and demanding money. PW-6 has also
explained in his evidence about the dispute relating to the
lease of the temple land through one Chinnamanur Kuruvaya
Pillai and handing over the said land to PW-11, son of the
said Chinnamanur Kuruvaya Pillai. According to PW-6,
because of the said land, there were strained relationship
between the two families for more than 10 years and the
appellant-accused used to quarrel with him and his wife as
7Page 8
to how the land leased out to their family could be handed
over to PW-11 and was demanding money for the same.
7) The evidence of PWs 1 and 2 – the eye-witnesses, the
evidence of PWs 3 and 4, who saw the accused running after
the occurrence with Aruval (M.O.1) and the recovery of the
weapon at the instance of the accused which was found to
be stained with human blood of “O” group, as per the
serologist report (Ex.P.12), tallied with the blood group of the
deceased as the clothes of the deceased viz., M.O.s 1 to 4
were also stained with human blood “O” group clearly prove
the case of the prosecution. Further, the medical evidence
through PW-9-the Doctor, who conducted the post mortem
and issued the report (Ex.P-3) strengthened the version of
PWs 1 and 2.
8) From the materials analyzed, discussed and concluded
by the trial Court and the High Court, it clearly establishes
that it was the accused-appellant who committed the
murder.
8Page 9
9) Coming to the only contention put-forward by the
appellant-accused that the accused was suffering from
Paranoid Schizophrenia, learned counsel for the appellant
placed reliance on the evidence of DW-1-the Doctor attached
to Government Rajaji Hosital, Madurai who treated the
accused from 11.07.2001 to 08.08.2001. In his evidence,
DW-1 has stated that the accused was suffering from
Paranoid Schizophrenia. The other material relied on in
support of the plea of insanity is Ex. D-2, the termination
order of the Inspector General of Police, Northern Sector,
CRPF, New Delhi wherein it is stated that the accused is
medically unfit for service in CRPF due to Paranoid
Schizophrenia. It is further contended that the appellant has
also relied on the statement of PW-2, grand-daughter of the
deceased, that the wife of the accused obtained divorce on
the ground that the accused was mentally ill.
10) Since the appellant has raised the plea of insanity
seeking protection under Section 84 of the IPC, it is useful to
refer the same:
9Page 10
“84. Act of a person of unsound mind.- Nothing is an
offence which is done by a person who, at the time of
doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of
knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is
either wrong or contrary to law.”
The above section makes it clear that a person, who, at the
time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind,
commits anything, he is permitted to claim the above
exception. (emphasis supplied). In other words, insanity or
unsoundness of mind are the stages when a person is
incapable of knowing the nature of the act or unable to
understand what is wrong or right and must relate to the
period in which the offence has been committed.
11) It is also useful to refer Section 105 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 which reads as under:
“105. Burden of proving that case of accused comes
within exceptions.- When a person is accused of any
offence, the burden of proving the existence of
circumstances bringing the case within any of the General
Exceptions in the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860), or within
any special exception or proviso contained in any other
part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence,
is upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of
such circumstances.”
Though the burden of proving an offence is always on the
prosecution and never shifts, however, the existence of
10Page 11
circumstances bringing the case within the exception under
Section 84 IPC lies on the accused.
12) With these provisions, let us examine whether at the
time of the incident, the accused was suffering from
unsoundness of mind, i.e., on 05.11.2001.
13) Learned counsel for the appellant-accused heavily
relied on the decision of this Court in Shrikant Anandrao
Bhosale vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 7 SCC 748
wherein this Court considered the similar issue. A reference
made from Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology,
22nd Edition, as quoted in paras 10 and 11 are relevant,
which reads thus:
“10. What is paranoid schizophrenia, when it starts, what
are its characteristics and dangers flowing from this
ailment? Paranoid schizophrenia, in the vast majority of
cases, starts in the fourth decade and develops insidiously.
Suspiciousness is the characteristic symptom of the early
stage. Ideas of reference occur, which gradually develop
into delusions of persecution. Auditory hallucinations
follow, which in the beginning, start as sounds or noises in
the ears, but afterwards change into abuses or insults.
Delusions are at first indefinite, but gradually they become
fixed and definite, to lead the patient to believe that he is
persecuted by some unknown person or some superhuman
agency. He believes that his food is being poisoned, some
noxious gases are blown into his room and people are
plotting against him to ruin him. Disturbances of general
11Page 12
sensation give rise to hallucinations, which are attributed
to the effects of hypnotism, electricity, wireless telegraphy
or atomic agencies. The patient gets very irritated and
excited owing to these painful and disagreeable
hallucinations and delusions. Since so many people are
against him and are interested in his ruin, he comes to
believe that he must be a very important man. The nature
of delusions thus may change from persecutory to the
grandiose type. He entertains delusions of grandeur, power
and wealth, and generally conducts himself in a haughty
and overbearing manner. The patient usually retains his
memory and orientation and does not show signs of
insanity, until the conversation is directed to the particular
type of delusion from which he is suffering. When delusions
affect his behaviour, he is often a source of danger to
himself and to others. (Modi's Medical Jurisprudence and
Toxicology, 22nd Edn.)
11. Further, according to Modi, the cause of schizophrenia
is still not known but heredity plays a part. The irritation
and excitement are effects of illness. On delusion affecting
the behaviour of a patient, he is a source of danger to
himself and to others.”
14) It is useful to refer the decision relied on by learned
counsel for the State i.e. Sudhakaran vs. State of Kerala,
(2010) 10 SCC 582. The facts in that case are identical to
the case on hand. Here again, this Court referred to Modi’s
Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 23rd Edition about
paranoid schizophrenia. The following statement in paras 26
and 28 are relevant:
“26. The defence of insanity has been well known in the
English legal system for many centuries. In the earlier
times, it was usually advanced as a justification for seeking
pardon. Over a period of time, it was used as a complete
12Page 13
defence to criminal liability in offences involving mens rea.
It is also accepted that insanity in medical terms is
distinguishable from legal insanity. In most cases, in India,
the defence of insanity seems to be pleaded where the
offender is said to be suffering from the disease of
schizophrenia.
28. The medical profession would undoubtedly treat the
appellant herein as a mentally sick person. However, for
the purposes of claiming the benefit of the defence of
insanity in law, the appellant would have to prove that his
cognitive faculties were so impaired, at the time when the
crime was committed, as not to know the nature of the
act.”
15) After adverting to Sections 84 and 299 IPC and
Sections 105 and 101 of the Evidence Act, this Court
concluded that “when a person is bound to prove the
existence of any fact, the burden of proof lies on that
person”. This Court also held as under:
“35. It is also a settled proposition of law that the crucial
point of time for ascertaining the existence of
circumstances bringing the case within the purview of
Section 84 is the time when the offence is committed. We
may notice here the observations made by this Court in
Ratan Lal v. State of M.P. In para 2 of the aforesaid
judgment, it is held as follows:
“It is now well settled that the crucial point of time at
which unsoundness of mind should be established is
the time when the crime is actually committed and
the burden of proving this lies on the [appellant].”
13Page 14
As concluded, we also reiterate that at the time of
commission of offence, the physical and mental condition of
the person concerned is paramount for bringing the case
within the purview of Section 84.
16) In the case on hand, though the Doctor (DW-1)
attached with the Government Rajaji Hospital, Madurai, who
treated the accused from 11.07.2001 to 08.08.2001 has
stated that the appellant-accused was suffering from
paranoid schizophrenia, it is not in dispute that after
08.08.2001, there is no material or information on record
that he was suffering from the same. It is relevant to
mention that the date of occurrence was 05.11.2001 i.e.
nearly after three months of the treatment by DW-1. In the
same way, Ex. D-2, the termination order of the Inspector
General of Police, Northern Sector, CRPF, New Delhi is also
not helpful because of the language used in Section 84 of
IPC. As a matter of fact, DW-2, father of the accusedappellant has not stated anything about the behaviour of the
deceased. He has also not stated anything that he is a
mentally ill person and not able to do his routine works
14Page 15
properly. In fact, it was brought to our notice that in Ex. D-2,
which is a letter from the Department, it is seen that the
appellant-accused made a written request for rejoining
stating improvement in his health.
17) It is also relevant to note that the appellant came to the
house one day prior to the occurrence, demanded money
and threatened the deceased of grave consequences and on
the next day, when the demand was not fulfilled, he
trespassed into the house, pushed away PWs 1 and 2, bolted
the door from inside and inflicted repeated aruval blows on
the deceased resulted into her death. All these aspects also
show that at the relevant time, he was not insane as claimed
by him. 
18) Another factor which goes against the appellant accused is that
 he himself was examined as a defence
witness No.3. According to learned trial Judge, as a witness,
he made his statement clearly and cogently and it was also
observed that he was meticulously following the court
proceedings, acting suitably when the records were
15Page 16
furnished for perusal. 
The trial Judge has also pointed out
that during the entire proceedings, the accused has nowhere
stated that he was insane earlier to the date of incident. 
The
trial Judge, after noting his answers in respect of the
questions under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 has concluded that the accused could not
be termed as an “insane” person. 
19) In the light of the above discussion and in view of the
materials placed and the decision arrived at by the trial
Court and of the fact that
there is no evidence as to the
unsoundness of mind of the appellant-accused at the time of
the occurrence, namely, on 05.11.2001 and also taking note
of the fact that the accused failed to discharge the burden as
stated in Section 105 of the Evidence Act, we fully agree
with the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court and affirmed
by the High Court. 
20) Consequently, the appeal fails and the same is
dismissed.
16Page 17
………….…………………………J.
(P. SATHASIVAM)
 ………….…………………………J.
(M.Y. EQBAL)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 18, 2013.
17

Order VI Rule 16 ,17CPC= whether the defendants can withdraw the admission made in the written statement and finally came to the conclusion that the defendant-appellants cannot be allowed to resile from the admission made in the written statement by taking recourse to Order VIII Rule 9 or Order VI Rule 16 CPC by seeking to file a fresh written statement. In the aforesaid premises, filing of a fresh petition by the defendants under Order VI Rule 17 CPC after about 13 years when the hearing of the suit had already commenced and some of the witnesses were examined, is wholly misconceived. The High Court in the impugned order has rightly held that filing of subsequent application for the same relief is an abuse of the process of the court. As noticed above, the relief sought for by the defendants in a subsequent petition under Order VI Rule 17 CPC was elaborately dealt with on the two earlier petitions filed by the defendant-appellants under Order VI Rule 16 and Order VIII Rule 9 CPC and, therefore, the subsequent petition filed by the defendants labelling the petition under Order VI Rule 17 CPC is wholly misconceived and was not entertainable. 25. After giving our full consideration on the matter, we do not find any error in the impugned order passed by the High Court. Hence, these appeals have no merit and are accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.

Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3914 OF 2013
[Arising out of SLP (C) No.12497 of 2008]
S. Malla Reddy … Appellant(s)
vs.
M/s. Future Builders Co-operative Housing
Society & Ors. … Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3916 OF 2013
[Arising out of SLP (C) No.17029 of 2009]
Jai Lakshmi … Appellant(s)
vs.
M/s Future Builders Co-operative
Housing Society & Ors. … Respondent(s)
AND
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3915 OF 2013
[Arising out of SLP (C) No.28828 of 2008]
Raghava Reddy & Anr. … Appellant(s)
vs.
M/s Future Builders Co-operative
Housing Society & Ors. … Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
M.Y. EQBAL, J.Page 2
Leave granted.
2. The defendants (appellants herein) have assailed the
common order dated 28.12.2007 passed by a learned Judge of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court, whereby the Revision Petitions filed by
the plaintiff-respondent (M/s Future Builders Coop Society) under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India have been allowed and the
order passed by the trial court allowing amendment in the written statement has been set aside.
3. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass.
4. The plaintiff-respondent M/s. Future Builders Co-op.
Housing Society (in short “the plaintiff Society”) filed a suit against the
defendant-appellants for declaration of title in respect of the property
mentioned in the schedule of the plaint (in short “the suit property”)
and for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from
interfering with possession. The case of the plaintiff-Society is that
the Society is a registered Society under the Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act with the object to acquire or purchase land for
the benefit of its members and render it fit for habitation.
The Society
was founded by several promoters including the first defendant-S.
Malla Reddy (appellant herein). The plaintiff’s further case is that for
the purpose of registration under Co-operative Societies Act, it was
necessary to show to the Registrar that they have entered into an
agreement for purchase of land for the benefit of its members.
It was
2Page 3
alleged that before the Society was registered, its promoters identified
the suit land as fit for the purpose and negotiated with the owner and
entrusted the work to the first defendant for effecting purchase after
measurement and a sum of Rs. 10,000/- was paid to him.
The first
defendant alleged to have executed an agreement on 8.3.1978 in
favour of the Chief Promoter of the Society, inter alia, agreeing that
the first defendant will get the land measured and obtain legal opinion
and pay the money to the land owner. It was agreed that the sale
deed would be obtained in the name of the first defendant and a patta
would be got transferred in his name or of his nominee for the benefit
of the Society. The Society was registered on 28.08.1981 and
defendant No.1 having obtained a Sale Deed dated 02.01.1979 and
transfer of patta in the name of himself and defendant Nos. 2 to 4
(appellants herein), who are his wife and sons in respect of the suit
property, had delivered possession to the Society and they further
agreed to secure the patta in the name of the plaintiff-Society. A
Memorandum of Agreement dated 16.09.1981 was also executed to
the effect that the plaintiff would hold the land as owner. It was
alleged by the plaintiff-Society that the defendants, in spite of several
requests and demands, were postponing the transfer of patta in
respect of the suit property in its name on one pretext or the other.
Hence, suit.
3Page 4
5. On being summoned, the defendants appeared and filed a
joint written statement on 19.01.1995 admitting the claim of the
plaintiff stating that after filing of the suit there was a mediation
wherein the dispute was settled and, accordingly, a sum of Rs.
1,00,000/- was paid to them and they were then willing to transfer the
patta in respect of the suit property in favour of the plaintiff who had
already acquired title. The defendants, therefore, prayed to the court
to decree the suit.
6. Controversy started when the defendants after filing of the
written statement and admitting the claim of the plaintiff filed a
petition being I.A. No.2217 of 1995, later renumbered as I.A. No.162 of
2000, seeking permission to change their advocates on the ground
that they were acting detrimental to their interest by filing written
statement contrary to the instructions. The said petition was objected
by the plaintiff. The trial court by order dated 07.02.2000 permitted
the defendants to change their advocates without prejudice to the
rights of the parties. Thereafter, defendants filed another petition
under Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) being I.A.
No.415 of 2000 on 28.02.2000 seeking leave of the court to strike out
the pleadings in the written statement or to expunge the written
statement and to permit them to file a detailed written statement. It
was alleged that the written statement filed earlier was in collusion
with the plaintiff contrary to the instructions given by them to their
4Page 5
advocate. Another petition was filed by the defendants being I.A.
No.416 of 2000 under Order VIII Rule 9 and Order VI Rule 5 of CPC
seeking leave of the court to permit them to file a detailed written
statement. Some more developments took place during the pendency
of those petitions. The youngest son of the first defendant filed a
petition being l.A. 1819 of 2000 seeking leave of the court to implead
him as party to those two interlocutory petitions which was, however,
allowed and the said son was brought on record.
7. The trial court after hearing the parties dismissed both the
petitions being I.A. Nos.415 and 416 of 2000 by common order dated
04.01.2002. The defendant- appellants challenged the said order by
filing Civil Revisions in the High Court being CRP Nos.502 and 505
which were ultimately dismissed on 18.09.2002. The defendantappellants then filed review petition being Review CMP No. 2102 of
2003 which was also dismissed on 25.06.2003. The defendants then
preferred appeals to this Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 7940 to 7942 of
2004 which were also dismissed on 15.03.2007.
8. After the defendants lost the claim upto this Court and
their prayer was refused, a fresh petition under Order VI Rule 17 CPC
was filed seeking leave of the Court to amend the written statement.
The said application was registered as I.A. SR No. 593 of 2007. The
trial court rejected the said application by a non-speaking order. The
order was challenged in the High Court in Revision which was disposed
5Page 6
of with the directions to the trial court to register the application and
dispose of the same by passing a reasoned order. The trial court in
compliance of the aforesaid directions finally heard the amendment
petition and by order dated 27.09.2007 allowed the petition
permitting the defendants to amend the written statement.
9. The plaintiff-Society challenged the aforesaid order
allowing amendment of the written statement by filing revision
petitions before the High Court. The said revision petitions filed by
the plaintiff-Society under Article 227 were heard at length and finally
those petitions were allowed by the High Court vide order dated
28.12.2007 and the order of the trial court allowing amendment of the
written statement was set aside. Hence, these appeals by special
leave filed by the defendant-appellants.
10. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties. Mr. Dushyant A. Dave, Senior Advocate and Mr. Huzefa A.
Ahmadi, Senior Advocate appearing for the defendant-appellants drew
our attention to various decisions of this Court for the proposition that
the admission made in the written statement can be withdrawn and
inconsistent plea can be taken in the written statement. Learned
counsel also tried to impress us that the order passed on the petition
under Order VI Rule 16 and Order VIII Rule 9 will not operate as res
judicata on the subsequent application filed under Order VI Rule 17 of
CPC. Learned counsel submitted that the High Court has not correctly
6Page 7
appreciated the settled principle of law and has passed the impugned
order without considering the entire gamut of the case.
11. On the other hand, Mr. L. Nageswara Rao, learned Senior
Advocate appearing for the plaintiff-Society (respondent herein) firstly
contended that the application for amendment is liable to be rejected
on the sole ground that it was filed 13 years after the institution of the
suit and that too when the trial of the suit had begun and the
plaintiff’s witness was cross- examined. Mr. Rao contended that the
disruptive plea cannot be allowed to be taken by way of amendment
in the written statement. According to the learned counsel, the
ground taken by the defendants for amending the written statement
has already been discussed in the earlier petition filed under Order VI
Rule 16 and that under Order VIII Rule 9 and Order VI Rule 5 CPC. The
said applications were rejected by the trial court and the order was
affirmed by this Court also.
12. Before appreciating the rival contentions, we would like to
first reproduce the written statement filed by the defendantappellants in the suit. The written statement contains of only four
paragraphs, which are as under:-
“WRITTEN STATEMENT FILED UNDER ORDER 8 RULE 1
CVIL PROCEDURE CODE by Defendants 1 to 4
1. The first defendant was entrusted with the work of
purchase of the land for the Plaintiff’s Society before
its incorporation. Since there was delay in the
registration and incorporation of the Society, the suit
land was purchased in the name of the First
7Page 8
Defendant who is also one of the Promoters from Sri
Mohammad Sarvar and others and the patta was
transferred in the name of these defendants. These
defendants held it for the benefit of the plaintiffs and
after the Society was incorporated on 28.8.2001,
delivered the land to the plaintiff and also executed a
Memorandum dated 16.9.1981 which was ratified by
the Plaintiff Society.
2. One of the terms of the Memorandum was that
the plaintiff agreed to pay the expenses incurred by
the defendants for the development and protection of
the land. Since the plaintiff postponed the settlement
of accounts, these defendants did not apply for
transfer of patta in favour of the plaintiff.
3. After the suit is filed there is mediation and
settlement and a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one
lakhs only) is paid as full quid to these defendants and
these defendants are willing to transfer of the patta in
favour of the plaintiff who has already acquired the
title as stated in the plaint.
4. Hence the suit may be decreed as prayed for
but without costs.
Defendants
1.
2.
3.
4.
Counsel for the Defendants 1 to 4
Verification
The facts stated above are true to the best of our
knowledge, belief and information.”
13. From bare perusal of the written statement, it is
manifestly clear that the defendant-appellants categorically admitted
not only the case of the plaintiff but also acknowledged receipt of Rs.
1,00,000/- and their willingness for transfer of patta in favour of the
8Page 9
plaintiff. The defendants, on the basis of such admission, prayed to
the court that the suit be decreed but without any costs.
14. As noticed above, the defendant-appellants filed
application on 28.02.2000 under Order VI Rule 16 of CPC being I.A. No.
415 of 2000 praying that the earlier written statement be struck out
since the same was against their interests. Another application being
I.A.No.416 of 2000 under Order VIII Rule 9 CPC was filed praying that
the defendants may be permitted to file detailed written statement in
the suit since the earlier written statement filed by them was against
their interests. Both applications were taken up together by the trial
court and disposed of by common order dated 04.01.2002. The trial
court while rejecting the aforementioned two applications held that
the defendant-appellants cannot be allowed to substitute their written
statement in the suit whereunder there was an admission of the claim
of the plaintiff-Society. While rejecting the applications, the trial court
elaborately discussed the facts of the case and considered the
arguments advanced by the lawyers as also the decisions relied upon
by them with regard to withdrawal of admission by filing fresh written
statement.
15. At this stage, we must mention that even before the suit
was instituted by the plaintiff-Society, the defendants had filed a
caveat duly supported by affidavit through the same advocate
wherein the entire claim of the plaintiff-Society was admitted. The
9Page 10
only grievance made in the caveat was that without settlement of the
amount due as agreed under the Memorandum of Agreement, the
plaintiff-Society was trying to lay out the suit land and to dispose of
the same without paying the amount due. The relevant paragraphs of
the trial court order dated 04.01.2002 are quoted hereinbelow (from
pages 165-170 of paper book):
“16. The learned counsel for the petitioner,
referring to the earlier suit litigation between the
defendants and others, contended that there is no
reason for the defendants to admit the suit claim of
the plaintiffs society but for the reasons that fraud
was played upon the defendants in filing their written
statement. The learned counsel for the petitioner
relying upon the decision in BHIKAJI KESHAO JOSHI
AND ANOTHER vs. BRIJLAL NANDLAL BIYANI and
OTHERS (AIR 1955 SC 610) contended that the Court
can order strike out of the written statement and
permit the defendants to file substituted written
statement with specific pleadings. In the said
decision, the petitioner in the said election petition
made vague allegations of corrupt practices of the
respondent and in the said circumstances it was found
that the court can exercise its powers and call for
better particulars. It is not the case of the petitioners
– defendants herein that their written statement
pleadings are vague and that therefore, to furnish
better particulars the earlier written statement filed
on their behalf may be struck out and they may be
permitted to file a detailed substituted written
statement. In the written statement filed on behalf of
the defendants in the suit OS No.408/94 (OS 1 of 2000
on the file of this court) the defendants had
categorically admitted the entire suit claim and have
further mentioned that they had no objection for the
suit to be decreed. No doubt, it is the contention of
the petitioners that their advocate Sri Sunil Kumar
obtained their signatures on blank paper and that is
contrary to their instructions he prepared the written
statement in collusion with the plaintiff- society
admitting the suit claim for which they had
1Page 11
complained against the said advocate to Bar Council
of Andhra Pradesh. Ex.B.1 is the Xerox certified copy
of caveat number 178/94 on the file of IIIrd Additional
Judge, City Civil Court, against the plaintiff society on
07.07.1994. In the said caveat petition also, the
defendants in the suit admitted the entire claim of the
plaintiff-society but the grievance of the defendants
under that caveat was without settlement of the
amount due as agreed under the memorandum of
agreement, the plaintiff society was trying to lay out
the suit land and to dispose it of without paying his
amount and that, therefore, if any injunction suit is
filed against him with respect to the said property, he
may be given notice. There is no explanation given
by the petitioners herein in these petitions with
respect to the said admission of the defendants herein
in the said caveat petition. In fact, it was pleaded in
the written statement in question by the defendants
that after the suit was filed there was mediation and
sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- was paid to them towards
settlement. No doubt the said caveat petition was
also filed by the same advocate Sri Sunil Kumar but in
the affidavit filed in support of these two petitions, the
1
st defendant did not explain about his admissions in
the said caveat petition with respect to the suit
schedule properties in favour of the plaintiff society.
17. The learned counsel for the 1st
defendant-plaintiff Society relying upon the decisions
in MODI SPINNING AND WEAVING MILLS COMPANY
LIMITED AND ANOTHER VS. M/S LADHA RAM AND
COMPANY (AIR 1977 Supreme Court 680), B.K.
NARAYANA PILLAI AND PARAMESWARAN PILLAI AND
ANOTHER (2000) 1 Supreme Court Cases 712) and
HEERALAL AND KALYAN MALAND AND OTHERS (1998)
1 Supreme Court Cases 278) contended that any
amendment introducing entirely different new case
and seeking to displace the plaintiff the benefit
completed from the admission made by the
defendants in the written statement, is not
permissible. In the decision in MODI SPINNING AND
WEAVING MILLS COMPANY LIMITED VS. M/S LADHA
RAM AND COMPANY (AIR 1988 Supreme Court 680) by
means of an amendment the defendant wanted to
introduce an entirely different case. In the facts and
said circumstances, it was held that the defendants
1Page 12
cannot be allowed to change completely the case
made out in their written statement and to substitute
an entirely different new case and that if such
amendments are allowed the plaintiffs will be
irretrievably prejudiced by being denied the
opportunity of extracting the admission from the
defendants. In HEERALAL vs. KAYALAN MAL AND
OTHERS (1998) 1 Supreme Court Cases 278, and
HEERALAL vs. KAYALAN MAL AND OTHERS (AIR 1998
Supreme Court 618), it was held that once the written
statement contains an admission in favour of the
plaintiff, the amendment of such admission of the
defendants cannot be allowed to be withdrawn and
such withdrawal would amount to totally displacing
the case of the plaintiff which would cause him
irretrievable prejudice. In B.K. Narayana Pillai and
Parameshwaran Pillai and Another (2000) 1 Supreme
Court Cases 712, it was held though the defendant
has a right to take alternative pleas in defence by way
of amendment, it would be subject to qualification
that (i) Proposed amendment should not result in
injustice to the other side; (ii) any admission made in
favour of plaintiff should not be withdrawn; and (iii)
inconsistent and contradictory allegations which
negate admitted facts should not be raised. Under
the present petitions, the petitioners – defendants are
intending to take away the admission made by them
in regard to the suit claim of the plaintiff society. The
law is that no additional written statement should not
set up a totally new case or state facts at direct
variance with the original written statement so as to
completely change the issue in the case. This is not a
case where the defendants are intending to take
alternative pleas or that they are intending to explain
the vague pleadings made by them in their written
statement filed. This is also not a petition to file
additional written statement but as a petition to
substitute the original written statement to get over
the admissions made in favour of the plaintiff society.
There is no material placed before the court to
substantiate their affidavit. As already stated, the
documents filed are not helpful to support the
affidavit of the petitioner in regard to the allegations
made against their previous advocate so as to request
the court to permit them to file a detailed written
statement, in the place of their earlier written
1Page 13
statement in which they had admitted the entire claim
of the plaintiff society. A perusal of written statement
which is sought to be substituted in the place of the
earlier written statement discloses that the
defendants plead an entire new case against the
admissions made by them in the written statement.
In view of the settled law of the Apex Court the
petitioners cannot be permitted to request the court
to strike out the earlier written statement filed by
them or to permit them to substitute a fresh written
statement in contrary to the admission made by them
in their written statement.
18. No doubt, the petitioner had filed criminal
proceedings against the said Advocate and others and
copies of those criminal proceedings are filed in this
petition. Admittedly, the said Criminal Case is
pending. Moreover, it was subsequent to the filing of
I.A. 2217/95. It is well–established principle of law
that the decisions of the Civil Courts are binding on
the criminal courts and the converse is not true (vide
decision in Karamchand vs. Union of India (AIR 1977
Supreme Court 1244). The plaintiff society is not a
party to the earlier civil proceedings, which are filed in
this petition on the behalf of the Petitioners.
Therefore, those documents, which are filed on behalf
of the petitioners – defendants are not binding on the
first respondent – plaintiff society. The revenue
records, filed are also not helpful for the petitioners in
support of their contention in this petition. Whether
the chief promoter was by the date of the agreement
was a minor as contended by the petitioners is also
not a question relevant for the purpose of this
petition. Thus, this court holds that the documents
filed on behalf of the petitioner do not advance the
claim of the petitions. For the foregoing reasons and
in view of the law enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex
Court, the petitioners–defendants cannot be permitted
to substitute the earlier written statement filed by
them in the suit whereunder there was an admission
of the suit claim of the plaintiffs society, by way of an
entirely new written statement taking contradicting
pleas. Thus this court does not find any merits in the
petitions.
1Page 14
19. In the result, the petitions are dismissed but
without costs.”
16. On the basis of the findings recorded by the trial court,
defendants’ two petitions under Order VIII Rule 9 and Order VI Rule 16
CPC were dismissed holding that the defendants cannot be permitted
to substitute the earlier written statement wherein there was an
admission of the suit claim of the plaintiff-Society.
17. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the defendants
preferred revision petitions before the High Court. Before the High
Court, it was argued that though some admissions were made in the
written statement, the same can be withdrawn by filing a fresh
detailed written statement. Dismissing the said revision petitions,
the High Court in its order dated 18.09.2002 (pages 184 to 186 of
paperbook) observed:-
“The court below had elaborately discussed this
aspect I agree with the reasoning and finding thereof
given by the court below on this aspect and I hold that
they are perfect and valid.
Before the court below the defendant relied on
a Judgment reported in Bhikaji Keshao Joshi and
another vs. Brijlal Nadanlal Biyani and others (AIR
1955 SC 610) and contended that the court can order
striking out of the written statement and permit the
defendants to file substituted written statement with
specific pleadings. The court below rightly
distinguished the same and held that it is not
applicable.
The lower appellate court while dismissing the
I.As. relied on a judgment of the Apex Court reported
1Page 15
in HEERALAL vs. KAYALAN MAL AND OTHERS (AIR
1998 SC 618), wherein it was held that once the
written statement contains an admission in favour of
the plaintiff, the amendment of such admission of the
defendants cannot be allowed to be withdrawn and
such withdrawal would amount to totally displacing
the case of the plaintiff which would cause him
irretrievable prejudice. In another decision of the
Supreme Court referred to by the Court below in B.K.
NARAYANA PILLAI vs. PARAMESHWARAN PILLAI AND
ANOTHER (2000 (1) SCC 712) it was held that though
the defendant has a right to take alternative pleas in
defence by way of amendment, it would be subject to
qualifications which are (1) proposed amendment
should not result in injustice to the other side and (2)
any admission made in favour of the plaintiff should
not be withdrawn and (3) inconsistent and
contradictory allegations which negate admitted facts
should not be raised.
In the present case the question now is
whether the admission made by the defendant in
favour of the plaintiff can be withdrawn and the
answer in the language of the apex court, is ‘not
permissible’.
As already discussed the admissions made in
the written statement are absolutely matching with
the original stand taken by the 1st defendant in the
affidavit filed to his caveat petition and also with the
pleadings and the only dispute raised is with regard to
payment of money to the defendant. In such a case, I
am of the strong view that the defendant had not
approached the court with clean hands in filing the
present I.As.
It has to be further noticed that the allegations
made against the counsel are not established so far.
Mere filing of a complaint before the police or before
the Bar Council of India, in the circumstances like the
present one would only jeopardize the decency and
dignity of the profession of the Advocate. This
attitude of making wild and baseless allegations
against the counsel has to be dissuaded by all means.
However, this observation shall not be understood as
an opinion expressed by this court on the proceedings
already initiated and pending against the said
1Page 16
counsel. To put in a different way, the original stand
of the defendant as stated in the affidavit filed in
support of the caveat petition, demolishes or cuts
across the very basis for filing the present I.As. I am
of the further view that if these types of allegations
are made without substantiating them and if they are
encouraged, it would lead to a situation where
litigants with false cases would resort to smudging the
career of genuine or innocent advocates. The conduct
on the part of the defendant is palpably mischievous
and this court cannot lend any kind of support to a
litigant like the defendant, who has approached the
court with unclean hands.
It is also brought to the notice of this Court
that in another suit which is not connected with the
present suit, the defendant resorted to similar type of
allegations against another counsel, and of course the
trial court did not take into consideration those
allegations.
The court below had discussed in detail all the
aspects and dismissed the I.As. with cogent and
convincing reasons and I do not find any valid ground
to interfere with the same. Accordingly, I pass the
order as under.
The revisions petitions are dismissed with
costs.”
18. The relevant paragraphs of the orders passed by the trial
court and the High Court have been quoted hereinbefore mainly for
the reason that while considering the petitions under Order VIII Rule 9
and Order VI Rule 16 both the courts have also gone into the question
as to whether those admissions could be withdrawn by permitting the
defendants to file a fresh written statement or by striking out of the
earlier written statement.
1Page 17
19. Aggrieved by the above said orders, the appellants moved
this Court in Civil Appeal No.7940-7942 of 2004. Finding no merit, this
Court dismissed the appeals by order dated 15.03.2007.
20. Instead of participating in the suit, the defendantappellants filed another petition purported to be under Order VI Rule
17 CPC seeking amendment of the written statement. The said
amendment petition was allowed by the trial court and against that
the plaintiff-Society preferred revision before the High Court. The
High Court by passing the impugned order dated 28.12.2007 allowed
the revision petitions and set aside the order passed by the trial court.
The High Court held as under :-
“15. The ratio in THE UNITED PROVINCES
ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO. LTD. case (AIR 1972 SC
1201) that decision on any particular point given in an
order of remand does not operate as res judicata in an
appeal filed against the final order passed after the
remand; does not apply to the facts of this case
because there is no ‘order of remand’ in this case as
plaintiff is not relying on any of the observations in an
‘order of remand’ to contest the applications made by
the defendants.
16. In view of the ratio in SATYADHYAN GHOSAL
case (AIR 1960 SC 941), ARJUN SINGH case (AIR
1964 SC 993) and THE UNITED PROVINCES
ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO. LTD. case (..supra)
successive applications for the same relief cannot be
permitted, and they can even be rejected as an abuse
of the process of Court.
17. It is contended by the learned counsel for the
defendants that subsequent to the filing of I.A. No.416
of 2000, defendants came to know through the report
of an expert that the written statement filed on their
behalf was typed on the same typewriter on which the
1Page 18
plaint was typed. In the common order challenged in
these revisions, the trial Court considered that
contention and held that that contention has to be
decided at the time of trial, but cannot be considered
at this stage. For the reasons given by the trial court,
that finding cannot be said to be erroneous.
18. As rightly contended by the learned counsel
for the plaintiff, the trial Court which agreed with the
contention of the plaintiff that defendants cannot by
invoking the plea of fraud seek the amendment
sought, allowed the petitions only on the basis of the
observations made in UDAY SHANKAR TRIYAR V.
RAM KALEWAR PRASAD SINGH AIR 2006 SC 269.
In the very same judgment the apex Court held that
procedure, a hand maiden to justice, should never be
made a tool to carry justice or perpetuate injustice by
any oppressive or punitive use. The trial Court
without keeping in view the fact the defendants
cannot repeatedly file the petition for the same relief
which was negatived earlier, in a different form by
quoting different provisions of law, thought it fit to
allow the petitions and thereby virtually set at naught
the order of dismissal of I.A.Nos.415 and 416 of 2000
passed by it earlier which order was confirmed by this
Court and the Apex Court also.”
21. Before going into the merits of the case, we would like to
refer two of the provisions viz. Order VI Rule 16 and Order VI Rule 17
CPC which are involved in the instant case. These two provisions read
as under:-
“16. Striking out pleadings— The Court may at
any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out
or amended any matter in any pleading—
1Page 19
(a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous
or vexatious, or
(b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay
the fair trail of the suit, or
(c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the
Court.]
17. Amendment of pleadings— The Court may at
any stage of the proceedings allow either party to
alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on
such terms as may be just, and all such amendments
shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose
of determining the real questions in controversy
between the parties.
Provided that no application for amendment
shall be allowed after the trial has commenced,
unless the court comes to the conclusion that in
spite of due diligence, the party could not have
raised the matter before the commencement of
trial.”
22. Order VI Rule 16 CPC has been substituted by the CPC
(Amendment) Act, 1976. This provision deals with the amendment or
striking out of the pleadings, which a party desires to be made in his
opponent’s pleadings. In other words, the plaintiff or the defendant
may ask the court for striking out pleadings of his opponent on the
ground that the pleadings are shown to be unnecessary, scandalous,
frivolous or vexatious. This Rule is based on the principle of ex debito
justitia. The court is empowered under this Rule to strike out any
1Page 20
matter in the pleadings that appears to be unnecessary, scandalous,
frivolous or vexatious or which tends to prejudice, embarrass or delay
the fair trial of the suit.
23. On the other hand, Order VI Rule 17 CPC empowers the court
to allow either party to alter or amend his own pleading and on such
application the court may allow the parties to amend their pleadings
subject to certain conditions enumerated in the said Rule.
24. Although the defendant-appellants filed the petition for
striking out their own pleading i.e. written statement, labelling the
petition as under Order VI Rule 16 CPC, but in substance the
application was dealt with as if under Order VI Rule 17 CPC inasmuch
as the trial court discussed the facts of the case and did not permit the
defendants to substitute the written statement whereunder there was
an admission of the suit claim of the plaintiff-Society. The relevant
portion of the order quoted hereinabove reveals that the trial court
while rejecting the aforementioned petition held that the defendantappellants cannot be allowed to substitute their earlier written
statement filed in the suit whereunder there was an admission of the
claim of the plaintiff-Society 
(respondent herein). Similarly in the revision filed by the defendants,
the High Court considered all the decisions referred by the defendants
on the issue as to 
whether the defendants can withdraw the admission
made in the written statement and finally came to the conclusion that
2Page 21
the defendant-appellants cannot be allowed to resile from the
admission made in the written statement by taking recourse to Order
VIII Rule 9 or Order VI Rule 16 CPC by seeking to file a fresh written
statement. In the aforesaid premises, filing of a fresh petition by the
defendants under Order VI Rule 17 CPC after about 13 years when the
hearing of the suit had already commenced and some of the witnesses
were examined, is wholly misconceived. 
The High Court in the
impugned order has rightly held that filing of subsequent application
for the same relief is an abuse of the process of the court. 
As noticed
above, the relief sought for by the defendants in a subsequent petition
under Order VI Rule 17 CPC was elaborately dealt with on the two
earlier petitions filed by the defendant-appellants under Order VI Rule
16 and Order VIII Rule 9 CPC and, therefore, the subsequent petition
filed by the defendants labelling the petition under Order VI Rule 17
CPC is wholly misconceived and was not entertainable.
25. After giving our full consideration on the matter, we do not
find any error in the impugned order passed by the High Court. Hence,
these appeals have no merit and are accordingly dismissed. No order
as to costs.
…………………………………….J.
(P. Sathasivam )
2Page 22
……………………………………J.
(M.Y. Eqbal)
New Delhi,
April 18, 2013.
2

sec. 360 - Reducing of sentence by high court = Section 360 of CrPC so as to extend the benefit of treatment reserved for first offenders, these appellants hardly deserve the same. Admittedly, both the appellants were above the age of 21 years on the date of committing the offence. They have wielded dangerous weapons like firearms. Four shots were fired. The only fortunate part of the occurrence is that the victim escaped death. The offence committed by the appellants is proved to be one under Section 307 of IPC punishable with imprisonment for life. If acquittal of some co-accused casts a cloud of doubt over the entire prosecution case, the whole case may be rejected. But we fail to understand how acquittal of some of the accused can have any relevance to the question of sentence awarded to those who are convicted. -The second ground relied on by the High Court is that it will further the enmity between the families of victim and the accused. In our considered view, this ground is irrelevant for the purpose of determining the sentence to be awarded to the accused. The Courts cannot let the accused go scot-free on mere suspicion of eruption of enmity between the families.- We were told that the appellants had hardly suffered imprisonment for three months. If the offence is under Section 307 IPC i.e. attempt to commit murder which is punishable with imprisonment for life and the sentence to be awarded is imprisonment for three months, it is better not to award substantive sentence as it makes mockery of justice. - Accepting such a submission would mean that if your pockets can afford, commit serious crime, offer to pay heavy fine and escape tentacles of law. Power of wealth need not extend to overawe court processes. - In our view, the reduction of sentence passed by the High Court without appreciating the nature of offence, grievous injuries of witnesses/victims, is unsustainable. In addition to the factual matrix discussed in the earlier paras, Dr. Ashwani Kumar Chaudhary (PW-18), after examining the witness Mehma Singh, (PW-19), has stated that his speech was blurred and he was feeling difficulty in speaking. We are satisfied that from the statements of eyewitnesses coupled with the medical evidence, it is proved that the accused caused injuries in the manner as propounded by the prosecution. It is also proved that Bhag Singh inflicted injury with a blunt weapon on the left shoulder of Piara Singh. Likewise, the M.L.R. of Hazara Singh proves that the injury was caused by a sharp-edged weapon i.e. gandasa by Kesho Ram. The High Court has failed to take note of a very relevant fact that with regard to the offence under Section 307 IPC, Raj Kumar has been charge sheeted individually for causing grievous injury on the head of Mehma Singh with an intention or knowledge and under such circumstances, if by that act, he had caused death of the said Mehma Singh, he would have been guilty of murder. 26) Under these circumstances, we hold that the High Court has wrongly interfered with the order of sentence on wholly untenable and irrelevant grounds, some of them even not borne out on record. To avoid miscarriage of justice, we must interfere and accordingly, we set aside the sentence imposed by the High Court and restore the sentence imposed by the trial Court. All the respondents-accused, namely, Raj Kumar, Keshav Ram, Lal Chand and Bhag Singh shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve the remaining period of sentence as ordered by the trial Court. The appeals are allowed.

Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 603-604 OF 2013
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 2014-2015 of 2009)
Hazara Singh .... Appellant(s)
Versus
Raj Kumar & Ors. ....
Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
P.Sathasivam, J.
1) Leave granted.
2) These appeals are directed against the common final
judgment and order dated 03.11.2008 passed by the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal
Appeal No. 4-SB of 1997 and Criminal Revision No. 416 of
1997, whereby the High Court partly allowed the appeal filed
by the respondents herein by reducing the sentence
1Page 2
awarded to them to the period already undergone and
dismissed the revision preferred by the appellant herein. 
3) Brief facts:
(a) According to the prosecution, on 25.04.1994, Dr. P.
Aggarwal, Medical Officer, C.H.C. Ladwa, sent a ruqa to the
Police Station informing that Mehma Singh, Piara Singh and
Hazara Singh have been admitted to the hospital after
allegedly having received injuries in a fight. Mehma Singh
was serious and had been referred to the L.N.J.P. Hospital,
Kurukshetra. After receipt of the said ruqa, on 26.04.1994,
Raj Pal Singh, S.I., In-charge Police Station, Babain, went to
the hospital and recorded the statements of the injured.
(b) Hazara Singh, in his statement, alleged that he was a
resident of village Kassithal and was an agriculturist. That
about 6/7 years back, he had purchased 6 kanals of disputed
agricultural land in village Rampura from one Sat Pal,
possession of which was delivered to him. He along with his
family members harvested wheat crop from that land and
had kept it in their adjoining field.
2Page 3
(c) On 25.04.1994, at about 6.30 p.m., his brother Piara
Singh was ploughing the above said land, with the help of a
tractor, while he along with his father was collecting the
harvested wheat crop in the adjoining field. At that time,
they suddenly, heard the noise of “bachao bachao” from his
brother Piara Singh. Thereafter, he noticed Piara Singh
jumping from the tractor and raising alarm coming towards
them and Kesho Ram and his brother, along with 5/6
persons, were lifting the harvested wheat crop and placing it
on the tractor. Raj Kumar was pouring diesel on the tractor
out of the can held by him. Then Kesho Ram lit the fire on
the tractor and Lal Chand and Bhag Singh ran after his
brother Piara Singh and encircled him. They started
inflicting lathi blows to his brother. He along with his father
went near their brother by raising alarm. When they
reached near their brother, Kesho Ram inflicted gandasi blow
over his head but he rescued it by lifting his right hand which
resulted in an injury in the middle of the right thumb and
fingers. Simultaneously, Annu and Tinna started inflicting
lathi blows upon him. In the meanwhile, Lal Chand, Raj
3Page 4
Kumar and Bhag Singh started inflicting injuries on his father
and caused grievous injuries. On hearing their alarm,
Lachman Singh and Bhagat Singh were attracted from the
nearby fields. On seeing them, all the accused with their
respective weapons, i.e., lathis and gandasis ran away. All
three of them became unconscious due to the said injuries.
When he regained consciousness, he found himself in the
hospital, Ladwa.
(d) Upon this information, an FIR under Sections 148, 149,
323, 324, 435 and 447 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in
short “IPC”) was registered. After receipt of the opinion of
the doctor that the injuries sustained were dangerous to life,
an offence under Section 307 IPC was also added.
(e) After obtaining medical reports and completion of
investigation, all the accused were arrested and on their
disclosure statements, weapons of offence were recovered
and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions. After
hearing the parties, all the accused totaling six were charge
sheeted for the above-said offences. Out of the six accused,
two were held to be minors and were directed to be tried by
4Page 5
the Juvenile Court. The remaining four accused (respondent
Nos. 1 to 4 herein) pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
(f) The Additional Sessions Judge, Kurukshetra, by order
dated 21.12.1996, in Sessions Case No. 44 of 1994 convicted
all the accused persons, namely, Raj Kumar, Bhag Singh,
Kesho Ram and Lal Chand for the offence punishable under
Section 307 IPC and sentenced Raj Kumar and Bhag Singh to
undergo RI for 5 years and a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default,
to further undergo RI for 1 year, whereas Kesho Ram and
Lal Chand to undergo RI for 3 years and a fine of Rs.
10,000/-, in default, to further undergo RI for 9 months. In
addition to the above, all the accused persons were
convicted and sentenced under different heads.
(g) Aggrieved by the said order of conviction and sentence,
the accused-respondents preferred Criminal Appeal No. 4-SB
of 1997 whereas the appellant preferred Criminal Revision
No. 416 of 1997 for enhancement of sentence before the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh.
5Page 6
(h) The High Court, by impugned order dated 03.11.2008,
dismissed the revision filed by the appellant and partly
allowed the appeal filed by the accused by reducing the
sentence to the period already undergone.
(i) Being dis-satisfied with the judgment of the High Court,
the appellant has preferred these appeals by way of special
leave before this Court.
4) Heard Mr. R.C. Kohli, learned counsel for the appellant,
Ms. Naresh Bakshi, learned counsel for the State of Haryana
and Mr. Ashwani Antil, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1
to 4.
5) The only point for consideration in these appeals is
whether the High Court is justified in reducing the sentence
awarded to the accused persons to the period already
undergone. In view of the limited question relating to
sentence alone urged before the High Court, there is no
difficulty in confirming the conviction under Section 307 IPC,
accordingly, we do so.
6Page 7
6) In order to understand the reasoning of the High Court
for reduction of sentence, it is but proper to refer Section
307 IPC which reads thus:
“307. Attempt to murder.- Whoever does any act with
such intention or knowledge, and under such
circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he
would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if
hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall
be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such
punishment as is hereinabove mentioned.”
From the above, it is clear that the maximum punishment
provided therein is imprisonment for life or a term which
may extend to 10 years. Although Section 307 does not
expressly state the minimum sentence to be imposed, it is
the duty of the Courts to consider all the relevant factors to
impose an appropriate sentence. The legislature has
bestowed upon the judiciary this enormous discretion in the
sentencing policy, which must be exercised with utmost care
and caution. The punishment awarded should be directly
proportionate to the nature and the magnitude of the
offence. The benchmark of proportionate sentencing can
assist the judges in arriving at a fair and impartial verdict.
7Page 8
Sentencing Policy:
7) The cardinal principle of sentencing policy is that the
sentence imposed on an offender should reflect the crime he
has committed and it should be proportionate to the gravity
of the offence. This Court has repeatedly stressed the central
role of proportionality in sentencing of offenders in
numerous cases.
8) The factual matrix of this case is similar to the facts and
circumstances of the case in Shailesh Jasvantbhai and
Another vs. State of Gujarat and others, (2006) 2 SCC
359, wherein the accused was convicted under Section
307/114 IPC and for the same the trial Court sentenced the
accused for 10 years. However, the High Court, in its
appellate jurisdiction, reduced the sentence to the period
already undergone. In this case, this Court held that the
sentence imposed is not proportionate to the offence
committed, hence not sustainable in the eyes of law. This
Court, observed thus:
“7. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting
claims and demands. Security of persons and property of
the people is an essential function of the State. It could be
8Page 9
achieved through instrumentality of criminal law.
Undoubtedly, there is a cross-cultural conflict where living
law must find answer to the new challenges and the courts
are required to mould the sentencing system to meet the
challenges. The contagion of lawlessness would undermine
social order and lay it in ruins. Protection of society and
stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law,
which must be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence.
Therefore, law as a cornerstone of the edifice of “order”
should meet the challenges confronting the society.
Friedman in his Law in Changing Society stated that: “State
of criminal law continues to be - as it should be -a decisive
reflection of social consciousness of society.” Therefore, in
operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the
corrective machinery or deterrence based on factual matrix.
By deft modulation, sentencing process be stern where it
should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to
be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the
nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and
committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the
conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all
other attending circumstances are relevant facts which
would enter into the area of consideration.
8. Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate
sentence would do more harm to the justice system to
undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and
society could not long endure under such serious threats. It
is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper
sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the
manner in which it was executed or committed etc.”
9) This position was reiterated by a three-Judge Bench
of this Court in Ahmed Hussein Vali Mohammed Saiyed
and Anr. vs. State of Gujarat, (2009) 7 SCC 254, wherein
it was observed as follows:-
“99.….The object of awarding appropriate sentence should
be to protect the society and to deter the criminal from
achieving the avowed object to law by imposing
appropriate sentence. It is expected that the courts would
9Page 10
operate the sentencing system so as to impose such
sentence, which reflects the conscience of the society and
the sentencing process has to be stern where it should be.
Any liberal attitude by imposing meager sentences or
taking too sympathetic view merely on account of lapse of
time in respect of such offences will be result-wise counter
productive in the long run and against the interest of
society which needs to be cared for and strengthened by
string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system.
100. Justice demands that courts should impose
punishment befitting the crime so that the courts reflect
public abhorrence of the crime. The court must not only
keep in view the rights of the victim of the crime and the
society at large while considering the imposition of
appropriate punishment. The court will be failing in its duty
if appropriate punishment is not awarded for a crime which
has been committed not only against the individual victim
but also against the society to which both the criminal and
the victim belong.”
In this case, the court further goes to state that meager
sentence imposed solely on account of lapse of time without
considering the degree of the offence will be counter
productive in the long run and against the interest of society.
10) In Jameel vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2010) 12
SCC 532, this Court reiterated the principle by stating that
the punishment must be appropriate and proportional to the
gravity of the offence committed. Speaking about the
concept of sentencing, this Court observed thus: -
“15. In operating the sentencing system, law should adopt
the corrective machinery or deterrence based on factual
matrix. By deft modulation, sentencing process be stern
where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it
1Page 11
warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each
case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was
planned and committed, the motive for commission of the
crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons
used and all other attending circumstances are relevant
facts which would enter into the area of consideration.
16. It is the duty of every court to award proper sentence
having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner
in which it was executed or committed. The sentencing
courts are expected to consider all relevant facts and
circumstances bearing on the question of sentence and
proceed to impose a sentence commensurate with the
gravity of the offence.”
11) In Guru Basavaraj @ Benne Settapa vs. State of
Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 734, while discussing the concept
of appropriate sentence, this Court expressed that:
“It is the duty of the court to see that appropriate sentence
is imposed regard being had to the commission of the
crime and its impact on the social order. The cry of the
collective for justice, which includes adequate punishment
cannot be lightly ignored.”
12) Recently, this Court in Gopal Singh vs. State of
Uttarakhand JT 2013 (3) SC 444 held as under:-
“18. Just punishment is the collective cry of the society.
While the collective cry has to be kept uppermost in the
mind, simultaneously the principle of proportionality
between the crime and punishment cannot be totally
brushed aside. The principle of just punishment is the
bedrock of sentencing in respect of a criminal offence…..”
1Page 12
13) We reiterate that in operating the sentencing system,
law should adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence
based on factual matrix. The facts and given circumstances
in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it
was planned and committed, the motive for commission of
the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of
weapons used and all other attending circumstances are
relevant facts which would enter into the area of
consideration. We also reiterate that undue sympathy to
impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the
justice system to undermine the public confidence in the
efficacy of law. It is the duty of every court to award proper
sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the
manner in which it was executed or committed. The Court
must not only keep in view the rights of the victim of the
crime but also the society at large while considering the
imposition of appropriate punishment.
14) With these principles, let us consider whether the
reasons rendered by the impugned judgment falls within the
1Page 13
parameter of the established principles. The relevant
paragraph in the impugned judgment are as under:-
“……Stress is that Raj Kumar has undergone 14 months of
sentence and so as Bhag Singh six months of sentence
whereas Kehso Ram and Lal Chand have undergone two
months’ sentence each and they are facing the agony of
trial since 1994. The purpose of criminal law justice is to
bring discipline, peace and harmony in the society and also
to give an opportunity to an erring individual to reform
himself. In appropriate cases, leniency be shown and
opportunity is required to be given to the accused to
reform themselves by adopting reformative approach. It is
not in dispute that the parties are co-villagers. It has also
not been indicated that during all these years, they had
any further tiff among themselves. If the appellants are
sent behind bars, it will revive the old enmity between the
parties in the village. They have already suffered agony of
long trial/appeal for the last 14 years. Therefore it would be
expedient in the interest of justice to take a lenient view
that the sentence awarded to he accused deserves to be
modified and the injured complainants can be granted
compensation”
15) Now, let us analyze the reasoning mentioned in the
impugned judgment for reduction of sentence. It was
mentioned before the High Court that Raj Kumar has
undergone 14 months of sentence, Bhag Singh has
undergone six months of sentence, Kesho Ram and Lal
Chand have undergone two months of sentence each. It was
also noted by the High Court that they were facing the agony
of trial since 1994. In addition to the same, the High Court
1Page 14
has noted that both the parties are co-villagers and during
pendency of these proceedings, they had no further tiff
among themselves. If the accused are sent behind bars, it
will revive the old enmity between the accused and the
victim’s family. Mentioning these facts, the High Court has
concluded that in the interest of justice, it is but proper to
take a lenient view and that the sentence awarded to the
accused deserves to be modified and the injured
complainants be granted compensation. By saying so, the
High Court reduced the sentence to the period already
undergone by them and directed the accused to pay a sum
of Rs.25,000/- each as compensation to all the three injured
persons, namely, Mehma Singh, Piara Singh and Hazara
Singh within three months from the date of its order, failing
which the appeal filed by them shall be treated as dismissed.
16) For the reasons best known to it, the State has not
challenged the said order of the High Court before this Court.
On the other hand, one of the complainants’, namely, Hazara
Singh has filed the present appeals by way of special leave
petitions. We have already concluded that the conviction
1Page 15
relating to the offence punishable under Section 307 is
confirmed, in fact, it was not at all challenged. In the
present appeals, learned counsel appearing for the appellant
pointed out that considering the serious nature of the
injuries, period of treatment, agony undergone, reduction of
sentence to the period already undergone i.e. for a period of
few months is not justifiable and the decision of the High
Court is to be set aside and the order of the trial Court is to
be restored.
17) It is not in dispute that three persons were injured at
the hands of the accused persons and all of them were
examined by the doctors. Their injuries were evidenced by
certificates issued by the doctors, who treated them, which
read thus:
“PW-1 is Dr. K.K. Chawla, Medical Officer, L.N.J.P. Hospital,
Kurukshetra, who has proved x-ray report Ex.PA with
regard to Hazara Singh and has opined that as per x-ray of
left knee, it showed fracture of patilla left with regard to
remaining 5 injuries, i.e. X-ray of skull, left thigh, left
forearm, right hand and left shoulder of the injured, he has
stated that no bonny injury was found. With regard to
injured Piara Singh, he has stated that X-ray skull showed
no bonny injury. Simultaneously, x-ray chest right forearm
and left ankle showed no bonny injury. However, there
was fracture of left scapula as per x-ray of left shoulder.
The report in this behalf is Ex.PB.
1Page 16
PW-2, Dr. P. Aggarwal, Medical Officer, C.H.C. Ladwa, has
examined Mehma Singh on 25.04.1994 at 9.25 p.m. and
found the following injuires on his person:-
1. Lacerated wound 1-1/2 cm x ½ cm x bone deep on the
left parietal region, 3 cm posterior to anterior hair line.
Surrounding parts in diameter of 8 cm was swollen.
Swelling was boggy in nature. X-ray and surgeon’s
opinion was advised.
2. Left eye was swollen and reddish blue in colour. Both
lids were swollen. Swelling was extending upto
forehead. X-ray and eye surgeon’s opinion was advised.
3. Contusion 10 cm x 1 cm each two in number on back of
left side of chest situated perpendicular on each other.
X-ray was advised.
4. Contusion 12 cm x 2 cm on outer side of left side of
abdomen x-ray and surgeon’s opinion was advised.
5. Lower half of left fore-arm was swollen. Crepitus was
present. X-ray was advised.
6. Two contusions on left buttock, surrounding parts
swollen, x-ray was advised.
7. Abrasion 1 cm x ½ cm on right side of nose bridge. Xray was advised.
He also examined Hazara Singh, son of Mehma Singh at
9.50 p.m. and found the following injuries on his person:
1. Lacerated wound 3 cm x ½ cm into bone deep on left
parietal region situated anterior posteriorily, 3 cm
posterior to anterior hair line. Fresh bleeding was
present. X-ray and surgeon’s opinion was advised.
2. Contusion 12 cm x 3 cm on antro lateral side of middle
of left thigh. Surrounding parts were swollen. X-ray
was advised.
3. Swelling was present on middle half of left fore-arm. Xray was advised.
1Page 17
4. Incised wound 1 cm x ½ cm, x muscle deep on outer
side of right palm in between index finger and thumb.
Margins were cleancut. Fresh bleeding was present. Xray was advised.
5. Abrasions 2 cm x 1 cm x 1 cm on back of right shoulder.
Movements were painful. X-ray was advised.
6. Lacerated wound 1 cm x ½ cm x skin deep on right sole
near base of second toe.
That during examination of the patient routine checking on
26.04.1994, he found one more injury on the person of
Hazara Singh as under:-
“There was faint reddish swelling, diffused all around the
left knee. Patient was complaining of severe pain. Injury
was tender to touch. Movements were painful and
restricted. X-ray left knee was advised.”
All the injuries on the person of Mehma Singh were found
to have been caused by blunt weapon. All the injuries
except injury No.4 on the person of Hazara Singh was
found to have been caused by blunt weapon. Injury No.4
was caused by sharp weapon.
That this doctor witness also examined Piara Singh at
10.05 p.m. and found the following 6 injuries on his
person:-
1. Lacerated wound 1-1/2 cm x ½ cm x bone deep on
middle of scalp with fresh bleeding situated 12 cm
posterior to anterial hair-line. X-ray and surgeon’s
opinion was advised.
2. Reddish swelling, diffused on back of left shoulder.
Movements of shoulder were very painful. Tenderness
was present. X-ray was advised.
3. Contusion 18 cm x 2 cm on lateral side of left side of
chest and abdomen situated vertically.
4. Abrasion 4 cm x 1 cm on back of right side of chest
surrounding parts were swollen. X-ray was advised.
5. Swelling diffused present on lower 3rd of right forearm.
X-ray was advised.
1Page 18
6. Diffused swelling near left medial mallelous was
present. Movement at ankle joint was painful. X-ray
was advised.
All the injuries were caused by blunt weapon. Medical
Report in this behalf is Ex. PE and diagram showing seat of
injuries in this behalf is Ex. PE/1.
This witness has further proved his report Ex. PG to the
effect that the injury No.1 shown in supplementary M.L.R.
i.e. Ex. PH on the person of Hazara Singh was found to be
grievous. He also proved report Ex. PK to the effect that
injury No.2 on the person of Piara Singh, was also grievous
and rest were simple. He has also stated that on
28.04.1994, he received operation note of Mehma Singh
from P.G.I. Chandigarh, whereupon, he sent intimation Ex.
PL to the Police and declared injuries No.1 and 2 as
dangerous to life.
That PW-3 Dr. P. Vara Prasad, S.M.O., Casualty, P.G.I.
Chandigarh has proved his endorsement Ex. PM/1 and Ex.
PM/3 to the effect that on 02.06.1994 and 22.07.1994,
when the police wanted his opinion, Mehma Singh injured
was unfit for statement.
That PW-15, Hazara Singh injured, PW-16 Jaspal Singh, eyewitness, PW-17 Piara Singh injured and PW-19, Mehma
Singh injured, have broadly supported the case of the
prosecution.”
After analyzing the above injuries with reference to the
specific evidence by the doctors concerned and the
certificates issued, the trial Court came to the following
conclusion:-
“a) In the present case, the prosecution has been able to
show that the witness was unable to speak during
investigation. Even, Dr. Ashwani Kumar Chaudhary, while
appearing in the witness box as PW-18, on 02.04.1996, has
stated after examining the witness orally in the Court, that
1Page 19
his speech was blurred. When Mehma Singh appeared as
PW-19, he was feeling difficulty in speaking but since he
could be understood, what he wanted to say, his statement
was recorded. The perusal of his statement further shows
that during his examination, he was feeling difficulty in
speaking the name of the accused and he was allowed to
touch their person to depose about the part played by each
of the accused. As per the case of the prosecution, the
witness was injured in the occurrence and as such no
prejudice was caused to the accused in examining the
witness for the first time in Court.
b) That in view of the statements of these eyewitnesses coupled with the medical evidence, it is proved
that the accused caused injuries in the manner
propounded by the prosecution. Although, the prosecution
has discharged its onus in proving its case, yet, to analyze
the defence, at this stage, would be relevant for the
purpose of deciding the complicity.
c) Resultantly, thus, I hold that on the date of
occurrence, the injured party were in possession of the
disputed land. The occurrence took place in the manner
propounded by the prosecution and further that the
accused have not acted in the right of private defence and
property.
d) In this view of the matter, and the fact that all the
accused formed an unlawful assembly and entered into the
field belonging to the injured and being in their possession,
they have committed an offence punishable under Sections
148 and 447 of the Indian Penal Code.
e) The version of burning of the tractor by the accused
in furtherance of their common object of the assembly, has
been found proved and as such, they have also committed
an offence punishable under Section 435 read with 149 of
the Indian Penal Code.
f) It is proved that Bhag Singh inflicted injury with blunt
weapon on the left shoulder of Piara Singh. Copy of X-ray
report in this behalf is Ex. PB which shows fracture of bone.
He has thus committed an offence punishable under
Section 325 and the other accused are also liable for an
offence under Section 325 read with 149 of the Indian
Penal Code.
1Page 20
g) In view of the M.L.R. of Hazara Singh, injury No. 4
was caused by sharp edged weapon i.e. gandasi by Kesho
Ram and he himself has held liable for an offence under
Section 324 of IPC and the other accused being members
of an unlawful assembly are liable for an offence under
Section 324 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal
Code.
h) It is also proved that all the accused voluntarily
caused simple hurt to Mehma Singh, Piara Singh and
Hazara Singh and held themselves liable for an offence
under Section 323 read with Section 149 of the Indian
Penal Code.
i) With regard to the offence under Section 307 IPC, Raj
Kumar accused has been charge-sheeted individually, for
causing the injury on the head of Mehma Singh with an
intention or knowledge and under such circumstances, that
if by that act, he had caused death of said Mehma Singh,
he would have been guilty of murder. The other accused
have been charge-sheeted with the aid of Section 149 of
IPC Bhag Singh accused, was also individually charged for
offence under Section 307 IPC and other accused were also
charged with the aid of Section 149 IPC for the act of Bhag
Singh.
18) The trial Court, after detailed analysis of the evidence
of doctors and the certificates issued, convicted the above
accused persons and passed the following sentence:
“a) Accused Raj Kumar U/s 307 IPC – RI for 5 years and fine
of Rs.10,000/- in default further RI of 1 year.
b) Accused Bhag Singh U/s 307 IPC – RI for 5 years and
fine of Rs.10,000/- in default further RI for 1 year.
c) Accused Kesho Ram U/s 307 IPC – RI of 3 years and
fine of Rs.10,000/- in default further RI for 9 months
d) Accused Lal Chand U/s 307 IPC – RI of 3 years and
fine of Rs.10,000/- in default further RI for 9 months.
Addition to the above all accused respondents were
awarded following sentence:-
2Page 21
U/s 325 IPC – RI for 2 years and a fine of Rs.2,000/- in
default further sentence for 6 months RI.
U/s 324 IPC – RI for 1 year
U/s 447 IPC – RI for 1 month
U/s 323 IPC – RI for 6 months.
U/s 148 IPC – RI for one year.
U/s 435 IPC – RI for 2 years with fine of Rs.10,000/- each in
default further sentence of RI for 6 months.”
19) It is clear that the High Court failed to take note of the
fact that as per the medical evidence, Injury No.1 shown in
supplement MLR on the person of Hazara Singh was found to
be grievous. Injury No.2 on the person of Piara Singh was
also found to be grievous whereas Injury Nos. 1 and 2
caused to Mehma Singh one was declared as dangerous to
life and it is also on record that injured Mehma Singh had
also lost his speech.
20) As rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the
appellant, the High Court failed to appreciate that the trial
Court has come to the conclusion that in view of the
statement of injured eye-witnesses coupled with medical
evidence, it is proved that the accused caused injuries in the
2Page 22
manner explained by the prosecution and passed
appropriate sentence to the accused respondents. We have
already stated that while dismissing the revision for
enhancement of sentence at the instance of the present
appellant and partly allowing the order of reduction of
sentence, the High Court has assigned only two reasons,
viz., “one, if the accused are sent behind bars, it will
revive the old enmity between the parties in the
village and secondly, the accused also suffered agony
of long trial/appeal for the last 14 years.”
21) It is unfortunate that the High Court failed to appreciate
that the reduction of sentence merely on the ground of long
pending trial is not justifiable. In Sadha Singh and
Another vs. State of Punjab, (1985) 3 SCC 225, a three
Judge Bench of this Court, while considering the identical
issue which also arose for an offence under Section 307 and
reduction of substantive sentence by the High Court, held as
under:-
“5. … We must confess that what ought to be the proper
sentence in a given case is left to the discretion of the trial
court, which discretion has to be exercised on sound
2Page 23
judicial principles. Various relevant circumstances which
have a bearing on the question of sentence have to be
kept in view. Before deciding the quantum of sentence the
learned Sessions Judge has to hear both the sides as
required by the relevant provision of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
6. In an appeal against the conviction, it is open to the
High Court to alter or modify or reduce the sentence after
confirming conviction. If the High Court is of the opinion
that the sentence is heavy or unduly harsh or requires to
be modified, the same must be done on well recognised
judicial dicta. Therefore, we may first notice the reasons
which appealed to the learned Judge to reduce the
substantive sentence awarded to the appellants to
sentences undergone.”
While rejecting the similar reasons as stated by the High
Court in the present case, the following conclusion arrived at
by this Court are relevant:
“7. …. The learned Judge then took notice of the fact that
three co-accused of the appellants were given benefit of
doubt by the trial court and acquitted them although they
were also attributed causing of some injuries. If acquittal of
some co-accused casts a cloud of doubt over the entire
prosecution case, the whole case may be rejected. But we
fail to understand how acquittal of some of the accused
can have any relevance to the question of sentence
awarded to those who are convicted. In this case the
prosecution submitted that these two appellants alone
were armed with guns. Then the learned Judge observes
that no useful purpose, will be served by sending the
appellants to prison again to undergo the unexpired period
of their sentence. We repeatedly asked why this
indulgence and waited for answer in vain. If someone is
enlarged on bail during the pendency of appeal and when
the appeal is dismissed sending him back to jail is going to
raise qualms of conscience in the Judge, granting of bail
pending appeal would be counter-productive. 
One can preempt or forestall the decision by obtaining an order of bail.
2Page 24
8. If the learned Judge had in mind the provisions of
Section 360 of CrPC so as to extend the benefit of
treatment reserved for first offenders, these appellants
hardly deserve the same. 
Admittedly, both the appellants
were above the age of 21 years on the date of committing
the offence. 
They have wielded dangerous weapons like
firearms. Four shots were fired. 
The only fortunate part of
the occurrence is that the victim escaped death. 
The
offence committed by the appellants is proved to be one
under Section 307 of IPC punishable with imprisonment for
life. 
We were told that the appellants had hardly suffered
imprisonment for three months. If the offence is under
Section 307 IPC i.e. attempt to commit murder which is
punishable with imprisonment for life and the sentence to
be awarded is imprisonment for three months, it is better
not to award substantive sentence as it makes mockery of
justice. 
Mr Jain said that the High Court has enhanced the
fine and compensated the injured and, therefore, we
should not enhance the sentence. Accepting such a
submission would mean that if your pockets can afford,
commit serious crime, offer to pay heavy fine and escape
tentacles of law. Power of wealth need not extend to
overawe court processes. Thus it appears that the High
Court wrongly interfered with the order of sentence on
wholly untenable and irrelevant grounds some of them not
borne out by the record. In order, therefore, to avoid
miscarriage of justice we must interfere and set aside the
sentence imposed by the High Court and restore the
sentence imposed by the learned Sessions Judge which we
hereby order. Both the appellants shall be taken into
custody forthwith to suffer their sentence.”
22) Applying the same principles in State of U.P. vs.
Nankau Prasad Misra and Others, (2005) 10 SCC 503,
this Court set aside the judgment of the High Court reducing
the sentence without adequate reasons.
23) The second ground relied on by the High Court is that it
will further the enmity between the families of victim and the
2Page 25
accused. 
In our considered view, this ground is irrelevant for
the purpose of determining the sentence to be awarded to
the accused. The Courts cannot let the accused go scot-free
on mere suspicion of eruption of enmity between the
families.
24) In our view, the reduction of sentence passed by the
High Court without appreciating the nature of offence,
grievous injuries of witnesses/victims, is unsustainable. 
25) In addition to the factual matrix discussed in the earlier
paras, Dr. Ashwani Kumar Chaudhary (PW-18), after
examining the witness Mehma Singh, (PW-19), has stated
that his speech was blurred and he was feeling difficulty in
speaking. We are satisfied that from the statements of eyewitnesses coupled with the medical evidence, it is proved
that the accused caused injuries in the manner as
propounded by the prosecution. It is also proved that Bhag
Singh inflicted injury with a blunt weapon on the left
shoulder of Piara Singh. Likewise, the M.L.R. of Hazara Singh
proves that the injury was caused by a sharp-edged weapon
i.e. gandasa by Kesho Ram. The High Court has failed to
2Page 26
take note of a very relevant fact that with regard to the
offence under Section 307 IPC, Raj Kumar has been charge
sheeted individually for causing grievous injury on the head
of Mehma Singh with an intention or knowledge and under
such circumstances, if by that act, he had caused death of
the said Mehma Singh, he would have been guilty of murder.
26) Under these circumstances, we hold that the High Court
has wrongly interfered with the order of sentence on wholly
untenable and irrelevant grounds, some of them even not
borne out on record. To avoid miscarriage of justice, we
must interfere and accordingly, we set aside the sentence
imposed by the High Court and restore the sentence
imposed by the trial Court. All the respondents-accused,
namely, Raj Kumar, Keshav Ram, Lal Chand and Bhag Singh
shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve the remaining
period of sentence as ordered by the trial Court. The
appeals are allowed. 
2Page 27
………….…………………………J.
(P. SATHASIVAM)
 ………….…………………………J.
(M.Y. EQBAL)
 ………….…………………………J.
(ARJAN KUMAR SIKRI)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 18, 2013.
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