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Wednesday, May 23, 2012

. It is, therefore, quite clear that the answer to question No. 1 is that the Registrar does not have the power to extend the time for filing of the evidence affidavit in support of an opposition beyond the maximum period of three months prescribed under Rule 50 (1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2002 and that the answer to question No. 2 is that the non-filing of the evidence affidavit within the prescribed time would by itself lead to the conclusion that the opposition has been abandoned. In view of the above principles laid down by the Hon’ble High Court, it is clear that the Registrar does not have the power to extend the time for filing evidence beyond a period of three months prescribed under the Rule 50(1) of the Rules, 2002. In the instant case, the appellant had sought time till 19.01.2005, but had filed evidence on 08.02.2005 after 20 days with an application for condoning the delay. In our considered opinion, we think, as stated earlier, the Registrar may grant time up to one month and not further. If that be so, we do not think that the Registrar has the power to condone the delay and take on record the evidence. 9. We therefore hold that the Registrar was right in dismissing the Review Petition. The order dated 05.04.2005 also does not need to be interfered with by us. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs.


INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD
Guna Complex, Annexe-I, 2nd Floor, Anna Salai, Teynampet, Chennai 600 018


(Circuit Sitting at Ahmedabad)

OA/80 & 81 /2009/TM/AMD

FRIDAY, THIS THE 18th  DAY OF MAY, 2012

Hon’ble Ms.S.USHA                            …..                               Vice-Chairman
Hon’ble Shri V.RAVI                            …..                              Technical Member

OA/80 and 81/2009/TM/AMD

M/s.H.I.Tamboli & Co.,
A registered partnership firm,
Having its Office at
37-A, Rajaspura, Satara 415 001,
 Maharashtra.                                                                          … Appellant


(Rep. by: Advocate Shri Shiwprasad Anandrao Wanne)                                                                              
                                                            vs.
 1. M/s.Urmin Products Pvt.Ltd.,
    48, Changadar Industrial Estate,
    Bavla Road, Changador 382 210,
    Gujarat.

2. The Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks,
    15/27, National Chambers, Ashram Road,
    Ahmedabad 380 009.                                                          … Respondents

                        (R1 – rep by: Advocate Shri Harshil Shah)
                                                                                               

ORDER (No.120/2012)
Hon’ble Ms. S.USHA, Vice Chairman:

These two appeals arise out of the order dated 15.07.2009 and 05.04.2005 respectively, passed by the Deputy Registrar dismissing the Review Petition, treating the notice of opposition as abandoned for non-compliance  of Rule 50(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2002.

            2. The 1st respondent filed two applications on 09.03.2001 under Nos.997712 and 997713 in Class 34 for registration of the trade mark‘Sarathi 62’ and ‘Sarathi 39’ respectively.  The said applications were advertised in the Trade marks Journal No.MEGA-3 - Vol.J dated 14.10.2003.  On 25.03.2004, the appellant  herein filed the notice of opposition on various grounds.  The first respondent herein filed the counter statement.  The 2ndrespondent herein, by letter dated 18.10.2004, invited the appellant to file the evidence as per Rule 50.  The evidence was, therefore, to be filed on or before 18.12.2004.  On 10.12.2004, the appellant filed an application for extension of time up to 19.01.2005. The appellant therefore filed their evidence  in support of opposition along with an application to condone the delay of 20 days in filing the evidence on 08.02.2005.  The 2nd respondent had not communicated any order as to the request made on 10.12.2004 and 08.02.2005, but had communicated the order dated 05.04.2005 treating the opposition as abandoned.  The appellant herein preferred a Review Petition against the said order of abandonment.  The second respondent heard the parties and passed an order dismissing the Review Petition on 15.07.2009. 

            3. Being aggrieved by the said orders, the appellant has filed the instant appeals praying that the orders be set aside and the evidence in support of opposition be taken on record.

            4The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that on 10.12.2004 within the stipulated period, the extension of time was sought for, which the Registrar had powers to grant.  The other grievance of the appellant is that there had been two letters sent to the Registrar requesting for extension, for which they received no communication. The Registrar has the power to grant extension as per Section 131 of the Act.  The counsel referred to the following judgments:

1. Wyeth Holdings Corpn. & Anr. v. C.G., of P.D. & TM & Ors. [2007(34)  PTC 1 (Guj)].
2. UCB v. Torent Pharmaceuticals Limited & Ors [2007(35) PTC 820(IPAB)]
3. Nissan Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha, A  Joint Stock Company organised under the law of   Japan of 2, Takara-Cho v. Crossword Agro Industries and Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks [MANU/IC/0024/2008]
4. Asian Paints Limited v. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks and Greenline Pvt. Ltd. [2005 (30) PTC 444 (IPAB)]
5. Tata Motors Ltd. V. Cavincate Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. [2006 (32) PTC 717(IPAB)]\
6.  Jagatjit Industries Limited v. The Registrar of Trade Marks [MANU/DE/2041/2001]
7. Hastimal Jain Trading as Oswal Industries v. Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr. [MANU/DE/0816/2000]
8. Aktieboaget AKF v. SKR Engineering Corpn. [2001 PTC 389 (Del)]
9. Kantilal Tulsidas Jobanputra v. The Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr. [1982 PtC 127]
10. Nisar Enterprises, A proprietary Firm carrying on its Business  v. Vikash Fashion Clothing (P) Ltd., the Registrar of trade Marks, Chennai and the Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai [MANU/IC/0020/2010]
11. Sanyo Electric Col. Ltd. v. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks National Chambers, the Registrar of Trade Marks  National Chambers and Sanyo Ceramics [2007 (34) PTC 156 (IPAB)]

All the judgments deal with the powers of the Registrar to extend the time to file evidence.  The Registrar’s power was said to be directory and not mandatory.

            5. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the appellant have given no reason for the delay.  The counsel further strongly opposed the appeals.  The counsel then relied on few judgments which are as follows:
[1] Parsion Devi & Others v. Sumitri Devi & Others [1998 (1) CTC 25] was relied on to say in which circumstances, the order can be reviewed.   A review petition cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise.
[2] Sanofi – Synthelabo, France v. The Registrar of Trade Marks, New Delhi and Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited, New Delhi in OA/72/2004/TM/DEL (unreported decision):-    Even after the Registrar granting several extension, the appellant had not filed the evidence.  The opposition was therefore treated as abandoned against which a review petition was filed.  The review petition filed was dismissed against which an appeal was filed  which was also dismissed as there was no error on the face of the order and held that the Registrar was right in treating the notice of opposition as abandoned for non-compliance  of Rule 50.
[3] Rikab Chand Jain, New Delhi v. M/s.Swastik Pipes Ltd., New Delhi in R.P.No.1/2004 in TA/100/2003/TM/DEL(CM(M) 551/94), (unreported decision):- Review Petition  was dismissed stating that the merits of the case had already been gone into and the same cannot be again dealt with.
[4] M/s.Shah Jivraj Nanchand & Sons, Surat (Gujarat) v. M/s.Jivraj Tea Ltd., Surat, Gujarat and The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, Ahmedabad in OA/42/2005.TM.AHD (unreported decision):-  It was a case on identical facts of the case on hand, where the appeal was dismissed.
[5] Dolat Industries v. Krishna Oil Industries [2002 (24) PTC 468 (Guj)] – The same principle was followed in this case.

            6. We shall first deal with the Review Petition which arose out of the order based on the merits of the main opposition proceedings.  The ground on which the appellants had sought for review  was that the Registrar had the power to extend the time for filing evidence in support of application.  Review of an order/judgment can be allowed only (a) on discovery of new and important matter of evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the appellant or could not be produced at the time when the decree was passed or order was made or (b) if some mistake or error is apparent on the face of the record or (c) for any sufficient reason.  The Supreme Court of India in a leading case [Parsion Devi case (cited supra)] held –
            “9. Under Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record.  An error which is not self evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power to review under Order 47, Rule 1, CPC.  In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be ‘reheard and corrected’. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be ‘an appeal in disguise’.”
Therefore, an order can be reviewed  only when there is any error on the face of the order.  No order can be corrected by rehearing in a Review Petition.
            7. In this appeal, the appellant has sought for an order setting aside the order dated 05.04.2005 which was sought to be reviewed.  The order dated 05.04.2005  was treating the notice of opposition as abandoned as the evidence in support of opposition was filed after the prescribed period.  The judgments relied on  by the appellant were all dealt with under the 1958 Act.  The relevant provision under the 1999 Act has been dealt with inSunrider Corporation, U.S.A. v.Hindustan Lever Ltd. & Anr.  [2007 (35) PTC 388 (Del.)] as under:
“50. Evidence in support of opposition.- (1) Within two months from services on him of a copy of the counterstatement or within such further period not exceeding one month in the aggregate thereafter as the Registrar may on request allow, the opponent shall either leave with the Registrar, such evidence by way of affidavit as he may desire to adduce in support of his opposition or shall intimate to the Registrar and to the applicant in writing that he does not desire to adduce evidence in support of his opposition but intends to rely on the facts stated in the notice of opposition. He shall deliver to the applicant copies of any evidence that he leaves with the Registrar under this sub-rule and intimate the Registrar in writing of such delivery.
(2) If an opponent takes no action under sub-rule (1) within the time mentioned therein, he shall be deemed to have abandoned his opposition.
(3) An application for the extension of the period of one month mentioned in sub-rule (1) shall be made in Form TM-56 accompanied by the prescribed fee before the expiry of the period of two months mentioned therein.
7. Reading Rule 50, it is clear that the evidence by way of affidavit in support of an opposition to the registration of a trade mark has to be filed within two months of the service of a copy of the counter-statement on the opponent. This period of two months is further extendable by a period of one month in the aggregate thereafter as the Registrar may on request allow. Clearly, in the first instance, the evidence affidavit has to be filed within two months of the receipt of a copy of the counter-statement. The Registrar may extend this period by a further one month in the aggregate if a request for the same is made in time. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 50 makes it clear that if an opponent takes no action under sub-rule (1) within the time mentioned therein, he shall be deemed to have abandoned his opposition. It is also interesting to note that sub-rule (3) refers to the application for extension of the period of one month mentioned in sub-rule (1). It is also stipulated that such an application has to be made in Form TM-56 accompanied by the prescribed fee before the expiry of the period of two months mentioned therein. So, it is clear that a strict regimen has been prescribed for the filing of evidence by way of affidavit in support of an opposition. A plain reading of the provisions makes it abundantly clear that the evidence has to be filed within two months in the first instance and, if an appropriate application for extension of time is made before the expiry of the period of two months and if such application is allowed by the Registrar, then latest by a further month. In other words, under no circumstances can the evidence affidavit be filed beyond the maximum three months prescribed under the said rule. In case the opponent has not taken steps within the prescribed time, then there is no option left with the Registrar but to deem that the opponent has abandoned his opposition.
8. In Chief Forest Conservator (supra), the Supreme Court held:
It is now well-settled that when rules are validly framed, they should be treated as a part of the Act.
There is no doubt that Rule 50 of the 2002 Rules has been validly framed in exercise of the Central Government's rule making powers under Section 157(1) in general and Section 157(2)(vii) in particular. In this background, it can be safely stated that the time and manner prescribed in Rule 50 of the 2002 Rules should be treated as having been prescribed by the 1999 Act itself.
131. Extension of time.-(1) If the Registrar is satisfied, on application made to him in the prescribed manner and accompanied by the prescribed fee, that there is sufficient cause for extending the time for doing any act (not being a time expressly provided in this Act), whether the time so specified has expired or not, he may, subject to such conditions as he may think fit to impose, extend the time and inform the parties accordingly.
(2) Nothing in Sub-section (1) shall be deemed to require the Registrar to hear the parties before disposing of an application for extension of time, and no appeal shall lie from any order of the Registrar under this section.
The Registrar has been empowered to extend time for doing certain acts provided he is satisfied that there is sufficient cause for extending the time. But there is an exception to this power. The exception being that it must not be a case where time is expressly provided in the Act. Rule 105 of the 2002 Rules, which is also sought to be pressed into service by the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, reads as under:
105. Extension of time.-(1) An application for extension of time under Section 131 (not being a time expressly provided in the Act or prescribed by Rule 79 or by sub-rule (4) of Rule 80 or a time for the extension of which provision is made in the rules) shall be made in Form TM-56.
(2) Upon an application made under sub-rule (1) the Registrar, if satisfied that the circumstances are such as to justify the extension of the time applied for, may, subject to the provisions of the rules where a maximum time limit is prescribed and subject to such conditions as he may think fit to impose, extend the time and notify the parties accordingly and the extension may be granted though the time for doing the act or taking the proceeding for which it is applied for has already expired.
The said rule stipulates that an application for extension of time under Section 131 of the 1999 Act has to be made in Form TM-56. It may be remembered that this is the same Form TM-56 in which an application for extension of time is required to be made under Rule 50 (3). However, the extension of time permissible under Rule 105 is not applicable to the following cases:
i) where time is expressly provided in the Act ; or
ii) where time is prescribed by Rule 79 or by sub-rule (4) of Rule 80; or
iii) where time for the extension of which provision is made in the rules.
Therefore, in cases where time is expressly provided for doing of an act under the 1999 Act or where provision for extension of time for doing such act is made in the rules itself, then Rule 105 would have no applicability.
In any event, Rule 50 (1) specifically makes provision for the extension of time for filing the evidence affidavit. That being the case, Rule 105 cannot have any application. It is interesting to note that both Rule 50 and Rule 105 require that the application for extension of time be made in Form TM-56. If the view espoused by the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 is to be taken, then the provisions of Rule 50 would be rendered otiose. An exception has been carved out in Rule 105 with regard to provisions made in the Rules for extension of time. But, no exception has been made in Rule 50. Therefore, Rule 105 would have no application insofar as the filing of an evidence affidavit in support of an opposition beyond the prescribed time is concerned. It is only Rule 50 which would apply. In fact, sub-rule (2) of Rule 105 itself circumscribes the power of the Registrar to extend time by using the expression "subject to the provisions of the rules where a maximum time limit is prescribed". Rule 50 (1) prescribes a maximum time limit. Therefore, even under Rule 105, the Registrar cannot extend time beyond the prescribed maximum time limit.
First of all, in sub-rule (1) of Rule 50 of the 2002 Rules, the following words have been inserted:-
‘or within such further period not exceeding one month in the aggregate thereafter as the Registrar may on request allow.’
These words are missing in Rule 53 (1) of the 1959 Rules and, Therefore, the decision in Hastimal Jain (supra) would not apply to the facts of the present case. The second difference is that the expression "unless the Registrar otherwise directs" appearing in Rule 53 (2) of the 1959 Rules is missing from Rule 50 (2) of the 2002 Rules. For this reason also, the decision of the Full Bench in Hastimal Jain's case would not apply to the present case. The Full Bench had placed great reliance on the expression "unless the Registrar otherwise directs" to indicate that the provision was directory and not mandatory and secondly that the Registrar had discretion in the matter. But these words are missing in the new avatar of this rule which is to be found in Rule 50 (2) of the 2002 Rules. The new Rule 50 (2) simply and plainly states that if an opponent takes no action under sub-rule (1) within the time prescribed therein, he shall be deemed to have abandoned his opposition. The Registrar has no role to play and no discretion in the matter. The entire basis of the Full Bench decision in Hastimal Jain's case is that the Registrar had been given discretion in the matter as indicated by the words "unless the Registrar otherwise directs". This discretion is missing in Rule 50 under the 2002 Rules.
Rule 53 of the 1959 Rules did not prescribe any maximum period of extension of time. Whereas Rule 50 of the 2002 Rules specifically provides for extension of time not exceeding one month in the aggregate. This introduces a clear stipulation that the Registrar's powers to grant extension of time are limited to one month in the aggregate beyond the two months prescribed under the said Rule. This limitation was not there in the earlier Rule, but it is definitely there in Rule 50 of the 2002 Rules. The second instance is that the words "unless the Registrar directs" have been consciously deleted from sub-rule (2) of Rule 53 in its new incarnation in Rule 50 (2). It is obvious that the legislature wanted to make the provision mandatory and did not want to give any discretion to the Registrar in this connection. The object is apparent that the delays be cut down in deciding the application for registration of a trade mark.
16. It is, therefore, quite clear that the answer to question No. 1 is that the Registrar does not have the power to extend the time for filing of the evidence affidavit in support of an opposition beyond the maximum period of three months prescribed under Rule 50 (1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2002 and that the answer to question No. 2 is that the non-filing of the evidence affidavit within the prescribed time would by itself lead to the conclusion that the opposition has been abandoned.”

            8. In view of the above principles laid down by the Hon’ble High Court, it is clear that the Registrar  does not have the power to extend the time for filing evidence  beyond a period of three months prescribed under the Rule 50(1) of the Rules, 2002.  In the instant case, the appellant had sought time till 19.01.2005, but had filed evidence on 08.02.2005 after 20 days with an application for condoning the delay.  In our considered opinion, we think, as stated earlier, the Registrar may grant time up to one month and not further. If that be so, we do not think that the Registrar has the power to condone the delay and take on record the evidence.

            9. We therefore hold that the Registrar was right in dismissing the Review Petition.  The order dated 05.04.2005 also does not need to be interfered with by us.  Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs.


(V.RAVI)                                                                                                  (S.USHA)
Technical Member                                                                               Vice-Chairman






(Disclaimer: This order is being published for present information and should not be taken as a certified copy issued by the Board.)

The Deputy Registrar gave a finding that though the applicants have stated that they have been using the mark from 1977, no sales figures have been filed. The certificate of sales tax also do not reveal user and it is also noted that the applicant has used the word “AYUR” prominently along with his trade mark KAYA KALYAN TEL. Therefore according to the Registrar, the objection raised under Section 9 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (in short ‘Act’) is maintainable and also the objection under Section 11 of the Act as regards the use of the word “AYUR” along with applicant’s trading style. Applying (1993) IPLR 63 at p.597 – Apple Computer vs. Apple Leasing and Industries the Registrar held that the adoption of “AYUR” as trading style is dishonest. In this case no actual tax assessment is given. It is true that sales tax figures alone may not by themselves prove anything but in the present case the order of assessment shows that the assessee’s name is “KAYA KALYAN INDUSTRIES AYURVEDIC” and the order related to first sales of KAYA KALYAN AYUR. This is sufficient for the purpose of proof of use. The honesty in adoption is shown from the search report which the appellant has filed. The mention of AYUR in the name of the Company of the appellant can in no way be said to lead to confusion. In any event, “AYUR” is a generic word. It is not an invented word. It cannot belong to any one exclusively. Everyone in India is entitled to use the word “AYUR” whether it is short or long form, in conjunction with other words to indicate their use. In fact we have to search for the word “AYUR” on the label that is now attacked by the respondent. The opposition is clearly motivated by malafides. 13. Incidentally the marks of the respondent have been removed in TRA/138/2004/TM/DEL, TRA/139/2004/TM/DEL and TRA/116 to 118/2004/TM/DEL today by our order. 14. Appeal OA/31/2007/TM/DEL is allowed with costs of Rs.10,000/- and the appellant’s mark shall proceed to registration in accordance with law.


INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD
Guna Complex Annexe-I, 2nd Floor, 443, Anna Salai, Teynampet, Chennai-600018

(CIRCUIT SITTING AT DELHI)

OA/31/2007/TM/DEL

 FRIDAY, THIS THE 18th DAY OF MAY, 2012


Hon’ble Smt. Justice Prabha Sridevan                    …  Chairman
Hon’ble Shri V. Ravi                                                      …  Technical Member (Trade Marks)

M/s. Kaya Kalyan Industries (AYUR)
acting through its Sole Proprietor
Sri Bhartinder Kumar Malhotra
Motibagh
FAIZABAD-224001.                                                          … Appellant


(By Advocate:  Shri Vijay Verma)


Vs


1.         M/s. Three-N-Products Pvt. Ltd.,
            2/12, West Patel Nagar
            New Delhi.
            acting through its Director Shri Manminder Singh

2.         Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks
            New Delhi.                                                          … Respondents
                                   
                                               
                                               
(By Advocate:  Shri Shailen Bhatia, Ms. Jubli Momalia)


ORDER(No.119/2012)

Hon’ble Smt. Justice Prabha Sridevan, Chairman:

            The appeal is against the refusal of registration of the mark “KAYA KALYAN TEL” under No.823144 in Class 5. The appellant claims that he is using KAYA KALYAN TEL from 1977. He is the first and prior user of the trade mark KAYA KALYAN TEL. They claimed that the word KAYA KALYAN INDUSTRIES (AYUR) will not amount to confusion and deception as stated by the respondent herein. They stated that “AYUR” is not an invented word, it is the short form of Ayurveda.

2.         The respondent claims that they are the bonafide owners of business in ayurvedic medicinal preparations. The trade mark 504095 in Class 5 was registered in respect of face pack kit for skin treatment and several applications. They claim that they have extensive sales. KAYA KALYAN INDUSTRIES (AYUR) is similar to their renowned trade mark “AYUR”. Their trade mark “AYUR” is registered in Classes 3,5,7,10,11,13,14,15,16,18,20,21,27 to 34, 41 and 42.  The mark is associated with the goods manufactured and marketed. 

3.         The Deputy Registrar gave a finding that though the applicants have stated that they have been using the mark from 1977, no sales figures have been filed. The certificate of sales tax also do not reveal user and it is also noted that the applicant has used the word “AYUR” prominently along with his trade mark KAYA KALYAN TEL. Therefore according to the Registrar, the objection raised under Section 9 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (in short ‘Act’) is maintainable and also the objection under Section 11 of the Act as regards the use of the word “AYUR” along with applicant’s trading style. Applying (1993) IPLR 63 at p.597 – Apple Computer vs. Apple Leasing and Industries the Registrar held that the adoption of “AYUR” as trading style is dishonest. 

4.         The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the marks are not similar and that there is no likelihood of causing confusion and that the appeal should be allowed.

5.         The learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the order of the Deputy Registrar shall not be interfered with.

6.         The evidence filed by the appellant are advertisements in newspapers showing the sale of KAYA KALYAN TEL in 1999.  It is also seen that they had obtained a search report which shows that there was no trade mark identical with or deceptively similar to the mark applied for. There is a copyright registration of the year 2001 which clearly shows that  the mark along with trading style, had been adopted in the year 1978. The enclosure 14 is a sales tax order of the year 1978-79, enclosure 15 is for the year 1984-85. Enclosure 16 is dated 1.4.1983. This is another document issued by the Sales Tax authority which is of the year 1984. In these documents the appellant is described as “SARVASHRI KAYA KALYAN INDUSTRIES AYURVEDIC” in devanagiri script or “SARVASHRI KAYA KALYAN INDUSTRIES AYUR”. There is reference to KAYA KALYAN and this is of the year 1984-85. 

7.         The respondent has enclosed several documents. Exhibit ‘A1’ is the registration of “AYUR” for cosmetics. The application is dated 14.5.1984. There are advertisements for cosmetics and for ayurvedic medicinal preparations as claimed in the opposition which come under Class 5 whereas the documents filed from Exhibit A1 to A13 are Class 3 registrations and A14 is face pack kit but not ayurvedic preparation. We do not see any registration of the mark for goods which are ayurvedic medicinal preparation. Numerous documents have been filed to show the registration. For a medicinal preparation the applicant also needs to produce license from the Drug Controller. The sales which are marked as ‘B1’ are from 9.5.1984.  They have also filed documents to show their advertisements which are in the year 2000.  We are not concerned with that.  They relied on -

(i)                 2002 24 PTC  518 (Del) – Three-n-Products Pvt. Ltd., Petitioner Vs. Yashwant and Ors., Respondents - Here the learned Judge has granted injunction in favour of ‘AYUR’. 

(ii)               AIR 1977 Calcutta 413 – The Imperial Tobacco Co. of India Ltd., Appellant Vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks and another, Respondents to show that evidence on subsequent events not admissible and that the appellants will not rely on new evidence. 

(iii)             They also relied on 1996 PTC (16) -  First Computers (formerly known as ‘Brilliant’s Computers Centre’), Petitioner Vs. A. Guruprasad, Respondents -  Here it is held that mere sales tax assessment is not sufficient to prove user.

8.         We have considered the matter. The respondents claim of user is from 1983, whereas we find that right from 1977 and definitely from 1984-85 the appellants had got the “KAYA KALYAN INDUSTRIES AYUR” or “KAYA KALYAN AYURVEDIC”. Therefore the appellant is entitled to use the name and trading style and when the respondent has also commenced user only in 1984, there is no question of dishonesty on the part of the appellant. The appellant has not called his product “AYUR”. The product is “KAYA KALYAN AYUR”. The company is “KAYA KALYAN INDUSTRIES AYURVEDIC”.

9.         The marks have to be seen as a whole. There is no deceptive similarity. Any one looking at the label will think it is the product of the appellant. It is clear from the label that “AYUR” is called “KAYA KALYAN AYUR” and the manufacturer “KAYA KALYAN INDUSTRIES AYUR”. The Registrar grievously erred in overlooking this aspect.  Even the judgment cited by the respondent is actually in favour of the appellant as in AIR 1977 Calcutta 413 (cited supra) where an appeal was filed against the refusal to register the word “Simla” for tobacco. The Division Bench held that “Simla” is well known in the country and abroad and is inherently neither distinctive nor adapted to distinguish nor capable of distinguishing the goods of the appellant. We are of the opinion that “AYUR” is well known as a short form for “AYURVEDA” in this country and abroad and cannot be adapted to distinguish nor distinguish the goods of the respondent nor is it inherently distinctive. Therefore on the basis of such a mark the respondent’s opposition ought not to have been allowed. In the same judgment it was held that “…no trade mark should be allowed to be registered which may hamper or embarrass the traders or trade now or in future in respect of the place or country which is proposed to be registered….” Of course in that case it was held that registration could be allowed without causing interference to or infringing upon reasonable trading rights of other manufacturers.

10.       We are aware that we are not deciding the validity of the respondent’s mark. But the respondent’s mark is so obviously unregistrable that we do not think the opposition ought to have been allowed. It ought to have been dismissed and the Registrar should have assessed for himself whether the mark of the appellant deserves to be taken on the register.

11.       In 1996 PTC (16) (cited supra), the mark was the “First Computers”. The plaintiff started the business in the name and style of “First Computers”. The defendant had been incorporated under the name and style of “First Computer Pvt. Ltd.” The Division Bench considered the question of honesty and on facts, the Bench found that the appellant had not changed the name with dishonest motive and they also took into account the question of sales tax assessment.

12.       In this case no actual tax assessment is given. It is true that sales tax figures alone may not by themselves prove anything but in the present case the order of assessment shows that the assessee’s name is “KAYA KALYAN INDUSTRIES AYURVEDIC” and the order related to first sales of  KAYA KALYAN AYUR.  This is sufficient for the purpose of proof of use. The honesty in adoption is shown from the search report which the appellant has filed. The mention of AYUR in the name of the Company of the appellant can in no way be said to lead to confusion. In any event, “AYUR” is a generic word. It is not an invented word. It cannot belong to any one exclusively. Everyone in India is entitled to use the word “AYUR” whether it is short or long form, in conjunction with other words to indicate their use. In fact we have to search for the word “AYUR” on the label that is now attacked by the respondent. The opposition is clearly motivated by malafides. 

13.       Incidentally the marks of the respondent have been removed in TRA/138/2004/TM/DEL, TRA/139/2004/TM/DEL and TRA/116 to 118/2004/TM/DEL today by our order.

14.       Appeal OA/31/2007/TM/DEL is allowed with costs of Rs.10,000/- and the appellant’s mark shall proceed to registration in accordance with law.




(V. Ravi)                                                                       (Justice Prabha Sridevan)
Technical Member (Trade Marks)                           Chairman




(This order is being published for present information and should not be taken as a certified copy issued by the Board.)



“AYUR” is a generic word and no one can claim exclusive right to the said word and that there is no evidence of confusion. No one will mistake “AYUR” and “AYURTHEERAM” as identical or even deceptively similar. The letter enclosing the “Green Leaf” classification to the respondent shows that Ayurveda has been elevated as USP of Kerala Tourism. The respondent is a full-fledged resort in the Kerala backwaters. They claim to have therapy rooms. The respondent has shown in its balance sheet expenditure under the head “Ayurvedic expenses” or “Ayurvedic Centre” expenses. In the balance sheet as on 31.3.2002, secured loan on the landed property at Komarakom Village is shown According to tradition, Ayurveda is the “science of life”. But we have decided today that the appellants herein is not entitled to claim proprietorship over the mark “AYUR” and we have ordered removal of the mark in TRA/138/2004/TM/DEL, TRA/139/2004/TM/DEL and TRA/116 to 118/2004/TM/DEL. We have held that “AYUR” is generic which has a dictionary meaning and is not an invented word and the appellant cannot appropriate “AYUR” excluding everyone else from using it legally as a mark. In view of the above and the decision of the judgment of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court we will not interfere with the impugned order. 15. Appeal OA/15/TM/CH/2010 is dismissed with costs of Rs.10,000/-. Miscellaneous Petition No.32/2010 is dismissed as infructuous.


INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD
Guna Complex Annexe-I, 2nd Floor, 443, Anna Salai, Teynampet, Chennai-600018


M.P.No.32/2010
 in
OA/15/2010/TM/CH AND OA/15/2010/TM/CH


 FRIDAY, THIS THE  18th DAY OF MAY, 2012


Hon’ble Smt. Justice Prabha Sridevan                     …  Chairman
Hon’ble Ms.S. Usha                                                        …  Vice-Chairman

M/s. Three-N-Products Pvt. Ltd.
2/12 West Patel Nagar
New Delhi-110008.                                                           …  Appellant


(By Advocate:  Shri Gopal Trivedhi)


Vs


1.         M/s. Alex Resorts and Hotels Pvt. Ltd.
            21/1, Rest House Road,
            Bangalore,
            Karnataka.

2.         Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks
            Trade Marks Registry
            Intellectual Property Building
            G.S.T. Road
            Guindy
            Chennai-600032.                                                  … Respondents
                                   
                                                                                               
(By Advocate:  Shri K. Subbu Ranga Bharathi)


ORDER(No.118/2012)

Hon’ble Smt. Justice Prabha Sridevan, Chairman:

            This appeal is against the impugned order granting registration of the trade mark “AYURTHEERAM” for the services “Ayurveda Hospital and Resorts” included in class 42 subject to confining the services in the States of Kerala and Karnataka.

2.         The respondent is the applicant who succeeded before the Registry.  They claimed user from 1.6.2005. Their application No.1384396 was made on 12.9.2005.  It was advertised before acceptance in the Journal No.1349 dated 1.8.2006.

3.         The appellants filed their notice of opposition. According to them they are a reputed company engaged in the business of manufacturing/marketing, bleaching preparations, cleansing, soaps, cosmetics and a variety of such products. They have been in the market since 1984. They adopted the mark “AYUR” openly, continuously and extensively. They are the registered proprietors of the mark in several classes. They have also obtained foreign registrations.  They have obtained copyright registration for the particular design of the label “AYUR”.  They opposed the impugned mark on the ground that it was dishonest and intended to trade upon the goodwill and reputation of the appellants.

4.         The respondent’s case was that they had adopted the mark in 2005 and they are engaged in service industry and running Ayurvedic clinics in Kerala.  They gave proof of their established reputation.

5.         After hearing both sides the Learned Registrar was of the opinion that “AYUR” is a generic word and no one can claim exclusive right to the said word and that there is no evidence of confusion.

6.         The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondent is not consistent about the date of user and is not certain whether they started using the mark from 1999 or 2005.  The learned Registrar did not consider the effect of Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The appellant’s mark was already registered on the date of the respondent’s application. The time between the alleged date of user, that is, 1.6.2005 and the date of application was not enough to establish distinctiveness. The explanation given for adoption of the name is not acceptable. The appellant also has Class 42 registration and outlets in Delhi and “AYURGRAM” registration from 2003.  He relied on 2010 (43) PTC 311(Del) – Three-N-Products Pvt. Ltd., Plaintiff Vs. Holistic Health Care Pvt. Ltd., Defendant, 2001 (2) CTMR 514 (Del) – Three-N-Products Pvt. Ltd., Plaintiff Vs. Yashwant and others, Defendants, 2009(40) PTC 275 (IPAB) – Three-N-Products Private Limited, Applicant Vs. Amalco Herbal Products, Respondent, 141(2007) Delhi Law Times 609 – Ayurherbs Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., Petitioner Vs. Three-N-Products Private Ltd., Respondent, 2007 (34) PTC 515(Cal) – Three-N-Products Private Ltd., Petitioner Vs. Karnataka Soaps & Detergents Ltd. & Another, Respondents.

7.         The learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that “AYURTHEERAM” is a full fledged Ayurvedic hospital and has been awarded Green Leaf classification in Kerala. They coined the word from “Ayu” which means “life” and “Theeram” land. “AYURTHEERAM” mark is a mark that is known overseas too.  It was adopted bonafide.  The sales turnover is huge.  ‘Ayur’ is a generic word.  In 2004 (28) PTC 59 (Bom) – Ayushakti Ayurved Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Hindustan Lever Limited, it was held that Ayush and Ayurshakti were not similar. He relied on A.P.O. No.248 of 2008 in C.S. No.204 of 2007 – Three-N-Productrs Private Limited Vs. Emami Limited a judgment of the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court.

8.         The word “Ayur” means “life”. It is a generic word. It can not be appropriated by anyone excluding all.

9.         In 2001 (2) CTMR 514 (Del) (cited supra), Ayur was held to be a meaningless invented word and on the basis of priority an order of injunction was granted to the respondent. In 2010 (43) PTC 311(Del) (cited supra) the appellant got interim relief on the basis of priority of user.  In 2009 (40)PTC 275(IPAB) (cited supra) the IPAB held that a dictionary word can not be allowed registration unless distinctiveness is proved and that “AYUR” is a generic word. Having held so, the IPAB removed Ayurgreen. In Delhi Law Times 609 (cited supra) “Ayur herbs” was removed at the instance of the appellant herein. In 2007 (34) PTC 515(Cal( (cited supra) the appellant used seniority of user and obtained injunction.

10.       But as against all these judgments we have the judgment of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court (cited supra). The Learned Judges held that “the word “Ayu” or “Ayur” cannot be said to be the particular invented words”. They held that the appellant cannot claim exclusive right over those words  because “Ayu” means longevity and “Ayur” denotes Ayurveda. They felt that “the plaintiff cannot legitimately claim that those words should in “no case” be used by any other person…” and a small variation should be sufficient to avoid confusion. The judgment of the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court, guides us.

11.       In the present case there is no proof of confusion. The respondent has acquired a great degree of reputation for providing such services.  The State has in fact honoured the respondent.

12.       No one will mistake “AYUR” and “AYURTHEERAM” as identical or even deceptively similar. The letter enclosing the “Green Leaf” classification to the respondent shows that Ayurveda has been elevated  as USP of Kerala Tourism.  The respondent is a full-fledged resort in the Kerala backwaters. They claim to have therapy rooms. The respondent has shown in its balance sheet expenditure under the head “Ayurvedic expenses” or “Ayurvedic Centre” expenses.  In the balance sheet as on 31.3.2002, secured loan on the landed property at Komarakom Village is shown  According to tradition,  Ayurveda is the “science of life”.

13.       It is true that the appellant has obtained registration for “AYUR” for a variety of class of goods. Their user may be from 1984. 

14.       But we have decided today that the appellants herein is not entitled to claim proprietorship over the mark “AYUR” and we have ordered removal of the mark in TRA/138/2004/TM/DEL, TRA/139/2004/TM/DEL and TRA/116 to 118/2004/TM/DEL. We have held that “AYUR” is generic which has a dictionary meaning and is not an invented word and the appellant cannot appropriate “AYUR” excluding everyone else from using it legally as a mark. In view of the above and the decision of the judgment of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court we will not interfere with the impugned order. 

15.       Appeal OA/15/TM/CH/2010 is dismissed with costs of Rs.10,000/-.  Miscellaneous Petition No.32/2010 is dismissed as infructuous.


(S. Usha)                                                                      (Justice Prabha Sridevan)
Vice-Chairman                                                             Chairman





(This order is being published for present information and should not be taken as a certified copy issued by the Board.)