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Wednesday, May 2, 2012

No rights will confirm for long standing possession of a property = False averments of facts and untenable contentions are serious problems faced by our courts. The other problem is that litigants deliberately create confusion by introducing irrelevant and minimally relevant facts and documents. The court cannot reject such claims, defences and pleas at the first look. It may take quite sometime, at times years, before the court is able to see through, discern and reach to the truth. More often than not, they appear attractive at first blush and only on a deeper examination the irrelevance and hollowness of those pleadings and documents come to light. 38. Our courts are usually short of time because of huge pendency of cases and at times the courts arrive at an erroneous conclusion because of false pleas, claims, defences and irrelevant facts. A litigant could deviate from the facts which are liable for all the conclusions. In the journey of discovering the truth, at times, this Court, on later stage, but once discovered, it is the duty of the Court to take appropriate remedial and preventive steps so that no one should derive benefits or advantages by abusing the process of law. The court must effectively discourage fraudulent and dishonest litigants. 39. Now, when we revert to the facts of this case it becomes quite evident that the appellant is guilty of suppressing material facts and introducing false pleas and irrelevant documents. The appellant has also clouded the entire case with pleas which have nothing to do with the main controversy involved in the case. IRRELEVANT DOCUMENTS: 40. All documents filed by the appellant along with the plaint have no relevance to the controversy involved in the case. We have reproduced a list of the documents to demonstrate that these documents have been filed to mislead the Court. The First Appellate Court has, in fact, got into the trap and was misled by the documents and reached to an entirely erroneous finding that resulted in undue delay of disposal of a small case for almost 17 years. FALSE AND IRRELEVANT PLEAS: 41. The appellant is also guilty of introducing untenable pleas. The plea of adverse possession which has no foundation or basis in the facts and circumstances of the case was introduced to gain undue benefit. The Court must be cautious in granting relief to a party guilty of deliberately introducing irrelevant and untenable pleas responsible for creating unnecessary confusion by introducing such documents and pleas. These factors must be taken into consideration while granting relief and/or imposing the costs. 42. On the facts of the present case, following principles emerge: 1. It is the bounden duty of the Court to uphold the truth and do justice. 2. Every litigant is expected to state truth before the law court whether it is pleadings, affidavits or evidence. Dishonest and unscrupulous litigants have no place in law courts. 3. The ultimate object of the judicial proceedings is to discern the truth and do justice. It is imperative that pleadings and all other presentations before the court should be truthful. 4. Once the court discovers falsehood, concealment, distortion, obstruction or confusion in pleadings and documents, the court should in addition to full restitution impose appropriate costs. The court must ensure that there is no incentive for wrong doer in the temple of justice. Truth is the foundation of justice and it has to be the common endeavour of all to uphold the truth and no one should be permitted to pollute the stream of justice. 5. It is the bounden obligation of the Court to neutralize any unjust and/or undeserved benefit or advantage obtained by abusing the judicial process. 6. Watchman, caretaker or a servant employed to look after the property can never acquire interest in the property irrespective of his long possession. The watchman, caretaker or a servant is under an obligation to hand over the possession forthwith on demand. According to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, Courts are not justified in protecting the possession of a watchman, caretaker or servant who was only allowed to live into the premises to look after the same. 7. The watchman, caretaker or agent holds the property of the principal only on behalf the principal. He acquires no right or interest whatsoever in such property irrespective of his long stay or possession. 8. The protection of the Court can be granted or extended to the person who has valid subsisting rent agreement, lease agreement or licence agreement in his favour. 43. In the instant case, we would have ordinarily imposed heavy costs and would have ordered restitution but looking to the fact that the appellant is a Watchman and may not be able to bear the financial burden, we dismiss these appeals with very nominal costs of Rs. 25,000/- to be paid within a period of two months and direct the appellant to vacate the premises within two months from today and handover peaceful possession of the suit property to the respondent-Society. In case, the appellant does not vacate the premises within two months from today, the respondent-Society would be a liberty to take police help and get the premises vacated. 44. Both the appeals are, accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.





                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                CIVIL APPEAL NOS.   4012-4013        OF 2012
          ARISING OUT OF S.L.P.(C) NOS.      14163-14164    OF 2012
                 ARISING OUT OF CC NOS. 21115-21116 OF 2011




A. SHANMUGAM                 ……              APPELLANT



                                   VERSUS



ARIYA KSHATRIYA RAJAKULA
VAMSATHU MADALAYA NANDHAVANA
PARIPALANAI SANGAM REPRESENTED
BY ITS PRESIDENT ETC.  …..        RESPONDENTS







                               J U D G M E N T


DALVEER BHANDARI J.


      Delay condoned.

2.    Leave granted.

3.    These two appeals arise out of  cross  suits  filed  before  the  High
Court of Judicature at Madras in S.A. No. 1973 of 2002 and S.A. No.  869  of
2009 dated April 20, 2011.  In both these  appeals,   A.  Shanmugam  is  the
appellant and Ariya Kshatriya Raja Kulavamsa Madalaya Nandhavana  Paripalana
Sangam is the respondent which for convenience hereinafter  is  referred  to
as the ‘Society’.

4.     The  property  in  question  belonged  to  one,  Muthu  Naicker,  who
dedicated the suit land for construction of a Dharamshala.  In the  southern
part of India, it is called as  ‘choultry’.   A  ‘Dharamshala’  is  commonly
known as ‘a place where boarding facilities  are  provided  either  free  of
cost or at a nominal cost’.  In the instant case, a Dharamshala  was  to  be
constructed  for  the  benefit  of  the  Ariya  Kshatriya  community.    The
appellant’s father, Appadurai Pillai was engaged as a Watchman on a  monthly
salary by the respondent-Society to look after the Dharamshala and  in  that
capacity lived in the premises with his family including the appellant.

5.    According to the appellant, in the year 1994,  the  respondent-Society
claiming to be the owner of  the  suit  property  tried  to  dispossess  the
appellant by force necessitating the  appellant  to  file  a  suit  in  O.S.
No.1143 of 1994 on the  file  of  the  Second  Additional  District  Munsif,
Tiruvannamalai praying for issuance  of  permanent  injunction  against  the
respondent-Society.  The said suit  was,  however,  dismissed.   As  against
that, the appellant preferred an appeal in A.S. No.94 of 2001  on  the  file
of the Additional District Judge, Tiruvannamalai and  the  said  appeal  was
allowed and consequently, the appellant’s suit was decreed.  The respondent-
Society preferred a Second Appeal in S.A. No.1973 of 2002  before  the  High
Court of Madras against the said judgment of the Additional District Judge.


6.    The respondent-Society during the pendency of Second  Appeal  filed  a
suit in O.S.  No.239  of  2003  before  the  Additional  Subordinate  Judge,
Tiruvannamalai praying for declaration of title and recovery  of  possession
of the suit property comprised in  T.S.  No.1646/1  of  Tiruvannamalai  Town
having an extent of 70 feet east to west and 30 feet north to south  bearing
Old Door No.116 and New Door No.65.  The said suit  was  decreed  as  prayed
for.  Against that, the appellant preferred an appeal in A.S. No.19 of  2008
on the file  of  the  Additional  District  Judge,  Tiruvannamalai  and  the
decision of the  trial  court  was  reversed  in  Appeal  resulting  in  the
dismissal of the suit filed by the  respondent-Society.   Aggrieved  against
the appeal being allowed and  the  suit  being  dismissed,  the  respondent-
Society preferred a Second Appeal in S.A. No.869 of  2009  before  the  High
Court of Madras.  The learned Judge of the Madras High Court heard both  the
aforesaid Second Appeals together and by a common  judgment  set  aside  the
well-considered judgments of the First Appellate Court.   Aggrieved  by  the
said common impugned judgment, the appellant has preferred these appeals  by
way of special leave.

7.    It may be pertinent to mention that the appellant filed Original  Suit
No.1143 of 1994 and also filed the following documents :-
1.    20.11.1899 Certified copy of the registered agreement
                       between Krishnasamy Raju and others

2.    Certified copy of the  bye-law  of  the  plaintiff  Sangam(respondent-
                       Society before us)

3.    Certified  copy  of  Memorandum  of  Association  of  plaintiff-Sangam
                       (respondent-Society before us)

4.    Certified copy of Registration Certificate

5.    Certified copy of field Map Book Plan

6.    Certified copy of Town Survey Field Register

7.    Certified copy of Demand Register Extent

8.    Certified copy of Tax receipts (9)

9.    Certified copy of Indemnity Card by Munusamy

10.   Certified copy of Ration Card of Munusamy

11.   Certified copy of  account  of  plaintiff  Sangam  (respondent-Society
                       before us)


12.   Certified copy of photocopy of Silesasanam

13.      14.5.29 Copy of application by the  President  of  plaintiff-Sangam
                       to Municipal Chairman

14.        24.2.32       Copy  of  the  application  by  the  President   of
                       plaintiff-Sangam to Municipal Chairman

15.      17.8.2001     Certified copy of judgment in  O.S.  No.  1143/94  of
                       District Munsif Court, Tiruvannamalai

16.      31.5.2002     Certified copy of  judgment  in  A.S.  No.94/2001  of
                       Additional District Judge, Tiruvannamalai

17.      2000-02 House Tax Receipt

18.      2001-02        House Tax Receipt

19.      2002-03        House Tax Receipt

20.   Xerox copy of the Minutes Book pages 13 to 19.




8.    The trial  court  on  the  basis  of  the  pleadings  has  framed  the
following issues:-
        1. Whether the plaintiff has the right to possession and  enjoyment
           of the suit property?


        2. Whether the plaintiff and his  father  have  obtained  right  of
           enjoyment through adverse enjoyment?

        3. As per the averments on the defendant’s side, is  it  true  that
           the plaintiff’s father in the capacity of the  watchman  of  the
           suit property has been in enjoyment of the suit property?

        4. Whether the plaintiff is  entitled  to  a  relief  of  permanent
           injunction as prayed for by him?

        5. Other relief?



9.    In Suit No. 239 of 2003 filed by the  respondent-Society  against  the
appellant seeking  a  decree  for  possession,  the  following  issues  were
framed:-
        1. Whether the plaintiff Association  is  competent  to  file  this
           case?
        2.Whether the plaint property belongs to the plaintiff’s club?
        3. Is it right that the defendant’s father Appadurai Pillai in  the
           capacity of a Watchman, has been maintaining the suit property?
        4. When there is a Second Appeal pending before the High  Court  in
           S.A. No.1923 of 2002 against the  judgment  and  decree  of  the
           Court of the District  Munsif  in  O.S.  No.  1143  of  1994  is
           sustainable.
        5. Whether the defendant has acquired the right  of  possession  in
           the plaint property due to adverse possession?
        6. Whether this case has been procedurally evaluated for the  court
           fee and jurisdiction?
        7. Is the Court competent to try this Court?
        8.  To what other relief is the plaintiff entitled to?

10.   The trial court in Suit No.1143 of 1994 has held  that  the  appellant
was in possession of the suit  property  in  the  capacity  of  a  Watchman.
Regarding Issue No. 3, the trial court has observed as under:
      “… … …As per the July 1949 register Ex.D5 it is established  that  the
      plaintiff’s father has been employed as a watchman in the association.
       Further, it has already been decided that the suit  property  belongs
      to the defendants Association.  Further it has also been decided  that
      apart from that the plaintiff’s father has only been a watchman to the
      suit property.  Only source of  the  plaintiff’s  father  had  been  a
      watchman, he was permitted to stay in a portion in the  suit  property
      only because of that he had not instituted a case for the total extent
      110 x 56 feet but only for the extent of 70 x 30 feet.  He admits that
      the remaining portion is in the possession of the association.  It  is
      true  that  only  for  this  reason  the  defendants  association  has
      permitted that plaintiff and his family members to reside in the  suit
      property.  It is evident that only in the status of  a  watchman  that
      the plaintiff’s father has been occupying a portion in the suit survey
      number.  This issue is decided accordingly.”




11.   Regarding Issue No. 2 of adverse possession,  the  trial  court  found
that the appellant’s father was employed  by  the  respondent-Society  as  a
Watchman on a petty monthly salary and in that capacity he  was  allowed  to
stay in the suit property.  The appellant did not acquire the suit  property
by adverse  possession  and  the  issue  was  rightly  decided  against  the
appellant by the trial court.


12.   Regarding issue No. 4, the trial  court  found  that  the  appellant’s
father was residing in the suit premises as a Watchman and after  his  death
the appellant was also allowed to continue to stay in the suit  property  as
a Watchman.




13.   The trial court  relied  on  a  judgment  of  the  Madras  High  Court
reported in Alagi Alamelu Achi v. Ponniah Mudaliar AIR 1962 Madras 149.  The
Court held that a person in  wrongful  possession  is  not  entitled  to  be
protected against lawful owner by an order of injunction.




14.   The trial court also came to a definite conclusion that the  appellant
has concealed certain vital facts and has  not  approached  the  Court  with
clean  hands  and  consequently,  he  is  not  entitled  to  the  grant   of
discretionary relief of injunction.


15.   The First Appellate Court reversed the judgment  of  the  trial  court
and held that the  appellant  was  entitled  to  the  relief  of  injunction
because of his long possession of the suit property.   The  First  Appellate
Court also set aside the decree passed by the trial court in O.S. No.239  of
2003.




16.   The Suit No. 239 was decreed  against  the  appellant.   Aggrieved  by
this, the appellant preferred First Appeal before the District  Judge  which
was allowed on 3rd April, 2009.  Aggrieved by this judgment, the respondent-
Society filed a Second Appeal before the High Court which was allowed.   The
High Court heard both the appeals filed by the  respondent-Society  and  the
same were allowed by a common judgment dated 20th April, 2011.

17.   The High Court by a detailed reasoning, set aside the judgment of  the
First Appellate Court and held  that  the  First  Appellate  Court  was  not
justified in reversing the judgments passed by the trial court in  both  the
abovementioned suits, O.S. No.1143 of 1994 and  O.S.  No.239  of  2003.  The
appellant, aggrieved by the said judgment, has preferred these two  appeals.
We propose to decide both these appeals by this common judgment.

18.   We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant at length.


19.   In our considered view, a well-reasoned judgment and a  decree  passed
by the trial court ought not to have been reversed by  the  First  Appellate
Court.  It is reiterated that  the  appellant’s  father  was  engaged  as  a
Watchman on a monthly salary and in that capacity he was allowed to stay  in
the suit premises and  after  his  death  his  son  (the  appellant  herein)
continued to serve the respondent-Society as a Watchman and was  allowed  to
live in the premises.  The property is admittedly owned by  the  respondent-
Society.


20.   The appellant has also failed to prove the adverse possession  of  the
suit property.  Only  by  obtaining  the  ration  card  and  the  house  tax
receipts, the appellant cannot strengthen his claim of  adverse  possession.
The High Court was fully justified in reversing the judgment  of  the  First
Appellate Court and restoring the judgment  of  the  trial  court.   In  our
considered opinion, no interference is called for.

21.   This  case  demonstrates  widely  prevalent  state  of  affairs  where
litigants  raise  disputes  and  cause  litigation  and  then  obstruct  the
progress of the case only because they stand to gain by doing so.  It  is  a
matter of common experience that the Court’s otherwise scarce resources  are
spent in dealing with non-deserving cases and unfortunately those  who  were
waiting in the queue for justice in  genuine  cases  usually  suffer.   This
case is a typical example of delayed administration of civil justice in  our
Courts.  A small suit, where the appellant was directed to be  evicted  from
the premises in 1994, took 17 years before the matter  was  decided  by  the
High Court.   Unscrupulous litigants are encouraged to file frivolous  cases
to take undue advantage of the judicial system.

22.   The question often arises as to how we can solve  this  menace  within
the frame work of law.  A serious endeavour has been  made  as  to  how  the
present system can be improved to a large extent.   In  the  case  of  Maria
Margarida Sequeria Fernandes and Others  v. Erasmo Jack de  Sequeria  (Dead)
through L.Rs. (2012) 3 SCALE 550 (of which one of us, Bhandari, J.  was  the
author of the judgment), this Court had laid stress on purity  of  pleadings
in civil cases.  We deem it appropriate to set out paras 61 to  79  of  that
judgment dealing with broad guidelines  provided  by  the  Court  which  are
equally relevant in this case:-
           “61.  In civil cases,  pleadings  are  extremely  important  for
           ascertaining  the  title  and  possession  of  the  property  in
           question.
           62.   Possession  is  an  incidence  of  ownership  and  can  be
           transferred by the owner of an  immovable  property  to  another
           such as in a mortgage or lease.  A licensee holds possession  on
           behalf of the owner.


           63.   Possession is important when there are no title  documents
           and other relevant records before   the  Court,  but,  once  the
           documents and records of title come before the Court, it is  the
           title which has to be looked at first and due weightage be given
           to it.  Possession cannot be considered in vacuum.


           64.   There is a presumption that possession of a person,  other
           than the owner, if at all it is  to  be  called  possession,  is
           permissive on behalf of the title-holder.   Further,  possession
           of the past is one thing, and the right to remain or continue in
           future is another thing.  It is the latter which is usually more
           in controversy than the former, and it is the latter  which  has
           seen much abuse and misuse before the Courts.


           65.   A suit can be filed by the title holder  for  recovery  of
           possession or it can be one for ejectment of an ex-lessee or for
           mandatory injunction requiring a person to remove himself or  it
           can be a suit under Section 6 of  the  Specific  Relief  Act  to
           recover possession.


           66.   A title  suit  for  possession  has  two  parts  –  first,
           adjudication of title, and second, adjudication  of  possession.
           If the title dispute is removed and the title is established  in
           one or the other,  then,  in  effect,  it  becomes  a  suit  for
           ejectment where the defendant must plead and prove why  he  must
           not be ejected.


           67.   In an action  for  recovery  of  possession  of  immovable
           property, or for protecting possession thereof, upon  the  legal
           title to the  property  being  established,  the  possession  or
           occupation of the property by a person other than the holder  of
           the legal title will be presumed  to  have  been  under  and  in
           subordination to the legal title, and it will be for the  person
           resisting a claim for recovery of possession or claiming a right
           to continue in possession, to  establish  that  he  has  such  a
           right. To put it differently, wherever pleadings  and  documents
           establish title to a particular property and  possession  is  in
           question, it will be  for  the  person  in  possession  to  give
           sufficiently detailed pleadings, particulars  and  documents  to
           support his claim in order to continue in possession.


           68.   In order to do justice, it  is  necessary  to  direct  the
           parties to give  all  details  of  pleadings  with  particulars.
           Once the title is prima facie established, it is for the  person
           who is resisting the title holder’s claim to possession to plead
           with sufficient particularity on  the  basis  of  his  claim  to
           remain in  possession  and  place  before  the  Court  all  such
           documents as  in  the  ordinary  course  of  human  affairs  are
           expected to be there.  Only if  the  pleadings  are  sufficient,
           would an issue be struck and the matter sent to trial, where the
           onus will be on him to prove the averred facts and documents.


           69.   The person averring a  right  to  continue  in  possession
           shall, as  far  as  possible,  give  a  detailed  particularized
           specific pleading along with documents to support his claim  and
           details of subsequent conduct which establish his possession.


           70.   It would be imperative that one who claims possession must
           give all such details as enumerated hereunder.   They  are  only
           illustrative and not exhaustive.
                    a) who is or are the owner or owners of the property;
                    b) title of the property;
                    c) who is in possession of the title documents
                    d) identity of the claimant or claimants to possession;
                    e) the date of entry into possession;
                    f) how he came into possession -  whether  he  purchased
                       the property or inherited or got the same in gift  or
                       by any other method;
                    g) in case  he  purchased  the  property,  what  is  the
                       consideration; if he has taken it on rent,  how  much
                       is the rent, license fee or lease amount;
                    h) if taken on rent, license fee or lease - then  insist
                       on rent deed, license deed or lease deed;
                    i) who  are  the  persons  in  possession/occupation  or
                       otherwise living  with  him,  in  what  capacity;  as
                       family members, friends or servants etc.;
                    j) subsequent conduct, i.e., any event which might  have
                       extinguished his entitlement to possession or  caused
                       shift therein; and
                    k) basis of his claim that not to deliver possession but
                       continue in possession.


           71.   Apart from these  pleadings,  the  Court  must  insist  on
           documentary proof  in  support  of  the  pleadings.   All  those
           documents would be relevant which come into existence after  the
           transfer of  title  or  possession  or  the  encumbrance  as  is
           claimed.   While dealing with the civil suits, at the threshold,
           the Court must carefully and critically  examine  pleadings  and
           documents.


           72.   The Court will examine the pleadings  for  specificity  as
           also the supporting  material  for  sufficiency  and  then  pass
           appropriate orders.


           73.   Discovery and  production  of  documents  and  answers  to
           interrogatories, together with an approach of  considering  what
           in ordinary course of human affairs is more likely to have  been
           the probability, will prevent many a false  claims  or  defences
           from sailing beyond the stage for issues.


           74.   If the pleadings do not give sufficient details, they will
           not raise an issue, and the Court can reject the claim or pass a
           decree on admission.


           75.   On vague pleadings, no issue  arises.   Only  when  he  so
           establishes, does  the  question  of  framing  an  issue  arise.
           Framing of issues is an extremely important  stage  in  a  civil
           trial.  Judges are expected to carefully examine  the  pleadings
           and documents before framing of issues in a given case.


           76.   In pleadings, whenever a person claims right  to  continue
           in possession of another property, it becomes necessary for  him
           to plead with specificity about who was the owner, on what  date
           did he enter into possession,  in  what  capacity  and  in  what
           manner did he conduct his relationship with the owner  over  the
           years till the date of suit.  He must also give details on  what
           basis he is claiming a right to continue in  possession.   Until
           the pleadings raise a sufficient case, they will not  constitute
           sufficient claim of defence.


           77.   XXXX        XXXX       XXXX


           78.   The Court must  ensure  that  pleadings  of  a  case  must
           contain sufficient particulars.  Insistence on  details  reduces
           the ability to put forward a  non-existent  or  false  claim  or
           defence.


           79.   In dealing with a civil case, pleadings,  title  documents
           and relevant records play a vital role and that would ordinarily
           decide the fate of the case.”




23.   We reiterate  the  immense  importance  and  relevance  of  purity  of
pleadings.  The pleadings need to be critically  examined  by  the  judicial
officers or judges both before issuing  the  ad  interim  injunction  and/or
framing of issues.


ENTIRE JOURNEY OF A JUDGE IS TO DISCERN THE TRUTH
24.   The entire journey of a  judge  is  to  discern  the  truth  from  the
pleadings, documents and arguments of the parties.  Truth is  the  basis  of
justice delivery system.  This Court in Dalip Singh v.  State  of  U.P.  and
Others (2010) 2 SCC 114 observed  that truth constitutes  an  integral  part
of the justice delivery system which was in vogue  in  pre-independence  era
and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the  courts  irrespective
of the consequences.  However, post-independence  period  has  seen  drastic
changes in our value system.

25.   This Court in  Maria  Margarida  Sequeria  Fernandes  (supra)  had  an
occasion to deal with the same aspect.  According  to  us,  observations  in
paragraphs 31 to 52 are absolutely germane as  these  paragraphs  deal  with
relevant cases which have enormous bearing on the facts  of  this  case,  so
these paragraphs are reproduced hereunder:-


        “31.      In  this  unfortunate  litigation,  the  Court’s  serious
        endeavour has to be to find out where in fact the truth lies.   The
        truth should be the guiding star in the entire judicial process.
        32.      Truth alone has to be  the  foundation  of  justice.   The
        entire judicial system has been created only to  discern  and  find
        out the real truth.  Judges at all levels have to seriously  engage
        themselves in the journey of discovering the truth.  That is  their
        mandate, obligation and bounden duty.


        33.      Justice system will acquire credibility only  when  people
        will be convinced that justice is based on the  foundation  of  the
        truth.


        34.      In Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India  1991  Supp  (1)
        SCC 271, this Court observed that in such a  situation  a  question
        that arises for consideration is whether the presiding officer of a
        Court should simply sit as a mere umpire at a contest  between  two
        parties and declare at the end of the combat who has  won  and  who
        has lost or is there not any legal duty of his own, independent  of
        the parties, to take an active role in the proceedings  in  finding
        the truth and administering justice? It  is  a  well  accepted  and
        settled  principle  that  a  Court  must  discharge  its  statutory
        functions-whether discretionary or obligatory-according to  law  in
        dispensing justice because it is the duty of a Court not only to do
        justice but also to ensure that justice is being done.


        35.      What people expect is that the Court should discharge  its
        obligation to find out where in fact the truth  lies.   Right  from
        inception  of  the  judicial  system  it  has  been  accepted  that
        discovery, vindication and establishment  of  truth  are  the  main
        purposes underlying the existence of the courts of justice.


        36.      In Ritesh Tewari and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
        Others (2010)  10  SCC  677  this  Court  reproduced  often  quoted
        quotation which reads as under:
              “Every trial is a voyage of discovery in which truth  is  the
              quest”


        37.      This Court observed that the power is to be exercised with
        an object to subserve the cause of justice and public interest  and
        for getting the evidence in aid of a just decision  and  to  uphold
        the truth.


        38.      Lord Denning, in the case of Jones v.  National Coal Board
         [1957] 2 QB 55 has observed  that:
              “In the system of trial that we evolved in this country,  the
              Judge sits to hear and determine the  issues  raised  by  the
              parties, not to conduct an investigation  or  examination  on
              behalf of the society at large, as happens,  we  believe,  in
              some foreign countries.”




        39.      Certainly, the above, is not true of the  Indian  Judicial
        System.  A judge in the Indian System has to be regarded as failing
        to exercise his jurisdiction and thereby discharging  his  judicial
        duty, if in the guise of  remaining  neutral,  he  opts  to  remain
        passive to the proceedings before him.  He has to  always  keep  in
        mind that “every trial is a voyage of discovery in which  truth  is
        the quest”.  In order to bring on record the relevant fact, he  has
        to play  an  active  role;  no  doubt  within  the  bounds  of  the
        statutorily defined procedural law.


        40.      Lord Denning further observed in the said  case  of  Jones
        (supra) that “‘It’s all very well to paint justice blind,  but  she
        does better without a bandage round her eyes.  She should be  blind
        indeed to favour or prejudice, but clear to see which way lies  the
        truth…”


        41.      World  over,  modern  procedural  Codes  are  increasingly
        relying on full disclosure by the parties.   Managerial  powers  of
        the Judge are being deployed  to  ensure  that  the  scope  of  the
        factual controversy is minimized.


        42.      In civil cases, adherence to Section  30  CPC  would  also
        help in ascertaining the truth.  It seems that this provision which
        ought to be frequently used is rarely pressed  in  service  by  our
        judicial officers and judges.  Section 30 CPC reads as under:-
           30. Power to order discovery and the like.  –  Subject  to  such
           conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, the Court  may,
           at any time either of its own motion or on  the  application  of
           any party, -
                 (a)   make such orders as may be necessary or reasonable in
                       all matters relating to the delivery and answering of
                       interrogatories,  the  admission  of  documents   and
                       facts, and  the  discovery,  inspection,  production,
                       impounding and return of documents or other  material
                       objects producible as evidence;


                 (b)   issue summons to persons whose attendance is required
                       either to give evidence or to  produce  documents  or
                       such other objects as aforesaid;


                    c) order any fact to be proved by affidavit



        43.      "Satyameva Jayate" (Literally: "Truth Stands  Invincible")
        is a mantra from the  ancient  scripture  Mundaka  Upanishad.  Upon
        independence of India, it was adopted  as  the  national  motto  of
        India. It is inscribed in Devanagari script  at  the  base  of  the
        national emblem. The meaning of full mantra is as follows:

              “Truth alone  triumphs;  not  falsehood.  Through  truth  the
              divine path is spread out by which the  sages  whose  desires
              have been completely  fulfilled,  reach  where  that  supreme
              treasure of Truth resides.”




        44.      Malimath Committee on Judicial Reforms heavily  relied  on
        the fact that in discovering truth, the judges of all  Courts  need
        to play an active role.  The Committee observed thus:
              2.2……….  In the  adversarial  system  truth  is  supposed  to
              emerge from the respective versions of the facts presented by
              the prosecution and the defence before a neutral  judge.  The
              judge acts like an umpire to see whether the prosecution  has
              been able to prove the  case  beyond  reasonable  doubt.  The
              State discharges the obligation to protect life, liberty  and
              property of the citizens by taking  suitable  preventive  and
              punitive measures which also serve the object  of  preventing
              private retribution so essential for maintenance of peace and
              law and order in the society doubt and gives the  benefit  of
              doubt to  the accused.  It is the parties that determine  the
              scope of dispute and decide largely, autonomously  and  in  a
              selective manner on the evidence that they decide to  present
              to  the  court.   The   trial   is   oral,   continuous   and
              confrontational.  The  parties   use   cross-examination   of
              witnesses to undermine the  opposing  case  and  to  discover
              information the other side has not brought out.  The judge in
              his anxiety to maintain  his  position  of  neutrality  never
              takes any initiative to discover truth.  He does not  correct
              the aberrations in the investigation  or  in  the  matter  of
              production of evidence before court……..”


              2.15 “The Adversarial System lacks dynamism because it has no
              lofty ideal to inspire.  It has not  been  entrusted  with  a
              positive duty to  discover  truth  as  in  the  Inquisitorial
              System.    When   the   investigation   is   perfunctory   or
              ineffective, Judges seldom take any initiative to remedy  the
              situation.  During the trial, the Judges  do  not  bother  if
              relevant evidence is not produced and plays a passive role as
              he has no duty to search for truth…..”


              2.16.9. Truth being the cherished ideal and ethos  of  India,
              pursuit of truth should be the guiding star of  the  Criminal
              Justice System.  For justice to be done truth  must  prevail.
              It is truth that must protect the innocent and  it  is  truth
              that must be the basis to punish the guilty.   Truth  is  the
              very soul of justice. Therefore truth should become the ideal
              to inspire the courts to pursue.  This  can  be  achieved  by
              statutorily mandating the courts to become active seekers  of
              truth.  It is of seminal importance to inject  vitality  into
              our system if we have to regain the lost  confidence  of  the
              people.  Concern for and duty to seek truth should not become
              the limited concern of  the  courts.  It  should  become  the
              paramount duty of everyone to assist the court in  its  quest
              for truth.




        45.      In Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma (1995) 1 SCC 421  to
        enable the Courts to ward off  unjustified  interference  in  their
        working, those who indulge  in  immoral  acts  like  perjury,  pre-
        variation and motivated falsehoods have to be  appropriately  dealt
        with, without which it would not  be  possible  for  any  Court  to
        administer justice in the true sense and  to  the  satisfaction  of
        those who approach it in  the  hope  that  truth  would  ultimately
        prevail. People would have faith in Courts  when  they  would  find
        that truth alone triumphs in Courts.


        46.      Truth has been foundation of other judicial systems,  such
        as, the United States of America,  the  United  Kingdom  and  other
        countries.


        47.      In James v. Giles et al. v. State of Maryland 386 U.S.  66
        (1967) 87,  S.Ct.  793, the US Supreme  Court,  in  ruling  on  the
        conduct of prosecution in suppressing evidence  favourable  to  the
        defendants and use of  perjured  testimony  held  that  such  rules
        existed for a purpose as a necessary component of  the  search  for
        truth and justice that judges, like prosecutors must undertake.  It
        further held that the State’s  obligation  under  the  Due  Process
        Clause “is not to convict, but to see  that  so  far  as  possible,
        truth emerges.”


        48.      The  obligation  to  pursue  truth  has  been  carried  to
        extremes. Thus, in United States v. J. Lee Havens 446 U.S. 620, 100
        St.Ct.1912, it was held  that  the  government  may  use  illegally
        obtained evidence to impeach a  defendant’s  fraudulent  statements
        during cross-examination for the purpose of  seeking  justice,  for
        the purpose of “arriving at the truth, which is a fundamental  goal
        of our legal system”.


        49.      Justice Cardozo in his widely read  and  appreciated  book
        “The Nature of the Judicial Process”  discusses  the  role  of  the
        judges.  The relevant part is reproduced as under:-
              “There has been a certain lack of candour,” “in much  of  the
              discussion of the theme  [of  judges’  humanity],  or  rather
              perhaps in the refusal to discuss it, as if judges must  lose
              respect and confidence by the reminder that they are  subject
              to human  limitations.”  I  do  not  doubt  the  grandeur  of
              conception which lifts them into the realm  of  pure  reason,
              above and beyond  the  sweep  of  perturbing  and  deflecting
              forces.  None the less, if there is anything of reality in my
              analysis of the judicial process, they do not stand aloof  on
              these chill and distant heights; and we shall  not  help  the
              cause of truth by acting and speaking as if they do.”


        50.      Aharon Barak, President of Israeli Supreme Court from 1995
        to 2006 takes the position that:


              “For issues in which stability  is  actually  more  important
              than the substance of the solution – and there are many  such
              cases – I  will  join  the  majority,  without  restating  my
              dissent each time.  Only when my dissenting opinion  reflects
              an issue that is central for me – that goes to the core of my
              role as a judge – will I not capitulate, and will I  continue
              to restate my dissenting opinion: “Truth or stability – truth
              is preferable”.


                    “On  the  contrary,  public  confidence   means   ruling
              according to the law and according to the judge’s conscience,
              whatever  the  attitude  of  the  public  may   be.    Public
              confidence  means  giving  expression  to  history,  not   to
              hysteria.  Public confidence is ensured  by  the  recognition
              that the judge is doing justice within the framework  of  the
              law and its provisions.  Judges must act – inside and outside
              the court – in a manner that preserves public  confidence  in
              them.  They must understand that judging is not merely a  job
              but a way of life. It is a way of life that does not  include
              the pursuit of material wealth or publicity; it is a  way  of
              life based on spiritual wealth; it is  a  way  of  life  that
              includes an objective and impartial search for truth.”




        51.      In the administration of justice, judges and lawyers  play
        equal roles.  Like judges, lawyers  also  must  ensure  that  truth
        triumphs in the administration of justice.


        52.      Truth is  the  foundation  of  justice.  It  must  be  the
        endeavour of all the judicial  officers  and  judges  to  ascertain
        truth in every matter and no  stone  should  be  left  unturned  in
        achieving this object.  Courts must give greater  emphasis  on  the
        veracity of pleadings and  documents  in  order  to  ascertain  the
        truth.”

26.   As stated in the preceding paragraphs, the  pleadings  are  foundation
of litigation but experience reveals that sufficient attention is  not  paid
to the pleadings and documents by the judicial officers before dealing  with
the case.  It  is  the  bounden  duty  and  obligation  of  the  parties  to
investigate  and  satisfy  themselves  as  to  the   correctness   and   the
authenticity of the matter pleaded.

27.   The pleadings must set-forth sufficient factual details to the  extent
that it reduces the ability to put forward a false or exaggerated  claim  or
defence.  The pleadings must inspire confidence and credibility.   If  false
averments, evasive denials or false denials are introduced, then  the  Court
must carefully look into it while deciding a case and insist that those  who
approach the Court must approach it with clean hands.

28.   It is imperative that judges must have  complete  grip  of  the  facts
before they start dealing with  the  case.   That  would  avoid  unnecessary
delay in disposal of the cases.

29.    Ensuring  discovery  and  production  of  documents  and   a   proper
admission/denial  is  imperative  for  deciding  civil  cases  in  a  proper
perspective.    In   relevant   cases,   the   Courts    should    encourage
interrogatories to be administered.

FRAMING OF ISSUES
30.   Framing of issues is a very important stage of a civil trial.   It  is
imperative for a judge to critically examine the pleadings  of  the  parties
before framing of issues.  Rule 2 of Order X CPC enables the Court,  in  its
search for the truth, to go to the core of the matter and  narrow  down,  or
even eliminate the controversy.  Rule 2 of Order X reads as under:-
                 “2. Oral examination of party, or companion of party. – (1)
           At the first hearing of the suit, the Court -


                 (a)   shall,  with  a  view  to  elucidating   matters   in
                       controversy in the suit, examine orally such  of  the
                       parties to the suit appearing in person or present in
                       Court, as it deems fit; and


                 (b)   may orally examine any person,  able  to  answer  any
                       material question relating to the suit, by  whom  any
                       party appearing in person or present in Court or  his
                       pleader is accompanied.



                 (2)   xxx        xxx         xxx


                 (3)   xxx        xxx         xxx

31.   It is a useful procedural device and must be  regularly  pressed  into
service.  As per Rule 2 (3) of Order X CPC, the Court may if it thinks  fit,
put in the course of such examination questions suggested by  either  party.
Rule 2 (3) of Order X CPC reads as under:-
           “2.      (1)     xxx         xxx        xxx
                   (2)  xxx       xxx         xxx


                  (3)  The Court may, if it thinks fit, put in the course of
           an examination under this rule  questions  suggested  by  either
           party.”


32.   If issues are properly framed, the controversy  in  the  case  can  be
clearly focused and documents can be properly  appreciated  in  that  light.
The relevant evidence can also be carefully examined.   Careful  framing  of
issues also helps in proper examination and cross-examination  of  witnesses
and final arguments in the case.

GRANT OR REFUSAL OF INJUNCTION
33.   In Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes  (supra),  this  Court  examined
the importance of grant or refusal of an injunction in paras 86 to 89  which
read as under:-
        “86.     Grant or refusal of an injunction in a civil suit  is  the
        most important stage  in  the  civil  trial.   Due  care,  caution,
        diligence and attention must be bestowed by the  judicial  officers
        and judges while granting or refusing injunction.  In  most  cases,
        the fate of  the  case  is  decided  by  grant  or  refusal  of  an
        injunction.  Experience  has  shown  that  once  an  injunction  is
        granted, getting it  vacated  would  become  a  nightmare  for  the
        defendant.  In order to grant or refuse  injunction,  the  judicial
        officer or the judge must carefully examine  the  entire  pleadings
        and documents with utmost care and seriousness.


        87.      The safe and better course is  to  give  short  notice  on
        injunction application and pass an appropriate order after  hearing
        both the sides.  In case of grave urgency, if it becomes imperative
        to grant an ex-parte ad interim injunction, it  should  be  granted
        for a specified period, such as, for two weeks.   In  those  cases,
        the plaintiff will have no inherent interest in  delaying  disposal
        of injunction application after obtaining an  ex-parte  ad  interim
        injunction.  The Court, in order to avoid abuse of the  process  of
        law may also record in the injunction order that  if  the  suit  is
        eventually dismissed, the plaintiff undertakes to pay  restitution,
        actual or realistic costs.  While passing the order, the Court must
        take into consideration the pragmatic  realities  and  pass  proper
        order for mesne profits.  The Court must make serious endeavour  to
        ensure that even-handed justice is given to both the parties.


        88.      Ordinarily, three main  principles  govern  the  grant  or
        refusal of injunction.
                    a) prima facie case;
                    b) balance of convenience; and
                    c) irreparable injury, which guide  the  Court  in  this
                       regard.
        89.       In  the  broad  category  of  prima  facie  case,  it  is
        imperative for the Court to carefully analyse the pleadings and the
        documents on record and only  on  that  basis  the  Court  must  be
        governed by  the  prima  facie  case.   In  grant  and  refusal  of
        injunction, pleadings and documents play vital role.”

RESTITUTION AND MESNE PROFITS
34.   Experience reveals that a large number of cases  are  filed  on  false
claims or evasive pleas are introduced by the defendant to  cause  delay  in
the administration of justice and this can be sufficiently taken care of  if
the Courts adopt realistic approach granting restitution. This Court in  the
case of  Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi (2011) 8 SCC 249  (of which  one
of us, Bhandari, J. was the author of the judgment) in paragraph  52  (C,  D
and G) of the judgment dealt with the aspect  of  imposition  of  actual  or
realistic costs which  are equally relevant for this case reads as under:-

        “C. Imposition  of  actual,  realistic  or  proper  costs   and  or
           ordering prosecution would go a  long  way  in  controlling  the
           tendency  of  introducing  false  pleadings   and   forged   and
           fabricated documents by  the  litigants.   Imposition  of  heavy
           costs  would  also  control  unnecessary  adjournments  by   the
           parties.   In appropriate cases the courts may consider ordering
           prosecution otherwise it may not be possible to maintain  purity
           and sanctity of judicial proceedings.


     D.    The  Court  must  adopt  realistic  and  pragmatic  approach  in
        granting mesne profits.  The Court must carefully keep in view  the
        ground realities while granting mesne profits.


     G.     The principle of restitution be fully applied  in  a  pragmatic
        manner in order to do real and substantial justice.”




35.   Unless wrongdoers are denied profit or undue  benefit  from  frivolous
litigations, it would be difficult to control  frivolous  and  uncalled  for
litigations.  Experience  also  reveals  that  our  Courts  have  been  very
reluctant to grant the actual or realistic costs.  We would like to  explain
this by giving this illustration.  When a litigant  is  compelled  to  spend
Rs.1 lac on a frivolous litigation there  is  hardly  any  justification  in
awarding Rs. 1,000/- as costs unless  there  are  special  circumstances  of
that case.   We need to decide cases while keeping  pragmatic  realities  in
view.  We have to ensure that unscrupulous  litigant  is  not  permitted  to
derive any benefit by abusing the judicial process.

36.   This Court in another important case  in Indian  Council  for  Enviro-
Legal Action v. Union of India and Others (2011) 8 SCC 161 (of which one  of
us, Bhandari, J. was the author of the judgment) had  an  occasion  to  deal
with the concept of restitution.  The relevant paragraphs of  that  judgment
dealing with relevant judgments are reproduced hereunder:-


      193.  This Court in Grindlays Bank  Limited  v.  Income  Tax  Officer,
      Calcutta  (1980) 2 SCC 191 observed as under :-
                  “…When passing such orders the High  Court  draws  on  its
               inherent power to make all such orders as are necessary  for
               doing complete justice between the parties.   The  interests
               of justice require that any undeserved or  unfair  advantage
               gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court, by
               the mere circumstance that it has initiated a proceeding  in
               the court, must be neutralised.   The  simple  fact  of  the
               institution of litigation by itself should not be  permitted
               to confer an advantage on the party responsible for it. …”


      194.  In Ram Krishna Verma and Others v.  State  of  U.P.  and  Others
      (1992) 2 SCC 620 this Court observed as under :-
                   “The  50  operators  including  the  appellants/  private
             operators have been running their stage  carriages  by  blatant
             abuse of the process of the court by delaying  the  hearing  as
             directed in Jeevan Nath Bahl’s case and the High Court  earlier
             thereto.  As a fact, on the expiry of  the  initial  period  of
             grant after Sept. 29,  1959  they  lost  the  right  to  obtain
             renewal or to ply their vehicles, as this  Court  declared  the
             scheme to be operative.  However, by sheer abuse of the process
             of law they  are  continuing  to  ply  their  vehicles  pending
             hearing of the objections.  This Court in Grindlays  Bank  Ltd.
             vs Income-tax Officer -  [1990] 2 SCC 191 held  that  the  High
             Court while exercising its power under Article 226 the interest
             of justice requires that any  undeserved  or  unfair  advantage
             gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the  court  must
             be neutralised.  It was further held that  the  institution  of
             the litigation by it should  not  be  permitted  to  confer  an
             unfair advantage on the party responsible for it.  In the light
             of that law and in view of the power under  Article  142(1)  of
             the Constitution this Court, while exercising its  jurisdiction
             would do complete justice and neutralise the  unfair  advantage
             gained by the 50 operators including the appellants in dragging
             the litigation to run the stage carriages on the approved route
             or area or portion thereof and forfeited their right to hearing
             of the objections filed by them to the draft scheme dated  Feb.
             26, 1959.   …”


      195.  This Court in Kavita Trehan vs Balsara Hygiene Products (1994) 5
      SCC 380 observed as under :-


                  “The jurisdiction to make restitution is inherent in every
             court and will be exercised whenever the justice  of  the  case
             demands.  It will be exercised under inherent powers where  the
             case did not strictly fall within the  ambit  of  Section  144.
             Section 144 opens with the words “Where and  in  so  far  as  a
             decree or an  order  is  varied  or  reversed  in  any  appeal,
             revision or other proceeding or is set aside or modified in any
             suit instituted for the purpose, ...”.  The  instant  case  may
             not strictly fall within the terms  of  Section  144;  but  the
             aggrieved party in such a case can appeal  to  the  larger  and
             general powers of restitution inherent in every court.”


      196.  This Court in Marshall Sons & Co. (I) Ltd. v. Sahi Oretrans  (P)
      Ltd. and Another (1999) 2 SCC 325 observed as under :-


                  “From the narration of the facts, though it appears to us,
           prima facie, that a decree in favour of  the  appellant  is  not
           being executed for some reason or the other, we do not think  it
           proper at this stage to direct the  respondent  to  deliver  the
           possession  to  the  appellant  since  the  suit  filed  by  the
           respondent is still pending.  It is true  that  proceedings  are
           dragged for a long time  on  one  count  or  the  other  and  on
           occasion  become  highly  technical  accompanied   by   unending
           prolixity, at every stage providing a legal trap to the  unwary.
           Because of the delay unscrupulous  parties  to  the  proceedings
           take undue advantage and person who is  in  wrongful  possession
           draws delight in delay in disposal of the cases by taking  undue
           advantage of procedural complications.  It is  also  known  fact
           that after  obtaining  a  decree  for  possession  of  immovable
           property, its execution takes long time.  In  such  a  situation
           for  protecting  the  interest  of  judgment  creditor,  it   is
           necessary to pass appropriate order  so  that  reasonable  mesne
           profit which may be equivalent to the market rent is paid  by  a
           person who is holding over the property.  In appropriate  cases,
           Court may appoint Receiver and direct the person who is  holding
           over the property to act as an agent  of  the  Receiver  with  a
           direction to deposit the royalty amount fixed by the Receiver or
           pass such other order which may meet the  interest  of  justice.
           This may prevent further injury to the plaintiff in whose favour
           decree is passed and to protect the property  including  further
           alienation.”


      197.  In Padmawati v. Harijan Sewak Sangh - CM (Main) No.449  of  2002
      decided by the Delhi high Court  on  6.11.2008,  the   court  held  as
      under:-


                       “The case at hand shows that frivolous  defences  and
             frivolous litigation is a calculated venture involving no risks
             situation.  You have only to engage  professionals  to  prolong
             the litigation so as to deprive the  rights  of  a  person  and
             enjoy the fruits of illegalities.   I  consider  that  in  such
             cases where Court finds that using the  Courts  as  a  tool,  a
             litigant has perpetuated illegalities  or  has  perpetuated  an
             illegal  possession,  the  Court  must  impose  costs  on  such
             litigants which should be equal to the benefits derived by  the
             litigant and harm and  deprivation  suffered  by  the  rightful
             person so as to check the frivolous litigation and prevent  the
             people from reaping a rich harvest of illegal acts through  the
             Court. One of the aims of every judicial system has  to  be  to
             discourage unjust enrichment using Courts as a tool.  The costs
             imposed by the Courts must in all  cases  should  be  the  real
             costs equal to deprivation suffered by the rightful person.”


      198.  We approve the findings of  the  High  Court  of  Delhi  in  the
      aforementioned case.


      199.   The Court also  stated  “Before  parting  with  this  case,  we
      consider it necessary to observe that one of the main reasons for over-
      flowing of court dockets is the  frivolous  litigation  in  which  the
      Courts are engaged by the litigants and which is dragged  as  long  as
      possible.  Even if these litigants  ultimately  loose  the  lis,  they
      become the real victors and have the last laugh.  This class of people
      who perpetuate illegal acts by obtaining stays  and  injunctions  from
      the Courts must be made to  pay  the  sufferer  not  only  the  entire
      illegal gains made by them as costs to  the  person  deprived  of  his
      right and also must be burdened with exemplary costs.  Faith of people
      in judiciary can only be sustained if the persons on the right side of
      the law do not feel that even if they keep fighting for justice in the
      Court and ultimately win, they would turn  out  to  be  a  fool  since
      winning a case after 20 or 30  years  would  make  wrongdoer  as  real
      gainer, who had reaped the benefits for all  those  years.   Thus,  it
      becomes the duty of  the  Courts  to  see  that  such  wrongdoers  are
      discouraged at every step and even if they succeed in  prolonging  the
      litigation due to their money power, ultimately they must  suffer  the
      costs of all  these  years  long  litigation.  Despite  settled  legal
      positions, the obvious wrong doers, use one  after  another   tier  of
      judicial review mechanism as a gamble, knowing fully well that dice is
      always loaded in their favour, since  even  if  they  lose,  the  time
      gained is the real gain.  This  situation  must  be  redeemed  by  the
      Courts”.


            200.  Against this judgment, Special Leave to Appeal (Civil)  No
      29197/2008  was  preferred  to  this  Court.   The  Court  passed  the
      following order:
                  “We have heard learned counsel appearing for the  parties.
             We  find  no  ground  to  interfere  with  the  well-considered
             judgment passed by the High Court.  The Special Leave  Petition
             is, accordingly, dismissed.”


      208. In Marshall sons and Company (I) Limited  v.  Sahi  Oretrans  (P)
      Limited and Another (1999) 2 SCC 325 this  Court  in  para  4  of  the
      judgment observed as under:

              “…It is true that proceedings are dragged for a long time  on
           one count or the other and, on occasion, become highly technical
           accompanied by unending prolixity at  every  stage  providing  a
           legal trap to the unwary. Because  of  the  delay,  unscrupulous
           parties to the proceedings take undue advantage and a person who
           is in wrongful possession draws delight in delay in disposal  of
           the cases by taking undue advantage of procedural complications.
           It is also a known  fact  that  after  obtaining  a  decree  for
           possession of immovable property, its  execution  takes  a  long
           time. In such a situation, for protecting the  interest  of  the
           judgment-creditor, it is necessary to pass appropriate orders so
           that reasonable mesne profit which  may  be  equivalent  to  the
           market rent is  paid  by  a  person  who  is  holding  over  the
           property. In appropriate cases, the court may appoint a Receiver
           and direct the person who is holding over the property to act as
           an agent of the Receiver with a direction to deposit the royalty
           amount fixed by the Receiver or pass such other order which  may
           meet the interest of justice. This may prevent further injury to
           the plaintiff in whose  favour  the  decree  is  passed  and  to
           protect the property including further alienation. …”




      209. In Ouseph Mathai and Others v. M. Abdul Khadir  (2002) 1 SCC  319
      this Court reiterated the legal position that the stay granted by  the
      Court does not confer a right upon a party and it  is  granted  always
      subject to the final result of the matter in the Court and at the risk
      and costs of the party obtaining the stay.  After  the  dismissal,  of
      the lis, the party  concerned  is  relegated  to  the  position  which
      existed prior to the filing of the petition in  the  Court  which  had
      granted the stay.  Grant of stay  does  not  automatically  amount  to
      extension of a statutory protection.




      210.  This Court in South Eastern Coalfields  Limited   v.   State  of
      M.P. and others (2003)  8  SCC  648  on  examining  the  principle  of
      restitution in para 26 of the judgment observed as under:
           “In our opinion, the principle of restitution takes care of this
           submission. The word “restitution”  in  its  etymological  sense
           means restoring to a party on  the  modification,  variation  or
           reversal of a decree or order, what has  been  lost  to  him  in
           execution  of  decree  or  order  of  the  court  or  in  direct
           consequence of a decree or order (see Zafar  Khan  v.  Board  of
           Revenue, U.P   -   (1984)   Supp  SCC  505)  In  law,  the  term
           “restitution” is used in three senses: (i) return or restoration
           of some specific thing to its rightful  owner  or  status;  (ii)
           compensation for benefits derived from a wrong done to  another;
           and (iii) compensation or reparation  for  the  loss  caused  to
           another.”




      211. The Court in para 28 of the  aforesaid  judgment  very  carefully
      mentioned that the litigation should not turn into a fruitful industry
      and observed as under:




           “… … …Litigation may  turn  into  a  fruitful  industry.  Though
           litigation is not gambling yet there is an element of chance  in
           every litigation. Unscrupulous litigants may feel encouraged  to
           approach the courts, persuading the court to pass  interlocutory
           orders favourable to them by making out a prima facie case  when
           the issues are yet to be heard and determined on merits  and  if
           the concept of  restitution  is  excluded  from  application  to
           interim orders,  then  the  litigant  would  stand  to  gain  by
           swallowing the benefits yielding out of the interim  order  even
           though the battle has been lost  at  the  end.  This  cannot  be
           countenanced.  We  are,  therefore,  of  the  opinion  that  the
           successful party finally held entitled to a relief assessable in
           terms of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled  to  be
           compensated by award of interest at a suitable  reasonable  rate
           for the  period  for  which  the  interim  order  of  the  court
           withholding the release of money had remained in operation.”




      212. The Court in the aforesaid judgment also observed that  once  the
      doctrine of restitution is attracted, the interest is often  a  normal
      relief given in restitution.  Such interest is not controlled  by  the
      provisions of the Interest Act of 1839 or 1978.




      213. In a relatively recent judgment of this Court in  Amarjeet  Singh
      and Others  v.  Devi Ratan and Others (2010) 1 SCC 417  the  Court  in
      para 17 of the judgment observed as under:


           “No litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency  of  case
           in a court of law, as the interim order  always  merges  in  the
           final order to be passed in the case and if the writ petition is
           ultimately  dismissed,  the  interim  order   stands   nullified
           automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit  of
           its own wrongs by getting an interim order and thereafter  blame
           the court. The fact that the writ is found,  ultimately,  devoid
           of any merit, shows that a  frivolous  writ  petition  had  been
           filed. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, which means that
           the act of the court shall prejudice no one, becomes  applicable
           in such a case. In such a fact situation the court is  under  an
           obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act  of  the
           court. Thus, any undeserved or  unfair  advantage  gained  by  a
           party  invoking  the  jurisdiction  of   the   court   must   be
           neutralised,  as  the  institution  of  litigation   cannot   be
           permitted to confer any  advantage  on  a  suitor  from  delayed
           action by the act of the court. … …”


      215.  In consonance with the concept of restitution, it  was  observed
      that courts should be careful  and  pass  an  order  neutralizing  the
      effect of all consequential orders passed in pursuance of the  interim
      orders passed by the court.  Such express directions may be  necessary
      to check the rising trend among the litigants to secure the relief  as
      an interim measure and then avoid adjudication on merits.


      216. In consonance with the principle  of  equity,  justice  and  good
      conscience judges should ensure that the legal process is  not  abused
      by the litigants in any manner.   The  court  should  never  permit  a
      litigant to perpetuate illegality by abusing the legal process.  It is
      the bounden duty of the  court  to  ensure  that  dishonesty  and  any
      attempt to abuse the legal process must be effectively curbed and  the
      court must ensure that there is no wrongful,  unauthorized  or  unjust
      gain for anyone by the abuse of the process of the court.  One way  to
      curb this tendency is to impose realistic costs, which the  respondent
      or the defendant has in fact incurred in order to  defend  himself  in
      the legal proceedings.  The  courts  would  be  fully  justified  even
      imposing punitive costs where legal process has been  abused.  No  one
      should be permitted to use the judicial process for earning undeserved
      gains or  unjust  profits.   The  court  must  effectively  discourage
      fraudulent, unscrupulous and dishonest litigation.


      217. The court’s constant endeavour must be to  ensure  that  everyone
      gets just and fair treatment.  The court while rendering justice  must
      adopt a pragmatic approach and in appropriate  cases  realistic  costs
      and  compensation  be  ordered  in  order  to   discourage   dishonest
      litigation.  The object and true meaning of the concept of restitution
      cannot be achieved or accomplished unless the courts adopt a pragmatic
      approach in dealing with the cases.


      218. This Court in a very recent case Ramrameshwari  Devi  and  Others
      v.  Nirmala Devi and Others 2011(6) Scale 677 had an occasion to  deal
      with similar questions of law regarding imposition of realistic  costs
      and restitution.    One of us (Bhandari, J.) was  the  author  of  the
      judgment.  It was observed in that case as under:


           “While  imposing  costs  we  have  to  take  into  consideration
           pragmatic realities and be realistic what the defendants or  the
           respondents had to actually incur in contesting  the  litigation
           before different courts.  We have  to  also  broadly  take  into
           consideration the prevalent fee structure  of  the  lawyers  and
           other miscellaneous expenses which have to be  incurred  towards
           drafting and filing  of  the  counter  affidavit,  miscellaneous
           charges towards typing, photocopying, court fee etc.


           The other factor which should not be  forgotten  while  imposing
           costs is  for  how  long  the  defendants  or  respondents  were
           compelled to  contest  and  defend  the  litigation  in  various
           courts.  The appellants in the instant case  have  harassed  the
           respondents to the hilt for four decades in a totally  frivolous
           and dishonest litigation in various courts.  The appellants have
           also wasted judicial time of the various courts for the last  40
           years.”




37.   False  averments  of  facts  and  untenable  contentions  are  serious
problems  faced  by  our  courts.   The  other  problem  is  that  litigants
deliberately  create  confusion  by  introducing  irrelevant  and  minimally
relevant  facts  and  documents.   The  court  cannot  reject  such  claims,
defences and pleas at the first look.  It may take quite sometime, at  times
years, before the court is able to see through, discern  and  reach  to  the
truth.  More often than not, they appear attractive at first blush and  only
on a deeper examination the irrelevance and hollowness  of  those  pleadings
and documents come to light.


38.   Our courts are usually short of  time  because  of  huge  pendency  of
cases and at times the courts arrive at an erroneous conclusion  because  of
false pleas, claims,  defences  and  irrelevant  facts.   A  litigant  could
deviate from the facts which are liable for all  the  conclusions.   In  the
journey of discovering the truth, at times, this Court, on later stage,  but
once discovered, it is the duty of the Court to  take  appropriate  remedial
and preventive steps so that no one should derive benefits or advantages  by
abusing  the  process  of  law.   The  court  must  effectively   discourage
fraudulent and dishonest litigants.

39.   Now, when we revert to  the  facts  of  this  case  it  becomes  quite
evident that the appellant is  guilty  of  suppressing  material  facts  and
introducing false pleas and irrelevant documents.  The  appellant  has  also
clouded the entire case with pleas which have nothing to do  with  the  main
controversy involved in the case.


IRRELEVANT DOCUMENTS:
40.   All documents filed by the appellant along with  the  plaint  have  no
relevance to the controversy involved in the case.   We  have  reproduced  a
list of the documents to demonstrate that these documents  have  been  filed
to mislead the Court.  The First Appellate Court has, in fact, got into  the
trap and was misled by the documents and reached to  an  entirely  erroneous
finding that resulted in undue delay of disposal of a small case for  almost
17 years.

FALSE AND IRRELEVANT PLEAS:
41.   The appellant is also guilty of introducing untenable pleas. The  plea
of adverse possession which has no foundation or  basis  in  the  facts  and
circumstances of the case was introduced to gain undue benefit.   The  Court
must be cautious in granting  relief  to  a  party  guilty  of  deliberately
introducing  irrelevant  and  untenable  pleas  responsible   for   creating
unnecessary  confusion  by  introducing  such  documents  and  pleas.  These
factors must be  taken  into  consideration  while  granting  relief  and/or
imposing the costs.

42.   On the facts of the present case, following principles emerge:
   1. It is the bounden duty of  the  Court  to  uphold  the  truth  and  do
      justice.


   2. Every litigant is expected to state truth before the law court whether
      it is pleadings, affidavits or evidence.  Dishonest  and  unscrupulous
      litigants have no place in law courts.

   3. The ultimate object of the judicial  proceedings  is  to  discern  the
      truth and do justice.  It is imperative that pleadings and  all  other
      presentations before the court should be truthful.

   4.  Once  the  court  discovers   falsehood,   concealment,   distortion,
      obstruction or confusion in pleadings and documents, the court  should
      in addition to full restitution impose appropriate costs.   The  court
      must ensure that there is no incentive for wrong doer in the temple of
      justice.  Truth is the foundation of justice and  it  has  to  be  the
      common endeavour of all to uphold the  truth  and  no  one  should  be
      permitted to pollute the stream of justice.

   5. It is the bounden obligation of the Court  to  neutralize  any  unjust
      and/or  undeserved  benefit  or  advantage  obtained  by  abusing  the
      judicial process.

   6. Watchman, caretaker or a servant employed to look after  the  property
      can never acquire interest in the property irrespective  of  his  long
      possession.   The  watchman,  caretaker  or  a  servant  is  under  an
      obligation to hand over the possession forthwith on demand.  According
      to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience,  Courts  are
      not justified in protecting the possession of a watchman, caretaker or
      servant who was only allowed to live into the premises to  look  after
      the same.

   7. The watchman, caretaker or agent holds the property of  the  principal
      only on behalf the  principal.   He  acquires  no  right  or  interest
      whatsoever  in  such  property  irrespective  of  his  long  stay   or
      possession.

   8. The protection of the Court can be granted or extended to  the  person
      who has valid subsisting rent agreement, lease  agreement  or  licence
      agreement in his favour.

43.   In the instant case, we would have ordinarily imposed heavy costs  and
would have ordered restitution but looking to the fact  that  the  appellant
is a Watchman and may not be able to bear the financial burden,  we  dismiss
these appeals with very nominal costs of Rs. 25,000/- to be  paid  within  a
period of two months and direct the appellant to vacate the premises  within
two months from today and handover peaceful possession of the suit  property
to the respondent-Society.  In case,  the  appellant  does  not  vacate  the
premises within two months from today, the  respondent-Society  would  be  a
liberty to take police help and get the premises vacated.

44.   Both the appeals are, accordingly dismissed, leaving  the  parties  to
bear their own costs.

                                        ………………………………J
                                        [DALVEER BHANDARI]




                                        ………………………………J
                                         [DIPAK MISRA]
NEW DELHI,
APRIL  27,  2012.


-----------------------
48


Election petition dismissed on preliminary objection as there is no complete cause of action. Apex court upheld the same.the parliamentary elections held on 16th April, 2009 for the No.05 – Kozhikode Constituency of the Lok Sabha, challenged the election of the Respondent, Shri M.K. Raghavan, who was the returned candidate from the said constituency, by way of an Election Petition filed under Section 81 read with Sections 100, 101 and 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, hereinafter referred to as the “1951 Act”. The Appellant contested the election as the official candidate of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), hereinafter referred to as the “CPI(M)” led by the Left Democratic Front, hereinafter referred to as the “LDF”, whereas the Respondent No.1 was a candidate of the Indian National Congress and he contested the election as the candidate of the United Democratic Front, hereinafter referred to as the “UDF”. 2. The ground on which the election of the Respondent No.1 was challenged was that he had published false statements with regard to the Appellant and thereby committed corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(4) of the 1951 Act, which provides that the publication by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent, of any statement of fact which is false in relation to the personal character, conduct of any candidate, shall be deemed to be guilty of corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123 of the 1951 Act. the Petition, which did not strictly comply with the requirements of Section 86(1) of the 1951 Act, could not be said to be an Election Petition as contemplated in Section 81 and would attract dismissal under Section 86(1) of the 1951 Act. On the other hand, the failure to comply with the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act rendered the Election Petition ineffective, as was held in Hardwari Lal’s case .the proviso to Section 83(1) of the 1951 Act provides that where corrupt practices are alleged, the Election Petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form, it could not have been the intention of the legislature that two affidavits would be required, one under Order VI Rule 15(4) CPC and the other in Form 25.since in the absence of proper verification as contemplated in Section 83, it cannot be said that the cause of action was complete. The consequences of Section 86 of the 1951 Act come into play immediately in view of Sub- Section (1) which relates to trial of Election Petitions and provides that the High Court shall dismiss the Election Petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117 of the 1951 Act. Although, Section 83 has not been mentioned in Sub-Section (1) of Section 86, in the absence of proper verification, it must be held that the provisions of Section 81 had also not been fulfilled and the cause of action for the Election Petition remained incomplete. The Petitioner had the opportunity of curing the defect, but it chose not to do so. 27. In such circumstances, we have no other option, but to dismiss the appeal. 28. The Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs.


                               REPORTABLE | |



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10262 OF 2010





P.A. Mohammed Riyas                          … Appellant



           Vs.





M.K. Raghavan & Ors.                         … Respondents






                               J U D G M E N T





ALTAMAS KABIR, J.



1.    The appellant herein, who contested the parliamentary  elections  held
on 16th April, 2009 for the  No.05  –  Kozhikode  Constituency  of  the  Lok
Sabha, challenged the election of the Respondent, Shri  M.K.  Raghavan,  who
was the returned  candidate  from  the  said  constituency,  by  way  of  an
Election Petition filed under Section 81 read with  Sections  100,  101  and
123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, hereinafter  referred  to
as the “1951 Act”.  The Appellant contested the  election  as  the  official
candidate of the Communist Party of India  (Marxist),  hereinafter  referred
to as the “CPI(M)” led by the Left Democratic  Front,  hereinafter  referred
to as the “LDF”, whereas the Respondent No.1 was a candidate of  the  Indian
National Congress and he contested the election  as  the  candidate  of  the
United Democratic Front, hereinafter referred to as the “UDF”.

2.     The  ground  on  which  the  election  of  the  Respondent  No.1  was
challenged was that he had published false statements  with  regard  to  the
Appellant and thereby committed  corrupt  practice  within  the  meaning  of
Section 123(4) of the 1951 Act, which provides that  the  publication  by  a
candidate or his agent or  by  any  other  person  with  the  consent  of  a
candidate or his election agent, of any statement of fact which is false  in
relation to the personal character,  conduct  of  any  candidate,  shall  be
deemed to be guilty of corrupt practice within the meaning  of  Section  123
of the 1951 Act.  The details of the  publications  have  been  set  out  in
paragraph 4 of the impugned judgment and are as follows :

      “”A.  “Corrupt  practice”  by  the  publication  of  allegedly   false
      statements in the form of –


       1) Annexure A (“Jagratha” (“Be careful”) Newsletter bearing no date)
          allegedly published on 14-4-2009 and distributed on 15-4-2009


       2) Annexure H (Anonymous notice allegedly published on 14-4-2009 and
          15-4-2009

       3) Annexure K (Report in the Mathrubhumi daily  dated  31-3-2009  of
          the speech of M.P. Veerendra Kumar

       4) Annexure L Hand Bill dated 11-4-2009 allegedly distributed on 14-
          4-2009

       5) Annexure M Wall poster allegedly published on 14-4-2009  &  15-4-
          2009

       6) Annexure N Wall poster   -do-    -do-

                  AND


      B.    Fielding  of  other  candidates  having  similarity  in  names.”



3.    The highlights of the six publications  have  also  been  shown  in  a
tabular chart in  paragraph  5  of  the  impugned  judgment  and  speak  for
themselves.

4.    During the hearing of the petition, a question was raised with  regard
to the maintainability of the petition for  want  of  a  complete  cause  of
action.  After considering the submissions made on  such  ground,  the  High
Court accepted the objection taken with regard  to  the  maintainability  of
the Election Petition and dismissed the same.

5.    Appearing for the Appellant, Mr. Krishnan  Venugopal,  learned  Senior
Advocate, submitted that the learned Single Judge  of  the  High  Court  had
dismissed the Election Petition on two grounds :

(i) The Election Petition did not make out a complete cause of action in  so
        far as it did not contain averments regarding the knowledge  of  the
        Respondent No.1 about the falsity of the statements in  relation  to
        each of the publications; and

(ii) The false statements did  not  relate  to  the  personal  character  or
        candidature of the candidate within the meaning of false  statements
        in section 123(4) of the Act.

6.    On behalf of the Respondent No.1, a preliminary objection  was  raised
at the time of hearing that the Election Petition  was  incomplete  and  was
liable to be dismissed as it did not  contain  the  requisite  affidavit  in
Form 25, as required under the proviso to Section  83(1)  of  the  1951  Act
read with Rule 94A of the Conduct of Election  Rules,  1961.  Mr.  Venugopal
contended that the trial  of  an  Election  Petition  was  a  quasi-criminal
proceeding which entailed that the statutory requirements  for  an  Election
Petition had to be strictly construed. Of course, it is  also  necessary  to
protect  the  purity  and  sobriety  of  elections  by  ensuring  that   the
candidates  did  not  secure  vote  by  undue  influence,  fraud,   communal
propaganda, bribery or other corrupt practices, as  mentioned  in  the  1951
Act. Mr.Venugopal submitted that the importance of  Section  123(4)  of  the
above Act lies in the fact that voters should not be misled at the  time  of
casting of  their  votes  by  a  vicious  and  defamatory  campaign  against
candidates. Mr.Venugopal submitted that the  common  refrain  in  all  these
various decisions is that while the requirements of the  election  laws  are
strictly followed, at the same time, the purity of the election process  had
to be maintained at all costs.

7.    In addition to the above, Mr. Venugopal urged that the argument  which
had not been advanced earlier and had been orally raised for the first  time
before this Court, should not be taken into consideration.  The  preliminary
objection taken at the time of final hearing that the Election Petition  was
not supported by an affidavit in Form 25, ought not to have  been  taken  by
the Respondent No.1 either in his Written Statement  or  in  the  Additional
Written Statement filed in the High Court, or  even  in  the  reply  to  the
Election Appeal before this Court.  Accordingly,  such  an  objection  ought
not to have been entertained and is liable to be ignored.   Apart  from  the
above, the learned Single Judge had already taken the Appellant’s  affidavit
on record on 15th December, 2009, wherein it was expressly  noted  that  the
Respondent No.1 did  not  oppose  the  same  being  taken  on  record.   Mr.
Venugopal submitted that once the affidavit had been  taken  on  record,  it
was no longer open to the Respondent  No.1  to  contend  that  the  Election
Petition was defective on the ground of  absence  of  affidavit  in  support
thereof.  Mr. Venugopal submitted that  the  affidavit  was  in  substantial
compliance with the requirements of Order VI Rule 15(4) read with Order  XIX
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, hereinafter referred  to  as  “CPC”  ,
and with Form 25 appended to the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961.

8.    Mr. Venugopal urged that an Election Petition could not  be  dismissed
in limine on the ground of non-compliance with the requirements  of  Section
83(1) thereof.  It was also pointed  out  that  Section  86(1)  of  the  Act
requires dismissal of an Election Petition only when it did not satisfy  the
requirements of Sections 81, 92 and 117.  Section 83 has not  been  included
in the  said  provision.   Mr.  Venugopal  submitted  that  this  Court  has
repeatedly held that non-compliance of Section  83(1),  which  includes  the
requirement of verification under Section 83(1)(c), is a  “curable”  defect.
In support of the said proposition, Mr. Venugopal referred to the  decisions
of this Court in (i) Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar Vs. Roop  Singh  Rathore
& Others [AIR 1964 SC 1545]; (ii) F.A.  Sapa  &  Ors.  Vs.  Singora  &  Ors.
[(1991) 3 SCC 375]; (iii) Sardar  Harcharan  Singh  Brar  Vs.  Sukh  Darshan
Singh & Ors. [(2004) 11 SCC 196]  and  K.K.  Ramachandran  Master  Vs.  M.V.
Sreyamakumar & Ors. [(2010) 7 SCC 428].  Mr. Venugopal  submitted  that  the
submission made on behalf of the Respondent No.1 that an affidavit  in  Form
25 is an integral part of an  Election  Petition  has  been  considered  and
rejected by a Bench of three learned Judges of this  Court  in  F.A.  Sapa’s
case (supra).  Learned counsel submitted  that  as  a  general  proposition,
this Court has held that the affidavit of an Election  Petition  is  not  an
integral part of a petition.

9.    Mr. Venugopal next urged that it had been contended on behalf  of  the
Respondent No.1 that the Election Petitioner/Appellant had  filed  only  one
affidavit under Order VI Rule 15(4) of the CPC and had not filed a  separate
and second affidavit in Form 25,  as  provided  under  Section  94A  of  the
Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, which is also required to  be  filed  under
the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act in support of  an  allegation  of  a
corrupt practice.  Referring to the provisions of Section  83(1)(c)  of  the
1951 Act and Order VI Rule 15(4) CPC, Mr. Venugopal drew  our  attention  to
the Proviso to Section 83(1) which states that where the petitioner  alleges
a corrupt practice, the Election Petition shall “also be accompanied  by  an
affidavit in the prescribed  form”.   Learned  counsel  submitted  that  two
affidavits would be necessary only where an Election Petitioner  wanted  the
election to be set aside both on  grounds  of  commission  of  one  or  more
corrupt practices under Section 100(1)(b) of the Act and  other  grounds  as
set out in Section 100(1).  In such a case, two  affidavits  could  possibly
be required, one under Order VI Rule 15(4)  CPC  and  another  in  Form  25.
However, even in  such  a  case,  a  single  affidavit  that  satisfies  the
requirements of both the provisions could be filed.  In any event, when  the
Election Petition was based entirely on allegations  of  corrupt  practices,
filing of two affidavits over the self-same matter would render one of  them
otiose, which proposition was found acceptable by the Karnataka  High  Court
in Prasanna Kumar Vs. G.M. Siddeshwar [AIR  2010  Karnataka  113].   Learned
counsel urged that even non-mentioning and wrong mentioning of  a  provision
in an application is not a ground to reject the application.

10.   Mr. Venugopal submitted that the object of  the  affidavit  under  the
Proviso to Section 83(1) is to fix responsibility with a person  making  the
allegations.  Referring to the decision of this Court in the  case  of  F.A.
Sapa (supra), Mr. Venugopal pointed out that this Court had held that  while
there is sufficient justification for the law to be harsh  who  indulged  in
such practices, there is also the need to ensure that such  allegations  are
made with the sense of responsibility and concern and not merely to vex  the
returned candidate.

11.   Mr. Venugopal also urged that it has been held by  this  Court  in  V.
Narayanaswamy Vs. C.P. Thirunavukkarasu [(2000) 2 SCC 294], that a  petition
levelling a charge of corrupt practice is required by law  to  be  supported
by an affidavit and the Election  Petitioner  is  obliged  to  disclose  his
source of information in respect of the commission of the corrupt  practice.
 He has to  indicate  that  which  of  the  allegations  were  true  to  his
knowledge and which to his belief on information received  and  believed  by
him to be true.  It was further observed that it was not  the  form  of  the
affidavit but the substance that matters.  Mr. Venugopal submitted  that  in
the instant case, contrary  to  what  had  been  argued  on  behalf  of  the
Respondent  No.1,  read  as  a  whole,  the  affidavit  is  in   substantial
compliance with the requirements of Form 25  because  it  clearly  specifies
the source of information, personal knowledge as well as the  names  of  the
person from whom information was received by the  Appellant  in  respect  of
each of the paragraphs and schedules annexed to the Election Petition.

12.   On the question of finding of learned Single Judge that  the  Election
Petitioner failed to state that a complete cause of  action  was  incorrect,
since the information sought for was available in  different  parts  of  the
Election Petition.  Mr. Venugopal submitted that the law laid down  by  this
Court is that pleadings should not be read in isolation but must be read  as
a whole and construed reasonably to  determine  whether  they  did  state  a
cause of action.  Learned counsel submitted  that  it  is  now  well-settled
that material particulars, as opposed to material facts,  need  not  be  set
out in the Election Petition and may be supplied at a later date.   In  this
regard, learned counsel referred to the decision of this  Court  in  Ashwani
Kumar Sharma Vs. Yaduvansh Singh & Ors. [(1998)  1  SCC  416],  and  certain
other decisions which only served to multiply the decisions rendered on  the
said subject.  Further submission was made that a “clumsy  drafting”  of  an
Election Petition should  not  result  in  its  dismissal  so  long  as  the
petition could make out a charge of a head of corrupt practice  when  it  is
read as a whole and construed reasonably, as was observed  in  the  case  of
Raj Narain Vs. Indira Nehru Gandhi & Anr. [(1972) 3 SCC 850].

13.   Mr. Venugopal submitted  that  in  the  present  Election  Appeal  the
requirements of a proper pleading  have  been  fully  met  but  the  learned
Single Judge failed to appreciate that there is  just  one  single  head  of
corrupt practice alleged under Section 123(4) of the 1951 Act,  relating  to
the publication  of  false  statements  about  the  personal  character  and
candidature  of  the  Appellant  that  were  calculated  to  prejudice   his
election.  Learned counsel submitted that the onus of proving  a  particular
ingredient of Section 123(4) of the 1951 Act was  not  very  onerous,  since
the Appellant is only required to plead and prove that the  statements  made
by the Respondent No.1 or his election agent or any person acting  with  the
consent of either the Respondent No.1 or his  agent  are  false.  Once  such
statement  is  made  on  oath,  the  onus  shifts  to  Respondent  No.1   to
demonstrate that he was not  aware  that  the  statements  were  not  false.
Various decisions were  cited  in  support  of  such  submission,  to  which
reference may be made, if required, at the  later  stage  of  the  judgment.
The learned counsel submitted that the learned Single  Judge  had  erred  in
concluding that the allegations in various  publications  were  not  against
the personal character or candidature of the Appellant.   It  was  submitted
that the statement published in the newspapers was certainly  sufficient  to
effect the private or personal character of the  candidate.   Mr.  Venugopal
submitted that the order of the Hon’ble High Court was required  to  be  set
aside with the direction to expedite the appeal of the  Election  Petitioner
and to render its verdict at an early date.

14.   The submissions of Mr. P.P. Rao, learned  Senior  Advocate,  appearing
for the Respondent No.1, were on expected lines.   Mr.  Rao  reiterated  the
submissions which have been made before the High Court that the  Proviso  to
Section 83(1)(c) of the 1951 Act, requires a separate affidavit to be  filed
in Form 25 in support of each allegation of corrupt  practice  made  in  the
Election Petition.  Mr. Rao submitted that in  the  instant  case,  no  such
affidavit had been filed at all.  He also urged  that  it  was  settled  law
that the  affidavit  required  to  be  filed,  by  the  Proviso  to  Section
83(1)(c), is an integral part of the Election Petition and  in  the  absence
thereof, such petition did not disclose a cause of  action  and  could  not,
therefore, be regarded  as  an  Election  Petition,  as  contemplated  under
Section 81 of the aforesaid Act.  Mr. Rao urged that the  Election  Petition
filed by the Appellant was, therefore, liable to be dismissed under  Section
86(1) of the 1951 Act read with Order VII Rule  11(a)  CPC.   Reference  was
made to the decision of this Court in M. Kamalam Vs. Dr. V.A. Syed  Mohammed
[(1978) 2 SCC 659], in which this  Court  had  held  that  if  the  Election
Petition did not comply with Section 81 of the 1951 Act, the High Court  was
required to dismiss the same under Section 86(1) thereof.   Learned  counsel
then referred to the decision of this Court rendered in  R.P.  Moidutty  Vs.
P.T. Kunju Mohammad & Anr. [(2000) 1 SCC 481], wherein  also  the  provision
of verification of an election petition fell for consideration  and  it  was
held that for  non-compliance  with  the  requirements  of  the  Proviso  to
Section 83(1) of the 1951 Act  and  Form  25  appended  to  the  Rules,  the
election petition was liable to be dismissed at the threshold.  It was  also
held that the defect in verification was curable, but failure  to  cure  the
defects would be fatal.  It was further held that the  object  of  requiring
verification of an election petition is to clearly  fix  the  responsibility
for the averments and allegations in the petition on the person signing  the
verification and, at the same  time,  discouraging  wild  and  irresponsible
allegations unsupported by facts.

15.   In regard to his aforesaid submission that the Election Petition  must
disclose the cause of action and that in respect of allegations in  relation
to corrupt practice, the same had to be supported  by  affidavit  disclosing
source of information and stating that  the  allegations  are  true  to  the
petitioner’s knowledge and belief by him to be true, Mr. Rao  also  referred
to two other decisions of this Court in :  (i)  V.  Narayanaswamy  Vs.  C.P.
Thirunavukkarasu [(2000) 2 SCC 294] and  (ii)  Ravinder  Singh  Vs.  Janmeja
Singh & Ors. [(2000) 8 SCC 191].

16.   Mr. Rao contended that Section 83(1)(c) of the above Act requires  the
Election Petition to be signed by the petitioner and verified in the  manner
specified in the CPC for the verification of pleadings. Referring  to  Order
VI Rule 15 of the Code, Mr. Rao submitted that Sub-Rule  (4)  requires  that
the person verifying  the  pleading  shall  also  furnish  an  affidavit  in
support of his  pleadings,  which  was  a  requirement  independent  of  the
requirement of a separate affidavit with respect to  each  corrupt  practice
alleged, as mandated by the Proviso to Section 83(1)(c) of  the  above  Act.
Mr. Rao submitted that in the body of the Election  Petition,  there  is  no
averment that the Respondent  No.1  believed  the  statements  made  in  the
publications to be false and did not believe them to  be  true,  which,  Mr.
Rao submitted, was an essential ingredient of the corrupt  practice  alleged
under Section 123(4) of the 1951 Act.  Mr. Rao, however,  admitted  that  in
ground A of the Election Petition there is a submission based on the  advice
of the petitioner’s counsel as per the verification made  in  the  affidavit
filed under Order VI Rule 15(4) CPC, which stands  incorporated  in  Section
83(1)(c) of the 1951 Act by reference.  According to Mr. Rao, there  was  no
factual foundation laid for the alleged corrupt practice  and  the  Election
Petition was, therefore, liable to be dismissed.

17.   Learned senior counsel further contended  that  omission  to  state  a
single material fact would lead to an incomplete  cause  of  action  and  an
Election Petition without material facts relating to a corrupt practice  was
not an Election Petition at all and  such  omission  would  amount  to  non-
compliance of the mandate of  Section  83(1)(a)  of  the  above  Act,  which
rendered the Election Petition ineffective. Beginning with the  decision  of
this Court in Hardwari Lal Vs. Kanwal Singh [(1972)  1  SCC  214],  Mr.  Rao
also referred to various other decisions on the same lines,  including  that
of Azhar Hussain Vs. Rajiv Gandhi [1986 Supp SCC 315], which had  relied  on
the decision in Samant N. Balkrishna & Anr.  Vs.  George  Fernandez  &  Ors.
[(1969) 3 SCC 238], Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal Vs. Rajiv  Gandhi  [(1987)
Supp SCC 93] and Anil  Vasudev  Salgaonkar  Vs.  Naresh  Kushali  Shigaonkar
[(2009) 9 SCC 310], to which reference may be made, if required, at a  later
stage.

18.   Mr. Rao also urged that no corrupt  practice  could  be  made  out  in
terms of Section 123(4) of the 1951 Act, if the allegations did  not  relate
to  the  personal  character,  conduct  or  candidature  of  the   concerned
candidate and in support thereof, he relied on the decision  of  this  Court
in the case of Dev Kanta Barooah Vs. Golok Chandra Baruah & Ors.  [(1970)  1
SCC 392] and several other cases, to which reference, if  required,  may  be
made at a later stage.

19.   Attempting to distinguish the decisions cited by  Mr.  Venugopal,  Mr.
Rao submitted that all the said case laws were distinguishable on facts  and
had no application to the facts of the  present  case.   In  fact,  Mr.  Rao
submitted that in F.A. Sapa’s case (supra), it has  been  clearly  indicated
that the petition which did not strictly comply  with  the  requirements  of
Section 83 of the 1951 Act, could not be said to be an Election Petition  in
contemplation of Section 81 and attract dismissal  under  Section  86(1)  of
the said Act.

20.   Mr. Rao submitted that the Appellant had not been able to  refute  the
findings  of  fact  recorded  by  the  High  Court,  which  had  elaborately
considered the decisions of this Court and correctly applied  to  the  facts
of the present case.  Mr. Rao submitted  that  the  present  appeal  has  no
merit and is liable to be dismissed with costs.

21.   Although, during the hearing of the Petition, a  question  was  raised
regarding the maintainability of the Petition for want of a  complete  cause
of action and the same was accepted by the High Court  which  dismissed  the
Election Petition, the learned Single Judge of the High Court took the  view
that the Election Petition did not make out a complete cause  of  action  as
it was not in conformity with Form 25 annexed to the Rules.

22.   This brings us to the next question  that  in  order  to  protect  the
purity of elections in the manner indicated, it was the duty  of  the  State
to ensure that the candidates in the elections did not secure  votes  either
by way of an undue influence, fraud, communal  propaganda,  bribe  or  other
types of corrupt practices, as specified in the 1951 Act.

23.    The  provisions  of  Chapter  II  of  the  1951  Act  relate  to  the
presentation of election petitions to the High Court and  Section  83  which
forms part of Chapter II deals with the contents of  the  Election  Petition
to be  filed.  For  the  purpose  of  reference,  Section  83  is  extracted
hereinbelow :-
      83. Contents of petition. (1) An election petition-


      (a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts  on  which
           the petitioner relies;


      (b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that  the
           petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of
           the names of the parties alleged to have committed such  corrupt
           practice and the date and place of the commission of  each  such
           practice; and


      (c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner  laid
           down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of  1908)  for  the
           verification of pleadings:


                Provided that where  the  petitioner  alleges  any  corrupt
           practice, the petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit
           in the prescribed form in support  of  the  allegation  of  such
           corrupt practice and the particulars thereof.


      (2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be  signed  by
      the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition.


      As will be seen from the Section itself, the  Election  Petitioner  is
required to set forth full particulars  of  any  corrupt  practice  that  he
alleges and the names  of  the  parties  involved  therein  and  it  further
provides that the same is to be signed by the  Petitioner  and  verified  in
the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for the verification  of
proceedings.  What is important is the proviso which  makes  it  clear  that
where the Election Petitioner alleges any  corrupt  practice,  the  Petition
shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in  support
of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars  thereof  and
the schedule or annexures to the  Petition  shall  also  be  signed  by  the
Petitioner and verified in the same manner as the Petition. In other  words,
when corrupt practices are alleged in an Election Petition,  the  source  of
such allegations has to be disclosed and the same has to be supported by  an
affidavit in support thereof.

24.   In the present case, although  allegations  as  to  corrupt  practices
alleged to have been employed by the Respondent had been  mentioned  in  the
body of the Petition, the Petition itself  had  not  been  verified  in  the
manner specified in Order VI Rule 15 of the Code of  Civil  Procedure.  Sub-
Section (4) of Section 123 of the 1951 Act defines  “corrupt  practice”  and
the publication of various statements against the Respondent which were  not
supported  by  affidavit,  could  not,  therefore,  have  been  taken   into
consideration by the High Court while  considering  the  Election  Petition.
In the absence of proper verification,  it  has  to  be  accepted  that  the
Election Petition was incomplete as it did not contain a complete  cause  of
action.

25.   Of course, it has been submitted and  accepted  that  the  defect  was
curable and such a proposition has been upheld in the  various  cases  cited
by Mr. Venugopal, beginning with the decision in Murarka  Radhey  Shyam  Ram
Kumar’s case (supra) and subsequently followed in F.A. Sapa’s case  (supra),
 Sardar Harcharan Singh Brar’s case (supra) and K.K.  Ramachandran  Master’s
case (supra), referred to hereinbefore. In this context, we  are  unable  to
accept Mr. Venugopal’s submission that despite the fact that the proviso  to
Section 83(1) of the 1951 Act provides  that  where  corrupt  practices  are
alleged, the Election Petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit  in
the  prescribed  form,  it  could  not  have  been  the  intention  of   the
legislature that two affidavits would be required, one under Order  VI  Rule
15(4) CPC and the other in Form 25.   We  are  also  unable  to  accept  Mr.
Venugopal’s submission that even in a case  where  the  proviso  to  Section
83(1) was attracted, a single affidavit would be sufficient to  satisfy  the
requirements of both the provisions. Mr.  Venugopal’s  submission  that,  in
any event, since the Election Petition was based entirely on allegations  of
corrupt practices, filing of two affidavits  in  respect  of  the  self-same
matter, would render one of them redundant, is also not acceptable.  As  far
as the decision in F.A. Sapa’s  case  (supra)  is  concerned,  it  has  been
clearly indicated that the Petition, which did not strictly comply with  the
requirements of Section 86(1) of the 1951 Act, could not be said  to  be  an
Election Petition as contemplated in Section 81 and would attract  dismissal
under Section 86(1) of the 1951 Act.  On the  other  hand,  the  failure  to
comply with the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act  rendered  the  Election
Petition ineffective, as was held in Hardwari Lal’s  case  (supra)  and  the
various other cases cited by Mr. P.P. Rao.

26.   In our view, the objections taken by Mr. P.P. Rao must succeed,  since
in the absence of proper verification as  contemplated  in  Section  83,  it
cannot be said that the cause of action was complete.  The  consequences  of
Section 86 of the 1951 Act come  into  play  immediately  in  view  of  Sub-
Section (1) which relates to trial of Election Petitions and  provides  that
the High Court shall dismiss the Election Petition  which  does  not  comply
with the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117 of  the  1951
Act. Although, Section 83 has not  been  mentioned  in  Sub-Section  (1)  of
Section 86, in the absence of proper verification, it must be held that  the
provisions of Section 81 had also  not  been  fulfilled  and  the  cause  of
action for the Election Petition remained  incomplete.  The  Petitioner  had
the opportunity of curing the defect, but it chose not to do so.

27.    In such circumstances, we have no other option, but  to  dismiss  the
appeal.

28.   The Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed, but there will be no  order  as
to costs.


                                                     ………………………………………………………J.
                                     (ALTAMAS KABIR)



                                                     ………………………………………………………J.
                                         (J. CHELAMESWAR)
New Delhi
Date: 27.04.2012





where the revision petition is filed before the Tribunal but the Tribunal refuses to interfere with the decree or order earlier made. It simply dismisses the review petition. The decree in such a case suffers neither any reversal nor an alteration or modification. It is an order by which the review petition is dismissed thereby affirming the decree or order. In such a contingency there is no question of any merger and anyone aggrieved by the decree or order of the Tribunal or Court shall have to challenge within the time stipulated by law, the original decree and not the order dismissing the review petition. Time taken by a party in diligently pursing the remedy by way of review may in appropriate cases be excluded from consideration while condoning the delay in the filing of the appeal, but such exclusion or condonation would not imply that there is a merger of the original decree and the order dismissing the review petition. 15. The decisions of this Court in Manohar S/o Shankar Nale and Ors. v. Jaipalsing S/o Shivalalsing Rajput (2008) 1 SCC 520 in our view, correctly settle the legal position. The view taken in Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar (1975) 1 SCC 774 and Kunhayammed and Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr. (2000) 6 SCC 359, wherein the former decision has been noted, shall also have to be understood in that light only. 16. In the result, we dismiss these appeals as no substantial question of law arises for our consideration. The respondent shall also be entitled to cost of Rs.20,000/- in each case to be deposited in the SCBA Lawyers’ Welfare Fund within six weeks from today.


                                                   REPORTABLE

                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3814 OF 2007




M/s. DSR Steel (P) Ltd.                            …Appellant

                 Versus

State of Rajasthan & Ors.                    …Respondents

(With Civil Appeal No.4393/2007 and No.4396/2007)









                                  O R D E R



T.S. THAKUR, J.

1.    These appeals under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003  call  in
question the correctness of an order dated 23rd November,  2006,  passed  by
the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity whereby a batch of appeals  including
those filed by the appellants against an order dated 8th June,  2006  passed
by the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission, have been dismissed.

2.    Jaipur Vidyut  Vitran  Nigam  Limited  (‘JVVNL’  for  short),  Jodhpur
Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited (‘JDVVNL’ for short)  and  Ajmer  Vidyut  Vitran
Nigam Limited (‘AVVNL’ for short), submitted  separate  applications  before
the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (for short ‘Commission’)  at
Jaipur in terms of Sections 62 and 64  of  the  Electricity  Act,  2003  for
revision of tariff to be effective from December 1, 2004. Each one of  these
distribution companies (‘Discoms’ for short) had an existing tariff  but  in
their respective applications  they  sought  an  identical  tariff  revision
which requests were taken up by the Commission  for  consideration  together
and disposed of in terms of  a  common  order  dated  17th  December,  2004,
passed  after  notices  regarding  filing  of  the  said  applications  were
published in  different  newspapers  having  circulation  in  the  State  of
Rajasthan. Several objections were filed and suggestions made by nearly  100
individuals and organisations in the course of the  proceedings  before  the
Commission. All these objections were then considered by the  Commission  no
matter only 38 of those who  had  filed  the  same  had  complied  with  the
requirement  laid  down  by  the  former.  A  large  number  of  people  and
organisations even applied for personal hearing and were heard on  different
dates at different venues fixed for the purpose. Some  of  these  objections
also related to individual problems of the consumers  or  disputes  relating
to bills and other matters which were  directed  to  be  considered  by  the
Discoms and decision taken on the  same  under  intimation  to  the  persons
concerned. Other issues including those questioning the  maintainability  of
the  petitions  and  alleging  non-compliance  with  the   regulations   and
directions of the Commission were also raised.  Issues touching  reforms  in
power sector, non-determination of  the  Rajasthan  Vidyut  Utpadan  Nigam’s
tariff from whom the  Discoms  purchase  electricity,  poor  performance  of
Vidyut Vitran Nigams  were  also  agitated.   Similarly  objections  to  the
proposed increase in tariff, interest charges, depreciation  etc.  too  were
raised and examined by the Commission.  Suggestions  regarding  improvement,
objections relating to high T&D losses, inadequacy  of  staff,  continuation
of un-metered supply,  issue  of  deemed  licensee  and  tariff  for  deemed
licensee were also examined. Questions  relating  to  high  voltage  supply,
segregation of mixed load, billing  demand,  demand  based  tariff  for  MIP
consumers, power factor and shunt capacitor  surcharge,  vigilance  checking
of consumers, minimum billing, agriculture, domestic and  industrial  tariff
too were examined by the Commission apart from  several  other  issues  that
were placed before the  Commission  to  which  the  Commission  has  made  a
reference in its order dated  8th  June,  2006.  The  Commission  eventually
directed that the revised tariff determined  by  it  will  become  effective
from 1st January, 2005 and remain in force till the same is amended  by  the
Commission by a separate order passed by it.

3.    Aggrieved by the order passed by the Commission, the appellants and  a
large number of other consumers in  that  category  filed  review  petitions
under Section 94 (1)(f) of the Electricity  Act,  2003  seeking  review  and
continuation of the incentive scheme. These review petitions were  dismissed
by the  Commission  in  terms  of  its  order  dated  8th  June,  2006.  The
Commission noted the contention urged on  behalf  of  the  petitioners  that
they were affected by the withdrawal of the incentive scheme.  It  was  also
urged that these  consumers  had  made  investments  on  the  basis  of  the
incentive scheme bona fide believing that the same  would  continue  for  at
least three years. The review petitioners,  therefore,  sought  continuation
of the said scheme by suitable review of the Commission’s order  dated  17th
December, 2004. The Commission also noted the opposition of the  Discoms  to
the said prayer and the contention that  the  incentive  scheme  was  to  be
effective upto 31st March, 2003 or  till  the  Commission  issued  a  tariff
order                 whichever                 was                 earlier.


4.    The Commission noted the submissions made on  behalf  of  the  Discoms
that the tariff petitions had been filed in August 2004 and the  details  of
the scheme had been published in newspapers including the  incentive  scheme
which was deliberated in the course of the public hearing and dealt with  in
the Commission’s tariff order dated 17th December, 2004. It was also  argued
on behalf of the Discoms that the modified incentive scheme  was  free  from
any legal flaw.

5.    Consideration of the rival  submissions  led  the  Commission  to  the
conclusion that its  order  dated  17th  December,  2004  had  examined  the
question raised  by  the  petitioners  regarding  the  continuation  of  the
incentive scheme and found that the scheme had a limited  validity  and  its
withdrawal did not offend the principles of  promissory  estoppel.  It  also
held that the modification of the scheme was not without public  notice  and
the  discontinuance  of  the  old  incentive  scheme  had  been  given  wide
publicity pursuant to which  large  industries  and  associations  had  been
heard on the question of introduction of a new scheme in place of  the  old.
The Commission also held that the question of  applicability  of  Promissory
Estoppel had been raised before the Commission at the hearing of the  tariff
petitions and that the material sought to be introduced in  support  of  the
said plea at the stage of review could not be taken into consideration.  The
Commission, accordingly, concluded  that  there  was  no  mistake  or  error
apparent on the face of the record in the order passed by it to call  for  a
review of the same. In support the Commission  noted  several  decisions  of
this Court on the question of Promissory Estoppel including those  delivered
in M/s Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar  Pradesh  and
Ors. (1979) 2 SCC 409, Kasinka Trading and Anr. v. Union of  India  an  Anr.
(1995) 1 SCC 274, Shrijee Sales Corporation  and  Anr.  v.  Union  of  India
(1997) 3 SCC 398, Union of India  &  Ors.  v.  Godfrey  Philips  India  Ltd.
(1985) 4 SCC 369.

6.    Aggrieved by the orders dated 17th December, 2004 and 8th  June,  2006
passed by the  Commission,  the  appellants  and  few  others  filed  Appeal
Nos.180-197 of 2006 and Appeal No.226 of 2006 before the Appellate  Tribunal
for Electricity, at New Delhi which were as noticed above  dismissed by  the
Tribunal by the order impugned in these appeals.  The  Tribunal  noted  that
there was no challenge before it as to the  revision  of  the  tariff  order
issued by the Commission.  It also  found  that  the  Regulatory  Commission
could exercise its power of review in  terms  of  Section  94(1)(f)  of  the
Electricity Act, 2003 read with Order XLVII of the Civil Procedure Code  and
that it could review an order, provided a case for any such review was  made
out. The Tribunal rejected the contention urged on behalf of the  appellants
that the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel was attracted in the facts  of  the
case.  It  concurred  with  the  view  taken  by  the  Commission  that  the
incentive scheme was applicable only upto  31st  March,  2007  or  till  the
Commission issued  a  tariff  order  whichever  was  earlier.  The  Tribunal
observed:

         “As has been held in Pawan Alloys & Casting Pvt.  Ltd.,  Meerut  v.
         U.P. State Electricity Board And Others,  (1997)  7  Supreme  Court
         Cases 251, in this case,  no  promise  was  held  out  to  any  new
         industries nor there was an invitation  for  investments  of  large
         scale fund but it only imposed a condition that existing industries
         could avail of the incentive subject to  the  stipulations  in  the
         scheme and nothing  more.   The  tariff  fixation  is  a  statutory
         function in terms of The Electricity Act 2003 and tariff is  to  be
         fixed in the larger interest of consumer  public  at  large.   That
         being the position and when in the very tariff scheme, it has  been
         specifically provided that the  scheme  will  come  to  an  end  on
         31.03.2007   or   when   the   Regulatory   Commission   determines
         distribution tariff which ever is earlier.  This is only meaning it
         is not known as to  how  the  appellants  could  advance  the  said
         contention that the scheme is to be  given  any  other  meaning  is
         impermissible.  This sentence which is incorporated in  the  scheme
         is fatal to the claim of the appellants and none of the  precedents
         pressed into service by the appellants will come to  their  rescue.
         It will be  sufficient  to  answer  this  point,  however,  as  the
         appellants on all the contentions pressed for a decision.”


7.    We have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable  length.
An appeal under Section 125 of the Electricity  Act,  2003  is  maintainable
before this Court only on the grounds specified in Section 100 of  the  Code
of Civil Procedure. Section 100 of the C.P.C. in turn permits filing  of  an
appeal only if the case involves a substantial question of law. Findings  of
fact recorded by the Courts below, which would in the  present  case,  imply
the Regulatory Commission as the Court of first instance and  the  Appellate
Tribunal as the Court hearing the first appeal, cannot be  re-opened  before
this Court in an appeal under Section 125  of  the  Electricity  Act,  2003.
Just as the High Court cannot interfere  with  the  concurrent  findings  of
fact recorded by the Courts below in a second appeal under  Section  100  of
the Code of Civil  Procedure,  so  also  this  Court  would  be  loathed  to
entertain any challenge to the concurrent findings of fact recorded  by  the
Regulatory Commission and the Appellate  Tribunal.  The  decisions  of  this
Court on the point are a legion. Reference to Govindaraju v. Mariamman  (AIR
2005 SC 1008), Hari Singh v. Kanhaiya Lal  (AIR  1999  SC  3325),  Ramaswamy
Kalingaryar v. Mathayan Padayachi (AIR 1992 SC 115),  Kehar  Singh  v.  Yash
Pal and Ors. (AIR 1990 SC 2212), Bismillah Begum (Smt.) (Dead)  by  LRs.  v.
Rahmatullah Khan (Dead) by LRs. (AIR 1998 SC 970) should, however,  suffice.


8.    The Regulatory Commission has, in the case at hand  recorded  a  clear
finding of fact that the old incentive scheme was  limited  only  upto  31st
March, 2007 or till the Commission  issued  a  tariff  order  whichever  was
earlier. It has also recorded a finding that while considering  revision  of
tariff it had gone into  the  proposals  regarding  introduction  of  a  new
incentive scheme and approved the same, effectively bringing to an  end  the
existing scheme and introducing a new scheme in its  place.  The  Commission
had declined to accept the  contention  that  the  appellant  companies  had
altered their position to their detriment by making  additional  investments
or that there was any specific representation or promise made to  them  that
the old  scheme  would  inevitably  continue  till  31st  March,  2007.  The
additional material which the appellants had sought to  introduce  belatedly
at the review stage had also been declined by the Commission. In  its  order
dated 17th December, 2004 revising tariff the Commission had dealt with  the
question relating to the incentive scheme in the following words:

         “70.     The incentive scheme was  proposed  by  the  Nigams  as  a
         stopgap  arrangement  to   arrest   the   decline   in   industrial
         consumption.   The  Commission  while  conveying  its  approval  to
         extension of the incentive scheme clearly stipulated that it  shall
         be valid till 31.3.07 or revision of tariff whichever was  earlier.
         The scheme itself had a limited validity  and  therefore,  did  not
         attract the principle of promissory estoppel.  The  Commission  had
         envisaged  review  of  incentive  scheme  at  the  time  of  tariff
         revision, as the proceeding  would  have  provided  opportunity  to
         public to express their views  to  enable  appropriate  changes  in
         incentive scheme or tariff.


         71.      After considering the petitioners’ proposal and the  views
         expressed before us, the Commission is of the view that no separate
         scheme is called for at this stage. The need to  provide  incentive
         to promote consumption of electricity  by  large  industrial  power
         (LIP) consumers should be taken care of by the tariff  itself.   An
         incentive which  encourages  better  load  factor  will  serve  the
         purpose.  Consequently, an incentive scheme linked  to  consumption
         per KVA of contract demand is proposed.  Accordingly we direct that
         the incentive shall be available to  all  LIP  consumers  including
         railways and public water  works,  and  eligibility  for  incentive
         shall be as follows:


             (i)       The annual  consumption  of  the  consumer  for  the
                current financial year shall not be  less  than  his  annual
                consumption of the previous financial year.
             (ii)      In respect of new LIP  consumers  and  existing  LIP
                consumers who reduce their contract demand, incentive  shall
                be admissible from the quarter following six months from the
                date of new connection or reduction of contract  demand,  as
                the case may be.
             (iii) Consumer should have no arrear outstanding against him.


         72. Incentive shall be allowed to eligible consumers  provisionally
         on quarterly basis provided that consumption during the quarter  is
         not less than his  consumption  during  the  corresponding  quarter
         during the previous year.  Incentive so allowed shall be subject to
         final assessment at the end of the year, on year-to-year basis.  If
         consumption of a consumer in any quarter is less than that  of  the
         corresponding  quarter  of  the  previous  year  but   the   annual
         consumption is more than that of the previous  year,  he  shall  be
         eligible for the incentive for the  year  as  a  whole.   Incentive
         shall be as under on energy charges:-


       |(i)         |Energy consumption of 250 KWh per|               |
|            |month per kVA of contract demand |               |
|            |and upto 400 KWh per month per   |               |
|            |kVA of contract demand.          |1.0%           |
|(ii)        |Energy consumption exceeding 400 |               |
|            |KWh per month per kVA of contract|               |
|            |demand and upto 550 KWh per month|               |
|            |per kVA of contract demand.      |4.0%           |
|(iii)       |Energy consumption in excess of  |               |
|            |550 KWh per Month per kVA of     |7.0%           |
|            |contract demand.”                |               |




9.    The Tribunal concurred with the above view  taken  by  the  Commission
and repelled the contention based on the principle  of  promissory  estoppel
not only on the ground that there had  been  no  unequivocal  representation
regarding continuation of the scheme till 31st March, 2007 but also  on  the
ground that there was  no  material  to  support  the  contention  that  the
appellants had indeed made any  investment  or  changed  their  position  to
their detriment so as to attract the doctrine  of  promissory  estoppel.  In
coming to that conclusion  the  Commission  has  also  relied  upon  several
decisions of this Court to which we have made a mention above.   We  do  not
see any perversity  in  any  one  of  those  findings  nor  do  we  see  any
substantial question of law arising in the fact situation of these  appeals.
We have, therefore, no hesitation in  dismissing  these  appeals  on  merits
although the same have been filed  beyond  the  period  stipulated  for  the
purpose under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

10.   We may before parting mention that in Civil  Appeal  No.3814  of  2007
filed by DSR Steel (P) Ltd., one of the questions that was urged  before  us
was whether the period of limitation would start running from  the  date  of
pronouncement of the order or the date  of  communication  thereof.  Relying
upon the decision of this Court in Chhattisgarh State Electricity  Board  v.
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and Ors. (2010) 5 SCC  23  it  was
contended on behalf of the respondent that the date on which the  order  was
pronounced would also be the date on which the same is deemed to  have  been
communicated.

11.   Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003  makes  it  abundantly  clear
that the period of limitation commences from the date  of  communication  of
the decision or order and not from the date  of  its  pronouncement.   As  a
matter of fact, Rules 94 and 98 of the Rules framed under  the  Act  make  a
clear distinction between intimation regarding pronouncement  of  the  order
on the one hand and the communication of the  order  so  pronounced  to  the
parties on the other. While Rule 94 appears to us to provide for  notice  of
pronouncement of an order, it makes no mention about the ‘communication’  of
such an order as is referred to in Section 125 of the Act.  Transmission  of
the order by the Court Master to the Deputy Registrar of  the  Tribunal  and
its onward communication to the parties is dealt with  by  Rule  98  of  the
said Rules which communication alone can be  construed  as  a  communication
for purposes of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003.  The  decision  of
this Court in the Chattisgarh State Electricity Board’s case (supra) may  in
that view require reconsideration if the same were to be  understood  to  be
laying  down  that  the  date  of  pronouncement  is  also   the   date   of
communication of the order.  We would have, in the ordinary course,  made  a
reference to a larger Bench for that purpose but having regard to  the  fact
that we have dismissed the appeals on merits, we consider it unnecessary  to
do so in the present case.

12.   So also the question whether  an  order  passed  by  the  Tribunal  in
appeal merges  with  an  order  by  which  the  Tribunal  has  dismissed  an
application for review of the said  order  was  argued  before  us  at  some
length. Learned counsel for the appellants contended  that  since  a  review
petition had been filed by two of the  appellants  namely,  J.K.  Industries
Ltd. (Now known as J.K. Tyres and Industries Ltd.)  and  J.K.  Laxmi  Cement
Ltd. in this case, the orders made by the Tribunal  dismissing  the  appeals
merged with the orders passed by it in the said review applications so  that
it is only the order dismissing the review application that  was  appealable
before this Court.  If that were  so  the  period  of  limitation  could  be
reckoned only from the date of the order passed in the review  applications.


13.   Different situations may arise in relation to review  petitions  filed
before a Court or Tribunal. One of the situations could be where the  review
application is allowed, the decree or order passed by the Court or  Tribunal
is vacated and the appeal/proceedings in which the  same  is  made  are  re-
heard and a fresh decree or order passed in the same.  It is  manifest  that
in such a situation the subsequent decree alone is  appealable  not  because
it is an order in review but because it is a decree  that  is  passed  in  a
proceeding after the earlier decree passed in the very same proceedings  has
been vacated by the Court hearing the review petition. The second  situation
that one can conceive of is where a Court or Tribunal makes an  order  in  a
review  petition  by  which  the  review  petition  is   allowed   and   the
decree/order under review reversed or modified.  Such an  order  shall  then
be a composite order whereby the Court not only vacates the  earlier  decree
or order but simultaneous with  such  vacation  of  the  earlier  decree  or
order, passes another decree or order or  modifies  the  one  made  earlier.
The decree so vacated reversed or  modified  is  then  the  decree  that  is
effective for purposes of a further appeal, if any, maintainable under  law.


14.   The third situation with which we are concerned in  the  instant  case
is where the  revision  petition  is  filed  before  the  Tribunal  but  the
Tribunal refuses to interfere with the decree or  order  earlier  made.   It
simply dismisses the review petition.  The decree in  such  a  case  suffers
neither any reversal nor an alteration or modification.  It is an  order  by
which the review petition is  dismissed  thereby  affirming  the  decree  or
order.  In such a contingency there is no question of any merger and  anyone
aggrieved by the decree or order of the Tribunal  or  Court  shall  have  to
challenge within the time stipulated by law, the  original  decree  and  not
the order dismissing  the  review  petition.   Time  taken  by  a  party  in
diligently pursing the remedy by way of review may in appropriate  cases  be
excluded from consideration while condoning the delay in the filing  of  the
appeal, but such exclusion or condonation would not imply that  there  is  a
merger of the original decree and the order dismissing the review petition.

15.   The decisions of this Court in Manohar S/o Shankar Nale  and  Ors.  v.
Jaipalsing S/o Shivalalsing Rajput (2008) 1 SCC 520 in our  view,  correctly
settle the legal position.  The view taken in Sushil Kumar Sen v.  State  of
Bihar (1975) 1 SCC 774 and Kunhayammed and Ors. v. State of  Kerala  &  Anr.
(2000) 6 SCC 359, wherein the former decision has  been  noted,  shall  also
have to be understood in that light only.

16.   In the result, we dismiss these appeals as no substantial question  of
law arises for our consideration.  The respondent shall also be entitled  to
cost of Rs.20,000/- in each case  to  be  deposited  in  the  SCBA  Lawyers’
Welfare      Fund       within       six       weeks       from       today.





                                                        ……………………..……………..…J.
                                                               (T.S. THAKUR)



                                                          ……………………………….………J.
                                                          (GYAN SUDHA MISRA)
New Delhi
May 1, 2012