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Monday, April 16, 2012

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Pursuant to our order dated 6.4.2012 taking suo motu cognizance in the matter after a news report in the "Hindustan" daily of crimes of sexual abuse of minor orphan girls in the Shivkuti, Allahabad Rajkiya Shishu Grih (Government Home for infants) the District Magistrate (DM) and the Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP), Allahabad have appeared in Court on 11.4.2012. The Chief Probation Officer representing the Principal Secretary, Women and Child Development, U.P was also present. 14.We direct all the District Judges (Chairpersons, District Legal Services Authorities) to nominate officers not below the rank of Senior Judicial Magistrates to participate in the Committee meetings set up in pursuance of the Government circular dated 9.4.2012 for monitoring the running of the homes and for addressing the problems of the inmates therein. The said Judicial Officers may forward their observations and suggestions to the District Legal Services Authority, State Legal Services Authority and this Court which is monitoring the matters relating to such institutions. The UP State Legal Services Authority shall ensure compliance of this direction. In this regard the Apex Court has already directed on 19.8.2011 in Sampurna Behura v Union of India, in Writ Petition (C) No. 473 of 2011, "As considerable co-ordination is required, the Executive Chairmen and Member Secretaries of the State Legal Services Authorities may arrange for periodic supervision and visits to ascertain the functioning of the Children Homes, Observation Homes etc."

 HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 
court No. 46
Case :- CRIMINAL WRIT-PUBLIC INETEREST LITIGATION No. - 4207 of 2012 
 

Petitioner :- In The Matter Of Govt. Children'S Home At Shivkuti Allahabad 
Petitioner Counsel :- Manju R. Chauhan 
Respondent Counsel :- A.G.A.,K.K.Ray,Ms. Usha Kiran 

Hon'ble Amar Saran,J. 
Hon'ble Ashok Srivastava,J. 
Pursuant to our order dated 6.4.2012 taking suo motu cognizance in the matter after a news report in the "Hindustan" daily of crimes of sexual abuse of minor orphan girls in the Shivkuti, Allahabad Rajkiya Shishu Grih (Government Home for infants) the District Magistrate (DM) and the Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP), Allahabad have appeared in Court on 11.4.2012. The Chief Probation Officer representing the Principal Secretary, Women and Child Development, U.P was also present. 
On the request of Shri D.R. Chaudhary, learned Government Advocate to hear the case in camera looking to the sensitivity of the matter, we have heard the case in chambers on 11.4.2012. 
An affidavit of the District Magistrate, Allahabad and a personal affidavit of the Principal Secretary, Women and Child Development, UP, Lucknow have been filed. A report on the basis of spot visits have also been submitted by Mrs. Manju R. Chauhan, learned Amicus Curiae, and by Ms. Usha Kiran on our direction. 
Intervention applications filed by Shri K.K. Roy in this public interest litigation on behalf of the intervenor Utpala Shukla and another on behalf of Utkarsh Dixit and others, are also taken on record. Orders therein will be passed on a subsequent date of hearing. 
It appears that due to the public and press outcry raised, and our previous order the administration does appear to have taken the matter seriously at this stage. 

MAGISTERIAL INQUIRY REPORT DATED 8.4.2012 
The officiating District Magistrate/Chief Development Officer (CDO), Allahabad had directed on 5.4.2012 that a Magisterial inquiry be conducted within 3 days by a team comprising Ms Pravina, Additional City Magistrate-II (ACM II), Allahabad, Smt. Nitika Dubey, District Backward Classes Welfare Officer and Shri S.N. Tripathi, District Economic and Statistics Officer. This remarkably perceptive, candid and prompt inquiry report dated 8.4.2012 reveals a shocking picture where the main delinquent Vidya Shankar Ojha, a contract chowkidar has been found committing the most heinous and barbaric acts of sexual abuse with minor girls aged 6 to 10 years for the past several years in the Shivkuti Shishu Grih. It also shows that other employees including superintendents, house mothers, cook, Class 4 workers such as helpers, nurses, nursery teachers and sweepers have either facilitated (or at least overlooked) the immoral acts of Ojha, sometimes even after being eye witnesses of this grave crime. In fact their indifference or active concealment is tantamount to their virtual connivance in the crimes of Vidya Bhushan Ojha. 
Shorn of details the report makes the following points: 
Although the FIR was lodged after consultation with the Probation Officer against the offender for rape with one girl A about which the Superintendent Urmila Gupta claims to have gained knowledge only on 5.4.2012, the report finds sexual abuse of seven girl-child inmates by the suspended and presently jailed daily wager chaukidar (watchman) Vidya Bhushan Ojha. 
Ojha had been indulging in these misdeeds for several years after his appointment as a chowkidar in the adoption unit of the home for 6 months in 2006. It was unclear how he was continuing in the home till 5.4.2012. Under a Government Order only an earlier inmate of the children's home who had crossed 18 years of age could be appointed as a 'chowkidar' in the home. 
The said victim A claims to have been raped a few days earlier in the kitchen and then in the toilet. She had been sexually assaulted several times earlier by Ojha. When she tried to cry out during the incident, Ojha had gagged her mouth. 
A also named a boy-child witness, who corroborated the incident before the committee. 
A also stated that Ojha had sexually assaulted two other girls B and C and threatened to kill them if they disclosed this fact to anyone. 
4 other girl inmates disclosed that Ojha would force them to broom, sweep, cook and clean the toilet, and on their failure to perform their tasks, he would administer a beating to them. They also complained about Ojha's bad character, and that they would need to run away whenever he tried to catch them. 
As the 2 other girls B and C named by victim A had been shifted to the Mumfordganj government home for bigger girls in December 2011, the committee questioned them there. 
B confirmed the allegations against Ojha. B also stated that Ojha had sexually abused A, C and one D. 
C being mentally challenged was unable to say anything about the incidents with her. 
9 girls who had been transferred to the Mumfordganj home in the past 12 months, (after they completed the age of 10 years), on being jointly questioned confirmed the beatings, forced cooking, washing of clothes, cleaning of toilets etc. at the instance of Ojha, Munim, Bhola, Vinod Kumar and Rama Aunty. They used to beat the girls with brooms, dandas, wipers and wires etc. for extracting work from them. 
One of the 9 girls mentioned that she had witnessed Ojha sexually abusing E. Another girl mentioned sexual abuse of a girl F by Ojha. They also stated that when they complained about the misdeeds of Ojha to the then superintedent Suman Srivastava, the complaints fell on deaf ears and instead of disciplinary action against Ojha, the girls were rebuked. 
Smt. Rama Singh disclosed that one adopted girl child G was returned to the home by the adoptive parents as they found her to have been sexually violated. At that time Suman Srivastava was the superintendent, but she took no action against the offender Ojha. Hence the committee has also found Suman Srivastava to be culpable for the incidents. Overlooking of his crimes emboldened Ojha to indulge in further immoral acts. 
The 4th Class employee, cook Smt. Ramapati, would usually get the cooking done by the girls by force and threats and would take the help of Ojha for cooking, giving him access to the kitchen, the venue for his misdeeds. B disclosed that Ojha would send Ramapati 'mausi' outside the kitchen, and that the latter even saw Ojha committing rape on her from the kitchen window, but Ramapati never tried to interfere or protect the victim from Ojha. 
Rama Singh the house mother, and Nirmala Mishra, the 4th Class employee were entrusted with the task of looking after the children and washing their clothes. But the girls revealed that Ojha used to wash the clothes on a washing machine. If Rama Singh and Nirmala Mishra had attended to the underclothes of the girls, then the incident would have been noticed by these persons, and the incident would not have come to light at the instance of the adoptive mother of the newly adopted girl (This mother had found blood stains on the panty worn by the adopted child, who revealed that the panty belonged to A who on questioning disclosed about the misdeeds of Ojha). 
The two nurses Krishnavati and Uma Jaiswal appear to have used the services of the older girls to give medicines to the infants. It was only because of their distance from the girls that the girls had not revealed the happenings to them. The report concluded that the other employees not having knowledge of the sexual abuse of the children in the home was due to the absence of dialogue, lack of feeling for the children and the consequent absence of faith of the children that they would be protected by the staff members at the time of need. Because of the indifference of the staff, the violated girls remained silent and did not complain of the injustice meted out to them and whenever they mustered courage to complain they were rudely rebuffed. Hence the report indicted the superintendents, assistant superintendent and subordinate staff of gross neglect and dereliction of duties in failing to provide care, love and protection to the children. 
It appears that consequent to the scathing report ten employees including the Superintendent Urmila Gupta, Assistant Superintendent, Chaya Badwal two nurses, Km. Uma Jaiswal, and Smt. Krishnavati, one nursery teacher, Kusum Gupta, two house mothers, Rama Singh and Preeti Lata, Class 4 employee Ramapati, helper Smt. Nirmala Mishra, and one male class-IV employee, Prem Singh have already been suspended and disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against them, and they have been attached to other districts. 
We are also informed that Vidya Bhushan Ojha, the principal accused, a Chaukidar on contract at the Shishu Grih, and the Superintendent of the Home Urmila Gupta have already been arrested and the arrests of others are on the anvil. Also the Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent of the Children's home (Shishu) have been transferred and others appointed in their place. Even the Probation Officer, Ila Pant posted in Allahabad has been transferred outside Allahabad and is replaced by another officer. 
To check such incidents in the future, the Committee has recommended: 
(a) In Government Children Homes where girls are lodged, as far as possible, no male employee should be posted. In case they are posted, they should be kept out of the living area. 
(b) There should be efforts for making the staff serving in the Government Children's Homes more sensitive to the problems of children and girls, and constant trainings and counseling of the staff are needed for this purpose. 
� Higher officials must make at least 2 inspections every month, in which they should make efforts to talk to each staff member and inmate separately. 
(d) In the Government institutions, in each room and in the galary, CCTV Cameras should be fixed and they should be monitored regularly. 
(e) It should be necessary for the Superintendents to reside in the Homes. 

BASIC REASONS FOR THE EPISODE 
We may mention that if similar promptitude and transparency (instead of cover-up actions) and consequential actions by way of arrests and suspension orders as in this case had earlier been taken when such misdemeanours occurred in the past, the Allahabad Shishu Grih episode or other similar incidents would never have transpired. The abject surrender before Ojha, turning a blind eye to his grave misdeeds and even protection for his crimes appears to have happened because government servants across the board (subject to a few notable exceptions) have lost the capacity to do any work or to assume responsibility, their conscience appears to have died and inspite of receiving fat salaries (compared to the wages of lowly paid private or contractual employees) they have no scruples in passing off their work to other persons and exploiting the helpless for getting their jobs done, and infinite greed for cash or kind benefits outside the scope of their employment. Regrettably worker unions in India have played a very negative role and never pulled up their members, even when found involved in grave and unconscionable crimes involving moral turpitude (as in the present case), but have readily expended all their energies in protecting such culprits and getting them reinstated. Influential politicians also leave no stone upturned for getting criminally minded employees belonging to their caste group or known to their supporters reinstated, with disastrous consequences which embolden the culprit, resulting in recurrence of such acts of criminal misconduct with earlier victims and also with other girls. 
The indifference of higher officials to the conditions of the homes and the children therein is because it appears to be a low priority area and orphans are not politically important as they have no voice, no vote and no one to espouse their cause. The Court must also express its disappointment that the Child Welfare Committees consisting mainly of Social Workers which have been constituted under the Juvenile Justice Act (2000) [JJ Act] for attending to the welfare of children, have shown little proactive sensitivity for addressing the myriad problems relating to children, but have simply been passing orders in a mechanical and bureaucratic manner, with no sense of mission and thus have given little relief to children in distress. 
It was in this background that Ojha the lowly paid contract chowkidar would do the kitchen work, run the washing machine and perform sundry jobs, and in complete callousness to their human or child rights, exploit helpless little orphan girls or boys and force them to do the work meant for adults by violence, threats or petty allurements and simultaneously gratify his perverse sexual needs, whilst other regular properly paid employees who had a distaste for any work or were seeking petty pilferage or diversion of gifts, cash or other items meant for the orphan child would look the other way. We are aware that some spouses of previous District Magistrates had great love and concern for the welfare of these little children, and frequently visited the homes and laved the children with gifts and tried to improve the facilities in the homes. But so great must have been the threat of beating and the terror looming over the heads of the little inmates at the instance of Ojha and his supporters, that not a word regarding the happenings was leaked out to the high ups during their visits to the home or during the children's outings by the victim girls. It was only on the present occasion, when such an outcry was raised, the main offender was even arrested, and some of the victims had been shifted to the Mumfordganj girls' home for over ten year olds, that they mustered up enough courage to reveal the facts to the police and to the magisterial committee. 
POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS: 
We must however note a positive development that a Government Office Order dated 9.4.2012 has been issued by the Women and Child Development Section which inter alia directs constitution of Committees in each district to be known as the "Inspection, Evaluation and Advisory Committees" to be chaired by an Additional District Magistrate nominated by the D.M., an officer not below Circle Officer's level appointed by the SSP/ SP, a doctor appointed by the Chief Medical Officer, two reputed social workers/ local NGOs, and the District Probation Officer. The D.M. may in consultation with the District Judge also seek the co-operation and advice of a Judicial Magistrate who may be an invitee to the committee. 
The committees are to carry out surprise inspections of all the homes each month, when they shall check the food quality, medical health, education and training programmes, conduct of employees towards children, arrangements for children's play, entertainment and rehabilitation and for restoring them to their families. Personal profiles of each individual child are to be prepared, staff attendance monitored and restrictions on entries of male employees to the women's, girls and infant homes have to be ensured. Hearing of complaints of children in isolation has been suggested. No employees should be present when inmates are being questioned regarding their conduct. The D.M.s, SSPs are to seriously address the findings of the committee during their inspections which are also to be forwarded to the Women Welfare Directorate, and they are to take the complaints of inmates and reports of absconding or deaths of inmates very seriously and order preliminary inquiries wherever required. The D.M.s, SSPs are also to sensitize concerned station officers to obtain information from time to time about the running of such institutions, and the Local Intelligence Unit (LIU) is also to obtain confidential intelligence about the homes and to take every step for providing protection to children and for preventing their exploitation. Active NGOs and recognized women's organizations may also be joined in these matters. 
Another order of the Principal Secretary, Women and Child Development dated 9.4.12 addressed to all DMs, SSPs/ SPs in addition to incorporating the suggestions made by the Committee in its report dated 8.4.12 and the directions mentioned in the Government Office Order of the same date also directs keeping of complaint boxes in the institutional premises for receiving confidential complaints of boys/girls and women so that minor problems may be immediately addressed by the Probation officers or the district level Committee, and grave issues be communicated to the D.M.s/ SSPs, Director, Women Welfare, U.P. for redressal at their levels. Joint committees of the staff and inmates in the homes are also to be constituted (with effective participation of children at all stages) which are to meet twice a week and to address issues relating to health, entertainment, education, food, personal problems and behaviour of staff with children. The fridge, TV ration and other facilities for inmates should not be usurped for their personal use by the in-charges/staff of the homes. The food is to be tested for quality and taste before being offered to inmates. There should be prohibition on drinking and smoking on the premises by the employees or others. There should be no verbal abuse of inmates or any kind of physical or emotional exploitation of the inmates. No bribe may be taken for helping inmates meet their parents. The police should render help for tracing out the parents/ guardians of the inmates and for reaching them home. Education, and vocational training in the institutions be made more effective. If the inmates are found illiterate at the time of inspection then appropriate action be taken against the educators. It should be made mandatory for the superintendents to reside in the homes. 
However the acid test will not be the issuance of such lofty and comprehensive circulars or G.O.s, but in ensuring their observance. Only when parties which violate or ignore the directions and laws are promptly and effectively punished, that the issuance of such circulars will assume any value. Presently also such statutes and Rules such as the Juvenile Justice Act and Rules incorporating these directions exist, but they seem to be observed more in their breach. 
OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES: 
One important issue which has been left out in the report is the appointment of sensitive, hard working and perceptive superintendents and in-charges especially in the homes for women, girls and infants, as they occupy the crucial position in the homes. More than infrastructure and other facilities in the home, appointment of good in-charges appears to be the single most important factor for improving the conditions in the homes, and the lives of the inmates therein. It appears to be a positive trend that good case workers are now being selected to be in-charges of children's or girls homes in preference to senior persons possibly on the basis of their performance. 
The Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) informs that steps are being taken for completing the investigation against Vidya Bhushan Ojha who has been taken into custody. He further states that the in-charges and other home staff who failed to take preventive or punitive action against Ojha when the girl victims made disclosures to them or they otherwise learnt of his misdeeds are also culpable under the penal law for having facilitated the crimes of Ojha and their arrests are also being carried out. 
We fail to understand why no action has been taken against the previous superintendent Suman Srivastava regarding whose culpability the Magisterial Committee has recorded a clear finding that she was engaged in protecting Ojha in spite of her awareness of his misdeeds. 
It has been reported that a large number of civil society and media persons are repeatedly visiting the home and seeking to question the victims and other inmates disturbing the peace of the campus, and taumatizing the victims. As the girl child victims are already traumatized and there is a risk that their identities may become public, we think the administration should put restraints on the visits by publicity seeking individuals to the homes at this stage. 
PAST MISCONDUCTS AND ACTIONS: 
As this Court was under the impression that absence of deterrent actions in the past in similar cases of sexual abuse had resulted in episodes like the present, we had enquired from the Principal Secretary in our previous order dated 6.4.2012 as to what action had been taken against employees in the past when such misconduct had come to light. In response the Secretary's affidavit refers to only two such inquiries in the past, one relating to Kaushal Kumar, a class-IV employee in the Government Children Homes (Infant), Agra relating to crimes of sexual misdemeanour committed in 2009 and another regarding Suresh Kumar, class-IV employee of Government Children Homes (Infant), Rampur relating to the years 2004-2005. 
In the first case of Kaushal Kumar of 2009, the allegations were that he used to get drunk and misbehave with the minor inmates at the home. Two victims specifically confirmed allegations of sexual abuse by this delinquent employee and he was suspended and thereafter dismissed from service by an order of the Director (Women Welfare) dated 11.1.2011. 
The allegations in the other case relating to Suresh Kumar, the class-IV employee working at Government Children Homes (Infant), Rampur were very grave. Suresh Kumar is said to have sexually abused a large number of minor orphan girls in the Rampur Home in the year 2004-05. In the case of three girls there was even medical corroboration of their being sexually assaulted repeatedly by this delinquent. However, Suresh Kumar after being suspended on 20.9.2005 got the inquiry proceedings against him delayed on one pretext or another usually by expressing dissatisfaction with the impartiality of the inquiry officers (who were usually Probation Officers). To our dismay this miscreant even succeeded in getting himself reinstated on 22.9.2009 due to the delay in the conduct of the inquiry proceedings. He even made charges against one nurse Smt. Santosh Saxena, (who may have been the rare government employee instrumental in exposing the misdeeds of this miscreant), that she gave only 50% of the allotted rations to the children. Further he complained that she had been able to procure the adverse medical reports of the girls confirming the allegations of rape against this delinquent through the agency of her husband who was a senior pharmacist in the Rampur district hospital. This delinquent employee could only be dismissed as late as on 26.2.2011, after 6 years of his initial suspension, after inquiry by the Director, Mahila Kalyan. 
It is obvious that in his case also without the complicity of a large number of persons in the Rampur Children's Home, such repeated acts of sexual abuse of a large number of inmates over a long period of time was not possible. We think that because of the tardy and inadequate action in just two cases, no deterrent effect has been caused to any intending offender who chooses to make tiny girl children in his custody in the government orphanage objects of his lust. 
We fail to understand as to how this delinquent employee succeeded in getting himself reinstated without the connivance of the authorities at the highest level. 
We also fail to understand why he was not prosecuted under section 376 IPC and other stringent provisions under the criminal law, and see no impediment to his prosecution even at this stage, as there is no period of limitation for the offence of rape by a staff member with a minor girl aged below 10 years in a children's institution which is punishable with imprisonment for not less than 10 years and which may extend up to life imprisonment with fine in view of section 376(2)(c) or section 376(2)(f) IPC.
We think that the present incident of sexual abuse of a large number of minor girls was possible because of delays or non-action or inadequate action against delinquent employees, in the present and and other matters when found engaging in such grave crimes. Only exemplary punishments for such offenders and expeditious disposal of their inquiries and trials, possibly within two or three months, can send out an appropriate deterrent message to others who may contemplate committing such dastardly crimes in future. 
DIRECTIONS: 
1.We direct that at this stage when the children have been traumatized and there is risk of the names or identities of the victim being leaked out, restrictions must be placed on the visits of publicity seeking individuals to the home. At a later stage for ensuring transparency in the running of the homes, and for monitoring of the conditions therein, visits by concerned persons may be encouraged who want to financially or otherwise help the institutions or children, or have a long standing engagement with women's/ girls or child rights issues, subject to their obtaining permission under Rule 73 of the Juvenile Justice Rules (JJ Rules) from the officer-in-charge of the home, Child Welfare Committee or the district administration. 
2.We further direct that in the present case as well as in all future cases of sexual misconduct by particular employees and acts of connivance or complacency by superintendents and other staff who having knowledge of the sexual misdemeanours and exploitation of minor girls by the said employee, choose to ignore or actively try to conceal information regarding the misconduct, the inquiry against the offender committing the crime, as well as the superintendent or other staff member covering up the crime be concluded within one month, or in exceptional circumstances to be recorded in writing within two months. For further extension of the period, the written permission of the Principal Secretary be taken, who must specify the extended period, record reasons for extending the time of inquiry beyond two months and seek an explanation from the inquiry officer of the reasons for failure to conclude the inquiry in two months. The government may consider issuing a suitable government order to this effect. 
3.We suggest that the suspension orders against an employee directly involved in cases of rape and other sexual misdemeanours and acts of violence with minor female inmates and superintendents, and other staff members who remain mute spectators and refuse to prevent such crimes or connive in protecting the offender, or other cases of grave nature such as pilfering items meant for the orphans or inmates, or taking bribes in any manner, the said suspension orders be ordinarily not revoked or the employee reinstated on the mere ground of delay or on other minor grounds. Only the Principal Secretary (Women and Child Development) be authorized to revoke the suspension order in the most exceptional circumstances for reasons to be recorded in writing. The State government may also consider issuing a suitable government order to this effect. 
4.We direct the SSP to ensure that the investigation is completed with the utmost expedition against Vidya Bhushan Ojha and to have a report submitted on the progress in investigation on the next listing. The SSP, Allahabad or a senior officer supervising the investigation not below the rank of Deputy S.P. nominated by the SSP be present in Court on the next date of hearing. 
5.The SSP should also inform this Court on the next date whether the other accused who are wanted for concealment of the crime and for facilitation of the offence by Ojha have been apprehended or not. 
6.The SSP may consider getting Vidya Bhushan Ojha tried separately for the cases of rape against different child victims. 
7.The investigation and trial should be conducted in camera having regard to the sensitivity and dignity of the female child victims, at a suitable venue in accordance with section 327(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
8.The media and other persons are prohibited from identifying the victims or in publishing their names or photographs. In case of violation of this direction this Court shall initiate stringent measures to punish persons who publicize such information. 
9.The State government is directed to prosecute the Class IV employee Suresh Kumar, who was working at the Rajkiya Bal Grih (Shishu) Rampur at the material time, under section 376 (2)(c) and section 376(2)(f) IPC and to ensure that the investigation and trial be concluded very expeditiously, if possible within 3 months. 
10.The Principal Secretary may explain why no action has been taken against the previous superintendent Suman Srivastava inspite of her clear indictment in the Magisterial Committee's report dated 8.4.12 and consider the advisability of also taking action against the said employee. 
11.The Principal Secretary (Women and Child Development), U.P., and Director (Mahila Kalyan) are directed to hand pick Superintendents and in-charges of Women's, girls and children's homes not necessarily on the basis of seniority, but on the basis of hard work, performance, and sensitivity to the needs of the women/ child inmates. 
12.The District Magistrate, Allahabad may also appear personally on the next date or send an officer such as the Chief Development Officer to apprise this Court regarding the follow up action taken for removing male employees from working in the living areas in Government Bal Shishu Grih, girls and women's homes, improving the conditions in the homes, appointing inspecting committees of government and private functionaries, opening up the process of confidential dialogue with individual inmates and prompt redressal of their grievances, and for ensuring prompt disposal of the proposed disciplinary inquiries against the delinquents adjudged prima facie guilty of committing rape or of concealment and shielding the person involved in sexual abuse as indicated by the Magisterial Committee report dated 8.4.12, within the period mentioned above. 
13.We hope that the recommendation made by the Committee in its report dated 8.4.12 which have also been reiterated in the Government Office Order and the Principal Secretary's order dated 9.4.12 (Annexures 7 and 8 to the Principal Secretary's affidavit) and the directions of this Court hereinabove and in its order dated 4.4.2012 in Cr. Misc. Writ Petition No. 27037 of 2011 shall be implemented in letter and spirit, particularly with regard to formation of committees in all districts to be headed by the DM's nominee of ADM rank, removing male workers from living areas in the women's, children's (infant) and girls homes, developing systems for receiving direct feedback from the victimized children and taking action on the same against the culpable employees, expeditiously concluding disciplinary inquiries in cases of misconduct of this nature against the main offender as also against the officers-in-charge or other staff engaged in protecting such offenders, within the period stipulated above. A compliance report may be submitted to this Court on the next listing through the Chief Probation Officer or other senior officer, who shall personally appear on that date on behalf of the Principal Secretary. 
14.We direct all the District Judges (Chairpersons, District Legal Services Authorities) to nominate officers not below the rank of Senior Judicial Magistrates to participate in the Committee meetings set up in pursuance of the Government circular dated 9.4.2012 for monitoring the running of the homes and for addressing the problems of the inmates therein. The said Judicial Officers may forward their observations and suggestions to the District Legal Services Authority, State Legal Services Authority and this Court which is monitoring the matters relating to such institutions. The UP State Legal Services Authority shall ensure compliance of this direction. In this regard the Apex Court has already directed on 19.8.2011 in Sampurna Behura v Union of India, in Writ Petition (C) No. 473 of 2011, "As considerable co-ordination is required, the Executive Chairmen and Member Secretaries of the State Legal Services Authorities may arrange for periodic supervision and visits to ascertain the functioning of the Children Homes, Observation Homes etc." 
List this case on 26.4.12 along with Cr. Misc. Writ Petition No. 20737 of 2011, Re: In the Matter of Children detained in Rajkiya Bal Grih, Varanasi. 
Let a copy of this order be given forthwith to the Government Advocate, Ms Usha Kiran, learned AGA, Smt. Manju R. Chauhan, Amicus Curiae and be forwarded within twenty four hours to the Principal Secretary, (Women and Child Development), U.P., Director (Mahila Kalyan), U.P., U.P. Member Secretary, State Legal Services Authority (UPSLSA), Member Secretary, National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) all district judges in U.P., District Magistrate and SSP, Allahabad. 
Order Date :- 16.4.2012 

Sunday, April 15, 2012

Supreme Court of Singapore - High Court 1 This is an appeal against an order of costs made by a District Judge in a defamation action arising from an email sent by the Appellant to two managers of the parent company of the Respondent’s employer. The District Judge had ordered that each party was to bear his own costs after dismissing the action. 33 Second, and perhaps more importantly, although the District Judge’s finding that the Email was not defamatory is not on appeal, it was at least arguable that the Email was defamatory. It is well established that the test for determining the natural and ordinary meaning of allegedly defamatory words is the meaning that the words would “convey to an ordinary reasonable person, not unduly suspicious or avid for scandal, using his general knowledge and common sense” (see Review Publishing Co Ltd and another v Lee Hsien Loong and another appeal [2010] 1 SLR 52 at [27]). In my view, the natural and ordinary meaning of the Email was that the Respondent was diverting business from DMS (his employer) to IT Wireless, a company of which he was a shadow director and from which he was receiving dividends. It is arguable that this meaning of the Email was defamatory. It is, of course, not defamatory to simply call someone a shadow director. However, the Email goes beyond that. The suggestion is that the Respondent was engaged in self-dealing. In establishing the defence of justification which the Appellant had pleaded as one of his defences, the Appellant would have to prove, inter alia, at the trial that the Respondent was indeed a shadow director of IT Wireless, the company that the Respondent was diverting business to whilst as an employee of DMS. If it was arguable that the Email was defamatory, then the Appellant’s conduct of the litigation in the proceedings below was reasonable. There was no reason therefore to depart from the general rule that costs should follow the event. 35 For the reasons above, I allow the appeal. The District Judge’s order that each party was to bear his own costs of the trial is set aside. I order the Respondent to pay the Appellant’s costs of the trial.



Low Leong Meng v Koh Poh Seng - [2012] SGHC 1 (3 January 2012)


Low Leong Meng v Koh Poh Seng
[2012] SGHC 1

Suit No:District Court Appeal No 31 of 2011
Decision Date:3 January 2012
Court:High Court
Coram:Chan Seng Onn J
Counsel:Mr Simon Jones and Mr Jayagobi Jayaram (Grays LLC) for the Appellant; Mr Tan Tee Giam (TanLim Partnership) for the Respondent.

Subject Area / Catchwords
Civil Procedure – costs
Judgment
3 January 2012
Judgment reserved.


Chan Seng Onn J:
Introduction
1 This is an appeal against an order of costs made by a District Judge in a defamation action arising from an email sent by the Appellant to two managers of the parent company of the Respondent’s employer. The District Judge had ordered that each party was to bear his own costs after dismissing the action.
BackgroundParties to the dispute
2 The Appellant was a director and shareholder of Daifuku-Wis Technologies Pte Ltd (“DWIST”), a Singapore company.[note: 1] DWIST is a joint venture between the Appellant and Daifuku Mechatronics (S) Pte Ltd (“DMS”), the Singapore subsidiary of Daifuku Co Ltd (“Daifuku”), a Japanese company.[note: 2]
3 The Respondent was DMS’s deputy general manager. At the time of the trial below, the Respondent had been promoted to the position of general manager.[note: 3]
Background to the defamation action
4 The Respondent sued the Appellant for defamation arising from an email in the Japanese language which the Appellant had sent to two members of Daifuku’s “top management” on 6 August 2007 (“the Email”).[note: 4] An agreed[note: 5] English translation of the Email reads as follows:[note: 6]
Attn: Inoue Director and Okuno General Manager
I am sorry for sending you this letter abruptly.
It’s been quite some time since we last met. I am Low, Ex-President of Singapore DWIST. Do you remember seeing me once in Japan about 2 years ago regarding the sale of DWIST shares?
About 3 years have passed already since I resigned as President of DWIST, but the transfer of DWIST shares has not been settled, and I am still in deadlock.
It is because DMS has been unilaterally pressing down the share value. I was told to keep the share value at zero if I wouldn’t sell to DMS for $0.30 per share. (In fact, DWIST did not have any sales in 2005. All new jobs orders were given to IT Wireless, and orders under maintenance contract were given to sub-contractor of DWIST.)
About 3 years ago, I reported to Shimizu, President of DMS, that [the Respondent] and Ms Quek, both [of whom] were employees of DMS, seemed to be intentionally giving DMS’ orders to a company called IT Wireless, and I showed evidence to him, but was ignored.
Form [sic] 2003, the order value from DMS to IT Wireless has increased continuously, and they achieved quite a large profit. Salaries of Eric Teo and Sam, both [of whom] are Directors of IT Wireless, have increased sharply to S$240,000 in 2006. (Their salaries were S$100,000 in around 2002.) (Sales of DWIST continued to decrease from 2003.)
[The Respondent] and Yong Yong of DMS are originally the founders of IT Wireless, and it appeared on the surface that all shares were sold to Eric Teo and Sam in 2001, but they received dividends payouts in around 2003, and in between 2005 and 2006, Eric Teo and Sam handed over money to [the Respondent] in several instalments. All these evidences [sic] were submitted to the judge by them as part of discovery process during the law suit against Koh, Eric Teo and Sam started last year. (Refer to the attached), the judge has already ruled that [the Respondent] was a Shadow Director of IT Wireless. There is a need for [the Respondent] to appear in court later to defend about Eric Teo and daily operation of IT Wireless. Among the evidences [sic] that were gathered, there were payment vouchers for the commission that IT Wireless paid to Yong Yong of DMS. A company called MobiSoft was set up under the names of Eric Teo and Sma [sic] in 2006, and orders from DMS were transferred to MobiSoft.
I always believe that Daifuku is not a company that bullies Partner [sic]. It is no point talking to Shimizu, Singapore local President. I have been thinking that there is no other way but to sue [the Respondent] and his lot, and show the evidences [sic] to the head office. I wish that I will receive fair treatment one way or another. For these 2 and half [sic] years, I am living a difficult life with debts and just a little income, and waiting for justice.
Looking forward to your kind attention.
DWIST
Ex President
LOW LEONG MENG
5 The Respondent claimed that the following portions of the Email were defamatory (“the Words”):[note: 7]
About 3 years ago, I reported to Shimizu, President of DMS, that [the Respondent] and Ms Quek, both were employees of DMS, seemed to be intentionally giving DMS’ orders to a company called IT Wireless, and I showed evidence to him, but was ignored.
[The Respondent] and Yong Yong of DMS are originally the founders of IT Wireless, and it appeared on the surface that all shares were sold to Eric Teo and Sam in 2001, but they received dividends payouts in around 2003, and in between 2005 and 2006, Eric Teo and Sam handed over money to [the Respondent] in several instalments. … the judge has already ruled that [the Respondent] was a Shadow Director of IT Wireless. There is a need for [the Respondent] to appear in court later to defend about Eric Teo and daily operation of IT Wireless. …
6 The Respondent pleaded in his Statement of Claim (Amendment No 1) that the natural and ordinary meaning of the Words meant or were understood to mean the following:
(a) The Respondent, together with Ms Quek Yong Yong, an employee of DMS, had abused the power of his position and office at DMS to give business to a company called IT Wireless Pte Ltd (“IT Wireless”), a competitor of DWIST, for personal gain and enrichment.
(b) Despite his purported resignation from his position in IT Wireless in 2001, the Respondent had continued to be involved in the business of IT Wireless. Arising from that relationship, the Respondent received several secret commissions from IT Wireless for giving it business.
(c) The Respondent had breached his fiduciary duties to DMS.
(d) The Respondent is guilty of dishonourable conduct against DMS.
(e) The Respondent is untrustworthy.
(f) The court had already ruled against the Respondent.
7 The Appellant denied that the Email had any of the meanings set out in the Respondent’s Statement of Claim (Amendment No 1) (see [6]above).[note: 8] Instead, the Appellant claimed that the plain and ordinary or innuendo meaning of the Words (see above at [5]) was as follows:[note: 9]
(a) The Appellant was a past President of DWIST.
(b) He owned shares in DWIST which he wished to dispose of to DWIST at a fair and reasonable price.
(c) DMS was the other majority shareholder of DWIST.
(d) A fair and reasonable agreement could not be reached for the sale of the Appellant’s DWIST shares to DMS because the value of DWIST has been kept artificially low.
(e) One reason the value of DWIST shares was artificially low was because business which would otherwise have been booked by DWIST has been procured for IT Wireless by, inter alia, the Respondent who was and may still be a shadow director of IT Wireless. The Respondent was and still is also an employee of DMS. The Appellant then set out the definition of the term “shadow director” under s 4(1) of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed).
(f) The Appellant averred that the directors of IT Wireless were accustomed to acting on the Respondent’s instructions after he resigned his directorship of IT Wireless on 30 June 2011.
(g) The Appellant had provided supporting evidence of the Respondent’s involvement in IT Wireless to one Shimizu, the President of DMS, in an attempt to seek his assistance in obtaining a fair and reasonable price for the Appellant’s shares in DWIST.
The Appellant then pleaded that the above understanding of the Words was true and therefore justified.[note: 10] He also raised the defence of qualified privilege.[note: 11]
The District Judge’s first decision
8 The District Judge dismissed the Respondent’s claim (see Koh Poh Seng v Low Leong Meng [2010] SGDC 256) (“the District Judge’s First Decision”). He held that the Email was not defamatory.[note: 12] In his view, the substance of the Email was this (see the District Judge’s First Decision at [21][note: 13]:
I ask for your intervention. The share value of DWIST has come down so that I can’t get a reasonable price for it. The reason that the share value of DWIST has come down is because the plaintiff has been giving business that might have come to DWIST instead to [IT Wireless]. The [Respondent], although he appeared to have sold his shares in [IT Wireless] in 2001, remains financially connected to, and have [sic] profited from, [IT Wireless]. The [Respondent], with others, has been sued. The court has ruled that the [Respondent] still retains influence over [IT Wireless’s] board of directors.
The District Judge did not consider this interpretation of the Email to be defamatory. He did not think that the Email suggested that the Respondent’s influence over IT Wireless was such that he had “profited at the expense of, or in derogation of his fiduciary duties to DMS” (see the District Judge’s First Decision at [22]).[note: 14] He did not consider that it was defamatory to call someone a shadow director “unless the context suggested otherwise, which was not the case here” (see the District Judge’s First Decision at [23]).[note: 15]
9 The District Judge then ordered that each party was to bear his own costs. He made this decision without hearing the parties.[note: 16] He reached this decision because he felt that the Appellant’s efforts at proving the “irrelevant fact” that the Respondent was a shadow director of IT Wireless (as part of his defence) took up almost the whole trial (see the District Judge’s First Decision at [44]).[note: 17]
The first application for leave to appeal
10 The Appellant applied in Originating Summons No 724 of 2010 for leave to appeal against the following aspects of the District Judge’s First Decision:[note: 18]
(a) The portions of the District Judge’s First Decision in which he found that the question of whether the Respondent was a shadow director was an “egregious exercise in futility” (“Head A”).
(b) The portion of the District Judge’s First Decision where he did not make a finding on whether the Respondent had succeeded in proving his defence of qualified privilege at trial (“Head B”).
(c) The portions of the District Judge’s First Decision where he did not make a finding on whether the Respondent was a shadow director of IT Wireless, whether the Respondent was paid for the IT Wireless shares that he sold and whether the Appellant had published the Words maliciously, with a deliberate intention of injuring the Respondent, knowing or not caring whether it was true or false out of spite or ill will towards the Respondent as pleaded by the Respondent in claiming aggravated damages from the Appellant (“Head C”).
(d) The portion of the District Judge’s First Decision where he recorded that the Appellant’s efforts at proving that the Respondent was a shadow director took most of the time at trial (“Head D”).
(e) The District Judge’s decision that he would not hear the parties on costs and that it was fair for each party to bear his own costs (“Head E”).
11 I granted the Appellant leave to appeal on 5 August 2010.[note: 19]
The High Court’s decision on the first appeal
12 The appeal (District Court Appeal No 43 of 2010 (“DCA 43/2010”)) was fixed before Kan Ting Chiu J.
13 After hearing the parties, Kan J ordered that the matter was to be remitted to the District Judge to hear submissions from the parties on the question of costs and thereafter to make orders on costs arising before and in the trial.[note: 20]
14 I pause here to note that it appears that Kan J’s order only concerned Head E of the appeal (see [10(e)] above). Kan J did not seem to have made any order on Heads A to D (see [10(a)]–[10(d)] above). Although Kan J did not provide written grounds of decision, it appears from the wording of his order that his concern was that the District Judge had made his order on costs without hearing the parties.
The District Judge’s second decision
15 The District Judge then heard submissions on costs. He reaffirmed his decision that each party should bear its own costs (see Koh Poh Seng v Low Leong Meng [2011] SGDC 130) (“the District Judge’s Second Decision”).[note: 21] He reasoned that although his remarks at trial may have suggested that he considered the issue of whether the Respondent was a shadow director to be relevant, he was bound to keep an open mind. His views on the meaning of the Email only crystallised as he reviewed the case for the purpose of making his decision (see the District Judge’s Second Decision at [17]).[note: 22] The District Judge was also of the view that he was functus officio in relation to the substantive issues (see the District Judge’s Second Decision at [20]).[note: 23] Hence, he believed that he could not revisit his findings, in particular, his finding that the Email was not defamatory.[note: 24] He nevertheless proceeded to explain that he saw no reason to disavow his primary findings (see the District Judge’s Second Decision at [22]).[note: 25]
16 He also held that O 59 r 3 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) (“ROC”) mandated that the costs of the interlocutory applications must, likewise, be borne by the parties respectively.[note: 26]
17 Finally, he ordered that each party was to bear his own costs in respect of the further hearing before him (see the District Judge’s Second Decision at [27]).
The Appellant’s attempts to reinstate the first appeal
18 The Appellant’s solicitors then wrote to the Supreme Court Registry (“the Registry”) on 26 April 2011 to request for DCA 43/2010 (ie. the first appeal before Kan J.) to be re-fixed for a hearing.[note: 27] The Registry replied on 29 April 2011 to inform the Appellant that Kan J had directed the parties to take whatever actions they considered to be appropriate on the basis of the District Judge’s Second Decision.[note: 28]
19 The Appellant’s solicitors followed up with another letter to the Registry on 29 April 2011. In this letter, they mentioned, inter alia, that Kan J had opined that “the appellate principles would apply” if the parties disagreed with the District Judge’s decision after having been heard on costs.[note: 29] They also repeated their request for DCA 43/2010 to be re-fixed for a hearing.[note: 30] The Registry replied on 6 May 2011 to inform the parties that Kan J had directed that the Registry’s letter dated 29 April 2011 was to stand.[note: 31]
The second application for leave to appeal
20 The Appellant applied in Originating Summons No 428 of 2011 for leave to appeal against the following aspects of the District Judge’s Second Decision:
(a) The District Judge’s ruling that the Email did not contain a “defamatory sting” (“Head F”) and his ruling that the Appellant should not get costs for expending time to prove what the District Judge had ruled to be a “non-defamatory sting” (“Head G”);
(b) The District Judge’s ruling that he could not infer that the Email alleged that there was a conflict of interest on the Respondent’s part (“Head H”);
(c) The District Judge’s ruling that the Appellant’s pleaded defence failed to identify a false innuendo and failed to explain why it should be inferred from the text (“Head I”);
(d) The District Judge’s reference to a “Lucas-Box meaning” (“Head J”); and
(e) The District Judge’s ruling that the orders as to costs for the interlocutory proceedings (that costs were to be in the cause) could not be taken into consideration in the court’s exercise of discretion in respect of the costs of the trial (“Head K”).
The Appellant also applied for leave to appeal against the District Judge’s Second Decision on the ground that all the evidence adduced at trial in support of the Appellant’s defence of justification was also essential to prove his alternate defence of qualified privilege (“Head L”). The Appellant deposed in his affidavit in support of his application for leave that this argument was raised to the District Judge.[note: 32] The District Judge did not, however, consider this argument in his judgment.[note: 33]
21 I granted the Appellant leave to appeal on 17 August 2011.[note: 34]
The arguments at the appeal
22 The Appellant argued that the Email was defamatory when it was read in context because it suggested that the Respondent placed his employer’s business with IT Wireless of which he was a “shadow director”.[note: 35] He asserted that he should have been awarded costs even if the Email was not held to be defamatory for the following reasons. First, the truthfulness of the statement in the Email that the Respondent was a “shadow director” of IT Wireless was an issue in the proceedings below. This is apparent from the District Judge’s suggestions and comments during the trial[note: 36] and the Respondent’s conduct at trial[note: 37]. Second, in defamation actions, costs should be awarded based on the success or failure of the defences advanced as long as the publication was adjudged as being capable of bearing a defamatory meaning. Otherwise, counsel would have to second-guess the judge’s decision on whether the publication is defamatory.[note: 38] Third, the District Judge should have taken into consideration the fact that the parties had incurred considerable pre-trial costs for which the costs order was costs in the cause.[note: 39]
23 The Appellant also argued that although costs are in the discretion of the court, an appellate court may intervene if the discretion has been “manifestly exercised wrongly or exercised on wrong principles” (citing Tullio Planeta v Maoro Andrea G [1994] 2 SLR(R) 501[note: 40] (“Tullio Planeta”) at [22]).[note: 41] The District Judge’s exercise of discretion was manifestly wrong. The Appellant did not waste any time at trial by pursuing the defence of justification.[note: 42]
24 The Respondent argued that the only portions of the District Judge’s Second Decision which were of relevance were [24]–[25] where he had set out his decision to reaffirm his earlier decision that each party was to bear his own costs.[note: 43] The Respondent asserted that the Appellant has not appealed against those portions of the District Judge’s Second Decision.[note: 44]
25 The Respondent further argued that this appeal was an abuse of process because the Appellant is having another bite at the cherry based on a fresh position that the Email was defamatory.[note: 45] If the Appellant was dissatisfied with the District Judge’s primary finding that the Email was not defamatory, he should have appealed against that aspect of his decision in the First Appeal.[note: 46]
The scope of the appeal
26 The rather complicated procedural history of this matter raises interesting issues concerning the scope of the present appeal. The Appellant had five heads of appeal in DCA 43/2010 (see [10] above). As I observed earlier (see [14] above), Kan J’s remission of the matter to the District Judge seemed to only touch on one of the heads of appeal, viz, Head E. On remission, the District Judge held that he was functus officio in relation to any substantive matters but he nevertheless expressed an opinion that his primary findings were correct (see [15] above). As a result, the present appeal before me also seemed to raise substantive issues. However, in the decision presently under appeal, the District Judge was merely expressing an opinion because he had ruled (correctly, in my view) that he was functus officioas regards his primary findings. These procedural complications raised two questions in my mind. First, was it within the scope of the present appeal for me to review the District Judge’s primary findings? Second, were the remaining heads of appeal in DCA 43/2010 (ie, Heads A to D) still in issue at the appeal before me?
27 I do not, however, have to decide these questions because of a development during the hearing of the appeal. Counsel for the Appellant, Mr Simon Jones, withdrew his client’s appeal on all substantive issues. In other words, he was only pursuing his client’s appeal on the District Judge’s affirmation of his earlier decision that each party was to bear his own costs.
28 This means that the scope of the appeal before me is limited to whether the District Judge erred in ruling that the Appellant should not get costs (ie, Head G). I should at this juncture mention that I do not think that the Respondent’s contention that the Appellant has not appealed against the portions of the District Judge’s Second Decision in which he affirmed his earlier order as to costs (see [24] above) had any merit. I considered that Head G of the Appellant’s second application for leave to appeal plainly placed in contention the issue of whether the District Judge had erred in his order as to costs.
AnalysisThe applicable legal principles
29 The Court of Appeal in Tullio Planeta adopted (at [24]) the following exposition of the principles governing cost orders from the headnote of the English Court of Appeal’s decision in Re Elgindata Ltd (No 2) [1993] 1 All ER 232:
... The principles on which costs were to be awarded were (i) that costs were in the discretion of the court, (ii) that costs should follow the event except when it appeared to the court that in the circumstances of the case some other order should be made, (iii) that the general rule did not cease to apply simply because the successful party raised issues or made allegations that failed, but that he could be deprived of his costs in whole or in part where he had caused a significant increase in the length of the proceedings, and (iv) thatwhere the successful party raised issues or made allegations improperly or unreasonably the court could not only deprive him of his costs but could also order him to pay the whole or part of the unsuccessful party's costs. The fourth principle implied, moreover, that a successful party who neither improperly nor unreasonably raised issues or made allegations which failed ought not to be ordered to pay any part of the unsuccessful party's costs ...
[emphasis added in bold italics]
30 The second principle is also found in O 59 r 3(2) of the ROC. The third and fourth principles set out above are embodied, in a slightly different way, in O 59 r 6A of the ROC:
(1) In addition to and not in derogation of any other provision in this Order, where a party has failed to establish any claim or issue which he has raised in any proceedings, and has thereby unnecessarily or unreasonably protracted, or added to the costs or complexity of those proceedings, the Court may order that the costs of that party shall not be allowed in whole or in part, or that any costs occasioned by that claim or issue to any other party shall be paid by him to that other party, regardless of the outcome of the cause or matter.
[emphasis added in bold italics]
A summary of the applicable principles may also be found in my decision in Raffles Town Club Pte Ltd v Lim Eng Hock Peter and others (Tung Yu-Lien Margaret and others, third parties) [2011] 1 SLR 582 at [34]–[36].
My decision
31 I find that the District Judge was manifestly wrong in the exercise of his discretion. The Appellant’s conduct of the litigation was reasonable for the following reasons.
32 First, the District Judge’s comments during the trial suggested that he considered the issue of whether the Respondent was a shadow director of IT Wireless to be relevant. The Appellant cannot therefore be faulted for continuing to pursue the issue. As the Appellant has correctly pointed out, the following comments and indications from the District Judge would have reasonably led him to believe at that time that it was relevant to prove that the Respondent was a shadow director of IT Wireless:
(a) When the Respondent requested for the District Judge to make a preliminary ruling as to whether the words complained about were defamatory, the District Judge stated that he would have to hear the evidence. His view was that there would be “no time savings” with making such a preliminary ruling.[note: 47]
(b) When the Respondent was asked if he recalled signing IT Wireless’ cheques, the Respondent replied that he could not recall. The District Judge then interjected and expressed his surprise that the Respondent would forget signing his cheques.[note: 48] The District Judge’s interjection suggested that he felt that it was relevant for the Appellant to pursue the truth of whether the Respondent was a shadow director in IT Wireless.
(c) On the second day of the trial, the Respondent was further cross-examined on the issue of his signing IT Wireless’ cheques. When the Respondent was asked whether he was aware that he remained as an authorised signatory for IT Wireless’ cheques at the material time, the District Judge interjected again and stated that the issue was whether the Respondent signed cheques and not whether he remained as a signatory.[note: 49]
I should also mention that, at the hearing before me, I asked the Respondent’s counsel to bring to my attention any part of the District Judge’s notes of evidence in which he (ie, the District Judge) indicated that the issue of whether the Respondent was a shadow director was irrelevant. The Respondent was not able to refer me to any such indication.
33 Second, and perhaps more importantly, although the District Judge’s finding that the Email was not defamatory is not on appeal, it was at least arguable that the Email was defamatory. It is well established that the test for determining the natural and ordinary meaning of allegedly defamatory words is the meaning that the words would “convey to an ordinary reasonable person, not unduly suspicious or avid for scandal, using his general knowledge and common sense” (see Review Publishing Co Ltd and another v Lee Hsien Loong and another appeal [2010] 1 SLR 52 at [27]). In my view, the natural and ordinary meaning of the Email was that the Respondent was diverting business from DMS (his employer) to IT Wireless, a company of which he was a shadow director and from which he was receiving dividends. It is arguable that this meaning of the Email was defamatory. It is, of course, not defamatory to simply call someone a shadow director. However, the Email goes beyond that. The suggestion is that the Respondent was engaged in self-dealing. In establishing the defence of justification which the Appellant had pleaded as one of his defences, the Appellant would have to prove, inter alia, at the trial that the Respondent was indeed a shadow director of IT Wireless, the company that the Respondent was diverting business to whilst as an employee of DMS. If it was arguable that the Email was defamatory, then the Appellant’s conduct of the litigation in the proceedings below was reasonable. There was no reason therefore to depart from the general rule that costs should follow the event.
34 Since the Appellant’s conduct of the litigation in the proceedings below was reasonable, the general rule that costs follow the event should have been followed.
Conclusion
35 For the reasons above, I allow the appeal. The District Judge’s order that each party was to bear his own costs of the trial is set aside. I order the Respondent to pay the Appellant’s costs of the trial.
36 Unless the parties wish to be heard on costs, the Appellant is further entitled to the costs of this appeal.

[note: 1]Appellant’s Core Bundle (“ACB”) at p 14 (the District Judge’s First Decision).
[note: 2]ACB at p 13 (the District Judge’s First Decision).
[note: 3]ACB at p 13 (the District Judge’s First Decision).
[note: 4]ACB at p 14 (the District Judge’s First Decision) and Record of Appeal (“RA”) Vol II at pp 33–34 (Schedule A to the Respondent’s Statement of Claim).
[note: 5]RA Vol II at p 42 (Defence (Amendment No 1) at [5]).
[note: 6]RA Vol II at p 38 (Schedule B to the Respondent’s Statement of Claim (Amendment No 1)).
[note: 7]RA Vol II at p 28 (Respondent’s Statement of Claim (Amendment No 1)).
[note: 8]RA Vol II at p 42 (Defence (Amendment No 1) at [6]).
[note: 9]RA Vol II at pp 42–43 (Defence (Amendment No 1) at [7]).
[note: 10]RA Vol II at p 42 (Defence (Amendment No 1) at [7]).
[note: 11]RA Vol II at p 44 (Defence (Amendment No 1) at [8]).
[note: 12]ACB at p 20C (the District Judge’s First Decision at [20]).
[note: 13]ACB at p 20C (the District Judge’s First Decision at [21]).
[note: 14]ACB at p 20D (the District Judge’s First Decision at [22]).
[note: 15]ACB at p 20D (the District Judge’s First Decision at [23]).
[note: 16]ACB at p 20K (the District Judge’s First Decision at [45]).
[note: 17]ACB at p 20K (the District Judge’s First Decision at [44]).
[note: 18]Respondent’s Core Bundle (“RCB”) at pp 20–22 (Notice of Appeal for DCA 43 of 2010).
[note: 19]See Order of Court No 4263 of 2010 in the EFS Case File for Originating Summons No 724 of 2010 read with the schedule to Originating Summons No 724 of 2010.
[note: 20]Respondent’s Core Bundle (“RCB”) at pp 112–113 (Order of Court No 6013 of 2010).
[note: 21]ACB at p 10 (the District Judge’s Second Decision at [25]).
[note: 22]ACB at p 8 (the District Judge’s Second Decision at [17]).
[note: 23]ACB at p 8 (the District Judge’s Second Decision at [20]).
[note: 24]ACB at p 8 (the District Judge’s Second Decision at [20]).
[note: 25]ACB at p 9 (the District Judge’s Second Decision at [22]).
[note: 26]ACB at p 10 (2nd GD at [26]).
[note: 27]RCB at p 151 (Letter from Grays LLC to the Supreme Court Registry dated 26 April 2011).
[note: 28]RCB at p 152 (Letter from the Supreme Court Registry to Grays LLC and TanLim Partnership dated 29 April 2011).
[note: 31]RCB at p 155 (Letter from the Supreme Court Registry to Grays LLC and TanLim Partnership dated 6 May 2011).
[note: 32]Affidavit of Low Leong Meng dated 6 June 2011 filed in support of OS 428/2011 at [11(f)].
[note: 34]See Order of Court No 3880 of 2011 in the EFS Case File for OS 428/2011 read with [11] of the Affidavit of Low Leong Meng dated 6 June 2011.
[note: 35]Appellant’s Skeletal Arguments at [10]; Appellant’s Case at [191]–[194].
[note: 36]Appellant’s Skeletal Arguments at [11]–[19]; [27]; Appellant’s Case at [67]–[90].
[note: 37]Appellant’s Case at [58]–[60].
[note: 38]Appellant’s Skeletal Arguments at [24].
[note: 39]Appellant’s Skeletal Arguments at [29]–[35]; Appellant’s Case at [113].
[note: 40]Appellant’s Bundle of Authorities (“ABOA”) Vol I at Tab C.
[note: 41]Appellant’s Case at [165].
[note: 42]Appellant’s Case at [166].
[note: 43]Respondent’s Case at [1]–[3].
[note: 44]Respondent’s Case at [4].
[note: 45]Respondent’s Case at [8].
[note: 46]Respondent’s Case at [10] and p 24.
[note: 47]RA Vol III Part III at p 617.
[note: 48]RA Vol III Part III at p 641.
[note: 49]RA Vol III Part III at p 660.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: ss.482 and 468 - Customary divorce - Agreement for, registered - Permanent alimony to wife - Ten years thereafter, wife filed complaint petition against husband and parents-in-law before the Women Cell on the ground that the husband had married for the second time - FIR lodged - Husband and parents-in-law filed application for quashing of the FIR - High Court, in exercise of jurisdiction u/s.482 CrPC, allowed the application - Justification of - Held: Justified - Since parties living separately for more than ten years, case under s.498A IPC not made out at such a distant point of time, particularly in view of the bar of limitation as contained in s.468 CrPC - Even otherwise, on facts, it is unbelievable that the wife was really harassed by her husband or in-laws - Though there does not exist any period of limitation in respect of offence under s.494, but no allegation was made out in regard to commission of said offence so far as the parents-in-law are concerned - If it is a case of customary divorce, question in regard to existence of good custom may have to be gone into, in a civil proceeding - But criminal prosecution shall not lie - It was initiated mala fide - If allowed to continue, same shall be abuse of the process of Court - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 498A and 494 - Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - s.13(1)(a) - Abuse of Court. The parties entered into an agreement for divorce in 1996 which was registered in the office of the Joint Sub-Registrar. The said divorce purportedly took place in terms of the custom prevailing in the community to which the parties belong. Appellant-wife also received a sum of Rs.25,000/- towards permanent alimony which was acknowledged by granting a stamped receipt therefor. Respondent No.1 married again in 1998. In 2006, Appellant filed a complaint petition against Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3, i.e., her husband and parents-in-law before the Women Cell, inter alia, on the premise that Respondent No.1 had married for the second time which fact she came to learn on receipt of summons in respect of a petition filed by Respondent No.1 under s.13(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. A First Information Report (FIR) was lodged pursuant to the said complaint. Respondents were thereafter arrested. An application for quashing the said FIR was filed before the High Court. By reason of the impugned judgment, the said application has been allowed. Appellant submitted before this Court, that in a case of this nature, where investigation into the allegations made in the complaint has been going on, the High Court should not have passed the impugned judgment, upon entering into the purported defence raised by the Respondents, particularly when the State itself, in its counter affidavit filed before the High Court, categorically stated that a prima facie case had been made out for investigation. Respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3, however, submitted that mala fide on the part of Appellant was evident in view of the fact that the complaint petition was filed 10 years after the divorce and that such complaint petition should be considered to be an abuse of the process of the Court. The question which arose for consideration before this Court is as to whether the High Court, in a case of this nature, could exercise its jurisdiction under s.482, CrPC. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. The customary divorce may be legal or illegal. The fact that such an agreement had been entered into or the Appellant had received a sum of Rs.25,000/- by way of permanent alimony, however, stands admitted. The document is a registered one. Appellant being in the legal profession must be held to be aware of the legal implication thereof. If the contents of the said agreement are taken to be correct, indisputably the parties had been living separately for more than ten years. How then a case under s.498A of IPC can be said to have been made out and that too at such a distant point of time is the question, particularly in view of the bar of limitation as contained in s.468 of CrPC. Even otherwise it is unbelievable that the Appellant was really harassed by her husband or her in-laws. [Para 10] [941-G,H, 942-A,B] 2. Though there does not exist any period of limitation in respect of an offence under s.494, as the maximum period of punishment which can be imposed therefor is seven years, but no allegation has been made out in the present case in regard to commission of the said offence so far as the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are concerned. If, even for exercising its jurisdiction under s.482 of CrPC, the High Court has taken into consideration an admitted document, there is no legal infirmity therein. If it is a case of customary divorce, the question in regard to the existence of good custom may have to be gone into in a civil proceeding. But a criminal prosecution shall not lie. It was initiated mala fide. Thus, if it is allowed to continue, the same shall be an abuse of the process of Court. [Para 12] [942-C-F] Gurukrishna Kumar, Srikala Gurukrishna Kumar and T. Senthil Kumar for the Appellant. V. Karoagaraj, R. Shnmugasundaram, S. Thananjayan, V.G. Pragasam, S.J. Aristotlc and Praburama Subramanian for the Respondents. , 2008(9 )SCR937 , , 2008(9 )SCALE411 , 2008(7 )JT245


CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.)  967 of 2008

PETITIONER:
M.Saravana Porselvi

RESPONDENT:
A.R. Chandrashekar @ Parthiban & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/05/2008

BENCH:
S.B. Sinha & Lokeshwar Singh Panta

JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.1641 of 2007)
REPORTABLE

S.B. Sinha, J.

1. Leave granted.
2. Appellant is an advocate.  She was married to Respondent No.1 on
or about 1.12.1993.
     The parties indisputably are living separately since 1996.  She
allegedly filed a complaint before the All Women Police Station at
Virudhunagar.  An enquiry was directed to be conducted.  As per the
advice of the officers of the said Police Station as also the relatives of the
parties, they entered into an agreement for divorce on or about 24.7.1996.
It was registered in the office of the Joint Sub-Registrar, Virudhunagar
being Registration No.146 of 1996.  Appellant also received a sum of
Rs.25,000/- towards permanent alimony which was acknowledged by
granting a stamped receipt therefor.  The said purported divorce is said to
have taken place in terms of the custom prevailing in the community the
which the parties belong.
3. Admittedly, the first respondent married again in 1998.  He has two
children out of the said wedlock.
4. Appellant, however, filed a complaint petition against the
respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 herein, i.e., her husband and parents-in-law in
May, 2006 before the Women Cell at Chennai, inter alia, on the premise
that the first respondent has married for the second time which fact she
came to learn on receipt of a summons in respect of a petition filed by the
first respondent under Section 13(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
5. A First Information Report (FIR) was lodged pursuant to the said
complaint which was registered as Crime No.5 of 2006.  Respondents
were arrested.
An application for quashing the said FIR was filed before the High
Court.  By reason of the impugned judgment, the said application has
been allowed.
6. Mr. Gurukrishna Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant, would submit that in a case of this nature, where
investigation into the allegations made in the complaint has been going
on, the High Court should not have passed the impugned judgment, upon
entering into the purported defence raised by the respondents, particularly
when the State itself, in its counter affidavit filed before the High Court,
categorically stated that a prima facie case had been made out for
investigation.
7. Mr. R. Shunmugasundaram, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the State, however, would submit that the High Court cannot be said to
have committed an error as the deed of divorce dated 24.7.1996 was a
registered document and, thus, a public document.  If, therefore,
execution of the said document has not been denied, the impugned
judgment should not be interfered with.
8. Mr. V. Kanakraj, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3, would submit that the mala fide on the part
of the appellant is evident in view of the fact that such a complaint
petition has been filed after a period of 10 years.  The learned counsel
contended that as the divorce had taken place 10 years back, it is futile to
urge that the complaint petition filed after such a long time, should not be
considered to be an abuse of the process of the Court.
9. The core question herein is as to whether the High Court, in a case
of this nature, could exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure.
10. The factual backdrop of the matter is not in dispute.
     The customary divorce may be legal or illegal.  The fact that such
an agreement had been entered into or the appellant had received a sum
of Rs.25,000/- by way of permanent alimony, however, stands admitted.
The document is a registered one.  Appellant being in the legal profession
must be held to be aware of the legal implication thereof.  If the contents
of the said agreement are taken to be correct, indisputably the parties had
been living separately for more than ten years.  How then a case under
Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code can be said to have made out and
that too at such a distant point of time is the question, particularly in view
of the bar of limitation as contained in Section 468 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.  Even otherwise it is unbelievable that the appellant
was really harassed by her husband or her in-laws.
11. We are not oblivious of the fact that there does not exist any period
of limitation in respect of an offence under Section 494, as the maximum
period of punishment which can be imposed therefor is seven years.
12. But no allegation has been made out in regard to commission of the
said offence so far as the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are concerned.  If even
for exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, the High Court has taken into consideration an admitted
document, we do not see any legal infirmity therein.  If it is a case of
customary divorce, the question in regard to the existence of good custom
may have to be gone into in a civil proceeding.  But a criminal
prosecution shall not lie.  It was initiated mala fide.  Thus, it is allowed to
continue, the same shall be an abuse of the process of court.
13. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no legal infirmity in the
impugned judgment.  The appeal is dismissed accordingly.