LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Friday, April 13, 2012

in the absence of clear evidence of age of accused whether he is juvenile or not , the doctors evidence can be considered for determining the age of the accused. Admittedly as second thought, the petitioner innovated and created another son who said to be died as an explanation for the another date of birth certificate – a second thought clearly establishes that the petitioner deliberately placed false records for proving the accused as minor.The apex court set aside the order of the High court and additional sessions judge and upheld that the accused is not juvenile and is not entitled for the benefits of juvenile justice act


Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELATE JURISDICTION
   CRIMINAL   APPEAL   NO.                  OF   2012
(Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No. 2411/2011)
OM PRAKASH   ..Appellant
Versus
STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR.      ..Respondents
  J  U  D  G  E   M  E  N  T
   GYAN   SUDHA   MISRA,   J.
1. The Judgment and order dated 19.08.2010
passed by the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur in
SBCRR No.597 of  2009 is under challenge in this appeal at
the instance of the appellant Om Prakash who is a hapless
father of an innocent girl of 13 ½ years who was subjected
to rape by the alleged accused-Respondent No.2 Vijay
1Page 2
Kumar @ Bhanwroo who has been allowed to avail the
benefit of protection under Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act 2000, although the courts below
could not record a finding that he, in fact, was a
juvenile since he had not attained the age of 18 years on the
date of incident.  Hence this Special Leave Petition in which
leave has been granted after condoning the delay.
2. Thus the questions inter alia which require
consideration in this appeal are:-
(i) whether the respondent/accused herein
who is alleged  to have committed  an offence of
rape under Section 376 IPC  and other allied
sections along with a co-accused  who  already
stands convicted for the offence under Section 376
IPC, can be allowed to avail the benefit of protection
to a juvenile in order to refer him for trial  to a
juvenile court  under the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (shortly referred to
as the ‘Juvenile Justice Act’) although the trial court
and the High Court  could not record a conclusive
finding of fact that the respondent-accused was
below  the age of 18 years  on the date of  the
incident?
(ii) whether the principle and benefit of
‘benevolent  legislation’ relating to  Juvenile Justice
Act could be applied in cases where two views
regarding determination of the age of child/accused
2Page 3
was possible and the so-called  child could not be
held to be a juvenile on the basis of evidence
adduced?
(iii) whether medical evidence and other
attending circumstances would be of any value and
assistance while determining the age of a juvenile, if
the academic record certificates do not conclusively
prove the age of the accused ?
(iv) whether reliance should be placed on
medical evidence if the certificates relating to
academic records is deliberately with held in order
to conceal the age of the accused and authenticity of
the medical evidence regarding the age is under
challenge?
3. Juvenile Justice Act was enacted with a laudable
object of providing  a separate forum  or a special court  for
holding trial of children/juvenile by the juvenile court as it
was felt that children become delinquent  by force of
circumstance and not by choice  and hence  they need to be
treated with care and sensitivity  while dealing and trying
cases involving criminal offence.   But when  an accused is
alleged to have committed a heinous offence like rape and
murder  or any other grave offence when he ceased to be a
child  on attaining the age of 18 years, but  seeks protection
of the Juvenile Justice Act under the ostensible plea  of
3Page 4
being a minor,  should such an accused be allowed to be
tried by  a juvenile court  or should he be  referred to a
competent court of  criminal jurisdiction where the trial of
other adult persons  are held.
4. The questions referred  to hereinbefore arise in
this appeal under the facts and circumstances emerging
from the materials on record which disclose that the
appellant/complainant lodged a written report on 23.5.2007
at about 1.00 p.m. that his daughter Sandhya aged about
13
1/2
  years   a student of class IX at Secondary School
Ghewada  was   called from the school by the accused
Bhanwaru @ Vijay Kumar, son of Joga Ram through her
friend  named Neetu on 23.2.2007 at about 1.00 p.m. in the
afternoon.  Neetu told  Sandhya that Bhanwroo was in the
Bolero vehicle near the bus stand.  Sandhya left the school
after taking permission from the school authorities and
when she reached  near the bus stand she did not find the
Bolero vehicle.  She therefore, made a telephonic call to
Bhanwru  who told her that he was standing at Tiwri Road
4Page 5
ahead of bus stand.  She then noticed  the Bolero vehicle on
Tiwri Road, but  she did not find Neetu and when she
enquired about Neetu, the accused Bhanwroo  @ Vijay
Kumar son of  Joga Ram misguided her and  told  her that
Neetu had got down to go to the  toilet after which she was
made to sit  in the vehicle which  was forcibly driven
towards Tiwri and after  a distance of  3-4 Km., a person
named Subhash Bishnoi was also made to sit  in the
vehicle.  The vehicle was then taken to a lonely place  off the
road where heinous physical assault of rape was committed
on her by Bhanwroo  @ Vijay Kumar and Subhash Bishnoi.
Since the victim girl/the petitioner’s daughter resisted and
opposed, she was  beaten as a result of which she sustained
injuries on her thigh, hand and back.  She was then  taken
towards the village  Chandaliya  and she was again
subjected to rape.  Bhanwru then  received a phone call
after which  Bhanwru and Subhash  dropped her near the
village Ghewada  but threatened   her that in case she
disclosed about this event to anyone, she will be killed.
Sandhya, therefore,   did not mention about this  incident
5Page 6
to anyone in the school but on reaching  home, she
disclosed it to her mother i.e. the  appellant’s/complainant’s
wife who in turn narrated it to the appellant  when  he came
back to village from Jodhpur on 24.2.2007.    The appellant
could not take an immediate decision keeping in view the
consequences of the incident and called his  brother Piyush
from Jodhpur and then lodged  a report with the P.S. Osian
on the basis of which a case was registered under Section
365, 323 and 376 IPC bearing C.R.No. 40/2007 dated
25.2.2007.   In course of the investigation, the accused
Bhanwru @ Vijay Kumar was arrested and in the  arrest
memo his name was mentioned as Vijay Kumar  @ Bhanwar
Lal son of Joga Ram and his age has been  mentioned as 19
years.   After completion of the investigation, it was   found
that the offences under Sections 363, 366, 323 and 376 (2)
(g)   IPC were made out  against  the accused Vijay Kumar @
Bhanwar Lal, son of Joga Ram Jat aged 19 years, Subhash
son of  Bagaram Bishnoi aged 20 years and against Smt.
Mukesh Kanwar @ Mugli @ Neetu aged 27 years and hence
charge sheet was submitted before the Judicial Magistrate,
6Page 7
Osian.  Vijay Kumar @ Bhanwar Lal and Subhash were
taken in judicial custody.
 
5. An application thereafter was moved on behalf of
the accused Vijay Kumar @ Bhanwar Lal before the Judicial
Magistrate, Osian  stating that he was a juvenile offender
and, therefore, he may be sent to the Juvenile Court  for
trial.
6. Arguments were heard  on the aforesaid
application by the concerned learned magistrate on
29.3.2007 and the learned magistrate allowed the
application by his order dated 29.3.2007, although the
Public Prosecutor  contested this application relying upon
the police investigation and the medical report wherein the
age of the accused was recorded as 19 years.  In the
application, the   stand taken on behalf of Vijay Kumar was
that in the school records, his date of birth was  30.6.1990.
 
7Page 8
7. However, contents of this application clearly
reveal  that  no dispute was raised in the application on
behalf of  Vijay Kumar that the name of the accused Vijay
Kumar was only Vijay Kumar  and not @ Bhanwar Lal.   It
was also not urged that the name of  accused Vijay Kumar
has been wrongly mentioned in the police papers as Vijay
Kumar   @ Bhanwar Lal nor in  course of investigation it
was evaer stated that the case was wrongly  registered in
the name of  accused Vijay Kumar @ Bhanwar Lal.
Without even raising this dispute, the academic record of
Vijay Kumar @ Bhanwar Lal was produced  whereas
according  to the complainant  the factual position is that
the name of the accused was Bhanwar Lal which was
recorded in the Government Secondary School Jeloo Gagadi
(Osian) when he entered the school on  18.12.1993 and
again on 22.4.1996  his name was  entered in the school
register wherein his date of birth was recorded as
12.12.1988
.
8Page 9
8. The complainant contested the age of the accused
Vijay Kumar and it was submitted that the accused Vijay
Kumar had been admitted in the 2
nd
Standard in some
private school known as Hari Om Shiksham Sansthan  in
Jeloo Gagadi (Osian) with a changed name as Vijay Kumar
and  there the date of birth was mentioned as  30.6.1990
which was reflected  in the  subsequent  academic records
and on that basis the admission card in the name of  Vijay
Kumar with date of birth as 30.6.1990 was mentioned in
the application for treating him as a juvenile.
9.     The case then came up  before the Additional
Sessions Judge (Fast Tract No.I) Jodhpur as Sessions Case
No. 151/2007 on 3.10.2007.  Shri Joga Ram, the father of
the accused moved an application under Section  49 of the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000
stating that the date of birth of his  son was 30.6.1990 in
his school administration record and, therefore,  on the date
of  incident i.e.  23.02.2007,  he  was less than  18 years.
In this  application form  dated 3.10.2007,  Joga Ram,
9Page 10
father of the accused Vijay Kumar had himself  stated at
three places i.e. title, para in the beginning and in the first
part describing  the name of his son (accused) as Vijay
Kumar @  Bhanwar Lal stating that his son was born on
30.6.1990 at his house and he was first admitted  in the
school named Hari Om Shikshan Sansthan, Jeloo Gagadi,
Osian on  1.9.1997 in 2
nd
  standard and his son studied in
this school  from 1.9.1997 to 15.7.2007  from 2
nd
standard
and the transfer certificate dated 4.7.2007 was enclosed.
The said application form had been signed  by Joga Ram as
father of the accused  Vijay Kumar  on which the signature
of  the headmaster along with the seal was also there.  In
transfer certificate the date of birth of the accused was also
stated  along with some other  facts in order to assert  that
Vijay Kumar was less than 18 years of age on the date of the
incident.   But he had nowhere stated that he  had another
son named Bhanwru who had died in 1995 and whose date
of birth  was 12.12.1988.  He attempted to establish that
the accused Vijay Kumar  is the younger son of  Joga Ram
and the elder son  Bhanwru had died in the year 1995 and
10Page 11
it was he whose date of birth was 1988.  He thus asserted
that Vijay Kumar in fact was born in the year 1990  and his
name was not Bhanwru but only Vijay Kumar.  This part of
the story    was set up by the  father of the accused Joga
Ram at a later stage when  the evidence  was adduced.
10. The application filed on behalf of the accused
Vijay Kumar was contested by the complainant and  both
the parties led evidence in support   of their respective plea.
The specific case of the  complainant was that Bhanwru Lal
and Vijay Kumar in fact  are one and the same person  and
Joga Ram has cooked up a story that he had another son
named Bhanwar Lal whose date of birth was 12.12.1988
and who later expired in 1995.   The complainant stated
that as per the version of the father of the accused if the
deceased’s son Bhanwar Lal continued in the school up to
24.2.1996, the same was impossible as he is  stated to have
expired  in 1995 itself.   According to the complainant  Vijay
Kumar  and Bhanwar Lal are the names of the same person
who  committed the offence  of rape in the year 2007  and
11Page 12
the defence taken by the accused  was a concocted story
merely to take undue advantage of the Juvenile Justice Act.
 
11. After taking into consideration the  oral and
documentary evidence, the Sessions Court categorically
concluded that in this  case no definite clear  and conclusive
view is  possible keeping in view the evidence  which has
come on record with regard to the age of the accused and
both the views are clearly established and, therefore,  the
view which is  in favour of the accused is taken and the
accused is held to be a juvenile.  The accused Vijay Kumar
was accordingly declared to be a juvenile and was directed
to be sent to the Juvenile Justice Board for trial.  This order
was passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Tract
No.1) Jodhpur  on 16.5.2009 in Sessions Case No.
151/2007.
12. The complainant-appellant thereafter assailed the
order of the Additional Sessions Judge holding the
respondent Vijay Kumar as a juvenile by filing a revision
12Page 13
petition before the High Court.  The learned Judge hearing
the revision observed that a lot  of contradictory evidence
with regard to the age and identity of Vijay Kumar @
Bhanwru has emerged  and a lot of confusion has been
created with regard to the date of birth of accused Vijay
Kumar @ Bhanwroo.  But the learned single Judge was
pleased to hold that the Additional Sessions Judge had
appreciated the evidence  in the right perspective  and he is
not found to have  erred in declaring respondent No.2 Vijay
Kumar @ Bhanwru to be a juvenile offender.  He has,
therefore, rightly  been referred to the Juvenile Justice
Board for trial which warrants no interference.   The learned
single Judge  consequently  dismissed the revision petition
against  which  the complainant filed this  special leave
petition (Crl.) No. 2411/2011 which after  grant of  leave has
given rise to this appeal.
13. Assailing the orders of the courts below, learned
counsel for the appellant  has essentially advanced twofold
submissions in course of the hearing.  He had initially
13Page 14
submitted that Vijay Kumar alias Bhanwar Lal,  son of Joga
Ram is the same person and Vijay Kumar  is the changed
name of Bhanwar Lal whose correct date of birth  is
12.12.1988 and not  30.6.1990 as stated by Joga Ram,
father of the accused.  Hence, Vijay Kumar @ Bhanwar Lal
was not a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence.
14. In order to substantiate this plea, learned counsel
for the appellant submitted that in the application which
was moved by Joga Ram, father of the accused, before the
Additional Sessions Judge under Section 49 of the Juvenile
Justice  Act, he has nowhere mentioned that he had two
sons named Vijay Kumar and  Bhanwar Lal and that
Bhanwar  Lal had died in 1995 whose date of birth was
12.12.1988 and his other son Vijay Kumar’s date of birth
was 30.6.1990.  In fact, he himself had mentioned  his son’s
name as Vijay Kumar @ Bhanwru at more than one place in
the application and later has planted a story that he had
two sonce viz., Bhanwar Lal and Vijay Kumar, and Bhanwar
14Page 15
Lal whose date of birth was 12.12.1988 had already died in
the year 1995.
15. Learned counsel for the appellant further
contended that the benefit of the principle of  benevolent
legislation conferred on the  Juvenile Justice Act, cannot be
applied  in the present case as the courts below -specially
the court of  fact which is the  Additional Sessions Judge
(Fast Track No.1) Jodhpur did not record a categorical
finding with regard to the date of birth of the respondentaccused and the aforesaid  principle can be applied only to a
case where the accused is clearly held to be a juvenile so as
to be sent for trial by the  juvenile court or to claim any
other benefit  by the alleged juvenile accused.  Counsel for
the Appellant has relied upon the evidence of NAW-3
-Medical Jurist, who conducted ossification test  of the
accused and  opined before the court  that the accused  was
19 years of age  and statement of NAW-1 Assistant Professor
in Radiology who opined before the court  on 23.11.2007
15Page 16
that on the  basis of the x-ray films, age of the accused is
above 18 years and below 20 years.
16. Learned counsel for the accused-respondent  on
his part contended that  medical opinion  could be sought
only when matriculation  or equivalent  certificate or date of
birth certificate  from the school was not available and since
in the present case  the admission certificate of the accused
from the school record is available which states  the date of
birth to be 30.6.1990, the  school certificate ought to be
allowed to prevail upon the medical opinion.
17. We are unable to appreciate and accept the
aforesaid contention of learned counsel for the respondent
since the age of the accused could not be proved merely on
the basis of the school record as the courts below in spite of
its scrutiny could not record a finding of fact that the
accused, in fact, was a minor on the date of the incident.
Hence, in a situation when the school record itself is not
free from ambiguity and conclusively prove the minority of
16Page 17
the accused, medical opinion cannot be allowed to be
overlooked or treated to be of no consequence.  In this
context the statement of NAW-3 Dr. Jagdish Jugtawat, the
medical jurist who conducted  the ossification test of the
accused and opined before the court that the accused was
19 years of age is of significance  since it specifically states
that the accused was not a juvenile on the date of
commission of the offence.  The statement of  NAW-1 Dr.
C.R. Agarwal, Asstt. Professor  in Radiology  also cannot be
overlooked since he  opined  that  on the basis of x-ray
films, the age of the accused is above 18 years and below 20
years.  Thus, in a circumstance where the trial court itself
could not arrive at a conclusive finding regarding the age of
the accused, the opinion of the medical experts based on xray and ossification test will have to be given precedence
over the shaky evidence based on school records and a plea
of circumstantial inference based on a story set up by the
father of the accused which prima facie is a cock and bull
story.
17Page 18
18. It is no doubt true that if there is a clear and
unambiguous case in favour of  the  juvenile accused that
he was a minor  below the age of 18 years on the date of the
incident and the documentary evidence at least prima facie
proves the same, he would be  entitled for  this special
protection under the Juvenile Justice Act.  But  when an
accused commits a grave and heinous offence and thereafter
attempts  to take statutory shelter under the guise  of being
a minor, a casual or cavalier  approach  while recording as
to whether  an accused is a juvenile or not  cannot be
permitted as the  courts  are enjoined  upon  to perform
their duties  with the object of protecting   the confidence of
common man in the institution entrusted with the
administration of justice.  Hence, while the courts must be
sensitive in dealing with the juvenile  who is involved in
cases of serious nature like sexual molestation, rape, gang
rape, murder and host of other offences, the accused cannot
be  allowed to abuse the statutory protection by attempting
to prove himself as a minor when the documentary evidence
to prove  his minority gives rise  to a reasonable doubt
18Page 19
about his assertion of minority.  Under such circumstance,
the medical evidence based on scientific investigation will
have to be given due weight and precedence over the
evidence based on school administration records which give
rise to hypothesis and speculation about the age of the
accused.  The matter however would stand on a different
footing if the academic certificates ad school records are
alleged to have been with held deliberately with ulterior
motive and authenticity of the medical evidence is under
challenge by the prosecution.
19. In the instant matter, the accused Vijay Kumar is
alleged to have committed a crime  which repels against
moral conscience  as he  chose a girl of 13 and a half years
to satisfy his lust by hatching  a plot with the  assistance of
his accomplice Subhash who already stands convicted and
thereafter the accused has attempted to seek protection
under the plea that  he committed such an act  due to his
innocence  without understanding  its implication  in which
his father  Joga Ram is clearly assisting by attempting to
19Page 20
rope in a story that he was a minor on the date of the
incident which is not based on conclusive evidence worthy
of credence but is based on a confused story as also shaky
and fragile nature of evidence which hardly inspires
confidence.  It is hard to ignore that when the  Additional
Sessions Judge in spite of meticulous  scrutiny of  oral and
documentary evidence could not arrive at a conclusive
finding  that  he was clearly a juvenile below the age of 18
years on the date of incident, then by what logic and
reasoning he should get the benefit of the theory of
benevolent legislation on the foothold of Juvenile Justice Act
is difficult to comprehend as it clearly  results in erroneous
application of this principle and thus we find sufficient
force in the contention of learned counsel for the appellant
that the benefit of  the principle of benevolent legislation can
be made applicable in favour of only those delinquents  who
undoubtedly have been held to be a juvenile which leaves no
scope for speculation about the age of the alleged accused.
20Page 21
20. We therefore cannot overlook that the trial court
as well as the High Court while passing the impugned order
could not arrive at any finding at all as to whether the
accused was a major or minor on the date of the incident
and yet gave the benefit of the principle of benevolent
legislation to an accused whose plea of minority that he was
below the age of 18 years itself was in doubt.  In such
situation, the scales of justice is required to be put on an
even keel by insisting for a reliable and cogent proof in
support of the plea of juvenility specially when the victim
was also a minor.
21. The benefit of the principle of  benevolent
legislation attached to Juvenile Justice Act would thus
apply to only such cases wherein the accused is held to be a
juvenile on the basis of  at least prima facie evidence
regarding his minority as the benefit of the possibilities of
two views in regard to the age of the alleged accused who is
involved in grave and serious offence which he committed
and gave effect to it in a well planned manner reflecting his
21Page 22
maturity of mind rather than innocence indicating that his
plea of juvenility is more in the nature of a shield to dodege
or dupe the arms of law, cannot be allowed to come to his
rescue.  Hence if the plea of juvenility or the fact that he
had not attained the age of discretion so as to understand
the consequence of his heinous act is not free from
ambiguity or doubt, the said plea cannot be allowed to be
raised merely on doubtful school admission record and in
the event it is doubtful, the medical evidence will have to be
given due weightage while determining the age of the
accused.
22. Adverting to the facts of this case we have noticed
that the trial court in spite of the evidence led on behalf of
the accused, was itself not satisfied that the accused  was  a
juvenile as none of the school records relied upon by the
respondent-accused  could be held to be free from doubt so
as to form a logical and legal basis for the purpose of
deciding the correct date of birth of the accused indicating
that the accused was a minor/juvenile on the date of the
22Page 23
incident. This Court  in several decisions including  the case
of  Ramdeo Chauhan @ Raj Nath vs. State of Assam,
reported in  (2001) 5 SCC 714dealing with a similar
circumstance had observed which adds weight and strength
to what we have stated which is quoted herein as follows :-
“it is clear  that the petitioner neither  was a
child nor near about  the age of being a child
within the meaning of the Juvenile Justice Act
or the  Children Act.  He is proved to be a  major
at the time  of the commission of the offence.
No doubt,   much less a reasonable  doubt is
created in the mind  of the court, for the
accused entitling him  to the benefit  of  a lesser
punishment, it is true that the accused tried to
create a smoke screen with respect to his age.
But such effort   appear to have been made only
to hide  his real age and not to create any doubt
in the mind of the court.  The judicial system
cannot be allowed to be taken to ransom by
having resort to imaginative  and concocted
grounds by  taking advantage of  loose
sentences appearing in the evidence of  some of
the witnesses particularly at the stage of
special leave petition.  The law  insists  on
finality  of judgments and is more concerned
with the strengthening  of the judicial system.
The courts are enjoined upon to perform their
duties with the object of strengthening  the
confidence of the common  man  in the
institution entrusted with the administration of
justice.  Any effort which  weakens the system
and shakes the faith of the common man in the
23Page 24
justice dispensation  system has to be
discouraged.”
The above noted observations no doubt were recorded by
the  learned Judges of this Court while  considering the
imposition of death sentence on the accused who claimed to
be a juvenile, nevertheless the views expressed therein
clearly lends weight for resolving an issue where the  court
is not in a position to clearly draw an inference wherein an
attempt is made by the accused or his guardian claiming
benefit available to a juvenile which may be an effort to
extract sympathy and impress upon the Court for a lenient
treatment  towards the so-called juvenile accused who, in
fact was a major on the date of incident.
23.    However, we reiterate that we may not be
misunderstood  so as to infer that even if  an accused is
clearly below the age of 18 years on the date  of  commission
of  offence, should not be  granted protection or treatment
available to a juvenile under the Juvenile Justice Act if a
dispute regarding his age had been raised but was finally
24Page 25
resolved on scrutiny of evidence.  What is meant to be
emphasized is that where the courts cannot clearly infer in
spite of available evidence on record that the accused is a
juvenile or the said plea appear to have been raised merely
to create a mist or a smokescreen so as to hide his real age
in order to shield the accused on the plea of his minority,
the attempt cannot be allowed to succeed so as to subvert
or dupe the cause of justice.  Drawing parallel between the
plea of minority and the plea of alibi, it may be worthwhile
to state that it is not uncommon to come across criminal
cases wherein an accused makes an effort to take shelter
under the plea of alibi which has to be raised at the first
instance but has to be subjected to strict  proof  of evidence
by the court trying the offence and cannot be allowed lightly
in spite of lack of evidence merely with the aid of salutary
principle  that an innocent   man  may not  have to suffer
injustice by recording an order of conviction in spite of his
plea of alibi.  Similarly, if the conduct  of an accused or the
method and manner of  commission of the  offence
indicates an evil and a well planned design of the accused
25Page 26
committing the offence which indicates more towards the
matured  skill of an accused than that of an innocent  child,
then in the absence of reliable documentary evidence in
support of the age of the accused, medical evidence
indicating that the accused was a major cannot be allowed
to be ignored  taking  shelter of the principle of benevolent
legislation like the Juvenile Justice Act, subverting the
course of justice as statutory protection of the Juvenile
Justice Act is  meant for  minors who are innocent law
breakers and not accused of matured  mind who uses the
plea of minority as a ploy or shield  to protect himself  from
the sentence  of the offence committed by him.  The benefit
of benevolent legislation under the Juvenile Justice Act
obviously will offer protection to a genuine child
accused/juvenile  who does not put the court into any
dilemma as to whether  he is a juvenile or not by adducing
evidence in support of his plea of minority but in absence of
the same, reliance placed merely on shaky evidence  like
the school admission register which is not proved or oral
evidence based on conjectures leading to further ambiguity,
26Page 27
cannot be relied upon in preference to the  medical evidence
for assessing  the age of the accused.
24. While considering the relevance and value of the
medical evidence, the doctor’s estimation of age although is
not a sturdy substance for proof as it is only an opinion,
such opinion based on scientific medical test like
ossification and radiological examination will have to be
treated as a strong evidence having corroborative value
while determining the age of the alleged juvenile accused. In
the case of Ramdeo Chauhan Vs. State of Assam (supra), the
learned judges have added an insight for determination of
this issue when it recorded as follows:-
“Of course the doctor’s estimate of age is not a
sturdy substitute for proof as it is only his
opinion. But such opinion of an expert cannot be
sidelined in the realm where the Court gropes in
the dark to find out what would possibly have
been the age of a citizen for the purpose of
affording him a constitutional protection.   In     the
   absence     of     all     other     acceptable     material,    if     such
   opinion     points     to    a     reasonable     possibility
   regarding     the     range     of     his     age,    it     has     certainly     to
   be   considered.”  
27Page 28
The situation, however, would be different if the academic
records are alleged to have been with held deliberately to
hide the age of the alleged juvenile and the authenticity of
the medical evidence is under challenge at the instance of
the prosecution.  In that event, whether the medical
evidence should be relied upon or not will obviously depend
on the value of the evidence led by the contesting parties.
25. In view of the aforesaid discussion and analysis
based on the prevailing facts and circumstances of the case,
we are of the view that the Respondent No.2 Vijay Kumar
and his father have failed to prove that Respondent No.2
was a minor at the time of commission of offence and hence
could not have been granted the benefit of the Juvenile
Justice Act which undoubtedly is a benevolent legislation
but cannot be allowed to be availed of by an accused who
has taken the plea of juvenility merely as an effort to hide
his real age so as to create a doubt in the mind of the courts
below who thought it appropriate to grant him the benefit of
a juvenile merely by adopting the principle of benevolent
28Page 29
legislation  but missing its vital implication that although
the Juvenile Justice Act by itself is a piece of benevolent
legislation, the protection under the same cannot be made
available to an accused who in fact  is not a juvenile but
seeks shelter merely  by   using  it  as a protective umbrella
or statutory shield.  We are under constraint to observe that
this will have to be discouraged if the evidence and other
materials on record fail to prove that the accused was a
juvenile at the time of commission of the offence. Juvenile
Justice Act which is certainly meant to treat a child accused
with care and sensitivity offering him a chance to reform
and settle into the mainstream of society, the same cannot
be allowed to be used as a ploy to dupe the course of justice
while conducting trial and treatment of  heinous offences.
This would clearly be treated as an effort to weaken the
justice dispensation system and hence cannot be
encouraged.
26. We therefore deem it just and appropriate to set
aside the judgment and order passed by the High Court as
29Page 30
also the courts below and thus allow this appeal.
Consequently, the accused Vijay Kumar, S/o Joga Ram
shall be sent for trial before the court of competent
jurisdiction wherein the trial is pending and not to the
Juvenile Court as pleaded by him.  We order accordingly.
                 …..……………………..J
     (G.S. Singhvi)
         …………………………J
     (Gyan Sudha Misra)
New Delhi,
April 13, 2012
30

Thursday, April 12, 2012

of course his case may be pending for more than 5 years, he filed appropriate cases in the concerned high court and the same is pending. making aspirations against judiciary unnecessarily is not encourage-able. his approach to this apex court directly pending alternative reliefs, is nothing but abuse of the process of the court. .no person is allowed to knock the doors of highest court of the land, after availing alternative reliefs pending before high court . it amounts to gross abuse of the process. The apex court fined the petitioner to pay Rs.20,000/- to the legal services authority.


Page 1
“NON-REPORTABLE”
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
ORIGINAL WRIT JURISDICTION
   WRIT   PETITION   (CRL)   NO.31   OF   2012
Karuna Singh …. Petitioner
Versus
State of NCT of Delhi & Anr. …. Respondents
  J   U   D   G   M  E   N  T
   JAGDISH   SINGH   KHEHAR,  J.
1. Respondent no.2 Mrs. Veena Solanki got FIR No.13 of 2004
registered at Police Station Lodhi Colony on 13.4.2004.  Therein she made
allegations against the petitioner Ms.Karuna Singh and five others.  On
16.4.2007, i.e., more than three years after the registration of the aforesaid
FIR, a charge-sheet was filed against the petitioner (and five others), under
Sections 420, 468 and 471 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal
Code.  Though a period of more than five years has elapsed after the filing
of the charge-sheet, we are informed, that charges are yet to be framed by
the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (South) Saket, New Delhi.
2. Soon after the registration of the FIR referred to in the foregoing
paragraph, the petitioner filed a complaint under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 on 24.9.2004.  The aforesaid complaint
1Page 2
was made against respondent no.2, Mrs.Veena Solanki.  Along with her
complaint, the petitioner claims to have filed her evidence by way of a
personal affidavit.  Thereafter on 25.9.2006, the Magistrate (Negotiable
Instruments Act) trying the complaint, allowed respondent no.2 to crossexamine the petitioner.  Even after five years, the cross-examination which
commenced in 2006 is stated to be continuing.  It is submitted, that the
cross-examination of the petitioner, at the behest of the respondent no.2, is
mainly with reference to FIR No.13 of 2004 registered on 13.4.2004.  This,
according to the petitioner amounts to a  gross abuse of law by respondent
no.2, and as such, violates the fundamental rights of the petitioner vested
in him under Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India.  In this
behalf, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the
provisions of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 contemplate a speedy and
swift trail.  Referring to the proceedings initiated by the petitioner under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act it is submitted, that the
cross-examination of the petitioner at the hands of respondent no.2 has
lasted for more than five years.  Denial of a speedy and expeditious trial
constitutes an act of harassment of the petitioner, and as such the violation
of the petitioner’s fundamental rights.
3. At the very inception, we expressed our views about the
maintainability of the instant writ petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India.  We, therefore, called upon the learned counsel for
the petitioner to assist us as to whether, it is desirable to entertain a
2Page 3
petition like the one in hand, directly before the highest court of the land.
In so far as the instant controversy is concerned, it would also be relevant
to notice, that in order to facilitate respondent no.2 to cross-examine the
petitioner, the Magistrate (Negotiable Instruments Act) trying the complaint
filed by the petitioner, vide an order dated 9.9.2009 summoned the chargesheet filed in Case FIR No.13 of 2004.  The petitioner Ms.Karuna Singh,
assailed the aforesaid order dated 9.9.2004 in the High Court at Delhi by
filing Criminal Misc. Case No.3668 of 2009.  It is the submission of the
learned counsel for the petitioner, that the trial court despite the pendency
of Criminal M.C. No.3668 of 2009, allowed respondent no.2 to crossexamine the petitioner, even with reference to the charge-sheet in case
FIR No.13 of 2004 (and other documents connected therewith).  In so far
as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it was the case of the
petitioner, that the High Court had failed to take any final decision in the
matter.  It was also submitted at the behest of the petitioner that the
Magistrate (Negotiable Instruments Act) trying the complaint of the
petitioner, had unfairly allowed the petitioner to be cross-examined with
reference to the said charge-sheet in Case FIR No.13 of 2004.  A
submission was also advanced at the behest of the petitioner, that the
Magistrate (Negotiable Instruments Act) had failed to control the crossexamination of the petitioner (at the hands of the respondent no.2).  In this
behalf, it was pointed out that during the process of cross-examination of
the petitioner, the petitioner had invited the attention of the Magistrate
3Page 4
(Negotiable Instruments Act) to a decision rendered by the Delhi High
Court in Rajesh Aggarwal vs. State and another etc., 2010 VII AD (Delhi)
576.  Despite the aforesaid, the Magistrate (Negotiable Instruments Act),
while permitting respondent no.2 to cross-examine the petitioner on
2.5.2011, had imposed costs of Rs.20,000/- for wasting court time by
making such an intervention.  It was also pointed out, that the order dated
2.5.2011 was assailed by the petitioner by filing a writ petition in the High
Court at Delhi.  It was submitted, that the aforesaid writ petition is pending,
wherein the High Court has stayed the operation of the order dated
2.5.2011 in respect of payment of costs imposed on the petitioner.  It was
submitted, that the High Court has however failed to grant any injunction,
staying further cross-examination of the petitioner before the Magistrate
(Negotiable Instruments Act).
4. In the facts and circumstances narrated hereinabove, in order to
respond to the query made by this Court on the issue of maintainability (of
the instant writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India),
learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on Baburam Prakash
Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad now Zila Parishad,
Muzaffarnagar AIR 1969 SC 556, Dr.Smt.Kuntesh Gupta v. Management
of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.) & Ors. AIR 1987 SC 2186
and Ram and Shyam Company vs. State of Haryana & Ors. (1985) 3 SCC
267, and on the basis thereof contended, that the rule which required the
exhaustion of alternative remedies, before the concerned High Court or the
4Page 5
Supreme Court of India could be approached under their inherent writ
jurisdiction, was a rule of convenience and discretion.  It was in the nature
of a self-imposed restraint of the court, rather than a binding rule of law.  It
was submitted, that the availability of an alternative remedy could not oust
the jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, and of this Court under Article  32 of the Constitution of India.  It was
also submitted, that in cases where the order complained of was illegal or
invalid and contrary to law, a petition at the instance of an affected party
could be entertained by the jurisdictional High Court or by this Court, and
the availability of an alternative remedy would not prevent a High Court or
this Court from entertaining a petition, specially in cases  where
extraordinary relief was prayed for.  It was also the case of the petitioner,
that in situations where the alternative remedy would not provide an
effective relief, the High Court and this Court, as a rule, ought to provide
relief to the concerned party.  In the facts and circumstances of this case,
it is submitted, that this Court should issue appropriate directions to the
Magistrate (Negotiable Instruments Act) so as to require him to effectively
control the petitioner’s cross-examination (at the hands of the respondent
no.2), as the petitioner’s fundamental rights are being violated.
5. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions
advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioner, as also,
the judgments relied upon by him.  We are astonished at the submissions
advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioner.  The
5Page 6
petitioner herein is seeking directions to the concerned Magistrate, as a
matter of first instance at the hands of this Court.  The submissions
advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioner by
themselves concede, that there is an alternative remedy available to the
petitioner, yet he has chosen to come to the highest court of the land,
under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.  Even though the order passed
by the Magistrate (Negotiable Instruments Act) dated 9.9.2009 has been
assailed by the petitioner before the High Court at Delhi under Sections
482 and 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by filing Criminal M.C.
No.3668 of 2009, and the said proceedings are still pending, the petitioner
has chosen to approach this Court.  While doing so, the petitioner has
even cast aspersions on the High Court, by pleading and contending that
the High Court had, till date, not taken a final decision in the matter.  It
would also be relevant to mention, that besides filing Criminal M.C.
No.3668 of 2009, the petitioner has also filed a writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India in the High Court at Delhi, wherein she had
assailed the order passed by the Magistrate (Negotiable Instruments Act)
dated 2.5.2011.  In the aforesaid writ petition, the petitioner has admittedly
sought directions to the Magistrate (Negotiable Instruments Act) to control
the petitioner’s cross-examination (at the hands of the respondent no.2).
The aforesaid writ petition is still pending consideration before the High
Court.  The High Court has stayed the payment of costs imposed on the
petitioner.  The grievance of the petitioner is, that the High Court had failed
6Page 7
to stay the further cross-examination of the petitioner, with reference to the
charge-sheet filed in Case FIR No.13 of 2004.  Surprisingly, when the
prayers made by the petitioner before this Court, are pending adjudication
before the High Court at Delhi, the petitioner has approached this Court
under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, without assailing any order
passed by the High Court.  This, in our considered view, amounts to gross
misuse of the jurisdiction of this Court.  Such a behaviour at the hands of
the petitioner cannot be countenanced.  The effort of the petitioner seems
to be, to browbeat either respondent no.2, or the Magistrate (Negotiable
Instruments Act), so that the proceedings progress as per the desire of the
petitioner.  In her aforesaid effort, the petitioner has also cast aspersions
against the High Court.
6. This is not a case where despite availability of an alternative
remedy, the petitioner has approached this Court under its writ jurisdiction.
This is a case where the petitioner has availed of her alternative remedies,
and simultaneously on the same cause of action, she has approached the
highest court of the land under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.  This
constitutes a gross abuse of the process of law.  We are satisfied that an
efficacious alternative remedy is available to a party which has initiated
proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
In the present case the petitioner has approached the High Court at Delhi
under Sections 482 and 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and
through a separate petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
7Page 8
India.  Both petitions are still pending before the High Court. It is not
possible for us to accept that the fundamental rights of the petitioner under
Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India have been violated in any
manner whatsoever, so as to enable him to approach this court, in the
manner suggested.  If the instant plea of the petitioner is accepted, the
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India will
become available against every action of a Magistrate, not only under the
Negotiable Instruments Act, but also, in respect of criminal proceedings
conducted under other statutory provisions.
7. To the benefit of the petitioner, it also needs to be noticed, that
reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioner on M/s.Mandvi Co-op. Bank
Ltd. vs. Nimesh B. Thakore AIR 2010 SC 1402.  The instant reliance was
placed on the basis of the merits of the controversy i.e., in support of the
merits of the petitioner’s cause.  Having gone through the judgment relied
upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, we find that the same is
wholly inapplicable to this case.  In Mandvi Coop. Bank’s case (supra) the
accused on being summoned under Section 145(2) of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, raised the plea, that inspite of the complainant having
filed his evidence by way of an affidavit under Section 145(1), the
complainant must be orally examined in chief all over again, before the
accused is summoned or called upon to cross-examine the complainant.
This Court while disposing of the aforesaid controversy interpreted Section
145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act to conclude, that a person who
8Page 9
had preferred his evidence on affidavit, need not make an oral deposition
in court, before the accused is summoned or is required to cross-examine
him.  This is not the issue in the present controversy.  We are therefore
satisfied, that the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner
on Mandvi Coop. Bank’s case (supra) is wholly misconceived.
8. In view of the above, we are of the view, that the petitioner has
grossly abused the jurisdiction of this Court by approaching this Court
under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.  The instant writ petition being
devoid of any merit is hereby dismissed.  For the abuse of the process of
this Court, the petitioner is directed to deposit costs quantified at
Rs.20,000/- with the Supreme Court Legal Services Authority, within four
weeks from the date of pronouncement of the instant order, failing which
the matter be placed before the Court for appropriate direction for recovery
of the costs.
…………………………….J.
(Dr. B.S. Chauhan)
…………………………….J.
(Jagdish Singh Khehar)
New Delhi;
April 10, 2012.
9Page 10
   Digital Performa
Case  No.           : Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 31 of 2012
Date of Decision : 10.04.2012
C.A.V. on : 19.03.2012
Cause Title :   Karuna Singh
Versus
State of NCT of Delhi & Anr.
Coram :    Hon’ble Dr. Justice B.S. Chauhan
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Jagdish Singh Khehar
Judgment delivered by :    Hon’ble Mr. Justice Jagdish Singh Khehar
(Read by Hon’ble Dr. Justice B.S.
Chauhan)
Nature of Judgment : Reportable
1

it is peculiar case where one Balaraju @ Billu and others were convicted for 9 years imprisonment in a case of kidnap of one Dineshu . while the matter in appeal stage before High court, Dineshu appeared and said ,he was not kidnapped. Balaraju filed a case against the defacto complainant etc., for lodging false case . Ramdhan filed discharge petition and simaltenously filed a petition in High court for quashing in high court which was dismissed, supressing that fact, he persued the discharge petition and the same was dismissed. Apex court court also dismissed the same on the point of suppression of material fact .


Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.335  OF 2012
Ram Dhan                … Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr.       … Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.
1. This petition has been filed against the judgment and order
dated 14.11.2011 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
in Criminal Revision No.4259 of 2011 by which the High Court has
rejected the said revision petition against the impugned order dated
3.9.2011 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bagpat, rejecting the
application under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter called `Cr.P.C.’).
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this petition are that
present petitioner Ram Dhan lodged an FIR dated 4.6.1995 alleging thatPage 2
his son Dinesh had disappeared and, subsequently, filed a complaint
against Balraj alias Billu and others (respondents) under Section 364 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called IPC).  The investigating
agency concluded the investigation and filed a chargesheet on the basis
of which trial commenced against the respondents Balraj etc. and the
trial Court vide judgment and order dated 11.5.2005 convicted the
respondent No.2 Balraj and others for the offences punishable under
Section 364 read with Section 149 IPC and awarded sentence of 9 years
rigorous imprisonment and imposed a fine of Rs.5,000/-.
3. Being aggrieved, Balraj, respondent No.2 and others preferred
an appeal before the High Court of Allahabad which was admitted and
the respondent No.2 and other convicts were granted bail by the High
Court.  The petitioner’s son for whose kidnapping Balraj, respondent
No.2 and others had been convicted, came back home and disclosed to
the public as well as to the police that he had not been kidnapped rather
had voluntarily gone to Punjab, where he worked for several years.
Balraj, respondent No.2  realised that he had been wrongly enroped and
convicted in the offence by the petitioner.  Thus, he filed an FIR on
29.8.2009 under Sections 177, 181, 182, 195 and 420 IPC.  After
2Page 3
investigating the case, chargesheet was filed against the petitioner and
others under Sections 177, 181, 182 and 195 IPC on 23.11.2009.
4. The petitioner filed an application under Section 239 Cr.P.C.
before the Chief Judicial Magistrate contending that the FIR at the
behest of the respondent No.2, Balraj was not maintainable in view of
the provisions of Section 195 read with Section 340 Cr.P.C.  The Chief
Judicial Magistrate rejected the said application vide order dated
3.9.2011.  The petitioner challenged the said order dated 3.9.2011 by
filing a criminal revision before the High Court which has been
dismissed vide impugned order dated 14.11.2011.  Hence, this petition.
5. Shri Ashok Kumar Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner, has vehemently contended that the prosecution of the
petitioner is illegal and liable to be quashed in view of the provisions of
Sections 195 and 340 Cr.P.C, for the reason that as the offence has been
committed in the court, such a drastic action can be taken against the
petitioner only on a complaint lodged by the court and not by the
convict/respondent No.2.
6. We find no merit in the petition.  After investigation,
chargesheet has been filed against the petitioner and others under
3Page 4
Sections 177, 181, 182 and 195 IPC. The petitioner has suppressed the
material fact and has not disclosed anywhere in this petition that he had
approached the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of
the chargesheet, which stood rejected vide order dated 3.2.2010 and the
said order attained finality as has not been challenged any further. Thus,
he is guilty of suppressing the material fact which makes the petition
liable to be dismissed only on this sole ground. We are of the view that
it was necessary for the petitioner to disclose such a relevant fact. The
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate while deciding the application under
Section 239 Cr.P.C. has made reference to the said order of the High
Court dated 3.2.2010. We had been deprived of the opportunity to
scrutinise the chargesheet as well as the order of the High Court dated
3.2.2010 and to ascertain as to whether the grievance of the petitioner in
respect of the application of the provisions of Section 195 read with
Section 340 Cr.P.C. had been raised in that petition and as to whether
even if such plea has not been taken whether the petitioner can be
permitted to raise such plea subsequently.  
7.  In such a fact-situation, the courts below may be right to the
extent that question of discharge under Section 239 Cr.P.C. was totally
unwarranted in view of the order passed by the High Court on 3.2.2010.
4Page 5
For the reasons best known to the petitioner, neither the copy of the
chargesheet nor of the order dated 3.2.2010 passed by the High Court
have been placed on record.
8. Be that as it may, the chargesheet has been filed under Sections
177, 181, 182, 195 and 420 IPC.  Section 177 IPC deals with an offence
furnishing false information.  Section 181 IPC deals with false
statement on oath.  Section 182 IPC deals with false information with
intent to cause public servant to use his lawful power to the injury of
another person.  Section 195 IPC deals with giving or fabricating false
evidence with intent to procure conviction of offence punishable with
imprisonment for life or imprisonment.
9. At least the provisions of Sections 177 and 182 deal with the
cases totally outside the court.  Therefore, the question of attracting the
provisions of Sections 195 and 340 Cr.P.C. are not attracted.  Section
195 IPC makes fabrication of false evidence punishable.  It is not
necessary that fabrication of false evidence takes place only inside the
court as it can also be fabricated outside the court though has been used
in the court.  Therefore, it may also not attract the provisions of Section
5Page 6
195 Cr.P.C.  (See: Sachida Nand Singh & Anr. v. State of Bihar &
Anr. , (1998) 2 SCC 493).
10. Mr. Ashok Kumar Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner, has placed a very heavy reliance on the judgment of this
Court in Abdul Rehman & Ors. v. K.M. Anees-ul-Haq, JT (2011) 13
SC 271. However, it is evident from the judgment relied upon that the
judgment in Sachida Nand Singh (Supra), which is of a larger Bench,
has not been brought to the notice of the court. (See also:
Balasubramaniam v. State & Anr., (2002) 7 SCC 649).
The petitioner is guilty of suppressing the material fact.
Admittedly, filing of successive petition before the court amounts to
abuse of the process of the court. Thus, we are not inclined to examine
the issue any further.
        Considering the composite nature of the offences, we do not see
any cogent reason to interfere with the impugned order.
        The petition lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.    
……......……………………….J.
(DR. B.S. CHAUHAN)
.......……………………………J.
 (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)
6Page 7
New Delhi;
April 10, 2012
7

Wednesday, April 11, 2012

UNDER SEC.50(1) OF NDPS ACT, SEARCH MUST BE DONE BEFORE THE GAZETTEDOFFICER AND THIS IS A RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED. IN ABSENCE OF INTIMATION OF THIS RIGHT TO THE ACCUSED, THE PROSECUTION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE . IN THIS CASE, IF THE ACCUSED VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED THE GANJA TO THE OFFICERS, THE QUESTION OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE BEFORE GAZETTED OFFICER NOT ARISE. THERE IS CLEAR BREACH OF MANDATORY PROVISION AND SINCE THE ENTIRE CASE ON THE BASIS OF POSSESSION OF GANJA PACKETS, THE CASE IS LIABLE TO BE SET ASIDE . OTHER TWO ACCUSED WHO HAVE NOT FILED APPEAL AGAINST THE CONVICTION ARE ALSO ENTITLED THE BENEFITS OF THIS JUDGEMENT. SO ALL THE THREE CONVICTION IS SET ASIDE.


NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
   CRIMINAL   APPEAL   NO.   611         OF   2012
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.6774 of 2011]
MYLA VENKATESWARLU …       APPELLANT
Vs.
THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH …       RESPONDENTS
JUDGMENT
   (SMT.)   RANJANA   PRAKASH   DESAI,   J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The challenge in this appeal, by special leave, is to the
judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court dismissing the criminal appeal filed by the
appellant questioning the correctness of the judgment and
order passed by the Ist Additional Sessions Judge, Guntur.
By the said judgment, the appellant (original accused 3) andtwo others viz. Myla Rambabu and Myla Muralikrishna
(original accused 1 and 2 respectively and for convenience,
referred to as “A1” and “A2” respectively) were convicted for
offences punishable under Section 8(c) read with Section 20(b)
(i) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,
1985, (for short, “the NDPS Act”) and sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for six months each and to pay a fine
of Rs.5,000/- each.  In default of payment of fine, they were
directed to undergo simple imprisonment for six months each.
3. According to the prosecution, on 5/1/2001, PW-3 CI
Koteswara Rao on receiving reliable information about illegal
sale of Ganja at Koneru Bazar, Chenchupeta, Tenali,
proceeded to Koneru Bazar along with PW-1 PC Shaik Khasim,
PW-2 SI Nageswara Rao and one other constable.  They
noticed the appellant, A1 and A2 sitting under a bridge.  On
seeing them, the appellant, A1 and A2 tried to run away.  PW-
3 CI Koteswara Rao and his team apprehended them.  The
prosecution story further goes on to say that the appellant, A1
and A2 revealed their names.  On questioning, they stated that
2they were carrying Ganja packets in their pockets.  It is
further the case of the prosecution that PW-3 CI Koteswara
Rao asked them whether they wanted any other gazetted
officer for their search and seizure in addition to him to which
they replied that they did not want any other gazetted officer
and checking by the Circle Inspector of Police was sufficient.
In the search, five Ganja packets were recovered from A1, six
Ganja packets were recovered from A2 and four Ganja packets
were recovered from the appellant.  A1, A2 and the appellant
are stated to have confessed to the crime. They were then put
under arrest.  After completion of the investigation, they were
charged for the offence under Sections 8(c) read with Section
20(b)(i) of the NDPS Act.  The appellant pleaded not guilty to
the charge. The evidence led by the prosecution found favour
with the trial court and it convicted the appellant, A1 and A2
as aforesaid.  The appeal carried from the said judgment was
dismissed by the High Court.  Hence, this appeal. It must be
noted here that A1 and A2 have not challenged the impugned
judgment and order and, hence, they are not before us.
34. We have heard, at some length, learned counsel
appearing for the appellant and learned counsel appearing for
the State of Andhra Pradesh, who has made a valiant effort to
support the impugned judgment and order.
5. Though several points were raised by learned counsel for
the appellant, it is not necessary for us to deal with them
because his contention that in this case there is a violation of
procedure contemplated under Section 50 of the NDPS Act
appeals to us.  Section 50 of the NDPS Act, so far as it is
relevant, reads as under :
“50. Conditions under which search of persons
shall be conducted. (1) When any officer duly
authorised under section 42 is about to search any
person under the provisions of section 41, section 42
or section 43, he shall, if such person so requires,
take such person without unnecessary delay to
nearest Gazetted Officer of any of the departments
mentioned in section 42 or to the nearest Magistrate.
(2) If such requisition is made, the officer may detain
the person until he can bring him before the Gazetted
Officer or the Magistrate referred to in sub-section (1).
(3) The Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate before
whom any such person is brought shall, if he sees no
reasonable ground for search, forthwith discharge
4the person but otherwise shall direct that search be
made.
(4) xxx xxx xxx”
A careful perusal of Section 50 indicates that when any
authorized officer is about to search any person under the
provisions of Sections 41, 42 or 43 of the NDPS Act, if such
person requires, he has to take such person, without
unnecessary delay, to the nearest gazetted officer of any of the
departments mentioned in Section 42 or to the nearest
Magistrate.  In short, the suspect can insist that his search be
conducted before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate.  Needless
to say that a suspect may insist on the presence of a gazetted
officer or a Magistrate so as to introduce transparency in the
search.
6. In   State     of     Punjab     v.       Baldev     Singh
1
the Constitution
Bench of this court was considering the question whether
compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act was mandatory and
1
 (1999) 6 SCC 172
5if it is so, what is the effect in case of breach thereof.  After
considering the relevant judgments on the point, the
Constitution Bench drew the following conclusions.
“(1) That when an empowered officer or a duly
authorised officer acting on prior information is about
to search a person, it is imperative for him to inform
the concerned person of his right under Sub-section
(1) of Section 50 of being taken to the nearest
Gazetted Officer or the nearest Magistrate for making
the search. However, such information may not
necessarily be in writing;
(2) That failure to inform the concerned person
about the existence of his right to be searched before
a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate would cause
prejudice to an accused;
(3) That a search made, by an empowered officer,
on prior information, without informing the person of
his right that if he so requires, he shall be taken
before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate for search
and in case he so opts, failure to conduct his search
before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, may not
vitiate the trial but would render the recovery of the
illicit article suspect and vitiate the conviction and
sentence of an accused, where the conviction has
been recorded only on the basis of the possession of
the illicit article, recovered from his person, during a
search conducted in violation of the provisions of
Section 50 of the Act;
xxx xxx xxx xxx
(5) That whether or not the safeguards provided in
Section 50 have been duly observed would have to
be determined by the Court on the basis of evidence
6led at the trial. Finding on that issue, one way or the
other, would be relevant for recording an order of
conviction or acquittal. Without giving an opportunity
to the prosecution to establish, at the trial, that the
provisions of Section 50, and particularly the
safeguards provided therein were duly complied
with, it would not be permissible to cut-short a
criminal trial;
(6) That in the context in which the protection has
been incorporated in Section 50 for the benefit of the
person intended to be searched, we do not express
any opinion whether the provisions of Section 50 are
mandatory or directory, but, hold that failure to
inform the concerned person of his right as
emanating from Sub-section (1) of Section 50, may
render the recovery of the contraband suspect and
the conviction and sentence of an accused bad and
unsustainable in law;
(7) That an illicit article seized from the person of
an accused during search conducted in violation of
the safeguards provided in Section 50 of the Act
cannot be used as evidence of proof of unlawful
possession of the contraband on the accused though
any other material recovered during that search may
be relied upon by the prosecution, in other
proceedings, against an accused, notwithstanding
the recovery of that material during an illegal
search.”
7. On account of divergence of opinion between the two
decisions of this court with regard to the dictum laid down by
the Constitution Bench in   Baldev     Singh, another
7Constitution Bench in   Vijaysingh Chandubha Jadeja v.
State of Gujarat
2
considered the question whether Section 50
of the NDPS Act casts a duty on the empowered officer to
inform the suspect of his right to be searched in the presence
of a gazetted officer or a Magistrate, if he so desires or whether
a mere enquiry by the said officer as to whether the suspect
would like to be searched in the presence of a Magistrate or a
gazetted officer can be said to be due compliance with the
mandate of the said section.  The Constitution Bench held
that although   Baldev     Singh did not decide in absolute terms
the question whether or not Section 50 of the NDPS Act was
directory or mandatory yet it was held that provisions of subsection (1) of Section 50 makes it imperative for the
empowered officer to inform the person concerned about the
existence of his right that if he so requires, he shall be
searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate; failure to
inform the suspect about the existence of his said right would
cause prejudice to him, and in case he so opts, failure to
conduct his search before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate,
2
 (2011) 1 SCC 609
8may not vitiate the trial but would render the recovery of the
illicit article suspect and vitiate the conviction and sentence of
an accused, where the conviction has been recorded only on
the basis of the possession of the illicit article, recovered from
the person during a search conducted in violation of the
provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act.  The Constitution
Bench noted that in   Baldev     Singh, it was clarified that it was
not necessary that the information required to be given under
Section 50 should be in a prescribed form or in writing but it
was mandatory that the suspect was made aware of the
existence of his right to be searched before a gazetted officer or
a Magistrate, if so required by him. The Constitution Bench
reiterated the principles laid down by this court in Baldev
Singh and added that the concept of substantial compliance
with the requirement of Section 50 of the NDPS Act is neither
borne out from the language of Section 50(1) nor it is in
consonance with the dictum laid down in   Baldev     Singh.
Thus, it is no longer in dispute that strict compliance with the
provisions of Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act is necessary.  We
need to see whether evidence adduced in this case establishes
9that there was strict compliance of Section 50(1) of the NDPS
Act.
8. PW-1 PC Shaik Khasim, who was, at the relevant time,
attached to the Tenali-III Town Police Station had
apprehended the appellant, A1 and A2 on 5/1/2001.  He
stated that on 5/1/2001 at 6.15 p.m., Circle Inspector of
Police took him in a jeep along with other police personnel to
Chenchupeta Railway Over Bridge.  They saw three persons
sitting under the bridge.  On seeing them, the said three
persons started running away. They apprehended them and
brought them to the Circle Inspector of Police. According to
him, the appellant, A1 and A2 confessed that they were having
Ganja packets in their pockets. He has further stated that the
Circle Inspector of Police asked them whether they wanted any
other gazetted officer for their search and seizure in addition
to him to which they replied that they did not want any other
gazetted officer and the checking by the Circle Inspector of
Police was sufficient for them.  Thereafter, the Circle Inspector
of Police checked their pockets and recovered Ganja packets.
1In the cross-examination also, this witness has maintained the
same story.
9. PW-2 SI Nageswara Rao was, at the relevant time,
working as Sub-Inspector of Police at Tanali-III Town Police
Station.  He was in the police party which apprehended the
appellant, A1 and A2.  He has corroborated PW-1 PC Shaik
Khasim as regards the apprehension of the appellant, A1 and
A2.  He has stated that before conducting the search, the
Circle Inspector of Police asked the appellant, A1 and A2
“about the intention to have another gazetted officer and they
replied that they do not want any other gazetted officer for
their search and seizure”.  According to this witness,
thereafter, the search was conducted and Ganja packets were
recovered from their possession.  From the evidence of PW-1
and PW-2, it is clear that the appellant, A1 and A2 were not
communicated their right to have search conducted in the
presence of a Magistrate or a gazetted officer.
110. At the relevant time, PW-3 CI Koteswara Rao was
working as Inspector of Police.  It is this witness who had
received information about the illegal sale of Ganja at Koneru
Bazar.  On receiving the information, he proceeded to Koneru
Bazar along with PW-1, PW-2 and another police constable.
He has corroborated PW-1 and PW-2 as regards the
apprehension of the appellant, A1 and A2.  He has stated that
the appellant, A1 and A2 revealed their names and identity.
According to him, A1 produced packets containing Ganja.
Then he told him that if he wanted another gazetted officer, he
will bring him.  So far as A2 and the appellant are concerned,
he has stated that they produced packets containing Ganja.
Thereafter, he revealed to them that they have a right to have
another gazetted officer in addition to him to which they
replied that his presence was sufficient.  PW-3 has thus come
out with a new story viz. the appellant, A1 and A2 took out the
Ganja packets from their pockets and, thereafter, he told the
appellant, A1 and A2 that they had a right to have another
gazetted officer in addition to him.  This story that the accused
themselves took out the Ganja packets from their pockets
1runs contrary to the version of PW-1 and PW-2 and, therefore,
it does not inspire confidence.  If the accused voluntarily took
out Ganja packets, there was no question of conducting
search in the presence of a gazetted officer or a Magistrate.
But, assuming that this right can be communicated to a
suspect after the seizure and assuming the evidence of this
witness to be true, it still does not indicate that the
requirement of Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act was fulfilled.
There is no clear communication to the accused that they had
a right to be searched in the presence of a gazetted officer or a
Magistrate.  As we have already noted, the concept of
substantial compliance cannot be read into the provisions of
Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act.  We, therefore, have no
hesitation in concluding that in this case, there is a breach of
Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act.  Since the conviction of the
appellant is solely based on possession of Ganja recovered
from him, it will have to be set aside.
11. A1 and A2 are not before us.  However, the conclusion
drawn by us applies to their case as well.  This court in Ashok
1  @ Dangra Jaiswal v. State of Madhya Pradesh
3
, dealt
with a somewhat similar fact situation.  Out of the three
accused convicted under Sections 8(c) and 20(b)(i) of the NDPS
Act, only one accused had appealed to this court. The other
two were in jail.  This court set aside the conviction and
sentence of the appellant therein and observed that the lapses
which had weighed with it for setting aside the conviction of
the appellant therein apply equally to the case of the accused
who had not appealed and, therefore, it would be unjust to let
them rot in jail even while allowing the appeal preferred by the
appellant therein.  We are respectfully inclined to follow the
same course.  In the circumstances, the impugned judgment
and order convicting  and  sentencing  the  appellant,  A1-
Myla  Rambabu and A2-Myla Muralikrishna is quashed and
set aside.  The appellant, A1-Myla  Rambabu and A2-Myla
Muralikrishna are acquitted of the charge under Section 8(c)
read with Section 20(b)(i) of the NDPS Act.
12. The appeal is disposed of in the aforestated terms.
3
 2011 (4) SCALE 273
1……………………………………………..J.
(AFTAB ALAM)
……………………………………………..J.
(RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI)
NEW DELHI,
APRIL 04, 2012.
1

in the withdrawn election petition, no third party can be substituted under sec. 110(3) of R.P.Act In the instant case, the complaint in the Election Petition was that the nomination paper of the Election Petitioner had been wrongly rejected by the Returning Officer. The Respondent herein, who had been substituted in place of Shri Yadavrao, did not have the same interest as Shri Yadavrao and, accordingly, the High Court, in our view, misconstrued the provisions of Section 110(3)(c) of the 1951 Act in applying the conditions literally, without even 1satisfying itself that the order fit in the facts of the case. 16. We are satisfied that the expression “a person who might himself have been a Petitioner”, (emphasis supplied) would not apply in a case like the present one, in which the right to be exercised does not concern the actions of the person elected on the grounds, as contemplated in Sections 100(1) and 101 of the 1951 Act, which provide for the grounds for declaring the elections to be void. The grievance of the original Election Petitioner was not against the elected candidate, but against the action of Returning Officer in rejecting his nomination paper. Once the Election Petitioner decided not to pursue the matter, the Election Petition could not have been continued by a person, as contemplated in Section 110(3)(c) of the aforesaid Act. 117. We, therefore, have no hesitation in setting aside the judgment and order dated 28 th November, 2011, passed by the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court in Election Petition No.5 of 2009 and Civil Application No.35 of 2010. 18. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed, but, there will be no order as to costs.


REPORTABL
E
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
   CIVIL   APPEAL   NO.3373         OF   2012
(Arising out of SLP(C)No.5776 of 2012)
CHAUGULE   … APPELLANT
Vs.
BHAGWAT      … RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
   ALTAMAS   KABIR,  J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The Appellant herein was elected to the
Maharashtra Legislative Assembly from the 240-Omerga Legislative Assembly Constituency, which was
reserved for a Scheduled Caste candidate.  His
election was challenged by one Shri Yadavrao, son
of Bhimrao Suryawanshi, who was also a Scheduled
Caste candidate.  In order to contest the
elections, the said Shri Yadavrao had filed three
nomination forms which were all rejected by the
Returning Officer on the ground that the proposer’s
name was not included in the voters’ list.
Accordingly, the Returning Officer found Shri
Yadavrao to be ineligible to contest the said
elections as a candidate.
3. On 26
th
September, 2009, Shri Yadavrao filed
Writ Petition No.6474 of 2009, challenging the
rejection of his nomination form which had been
submitted by him as an independent candidate.  On
1
st
October, 2009, the High Court allowed the Writ
Petition and quashed the order of the Returning
Officer.  The order of the High Court was
2challenged by the Election Commissioner before this
Hon’ble Court, in which notice was issued and the
impugned judgment was stayed.  Consequently, Shri
Yadavrao’s name was not included in the ballot
paper and he was unable to contest the elections.
4. The elections were conducted on 22
nd
October,
2009, and the Appellant herein was declared elected
from the said Constituency.  Shri Yadavrao
challenged the Appellant’s election by way of
Election Petition No.5 of 2009 filed before the
Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court on 1
st
December, 2009.  While the Election Petition was
pending hearing, on 25
th
November, 2010, Shri
Yadavrao filed an application for withdrawal of the
Election Petition filed by him.  After hearing Shri
Yadavrao in person, the High Court recorded the
fact that the Election Petitioner was no longer
interested in the Election Petition and wanted to
withdraw the same.  On the said materials, the High
3Court allowed the application filed by Shri
Yadvrao, particularly when no corrupt practice had
been alleged in the Election Petition. The Election
Petition was, therefore, disposed of as withdrawn.
At that point of time, there was no pending
application from any person wanting to be
substituted in place of the Election Petitioner,
Shri Yadavrao son of Bhimrao Suryawanshi.
5. Within 14 days of the said order having been
passed, on 8
th
December, 2010, the present
Respondent, Bhagwat, son of Maruti Danane, filed
Civil Application No.35 of 2010 under Section
110(3)(c) of the Representation of the People Act,
1951, hereinafter referred to as the “1951 Act”, in
Election Petition No.5 of 2009, which had been
disposed of as withdrawn, for substituting his name
as Election Petitioner in place of Shri Yadavrao.
Such application was filed by Shri Bhagwat for
substituting his name as the Election Petitioner in
4place of Shri Yadavrao, despite the fact that he
had neither filed any nomination paper, nor
contested the election. Furthermore, he did not
even allege any corrupt practice against the
Appellant, but filed the said Application No.35 of
2010, only on the ground that he was entitled to
continue with the Election Petition under Section
116 of the 1951 Act.
6. After considering the submissions made on
behalf of the respective parties regarding the
right of the Respondent to be substituted in the
Election Petition filed by Shri Yadavrao, the High
Court held that on a conjoint reading of Section
78(b), Section 81(1) and Section 110(3)(c) of the
1951 Act, the Applicant, Shri Bhagwat, was entitled
to be substituted in place of Shri Yadavrao for
continuing the Election Petition, notwithstanding
that the same had already been allowed to be
withdrawn on the application filed by Shri Yadavrao
5under Section 110(3)(c) of the aforesaid Act.  The
present appeal is directed against the said order
of the High Court allowing the application for
substitution filed by Shri Bhagwat in the Election
Petition which had been filed by Shri Yadavrao and
had also been allowed to be withdrawn.
7. Appearing in support of the Appeal, Mr. Anant
Bhushan Kanade, learned Senior Advocate, drew our
attention to Section 81 of the 1951 Act, which
deals with presentation of petitions.  Section 81
provides that an Election Petition calling in
question any election may be presented by any
candidate at such election or any elector within
the period specified.  Mr. Kanade also drew out
attention to Section 110 of the above Act, which
indicates the procedure for withdrawal of Election
Petitions which under Section 109 could be done
only with the leave of the High Court.  Placing
reliance on clause (c) of Sub-Section (3) of
6Section 110, Mr. Kanade urged that it has been
specifically indicated therein that a person who
might himself have been a Petitioner, may  within
14 days of the publication of the results, apply to
be substituted as Petitioner in place of the party
withdrawing, and upon compliance with the
conditions, if any, as to security, would be
entitled to be so substituted and to continue the
proceedings upon such terms as the High Court might
deem fit.
8. Attempting to draw a distinction between the
provisions of Section 110 and Section 116, which
deals with abatement or substitution on death of
the Respondent, Mr. Kanade pointed out that under
Section 116 in the event of the death of the sole
respondent, or giving notice that he did not intend
to oppose the Petition or any of the Respondent
dying or giving such notice that there is no
Respondent who is opposing the Petition, the High
7Court is required to cause notice of such event to
be published in the Official Gazette and thereupon
any person who might have been a Petitioner
(emphasis supplied)  may, within 14 days of such
publication, apply to be substituted in place of
such respondent to oppose the Petition and would be
entitled to continue the proceedings upon such
terms as the High Court thought fit.
9. Mr. Kanade submitted that in the present case
the provisions of Section 110 stood attracted and
not 116, since this case involved withdrawal of the
Election Petition by the Election Petitioner and is
not a case of abatement or substitution on death of
the Respondent.  While in Section 110(3)(c) the
expression “a person” has been used, in Section 116
the expression “any person” has been used.  He
urged that only a person who could have a similar
interest as that of the Election Petitioner could,
therefore, be permitted to be substituted in place
8of the Election Petitioner to continue the
proceedings initiated by the Election Petitioner.
10. Mr. Kanade, therefore, urged that the
Respondent herein, who had been allowed to be
substituted in place of the Election Petitioner,
had not filed any nomination paper in the election
in question and the High Court had misconstrued the
expression “who might himself have been a
petitioner” (emphasis supplied) in its application
to him.  Mr. Kanade contended that the expression
was not meant to apply to anybody or everybody.  By
allowing the substitution of the Respondent to
enable him to continue with the proceedings, which
had been withdrawn by the Election Petitioner,
would be over-reaching the provisions of Section
110(3)(c) of the 1951 Act.  Mr. Kanade submitted
that the aforesaid expression would have to be
logically interpreted to apply to a given situation
and that the present situation was not one such
9situation where such substitution should have been
allowed.
11. On behalf of the Respondent it was submitted by
Mr. K.V. Viswanathan, learned Senior Advocate, that
the language of Section 110(3)(c) was very clear
and that the expression “a person” (emphasis
supplied) used therein meant that any person who
was eligible to be a Petitioner in an Election
Petition, was entitled to be substituted in place
of the original Election Petitioner to enable him
to continue with the proceedings.  Mr. Viswanathan
contended that the aforesaid expression being
general in nature, could not exclude the Respondent
who was a registered voter and, therefore, was “an
elector” within the meaning of Section 2(1)(e) the
1951 Act.  Mr. Viswanathan submitted that the High
Court had rightly interpreted the aforesaid
expression and, since, the Respondent had an
interest in the elections in which the Appellant
1had been elected, he had every right to be
substituted in place of the original Election
Petitioner in terms of Section 110(3)(c) of the
1951 Act.  Reference was made to the decision of
this Court in   Nandiesha     Reddy Vs.   Kavitha     Mahesh
[(2011) 7 SCC 721], wherein it had been held that
the nomination paper, even if defective, could not
be rejected by the Returning Officer at the
inception and that the Returning Officer was
required to accept the petition and, thereafter, to
give an opportunity to the candidate to remove the
defects and upon removal of the defects, to accept
the same.  Mr. Viswanathan contended that in the
instant case the same not having been done, the
rejection of the nomination paper of the original
Election Petitioner, Shri Yadavrao, was erroneous
and the election, therefore, stood vitiated and the
election of the Appellant was, therefore, liable to
be set aside.
112. Having considered the submissions made on
behalf of the respective parties, we are unable to
sustain the judgment of the High Court or to accept
the submissions made by Mr. Viswanathan on behalf
of the Respondent.
13. In the very beginning it may be stated that
Section 81 of the 1951 Act disqualifies the
Respondent from maintaining an election petition,
since he was not entitled to invoke any of the
grounds set out in Sections 100(1) and 101 of the
1951 Act.
14. As indicated hereinbefore, Section 110 refers
to the procedure for withdrawal of the Election
Petition and is extracted hereinbelow :
“110. Procedure for withdrawal of election
petitions.- (1) If there are more
petitioners than one, no application to
withdraw an election petition shall be
made except with the consent of all the
petitioners.
(2) No application for withdrawal
shall be granted if, in the opinion of the
1High Court, such application has been
induced by any bargain or consideration
which ought not to be allowed.
(3) If the application is granted-
(a) the petitioner shall be ordered to
pay the costs of the respondents
therefore incurred or such portion
thereof as the High Court may
think fit;
(b) the High Court shall direct that
the notice of withdrawal shall be
published in the Official Gazette
and in such other manner as it may
specify and thereupon the notice
shall be published accordingly;
(c) a person who might himself have
been a petitioner may, within
fourteen days of such publication,
apply to be substituted as
petitioner in place of the party
withdrawing, and upon compliance
with the conditions, if any, as to
security, shall be entitled to be
so substituted and to continue the
proceedings upon such terms as the
High Court may deem fit.”
15. As may be noticed, Clause (c) of Section 110(3)
permits a person, who might himself have been a
Petitioner, (emphasis supplied) to apply for
substitution as Petitioner in place of the party
1withdrawing.  However, as has been pointed out by
Mr. Kanade, the said expression cannot be held to
apply across the board in all cases, but has to fit
in the facts of each case.  In the instant case,
the Election Petition filed by Shri Yadavrao was an
action in personam and, was, therefore, confined to
his own situation.  Had it been an action in rem,
the High Court may have been justified in
substituting the Respondent in place of the
original Election Petitioner.  In the instant case,
the complaint in the Election Petition was that the
nomination paper of the Election Petitioner had
been wrongly rejected by the Returning Officer.
The Respondent herein, who had been substituted in
place of Shri Yadavrao, did not have the same
interest as Shri Yadavrao and, accordingly, the
High Court, in our view, misconstrued the
provisions of Section 110(3)(c) of the 1951 Act in
applying the conditions literally, without even
1satisfying itself that the order fit in the facts
of the case.
16. We are satisfied that the expression “a person
who might himself have been a Petitioner”,
(emphasis supplied) would not apply in a case like
the present one, in which the right to be exercised
does not concern the actions of the person elected
on the grounds, as contemplated in Sections 100(1)
and 101 of the 1951 Act, which provide for the
grounds for declaring the elections to be void.
The grievance of the original Election Petitioner
was not against the elected candidate, but against
the action of Returning Officer in rejecting his
nomination paper.  Once the Election Petitioner
decided not to pursue the matter, the Election
Petition could not have been continued by a person,
as contemplated in Section 110(3)(c) of the
aforesaid Act.
117. We, therefore, have no hesitation in setting
aside the judgment and order dated 28
th
November,
2011, passed by the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay
High Court in Election Petition No.5 of 2009 and
Civil Application No.35 of 2010.
18. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed, but, there
will be no order as to costs.
   
………………………………………………………J.
   (ALTAMAS KABIR)
………………………………………………………J.
                            (SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR)
New Delhi
Dated:04.04.2012
1