LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws

WELCOME TO LEGAL WORLD

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Monday, February 4, 2019

“Where there is a sale of the same property in favour of a prior and subsequent transferee and the subsequent transferee has, under the conveyance outstanding in his favour, paid the purchase­money to the vendor, then in a suit for specific performance brought by the prior transferee, in case he succeeds, the question arises as to the proper form of decree in such a case. The practice of the Courts in India has not been uniform and three distinct lines of thought emerge. According to one point of view, the proper form of decree is to declare the subsequent purchase void as against the prior transferee and direct conveyance by the vendor alone. A second considers that both vendor and vendee should join, while a third would limit execution of the conveyance to the subsequent purchaser alone. According to the Supreme Court, the proper form of decree is to direct specific performance of the contract between the vendor and the prior transferee and direct the subsequent transferee to join in the conveyance so as to pass on the title which resides in him to the prior transferee. He does not join in any special covenants made between the prior transferee and his vendor; all he does is to pass on his title to the prior transferee.”

 “Where there is a sale of the same property in
favour   of   a  prior   and   subsequent   transferee
and the subsequent transferee has, under the
conveyance   outstanding   in   his   favour,   paid
the purchase­money to the vendor, then in a
suit for specific performance brought by the
prior   transferee,   in   case   he   succeeds,   the
question   arises   as   to   the   proper   form   of
decree   in   such  a  case.    The  practice  of  the
Courts   in   India   has   not   been   uniform   and
three   distinct   lines   of   thought   emerge.
According   to   one   point   of   view,   the   proper
form  of  decree   is  to  declare  the   subsequent
purchase void as against the prior transferee
and  direct  conveyance  by  the  vendor  alone.
A   second   considers   that   both   vendor   and
vendee should join, while a third would limit
execution   of   the   conveyance   to   the
subsequent   purchaser   alone.     According   to
the Supreme Court, the proper form of decree
is   to   direct   specific   performance   of   the
contract   between   the   vendor   and   the   prior
transferee   and   direct   the   subsequent
transferee to join in the conveyance so as to
pass on the title which resides in him to the
prior   transferee.     He   does   not   join   in   any
special   covenants   made   between   the   prior
transferee   and  his  vendor;   all  he  does   is  to
pass on his title to the prior transferee.”



Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre 

         REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.5177 OF 2009
Vijay A. Mittal & Ors.              ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Kulwant Rai (Dead) Thr. LRs.
& Anr.            …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the final judgment
and order dated 21.12.2007 passed by the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in RSA No.1537 of
1993   whereby   the   Single   Judge   of   the   High   Court
dismissed   the   regular   second   appeal   filed   by   the
appellants   herein   and   upheld   the   judgment/decree
1
dated 15.04.1993 of the First Appellate Court in C.A.
No.7 of 15.02.1992.
2. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in
this appeal, it is necessary to set out the relevant facts
hereinbelow.
3. Appellant   Nos.1   to   4   and   7   are   the   legal
representatives   of   the   original   defendant   No.1­Amar
Nath.  Appellant No.5 (Yash Pal Mittal), who was the
original   defendant   No.2   also   died   and   he   is   now
represented   by   his   legal   heirs   (i)   Rita   Mittal   (ii)
Akanksha and (iii) Akshay Mittal and Appellant No.6
(Sunil Mittal) is the original defendant No.3 whereas
respondent No.1 (Kulwant Rai) is the original plaintiff,
who also died and is now represented by his legal heirs
(i) Sudesh Goel, (ii) Ajay Goel and (iii) Sanjay K. Goel
and   respondent   No.2   (Atul   Kumar)   is   the   original
plaintiff No.2 in the civil suit out of which this appeal
arises.
2
4. In short, the civil suit out of which this appeal
arises was originally filed by one ­ Kulwant Rai as
plaintiff No.1 and Atul Kumar as plaintiff No.2 against
the defendants, namely, (1) Amar Nath, (2) Yash Pal
Mittal, (3) Sunil Mittal and (4) Bal Kishandas.
5. During the pendency of the civil suit, Kulwant
Rai (Plaintiff No.1), Amar Nath (defendant No.1) and
Yashpal Mittal (defendant No.2) died and, therefore,
their legal representatives, on whom the right to sue
devolved as detailed above, were brought on record in
places of the original plaintiff/defendants in the civil
suit to enable them to continue the  lis  on behalf of
those who died.
6. As   mentioned   above,   two   aforementioned
plaintiffs (respondents herein) filed a civil suit against
the aforementioned four defendants (appellants herein)
on 19.03.1982 claiming a relief of specific performance
of the agreement dated 12.06.1979 in relation to the
suit   property  (as  detailed  in   the   plaint)   situated  at
3
Narain Dass Building, Durga Charan Road, Ambala
Cantt.
7. The suit was founded on the agreement dated
12.06.1979 entered into between the plaintiffs and the
defendant   No.1   (Amar   Nath)   for   sale   of   the   suit
property for a sum of Rs.46,000/­.  According to the
plaintiffs, they paid a sum of Rs.5,000/­ by way of
earnest money to defendant No.1 (Amar Nath) and the
sale deed in relation to the suit property was to be
executed on or before 31.12.1979 by defendant No.1
(Amar Nath) in favour of the plaintiffs on paying the
balance consideration before the sub­Registrar.
8. It was alleged that defendant No.1 (Amar Nath)
instead of selling the suit property to the plaintiffs in
terms   of   agreement   dated   12.06.1979   sold   it   to
defendant Nos. 2 and 3 on 27.11.1981. The plaintiffs
alleged that they were ready to perform their part of
the agreement but it was defendant No.1 (Amar Nath)
who failed to perform his part and committed breach
4
by selling the suit property to defendant Nos. 2 and 3
on a higher price and, therefore, the plaintiffs were
constrained   to   file   the   suit   for   seeking   specific
performance of the agreement dated 12.06.1979.
9. Defendant No.1 (Amar Nath) died and, therefore,
he   could   not   file   his   written   statement.   His   legal
representatives, however, filed the written statement.
Their defense was three­fold.
10. First – Amar Nath (defendant No.1) was not the
absolute owner of the suit property because the suit
property was a Joint Hindu Family property; Second,
Amar   Nath   (defendant   No.1)   was,   therefore,   not
competent to enter into an agreement to sell the suit
property; and the Third, the sale in question was not
for any legal necessity and, therefore, it was bad in law
and not binding on the legal representatives because
their   consents   were   not   obtained   by   Amar   Nath
(defendant No.1) prior to entering into an agreement of
sale.
5
11. So far as defendant Nos. 2 to 4 are concerned,
they filed their written statement. They admitted that
the   suit   property   belonged   to   Amar   Nath(defendant
No.1).     They averred that they purchased the suit
property from Amar Nath pursuant to the agreement,
which they had entered into with him somewhere in
the   year   1978.   They   alleged   that   they   had   no
knowledge   of   the   agreement   of   the   plaintiffs   and,
therefore, they were  bona fide  purchasers of the suit
property.
12. The   Trial   Court   by   judgment/decree   dated
22.11.1991 dismissed the suit. It was held that the
agreement dated 12.06.1979 is proved; the plaintiffs
were ready and willing to perform their part of the
agreement but since Amar Nath was not competent to
enter into the agreement with the plaintiffs because
the suit property was a Joint Hindu Family property
and   Amar   Nath   was   only   a   Karta;   and   lastly,   the
6
Plantiffs failed to aver that the sale was for the legal
necessity and for the benefit of the family.
13. The   plaintiffs   felt   aggrieved   and   filed   appeal
before the First Appellate Court. By judgment/decree
dated 15.04.1993, the First Appellate Court allowed
the appeal, set aside the judgment/decree of the Trial
Court and decreed the plaintiffs’ suit.
14. The First Appellate Court held that the sale deed
executed by Late Amar Nath in favour of defendant
Nos. 2 and 3 was bad in law inasmuch as the same
was   obtained   by   a   collusion   so   as   to   deprive   the
plaintiffs   of   the   fruits   of   their   agreement   dated
12.06.1979.   It was also held that defendant Nos. 2
and   3   were   not  bona   fide  purchaser   of   the   suit
property.  It was also held that the suit property was
Joint Hindu family property and Amar Nath was its
Karta.   It was also held that the agreement of sale
entered   into   by   Amar   Nath   was   binding   on   all
coparceners.
7
15. The defendants, therefore, felt aggrieved and filed
the   second   appeal   before   the   High   Court.     By
impugned order, the High Court dismissed the second
appeal and upheld the judgment/decree of the first
Appellate Court.
16. It   was   held   that   Amar   Nath   executed   the
agreement dated 12.06.1979 as a Karta of Joint Hindu
Family.     It   was   also   held   that   the   agreement   was
binding on Amar Nath and his legal representatives.
17. It   is   against   this   order,   the   defendants   have
carried the matter to this Court in special leave to
appeal.
18.  Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and on perusal of the record of the case, we find no
merit in this appeal.
19. In   the   first   place,   in   our   considered   opinion,
when the three Courts below have held against the
defendants   and   in   favour   of   the   plaintiffs   that   the
plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part
8
of the agreement, this finding was binding on the High
Court and also on this Court.
20. Indeed, the Trial Court had already recorded this
finding in plaintiffs’ favour but since the Trial Court
dismissed the suit on other grounds, the defendants
had a right to challenge this finding by filing cross
objection before the First Appellate Court in plaintiffs’
appeal but the defendants did not do so and accepted
this finding. The First Appellate Court while decreeing
the plaintiffs’ suit upheld this finding being not under
challenge and the High Court upheld it by dismissing
defendants’ second appeal.
21. A   finding   on   the   issue   of   readiness   and
willingness   is   one   of   the   important   and   relevant
findings   in   a   suit   for   specific   performance   of   an
agreement. It is a finding based on facts and once it is
recorded, it becomes a finding of fact.
22. In this view of the matter, unless such finding is
found to be against the pleadings or contrary to the
9
evidence or the law governing the issue, it is binding
on the High Court and also on this Court.
23. Learned counsel for the appellants was not able
to point out any infirmity or illegality in this finding. It
is apart from the fact that the appellants (defendants)
failed to challenge its legality and correctness at the
first appellate stage in an appeal filed by the plaintiffs,
which was the appropriate stage to challenge.   It is,
therefore, binding on this Court.
24. The other argument of learned counsel for the
appellants (defendants) was that since the respondents
(plaintiffs)   got   impleaded   only   some   legal
representatives out of eight legal representatives of late
Amar Nath in their first appeal and remaining legal
representatives were not impleaded, the decree of the
Trial Court dismissing the civil suit  qua  those legal
representatives,   who   were   not   made   parties   in   the
appeal, had become final.
10
25. It was, therefore, urged that the First Appellate
Court by allowing the appeal filed by the plaintiffs and
decreeing   their   suit   has   passed   two   conflicting
decrees­one against some which has decreed the suit
and   other   against   some   which   has   resulted   in
dismissal of the suit.  It  is not legally permissible.
26. This   submission   was   dealt   with   by   the   High
Court  while  answering  5th  substantial  question  and
was rejected.  In our view, the High Court was right for
the following reasons.
27. First, all the legal representatives of late Amar
Nath were already on record in the Trial Court in the
suit and all had taken  similar defense in support of
their case against the plaintiffs. In other words, there
was no conflict of interest amongst them either inter se
or qua the plaintiffs.
28. Second, those legal representatives, who filed the
written   statement,   had   filed   a   joint   and   common
written statement whereas those, who did not file the
11
written statement, had given their power of attorney in
favour of the legal representatives, who had filed the
written statement.
29. Third, one legal representative, who did not file
his   written   statement   remained  ex­parte.  In   these
circumstances,    it was not necessary to implead him
as party respondent in the first appeal.
30.  Fourth, it is a trite law that if out of all the legal
representatives, majority of them are already on record
and   they   contested   the   case   on   merits,   it   is   not
necessary   to   bring   other   legal   representatives   on
record.  The reason is that the estate and the interest
of the deceased devolved on the legal representatives is
sufficiently represented by those who are already on
record.
31. Fifth, the defendants, who were respondents in
the first appeal, did not raise any objection before the
First Appellate Court.  Had such objection been raised,
the appellants (plaintiffs) would have cured the defect
12
by impleading them as party respondents before the
First Appellate Court.
32. As   rightly   argued   by   the   counsel   for   the
respondents, the reason for not impleading some legal
representatives   in   the   first   appeal   was   that   their
names were not shown in the decree of the Trial Court.
It was for this reason, the first appeal was filed by the
plaintiffs   only   against   those   legal   representatives
whose names were shown in the decree. 
33. In   the   light   of   this   factual   scenario   and   the
reasons   set   out   above,   we   are   of   the   considered
opinion that no case was made out by the appellants
to challenge the decree before the High Court on the
ground   that   the   impugned   decree   has   resulted   in
passing any conflicting decree by the First Appellate
Court ­ one of dismissal of the suit by the Trial Court
and the other  decreeing the suit by the First Appellate
Court.
13
34. Learned counsel for the appellants (defendants)
then   argued   that   the   two   Courts   below   were   not
justified   in   declaring   the   sale   made   in   favour   of
defendant Nos. 2 and 3 by defendant No.1 as bad in
law. According to the learned counsel, it should have
been   held   to   be   a  bona   fide  sale   for   consideration
without notices to the agreement of the plaintiff with
defendant No.1.
35. We find no merit in this submission for more
than one reason. First, the finding on this issue being
a   concurrent   finding   of   fact   recorded   against   the
appellants by the Appellate Court and the High Court,
the same is binding on this Court.
36. Second, the finding apart from being concurrent
is otherwise not liable to be interfered with for the
reason that the sale made by defendant No.1 in favour
of defendant Nos. 2 and 3 was on the face of it, a
collusive   sale   made   to   avoid   the   agreement   of   the
plaintiffs.
14
37. Third, defendant Nos. 2 and 3 did not adduce any
evidence to prove that their agreement was prior in
point of time as against the agreement of the plaintiffs
and, therefore, they were entitled to get the sale deed
executed pursuant to their prior agreement.
38. Fourth, the legal representatives of Amar Nath
having stepped into his shoes were entitled to raise
that defense which was available to Amar Nath against
the plaintiffs in addition to one which was appropriate
to their character as legal representatives as provided
under   Order   22   Rule   4(2)   of   the   Code   of   Civil
Procedure, 1908.
39. Fifth, the plaintiffs were only entitled to prove the
existence of the valid agreement with the defendant
No.1 – Amar Nath and its performance by the plaintiffs
qua him. This finding of readiness and willingness was
recorded in plaintiffs’ favour throughout.
40. The Trial Court had framed two Issues (7 and 8)
on the questions as to whether the suit property was a
15
Joint Hindu Family property of Amar Nath and, if so,
whether Amar Nath was its Karta or not. The Trial
Court held that the suit property was the Joint Hindu
Family property of which Amar Nath was its Karta.
41. This Court in a case  Sunil  Kumar  &   Anr.  vs.
Ram Parkash & Ors., (1988) 2 SCC 77 examined the
status and the powers of a Karta while dealing with
the   Joint   Hindu   Family   property   in   the   following
words.
“6.   In   this   appeal   we   are   called   upon   to
decide  the  only  question  whether  a   suit   for
permanent   injunction   restraining   the   Karta
of the joint Hindu family from alienating the
house  property  belonging  to the  joint  Hindu
family in pursuance of the agreement to sell
executed already in favour of the predecessor
of   the   appellants,   Jai   Bhagwan,   since
deceased, is maintainable.   It is  well settled
that   in   a  Joint  Hindu  Mitakshara  Family,  a
son   acquires   by   birth   an   interest   equal   to
that of the father in ancestral property.  The
father by reason of his paternal relation and
his  position  as  the  head of  the  family   is   its
Manager  and  he   is  entitled  to  alienate   joint
family property so as to bind the interests of
both   adult   and   minor   coparceners   in   the
property,   provided   that   the   alienation   is
made for legal necessity or for the benefit of
the estate or for meeting an antecedent debt.
The  power  of   the  Manager  of   a   joint  Hindu
16
family   to   alienate   a   joint   Hindu   family
property is analogous to that of a Manager for
an   infant   heir   as   observed   by   the   Judicial
Committee   in   Hunoomanpersaud   Panday   v.
Mussumat Babooee Munraj Koonweree (1856)
6 Moo Ind App 393)”
42. Keeping in view the aforementioned principle of
law and applying the same to the facts of the case at
hand, we are of the considered opinion that the Courts
below   were   justified   in   holding   that   the   agreement
dated   12.6.1979   was   binding   on   the   legal   heirs   of
Amar Nath for the following reasons:
43. First, no issue was framed on the question of
“legal necessity”. In our opinion, it should have been
framed; Second, yet the First Appellate Court while
allowing the plaintiffs’ appeal recorded a categorical
finding that one son of Amar Nath had signed the
agreement in question and, therefore, it was a case
where legal representatives of Late Amar Nath were
aware of the existence of the agreement and also had
given their consent; and Third, this finding was upheld
17
by the High Court while dismissing the defendants’
appeal.
44. One cannot dispute the power of a Karta to sell
the   Joint   Hindu   Family   property.     It   is,   indeed,
inherent   in   him.     However,   it   is   subject   to  certain
restrictions, namely, the sale should be for the legal
necessity and for the benefit of the family.
45. It   is   clear   that   Amar   Nath   had   obtained   the
consent   of   the   legal   heirs   before   entering   into   an
agreement for sale of the suit property to the plaintiffs.
The   very   fact   that   one   son   of   Amar   Nath   was   a
signatory to the agreement was sufficient to draw a
presumption that the agreement to sell was made by
Amar Nath with the consent of other coparceners.  It is
also for the reason because none of the coparceners
had   raised   any   objection   till   the   filing   of   written
statement in the suit. The very fact that Amar Nath
sold the suit property to defendant Nos. 2 and 3 and
which was not objected to by his legal heirs showed
18
that the plea regarding legal necessity had no factual
basis to sustain.
46. It is for all these reasons, we are of the view that
the appellants (defendants) have failed to make out
any   case   so   as   to   call   for   any   interference   in   the
impugned judgment. 
47. This takes us to examine another question which
arises in this case but was not taken note of by the
Courts below while decreeing the suit.  It relates to the
nature of decree to be passed in this case.
48. The question arises in this way.  The effect of
the decree passed in this case is that the original
defendant   No.1,   now   represented   by   his   legal
representatives (Appellant Nos.1­4 & 7) along with
legal representatives of original defendant No. 2, i.e.,
(i) Rita Mittal, (ii) Akanksha and (iii) Akshay Mittal,
and   defendant   No.   3   (Appellant   No.6   herein)   are
required to execute the sale deed in favour of legal
representatives   of   original   plaintiff   No.1,   i.e.,
19
respondent No.1(i) Sudesh Goel, (ii) Ajay Goel and
(iii) Sanjay K. Goel and Atul Kumar, plaintiff No.2
(respondent No.2 herein) jointly. 
49. Yet   another   effect   of   the   decree   is   that   the
transaction of sale of suit property between original
defendant   No.1,   now   represented   by   his   legal
representatives   (Appellant   Nos.1­4   &   7)   and
defendant   No.2   (Appellant   No.5   herein),   now
represented   by   his   legal   representatives   and
defendant Nos.3(Appellant No.6 herein) is declared
bad in law and stands nullified.  As a consequence
thereof,   legal   representatives   of   defendant
No.1(Appellant Nos.1­4 & 7) are required to return
Rs.48,000/­ to original defendant No.2 (appellant
No.5   herein),   now   represented   by   his   legal
representatives and defendant No.3 (appellant No.6
herein)   in   the   absence   of   any   contract   to   the
contrary in this behalf between the parties.   The
reason being that once the sale is declared bad, the
20
transaction   of   sale   fails   and,   therefore,   the
seller(defendant No.1) has no right to retain the sale
consideration with himself and has to refund the
sale consideration to the buyers(defendant Nos.2 &
3) [See Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act]. 
50. The question arose before this Court in the
case of  Lala Durga Prasad & Anr. Vs. Deep Chand
& Ors., AIR 1954 SC 75 as to what form of decree
should be passed in the case of specific performance
of contract where the suit property is sold by the
defendant, i.e., the owner of the suit property to
another person and later he suffers a decree for
specific   performance   of   contract   directing   him   to
transfer the suit property to the plaintiff in term of
contract.
51. The learned Judge­Vivian Bose, J. examined
this   issue   and   speaking   for   the   Bench   in   his
inimitable style of writing, held as under:
21
“Where there is a sale of the same property in
favour   of   a  prior   and   subsequent   transferee
and the subsequent transferee has, under the
conveyance   outstanding   in   his   favour,   paid
the purchase­money to the vendor, then in a
suit for specific performance brought by the
prior   transferee,   in   case   he   succeeds,   the
question   arises   as   to   the   proper   form   of
decree   in   such  a  case.    The  practice  of  the
Courts   in   India   has   not   been   uniform   and
three   distinct   lines   of   thought   emerge.
According   to   one   point   of   view,   the   proper
form  of  decree   is  to  declare  the   subsequent
purchase void as against the prior transferee
and  direct  conveyance  by  the  vendor  alone.
A   second   considers   that   both   vendor   and
vendee should join, while a third would limit
execution   of   the   conveyance   to   the
subsequent   purchaser   alone.     According   to
the Supreme Court, the proper form of decree
is   to   direct   specific   performance   of   the
contract   between   the   vendor   and   the   prior
transferee   and   direct   the   subsequent
transferee to join in the conveyance so as to
pass on the title which resides in him to the
prior   transferee.     He   does   not   join   in   any
special   covenants   made   between   the   prior
transferee   and  his  vendor;   all  he  does   is  to
pass on his title to the prior transferee.”
52. We, therefore, consider it just and proper and
with   a   view   to   end   this   litigation   between   the
parties, which is pending since 1982 and also to
balance   the   equities   amongst   the   parties   that
defendant   No.1   through   his   legal   representatives
22
(Appellant Nos. 1­4 & 7 herein) would return a sum
of   Rs.48,000/­   to   the   legal   representatives   of
defendant   No.2   (Appellant   No.5   herein)   and
defendant   No.   3   (Appellant   No.6   herein).     This
direction we give by taking recourse to our powers
under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do
complete   justice   between   the   parties   to   the  lis
because we do not want another round of litigation
to go on for years in future between the defendants
inter se for recovery of this amount.
53. In  the light  of the foregoing discussion,  the
appeal is disposed of by modifying the judgment
and decree as under:
(i) The   legal   representatives   of   defendant   No.1
(Appellant Nos.1­4 and 7)   shall deposit a sum of
Rs. 48,000/­ in the executing Court for being paid
to the legal representatives of defendant No.2, i.e.,
(i) Rita Mittal, (ii) Akanksha and (iii) Akshay Mittal
23
and Defendant No.3 (Appellant No.6 herein) within
three months as an outer limit.
(ii) The   legal   representatives   of   original   Plaintiff
No.1,(respondent No.1 herein) i.e., (i) Sudesh Goel,
(ii)   Ajay   Goel,   and   (iii)   Sanjay   K.   Goel   and   Atul
Kumar, plaintiff No.2 (respondent No.2 herein) shall
deposit in the executing Court a sum of Rs.41,000/­
for being paid to the legal representatives of original
Defendant No.1 (Appellant Nos.1 to 4 and 7 herein)
within three months as an outer limit.
(iii) The original defendant No.1, now represented
by his legal representatives (Appellant Nos.1­4 & 7)
along   with   legal   representatives   of   original
defendant   No.   2   and   defendant   No.   3   (Appellant
No.6 herein) will jointly execute the sale deed in
favour of legal representatives of original plaintiff
No.1, i.e., respondent No.1 herein (i) Sudesh Goel,
(ii)   Ajay   Goel   and   (iii)   Sanjay   K.   Goel   and   Atul
Kumar, plaintiff No.2 (respondent No.2 herein) and
24
hand over the possession of the suit property to
them   simultaneously   and  then   will   withdraw  the
money deposited for them in Court.
54. The executing Court will ensure completion of
proceedings within the time fixed and record due
satisfaction of the decree in accordance with law.  In
case of any default, the parties will be entitled to
put the decree in execution for enforcement of the
terms   of   the   decree   of   this   Court   amongst   the
defaulting parties.
55. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal
stands disposed of. 
          ………...................................J.
       [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
                                   
    …...……..................................J.
                [INDU MALHOTRA]
New Delhi;
January 28, 2019
25