REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.1331 OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 23299 of 2018)
Shri Rajendra Lalitkumar Agrawal ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Smt. Ratna Ashok Muranjan & Anr. ….Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the final judgment
and order dated 06.08.2018 of the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay in Second Appeal No. 44 of
2017 whereby the High Court dismissed the second
appeal filed by the appellant herein.
1
3. In order to appreciate the short controversy
involved in this appeal, few relevant facts need
mention hereinbelow.
4. The appellant is the plaintiff whereas the
respondents are the defendants in the civil suit out of
which this appeal arises.
5. The appellant filed a civil suit against the
respondents for specific performance of the contract in
relation to the suit property. The said suit was based
on an agreement dated 08.08.1984. The respondents
filed their written statement and denied the appellant's
claim. The Trial Court by judgment/decree dated
05.07.2004 decreed the appellant’s suit and passed a
decree for specific performance of the contract against
the respondents.
6. The respondents felt aggrieved and filed first
appeal before the District Judge, Pune. By
judgment/decree dated 10.11.2016, the first Appellate
Court allowed the respondents’ (defendants’) appeal
2
and dismissed the suit. The appellant (plaintiff) felt
aggrieved and filed second appeal before the High
Court.
7. By impugned order, the High Court dismissed the
second appeal holding that the appeal does not involve
any substantial question of law as is required to be
made out under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”)
which has given rise to filing of the present appeal by
way of special leave by the plaintiff in this Court.
8. The short question, which arises for
consideration in this appeal, is whether the High Court
was justified in dismissing the plaintiff's second appeal
on the ground that it does not involve any substantial
question(s) of law within the meaning of Section 100 of
the Code.
9. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and on perusal of the record of the case, we are
3
inclined to allow the appeal and while setting aside the
impugned order remand the case to the High Court for
deciding the second appeal on merits in accordance
with law after framing appropriate substantial
question(s) of law arising in the case.
11. Having perused the record and the judgments of
the Trial Court, first Appellate Court and the
impugned order, we are of the considered view that the
High Court was not right in holding that the appeal
does not involve any substantial question of law within
the meaning of Section 100 of the
Code. In our view, the appeal did involve the
substantial question of law and the same, therefore,
should have been framed at the time of admission of
the second appeal as provided under Section 100 (4) of
the Code for its final hearing. Indeed Section 100 (5) of
the Code provides that the appeal shall be heard only
on the substantial question of law framed by the High
Court under Section 100 (4) of the Code.
4
12. It cannot be disputed that the interpretation of
any terms and conditions of a document (such as the
agreement dated 08.08.1984 in this case) constitutes a
substantial question of law within the meaning of
Section 100 of the Code. It is more so when both the
parties admit the document.
13. As mentioned above, since the interpretation of
documents constitutes the substantial question of law,
the High Court should have first framed appropriate
substantial question(s) arising in the case especially
on the questions in relation to the true intent, rights
and obligations arising from Clauses 3, 5 and 15 of the
agreement dated 08.08.1984 in the context of
pleadings and the reversing findings of the two Courts
below and then should have called upon the
respondents to reply to the questions framed keeping
in view its jurisdiction under Section 100(5) of the
Code and its proviso.
5
14. In addition, the High Court also could have
framed questions on the issues, which are material for
grant or refusal of specific performance keeping in
view the requirements of Section 16 of the Specific
Relief Act, pleadings of the parties, and the reversing
findings of the two Courts below on such issues with a
view to find out as to which finding is more preferable.
15. From the reading the impugned order, we find
that, on one hand, the High Court went on interpreting
the terms of the document after hearing the argument
of both sides (see appearance of both parties through
lawyers) and on the other hand, in conclusion, held
that it does not involve any substantial question of
law. It virtually, therefore, decided the second appeal
bipartite like the first appeal without keeping in view
the scope of its jurisdiction conferred by Section 100
(4) and (5) of the Code. In our view, the approach of
the High Court while deciding the second appeal was
6
not in conformity with the requirements of Section 100
of the Code.
16. Learned counsel for the respondents(defendants),
however, vehemently argued that the findings of the
High Court, which are of affirmance, do not call for
any interference which rightly resulted in dismissal of
the suit on material issues but, in our view, it is now
for the High Court to examine the issue afresh on
merits after framing the substantial question(s) of law.
We, therefore, express no opinion on the merits of the
issues urged.
17. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we refrain
from entering into the merits of the case having formed
an opinion to remand the case and while allowing the
appeal and setting aside the impugned order remand
the case to the High Court with a request to admit the
appeal and frame appropriate substantial question(s)
of law which arise(s) in the case in terms of Section
100 (4) of the Code and then decide the second appeal
7
on merits by answering the question(s) framed as per
Section 100 (5) of the Code in accordance with law
without being influenced by any of our observations on
merits.
18. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned
order is set aside.
………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
....……..................................J.
[DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
January 31, 2019.
8
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.1331 OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 23299 of 2018)
Shri Rajendra Lalitkumar Agrawal ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Smt. Ratna Ashok Muranjan & Anr. ….Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the final judgment
and order dated 06.08.2018 of the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay in Second Appeal No. 44 of
2017 whereby the High Court dismissed the second
appeal filed by the appellant herein.
1
3. In order to appreciate the short controversy
involved in this appeal, few relevant facts need
mention hereinbelow.
4. The appellant is the plaintiff whereas the
respondents are the defendants in the civil suit out of
which this appeal arises.
5. The appellant filed a civil suit against the
respondents for specific performance of the contract in
relation to the suit property. The said suit was based
on an agreement dated 08.08.1984. The respondents
filed their written statement and denied the appellant's
claim. The Trial Court by judgment/decree dated
05.07.2004 decreed the appellant’s suit and passed a
decree for specific performance of the contract against
the respondents.
6. The respondents felt aggrieved and filed first
appeal before the District Judge, Pune. By
judgment/decree dated 10.11.2016, the first Appellate
Court allowed the respondents’ (defendants’) appeal
2
and dismissed the suit. The appellant (plaintiff) felt
aggrieved and filed second appeal before the High
Court.
7. By impugned order, the High Court dismissed the
second appeal holding that the appeal does not involve
any substantial question of law as is required to be
made out under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”)
which has given rise to filing of the present appeal by
way of special leave by the plaintiff in this Court.
8. The short question, which arises for
consideration in this appeal, is whether the High Court
was justified in dismissing the plaintiff's second appeal
on the ground that it does not involve any substantial
question(s) of law within the meaning of Section 100 of
the Code.
9. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and on perusal of the record of the case, we are
3
inclined to allow the appeal and while setting aside the
impugned order remand the case to the High Court for
deciding the second appeal on merits in accordance
with law after framing appropriate substantial
question(s) of law arising in the case.
11. Having perused the record and the judgments of
the Trial Court, first Appellate Court and the
impugned order, we are of the considered view that the
High Court was not right in holding that the appeal
does not involve any substantial question of law within
the meaning of Section 100 of the
Code. In our view, the appeal did involve the
substantial question of law and the same, therefore,
should have been framed at the time of admission of
the second appeal as provided under Section 100 (4) of
the Code for its final hearing. Indeed Section 100 (5) of
the Code provides that the appeal shall be heard only
on the substantial question of law framed by the High
Court under Section 100 (4) of the Code.
4
12. It cannot be disputed that the interpretation of
any terms and conditions of a document (such as the
agreement dated 08.08.1984 in this case) constitutes a
substantial question of law within the meaning of
Section 100 of the Code. It is more so when both the
parties admit the document.
13. As mentioned above, since the interpretation of
documents constitutes the substantial question of law,
the High Court should have first framed appropriate
substantial question(s) arising in the case especially
on the questions in relation to the true intent, rights
and obligations arising from Clauses 3, 5 and 15 of the
agreement dated 08.08.1984 in the context of
pleadings and the reversing findings of the two Courts
below and then should have called upon the
respondents to reply to the questions framed keeping
in view its jurisdiction under Section 100(5) of the
Code and its proviso.
5
14. In addition, the High Court also could have
framed questions on the issues, which are material for
grant or refusal of specific performance keeping in
view the requirements of Section 16 of the Specific
Relief Act, pleadings of the parties, and the reversing
findings of the two Courts below on such issues with a
view to find out as to which finding is more preferable.
15. From the reading the impugned order, we find
that, on one hand, the High Court went on interpreting
the terms of the document after hearing the argument
of both sides (see appearance of both parties through
lawyers) and on the other hand, in conclusion, held
that it does not involve any substantial question of
law. It virtually, therefore, decided the second appeal
bipartite like the first appeal without keeping in view
the scope of its jurisdiction conferred by Section 100
(4) and (5) of the Code. In our view, the approach of
the High Court while deciding the second appeal was
6
not in conformity with the requirements of Section 100
of the Code.
16. Learned counsel for the respondents(defendants),
however, vehemently argued that the findings of the
High Court, which are of affirmance, do not call for
any interference which rightly resulted in dismissal of
the suit on material issues but, in our view, it is now
for the High Court to examine the issue afresh on
merits after framing the substantial question(s) of law.
We, therefore, express no opinion on the merits of the
issues urged.
17. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we refrain
from entering into the merits of the case having formed
an opinion to remand the case and while allowing the
appeal and setting aside the impugned order remand
the case to the High Court with a request to admit the
appeal and frame appropriate substantial question(s)
of law which arise(s) in the case in terms of Section
100 (4) of the Code and then decide the second appeal
7
on merits by answering the question(s) framed as per
Section 100 (5) of the Code in accordance with law
without being influenced by any of our observations on
merits.
18. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned
order is set aside.
………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
....……..................................J.
[DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
January 31, 2019.
8
