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Tuesday, February 19, 2019

It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated by other evidence= It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction 12 unless it is corroborated by other evidence. A dying declaration, if found reliable, and if it is not an attempt by the deceased to cover the truth or to falsely implicate the accused, can be safely relied upon by the courts and can form the basis of conviction. More so, where the version given by the deceased as the dying declaration is supported and corroborated by other prosecution evidence, there is no reason for the courts to doubt the truthfulness of such dying declaration. The doctor PW­18, who recorded the statement of the deceased which was ultimately treated as his dying declaration, has fully supported the case of the prosecution by deposing about recording the dying declaration. He also deposed that the victim was in a fit state of mind while making the said declaration. We also do not find any material to show that the victim was tutored or prompted by anybody so as to create suspicion in the mind of the Court. Moreover, in this case the evidence of the eyewitnesses, which is fully reliable, is corroborated by the dying declaration in all material particulars. The High Court, on reappreciation of the entire evidence before it, has come to an independent and just conclusion by setting 13 aside the judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Court.The High Court has found that there are substantial and compelling reasons to differ from the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. The High Court having found that the view taken by the Trial Court was not plausible in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, has on independent evaluation and by assigning reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. We concur with the judgment of the High Court, for the reasons mentioned supra.


Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar 
NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 312 OF 2010
LALTU GHOSH ...APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF WEST BENGAL ...RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.
The judgment dated 15.05.2009 passed by the High
Court of Calcutta in Government Appeal No. 30 of 1987 is
called   into   question   in   this   appeal   by   the   convicted
accused.
2. The case of the prosecution in brief is that there was
a dispute between Ananta Ghosh (accused, since deceased)
and   the   victim   Keshab,   his   neighbour,   concerning   the
boundary of the landed property in which they had their
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respective houses; about 9.30 am on 30.04.1982, accused
Ananta Ghosh called the deceased Keshab by standing in
front   of   the   house   of   the   deceased;   the   deceased
accordingly   came   out   of   his   house   and   his   son   PW­1
followed him; at that point of time, Ananta Ghosh picked a
quarrel with the deceased and thereafter instigated his sons
Laltu Ghosh and Paltu Ghosh as well as his friend Sakti @
Sero   Karmakar   to   assault   the   deceased;   Laltu   Ghosh
punched the deceased on the face and thereafter stabbed
the accused in the abdomen;   though the deceased fell
down, he got up immediately and thereafter started to run
away; but Paltu Ghosh stabbed the deceased on his back,
who fell down near the tea stall of one Tabal; he was taken
to the Primary Health Centre, Kaliaganj in the rickshaw of
one Madan where he was treated by Dr. Roychowdhury,
PW­18, who gave him first aid and recorded the statement
of the deceased; later, the victim was sent to Krishnanagar
Hospital for better treatment.
3. The   statement   of   the   victim   was   recorded   by   Dr.
Roychowdhury   (PW­18)   and   the   same   was   treated   as   a
dying   declaration,   since   soon   after   such   treatment   the
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victim succumbed to his injuries on the way to the hospital.
His son PW­1 lodged the First Information Report (FIR) at
10.45 a.m. on the very same day, i.e. 30.04.1982.
4.  The   police   filed   the   charge­sheet   against   four
accused, viz. Laltu Ghosh, Paltu Ghosh, Ananta Ghosh and
Sakti @ Sero Karmakar.  The Trial Court upon appreciation
of the material on record acquitted all the accused. The
State filed an appeal before the High Court, which came to
be allowed in part by the impugned judgment. The High
Court convicted Laltu Ghosh, who is the appellant herein.
The   High   Court   also   declared   that   Paltu   Ghosh   was   a
juvenile on the date of the incident. The accused Ananta
Ghosh and Sakti Karmakar expired during the pendency of
the appeal before the High Court. Hence, this appeal by the
convicted accused Laltu Ghosh.
5.  There   are   four   eye­witnesses   to   the   incident   in
question, viz. PW­1, PW­2, PW­3 and PW­4.   Out of them,
PW­2 and  PW­3 have  turned hostile to  the  case of  the
prosecution. PW­1 is the son of the deceased and PW­4 is
the wife of the deceased. The prosecution, apart from the
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versions   of   the   eye­witnesses,   relied   upon   the   dying
declaration, Ext. 4.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant, having taken us
through the material on record submits that the High Court
was not justified in allowing the appeal of the State and
convicting the appellant herein, since the evidence of PW­1
and   PW­4   cannot   be   believed   in   view   of   the   material
contradictions found in their evidence; PW­1 and PW­4 are
none other than the son and the wife of the deceased and
therefore   the   Trial   Court   on   meticulous   and   careful
consideration of the evidence of these witnesses concluded
that   their   evidence   cannot   be   believed;   the   dying
declaration was also found to be shaky by the Trial Court;
the Trial Court had accorded reasons for rejecting the dying
declaration; and that the High Court has failed to analyse
the entire evidence and material on record and has failed to
meet the reasons given by the Trial Court upon taking the
evidence and material into consideration.
7. Per   contra,   it   is   argued   by   the   learned   counsel
appearing on behalf of the State that the High Court has
rightly rejected the findings of the Trial Court that the post
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mortem report was not of the deceased; there is absolutely
no doubt about the persons who caused injuries to the
deceased;   the   High   Court   was   justified   in   applying   the
principle of common intention; and that the High Court has
assigned   valid   reasons   as   to   why   the   dying   declaration
should not have been discarded by the Trial Court.  On the
basis   of   these,   among   other   grounds,   he   prays   for
confirming the judgment of the High Court. 
8.  To satisfy our conscience, we have gone through the
evidence of PW­1 and PW­4. PW­1 had deposed that about
9­9.30 a.m. on 30.04.1982, he and his father were at home,
sitting on a platform; the accused Ananta Ghosh called the
deceased from his house but the deceased initially refused
to come and told the accused Ananta Ghosh to come to the
road in front of his house; after saying so, the deceased
went out of his house and PW­1 followed him; thereafter, a
verbal   quarrel   took   place   between   the   accused   and   the
deceased, and the accused Ananta Ghosh at that point of
time instigated his sons Laltu Ghosh and Paltu Ghosh as
well as his friend Sakti @ Sero Karmakar to assault the
deceased; Laltu Ghosh dealt a blow to the deceased and
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thereafter stabbed him on his abdomen; the deceased made
an attempt to escape and had proceeded about 10 cubits
when Paltu Ghosh assaulted the deceased with a bhojali on
his back; despite  the same, the deceased made an attempt
to escape by running but Laltu Ghosh and Paltu Ghosh
chased him and ultimately, he fell near the tea stall of one
Tabal   from   where   he   was   shifted   to   the   hospital   at
Kaliaganj.   The evidence of PW­1 is consistent with the
version   of   the   prosecution.     His   evidence   could   not   be
shaken   in   the   cross­examination   in   respect   of   the
occurrence of the incident in question.  Even in the crossexamination,   PW­1   has   stated   that   the   appellant   had
concealed a sharp­cutting weapon, i.e. kirich, in a napkin
and had come fully prepared for committing the murder.
9. The   evidence   of   PW­1   is   fully   supported   by   the
evidence of PW­4. She has also deposed about the exchange
of words between the deceased and the accused Ananta
Ghosh;   about   Ananta   Ghosh   instigating   his   sons   Laltu
Ghosh   and   Paltu   Ghosh,   and   his   friend   Sakti   @   Sero
Karmakar to assault the deceased; about the assault by
Laltu Ghosh in the first instance and thereafter by Paltu
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Ghosh at the back of the deceased; about the deceased
trying to escape and running towards the tea stall, etc. She
has also deposed about the first aid given to the deceased
at   the   Primary   Health   Centre,   Kaliaganj   and   thereafter
about   shifting   him   to   Krishnanagar   Hospital.   She   has
further   deposed   about   the   victim’s   statement   being
recorded at the Primary Health Centre, Kaliaganj, which
was   ultimately   treated   as   his   dying   declaration.   She
withstood the lengthy cross­examination.
10. We   find   that   the   evidence   of   PW­1   and   PW­4   is
consistent, cogent, reliable and trustworthy. Their presence
at the scene of the incident is natural inasmuch as the
incident took place in front of their house, and that too in
the morning, at a time when PW­1 and PW­4 could be
expected to be at home. Though the incident started with a
verbal   quarrel   between   the   deceased   and   the   accused
Ananta Ghosh, the appellant along with his brother entered
the   scene   after   being   instigated   by   their   father   Ananta
Ghosh; both the brothers, namely, Laltu Ghosh and Paltu
Ghosh came to the spot fully armed with a  kirich  and a
bhojali; the victim was not spared by the accused though he
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tried to escape from the scene of the occurrence;  he was
chased by the appellant and Paltu Ghosh and ultimately,
the victim fell in front of a tea stall; the victim was able to
give his statement before the doctor PW­18 who treated him
at   the   first   instance   at   the   Primary   Health   Centre,
Kaliaganj.
11. We   do   not   find   any   major   contradiction   in   the
evidence of these witnesses. Minor variations, if any, will
not tilt the balance in favour of the defence in the facts and
circumstances of the present case. The defence could not
elicit any contradiction in the cross­examination of PW­1
and PW­4.  In our considered opinion, the High Court has
rightly believed the evidence of these witnesses, particularly
since minor discrepancies on trivial matters do not in and
of   themselves   affect   the   core   of   the   prosecution   case.
Hence, it is not open for the Court to reject the evidence
only in light of some minor variations and discrepancies.
12.   As regards the contention that the eye­witnesses are
close relatives of the deceased, it is by now well­settled that
a   related   witness   cannot   be   said   to   be   an   ‘interested’
witness merely by virtue of being a relative of the victim.
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This   Court   has   elucidated   the   difference   between
‘interested’ and ‘related’ witnesses in a plethora of cases,
stating that a witness may be called interested only when
he   or   she   derives   some   benefit   from   the   result   of   a
litigation, which in the context of a criminal case would
mean that the witness has a direct or indirect interest in
seeing the accused punished due to prior enmity or other
reasons, and thus has a motive to falsely implicate the
accused (for instance, see  State  of  Rajasthan   v.  Kalki,
(1981)   2   SCC     752;  Amit   v.   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh,
(2012)   4   SCC   107;   and  Gangabhavani   v.   Rayapati
Venkat   Reddy,   (2013)   15   SCC   298).     Recently,   this
difference was reiterated in Ganapathi v. State of Tamil
Nadu,   (2018)   5   SCC   549,   in   the   following   terms,   by
referring to the three­Judge bench decision in  State   of
Rajasthan v.  Kalki (supra):
“14. “Related” is not equivalent to “interested”. A
witness may be called “interested” only when he or
she   derives   some   benefit   from   the   result   of   a
litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing
an accused person punished. A witness who is a
natural one and is the only possible eye witness in
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the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be
“interested”...”
13.  In criminal cases, it is often the case that the offence is
witnessed by a close relative of the victim, whose presence
on the scene of the offence would be natural. The evidence
of such a witness cannot automatically be discarded by
labelling   the   witness   as   interested.   Indeed,   one   of   the
earliest statements with respect to interested witnesses in
criminal cases was made by this Court in Dalip Singh v.
State   of   Punjab,   1954   SCR   145,   wherein   this   Court
observed:
“26.   A   witness   is   normally   to   be   considered
independent unless he or she springs from sources
which   are   likely   to   be   tainted   and   that   usually
means   unless   the   witness   has   cause,   such   as
enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate
him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the
last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate
an innocent person…”
14.  In case of a related witness, the Court may not treat
his or her testimony as inherently tainted, and needs to
ensure   only   that   the   evidence   is   inherently   reliable,
probable,   cogent   and   consistent.   We   may   refer   to   the
observations   of   this   Court   in  Jayabalan   v.   Union
Territory of Pondicherry, (2010) 1 SCC 199:
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“23. We are of the considered view that in cases
where the Court is called upon to deal with the
evidence of the interested witnesses, the approach
of the Court while appreciating the evidence of such
witnesses must not be pedantic. The Court must be
cautious in appreciating and accepting the evidence
given   by   the   interested   witnesses   but   the   Court
must   not   be   suspicious   of   such   evidence.   The
primary endeavour of the Court must be to look for
consistency. The evidence of a witness cannot be
ignored or thrown out solely because it comes from
the mouth of a person who is closely related to the
victim.”
15.  In the instant matter, as already discussed above, we
find the testimony of the eye­witnesses to be consistent and
reliable,   and   therefore  reject   the   contention   of   the
appellants that the testimony of the eye­witnesses must be
disbelieved because they are close relatives of the deceased
and hence interested witnesses.
16. The FIR discloses that the doctor PW­18 examined
the victim at the first instance and recorded his statement,
in which the victim narrated the occurrence including the
names   of   the   assailants.   The   dying   declaration   Ext.   4
recorded by the doctor PW­18 shows that the victim was
first assailed by the accused Ananta Ghosh, and thereafter
by Paltu Ghosh, who stabbed the victim’s back, and by
Laltu Ghosh, who served a blow on the victim’s abdomen
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with a kirich.  The Trial Court has given more weightage to
the   minor   variations   found   in   the   evidence   of   the
prosecution   witnesses   as   compared   to   the   information
found in the dying declaration.
17.  The courts cannot expect a victim like the deceased
herein to state in exact words as to what happened during
the course of the crime, inasmuch  as it  would be very
difficult   for   such   a   victim,   who   has   suffered   multiple
grievous injuries, to state all the details of the incident
meticulously and that too in a parrot­like manner.   The
Trial   Court   assumed   that   the   Investigation   Officer   in
collusion   with   the   doctor   wilfully   fabricated   the   dying
declaration. It is needless to state that the Investigation
Officer and the doctor are independent public servants and
are not related either to the accused or the deceased.  It is
not open for the Trial Court to cast aspersions on the said
public officers in relation to the dying declaration, more
particularly when there is no supporting evidence to show
such fabrication. 
18.  It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that
a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction
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unless   it   is   corroborated   by   other   evidence.   A   dying
declaration, if found reliable, and if it is not an attempt by
the deceased to cover the truth or to falsely implicate the
accused, can be safely relied upon by the courts and can
form the basis of conviction.   More so, where the version
given by the deceased as the dying declaration is supported
and corroborated by other prosecution evidence, there is no
reason for the courts to doubt the truthfulness of such
dying   declaration.   The   doctor   PW­18,   who   recorded   the
statement of the deceased which was ultimately treated as
his dying declaration, has fully supported the case of the
prosecution   by   deposing   about   recording   the   dying
declaration. He also deposed that the victim was in a fit
state of mind while making the said declaration. We also do
not find any material to show that the victim was tutored or
prompted by anybody so as to create suspicion in the mind
of the Court.  Moreover, in this case the evidence of the eyewitnesses, which is fully reliable, is corroborated by the
dying   declaration   in   all   material   particulars.   The   High
Court, on reappreciation of the entire evidence before it,
has come to an independent and just conclusion by setting
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aside the judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Court.
The High Court has found that there are substantial and
compelling reasons to differ from the finding of acquittal
recorded by the Trial Court. The High Court having found
that the view taken by the Trial Court was not plausible in
view of the facts and circumstances of the case, has on
independent evaluation and by assigning reasons set aside
the judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Court.   We
concur   with   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court,   for   the
reasons mentioned supra.
19. Thus, we do not find any valid ground to interfere
with the impugned judgment of conviction passed by the
High   Court.  Accordingly,   the  appeal   fails   and  is   hereby
dismissed.
                   
        …………………………..……....J.
                                          [Mohan M. Shantanagoudar]
                                   ...……………………..…..…J.
            [Dinesh Maheshwari] 
New Delhi;
February 19, 2019.
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