R E P O R T A B L E
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7600 OF 2014
ALLAHABAD BANK & ORS. ...Appellant(S)
Versus
KRISHNA NARAYAN TEWARI …Respondent(S)
J U D G M E N T
T.S. THAKUR, CJI.
1. In this appeal by special leave the appellant calls in question the
correctness of a judgment and order dated 28th October, 2013 passed by the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow bench, whereby Writ Petition
No.2867 of 2006 filed by the respondent has been allowed and an order dated
29th July, 2005 passed by the Disciplinary Authority and that dated 5th
January, 2006 passed by the Appellate Authority directing removal of the
respondent from the service of the appellant-bank quashed. The High Court
has as a result directed the appellant bank to provide all service/retiral
benefits to the petitioner within ninety days of the order. The challenge
mounted by the appellant arises in the following circumstances:
2. The respondent was employed with the appellant-bank and was during
the relevant period posted as Officer in-charge at the appellant-bank’s
Sultanpur branch in District Sultanpur in the State of Uttar Pradesh. He
was, by an order dated 10th December, 2004, placed under suspension in
contemplation of a disciplinary enquiry which was initiated against him
with the service of a charge-sheet dated 10th February, 2005. The
respondent pleaded not guilty but the Enquiry Officer concluded the
enquiry proceedings rather quickly within a span of just about forty-five
days and submitted a report dated 27th May, 2005 holding that the
respondent was guilty on all counts except two which were held proved but
only partially. The Disciplinary Authority accepted the findings and passed
an order imposing upon the respondent the major penalty of removal from
service.
3. Aggrieved, the respondent preferred a departmental appeal which was
dismissed by the Appellate Authority by its order dated 5th January, 2006.
The respondent then questioned the said two orders before the High Court in
a writ petition which as noticed earlier has been allowed by the High Court
in terms of the order impugned in this appeal.
4. The High Court came to the conclusion that neither the Disciplinary
Authority nor the Appellate Authority had applied their mind or recorded
reasons in support of their conclusions. Relying upon the decisions of
this court in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank & Ors. (2009) 2 SCC
570, Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Ors. (1999) 2 SCC 10, Nand
Kishore v. State of Bihar (1978) 3 SCC 366, Kailash Nath Gupta v. Enquiry
Officer, Allahabad Bank & Ors. (2003) 9 SCC 480, State Bank of Bikaner &
Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya (2011) 4 SCC 584 and Mohd. Yunus Khan v. State
of U.P. & Ors. (2010) 10 SCC 539, the High Court held that the order passed
by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority were
unsustainable in law. The High Court found that the findings recorded by
the Disciplinary Authority and affirmed by the Appellate Authority were
perverse and were based on no evidence whatsoever. The High Court observed
that the Appellate Authority had not applied its mind independently and
simply cut and pasted the findings of the Disciplinary Authority while
dismissing the appeal.
5. On behalf of the appellant-bank it was contended before us that the
High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in re-appreciating the evidence
and holding the respondent not guilty. It was argued that so long as there
was some evidence on which the Disciplinary Authority could rest its
findings, sufficiency or insufficiency of such evidence could not be gone
into by a Writ Court. Alternatively, it was submitted that even if there
was any infirmity in the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority or the
Appellate Authority, on account of absence or insufficiency of the reasons
in support of the findings recorded by them, the proper course for the High
Court was to remand the matter back to the Appellate Authority or the
Disciplinary Authority as the case may be for doing the needful afresh.
The High Court could not, on account of absence of reasons or
unsatisfactory appraisal of the evidence by them, quash the order of
punishment and direct release of the service benefits due to the
respondent.
6. On behalf of the respondent it was on the other hand contended that
the enquiry conducted against the respondent and the conclusion arrived at
by the Enquiry Officer, Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority
suffered from fatal defects. Firstly, because the enquiry conducted by the
Enquiry Officer was unfair and had resulted in gross miscarriage of justice
on account of the failure of the Enquiry Officer to provide a reasonable
opportunity to the respondent to lead evidence in his defense. In the
second place the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and so also the
Disciplinary Authority were unsupported by any evidence whatsoever and were
perverse to say the least. In the third place, the orders were
unsustainable also for the reason that the same did not disclose due and
proper application of mind by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate
Authority. The order passed by the Appellate Authority was, in particular,
bad in law as the same did not examine the material on record independently
and had simply relied upon the findings of the Disciplinary Authority
without adverting to the points which the respondent had raised in support
of his challenge. It was lastly submitted that the respondent has since
superannuated and was a physical wreck having suffered a heart attack and a
debilitating stroke which had confined him to bed. Any remand of the
proceedings to the Appellate Authority to pass a fresh order or the
Disciplinary Authority for re-examination and fresh determination of the
respondent’s guilt would not only be harsh but would tantamount to denial
of justice to him. The High Court was in that view justified in taking a
pragmatic view of the matter and in directing continuity of service to the
respondent and release of all service and retiral benefits to him upto the
date of his superannuation.
7. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions at the
bar. It is true that a writ court is very slow in interfering with the
findings of facts recorded by a Departmental Authority on the basis of
evidence available on record. But it is equally true that in a case where
the Disciplinary Authority records a finding that is unsupported by any
evidence whatsoever or a finding which no reasonable person could have
arrived at, the writ court would be justified if not duty bound to examine
the matter and grant relief in appropriate cases. The writ court will
certainly interfere with disciplinary enquiry or the resultant orders
passed by the competent authority on that basis if the enquiry itself was
vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice, as is
alleged to be the position in the present case. Non-application of mind
by the Enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority, non-recording of
reasons in support of the conclusion arrived at by them are also grounds on
which the writ courts are justified in interfering with the orders of
punishment. The High Court has, in the case at hand, found all these
infirmities in the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the
Appellate Authority. The respondent’s case that the enquiry was conducted
without giving a fair and reasonable opportunity for leading evidence in
defense has not been effectively rebutted by the appellant. More
importantly the Disciplinary Authority does not appear to have properly
appreciated the evidence nor recorded reasons in support of his conclusion.
To add insult to injury the Appellate Authority instead of recording its
own reasons and independently appreciating the material on record, simply
reproduced the findings of the Disciplinary Authority. All told the Enquiry
Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority have
faltered in the discharge of their duties resulting in miscarriage of
justice. The High Court was in that view right in interfering with the
orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority.
8. There is no quarrel with the proposition that in cases where the High
Court finds the enquiry to be deficient either procedurally or otherwise
the proper course always is to remand the matter back to the concerned
authority to redo the same afresh. That course could have been followed
even in the present case. The matter could be remanded back to the
Disciplinary Authority or to the Enquiry Officer for a proper enquiry and a
fresh report and order. But that course may not have been the only course
open in a given situation. There may be situations where because of a long
time lag or such other supervening circumstances the writ court considers
it unfair, harsh or otherwise unnecessary to direct a fresh enquiry or
fresh order by the competent authority. That is precisely what the High
Court has done in the case at hand. The High Court has taken note of the
fact that the respondent had been placed under suspension in the year 2004
and dismissed in the year 2005. The dismissal order was challenged in the
High Court in the year 2006 but the writ petition remained pending in the
High Court for nearly seven years till 2013. During the intervening period
the respondent superannuated on 30th November, 2011. Not only that he had
suffered a heart attack and a stroke that has rendered him physically
disabled and confined to bed. The respondent may by now have turned 65
years of age. Any remand either to the Enquiry Officer for a fresh enquiry
or to the Disciplinary Authority for a fresh order or even to the Appellate
Authority would thus be very harsh and would practically deny to the
respondent any relief whatsoever. Superadded to all this is the fact that
the High Court has found, that there was no allegation nor any evidence to
show the extent of loss, if any, suffered by the bank on account of the
alleged misconduct of the respondent. The discretion vested in the High
Court in not remanding the matter back was, therefore, properly exercised.
9. The next question is whether the respondent would be entitled to
claim arrears of salary as part of service/retiral benefits in full or
part. The High Court has been rather ambivalent in that regard. We say so
because while the High Court has directed release of service/retiral
benefits, it is not clear whether the same would include salary for the
period between the date of removal and the date of superannuation. Taking
a liberal view of the matter, we assume that the High Court’s direction for
release of service benefits would include the release of his salaries also
for the period mentioned above. We are, however, of the opinion that while
proceedings need not be remanded for a fresh start from the beginning,
grant of full salary for the period between the date of dismissal and the
date of superannuation would not also be justified. We, therefore, allow
this appeal but only in part and to the extent that while orders passed by
the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority shall stand quashed,
and the respondent entitled to continuity of service till the date of his
superannuation with all service benefits on that basis, he shall be
entitled to only 50% of the salary for the period between the date of his
removal from service till the date of superannuation. Retiral benefits
shall also be released in his favour. The order passed by the High Court
shall, to the extent indicated above, stand modified. The parties shall
bear their own costs.
…………………….…..…CJI.
(T.S. THAKUR)
……………………….…..…J.
(A.M. KHANWILKAR)
New Delhi
January 2, 2017
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7600 OF 2014
ALLAHABAD BANK & ORS. ...Appellant(S)
Versus
KRISHNA NARAYAN TEWARI …Respondent(S)
J U D G M E N T
T.S. THAKUR, CJI.
1. In this appeal by special leave the appellant calls in question the
correctness of a judgment and order dated 28th October, 2013 passed by the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow bench, whereby Writ Petition
No.2867 of 2006 filed by the respondent has been allowed and an order dated
29th July, 2005 passed by the Disciplinary Authority and that dated 5th
January, 2006 passed by the Appellate Authority directing removal of the
respondent from the service of the appellant-bank quashed. The High Court
has as a result directed the appellant bank to provide all service/retiral
benefits to the petitioner within ninety days of the order. The challenge
mounted by the appellant arises in the following circumstances:
2. The respondent was employed with the appellant-bank and was during
the relevant period posted as Officer in-charge at the appellant-bank’s
Sultanpur branch in District Sultanpur in the State of Uttar Pradesh. He
was, by an order dated 10th December, 2004, placed under suspension in
contemplation of a disciplinary enquiry which was initiated against him
with the service of a charge-sheet dated 10th February, 2005. The
respondent pleaded not guilty but the Enquiry Officer concluded the
enquiry proceedings rather quickly within a span of just about forty-five
days and submitted a report dated 27th May, 2005 holding that the
respondent was guilty on all counts except two which were held proved but
only partially. The Disciplinary Authority accepted the findings and passed
an order imposing upon the respondent the major penalty of removal from
service.
3. Aggrieved, the respondent preferred a departmental appeal which was
dismissed by the Appellate Authority by its order dated 5th January, 2006.
The respondent then questioned the said two orders before the High Court in
a writ petition which as noticed earlier has been allowed by the High Court
in terms of the order impugned in this appeal.
4. The High Court came to the conclusion that neither the Disciplinary
Authority nor the Appellate Authority had applied their mind or recorded
reasons in support of their conclusions. Relying upon the decisions of
this court in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank & Ors. (2009) 2 SCC
570, Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Ors. (1999) 2 SCC 10, Nand
Kishore v. State of Bihar (1978) 3 SCC 366, Kailash Nath Gupta v. Enquiry
Officer, Allahabad Bank & Ors. (2003) 9 SCC 480, State Bank of Bikaner &
Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya (2011) 4 SCC 584 and Mohd. Yunus Khan v. State
of U.P. & Ors. (2010) 10 SCC 539, the High Court held that the order passed
by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority were
unsustainable in law. The High Court found that the findings recorded by
the Disciplinary Authority and affirmed by the Appellate Authority were
perverse and were based on no evidence whatsoever. The High Court observed
that the Appellate Authority had not applied its mind independently and
simply cut and pasted the findings of the Disciplinary Authority while
dismissing the appeal.
5. On behalf of the appellant-bank it was contended before us that the
High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in re-appreciating the evidence
and holding the respondent not guilty. It was argued that so long as there
was some evidence on which the Disciplinary Authority could rest its
findings, sufficiency or insufficiency of such evidence could not be gone
into by a Writ Court. Alternatively, it was submitted that even if there
was any infirmity in the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority or the
Appellate Authority, on account of absence or insufficiency of the reasons
in support of the findings recorded by them, the proper course for the High
Court was to remand the matter back to the Appellate Authority or the
Disciplinary Authority as the case may be for doing the needful afresh.
The High Court could not, on account of absence of reasons or
unsatisfactory appraisal of the evidence by them, quash the order of
punishment and direct release of the service benefits due to the
respondent.
6. On behalf of the respondent it was on the other hand contended that
the enquiry conducted against the respondent and the conclusion arrived at
by the Enquiry Officer, Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority
suffered from fatal defects. Firstly, because the enquiry conducted by the
Enquiry Officer was unfair and had resulted in gross miscarriage of justice
on account of the failure of the Enquiry Officer to provide a reasonable
opportunity to the respondent to lead evidence in his defense. In the
second place the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and so also the
Disciplinary Authority were unsupported by any evidence whatsoever and were
perverse to say the least. In the third place, the orders were
unsustainable also for the reason that the same did not disclose due and
proper application of mind by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate
Authority. The order passed by the Appellate Authority was, in particular,
bad in law as the same did not examine the material on record independently
and had simply relied upon the findings of the Disciplinary Authority
without adverting to the points which the respondent had raised in support
of his challenge. It was lastly submitted that the respondent has since
superannuated and was a physical wreck having suffered a heart attack and a
debilitating stroke which had confined him to bed. Any remand of the
proceedings to the Appellate Authority to pass a fresh order or the
Disciplinary Authority for re-examination and fresh determination of the
respondent’s guilt would not only be harsh but would tantamount to denial
of justice to him. The High Court was in that view justified in taking a
pragmatic view of the matter and in directing continuity of service to the
respondent and release of all service and retiral benefits to him upto the
date of his superannuation.
7. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions at the
bar. It is true that a writ court is very slow in interfering with the
findings of facts recorded by a Departmental Authority on the basis of
evidence available on record. But it is equally true that in a case where
the Disciplinary Authority records a finding that is unsupported by any
evidence whatsoever or a finding which no reasonable person could have
arrived at, the writ court would be justified if not duty bound to examine
the matter and grant relief in appropriate cases. The writ court will
certainly interfere with disciplinary enquiry or the resultant orders
passed by the competent authority on that basis if the enquiry itself was
vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice, as is
alleged to be the position in the present case. Non-application of mind
by the Enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority, non-recording of
reasons in support of the conclusion arrived at by them are also grounds on
which the writ courts are justified in interfering with the orders of
punishment. The High Court has, in the case at hand, found all these
infirmities in the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the
Appellate Authority. The respondent’s case that the enquiry was conducted
without giving a fair and reasonable opportunity for leading evidence in
defense has not been effectively rebutted by the appellant. More
importantly the Disciplinary Authority does not appear to have properly
appreciated the evidence nor recorded reasons in support of his conclusion.
To add insult to injury the Appellate Authority instead of recording its
own reasons and independently appreciating the material on record, simply
reproduced the findings of the Disciplinary Authority. All told the Enquiry
Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority have
faltered in the discharge of their duties resulting in miscarriage of
justice. The High Court was in that view right in interfering with the
orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority.
8. There is no quarrel with the proposition that in cases where the High
Court finds the enquiry to be deficient either procedurally or otherwise
the proper course always is to remand the matter back to the concerned
authority to redo the same afresh. That course could have been followed
even in the present case. The matter could be remanded back to the
Disciplinary Authority or to the Enquiry Officer for a proper enquiry and a
fresh report and order. But that course may not have been the only course
open in a given situation. There may be situations where because of a long
time lag or such other supervening circumstances the writ court considers
it unfair, harsh or otherwise unnecessary to direct a fresh enquiry or
fresh order by the competent authority. That is precisely what the High
Court has done in the case at hand. The High Court has taken note of the
fact that the respondent had been placed under suspension in the year 2004
and dismissed in the year 2005. The dismissal order was challenged in the
High Court in the year 2006 but the writ petition remained pending in the
High Court for nearly seven years till 2013. During the intervening period
the respondent superannuated on 30th November, 2011. Not only that he had
suffered a heart attack and a stroke that has rendered him physically
disabled and confined to bed. The respondent may by now have turned 65
years of age. Any remand either to the Enquiry Officer for a fresh enquiry
or to the Disciplinary Authority for a fresh order or even to the Appellate
Authority would thus be very harsh and would practically deny to the
respondent any relief whatsoever. Superadded to all this is the fact that
the High Court has found, that there was no allegation nor any evidence to
show the extent of loss, if any, suffered by the bank on account of the
alleged misconduct of the respondent. The discretion vested in the High
Court in not remanding the matter back was, therefore, properly exercised.
9. The next question is whether the respondent would be entitled to
claim arrears of salary as part of service/retiral benefits in full or
part. The High Court has been rather ambivalent in that regard. We say so
because while the High Court has directed release of service/retiral
benefits, it is not clear whether the same would include salary for the
period between the date of removal and the date of superannuation. Taking
a liberal view of the matter, we assume that the High Court’s direction for
release of service benefits would include the release of his salaries also
for the period mentioned above. We are, however, of the opinion that while
proceedings need not be remanded for a fresh start from the beginning,
grant of full salary for the period between the date of dismissal and the
date of superannuation would not also be justified. We, therefore, allow
this appeal but only in part and to the extent that while orders passed by
the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority shall stand quashed,
and the respondent entitled to continuity of service till the date of his
superannuation with all service benefits on that basis, he shall be
entitled to only 50% of the salary for the period between the date of his
removal from service till the date of superannuation. Retiral benefits
shall also be released in his favour. The order passed by the High Court
shall, to the extent indicated above, stand modified. The parties shall
bear their own costs.
…………………….…..…CJI.
(T.S. THAKUR)
……………………….…..…J.
(A.M. KHANWILKAR)
New Delhi
January 2, 2017
