REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1448 OF 2010
Vijendra Singh …Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Uttar Pradesh …Respondent(s)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1452 OF 2010
Mahendra Singh …Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Uttar Pradesh …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.
Present appeals, by special leave, call in question the defensibility
of the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence dated 13.05.2009
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No.
1019 of 1981 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court has confirmed the
judgment and order passed by the learned IV Additional Sessions Judge,
Meerut in Sessions Trial No. 308 of 1979 whereunder the appellants along
with two others stood convicted under Section 302 read with
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and visited with the sentence of
life imprisonment.
2. Filtering the unnecessary details, the facts which are necessary to
be adumbrated for the adjudication of the instant appeals are that there
was enmity between the accused, Dharam Pal and his family on the one side
and Charan Singh, PW-1, on the other. Charan Singh, PW-1, Gajpal, PW-2,
Tedha, PW-3 and Nepal Singh belong to village Dastoi, to which the
deceased, Badan Pal, the nephew of Charan Singh as well as the accused
persons belong. As the prosecution story further unfurls, sometime prior to
the occurrence, Gaje Singh, brother of the accused, Dharam Pal, was
murdered and Charan Singh, PW-1, along with others had faced trial for his
murder and eventually got acquitted. The occurrence leading to the murder
of Badan Pal took place in the evening hours of 26.03.1979. Badan Pal was
a student and he used to stay overnight at his tube-well which had a shed
in the jungle of village Sarva. On the date of occurrence, he was at the
aforesaid tube-well. Gajpal, PW-2, and Nepal Singh in the fateful evening
while carrying the meals for Badan Pal, on their way, met Tedha, PW-3, who
wanted to irrigate his fields from the aforesaid tube-well. All of them
reached near the said tube-well about 7.30 p.m. when they heard the sound
of a gun fire from inside the “kotha” (shed) of the said tube-well. They
reached the place without loss of any time and noticed that all the four
accused, namely, Dhani Ram, Dharam Pal, Mahendra and Vijendra, came out of
that “kotha”. Dhani Ram and Dharam Pal carried pistols, Vijendra was armed
with a ballam and Mahendra carried a lathi. On seeing them, they took to
their heels. After they reached the place, they found Badan Pal lying dead
with bleeding wounds. The aforesaid witnesses identified the accused
persons in the light of the electric bulb fixed on the roof of the tube-
well as well as in the torch light. A report of the occurrence was
prepared by Devendra Singh with the assistance of Charan Singh, PW-1, and
was filed at Police Station Kharkhauda. After the criminal law was set in
motion, the investigation was conducted by S.I. Rajveer Singh, PW-8, who
after recording the statements of some of the witnesses under Section 161
CrPC between 6 a.m. to 8 a.m. on the next day, prepared the panchanama and
the sketch map of the spot and collected blood stained and unstained earth
as well as two cartridges. These were sealed on the spot and the dead
body was sent for postmortem. On 29.03.1979, the investigation was
transferred to S.I. V.P. Saxena and he came to learn on 11.04.1979 that all
the accused persons except Dhani Ram had surrendered before the Court and
had been sent to custody. Dhani Ram was arrested by S.I. V.P. Saxena at
Meerut on 19.04.1979. Eventually after concluding the investigation,
charge sheet was laid against the accused persons before the concerned
Magistrate.
3. After the matter was committed to the Court of Session, charges were
framed under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC against the accused
persons on 10.01.1980. The accused persons abjured their guilt and
intended to face trial. The prosecution in order to bring home the charges
examined 11 witnesses and marked certain documents as exhibits. Defence
chose not to adduce any evidence.
4. The trial court evaluating the ocular and the documentary evidence
brought on record found the accused person guilty of the offence under
Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced them to suffer rigorous
imprisonment for life.
5. The conviction and sentence was challenged before the High Court by
all the four accused persons. One of the accused, namely, Dhani Ram
expired during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court and the
appeal qua Dhani Ram stood abated. As far as the other three accused
persons, namely, Dharam Pal, Mahendra and Vijendra, were concerned, the
High Court concurred with the view expressed by the trial court and
resultantly dismissed their appeal. Be it stated here that Dharam Pal has
also expired, as has been stated by the learned counsel for the appellant.
Be that as it may, there is no appeal at his instance. The present two
appeals have been preferred by the two appellants who are aggrieved by the
affirmation of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence by the High
Court.
6. We have heard Mr. Mukesh K. Giri, learned counsel for the appellants
and Mr. R.K. Dash, learned senior counsel for the State of U.P.
7. Assailing the conviction, learned counsel for the appellants submits
that in the present case, there is no circumstance to infer common
intention and as there has been no meeting of minds, the conviction cannot
be supported in aid of Section 34 IPC. It is further submitted by him that
the conviction is based on the testimonies of PWs-1 to 3, though Charan
Singh, the author of the FIR, who is not an eye witness; that apart, the
evidence of PW-2, Gajpal, does not inspire confidence being replete with
major contradictions, improvements and embellishments. It is urged that
PW-3, Tedda, is a chance witness inasmuch as PW-1 has himself accepted in
his testimony that Tedda’s going to the tube-well was not regular.
According to Mr. Giri, the testimony of all the principal
prosecution witnesses, namely, PWs-1 to 3 are not worthy of credence and
they do not inspire confidence and hence, the conviction cannot be founded
on their depositions which are definitely not beyond reproach. In this
regard he would further urge that they are all related to each other and,
therefore, their testimony has to be scrutinized with immense
circumspection and when such a scrutiny is made, they do not reach the
pedestal of unimpeachability and hence, on that score alone, their
testimonies have to be discarded. Learned counsel would contend that Nepal
Singh, who is stated to have accompanied PW-2 and PW-3 has not been
examined and Ram Lal and Kasa who have been stated to have arrived at the
tube-well, as per the testimony of PW-2, have also not been examined and
they are independent witnesses and their non-examination creates an
incurable dent in the version of the prosecution. As per the medical
evidence there is only one gunshot injury attributed to pistol supposedly
in the hands of Dhani Ram and Dharam Pal (both since dead) and none of the
injuries on the person of the deceased could be attributed to lathi and
ballam which were carried by the present appellants and, therefore, they
cannot be made liable for the offence. Referring to the testimony of PW-6,
Dr. M.C. Varshney, it is put forth that the said witness has stated that
there was no blackening and scorching at the gunshot wound and that belies
the prosecution version that the deceased died of gunshot injury. Lastly,
it is canvassed that Vijendra Singh was a juvenile on the date of incident
and he has remained in custody more than the period that is required of a
juvenile to remain at juvenile home. To buttress his submissions, learned
counsel for the appellants has drawn inspiration from Pratap Singh v. State
of Jharkhand & Ors.[1], Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan and Anr.[2], Suresh
Sakharam Nangare v. State of Maharashtra[3], Jai Bhagwan and Ors. v. State
of Haryana[4] and Bijendra Bhagat v. State of Uttarakahand[5].
8. Supporting the judgment of conviction of the trial court that has
received the stamp of approval by the High Court, Mr. Dash, learned senior
counsel submitted that the accused Mahendra Singh has rightly been
convicted and sentenced with the aid of Section 34 IPC and in that regard
he has placed reliance upon Mohan Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab[6] and
Harshadsingh Pahelvansingh Thakore v. State of Gujarat[7]. Mr. Dash
further submitted that non-examination of certain witnesses in the backdrop
of the present case does not affect the prosecution version inasmuch as the
witnesses cited by the prosecution clearly established the charge against
the accused persons. As regards the appeal preferred by appellant,
Vijendra is concerned, learned senior counsel fairly conceded to the claim
of juvenility and submitted that this Court may levy fine upon the
appellant to be paid as compensation to the family of the deceased in terms
of law laid down in Jitendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh.[8]
9. At the outset, it is necessary to mention that the principal
witnesses are PW-1 to PW-3 and the trial court as well as the appellate
court has given credence to their evidence. PW-1, Charan Singh, the author
of the FIR, has testified that he got the FIR of the incident prepared on
the spot itself and then lodged it at Police Station Kharkhauda in the same
night by handing over it to the Head Constable Devi Ram, PW-4, who
thereafter made entry in the general diary. He has deposed that the
accused Dharam Pal, Mahendra and Vijendra are real brothers and they
belonged to his own village; that about nine years ago prior to the date of
occurrence, Gaje Singh, real brother of the accused, Dharam Pal, was
murdered for which he and Hukam Singh, real brother of the deceased Badan
Pal, and others were put on trial and eventually they were acquitted. He
has stated in his evidence that since then the accused persons brewed
enmity against them. It has also come out in his evidence that the
deceased was a student of High School and used to stay in the kotha where
the tube-well situate for availing the facility of electric light for his
studies. PW-2, Gajpal, cousin of the deceased Badan Pal, has clearly
stated that he along with his cousin Nepal Singh left the village at about
7 p.m. carrying the meals for Badan Pal, who was staying inside the kotha
of the aforesaid tube-well. He has further deposed that Tedha, PW-3,
accompanied them and after they reached the place, they heard a sound of
gun firing from inside the kotha of the tube-well. He has deposed that he
has seen all the four accused persons coming out of the northern side of
the said kotha of the tube-well and he had also seen the accused Dhani Ram
and Dharam Pal were armed with pistols and the accused Mahendra and
Vijendra carried lathi and ballam respectively. He had identified the
accused persons because of the electric bulb burning in the kotha and
further he had a torch light with him. Though there has been roving cross-
examination with regard to him seeing the accused persons coming out of the
kotha, nothing has been really elicited to make his testimony impeachable.
PW-3, Tedha, has also identified the accused person and supported the
testimony of PW-2. That apart, the said witness has lent support to the
case of the prosecution and corroborated in each necessary particulars that
has been stated by the PW-2. It was contended before the learned trial
judge that PW-2 and PW-3 are extremely interested witnesses and further PW-
3 was a chance witness. The learned trial judge did not find any substance
in the said contention inasmuch as there had been identification of the
accused persons, vivid description of the weapons they carried and the
recovery. Be it noted that though the pistol was not recovered, two
cartridges were recovered from the spot of the occurrence. The learned
trial judge arrived at the opinion that the prosecution had been able to
prove the presence of the witnesses PWs 2 and 3 at the place of occurrence
and their version with regard to the accused persons committing the murder
of the deceased. In appeal it was urged before the High Court that there
was no motive on the part of the accused to commit the murder of the
deceased; that the trial court has not been circumspect in the scrutiny of
the evidence of PWs 2 and 3 who were highly interested witnesses; that
there was no justification on the part of PW-2 to carry a torch with him
and, in any case, their testimony that they had seen the accused persons
was absolutely unacceptable; that the deceased had received only one fire
arm injury and the appellants were armed with lathi and ballam and had not
assaulted the deceased and, therefore, decision by the learned trial judge
to convict them in aid of Section 34 IPC was totally sustainable.
10. On a keen scrutiny of the decision of the High Court, it is evident
that it repelled the submissions of the appellants on the ground that lack
of motive was too feeble a plea in the circumstance of the case to throw
the prosecution case overboard; that it has come in evidence that the
accused persons had harboured vengeance against them after their acquittal
in the case where they were tried for the offence under Section 302 IPC;
that there was no reason why the witnesses who were close relations of the
deceased would falsely embroil the accused persons leaving the real
culprits; that there is no reason to discard the testimonies of PWs 2 and 3
singularly on the ground that they are related witnesses, for they have
stood embedded in their version and there is no inconsistency to discredit
them; that there is nothing unusual on the part of PW-2 to carry a torch
with him; that the identification of the accused persons by PWs 2 and 3
with the help of electric light and torch has been appositely appreciated
by the learned trial judge and there was no reason to dislodge the said
finding; that the plea that PW-3 was a chance witness and his presence at
the place of occurrence was doubtful did not really commend acceptation,
for his testimony was worthy of credence; that nothing tangible could be
elicited from the evidence of the witnesses in cross-examination by which
the version could be doubted and hence, there is no infirmity or perversity
in the finding recorded by the trial court; and that the trial court has
not erred in convicting the accused persons in aid of Section 34 IPC. In
this regard, the High Court further held that the said provision is only a
rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. It further
opined that the evidence of ocular witnesses had been found to be
satisfactory, reliable, consistent and credible by the trial court and
nothing tangible could be elicited from their evidence in the cross-
examination to create any speck of doubt in their version or to treat their
testimony as infirm or perverse.
11. Learned counsel for the appellants referring to the authority in
Suresh Sakharam Nangare (supra) would submit that the High Court has
admitted in the impugned judgment that the direct proof of common intention
is seldom available and in the present case there is no circumstance that
such intention can be inferred without there being evidence of preconcert.
Learned counsel for the appellants further criticized the judgment of the
High Court submitting that as per deposition of Dr. Varshney, PW-6, who
conducted post mortem of the deceased body, there was no blackening, no
scorching present at the gunshot wound, the genesis of the entire
prosecution case that the murder took place in kotha of tube-well i.e the
gun was shot from close range deserves to be discarded.
12. Learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the conviction
of the appellant Mahendra is not sustainable since none of the injuries on
the person of the deceased is attributable to lathi which was supposedly in
the hand of Mahendra. Reliance is placed by the learned counsel on the
authority in Bijendra Bhagat (supra) wherein this Court acquitted the
accused giving him the benefit of doubt stating that none of the injuries
on the person of the deceased could be attributed to lathi which was
supposedly in the hands of the appellant.
13. As is evincible, the accused-appellants have been convicted with the
aid of Section 34 IPC. It has come in evidence of PW-2 that the accused
Mahendra was armed with lathi and accused Vijendra Singh was armed with a
ballam and they were in the company of other accused. When the evidence
in its entirety is studiedly scrutinized, it clearly shows that the accused
persons were present in the shed, they were seen going away and the
deceased was found lying in a pool of blood. The witnesses specifically
stated about the weapons being carried by the accused persons. The
submission is that the prosecution story rests on the gun shot injury but
there is no evidence with regard to injury caused by the lathi or ballam.
It is relevant to state here that cartridges from the spot have been
recovered and PW-6 Doctor who conducted the post mortem had found gunshot
wound of entry eight in number in an area of 6 cm x 5 cm on the right side
of neck just above the clavicle and lower part of neck. The dimensions of
the wound ranged from 1 cm x 0.15 cm to 0.5 cm x 0.5 cm x
bone deep. There was no blackening or scorching around the wound. True it
is that the doctor has stated that there is no blackening or scorching
around the wound, but that will not belie that the injury was not inflicted
by the firing from the gun. He has opined that the death of the deceased
was caused by gunshot injury.
14. The heart of the matter is whether Section 34 IPC would be attracted
to such a case or not. In this regard, we may refer to certain authorities
as to how this Court has viewed the concept of “common intention” and
thereafter reflect upon how it is applicable to the case at hand.
15. Mr. Giri has drawn our attention to paragraph 10 of the authority in
Jai Bhagwan (supra). It reads as follows:-
“10. To apply Section 34 IPC apart from the fact that there should be two
or more accused, two factors must be established: (i) common intention and
(ii) participation of the accused in the commission of an offence. If a
common intention is proved but no overt act is attributed to the individual
accused, Section 34 will be attracted as essentially it involves vicarious
liability but if participation of the accused in the crime is proved and a
common intention is absent, Section 34 cannot be invoked. In every case, it
is not possible to have direct evidence of a common intention. It has to be
inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case.”
16. He has also relied on the decision in Suresh Sakharam Nangare
(supra). In the said case, the Court after referring to Section 34 IPC
opined that a reading of the above provision makes it clear that to apply
Section 34, apart from the fact that there should be two or more accused,
two factors must be established: (i) common intention, and (ii)
participation of the accused in the commission of an offence. It further
makes clear that if common intention is proved but no overt act is
attributed to the individual accused, Section 34 will be attracted as
essentially it involves vicarious liability but if participation of the
accused in the crime is proved and common intention is absent, Section 34
cannot be invoked.
17. In the said case, the Court after analyzing the evidence opined that
there is no material from the side of the prosecution to show that the
appellant therein had any common intention to eliminate the deceased
because the only thing against the appellant therein was that he used to
associate himself with the accused for smoking ganja. On this factual
score, the Court came to hold that the appellant could not be convicted in
aid of Section 34 IPC.
18. In this regard, we may usefully refer to a passage from the authority
in Pandurang and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad[9]. The three-Judge Bench in
the said case adverted to the applicability and scope of Section 34 IPC and
in that context ruled that:-
“32. … It requires a pre-arranged plan because before a man can be
vicariously convicted for the criminal act of another, the act must have
been done in furtherance of the common intention of them all: Mahbub Shah
v. King Emperor[10]. Accordingly there must have been a prior meeting of
minds. Several persons can simultaneously attack a man and each can have
the same intention, namely the intention to kill, and each can individually
inflict a separate fatal blow and yet none would have the common intention
required by the section because there was no prior meeting of minds to form
a pre-arranged plan. In a case like that, each would be individually liable
for whatever injury he caused but none could be vicariously convicted for
the act of any of the others; and if the prosecution cannot prove that his
separate blow was a fatal one he cannot be convicted of the murder however
clearly an intention to kill could be proved in his case: Barendra Kumar
Ghosh v. King Emperor[11] and Mahbub Shah v. King Emperor (supra). As Their
Lordships say in the latter case, “the partition which divides their bounds
is often very thin: nevertheless, the distinction is real and substantial,
and if overlooked will result in miscarriage of justice”.
33. The plan need not be elaborate, nor is a long interval of time
required. It could arise and be formed suddenly, as for example when one
man calls on bystanders to help him kill a given individual and they,
either by their words or their acts, indicate their assent to him and join
him in the assault. There is then the necessary meeting of the minds. There
is a pre-arranged plan however hastily formed and rudely conceived. But pre-
arrangement there must be and premeditated concert. It is not enough, as in
the latter Privy Council case, to have the same intention independently of
each other, e.g., the intention to rescue another and, if necessary, to
kill those who oppose.”
19. And, again:-
“34. … But to say this is no more than to reproduce the ordinary rule about
circumstantial evidence, for there is no special rule of evidence for this
class of case. At bottom, it is a question of fact in every case and
however similar the circumstances, facts in one case cannot be used as a
precedent to determine the conclusion on the facts in another. All that is
necessary is either to have direct proof of prior concert, or proof of
circumstances which necessarily lead to that inference, or, as we prefer to
put it in the time-honoured way, “the incriminating facts must be
incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation
on any other reasonable hypothesis”. (Sarkar’s Evidence, 8th Edn., p. 30).”
20. In this context, we may refer with profit to the statement of law as
expounded by the Constitution Bench in Mohan Singh (supra). In the said
case, the Constitution Bench has held that Section 34 that deals with cases
of constructive criminal liability provides that if a criminal act is done
by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of
such person is liable for the act in the same manner as if it were done by
him alone. It has been further observed that the essential constituent of
the vicarious criminal liability prescribed by Section 34 is the existence
of common intention. The common intention in question animates the accused
persons and if the said common intention leads to commission of the
criminal offence charged, each of the person sharing the common intention
is constructively liable for the criminal act done by one of them. The
larger Bench dealing with the concept of constructive criminal liability
under Sections 149 and 34 IPC, expressed that just as the combination of
persons sharing the same common object is one of the features of an
unlawful assembly, so the existence of a combination of persons sharing the
same common intention is one of the features of Section 34. In some ways
the two sections are similar and in some cases they may overlap. The
common intention which is the basis of Section 34 is different from the
common object which is the basis of the composition of an unlawful
assembly. Common intention denotes action-in-concert and necessarily
postulates the existence of a prearranged plan and that must mean a prior
meeting of minds. It would be noticed that cases to which Section 34 can be
applied disclose an element of participation in action on the part of all
the accused persons. The acts may be different; may vary in their
character, but they are all actuated by the same common intention.
Thereafter, the Court held:-
“It is now well-settled that the common intention required by Section 34 is
different from the same intention or similar intention. As has been
observed by the Privy Council in Mahbub Shah v. King-Emperor (supra) common
intention within the meaning of Section 34 implies a pre-arranged plan, and
to convict the accused of an offence applying the section it should be
proved that the criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the pre-
arranged plan and that the inference of common intention should never be
reached unless it is a necessary inference deducible from the circumstances
of the case.”
21. In Harshadsingh Pahelvansingh Thakore (supra), a three-Judge Bench,
while dealing with constructive liability under Section 34 IPC has ruled
thus:-
“Section 34 IPC fixing constructive liability conclusively silences such a
refined plea of extrication. (See Amir Hussain v. State of U.P.[12]; Maina
Singh v. State of Rajasthan.[13]) Lord Sumner’s classic legal shorthand for
constructive criminal liability, expressed in the Miltonic verse “They also
serve who only stand and wait” a fortiori embraces cases of common intent
instantly formed, triggering a plurality of persons into an adventure in
criminality, some hitting, some missing, some splitting hostile heads, some
spilling drops of blood. Guilt goes with community of intent coupled with
participatory presence or operation. No finer juristic niceties can be
pressed into service to nullify or jettison the plain punitive purpose of
the Penal Code.”
22. In Lallan Rai and Ors. v. State of Bihar[14] the Court relying upon
the principle laid down in Barendra Kumar Ghosh (supra) has ruled that the
essence of Section 34 is simultaneous consensus of the mind of persons
participating in the criminal action to bring about a particular result.
23. In Goudappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka[15] the Court has
reiterated the principle by opining that Section 34 IPC lays down a
principle of joint liability in doing a criminal act and the essence of
that liability is to be found in the existence of common intention. The
Court posed the question how to gather the common intention and answering
the same held that the common intention is gathered from the manner in
which the crime has been committed, the conduct of the accused soon before
and after the occurrence, the determination and concern with which the
crime was committed, the weapon carried by the accused and from the nature
of the injury caused by one or some of them and for arriving at a
conclusion whether the accused had the common intention to commit an
offence of which they could be convicted, the totality of circumstances
must be taken into consideration.
24. The aforesaid authorities make it absolutely clear that each case has
to rest on its own facts. Whether the crime is committed in furtherance of
common intention or not, will depend upon the material brought on record
and the appreciation thereof in proper perspective. Facts of two cases
cannot be regarded as similar. Common intention can be gathered from the
circumstances that are brought on record by the prosecution. Common
intention can be conceived immediately or at the time of offence. Thus,
the applicability of Section 34 IPC is a question of fact and is to be
ascertained from the evidence brought on record. The common intention to
bring about a particular result may well develop on the spot as between a
number of persons, with reference to the fact of the case and circumstances
of the situation. Whether in a proved situation all the individuals
concerned therein have developed only simultaneous and independent
intentions or whether a simultaneous consensus of their minds to bring
about a particular result can be said to have been developed and thereby
intended by all of them, is a question that has to be determined on the
facts. (See : Kirpal and Bhopal v. State of U.P.[16]). In Bharwad Mepa
Dana and Anr. v. The State of Bombay[17], it has been held that Section 34
IPC is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish
the acts of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the
common intention of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of
them. The principle which the Section embodies is participation in some
action with the common intention of committing a crime; once such
participation is established, Section 34 is at once attracted.
25. In the case at hand, it is contended that there is no injury caused
by lathi or ballam. Absence of any injury caused by a lathi cannot be the
governing factor to rule out Section 34 IPC. It is manifest from the
evidence that the accused-appellants had accompanied the other accused
persons who were armed with gun and they themselves carried lathi and
ballam respectively. The carrying of weapons, arrival at a particular
place and at the same time, entering into the shed and murder of the
deceased definitely attract the constructive liability as engrafted under
Section 34 IPC.
26. It is next contended by Mr. Giri, learned counsel for the appellants
that all the eyewitnesses are related to the deceased Badan Pal and they
being interested witnesses, their version requires scrutiny with care,
caution and circumspection and when their evidence is scanned with the said
parameters, it does not withstand the said test for which the case set
forth by the prosecution gets corroded and the principle of beyond
reasonable doubt gets shattered. The aforesaid submission, as we perceive,
has no legs to stand upon, for PWs-1 to 3 have deposed in detail about the
previous enmity between the parties, their presence at the spot, the
weapons the accused persons carried, their proximity to the shed and
establishment of the identity of all the four accused. They have also
testified as regards the deceased lying in a pool of blood. There is no
reason why they would implicate the appellants for the murder of their
relation leaving behind the real culprit. That apart, nothing has been
elicited in the cross-examination for which their testimony can be
discredited. In this regard reference to a passage from Hari Obula Reddy
and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh[18] would be fruitful. In the said
case, a three-Judge Bench has ruled that it cannot be laid down as an
invariable rule that interested evidence can never form the basis of
conviction unless corroborated to a material extent in material particulars
by independent evidence. All that is necessary is that the evidence of the
interested witnesses should be subjected to careful scrutiny and accepted
with caution. If on such scrutiny, the interested testimony is found to be
intrinsically reliable or inherently probable, it may, by itself, be
sufficient, in the circumstances of the particular case, to base a
conviction thereon. It is worthy to note that there is a distinction
between a witness who is related and an interested witness. A relative is
a natural witness. The Court in Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar[19] has
opined that a close relative who is a natural witness cannot be regarded as
an interested witness, for the term “interested” postulates that the
witness must have some interest in having the accused, somehow or the
other, convicted for some animus or for some other reason.
27. Mr. Giri, learned senior counsel for the appellant has also impressed
upon us to discard the testimony of PW-3, Tedda, on the ground that he is a
chance witness. According to him, his presence at the spot is doubtful and
his evidence is not beyond suspicion. Commenting on the argument of chance
witness, a two-Judge Bench in Rana Pratap and Ors. v. State of Haryana[20]
was compelled to observe:-
“We do not understand the expression “chance witnesses”. Murders are not
committed with previous notice to witnesses, soliciting their presence. If
murder is committed in a dwelling house, the inmates of the house are
natural witnesses. If murder is committed in a brothel, prostitutes and
paramours are natural witnesses. If murder is committed on a street, only
passersby will be witnesses. Their evidence cannot be brushed aside or
viewed with suspicion on the ground that they are mere “chance witnesses”.
The expression “chance witnesses” is borrowed from countries where every
man’s home is considered his castle and every one must have an explanation
for his presence elsewhere or in another man’s castle. It is a most
unsuitable expression in a country whose people are less formal and more
casual. To discard the evidence of street hawkers and street vendors on the
ground that they are “chance witnesses”, even where murder is committed in
a street, is to abandon good sense and take too shallow a view of the
evidence.”
28. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid observations, there is no
material on record to come to the conclusion that PW-3 could not have
accompanied PW-2 while he was going to the shed near the tube-well. What
has been elicited in the cross-examination is that he was not going daily
to the tube-well. We cannot be oblivious of the rural milieu. No adverse
inference can be drawn that he was not going daily and his testimony that
he had accompanied PW-2 on the fateful day should be brushed aside. We are
convinced that his evidence is neither doubtful nor create any suspicion in
the mind.
29. Thus, the real test is whether the testimony of PWs1 to 3 are
intrinsically reliable or not. We have already scrutinized the same and we
have no hesitation in holding that they satisfy the test of careful
scrutiny and cautious approach. They can be relied upon.
30. The next plank of argument of Mr. Giri is that since Nepal Singh who
had been stated to have accompanied PW-2 and PW-3 has not been examined
and similarly, Ram Kala and Bansa who had been stated to have arrived at
the tube-well as per the testimony of PW-2, have not been examined, the
prosecution’s version has to be discarded, for it has deliberately not
cited the independent material witnesses. It is noticeable from the
decision of the trial court and the High Court, reliance has been placed on
the testimony of PWs 1 to 3 and their version has been accepted. They have
treated PW-2 and PW-3 as natural witnesses who have testified that the
accused persons were leaving the place after commission of the offence and
they had seen them quite closely. The contention that they were interested
witnesses and their implication is due to inimical disposition towards
accused persons has not been accepted and we have concurred with the said
finding. It has come out in evidence that witnesses and the accused persons
belong to the same village. The submission of Mr. Giri is that non-
examination Nepal Singh, Ramlal and Kalsa is quite critical for the case
of the prosecution and as put forth by him, their non-examination crucially
affects the prosecution version and creates a sense of doubt. According to
Mr. Giri, Nepal Singh is a material witness. In this regard we may refer
to the authority in State of H.P. v. Gian Chand[21] wherein it has been
held that non-examination of a material witness is again not a mathematical
formula for discarding the weight of the testimony available on record
howsoever natural, trustworthy and convincing it may be. The charge of
withholding a material witness from the court levelled against the
prosecution should be examined in the background of the facts and
circumstances of each case so as to find whether the witnesses are
available for being examined in the court and were yet withheld by the
prosecution. The Court after so holding further ruled that it is the duty
of the court to first assess the trustworthiness of the evidence available
on record and if the court finds the evidence adduced worthy of being
relied on and deserves acceptance, then non-examination of any other
witnesses available who could also have been examined but were not
examined, does not affect the case of the prosecution.
31. In Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing and Ors.[22], it
has been held that if a material witness, who would unfold the genesis of
the incident or an essential part of the prosecution case, not convincingly
brought to fore otherwise, or where there is a gap or infirmity in the
prosecution case which could have been supplied or made good by examining a
witness who though available is not examined, the prosecution case can be
termed as suffering from a deficiency and withholding of such a material
witness would oblige the court to draw an adverse inference against the
prosecution by holding that if the witness would have been examined it
would not have supported the prosecution case. On the other hand, if
already overwhelming evidence is available and examination of other
witnesses would only be a repetition or duplication of the evidence already
adduced, non-examination of such other witnesses may
not be material. If the witnesses already examined are reliable and the
testimony coming from their mouth is unimpeachable, the court can safely
act upon it, uninfluenced by the factum of non-examination of other
witnesses. In Dahari and Ors. v. State of U.P[23], while discussing
about the non-examination of material witness, the Court expressed the view
that when he was not the only competent witness who would have been fully
capable of explaining the factual situation correctly and the prosecution
case stood fully corroborated by the medical evidence and the testimony of
other reliable witnesses, no adverse inference could be drawn against the
prosecution. Similar view has been expressed in Manjit Singh and Anr. v.
State of Punjab and Anr.[24] and Joginder Singh v. State of Haryana[25].
32. Tested on the aforesaid parameters, we are unable to accept the
submission of Mr. Giri that non-examination of Nepal Singh and other two
persons who had been referred to by PW-2 affects the prosecution version or
creates any doubt in the mind of the Court. We arrive at such a conclusion
since the witnesses examined by the prosecution are trustworthy and the
court can safely act on their testimony. There is no justification in the
instant case to draw any adverse inference against the prosecution.
33. Mr. Giri, learned counsel for the appellants laying stress on the
absence of injury caused by lathi on the person of the deceased has urged
that the appellant- Mahendra Singh cannot be convicted in aid of Section 34
IPC. In that regard, he has commended us to the authority in Bijendra
Bhagat (supra). Learned counsel has drawn inspiration from paragraph four
of the said decision. The relevant part of the said paragraph is as
follows:-
“… According to the witnesses these two accused were also armed with
country-made pistols. The injuries suffered by the deceased are incised
wounds and one firearm injury. However, none of the injuries on the person
of the deceased could be attributed to the lathi which was supposedly in
the hands of the appellant. Undoubtedly, three injuries on the person of
Sanjay Kumar could be caused by a hard and blunt object. But having gone
through the testimony of the witnesses and the other materials on record,
the presence of the appellant and his involvement in the incident clearly
appears to be doubtful. We, therefore, deem it appropriate to give the
appellant benefit of doubt. …”
34. Relying on the same, it is contended by Mr. Giri that when there is
no lathi blow on the person of the deceased as noticeable from the post
mortem report, the appellant- Mahendra Singh deserves to be acquitted. The
passage that has been commended to us has to be correctly appreciated. In
that case, the Court has referred to injury caused on the person of the
deceased and noticed how the injury was caused but the reason for
acquittal is that the presence of the appellant therein and his involvement
in the incident appeared to the Court to be doubtful. If a person is not
present at the spot, the question of common intention does not arise. As
has been held in Pandurang (supra), if the common intention is established,
an accused can be convicted. We have already discussed the role attributed
to the appellant- Mahendra Singh by the prosecution. He had gone with
other accused persons, who were carrying pistols and ballam. He himself was
carrying a lathi. Similarly, accused-appellant Vijendra Singh was carrying
a ballam and accompanying others. Their intention was to go to the shed
where the deceased was studying because of availability of the electric
light, has been established. Common intention can be gathered from the
facts and circumstances and in the instant case, the same is clearly
discernable and hence, the decision in Bijendra Bhagat (supra) is of no
assistance to the appellant.
35. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we do not find any merit in
Criminal Appeal No. 1452 of 2010 preferred by Mahendra Singh and the same
is, accordingly, dismissed.
36. As far as appellant-Vijendra Singh is concerned, a report was called
for and he has been found to be a juvenile being 16 years 3 months 10 days
old on the date of offence. The said report has gone unchallenged and Mr.
Dash, learned senior counsel appearing for the State, has fairly stated
that he was a juvenile on the date of offence. Mr. Giri has commended us to
the authority in Hari Ram (supra). We find that the Court relying on
Section 7-A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2000 and the amendments introduced in Section 20 of the 2000 Act whereby
the proviso and Explanation were added to Section 20 and the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, remitted the matter
to the Juvenile Justice Board with the observation that if he had been
detained for more than the maximum period for which a juvenile may be
confined to a special home, the Board shall release him from custody
forthwith. In the case at hand, as the appellant-Vijendra Singh remained
in custody for more than the maximum period for which he could have been
confined to a special home, while sustaining the conviction, we release him
from custody forthwith.
37. Consequently, Criminal Appeal No. 1452 of 2010 is dismissed and
Criminal Appeal No. 1448 of 2010 is disposed of treating the appellant-
Vijendra Singh as a juvenile and directions issued in that regard as stated
hereinbefore.
…………………….J.
[Dipak Misra]
…….…………………….J.
[Rohinton Fali Nariman]
New Delhi
January 04, 2017
-----------------------
[1] Criminal Appeal No. 210 of 2005 decided on 2.2.2005
[2] (2009) 13 SCC 211
[3] (2012) 9 SCC 249
[4] (1999) 3 SCC 102
[5] (2015) 13 SCC 99
[6] AIR 1963 SC 174
[7] (1976) 4 SCC 640
[8] (2013) 11 SCC 193
[9] AIR 1955 SC 216
[10] AIR 1945 PC 118
[11] AIR 1925 PC 1
[12] (1975) 4 SCC 247
[13] (1976) 2 SCC 827
[14] (2003) 1 SCC 268
[15] (2013) 3 SCC 675
[16] AIR 1954 SC 706
[17] AIR 1960 SC 289
[18] (1981) 3 SCC 675
[19] (1996) 1 SCC 614
[20] (1983) 3 SCC 327
[21] (2001) 6 SCC 71
[22] (2001) 6 SCC 145
[23] (2012) 10 SCC 256
[24] (2013) 12 SCC 746
[25] (2014) 11 SCC 335
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1448 OF 2010
Vijendra Singh …Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Uttar Pradesh …Respondent(s)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1452 OF 2010
Mahendra Singh …Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Uttar Pradesh …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.
Present appeals, by special leave, call in question the defensibility
of the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence dated 13.05.2009
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No.
1019 of 1981 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court has confirmed the
judgment and order passed by the learned IV Additional Sessions Judge,
Meerut in Sessions Trial No. 308 of 1979 whereunder the appellants along
with two others stood convicted under Section 302 read with
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and visited with the sentence of
life imprisonment.
2. Filtering the unnecessary details, the facts which are necessary to
be adumbrated for the adjudication of the instant appeals are that there
was enmity between the accused, Dharam Pal and his family on the one side
and Charan Singh, PW-1, on the other. Charan Singh, PW-1, Gajpal, PW-2,
Tedha, PW-3 and Nepal Singh belong to village Dastoi, to which the
deceased, Badan Pal, the nephew of Charan Singh as well as the accused
persons belong. As the prosecution story further unfurls, sometime prior to
the occurrence, Gaje Singh, brother of the accused, Dharam Pal, was
murdered and Charan Singh, PW-1, along with others had faced trial for his
murder and eventually got acquitted. The occurrence leading to the murder
of Badan Pal took place in the evening hours of 26.03.1979. Badan Pal was
a student and he used to stay overnight at his tube-well which had a shed
in the jungle of village Sarva. On the date of occurrence, he was at the
aforesaid tube-well. Gajpal, PW-2, and Nepal Singh in the fateful evening
while carrying the meals for Badan Pal, on their way, met Tedha, PW-3, who
wanted to irrigate his fields from the aforesaid tube-well. All of them
reached near the said tube-well about 7.30 p.m. when they heard the sound
of a gun fire from inside the “kotha” (shed) of the said tube-well. They
reached the place without loss of any time and noticed that all the four
accused, namely, Dhani Ram, Dharam Pal, Mahendra and Vijendra, came out of
that “kotha”. Dhani Ram and Dharam Pal carried pistols, Vijendra was armed
with a ballam and Mahendra carried a lathi. On seeing them, they took to
their heels. After they reached the place, they found Badan Pal lying dead
with bleeding wounds. The aforesaid witnesses identified the accused
persons in the light of the electric bulb fixed on the roof of the tube-
well as well as in the torch light. A report of the occurrence was
prepared by Devendra Singh with the assistance of Charan Singh, PW-1, and
was filed at Police Station Kharkhauda. After the criminal law was set in
motion, the investigation was conducted by S.I. Rajveer Singh, PW-8, who
after recording the statements of some of the witnesses under Section 161
CrPC between 6 a.m. to 8 a.m. on the next day, prepared the panchanama and
the sketch map of the spot and collected blood stained and unstained earth
as well as two cartridges. These were sealed on the spot and the dead
body was sent for postmortem. On 29.03.1979, the investigation was
transferred to S.I. V.P. Saxena and he came to learn on 11.04.1979 that all
the accused persons except Dhani Ram had surrendered before the Court and
had been sent to custody. Dhani Ram was arrested by S.I. V.P. Saxena at
Meerut on 19.04.1979. Eventually after concluding the investigation,
charge sheet was laid against the accused persons before the concerned
Magistrate.
3. After the matter was committed to the Court of Session, charges were
framed under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC against the accused
persons on 10.01.1980. The accused persons abjured their guilt and
intended to face trial. The prosecution in order to bring home the charges
examined 11 witnesses and marked certain documents as exhibits. Defence
chose not to adduce any evidence.
4. The trial court evaluating the ocular and the documentary evidence
brought on record found the accused person guilty of the offence under
Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced them to suffer rigorous
imprisonment for life.
5. The conviction and sentence was challenged before the High Court by
all the four accused persons. One of the accused, namely, Dhani Ram
expired during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court and the
appeal qua Dhani Ram stood abated. As far as the other three accused
persons, namely, Dharam Pal, Mahendra and Vijendra, were concerned, the
High Court concurred with the view expressed by the trial court and
resultantly dismissed their appeal. Be it stated here that Dharam Pal has
also expired, as has been stated by the learned counsel for the appellant.
Be that as it may, there is no appeal at his instance. The present two
appeals have been preferred by the two appellants who are aggrieved by the
affirmation of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence by the High
Court.
6. We have heard Mr. Mukesh K. Giri, learned counsel for the appellants
and Mr. R.K. Dash, learned senior counsel for the State of U.P.
7. Assailing the conviction, learned counsel for the appellants submits
that in the present case, there is no circumstance to infer common
intention and as there has been no meeting of minds, the conviction cannot
be supported in aid of Section 34 IPC. It is further submitted by him that
the conviction is based on the testimonies of PWs-1 to 3, though Charan
Singh, the author of the FIR, who is not an eye witness; that apart, the
evidence of PW-2, Gajpal, does not inspire confidence being replete with
major contradictions, improvements and embellishments. It is urged that
PW-3, Tedda, is a chance witness inasmuch as PW-1 has himself accepted in
his testimony that Tedda’s going to the tube-well was not regular.
According to Mr. Giri, the testimony of all the principal
prosecution witnesses, namely, PWs-1 to 3 are not worthy of credence and
they do not inspire confidence and hence, the conviction cannot be founded
on their depositions which are definitely not beyond reproach. In this
regard he would further urge that they are all related to each other and,
therefore, their testimony has to be scrutinized with immense
circumspection and when such a scrutiny is made, they do not reach the
pedestal of unimpeachability and hence, on that score alone, their
testimonies have to be discarded. Learned counsel would contend that Nepal
Singh, who is stated to have accompanied PW-2 and PW-3 has not been
examined and Ram Lal and Kasa who have been stated to have arrived at the
tube-well, as per the testimony of PW-2, have also not been examined and
they are independent witnesses and their non-examination creates an
incurable dent in the version of the prosecution. As per the medical
evidence there is only one gunshot injury attributed to pistol supposedly
in the hands of Dhani Ram and Dharam Pal (both since dead) and none of the
injuries on the person of the deceased could be attributed to lathi and
ballam which were carried by the present appellants and, therefore, they
cannot be made liable for the offence. Referring to the testimony of PW-6,
Dr. M.C. Varshney, it is put forth that the said witness has stated that
there was no blackening and scorching at the gunshot wound and that belies
the prosecution version that the deceased died of gunshot injury. Lastly,
it is canvassed that Vijendra Singh was a juvenile on the date of incident
and he has remained in custody more than the period that is required of a
juvenile to remain at juvenile home. To buttress his submissions, learned
counsel for the appellants has drawn inspiration from Pratap Singh v. State
of Jharkhand & Ors.[1], Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan and Anr.[2], Suresh
Sakharam Nangare v. State of Maharashtra[3], Jai Bhagwan and Ors. v. State
of Haryana[4] and Bijendra Bhagat v. State of Uttarakahand[5].
8. Supporting the judgment of conviction of the trial court that has
received the stamp of approval by the High Court, Mr. Dash, learned senior
counsel submitted that the accused Mahendra Singh has rightly been
convicted and sentenced with the aid of Section 34 IPC and in that regard
he has placed reliance upon Mohan Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab[6] and
Harshadsingh Pahelvansingh Thakore v. State of Gujarat[7]. Mr. Dash
further submitted that non-examination of certain witnesses in the backdrop
of the present case does not affect the prosecution version inasmuch as the
witnesses cited by the prosecution clearly established the charge against
the accused persons. As regards the appeal preferred by appellant,
Vijendra is concerned, learned senior counsel fairly conceded to the claim
of juvenility and submitted that this Court may levy fine upon the
appellant to be paid as compensation to the family of the deceased in terms
of law laid down in Jitendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh.[8]
9. At the outset, it is necessary to mention that the principal
witnesses are PW-1 to PW-3 and the trial court as well as the appellate
court has given credence to their evidence. PW-1, Charan Singh, the author
of the FIR, has testified that he got the FIR of the incident prepared on
the spot itself and then lodged it at Police Station Kharkhauda in the same
night by handing over it to the Head Constable Devi Ram, PW-4, who
thereafter made entry in the general diary. He has deposed that the
accused Dharam Pal, Mahendra and Vijendra are real brothers and they
belonged to his own village; that about nine years ago prior to the date of
occurrence, Gaje Singh, real brother of the accused, Dharam Pal, was
murdered for which he and Hukam Singh, real brother of the deceased Badan
Pal, and others were put on trial and eventually they were acquitted. He
has stated in his evidence that since then the accused persons brewed
enmity against them. It has also come out in his evidence that the
deceased was a student of High School and used to stay in the kotha where
the tube-well situate for availing the facility of electric light for his
studies. PW-2, Gajpal, cousin of the deceased Badan Pal, has clearly
stated that he along with his cousin Nepal Singh left the village at about
7 p.m. carrying the meals for Badan Pal, who was staying inside the kotha
of the aforesaid tube-well. He has further deposed that Tedha, PW-3,
accompanied them and after they reached the place, they heard a sound of
gun firing from inside the kotha of the tube-well. He has deposed that he
has seen all the four accused persons coming out of the northern side of
the said kotha of the tube-well and he had also seen the accused Dhani Ram
and Dharam Pal were armed with pistols and the accused Mahendra and
Vijendra carried lathi and ballam respectively. He had identified the
accused persons because of the electric bulb burning in the kotha and
further he had a torch light with him. Though there has been roving cross-
examination with regard to him seeing the accused persons coming out of the
kotha, nothing has been really elicited to make his testimony impeachable.
PW-3, Tedha, has also identified the accused person and supported the
testimony of PW-2. That apart, the said witness has lent support to the
case of the prosecution and corroborated in each necessary particulars that
has been stated by the PW-2. It was contended before the learned trial
judge that PW-2 and PW-3 are extremely interested witnesses and further PW-
3 was a chance witness. The learned trial judge did not find any substance
in the said contention inasmuch as there had been identification of the
accused persons, vivid description of the weapons they carried and the
recovery. Be it noted that though the pistol was not recovered, two
cartridges were recovered from the spot of the occurrence. The learned
trial judge arrived at the opinion that the prosecution had been able to
prove the presence of the witnesses PWs 2 and 3 at the place of occurrence
and their version with regard to the accused persons committing the murder
of the deceased. In appeal it was urged before the High Court that there
was no motive on the part of the accused to commit the murder of the
deceased; that the trial court has not been circumspect in the scrutiny of
the evidence of PWs 2 and 3 who were highly interested witnesses; that
there was no justification on the part of PW-2 to carry a torch with him
and, in any case, their testimony that they had seen the accused persons
was absolutely unacceptable; that the deceased had received only one fire
arm injury and the appellants were armed with lathi and ballam and had not
assaulted the deceased and, therefore, decision by the learned trial judge
to convict them in aid of Section 34 IPC was totally sustainable.
10. On a keen scrutiny of the decision of the High Court, it is evident
that it repelled the submissions of the appellants on the ground that lack
of motive was too feeble a plea in the circumstance of the case to throw
the prosecution case overboard; that it has come in evidence that the
accused persons had harboured vengeance against them after their acquittal
in the case where they were tried for the offence under Section 302 IPC;
that there was no reason why the witnesses who were close relations of the
deceased would falsely embroil the accused persons leaving the real
culprits; that there is no reason to discard the testimonies of PWs 2 and 3
singularly on the ground that they are related witnesses, for they have
stood embedded in their version and there is no inconsistency to discredit
them; that there is nothing unusual on the part of PW-2 to carry a torch
with him; that the identification of the accused persons by PWs 2 and 3
with the help of electric light and torch has been appositely appreciated
by the learned trial judge and there was no reason to dislodge the said
finding; that the plea that PW-3 was a chance witness and his presence at
the place of occurrence was doubtful did not really commend acceptation,
for his testimony was worthy of credence; that nothing tangible could be
elicited from the evidence of the witnesses in cross-examination by which
the version could be doubted and hence, there is no infirmity or perversity
in the finding recorded by the trial court; and that the trial court has
not erred in convicting the accused persons in aid of Section 34 IPC. In
this regard, the High Court further held that the said provision is only a
rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. It further
opined that the evidence of ocular witnesses had been found to be
satisfactory, reliable, consistent and credible by the trial court and
nothing tangible could be elicited from their evidence in the cross-
examination to create any speck of doubt in their version or to treat their
testimony as infirm or perverse.
11. Learned counsel for the appellants referring to the authority in
Suresh Sakharam Nangare (supra) would submit that the High Court has
admitted in the impugned judgment that the direct proof of common intention
is seldom available and in the present case there is no circumstance that
such intention can be inferred without there being evidence of preconcert.
Learned counsel for the appellants further criticized the judgment of the
High Court submitting that as per deposition of Dr. Varshney, PW-6, who
conducted post mortem of the deceased body, there was no blackening, no
scorching present at the gunshot wound, the genesis of the entire
prosecution case that the murder took place in kotha of tube-well i.e the
gun was shot from close range deserves to be discarded.
12. Learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the conviction
of the appellant Mahendra is not sustainable since none of the injuries on
the person of the deceased is attributable to lathi which was supposedly in
the hand of Mahendra. Reliance is placed by the learned counsel on the
authority in Bijendra Bhagat (supra) wherein this Court acquitted the
accused giving him the benefit of doubt stating that none of the injuries
on the person of the deceased could be attributed to lathi which was
supposedly in the hands of the appellant.
13. As is evincible, the accused-appellants have been convicted with the
aid of Section 34 IPC. It has come in evidence of PW-2 that the accused
Mahendra was armed with lathi and accused Vijendra Singh was armed with a
ballam and they were in the company of other accused. When the evidence
in its entirety is studiedly scrutinized, it clearly shows that the accused
persons were present in the shed, they were seen going away and the
deceased was found lying in a pool of blood. The witnesses specifically
stated about the weapons being carried by the accused persons. The
submission is that the prosecution story rests on the gun shot injury but
there is no evidence with regard to injury caused by the lathi or ballam.
It is relevant to state here that cartridges from the spot have been
recovered and PW-6 Doctor who conducted the post mortem had found gunshot
wound of entry eight in number in an area of 6 cm x 5 cm on the right side
of neck just above the clavicle and lower part of neck. The dimensions of
the wound ranged from 1 cm x 0.15 cm to 0.5 cm x 0.5 cm x
bone deep. There was no blackening or scorching around the wound. True it
is that the doctor has stated that there is no blackening or scorching
around the wound, but that will not belie that the injury was not inflicted
by the firing from the gun. He has opined that the death of the deceased
was caused by gunshot injury.
14. The heart of the matter is whether Section 34 IPC would be attracted
to such a case or not. In this regard, we may refer to certain authorities
as to how this Court has viewed the concept of “common intention” and
thereafter reflect upon how it is applicable to the case at hand.
15. Mr. Giri has drawn our attention to paragraph 10 of the authority in
Jai Bhagwan (supra). It reads as follows:-
“10. To apply Section 34 IPC apart from the fact that there should be two
or more accused, two factors must be established: (i) common intention and
(ii) participation of the accused in the commission of an offence. If a
common intention is proved but no overt act is attributed to the individual
accused, Section 34 will be attracted as essentially it involves vicarious
liability but if participation of the accused in the crime is proved and a
common intention is absent, Section 34 cannot be invoked. In every case, it
is not possible to have direct evidence of a common intention. It has to be
inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case.”
16. He has also relied on the decision in Suresh Sakharam Nangare
(supra). In the said case, the Court after referring to Section 34 IPC
opined that a reading of the above provision makes it clear that to apply
Section 34, apart from the fact that there should be two or more accused,
two factors must be established: (i) common intention, and (ii)
participation of the accused in the commission of an offence. It further
makes clear that if common intention is proved but no overt act is
attributed to the individual accused, Section 34 will be attracted as
essentially it involves vicarious liability but if participation of the
accused in the crime is proved and common intention is absent, Section 34
cannot be invoked.
17. In the said case, the Court after analyzing the evidence opined that
there is no material from the side of the prosecution to show that the
appellant therein had any common intention to eliminate the deceased
because the only thing against the appellant therein was that he used to
associate himself with the accused for smoking ganja. On this factual
score, the Court came to hold that the appellant could not be convicted in
aid of Section 34 IPC.
18. In this regard, we may usefully refer to a passage from the authority
in Pandurang and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad[9]. The three-Judge Bench in
the said case adverted to the applicability and scope of Section 34 IPC and
in that context ruled that:-
“32. … It requires a pre-arranged plan because before a man can be
vicariously convicted for the criminal act of another, the act must have
been done in furtherance of the common intention of them all: Mahbub Shah
v. King Emperor[10]. Accordingly there must have been a prior meeting of
minds. Several persons can simultaneously attack a man and each can have
the same intention, namely the intention to kill, and each can individually
inflict a separate fatal blow and yet none would have the common intention
required by the section because there was no prior meeting of minds to form
a pre-arranged plan. In a case like that, each would be individually liable
for whatever injury he caused but none could be vicariously convicted for
the act of any of the others; and if the prosecution cannot prove that his
separate blow was a fatal one he cannot be convicted of the murder however
clearly an intention to kill could be proved in his case: Barendra Kumar
Ghosh v. King Emperor[11] and Mahbub Shah v. King Emperor (supra). As Their
Lordships say in the latter case, “the partition which divides their bounds
is often very thin: nevertheless, the distinction is real and substantial,
and if overlooked will result in miscarriage of justice”.
33. The plan need not be elaborate, nor is a long interval of time
required. It could arise and be formed suddenly, as for example when one
man calls on bystanders to help him kill a given individual and they,
either by their words or their acts, indicate their assent to him and join
him in the assault. There is then the necessary meeting of the minds. There
is a pre-arranged plan however hastily formed and rudely conceived. But pre-
arrangement there must be and premeditated concert. It is not enough, as in
the latter Privy Council case, to have the same intention independently of
each other, e.g., the intention to rescue another and, if necessary, to
kill those who oppose.”
19. And, again:-
“34. … But to say this is no more than to reproduce the ordinary rule about
circumstantial evidence, for there is no special rule of evidence for this
class of case. At bottom, it is a question of fact in every case and
however similar the circumstances, facts in one case cannot be used as a
precedent to determine the conclusion on the facts in another. All that is
necessary is either to have direct proof of prior concert, or proof of
circumstances which necessarily lead to that inference, or, as we prefer to
put it in the time-honoured way, “the incriminating facts must be
incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation
on any other reasonable hypothesis”. (Sarkar’s Evidence, 8th Edn., p. 30).”
20. In this context, we may refer with profit to the statement of law as
expounded by the Constitution Bench in Mohan Singh (supra). In the said
case, the Constitution Bench has held that Section 34 that deals with cases
of constructive criminal liability provides that if a criminal act is done
by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of
such person is liable for the act in the same manner as if it were done by
him alone. It has been further observed that the essential constituent of
the vicarious criminal liability prescribed by Section 34 is the existence
of common intention. The common intention in question animates the accused
persons and if the said common intention leads to commission of the
criminal offence charged, each of the person sharing the common intention
is constructively liable for the criminal act done by one of them. The
larger Bench dealing with the concept of constructive criminal liability
under Sections 149 and 34 IPC, expressed that just as the combination of
persons sharing the same common object is one of the features of an
unlawful assembly, so the existence of a combination of persons sharing the
same common intention is one of the features of Section 34. In some ways
the two sections are similar and in some cases they may overlap. The
common intention which is the basis of Section 34 is different from the
common object which is the basis of the composition of an unlawful
assembly. Common intention denotes action-in-concert and necessarily
postulates the existence of a prearranged plan and that must mean a prior
meeting of minds. It would be noticed that cases to which Section 34 can be
applied disclose an element of participation in action on the part of all
the accused persons. The acts may be different; may vary in their
character, but they are all actuated by the same common intention.
Thereafter, the Court held:-
“It is now well-settled that the common intention required by Section 34 is
different from the same intention or similar intention. As has been
observed by the Privy Council in Mahbub Shah v. King-Emperor (supra) common
intention within the meaning of Section 34 implies a pre-arranged plan, and
to convict the accused of an offence applying the section it should be
proved that the criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the pre-
arranged plan and that the inference of common intention should never be
reached unless it is a necessary inference deducible from the circumstances
of the case.”
21. In Harshadsingh Pahelvansingh Thakore (supra), a three-Judge Bench,
while dealing with constructive liability under Section 34 IPC has ruled
thus:-
“Section 34 IPC fixing constructive liability conclusively silences such a
refined plea of extrication. (See Amir Hussain v. State of U.P.[12]; Maina
Singh v. State of Rajasthan.[13]) Lord Sumner’s classic legal shorthand for
constructive criminal liability, expressed in the Miltonic verse “They also
serve who only stand and wait” a fortiori embraces cases of common intent
instantly formed, triggering a plurality of persons into an adventure in
criminality, some hitting, some missing, some splitting hostile heads, some
spilling drops of blood. Guilt goes with community of intent coupled with
participatory presence or operation. No finer juristic niceties can be
pressed into service to nullify or jettison the plain punitive purpose of
the Penal Code.”
22. In Lallan Rai and Ors. v. State of Bihar[14] the Court relying upon
the principle laid down in Barendra Kumar Ghosh (supra) has ruled that the
essence of Section 34 is simultaneous consensus of the mind of persons
participating in the criminal action to bring about a particular result.
23. In Goudappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka[15] the Court has
reiterated the principle by opining that Section 34 IPC lays down a
principle of joint liability in doing a criminal act and the essence of
that liability is to be found in the existence of common intention. The
Court posed the question how to gather the common intention and answering
the same held that the common intention is gathered from the manner in
which the crime has been committed, the conduct of the accused soon before
and after the occurrence, the determination and concern with which the
crime was committed, the weapon carried by the accused and from the nature
of the injury caused by one or some of them and for arriving at a
conclusion whether the accused had the common intention to commit an
offence of which they could be convicted, the totality of circumstances
must be taken into consideration.
24. The aforesaid authorities make it absolutely clear that each case has
to rest on its own facts. Whether the crime is committed in furtherance of
common intention or not, will depend upon the material brought on record
and the appreciation thereof in proper perspective. Facts of two cases
cannot be regarded as similar. Common intention can be gathered from the
circumstances that are brought on record by the prosecution. Common
intention can be conceived immediately or at the time of offence. Thus,
the applicability of Section 34 IPC is a question of fact and is to be
ascertained from the evidence brought on record. The common intention to
bring about a particular result may well develop on the spot as between a
number of persons, with reference to the fact of the case and circumstances
of the situation. Whether in a proved situation all the individuals
concerned therein have developed only simultaneous and independent
intentions or whether a simultaneous consensus of their minds to bring
about a particular result can be said to have been developed and thereby
intended by all of them, is a question that has to be determined on the
facts. (See : Kirpal and Bhopal v. State of U.P.[16]). In Bharwad Mepa
Dana and Anr. v. The State of Bombay[17], it has been held that Section 34
IPC is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish
the acts of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the
common intention of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of
them. The principle which the Section embodies is participation in some
action with the common intention of committing a crime; once such
participation is established, Section 34 is at once attracted.
25. In the case at hand, it is contended that there is no injury caused
by lathi or ballam. Absence of any injury caused by a lathi cannot be the
governing factor to rule out Section 34 IPC. It is manifest from the
evidence that the accused-appellants had accompanied the other accused
persons who were armed with gun and they themselves carried lathi and
ballam respectively. The carrying of weapons, arrival at a particular
place and at the same time, entering into the shed and murder of the
deceased definitely attract the constructive liability as engrafted under
Section 34 IPC.
26. It is next contended by Mr. Giri, learned counsel for the appellants
that all the eyewitnesses are related to the deceased Badan Pal and they
being interested witnesses, their version requires scrutiny with care,
caution and circumspection and when their evidence is scanned with the said
parameters, it does not withstand the said test for which the case set
forth by the prosecution gets corroded and the principle of beyond
reasonable doubt gets shattered. The aforesaid submission, as we perceive,
has no legs to stand upon, for PWs-1 to 3 have deposed in detail about the
previous enmity between the parties, their presence at the spot, the
weapons the accused persons carried, their proximity to the shed and
establishment of the identity of all the four accused. They have also
testified as regards the deceased lying in a pool of blood. There is no
reason why they would implicate the appellants for the murder of their
relation leaving behind the real culprit. That apart, nothing has been
elicited in the cross-examination for which their testimony can be
discredited. In this regard reference to a passage from Hari Obula Reddy
and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh[18] would be fruitful. In the said
case, a three-Judge Bench has ruled that it cannot be laid down as an
invariable rule that interested evidence can never form the basis of
conviction unless corroborated to a material extent in material particulars
by independent evidence. All that is necessary is that the evidence of the
interested witnesses should be subjected to careful scrutiny and accepted
with caution. If on such scrutiny, the interested testimony is found to be
intrinsically reliable or inherently probable, it may, by itself, be
sufficient, in the circumstances of the particular case, to base a
conviction thereon. It is worthy to note that there is a distinction
between a witness who is related and an interested witness. A relative is
a natural witness. The Court in Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar[19] has
opined that a close relative who is a natural witness cannot be regarded as
an interested witness, for the term “interested” postulates that the
witness must have some interest in having the accused, somehow or the
other, convicted for some animus or for some other reason.
27. Mr. Giri, learned senior counsel for the appellant has also impressed
upon us to discard the testimony of PW-3, Tedda, on the ground that he is a
chance witness. According to him, his presence at the spot is doubtful and
his evidence is not beyond suspicion. Commenting on the argument of chance
witness, a two-Judge Bench in Rana Pratap and Ors. v. State of Haryana[20]
was compelled to observe:-
“We do not understand the expression “chance witnesses”. Murders are not
committed with previous notice to witnesses, soliciting their presence. If
murder is committed in a dwelling house, the inmates of the house are
natural witnesses. If murder is committed in a brothel, prostitutes and
paramours are natural witnesses. If murder is committed on a street, only
passersby will be witnesses. Their evidence cannot be brushed aside or
viewed with suspicion on the ground that they are mere “chance witnesses”.
The expression “chance witnesses” is borrowed from countries where every
man’s home is considered his castle and every one must have an explanation
for his presence elsewhere or in another man’s castle. It is a most
unsuitable expression in a country whose people are less formal and more
casual. To discard the evidence of street hawkers and street vendors on the
ground that they are “chance witnesses”, even where murder is committed in
a street, is to abandon good sense and take too shallow a view of the
evidence.”
28. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid observations, there is no
material on record to come to the conclusion that PW-3 could not have
accompanied PW-2 while he was going to the shed near the tube-well. What
has been elicited in the cross-examination is that he was not going daily
to the tube-well. We cannot be oblivious of the rural milieu. No adverse
inference can be drawn that he was not going daily and his testimony that
he had accompanied PW-2 on the fateful day should be brushed aside. We are
convinced that his evidence is neither doubtful nor create any suspicion in
the mind.
29. Thus, the real test is whether the testimony of PWs1 to 3 are
intrinsically reliable or not. We have already scrutinized the same and we
have no hesitation in holding that they satisfy the test of careful
scrutiny and cautious approach. They can be relied upon.
30. The next plank of argument of Mr. Giri is that since Nepal Singh who
had been stated to have accompanied PW-2 and PW-3 has not been examined
and similarly, Ram Kala and Bansa who had been stated to have arrived at
the tube-well as per the testimony of PW-2, have not been examined, the
prosecution’s version has to be discarded, for it has deliberately not
cited the independent material witnesses. It is noticeable from the
decision of the trial court and the High Court, reliance has been placed on
the testimony of PWs 1 to 3 and their version has been accepted. They have
treated PW-2 and PW-3 as natural witnesses who have testified that the
accused persons were leaving the place after commission of the offence and
they had seen them quite closely. The contention that they were interested
witnesses and their implication is due to inimical disposition towards
accused persons has not been accepted and we have concurred with the said
finding. It has come out in evidence that witnesses and the accused persons
belong to the same village. The submission of Mr. Giri is that non-
examination Nepal Singh, Ramlal and Kalsa is quite critical for the case
of the prosecution and as put forth by him, their non-examination crucially
affects the prosecution version and creates a sense of doubt. According to
Mr. Giri, Nepal Singh is a material witness. In this regard we may refer
to the authority in State of H.P. v. Gian Chand[21] wherein it has been
held that non-examination of a material witness is again not a mathematical
formula for discarding the weight of the testimony available on record
howsoever natural, trustworthy and convincing it may be. The charge of
withholding a material witness from the court levelled against the
prosecution should be examined in the background of the facts and
circumstances of each case so as to find whether the witnesses are
available for being examined in the court and were yet withheld by the
prosecution. The Court after so holding further ruled that it is the duty
of the court to first assess the trustworthiness of the evidence available
on record and if the court finds the evidence adduced worthy of being
relied on and deserves acceptance, then non-examination of any other
witnesses available who could also have been examined but were not
examined, does not affect the case of the prosecution.
31. In Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing and Ors.[22], it
has been held that if a material witness, who would unfold the genesis of
the incident or an essential part of the prosecution case, not convincingly
brought to fore otherwise, or where there is a gap or infirmity in the
prosecution case which could have been supplied or made good by examining a
witness who though available is not examined, the prosecution case can be
termed as suffering from a deficiency and withholding of such a material
witness would oblige the court to draw an adverse inference against the
prosecution by holding that if the witness would have been examined it
would not have supported the prosecution case. On the other hand, if
already overwhelming evidence is available and examination of other
witnesses would only be a repetition or duplication of the evidence already
adduced, non-examination of such other witnesses may
not be material. If the witnesses already examined are reliable and the
testimony coming from their mouth is unimpeachable, the court can safely
act upon it, uninfluenced by the factum of non-examination of other
witnesses. In Dahari and Ors. v. State of U.P[23], while discussing
about the non-examination of material witness, the Court expressed the view
that when he was not the only competent witness who would have been fully
capable of explaining the factual situation correctly and the prosecution
case stood fully corroborated by the medical evidence and the testimony of
other reliable witnesses, no adverse inference could be drawn against the
prosecution. Similar view has been expressed in Manjit Singh and Anr. v.
State of Punjab and Anr.[24] and Joginder Singh v. State of Haryana[25].
32. Tested on the aforesaid parameters, we are unable to accept the
submission of Mr. Giri that non-examination of Nepal Singh and other two
persons who had been referred to by PW-2 affects the prosecution version or
creates any doubt in the mind of the Court. We arrive at such a conclusion
since the witnesses examined by the prosecution are trustworthy and the
court can safely act on their testimony. There is no justification in the
instant case to draw any adverse inference against the prosecution.
33. Mr. Giri, learned counsel for the appellants laying stress on the
absence of injury caused by lathi on the person of the deceased has urged
that the appellant- Mahendra Singh cannot be convicted in aid of Section 34
IPC. In that regard, he has commended us to the authority in Bijendra
Bhagat (supra). Learned counsel has drawn inspiration from paragraph four
of the said decision. The relevant part of the said paragraph is as
follows:-
“… According to the witnesses these two accused were also armed with
country-made pistols. The injuries suffered by the deceased are incised
wounds and one firearm injury. However, none of the injuries on the person
of the deceased could be attributed to the lathi which was supposedly in
the hands of the appellant. Undoubtedly, three injuries on the person of
Sanjay Kumar could be caused by a hard and blunt object. But having gone
through the testimony of the witnesses and the other materials on record,
the presence of the appellant and his involvement in the incident clearly
appears to be doubtful. We, therefore, deem it appropriate to give the
appellant benefit of doubt. …”
34. Relying on the same, it is contended by Mr. Giri that when there is
no lathi blow on the person of the deceased as noticeable from the post
mortem report, the appellant- Mahendra Singh deserves to be acquitted. The
passage that has been commended to us has to be correctly appreciated. In
that case, the Court has referred to injury caused on the person of the
deceased and noticed how the injury was caused but the reason for
acquittal is that the presence of the appellant therein and his involvement
in the incident appeared to the Court to be doubtful. If a person is not
present at the spot, the question of common intention does not arise. As
has been held in Pandurang (supra), if the common intention is established,
an accused can be convicted. We have already discussed the role attributed
to the appellant- Mahendra Singh by the prosecution. He had gone with
other accused persons, who were carrying pistols and ballam. He himself was
carrying a lathi. Similarly, accused-appellant Vijendra Singh was carrying
a ballam and accompanying others. Their intention was to go to the shed
where the deceased was studying because of availability of the electric
light, has been established. Common intention can be gathered from the
facts and circumstances and in the instant case, the same is clearly
discernable and hence, the decision in Bijendra Bhagat (supra) is of no
assistance to the appellant.
35. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we do not find any merit in
Criminal Appeal No. 1452 of 2010 preferred by Mahendra Singh and the same
is, accordingly, dismissed.
36. As far as appellant-Vijendra Singh is concerned, a report was called
for and he has been found to be a juvenile being 16 years 3 months 10 days
old on the date of offence. The said report has gone unchallenged and Mr.
Dash, learned senior counsel appearing for the State, has fairly stated
that he was a juvenile on the date of offence. Mr. Giri has commended us to
the authority in Hari Ram (supra). We find that the Court relying on
Section 7-A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2000 and the amendments introduced in Section 20 of the 2000 Act whereby
the proviso and Explanation were added to Section 20 and the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, remitted the matter
to the Juvenile Justice Board with the observation that if he had been
detained for more than the maximum period for which a juvenile may be
confined to a special home, the Board shall release him from custody
forthwith. In the case at hand, as the appellant-Vijendra Singh remained
in custody for more than the maximum period for which he could have been
confined to a special home, while sustaining the conviction, we release him
from custody forthwith.
37. Consequently, Criminal Appeal No. 1452 of 2010 is dismissed and
Criminal Appeal No. 1448 of 2010 is disposed of treating the appellant-
Vijendra Singh as a juvenile and directions issued in that regard as stated
hereinbefore.
…………………….J.
[Dipak Misra]
…….…………………….J.
[Rohinton Fali Nariman]
New Delhi
January 04, 2017
-----------------------
[1] Criminal Appeal No. 210 of 2005 decided on 2.2.2005
[2] (2009) 13 SCC 211
[3] (2012) 9 SCC 249
[4] (1999) 3 SCC 102
[5] (2015) 13 SCC 99
[6] AIR 1963 SC 174
[7] (1976) 4 SCC 640
[8] (2013) 11 SCC 193
[9] AIR 1955 SC 216
[10] AIR 1945 PC 118
[11] AIR 1925 PC 1
[12] (1975) 4 SCC 247
[13] (1976) 2 SCC 827
[14] (2003) 1 SCC 268
[15] (2013) 3 SCC 675
[16] AIR 1954 SC 706
[17] AIR 1960 SC 289
[18] (1981) 3 SCC 675
[19] (1996) 1 SCC 614
[20] (1983) 3 SCC 327
[21] (2001) 6 SCC 71
[22] (2001) 6 SCC 145
[23] (2012) 10 SCC 256
[24] (2013) 12 SCC 746
[25] (2014) 11 SCC 335
