Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Section 12 — Agricultural seed failure — Inspection report showing 50% pod development and semi-development in remaining pods — Excess rainfall — No complete deficiency in service — Compensation modified. Seed quality — Mixed species 8–10% — Semi-development of pods — Impact on market price — Vis major (excess rainfall) considered — Liability apportioned. National Commission — Restoration of District Forum’s order — Supreme Court partly allowing appeals — Setting aside finding of deficiency of service — Equitable adjustment of compensation.

 Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Section 12 — Agricultural seed failure — Inspection report showing 50% pod development and semi-development in remaining pods — Excess rainfall — No complete deficiency in service — Compensation modified.

Seed quality — Mixed species 8–10% — Semi-development of pods — Impact on market price — Vis major (excess rainfall) considered — Liability apportioned.

National Commission — Restoration of District Forum’s order — Supreme Court partly allowing appeals — Setting aside finding of deficiency of service — Equitable adjustment of compensation.

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FACTUAL MATRIX

• Respondent-farmers purchased groundnut seeds (TAG 37A) on 15.06.2013.

• Alleged crop failure after 100–120 days.

• Complaint lodged before Deputy Director (Agriculture).

• Inspection Committee constituted.

• District Forum allowed complaints and awarded compensation.

• State Commission set aside District Forum’s order.

• National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission restored District Forum’s order.

• Appeals filed before the Supreme Court.

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KEY FINDINGS FROM INSPECTION REPORT (09.10.2013)

The Committee found:

1. 8–10% plants of different species (seed mixture).

2. 50% pods fully developed, remaining 50% semi-developed.

3. Crop ripening timeline: 100–110 days.

4. Excess rainfall during July–August.

5. Possibility of:

   • 20–25% general shortfall due to rains,

   • 40–50% shortfall in TAG37A variety.

6. Infection by Tika disease.

7. Good germination overall.

8. Adequate irrigation and soil fertility.

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CORE ISSUE

Whether there was deficiency in service attributable to the seed producer/distributor, justifying full compensation as awarded by the District Forum and restored by the NCDRC.

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SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS

I. Semi-Development ≠ Complete Failure

The Court emphasized:

• 50% pods were completely developed.

• Remaining 50% semi-developed.

• Therefore, not total crop failure.

This contradicted the District Forum’s assumption of complete deficiency.

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II. Role of Excess Rainfall (Vis Major)

The inspection report acknowledged:

• Heavy rainfall during relevant period.

• Significant arboreal growth.

• Yield shortfall attributable partly to climatic conditions.

Thus, liability could not be wholly fastened on appellants.

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III. Deficiency of Service — Not Absolute

The Court inferred:

• Some irregularity (semi-development, species mixture).

• But also natural causes.

• Therefore, finding of complete deficiency of service was unsustainable.

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FINAL DIRECTIONS

1. 50% of compensation deposited pursuant to interim order (02.08.2021) to be released to farmers with accrued interest.

2. Remaining 50% refunded to appellants with accrued interest.

3. Findings regarding deficiency of service set aside.

4. Appeals allowed in part.

5. Parties to bear own costs.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Where an expert inspection report establishes partial yield (50% full development) and attributes shortfall partly to natural causes such as excess rainfall, a finding of complete deficiency in service under the Consumer Protection Act is unsustainable. Compensation may be equitably apportioned.

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SIGNIFICANCE

This judgment underscores:

• Courts must carefully analyze scientific inspection reports.

• Agricultural disputes require consideration of climatic factors.

• Vis major cannot be ignored in seed quality cases.

• Compensation must be proportionate to proven deficiency.

• Consumer fora cannot assume total failure when evidence shows partial productivity.

Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — Last seen theory — Delay in lodging FIR — Accused in custody at relevant time — Chain of circumstances not complete — Benefit of doubt granted. Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 — Discovery statement — Custody requirement — Statement not made while in police custody — Inadmissible under Section 27 — However admissible as conduct under Section 8. Evidence Act — Section 8 — Conduct — Knowledge of place of recovery — Weak corroborative circumstance — Cannot by itself sustain conviction. DNA Evidence — Partial match with biological parents — Establishes death — Does not establish guilt of accused in absence of complete chain. Section 106 Evidence Act — Failure to explain — Cannot substitute prosecution’s burden — Applies only when foundational facts established. Faulty Investigation — Serious interpolation in arrest memo — Doubt regarding timeline — Accused entitled to benefit of doubt.

 Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — Last seen theory — Delay in lodging FIR — Accused in custody at relevant time — Chain of circumstances not complete — Benefit of doubt granted.

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 — Discovery statement — Custody requirement — Statement not made while in police custody — Inadmissible under Section 27 — However admissible as conduct under Section 8.

Evidence Act — Section 8 — Conduct — Knowledge of place of recovery — Weak corroborative circumstance — Cannot by itself sustain conviction.

DNA Evidence — Partial match with biological parents — Establishes death — Does not establish guilt of accused in absence of complete chain.

Section 106 Evidence Act — Failure to explain — Cannot substitute prosecution’s burden — Applies only when foundational facts established.

Faulty Investigation — Serious interpolation in arrest memo — Doubt regarding timeline — Accused entitled to benefit of doubt.

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CORE ISSUE

Whether the three circumstances relied upon by the High Court —

1. Last seen together theory,

2. Recovery of bones at the instance of the accused, and

3. DNA match with biological parents —

formed a complete chain pointing only to the guilt of the accused stepfather.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

• Deceased: 6-year-old girl.

• Accused: Stepfather.

• Date of quarrel: 05.10.2018.

• Alleged disappearance: Around 05–06.10.2018.

• Missing FIR registered: 11.10.2018.

• Alleged recovery at accused’s instance: 13.10.2018.

• Conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence.

The Court described the investigation as “botched” and riddled with inconsistencies.

---

ANALYSIS OF CIRCUMSTANCES

I. Last Seen Together Theory — Failed

Key infirmities:

• Accused arrested on 06.10.2018 (possibly 05.10.2018 — interpolation noticed).

• Missing complaint registered only on 11.10.2018.

• FIR stated child missing at 9:00 PM on 06.10.2018 — after arrest.

• No immediate complaint by mother or grandparents.

• Police accompanied family on day of quarrel but made no inquiry.

• Neighbour (PW8) volunteered “last seen” information only after 7 days.

Court held:

The last seen theory “fails miserably.”

The arrest timeline alone destroyed the prosecution narrative.

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II. Section 27 Recovery — Legally Defective

Legal Requirement

Under Section 27 Evidence Act:

• Statement must be made while accused is in police custody.

• Only portion distinctly connected with discovery admissible.

Here:

• Statement recorded at 10:30 AM on 13.10.2018.

• Arrest shown at 22:00 hrs same day.

• Accused not in custody at time of statement.

Thus Section 27 not attracted.

The Court relied on:

• Jaffar Hussain Dastagir v. State of Maharashtra

• Durlav Namasudra v. Emperor

However, applying:

• Dharam Deo Yadav v. State of U.P.

• Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v. State of Bombay

The Court held:

Even if not admissible under Section 27, recovery could be admissible as conduct under Section 8.

But:

Conduct evidence under Section 8 is weak and only corroborative.

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III. DNA Evidence — Limited Probative Value

• Vertebrae and teeth matched DNA of biological parents.

• Skull and other bones did not match.

• Saree wrapping not identified.

• Corpus delicti not fully recovered.

• No time of death established.

Court held:

DNA established death of child.

It did not establish:

• When death occurred,

• Who caused it,

• That accused alone committed offence.

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IV. Section 106 Evidence Act — Misapplied

High Court relied on failure of accused to explain recovery location.

Supreme Court clarified:

Section 106 applies only when prosecution first establishes foundational facts.

Here:

• Chain incomplete,

• Timeline doubtful,

• Arrest suspicious,

• No proof of custody during crucial period.

Hence Section 106 cannot fill evidentiary gaps.

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CRITICAL INVESTIGATIVE DEFECTS

1. Interpolation in arrest memo.

2. Contradictory arrest dates.

3. No inquiry into missing child despite earlier police involvement.

4. FIR delayed.

5. No attempt to establish time of death.

6. No conclusive corpus delicti.

7. Section 27 statement legally defective.

The Court noted:

“If the investigation had been half as good as the preparation of the State Counsel, the mystery could have been unravelled.”

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LEGAL PRINCIPLES REAFFIRMED

1. Suspicion cannot replace proof.

2. Circumstantial evidence must form complete chain.

3. Each circumstance must:

   • Be proved,

   • Be consistent only with guilt,

   • Exclude every other hypothesis.

4. Section 8 conduct evidence is corroborative, not substantive.

5. Section 27 requires custody.

6. DNA alone cannot prove guilt without linkage evidence.

7. Benefit of doubt must go to accused.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Where circumstantial evidence consists only of (i) doubtful last seen theory, (ii) recovery not satisfying Section 27 requirements, and (iii) DNA establishing death but not linking accused to homicide, the chain of circumstances remains incomplete. Conviction cannot be sustained and accused is entitled to benefit of doubt.

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FINAL ORDER

• Conviction set aside.

• Appeal allowed.

• Accused to be released forthwith (if not required in any other case).

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SIGNIFICANCE

This judgment is important for:

• Clarifying scope of Section 27 custody requirement.

• Distinguishing Section 8 conduct from Section 27 discovery.

• Limiting overreliance on DNA evidence in absence of connecting facts.

• Reinforcing strict standards in circumstantial evidence cases.

• Reiterating burden of prosecution despite Section 106.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 11 (pre-2015 regime) — Scope of power — Judicial determination of existence and validity of arbitration agreement — Finality under Section 11(7) — Binding effect at Section 34 stage — Reopening impermissible — SBP & Co. followed. Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 — Section 11(6A) — Prospective application — Limited scrutiny confined to “existence” post-amendment — Contrast drawn with pre-amendment regime. Res Judicata vs Precedent — Conceptual distinction — Section 11 order operates as res judicata inter partes, not as precedent in rem — Section 34 Court erred in treating earlier Section 11 order as non-binding. Section 34 — Award set aside on ground of non-existence of arbitration clause — Impermissible where Section 11 court had already appointed arbitrator in pre-amendment regime and order attained finality. Result — High Court and Commercial Court orders set aside — Matters remitted for adjudication on other grounds — Time-bound disposal directed.

 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 11 (pre-2015 regime) — Scope of power — Judicial determination of existence and validity of arbitration agreement — Finality under Section 11(7) — Binding effect at Section 34 stage — Reopening impermissible — SBP & Co. followed.

Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 — Section 11(6A) — Prospective application — Limited scrutiny confined to “existence” post-amendment — Contrast drawn with pre-amendment regime.

Res Judicata vs Precedent — Conceptual distinction — Section 11 order operates as res judicata inter partes, not as precedent in rem — Section 34 Court erred in treating earlier Section 11 order as non-binding.

Section 34 — Award set aside on ground of non-existence of arbitration clause — Impermissible where Section 11 court had already appointed arbitrator in pre-amendment regime and order attained finality.

Result — High Court and Commercial Court orders set aside — Matters remitted for adjudication on other grounds — Time-bound disposal directed.

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CORE ISSUE

Whether, in arbitral proceedings commenced prior to 23.10.2015 (pre-2015 Amendment regime), the Section 34 Court could reopen the question of existence and validity of an arbitration clause after an arbitrator had been appointed under Section 11 and the appointment order had attained finality.

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FACTUAL MATRIX (Common Thread in Both Appeals)

• Contracts between appellant-contractor and Rajasthan Housing Board.

• Clause 23 provided for dispute resolution by an Empowered Standing Committee.

• Section 11 applications filed in 2014.

• High Court appointed retired High Court Judges as sole arbitrators (pre-2015 Amendment).

• Awards passed in 2015–2016.

• Section 34 Courts set aside awards holding Clause 23 was not an arbitration clause.

• High Court affirmed Section 34 orders.

• Appeals before Supreme Court.

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LEGAL FRAMEWORK

I. Pre-2015 Legal Position — SBP Regime

The Court relied extensively on:

SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd.

Seven-Judge Bench held:

• Section 11 power is judicial, not administrative.

• Chief Justice/designate must decide:

  • Existence of arbitration agreement,

  • Validity,

  • Jurisdictional aspects,

  • Live claim.

• Section 11(7) gives finality.

• Such determination binds:

  • Arbitrator,

  • Section 34 Court,

  • Appellate Courts,

  • Except via appeal under Article 136.

Thus, once an arbitrator was appointed, existence/validity of arbitration clause could not be reopened.

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II. Reinforcement by Later Authority

The Court also relied on:

State of West Bengal v. Sarkar & Sarkar

Held:

• Arbitrator cannot re-examine validity of arbitration clause when Section 11 order has attained finality.

• Jurisdictional findings under Section 11 are binding.

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III. Post-2015 Contrast — Limited Inquiry

The Court clarified that had the proceedings commenced after 23.10.2015, the outcome could have differed.

Referred to:

In re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under A&C Act & Stamp Act

Post-amendment position:

• Section 11(6A) limits court to examining “existence” only.

• Inquiry is prima facie.

• Substantive validity left to arbitral tribunal under Section 16.

• No finality comparable to SBP regime.

But Section 26 of 2015 Amendment makes amendments prospective.

Since present arbitrations commenced before 23.10.2015, SBP regime governed.

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RES JUDICATA vs PRECEDENT — KEY CLARIFICATION

The Commercial Court reasoned that Section 11 order had no “precedential value”.

The Supreme Court held this was a fundamental conceptual error.

Distinction:

Precedent	Res Judicata
Operates in rem	Operates in personam
Binds future cases generally	Binds same parties
Concerned with legal principle	Concerned with finality between parties

Relied on:

State of Rajasthan v. Nemi Chand Mahela

Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty

Holding:

• Section 11 order operates as res judicata inter partes.

• Correctness of decision irrelevant unless jurisdictional nullity.

• Commercial Court wrongly treated issue as precedent question instead of finality issue.

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SUPREME COURT’S CONCLUSION

1. Section 11 order (2014) impliedly held Clause 23 to be an arbitration clause.

2. Respondents did not challenge appointment.

3. Order attained finality.

4. Under SBP regime:

   • Existence and validity stood conclusively decided.

5. Section 34 Court had no jurisdiction to reopen that issue.

6. High Court erred in affirming Section 34 Court.

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OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS

• High Court judgments dated 20.02.2020 set aside.

• Matters remitted to Commercial Court, Jaipur.

• Section 34 applications to be heard on other grounds only.

• Disposal directed within three months.

• Parties to bear own costs.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

In arbitral proceedings commenced prior to the 2015 Amendment, an order appointing an arbitrator under Section 11 necessarily entails a judicial determination of the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement. Such determination attains finality under Section 11(7) and operates as res judicata inter partes. The issue cannot be reopened at the Section 34 stage.

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SIGNIFICANCE OF THE JUDGMENT

This decision:

• Reinforces doctrinal clarity between SBP regime and post-2015 regime.

• Reasserts binding effect of pre-amendment Section 11 determinations.

• Clarifies difference between precedent and res judicata in arbitration jurisprudence.

• Protects finality of Section 11 orders in legacy arbitrations.

Part-time contractual instructors appointed under the RTE framework and continuously engaged for over a decade, performing full-time duties and prohibited from alternative employment, cannot be subjected to stagnant honorarium fixed under an initial short-term contract. Honorarium must be periodically revised by the competent authority (PAB), and once enhanced cannot be unilaterally reduced. Payment of meagre and stagnant honorarium in such circumstances amounts to economic coercion inconsistent with Article 23 of the Constitution. The State bears primary liability to ensure payment and may recover its share from the Union.

 Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 — Sections 7, 24, 27 — Rule 20(3) of 2010 Rules — Part-time contractual instructors in Upper Primary Schools — Honorarium fixed at ₹7,000 p.m. since 2013 — Whether revisable — Held, Yes — Honorarium cannot remain stagnant; periodic revision mandatory — PAB sole authority to sanction budget and fix honorarium (Paras 57–66, 70).

Samagra Shiksha Scheme / Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan — Project Approval Board (PAB) — Financial powers — Decision of PAB binding — No authority competent to reduce honorarium once fixed by PAB (Paras 61–65, 70(iv)–(v)).

Service Jurisprudence — Contractual / Part-time label — Continuous engagement for over 10 years — Prohibition on taking other employment — Deemed substantive posts — Nature of employment not truly part-time or contractual (Paras 39–46, 70(i)–(iii)).

Article 23, Constitution of India — Begar / Forced labour — Payment below minimum wages coupled with bar on alternative employment — Economic coercion — Honorarium of ₹7,000 p.m. held violative of constitutional spirit (Paras 54–56, 70(viii)).

Alternative Remedy — Section 24(3), RTE Act — Not bar to writ jurisdiction — Rule of prudence, not compulsion (Paras 27–30).

Financial Responsibility — Section 7(5), RTE Act — Primary liability on State Government — Principle of ‘Pay and Recover’ applicable where Centre fails to release share (Paras 68–69, 70(vi)).

Operative Directions — Honorarium fixed at ₹17,000 p.m. w.e.f. 2017–18 till revised by PAB — Arrears payable within six months — Periodic revision at least once in three years (Paras 67, 72).

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS

The appeals concerned part-time contractual instructors appointed in Upper Primary Schools (Classes VI–VIII) in Uttar Pradesh under the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (now subsumed into Samagra Shiksha).

Key factual matrix:

• Appointment in 2013 pursuant to Government Order dated 31.01.2013.

• Fixed honorarium: ₹7,000 per month.

• Contract period: 11 months, renewable.

• Condition: No other employment (full-time or part-time).

• Honorarium marginally revised to ₹8,470 (2016–17).

• PAB approved ₹17,000 (2017–18).

• Executive Committee reduced to ₹9,800.

• Actual payment remained ₹8,470.

• From 2019–20, honorarium reverted to ₹7,000.

The Single Judge directed ₹17,000 from March 2017. The Division Bench restricted benefit to 2017–18 only. Appeals were filed by teachers (seeking full benefit) and by the State (challenging liability).

The principal question:
Whether honorarium fixed in 2013 could remain static for years or was legally required to be revised.

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ANALYSIS OF LAW

I. Maintainability of Writ Petitions

The State argued availability of alternative remedy under Section 24(3) RTE Act.

The Court rejected this objection:

• Section 24 pertains to disciplinary grievances.

• Writ jurisdiction is discretionary.

• Alternative remedy is not an absolute bar.

• Reliance placed on Rajasthan SEB v. Union of India and Harbanslal Sahnia v. IOC.

Thus, writ petitions were maintainable.

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II. Nature of Employment — Contractual or Substantive?

The Court undertook a structural analysis:

1. Contract expired after 2017–18; no renewal in writing.

2. Continuous engagement for over 10 years.

3. Mandatory appointment: one instructor per 100 students.

4. Prohibition on taking other employment.

5. Identical qualifications as regular teachers.

6. Similar workload (up to eight periods per day).

Conclusion:

• Not truly part-time.

• Not purely contractual.

• Posts deemed substantively created due to permanence of work.

• Label “part-time contractual” described as deceptive nomenclature.

The Court observed that such appointments, made through due selection process under a statutory scheme, are substantive in character.

---

III. Authority to Fix Honorarium — Role of PAB

Under the Samagra Shiksha Scheme:

• PAB is the sole body with financial sanctioning power.

• State-level bodies lack budgetary authority.

• Once PAB approves honorarium, it is binding.

PAB had:

• Approved ₹8,470 (2016–17).

• Fixed ₹9,800 (2017–18).

• Approved ₹17,000 (2017–18).

The State had no authority to reduce or ignore PAB’s decision.

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IV. Article 23 — Begar and Economic Coercion

The Court invoked Article 23 (prohibition of begar).

Relying on People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India:

• Forced labour includes economic compulsion.

• Payment below minimum wages constitutes coercion.

• Contractual consent does not negate unequal bargaining power.

The Court held:

• ₹7,000 per month was below minimum wages.

• Teachers were barred from other employment.

• This created economic coercion.

• Fixing such honorarium permanently amounts to begar.

This is a significant constitutional holding extending Article 23 to honorarium stagnation in education employment.

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V. Revision of Honorarium

The Court held:

• Honorarium cannot remain stagnant indefinitely.

• Must be periodically revised.

• Once enhanced, cannot be reduced arbitrarily.

• Withdrawal of enhanced pay without natural justice impermissible.

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VI. Financial Responsibility — Section 7 RTE Act

Under Section 7(5):

• State Government bears primary responsibility.

• Even if Centre fails to release funds, State must pay.

• State may recover from Union under “pay and recover” principle.

Thus, teachers cannot suffer due to inter-governmental financial disputes.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Part-time contractual instructors appointed under the RTE framework and continuously engaged for over a decade, performing full-time duties and prohibited from alternative employment, cannot be subjected to stagnant honorarium fixed under an initial short-term contract. Honorarium must be periodically revised by the competent authority (PAB), and once enhanced cannot be unilaterally reduced. Payment of meagre and stagnant honorarium in such circumstances amounts to economic coercion inconsistent with Article 23 of the Constitution. The State bears primary liability to ensure payment and may recover its share from the Union.

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OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS

1. Honorarium fixed at ₹17,000 per month w.e.f. 2017–18.

2. Payable till further revision by PAB.

3. Effective payment from 01.04.2026.

4. Arrears to be cleared within six months.

5. PAB to revise honorarium periodically (at least once in three years).

6. State may recover Central share separately.

Appeals by teachers allowed.
Appeals by State dismissed.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Where a prosecutrix is a legally married woman awa...Where a prosecutrix is a legally married woman aware of the subsistence of her marriage, and the alleged promise of marriage is legally incapable of performance, consensual sexual relations between adults cannot be retrospectively characterised as rape on the ground of false promise of marriage. In absence of material showing that the promise was false from inception and intended solely to obtain consent, the offence under Section 376(2)(n) IPC is not made out. Criminal proceedings in such circumstances are liable to be quashed under the principles laid down in Bhajan Lal.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Where a prosecutrix is a legally married woman awa...: advocatemmmohan Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 375, 376(2)(n) — Rape on false promise of marriage — Married prosecutrix — Promise legall...

Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 375, 376(2)(n) — Rape on false promise of marriage — Married prosecutrix — Promise legally incapable of performance — Whether consent vitiated by misconception of fact — Held, No — Where prosecutrix was aware of subsisting marriage and legal impediment to remarriage, allegation of false promise cannot sustain offence — Consensual relationship turned acrimonious — FIR and chargesheet quashed (Paras 19–24, 27–28).

Consent — Section 90 IPC — Misconception of fact — Distinction between false promise and breach of promise — Promise must be false from inception with intent to deceive — Mere failure to marry insufficient — Reiterated (Paras 17–18, 23).

Section 376(2)(n) IPC — “Repeatedly” — Requires multiple distinct acts of sexual assault — Not attracted to long-standing consensual relationship absent coercion or deception from inception (Paras 15–16, 22).

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Section 5(i) — Subsisting marriage — Legal bar to second marriage — Promise to marry during subsistence of first marriage legally unenforceable — Relevance in determining quality of consent (Paras 19–20).

Criminal Proceedings — Quashing — Article 226 / Inherent jurisdiction — Application of Bhajan Lal principles — Where allegations even if taken at face value do not disclose offence — Continuation of proceedings amounts to abuse of process (Paras 26–28).

Broken relationship — Criminalisation — Caution — Courts must distinguish genuine sexual exploitation from consensual relationships turning sour — Misuse of rape provision deprecated (Paras 21–25).

Result — Impugned High Court order set aside — FIR No. 213/2025, Chargesheet No. 269/2025 and Sessions Case No. 89/2025 quashed (Para 28).

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS

The appeal arose from the refusal of the High Court of Chhattisgarh to quash FIR No. 213/2025 registered under Section 376(2)(n) IPC.

The complainant, a 33-year-old married advocate with a child, had matrimonial disputes with her husband; divorce proceedings were pending but no decree had been granted. She met the accused, also an advocate, in September 2022. A relationship developed.

The FIR alleged that the accused induced her into sexual relations on a false promise of marriage, repeatedly engaged in intercourse, impregnated her, forced abortion, and later refused marriage.

The accused contended that:

The relationship was consensual.

The complainant was fully aware of her marital status and the legal impediment to remarriage.

The allegations arose after personal discord.

The High Court granted anticipatory bail but refused to quash the FIR, observing that the question of “misconception of fact” required investigation.

The chargesheet was subsequently filed and Sessions Case instituted.

The Supreme Court examined whether, even taking the FIR at face value, ingredients of Section 376(2)(n) IPC were disclosed.

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ANALYSIS OF LAW

I. Scope of Section 376(2)(n) IPC

Section 376(2)(n) IPC deals with repeated commission of rape on the same woman. The Court clarified that “repeatedly” implies multiple distinct acts of sexual assault, not a continuous consensual relationship.

In genuine cases under this provision, there is usually an initial assault followed by repeated acts under coercion, fear, or deception rendering the victim vulnerable.

The Court found no such pattern here.

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II. False Promise of Marriage and Consent

The Court reiterated settled principles:

A distinction exists between a false promise and breach of promise.

A false promise must be made from inception with no intention to marry, solely to obtain consent.

Consent under Section 90 IPC is vitiated only when based on such initial fraudulent intention.

Reliance was placed on:

Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385

Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398

The Court emphasised that not every failed relationship amounts to rape.

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III. Legal Impossibility of Marriage

A crucial factor was that the complainant’s marriage subsisted throughout the alleged period of sexual relationship.

Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 prohibits marriage if either party has a living spouse.

Thus, even assuming there was a promise, such promise was legally incapable of performance at the relevant time.

The Court reasoned that:

The complainant, being an advocate, was presumed aware of the legal position.

Both parties knew of her subsisting marriage.

Therefore, it was implausible that she was induced into sexual relations under a legally enforceable expectation of marriage.

This rendered the allegation of misconception untenable.

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IV. Nature of Relationship

The Court characterised the case as:

A consensual relationship between adults.

Relationship turning sour.

Personal dispute given criminal colour.

The Court cautioned against the “disquieting tendency” of converting failed relationships into rape prosecutions.

The offence of rape, being grave, must be confined to cases involving genuine absence of free consent.

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V. Application of Bhajan Lal Principles

The Court applied categories laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.

It held that:

Even if allegations are accepted at face value, no offence under Section 376(2)(n) is made out.

Continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process.

Thus, the case fell within categories warranting quashing.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Where a prosecutrix is a legally married woman aware of the subsistence of her marriage, and the alleged promise of marriage is legally incapable of performance, consensual sexual relations between adults cannot be retrospectively characterised as rape on the ground of false promise of marriage. In absence of material showing that the promise was false from inception and intended solely to obtain consent, the offence under Section 376(2)(n) IPC is not made out. Criminal proceedings in such circumstances are liable to be quashed under the principles laid down in Bhajan Lal.

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OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS

The impugned order of the High Court dated 03.03.2025 was set aside.

FIR No. 213/2025 dated 06.02.2025 registered at Sarkanda Police Station, District Bilaspur,

Chargesheet No. 269/2025, and

Sessions Case No. 89/2025

were quashed.

The appeal was allowed.