NDPS Act — Seizure, sampling and chain of custody — Section 52-A — Representative samples drawn at spot; absence of independent witnesses; minor variation in sample weight — convictions sustained.

NDPS Act — Seizure, sampling and chain of custody — Section 52-A — Representative samples drawn at spot; absence of independent witnesses; minor variation in sample weight — convictions sustained.
Where official raiding party intercepted a vehicle and seized 23.500 kg ganja, drew two representative samples at the spot, sealed them, produced seized material and samples before the Magistrate and forwarded one sealed sample for chemical analysis with the other kept in judicial custody, the prosecution established chain of custody and identity of samples notwithstanding absence of independent lay witnesses at the seizure site and a minor reduction in sample weight. Procedural lapses or delayed compliance with Section 52-A of the NDPS Act are not ipso facto fatal; conviction may be sustained where the irregularity does not affect the integrity/identity of the material and the remaining evidence inspires confidence. Minimum sentence for commercial quantity under s.20(b)(ii)(C) is mandatory and cannot be reduced on mercy grounds by the court.

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Non-examination of independent witnesses: The non-presence or non-examination of independent witnesses at a seizure site is not automatically fatal where official witnesses give coherent, consistent and corroborative testimony and no material contradictions are elicited in cross-examination.

2. Scope of Section 52-A (sampling): Strict or ideal compliance with Section 52-A is desirable; however, mere procedural deviation or delayed compliance does not vitiate prosecution unless it causes discrepancies that undermine identity, integrity or chain of custody. Courts must assess whether irregularity casts reasonable doubt on the core evidence.

3. Minor variance in sample weight: Small reduction in sample weight between seizure and laboratory receipt, explained by drying/loss of moisture, does not, by itself, destroy the evidentiary value of the sample.

4. Sentencing in commercial quantity: Where statutory minimum punishment is prescribed for commercial quantity possession under the NDPS Act, the court lacks power to reduce below the mandatory minimum on humanitarian grounds (remission is executive).

ISSUE — HOLDING — REASONS (concise)

ISSUE
Whether convictions under Sections 8(c) r/w 20(b)(ii)(C) and 8(c) r/w 29(1) of the NDPS Act can be sustained where (i) representative samples were drawn at the spot (alleged non-compliance with Section 52-A), (ii) no independent lay witnesses attested the seizure mahazar, and (iii) there was a minor variation in sample weight between seizure and laboratory analysis.

HOLDING
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld conviction and sentence. Procedural irregularities were minor and did not impair identity, integrity or chain of custody of the seized ganja or the samples; scientific report and official witness testimony collectively proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Court cannot reduce mandatory minimum sentence for commercial quantity.

REASONS (summary)
• Official witnesses (raiding team) gave consistent, corroborative evidence; no material contradictions were brought out in cross-examination. Non-examination of independent witnesses, where none were available at site, is not fatal.
• Following precedents (including recent authority clarifying Section 52-A), mere non-compliance or delayed compliance with sampling formalities is not fatal unless it creates discrepancies affecting the integrity/identity of the substance. Here the Magistrate recorded samples, one sample was forwarded to FSL sealed and intact, the other retained judicially; the laboratory confirmed cannabinoids and certified intact seals.
• The marginal weight reduction (about 50g → 40.6g) was satisfactorily explained by drying and loss of moisture in the interregnum — a normal physical effect — and did not undermine identity.
• There was no evidence of tampering, substitution or broken seals; chain of custody remained intact.
• Sentencing: statutory minimum for commercial quantity under s.20(b)(ii)(C) is mandatory; court cannot temper it on humanitarian or social grounds — executive remission remains the proper channel.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Limitation / Revenue records — Correction of reven..Limitation / Revenue records — Correction of revenue map — Section 30, Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 2006 — Earlier proceedings and finality — Remand quashed.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Limitation / Revenue records — Correction of reven...: advocatemmmohan Limitation / Revenue records — Correction of revenue map — Section 30, Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 2006 — Earlier proce...

Limitation / Revenue records — Correction of revenue map — Section 30, Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 2006 — Earlier proceedings and finality — Remand quashed.
Where a revenue authority and first appellate authority had earlier considered and finally rejected an application for correction of a village map and the parties thereafter acquiesced for many years, a belated fresh application to alter the location of a plot (effectively to obtain a more beneficial frontage) is not a proper case for reopening settled revenue records under Section 30 of the Code. Section 30 obliges the Collector to maintain maps and correct detected errors or omissions, but it does not permit reopening of long-settled determinations merely to secure a more favourable position. Absent a genuine error or omission in the record, remand for fresh consideration was unwarranted; High Court order remanding the matter was set aside; assessment of factual questions (e.g., whether a true error existed or work occurred beyond territorial waters) is normally the domain of the revenue authority, but remand must not be used to generate avoidable litigation.

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Finality and relitigation: Where the Collector and appellate revenue authority have adjudicated an application under the predecessor statute and the order has attained finality, a later attempt—after a long lapse of time—to reopen the same factual issue will not be permitted unless there is a real and demonstrable error or omission in the map or field book within the meaning of Section 30.

2. Scope of Section 30: Section 30 requires maintenance and correction of maps and khasra records and is not a provision to be used as a vehicle for re-location of plots to secure commercial advantage; correction jurisdiction is limited to genuine errors or omissions discovered in records.

3. Remand jurisdiction: A remand by a High Court is inappropriate where it is founded on a misreading of statutory scope and risks creating multiplicity of litigation; courts should exercise restraint to prevent unnecessary reopening of long-settled records.

ISSUE — HOLDING — REASONS (concise)

ISSUE
Whether the High Court was right to set aside the revenue orders rejecting the petitioners’ application for correction of the revenue map and remand for fresh consideration under Section 30 of the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 2006.

HOLDING
No. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s remand order and restored finality to the earlier revenue decisions.

REASONS (summary)
• Factual background: The Collector (1998) and the Additional Commissioner (2001) had rejected the private respondents’ effort to alter the map/location of a plot; those orders attained finality. Seventeen years later, after the 2006 Code came into force, petitioners again sought correction under Sections 30/38; revenue authorities dismissed and affirmed the dismissal. The High Court remanded for fresh consideration.
• Statutory construction: Section 30 requires the Collector to maintain maps and correct errors/omissions; it does not authorize reopening of long-settled title/possession disputes to obtain a more favourable location unless a true error/omission is shown. The word “also” in s.30(1) indicates correction is an adjunct to record maintenance, not a gateway for relitigation.
• Finality and misuse: The Court found petitioners were seeking to reopen a settled matter (effectively to get a better frontage/value) rather than seeking correction of a recorded error. Remanding on the impugned basis would generate needless litigation and defeat finality; accordingly the Supreme Court corrected the High Court’s misinterpretation and quashed the remand.
• Principle on remands: While remands are generally not interfered with, where remand is founded on erroneous legal premise and would encourage avoidable litigation, appellate intervention is proper. The Court cited public-interest jurisprudence preferring curtailment of litigation where possible.

Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 — Works-contract assessment — Rule 31 (records to be maintained) v. Rule 17(1)(g) (presumptive levy where accounts not maintained) — Assessment set aside and remitted for fresh consideration where factual dispute as to sufficiency of records exists.

Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 — Works-contract assessment — Rule 31 (records to be maintained) v. Rule 17(1)(g) (presumptive levy where accounts not maintained) — Assessment set aside and remitted for fresh consideration where factual dispute as to sufficiency of records exists.
Where a works-contractor (foreign company) contends it maintained project accounts and produced records but declines to produce formal profit & loss books on the ground that it avails of deemed/composition provisions under Income-tax (s.44BB), the assessing authority cannot summarily invoke Rule 17(1)(g) unless Rule 31 records (separate contract-wise accounts) are demonstrably absent or deficient. Assessment orders invoking Rule 17(1)(g) without an opportunity to produce/complete records and without specifying deficiencies are liable to be set aside and remitted for fresh adjudication. Questions of territorial reach (whether work was performed beyond 12 nautical miles) and correct rate of tax are factual and to be considered afresh by the assessing authority. Garnishee proceedings predicated on the impugned assessments fall with them. Writ petitions allowed in part, assessments set aside and remanded.

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Rule 17(1)(g) can be invoked only after the assessing authority is satisfied that the records required by Rule 31 are not produced or are inadequate to determine the value of goods incorporated in a works contract; the provision is a measure of last resort, not a substitute for proper examination of records tendered.
   Where a dealer/contractor asserts that project accounts (or other records contemplated by Rule 31) were produced and points to statutory/compositional regimes under the Income-tax law, the assessing authority must afford a fair opportunity to produce, explain and complete the required records; failure to do so renders an assessment under Rule 17(1)(g) vulnerable to judicial interference.

2. An assessing authority who concludes that submitted records are insufficient must record with specificity what is missing and give the assessee an opportunity to remedy the deficiency before proceeding to invoke the presumptive assessment.
   Absent such a course, the Court should remit the matter for fresh consideration rather than judicially substitute findings on contested factual matrices.

3. Questions of mixed or pure fact — e.g., territorial incidence of the works (whether incorporation of goods occurred beyond territorial waters) and the correct rate of tax — are to be left to the assessing authority to decide on remand after full factual inquiry; they are not to be resolved in writ proceedings where material disputes of fact persist.

BRIEF ANALYSIS / APPLICATION

• Facts: foreign contractor (Helix) executed subsea works; claimed majority work beyond 12 nautical miles; registered under Service Tax and as dealer under APVAT/CST; produced certain records but not formal profit & loss books (claimed composition under s.44BB IT Act). Assessing officer treated accounts as incomplete, invoked Rule 17(1)(g), assessed huge demands, and issued garnishee recovery; appellate authority remanded once; AO again invoked Rule 17(1)(g) and passed orders — leading to writs.

• Court’s approach:

  • The Court accepted that Rule 31 contemplates contract-wise records sufficient to disclose goods incorporated and cost elements; it does not literally require a multiplicity of full sets of books where a single set with contract-wise detail will suffice.

  • The Court held that, on the record, it was not possible to determine whether all required materials had been produced; therefore the appropriate remedy is to set aside the impugned assessments and remit to the assessing authority to afford the petitioner a proper opportunity to produce/complete records and to specify any deficiencies.

  • Territorial-waters and rate-of-tax contentions are factual questions. The Court declined to decide them on writ, leaving them to the assessing authority on remand.

  • As assessments were set aside, garnishee proceedings predicated on them fell away.

• Disposition: Assessment orders dated 20-02-2010 set aside and remanded for fresh adjudication; garnishee writ closed; no cost order.

Service Law — Regularization of Contract/Temporary Staff in Special Magistrate Courts — Andhra Pradesh (Regularization of Appointments) Act, 1994 (Act 2 of 1994) — Scope — Vacancy requirement — Illegality v. Irregularity — Umadevi principle — Judicial Establishments within Act’s ambit — Result: Writ petitions dismissed.

Service Law — Regularization of Contract/Temporary Staff in Special Magistrate Courts — Andhra Pradesh (Regularization of Appointments) Act, 1994 (Act 2 of 1994) — Scope — Vacancy requirement — Illegality v. Irregularity — Umadevi principle — Judicial Establishments within Act’s ambit — Result: Writ petitions dismissed.

Petitioners employed on contract basis to staff Special Magistrate Courts sought parity/regularization akin to persons earlier regularized pursuant to Division Bench orders (W.P.Nos.32917 & 36206 of 2022). Held, the 1994 Act applies to establishments created under State law (including District Courts); Section 7 bars regularisation of temporary/daily-wage appointments where permanent posts are not involved. No permanent posts exist in Special Magistrate Courts; regularisation against non-existent permanent vacancies is impermissible and would perpetuate indirect recruitment circumventing statutory selection processes. Distinction drawn between illegal and irregular appointments (Umadevi): even treating appointments as irregular, the statutory bar and absence of vacancies preclude regularisation. Writ petitions dismissed.

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Act 2 of 1994 applies to District Courts and their establishments because District Courts are created under State legislation and fall within the definitions in the Act (Preamble and Section 2(vi)(d)); consequently, the Act’s prohibitions on regularisation of temporary/daily-wage appointments (Section 7) govern staffing of Special Magistrate Courts.

2. Regularisation requires existence of permanent posts and recruitment against vacancies; where temporary staff were appointed to Courts that have no corresponding permanent posts, regularising such staff against permanent vacancies in regular courts (to which they were not originally appointed) is impermissible as it effects indirect recruitment and undermines merit-based selection.

3. Policy constraints and Umadevi do not mandate regularisation here. Even if some appointments are irregular (not illegal), statutory prohibition and absence of appropriate vacancies, together with risk of perpetuating ad-hoc recruitment, justify refusal to regularize by writ remedy.

ANALYSIS (Concise)

Facts & context

• State sanctioned Special Magistrate Courts and filled staff posts by retired judicial-ministerial personnel or, failing that, by contract recruits. Petitioners are long-serving contract employees (some 12–13 years) seeking regularization after a division-bench precedent regularized a different cohort (Fast Track Courts employees).

• Earlier Division-Bench orders (W.P.Nos.32917 & 36206 of 2022) and subsequent Supreme Court dismissal produced regularisation for that cohort; petitioners seek parity.

Legal issues

• Whether Act 2 of 1994 applies to judicial establishments and thus bars regularization of temporary appointments.

• Whether the petitioners’ appointments are illegal or irregular and whether Umadevi principle requires or permits regularization.

• Whether regularization against permanent vacancies in regular courts is permissible.

Court’s reasoning

• The Court reads the Preamble and Section 2(vi)(d) of Act 2 of 1994 expansively to include District Courts (created under State law); therefore the Act’s prohibitions apply to the instant appointments.

• There are no permanent posts corresponding to Special Magistrate Courts; regularization into non-existent posts is not tenable.

• Regularizing temporary staff against vacancies in regular courts would amount to indirect recruitment without open selection, undermining merit-based process and risking a perpetual cycle of ad-hoc hiring and subsequent regularizations.

• The Court declines to examine in detail whether the appointments were illegal or irregular because, even assuming irregularity, statutory bar and absence of suitable posts preclude relief on writ jurisdiction.

Disposition

• Writ petitions dismissed; no order as to costs.

Practical implications

• Administrative regularisation of temporary contract staff in judicial/other State establishments must respect the statutory scheme (Act 2 of 1994) and may require legislative or executive action (creation of permanent posts and open recruitment) rather than judicial fiat by way of writs directing absorption.

• A prior favourable decision for one cohort does not create an automatic entitlement for other cohorts if materially different statutory or structural conditions exist.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Specific Performance — Agreement of Sale — Readine...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Specific Performance — Agreement of Sale — Readine...: advocatemmmohan Specific Performance — Agreement of Sale — Readiness and Willingness — Section 16(c), Specific Relief Act — Conduct of Parti...

Specific Performance — Agreement of Sale — Readiness and Willingness — Section 16(c), Specific Relief Act — Conduct of Parties — Attesting Witnesses — Appellate Review — Section 100 CPC.
Plaintiff sued for specific performance of an admitted agreement of sale (Ex.A-1 dated 17.09.1998) after payment of part consideration (Rs.20,000). Defendant admitted signature/witnesses on Ex.A-1 but claimed the document was nominal and alleged borrowing only Rs.10,000. Trial Court decreed specific performance; first appellate court affirmed. On second appeal, Held: (i) execution of Ex.A-1 was admitted and plaintiff established readiness and willingness (legal notice Ex.A-2 and initiation of suit within contractual period); (ii) defendant failed to substantiate the nominal-document defence or call family attestors; (iii) discretionary relief of specific performance was rightly exercised; (iv) concurrent findings of fact are not open to interference in second appeal under Section 100 CPC where no substantial question of law arises. Second appeal dismissed.

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. An admitted executed sale agreement, supported by part-payment and evidence of plaintiff’s readiness and willingness (including service of legal notice within the contractual period), justifies a decree for specific performance unless the defendant credibly proves some defence (e.g., nominal document, want of consent) capable of displacing the contract.

2. Where a defendant admits execution of the agreement and the attestors are members of her own family but the defendant elects not to examine them, the Court may infer the genuineness of the transaction; the defendant cannot rely on unsubstantiated pleas of nominality.

3. Concurrent findings of fact by trial and first appellate courts founded on proper appreciation of evidence do not raise a substantial question of law under Section 100 CPC and will not be disturbed in a second appeal.

ANALYSIS

Issues framed

1. Whether the plaintiff proved a case for specific performance of the agreement dated 17.09.1998 (Ex.A-1).

2. Whether Ex.A-1 was nominal (sham) and/or the plaintiff failed to prove readiness and willingness.

3. Whether appellate interference was warranted under Section 100 CPC.

Materials and evidence

• Documents: Ex.A-1 (agreement of sale), Ex.A-2 (legal notice dated 21.07.2000); no counter-document proving nominality produced by defendant.

• Oral evidence: Plaintiff PW-1 and scribe P.W.2; defendant D.W.1 admitted signatures and that attestors were her son, daughter and mother. Defendant did not call those attestors to support her nominal-document plea. Panchayat Secretary (D.W.4) gave market-value evidence but did not displace contractual facts.

• Conduct: Plaintiff paid Rs.20,000 as advance (1998) and sued within the contractual period; defendant allegedly waited at Sub-Registrar but plaintiff did not appear — disputed, but defendant failed to substantiate refusal to register.

Applicable law and principles

• Specific performance is discretionary; Section 16(c) and Section 20 of Specific Relief Act require court to examine readiness/willingness and conduct of parties.

• Burden of proof rests on defendant to prove that contract was nominal or consent absent. If defendant admits execution and attestors are family, failure to call them weakens nominality defence.

• Second appeal (Section 100 CPC): High Court interferes only on substantial questions of law; concurrent factual findings supported by evidence are final.

Court’s application of law to facts

• Execution of Ex.A-1 undisputed by defendant; plaintiff produced scribe and legal notice to show readiness/willingness.

• Defendant’s plea that agreement was nominal was unsubstantiated; she admitted the signatures and attestors and did not examine attestors who were within her control.

• Delay/laches and hardship arguments were considered and rejected: plaintiff filed suit reasonably within contractual period; defendant enjoyed the advance for years and failed to raise a convincing equitable defence.

• First appellate court’s judgment adequately discussed evidence; absence of multiple formal points did not vitiate judgment (substantial compliance with Order XLI R.31).

Conclusion

The trial court and first appellate court correctly exercised discretion to decree specific performance. No substantial question of law arises for interference in second appeal; concurrent findings stand. Second appeal dismissed.