Specific Performance — Agreement of Sale — Readiness and Willingness — Section 16(c), Specific Relief Act — Conduct of Parties — Attesting Witnesses — Appellate Review — Section 100 CPC.
Plaintiff sued for specific performance of an admitted agreement of sale (Ex.A-1 dated 17.09.1998) after payment of part consideration (Rs.20,000). Defendant admitted signature/witnesses on Ex.A-1 but claimed the document was nominal and alleged borrowing only Rs.10,000. Trial Court decreed specific performance; first appellate court affirmed. On second appeal, Held: (i) execution of Ex.A-1 was admitted and plaintiff established readiness and willingness (legal notice Ex.A-2 and initiation of suit within contractual period); (ii) defendant failed to substantiate the nominal-document defence or call family attestors; (iii) discretionary relief of specific performance was rightly exercised; (iv) concurrent findings of fact are not open to interference in second appeal under Section 100 CPC where no substantial question of law arises. Second appeal dismissed.
RATIO DECIDENDI
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An admitted executed sale agreement, supported by part-payment and evidence of plaintiff’s readiness and willingness (including service of legal notice within the contractual period), justifies a decree for specific performance unless the defendant credibly proves some defence (e.g., nominal document, want of consent) capable of displacing the contract.
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Where a defendant admits execution of the agreement and the attestors are members of her own family but the defendant elects not to examine them, the Court may infer the genuineness of the transaction; the defendant cannot rely on unsubstantiated pleas of nominality.
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Concurrent findings of fact by trial and first appellate courts founded on proper appreciation of evidence do not raise a substantial question of law under Section 100 CPC and will not be disturbed in a second appeal.
ANALYSIS
Issues framed
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Whether the plaintiff proved a case for specific performance of the agreement dated 17.09.1998 (Ex.A-1).
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Whether Ex.A-1 was nominal (sham) and/or the plaintiff failed to prove readiness and willingness.
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Whether appellate interference was warranted under Section 100 CPC.
Materials and evidence
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Documents: Ex.A-1 (agreement of sale), Ex.A-2 (legal notice dated 21.07.2000); no counter-document proving nominality produced by defendant.
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Oral evidence: Plaintiff PW-1 and scribe P.W.2; defendant D.W.1 admitted signatures and that attestors were her son, daughter and mother. Defendant did not call those attestors to support her nominal-document plea. Panchayat Secretary (D.W.4) gave market-value evidence but did not displace contractual facts.
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Conduct: Plaintiff paid Rs.20,000 as advance (1998) and sued within the contractual period; defendant allegedly waited at Sub-Registrar but plaintiff did not appear — disputed, but defendant failed to substantiate refusal to register.
Applicable law and principles
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Specific performance is discretionary; Section 16(c) and Section 20 of Specific Relief Act require court to examine readiness/willingness and conduct of parties.
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Burden of proof rests on defendant to prove that contract was nominal or consent absent. If defendant admits execution and attestors are family, failure to call them weakens nominality defence.
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Second appeal (Section 100 CPC): High Court interferes only on substantial questions of law; concurrent factual findings supported by evidence are final.
Court’s application of law to facts
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Execution of Ex.A-1 undisputed by defendant; plaintiff produced scribe and legal notice to show readiness/willingness.
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Defendant’s plea that agreement was nominal was unsubstantiated; she admitted the signatures and attestors and did not examine attestors who were within her control.
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Delay/laches and hardship arguments were considered and rejected: plaintiff filed suit reasonably within contractual period; defendant enjoyed the advance for years and failed to raise a convincing equitable defence.
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First appellate court’s judgment adequately discussed evidence; absence of multiple formal points did not vitiate judgment (substantial compliance with Order XLI R.31).
Conclusion
The trial court and first appellate court correctly exercised discretion to decree specific performance. No substantial question of law arises for interference in second appeal; concurrent findings stand. Second appeal dismissed.
