🇮🇳 Trump’s False Charge Against India: A Case Study in Political Mud-Slinging and Congressional Silence

🇮🇳 Trump’s False Charge Against India: 

A Case Study in Political Mud-Slinging

and Congressional Silence

By M.Murali Mohan
(Fact-based analysis — October 2025)

Introduction

Former U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent claim that India is “funding Russia’s war” through its crude-oil purchases has provoked dismay among policy experts and diplomats worldwide.
His assertion — that Prime Minister Narendra Modi promised to halt Russian oil imports — was officially denied by India’s Ministry of External Affairs, which clarified that “no such conversation took place.”

Yet, despite the availability of verifiable trade data contradicting Trump’s allegation,

the U.S. Congress has remained publicly silent.This silence — part legal constraint,

part political calculation — allows falsehoods to circulate unchecked,

harming the credibility of U.S.–India relations.

1. The Economic Reality:

India’s Purchases Are Legal, Limited, and Logical

a. Before the war

Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, India imported less than 2 % of its crude oil from Russia — roughly 70,000 barrels per day.
Its major suppliers were Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE.

b. After sanctions reshaped global supply

Western sanctions forced Moscow to sell oil at steep discounts — $20–30 per barrel cheaper than Brent crude.
When global prices spiked above $120, India, like many developing economies, turned to discounted Russian grades.
By 2023, Russia’s share of India’s crude imports rose to 25–30 % (≈ 1.6 million barrels/day) — entirely through lawful, market-based trade.

c. Scale and proportion

India’s annual purchases from Russia now total roughly USD 50–55 billion.
Russia’s GDP, meanwhile, exceeds USD 2 trillion, with oil-and-gas revenue around USD 200 billion annually.
Thus, India’s contribution represents barely 2–3 % of Russia’s economy and about 10–12 % of its energy revenue — far from decisive “war funding.”

2. The Legal Position: No Violation, No Collusion

• No UN sanctions prohibit buying Russian oil.
  
  

• India complies with the G7 price-cap mechanism when required.
  
  

• Payments are made through lawful non-dollar channels (dirhams, rupees) consistent with financial-compliance standards.
  
  

• India neither aids Russia militarily nor conceals trade — all shipments are transparent and recorded through customs.
  
  

Hence, equating commercial energy imports with funding warfare is legally unsound and morally dishonest.

3. The Hypocrisy Factor: The West Still Trades with Russia

Trump’s outrage ignores that Western nations continue to import Russian commodities in large volumes:

Region / Country	Key Russian imports (2024-25)	Approx. value (USD bn)
European Union	LNG, fertilizers, metals	≈ 90
United States	Uranium, palladium, platinum	2–3
Japan / Korea	LNG, coal	12–15
India	Crude oil	≈ 52

If purchasing Russian goods “funds the war,” then the West, not India, remains the largest contributor.

4. The Morality Question: Survival Is Not Sponsorship

When the war erupted, oil shortages and price surges threatened developing economies.
No country — including the U.S. — offered India affordable substitute supplies or subsidies.
In that context, buying discounted crude to protect 1.4 billion citizens from inflation is moral necessity, not complicity.

As one Indian diplomat summarized privately:

“Necessity cannot be immoral if the act is lawful and preserves life.”

India’s policy follows that logic — pragmatic, sovereign, and ethically defensible.

5. Trump’s Motive: Political Optics, Not Policy Substance

Trump’s rhetoric follows his familiar pattern of “maximum accusation for maximum attention.”
He uses India as a symbolic target to:

• Project toughness on Russia for domestic audiences,
  
  

• Distract from Western energy hypocrisy, and
  
  

• Justify new trade tariffs under the banner of “national security.”
  
  

It is geopolitical theatre, not a coherent energy doctrine.

6. Congressional Silence: Legal Constraint or Moral Deafness?

Under U.S. law, Congress cannot restrict Trump’s speech; the First Amendment protects political expression.
However, it can publicly correct falsehoods through committee hearings, policy statements, or bipartisan resolutions.

Its failure to do so reveals:

1. Extreme polarization — many Republicans fear alienating Trump’s base.
   
   

2. Limited foreign-policy literacy among legislators and media.
   
   

3. Domestic focus — India-Russia trade isn’t an electoral issue in the U.S.
   
   

This institutional silence creates the impression

that Congress is “deaf and dumb” to factual accuracy when politics intervenes.

7. India’s Response: Calm, Factual, and Sovereign

New Delhi’s reaction has been measured:

• It denied any conversation matching Trump’s claim.
  
  

• It reaffirmed that energy decisions are guided by national interest.
  
  

• It continues engagement with genuine U.S. institutions — Pentagon, State Department, and bipartisan allies — while ignoring campaign rhetoric.

India’s restraint underscores maturity: choosing facts over fury.

8. Conclusion

All available economic, legal, and moral evidence shows that:

• India’s Russian oil trade is lawful, necessary, and transparent.
  
  

• Trump’s accusations are politically motivated misrepresentations.
  
  

• Congressional inaction, though constitutionally explainable, reflects a troubling abdication of moral clarity.
  
  

In essence:

Trump threw mud; the facts prove it didn’t stick — but Congress pretended not to see it.

Until U.S. political institutions regain the courage to correct falsehoods even when uttered by

powerful figures, truth in diplomacy will remain hostage to domestic populism.

Key Facts at a Glance

Item	Figure / Source
Russia’s GDP (2025 est.)	≈ USD 2.08 trillion (IMF)
Russia’s energy revenue	≈ USD 180–200 billion
India’s oil imports from Russia (2024)	≈ USD 52 billion (≈ 30 % of imports)
U.S. imports from Russia (2024)	≈ USD 3 billion (non-oil)
India’s share of Russia’s GDP	≈ 2–3 %
Legal basis	No UN sanctions on Russian oil

Bottom line:
India did not fund Russia’s war — it merely adapted to survive a crisis the West itself created.
The numbers prove it; the silence of Congress only amplifies the irony.

🪔 దీపావళి 🪔.

దీపావళి —
నలుదిశలా చీకట్లు పారద్రోలే
దీపాల వెలుగులు మాత్రమే కాదు —
మనసున అలుముకున్న అజ్ఞానాంధకారములు
తొలగించే జ్ఞానజ్యోతులు.

మనలో జ్ఞానజ్యోతులు వెలిగించే దీపాల పండుగ,
మనలో అంతరంగ ఘర్షణలు తొలగించే వెన్నెల పండుగ,
అమావాస్యలో కూడా ఆనందాల హరివిల్లు విరబూసే పండుగ,
మనలో కమ్ముకున్న చీకట్లను చిటికలో పారద్రోలే పండుగ,
మానవాళికి నిజమైన మార్గదర్శనం చేసే పండుగ,
తరతరాలుగా మనల్ని వెలుగులవై పు నడిపే పండుగ.

A. Mohammedan Law — Matruka Property — Definition and Nature — What constitutes Matruka property Property, both movable and immovable, left behind by a deceased Muslim, is called Matruka. It includes the entire estate of the deceased which devolves upon the heirs after payment of funeral expenses, debts and legacies. (Ref.: Jamil Ahmad v. Vth ADJ, Moradabad, (2001) 8 SCC 599; Trinity Infraventures Ltd. v. M.S. Murthy, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 738; John T. Platts’ Dictionary of Urdu, Classical Hindi and English; Rekhta Dictionary). [Paras 8–9] B. Mohammedan Law — Matruka Property — Distribution of Estate — Priority of debts, legacies and shares of heirs — Scheme of inheritance under Sunni Law Held, as per Muslim Law and Mulla’s Principles of Mohammedan Law, the order of devolution is: (1) payment of funeral expenses, (2) discharge of debts, (3) satisfaction of valid legacies (not exceeding one-third of estate and not made in favour of an heir without consent of other heirs), and (4) distribution among heirs in prescribed proportions. Wife, being a Sharer, is entitled to ¼ share if there is no child or child of a son how low soever, and ⅛ share if there is such issue. Remaining portion devolves on Residuaries and, failing them, on Distant Kindred. [Paras 10–15; Qur’an, Ch. IV, Verse 12; Mulla’s Principles of Mohammedan Law, §§ 51, 61, 63] C. Mohammedan Law — Matruka Property — Property subject to incomplete transfer — Effect of unexecuted sale deed — Whether excluded from Matruka property An Agreement to Sell does not create any right, title or interest in the property, nor exclude it from the estate of the deceased. Such property continues to vest in the deceased and forms part of the Matruka property available for partition among heirs. Only upon execution of a valid registered sale deed does ownership pass. [Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. (2) v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656, followed; Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra, (2004) 8 SCC 614, applied.] [Paras 7–8] D. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Ss. 54, 55, 53-A — Sale and Agreement to Sell — Nature and Effect An agreement to sell, even if accompanied by possession, is not a conveyance. Ownership passes only upon execution of a registered sale deed duly stamped and registered. Until then, vendor remains full owner. Protection under S. 53-A operates only as a shield against transferor, not against third parties. [Paras 7; Suraj Lamp, (2012) 1 SCC 656, relied on] E. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — S. 100 — Second Appeal — No substantial question of law — Duty of High Court Where the High Court concludes that no substantial question of law arises, it must dismiss the appeal in limine, but with reasons. Having so held, it cannot then proceed to examine the matter on merits. [Surat Singh (dead) v. Siri Bhagwan, (2018) 4 SCC 562; Hasmat Ali v. Ameena Bibi, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1142, referred to.] [Para 5] F. Transfer of Property — Nemo dat quod non habet — Principle reaffirmed No person can convey a better title than what he possesses. Defendant-wife could have transferred only her own share (¼) in the Matruka property, not the entirety. [Para 15] G. Judicial Translation — Accuracy in legal translation — Importance emphasized Court expressed dissatisfaction with the poor translation of the Civil Court’s judgment into English. Observed that in matters of law, each word and punctuation affects meaning. Emphasized that due care must be taken to ensure accurate and faithful translation of original judicial records for proper comprehension in appellate forums. [Para 17; Chairman Managing Committee v. Bhaveshkumar Manubhai Parakhia, Order dated 18-3-2025, referred to] H. Result Appeals dismissed. Orders of First Appellate Court and High Court upheld. No costs. Pending applications disposed of. [Para 18]

A. Mohammedan Law — Matruka Property — Definition and Nature — What constitutes Matruka property

Property, both movable and immovable, left behind by a deceased Muslim, is called Matruka. It includes the entire estate of the deceased which devolves upon the heirs after payment of funeral expenses, debts and legacies. (Ref.: Jamil Ahmad v. Vth ADJ, Moradabad, (2001) 8 SCC 599; Trinity Infraventures Ltd. v. M.S. Murthy, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 738; John T. Platts’ Dictionary of Urdu, Classical Hindi and English; Rekhta Dictionary).
[Paras 8–9]

---

B. Mohammedan Law — Matruka Property — Distribution of Estate — Priority of debts, legacies and shares of heirs — Scheme of inheritance under Sunni Law

Held, as per Muslim Law and Mulla’s Principles of Mohammedan Law, the order of devolution is: (1) payment of funeral expenses, (2) discharge of debts, (3) satisfaction of valid legacies (not exceeding one-third of estate and not made in favour of an heir without consent of other heirs), and (4) distribution among heirs in prescribed proportions. Wife, being a Sharer, is entitled to ¼ share if there is no child or child of a son how low soever, and ⅛ share if there is such issue. Remaining portion devolves on Residuaries and, failing them, on Distant Kindred.
[Paras 10–15; Qur’an, Ch. IV, Verse 12; Mulla’s Principles of Mohammedan Law, §§ 51, 61, 63]

---

C. Mohammedan Law — Matruka Property — Property subject to incomplete transfer — Effect of unexecuted sale deed — Whether excluded from Matruka property

An Agreement to Sell does not create any right, title or interest in the property, nor exclude it from the estate of the deceased. Such property continues to vest in the deceased and forms part of the Matruka property available for partition among heirs. Only upon execution of a valid registered sale deed does ownership pass.
[Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. (2) v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656, followed; Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra, (2004) 8 SCC 614, applied.]
[Paras 7–8]

---

D. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Ss. 54, 55, 53-A — Sale and Agreement to Sell — Nature and Effect

An agreement to sell, even if accompanied by possession, is not a conveyance. Ownership passes only upon execution of a registered sale deed duly stamped and registered. Until then, vendor remains full owner. Protection under S. 53-A operates only as a shield against transferor, not against third parties.
[Paras 7; Suraj Lamp, (2012) 1 SCC 656, relied on]

---

E. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — S. 100 — Second Appeal — No substantial question of law — Duty of High Court

Where the High Court concludes that no substantial question of law arises, it must dismiss the appeal in limine, but with reasons. Having so held, it cannot then proceed to examine the matter on merits.
[Surat Singh (dead) v. Siri Bhagwan, (2018) 4 SCC 562; Hasmat Ali v. Ameena Bibi, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1142, referred to.]
[Para 5]

---

F. Transfer of Property — Nemo dat quod non habet — Principle reaffirmed

No person can convey a better title than what he possesses. Defendant-wife could have transferred only her own share (¼) in the Matruka property, not the entirety.
[Para 15]

---

G. Judicial Translation — Accuracy in legal translation — Importance emphasized

Court expressed dissatisfaction with the poor translation of the Civil Court’s judgment into English. Observed that in matters of law, each word and punctuation affects meaning. Emphasized that due care must be taken to ensure accurate and faithful translation of original judicial records for proper comprehension in appellate forums.
[Para 17; Chairman Managing Committee v. Bhaveshkumar Manubhai Parakhia, Order dated 18-3-2025, referred to]

---

H. Result

Appeals dismissed. Orders of First Appellate Court and High Court upheld. No costs. Pending applications disposed of.
[Para 18]

2025 INSC 1245

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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4516-4517 OF 2023

ZOHARBEE & ANR. … APPELLANT(S)

Versus

IMAM KHAN (D) THR.

LRS. & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KAROL, J.

1. In these appeals, challenge is laid to final judgment and

order dated 1st March 2012 in Second Appeal No.435 of 2011

with Civil Application No.10306 of 2011 passed by the High

Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad whereby

the appellants assailed the order of the First Appellate Court in 

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RCA No.87 of 20051 dated 4th March 2005, overturning the

findings of the Civil Court2

, was rejected.

2. The short conspectus of facts is that the appellant’s

husband namely Chand Khan passed away and now this litigation

pertains to the property he left behind, between his surviving

spouse namely Zoharbee3

and his brother i.e. Respondent Imam

Khan4

. The plot of land which is germane to the dispute is land

S.No.22/3 and 22/1 of Gut No. 107 and Gut No.126. It is the

plaintiff’s case that all the property left behind by the deceased

Chand Khan is matruka property and since he died issueless, as

per Mohammedan law the former would be entitled to 3/4th of the

total property and only the remaining 1/4th would fall in the rights

and entitlements of defendant no.1. On the other hand, the case

as per defendant no.1 is that the land bearing gut no.126 already

stood transferred to the third party in the lifetime of Chand Khan

by an Agreement to Sell dated November 1999 with defendant

no.2 and 3 namely, Pandit Fakirrao Bodkhe and Bhausaheb

Fakirrao Bodhke, and so the said property cannot be the point of

contention in the instant proceedings. In so far as the other piece

of land is concerned, it is contended that the same stood

transferred to the sole and exclusive ownership and possession of

1 District Judge, Aurangabad

2 2

nd Jt. Civil Judge (J.D.) Aurangabad in RCS No.310/99

3 Hereinafter Defendant No.1

4 Hereinafter Plaintiff

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defendant no.1 many years prior to the death of Chand khan but

in the challenging circumstances of the latter’s continued illness,

the same was sold to one Ayub Khan who is defendant no.4 and

part consideration of such sale stood received in the life of Chand

Khan and the remaining, subsequently after his death. Therefore,

nothing remains to be partitioned in terms of matruka property.

3. The learned Civil Court agreed with the contentions of

defendant no.1 and partly decreed the plaintiff’s suit in so far as

the property sold to defendant no.4 is concerned for the reason

that he chose not to contest the suit in any way whatsoever and

did not file a written statement. Regarding the remaining

property, it was observed that the Agreement to Sell entered into

between the parties in the lifetime of Chand Khan stood duly

proved by way of examination of witnesses (defendant no.2 and

3) and, therefore, no property remained to be divided between the

successors in interest of the deceased. It was acknowledged that

the sale deed was executed by Zoharbee after Chand Khan had

died however the said fact was not treated as material in view of

the evidence presented.

4. The plaintiff, being aggrieved, filed the first appeal under

Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The First Appellate

Court vide judgment dated 30th June 2011 reversed the findings

of the Civil Court and held that the plaintiff’s suit was entirely 

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maintainable. In other words, the plaintiff would be entitled to

3/4th of the total property in the name of the deceased. A further

reason for arriving at such a finding was that an Agreement to

Sell does not confer any right. The rights would stand vested with

the third party only upon the execution of the sale deed which

was done after his death. At the time of death therefor, the

property was still vested in Chand Khan.

5. In Second Appeal, by way of the impugned judgment, it is

recorded that no substantial question of law arises for

consideration. The learned Single Judge thereafter proceeds to

consider the contentions raised by either side which, for the

defendant no.1 are the points that were raised before the learned

Civil Court and on behalf of the plaintiff were those that were

raised before the First Appellate Court. Although we have some

reservations with the fact that the learned Single Judge proceeded

to examine the contentions on merit despite arriving at a finding

that no substantial question arose for consideration, we proceed

further. Suffice it only to say that when a Court is of the view that

no substantial question arise it has no choice but to dismiss, in

limine the appeal-but still has to give reasons therefor. [See: Surat

Singh (dead) v. Siri Bhagwan 2018 (4) SCC 562 and Hasmat Ali

v. Ameena Bibi & Ors. 2021 SCC Online SC 1142]. 

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6. Two issues arise for consideration one, whether the

agreement to sell in so far as one portion of the property would

be sufficient to exclude the same from the scope and expands of

matruka property to be partitioned at the time of his death and

second whether the properties of deceased Chand Khan qualify

as matruka properties within the meaning of Mohammedan law.

7. An agreement to sell does not confer any rights nor does it

vest any interest into the party that agrees thereby to buy a

particular property. This is a well acknowledged position in law.

In Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. (2) v. State of Haryana,

(2012) 1 SCC 656, the law was clarified as follows:

“16. Section 54 of the TP Act makes it clear that a contract of

sale, that is, an agreement of sale does not, of itself, create any

interest in or charge on such property. This Court in Narandas

Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam [(1977) 3 SCC 247] observed:

(SCC pp. 254-55, paras 32-33 & 37)

“32. A contract of sale does not of itself create

any interest in, or charge on, the property. This is

expressly declared in Section 54 of the Transfer of

Property Act. (See Ram Baran Prasad v. Ram

Mohit Hazra [AIR 1967 SC 744 : (1967) 1 SCR

293] .) The fiduciary character of the personal

obligation created by a contract for sale is

recognised in Section 3 of the Specific Relief Act,

1963, and in Section 91 of the Trusts Act. The

personal obligation created by a contract of sale is

described in Section 40 of the Transfer of Property

Act as an obligation arising out of contract and

annexed to the ownership of property, but not

amounting to an interest or easement therein.

33. In India, the word ‘transfer’ is defined with

reference to the word ‘convey’. … The word 

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‘conveys’ in Section 5 of the Transfer of Property

Act is used in the wider sense of conveying

ownership.

***

37. … that only on execution of conveyance,

ownership passes from one party to another….”

17. In Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji

Dhotra [(2004) 8 SCC 614] this Court held: (SCC p. 619, para

10)

“10. Protection provided under Section 53-A

of the Act to the proposed transferee is a shield

only against the transferor. It disentitles the

transferor from disturbing the possession of the

proposed transferee who is put in possession in

pursuance to such an agreement. It has nothing to

do with the ownership of the proposed transferor

who remains full owner of the property till it is

legally conveyed by executing a registered sale

deed in favour of the transferee. Such a right to

protect possession against the proposed vendor

cannot be pressed into service against a third

party.”

18. It is thus clear that a transfer of immovable property by

way of sale can only be by a deed of conveyance (sale deed).

In the absence of a deed of conveyance (duly stamped and

registered as required by law), no right, title or interest in an

immovable property can be transferred.

19. Any contract of sale (agreement to sell) which is not a

registered deed of conveyance (deed of sale) would fall short

of the requirements of Sections 54 and 55 of the TP Act and

will not confer any title nor transfer any interest in an

immovable property (except to the limited right granted under

Section 53-A of the TP Act). According to the TP Act, an

agreement of sale, whether with possession or without

possession, is not a conveyance. Section 54 of the TP Act

enacts that sale of immovable property can be made only by a

registered instrument and an agreement of sale does not create

any interest or charge on its subject-matter.”

(emphasis supplied)

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Holding in Suraj Lamp (supra) was recently followed in

RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar, 2025

SCC OnLine SC 793.

8. In view of the above, the view taken by the First Appellate

Court and the High Court cannot be faulted with. The property

agreed to be sold was, at the relevant time still the property of

Chand Khan and therefore would be subject to division of

property as per the applicable law. In other words, said property

would form part of ‘matruka’ property which has been defined

by the Courts as under:

In Jamil Ahmad v. Vth ADJ, Moradabad, (2001) 8 SCC 599:

“11. The property (both movable as well as immovable) left

by a deceased Muslim is called matruka. The scheme of

distribution of matruka among the heirs of a deceased

Muslim is that first that part of the matruka which is

covered by a will of the deceased, if there is a valid will

(subject to a maximum of 1/3rd of the

total matruka provided it is not in favour of an heir) will be

separated and given to the legatee. The balance

of matruka alone is distributable among the heirs and in the

proportion ordained under the Mohammedan law.

However, in regard to bhumiswami land the distribution

of matruka will be governed by Sections 169 and 171 of the

ZALR Act. Consequently the limitation placed under the

Mohammedan law that the bequest should not exceed 1/3rd

of the matruka of the deceased and it should not be in

favour of an heir, will not apply; so also classification of

heirs and the proportion in which they will

inherit matruka under the Mohammedan law is replaced 

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with the provisions of Section 171 of the ZALR Act in

which a different order of succession is provided.”

(emphasis supplied)

A judgment of fairly recent vintage also refers to the

pronouncement above. In Trinity Infraventures Ltd. V. M.S.

Murthy, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 738, it was observed:

“93. Before we proceed further, it may be necessary to

decode certain words and expressions used in these

proceedings from the beginning. If not, they will continue

to haunt and frighten the reader. Therefore, a glossary is

presented as under:

(i) Matruka: The property, both movable as well

as immovable left by a deceased

muslim is called Matruka6

.

9. Reference may also be made to John T Platts’ A Dictionary

of Urdu, Classical Hindi and English’5 which defines ‘matruka’

as the estate of a deceased person. Also, as per the Rekhta

Dictionary, ‘matruka’ is a word of Arabic origin and means

“abandoned from his possession (property etc.)[,] left by

immigrants (property etc.) [,] inherited wealth and property etc.6

.

It is clear from the above that matruka property simply refers to

property left behind by deceased person and nothing more.

Regarding the devolution of matruka property, it has to be

5 Digital Dictionaries of South Asia, University of Chicago, See:

https://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/app/platts_query.py?page=992

6 https://www.rekhtadictionary.com/meaning-of-matruuka

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observed that the Will is the first document that is to be satisfied

subject to the limits imposed by Muslim Law, namely, that it

cannot exceed one-third of the estate and cannot ordinarily be

made in favour of an heir without the consent of the other heirs,

and then whatever remains hereafter, is to be distributed strictly

as per the rules of intestate succession prescribed in Muslim Law.

10. Since the Agreement to Sell has no value in the eyes of

law, all the property that vested in Chand khan would become

matruka property. The next question then to be considered is as

to how the division thereof would take place.

11. In Mohammedan Law, the division of property is well

defined. The Holy Quran itself delineates how division of

property is to take place. Chapter IV, Verse 12 reads as under:

“And for you is half of what your wives leave if they have

no child. But if they have a child, for you is one fourth of

what they leave, after any bequest they [may have] made or

debt. And for the wives is one fourth if you leave no child.

But if you leave a child, then for them is an eighth of what

you leave, after any bequest you [may have] made or debt.

And if a man or woman leaves neither ascendants nor

descendants but has a brother or a sister, then for each one

of them is a sixth. But if they are more than two, they share

a third, after any bequest which was made or debt, as long

as there is no detriment [caused]. [This is] an ordinance from

Allah , and Allah is Knowing and Forbearing.”7

7

https://legacy.quran.com/4/12#:~:text=And%20for%20you%20is%20half,may%20have%

5D%20made%20or%20debt.

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12. It would also be useful to, at this stage, refer to Mulla

Principles of Mahomedan Law8 which in this regard says as

follows:

Ҥ51. Heritable property There is no distinction in the

Mahomedan law of inheritance between movable and

immovable property or between ancestral and self-acquired

property.

…

A. THREE CLASSES OF HEIRS

§ 61. Classes of heirs There are there classes of heirs,

namely, (1) Sharers, (2) Residuaries, and (3) Distant

Kindred:

(1) “Sharers” are those who are entitled to a prescribed

share of the inheritance;

(2) “Residuaries” are those who take no prescribed share,

but succeed to the “residue” after the claims of the sharers

are satisfied

(3) “Distant Kindred” are all those relations by blood who

are neither Sharers nor Residuaries.

 …

B. SHARERS

§ 63. Sharers- After payment of funeral expenses, debts,

and legacies, the first step in the distribution of the estate, of

a deceased Mahomedan is to ascertain which of the

surviving relations belong to the class of sharers, and which

again of these are entitles to a share of the inheritance, and,

after this is done, to proceed to assign their respective shares

to such of the sharers as are, under the circumstances of the

case, entitled to succeed to a share. The first column in the

accompanying table contains a list of sharers; the second

column specifies the normal share of each sharer; the third

column specifies the conditions which determine the right

of each sharer to a share, and the fourth column sets out the

shares as varied by special circumstances.

8 22nd Edition

C.A.Nos.4517-4518 of 2023 @

SLP©Nos.15386-15387 of 2012 Page 11 of 13

TABLE OF SHARES-SUNNI LAW

Sharers

Normal Share

Condition under

which the normal

share is inherited

---

Of one Of two or more

collectively

Wife 1/8 1/8 When there is a

child or child of a

son h.1.s

1/4 when no child

or child of a son

h.1.s

”

13. The first and foremost thing to be accomplished with the

estate of a deceased person is the payment for expenses, debts

and legacies. Thereafter, comes allotment of shares to such

relations who are entitled to a prescribed share. What follows is

that if any part of the estate remains, the same is divided among

the residuaries. Should there be a situation where there are no

sharers, the residuaries will come into the entirety of the

inheritance. It is further provided that if there are neither sharers

nor residuaries, ‘distant kindred’ shall be entitled to the same.

14. A perusal of the above extracted principles of Muslim Law

of inheritance depicts that the sharers are entitled to a prescribed

share of the inheritance and wife being a sharer is entitled to 1/8th

the share but where there is no child or child of a son how low so

ever, the share to which the wife is entitled is 1/4th

. 

C.A.Nos.4517-4518 of 2023 @

SLP©Nos.15386-15387 of 2012 Page 12 of 13

15. Since the rules governing inheritance are clear and there is

no room for subjective analysis, the proportions assigned have to

be necessarily followed. The property in question is

unquestionably matruka property and so has to be distributed

amongst the survivors of Chand Khan, as per the principles laid

down in this regard. The Civil Court, therefore, clearly fell in

error taking into consideration an incomplete sale wherein the

sale deed had not been executed and excluding the said property

from the total that had to be divided. Additionally, we may also

observe that the defendant no.1, in executing the sale deed had

the right only to do so in respect of the 1/4th share that fell in her

share and not the entire property for the maxim governing such

transactions is nemo dat quod non habet which translates to no

one can transfer a better title onto another than what they

themselves have.

16. Consequent to the above discussion, it has to be held that

the First Appellate Court and the High Court took the correct

view in law. As such no interference is called for.

17. Before parting with the matter, we record our

dissatisfaction with the manner in which the judgment of the

learned Civil Court was translated into English. In matters of law,

words are of indispensable importance. Each word, every comma

has an impact on the overall understanding of the matter. Due 

C.A.Nos.4517-4518 of 2023 @

SLP©Nos.15386-15387 of 2012 Page 13 of 13

care has to be taken to ensure that the true meaning and spirit of

the words in the original language are translated into English for

the Courts in appeal to comprehend what had transpired below.

Just recently, a Co-ordinate bench also highlighted similar

concern vide order dated 18th March 2025 in Chairman

Managing Committee & Anr v. Bhaveshkumar Manubhai

Parakhia & Anr. We may only underscore the observations made

therein.

18. Appeals are dismissed. No costs. Pending application(s),

if any, stands disposed of.

……………………………………J.

(SANJAY KAROL)

…………………………………….J.

(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)

New Delhi;

October 16, 2025.

Public Tribute and Appeal to PM & CM

Public Tribute and Appeal

A GRATEFUL TRIBUTE, CUM URGENT APPEAL:

HIGH COURT BENCH AT KURNOOL

To: The Hon’ble Prime Minister of India and the Hon’ble Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh

Subject: Profound Gratitude for Announcing the High Court Bench at Kurnool

and an Earnest Appeal for its Immediate Operationalization.

Respected Sir(s),

On behalf of the entire legal fraternity and the citizens of Rayalaseema,

I, M. Murali Mohan, Advocate, express our deepest gratitude for the momentous announcement

on October 16, 2025, confirming the High Court Bench establishment at Kurnool.

This declaration is more than just an administrative decision—

it is an act of historic justice. It fulfills a constitutional aspiration, recognizes Rayalaseema's rightful place,

and upholds the spirit of equitable governance.

Your leadership has transformed a decades-long promise into policy, honoring the trust

between the government and the people.

The Prime Minister's vision of "Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Nyay" finds its finest judicial expression here.

The Dawn of Accessible Justice

For millions across the eight districts of Rayalaseema, this Bench is life-changing.

It ensures that justice is no longer a privilege defined by the long, costly journey to Amaravati,

but a fundamental right of every citizen. Establishing the Bench at Kurnool,

the former capital of Andhra State, will bring speed, affordability, and dignity back to the judicial process.

Our Prayer for Speedy Implementation

While our hearts are filled with gratitude, we now earnestly pray and appeal for decisive and rapid action.

We request that the necessary administrative, judicial, and infrastructural steps be taken

at the earliest to operationalize the Kurnool Bench immediately.

Let the historic announcement of October 16, 2025, quickly translate into fully functional courtrooms.

We seek your leadership to transform the vision into reality, ensuring that justice is delivered

from the soil of Rayalaseema without further delay.

This Bench will stand as an enduring monument to your commitment to judicial equity

and equal justice for all. We pledge our full cooperation to ensure it becomes

a beacon of judicial excellence..

With the deepest respect and enduring gratitude,

(Sd/-)

M. MURALI MOHAN

Advocate, Atmakur, Nandyal District

Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 — S. 127 — Reservation lapse — Effect of lapse on ownership. Where the reservation on land lapses under S. 127 MRTP Act, title continues to vest with the original owner. Corporation’s possession of portion beyond acquisition (37 Ares) without acquisition confers no title. (Paras 2 to 5, 29) (B) Land Acquisition — Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 — S. 26 — Determination of market value — Method of calculation — Average of highest sale instances — Scope of judicial interference. S. 26(1)(b) r/w Explanations 1 & 2 mandates adoption of average sale price of similar lands in the nearest vicinity from registered sale deeds of preceding 3 years; one-half of highest-valued sale deeds to be considered. Reference Court rightly relied on six registered sale transactions proximate in location and period, selecting three highest instances (2014–2016) with 10% annual enhancement to reach market rate ₹ 26,814 per sq m. Interference by High Court in such statutory computation held impermissible. (Paras 24 – 27) (C) Land Acquisition — Compensation — Rental/Occupational compensation for unauthorised possession prior to acquisition — When entitled — Scope of S. 28 (seventhly). Claim of rental compensation for period 1972 onwards rejected — Evidence (eviction order 2000; SARFAESI receiver 2008; mortgage transactions) established possession and utilisation of property by original owner — Corporation not in exclusive possession — Hence no unlawful occupation warranting rental compensation. S. 28 (seventhly) permits equitable relief where facts justify; but claim must rest on proof of unauthorised governmental occupation. (Paras 28 – 36) (D) Land Acquisition — Compensation — Mesne profits — Equitable interest — Entitlement of purchaser pendente lite. Appellant-purchaser acquired land (29-07-2011) for ₹ 1.17 crore while land already under governmental use. Though not entitled to “rental compensation,” held entitled to interest at 8% p.a. on ₹ 1.17 crore from 29-07-2011 to 08-05-2017 (date of award/possession) as mesne profits/compensatory interest, applying equitable principle under S. 28 (seventhly). (Paras 36 – 39) (E) Land Acquisition — Compensation — Enhancement by Reference Court — Restoration of award. Award of Resettlement Authority (Nagpur) dated 18-03-2021 enhancing compensation to ₹ 20,20,11,533 restored — Includes enhanced market rate and statutory benefits under S. 26 and Schedule of 2013 Act — Interest at 9% p.a. for one year from 09-01-2017 (notification date) and 15% thereafter till realisation, deducting amount awarded by SLAO (29-04-2017). (Para 42) (F) Practice and Procedure — Adverse judicial remarks — Expunction — Costs — Waiver. Observations made by High Court against Appellant held unjustified as he was prosecuting statutory remedy bona fide — Adverse remarks expunged and cost of ₹ 10 lakh imposed by High Court waived. (Paras 40 – 41, 45) Held : Reference Court’s assessment of market rate ₹ 26,814 per sq m based on genuine sale deeds satisfies S. 26; High Court erred in substituting its view. Appellant not entitled to rental compensation for period prior to purchase; however, entitled to 8% interest p.a. on ₹ 1.17 crore from 29-07-2011 to 08-05-2017. Enhanced compensation ₹ 20.20 crore with statutory interest restored. Adverse remarks expunged and cost waived. (Paras 42 – 45) Result: Appeal allowed in part — Award of Reference Court restored — High Court order modified — Observations expunged — Costs waived — No order as to costs.

Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 — S. 127 — Reservation lapse — Effect of lapse on ownership.

Where the reservation on land lapses under S. 127 MRTP Act, title continues to vest with the original owner. Corporation’s possession of portion beyond acquisition (37 Ares) without acquisition confers no title. (Paras 2 to 5, 29)

(B) Land Acquisition — Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 — S. 26 — Determination of market value — Method of calculation — Average of highest sale instances — Scope of judicial interference.

S. 26(1)(b) r/w Explanations 1 & 2 mandates adoption of average sale price of similar lands in the nearest vicinity from registered sale deeds of preceding 3 years; one-half of highest-valued sale deeds to be considered.
Reference Court rightly relied on six registered sale transactions proximate in location and period, selecting three highest instances (2014–2016) with 10% annual enhancement to reach market rate ₹ 26,814 per sq m. Interference by High Court in such statutory computation held impermissible. (Paras 24 – 27)

(C) Land Acquisition — Compensation — Rental/Occupational compensation for unauthorised possession prior to acquisition — When entitled — Scope of S. 28 (seventhly).

Claim of rental compensation for period 1972 onwards rejected — Evidence (eviction order 2000; SARFAESI receiver 2008; mortgage transactions) established possession and utilisation of property by original owner — Corporation not in exclusive possession — Hence no unlawful occupation warranting rental compensation.
S. 28 (seventhly) permits equitable relief where facts justify; but claim must rest on proof of unauthorised governmental occupation. (Paras 28 – 36)

(D) Land Acquisition — Compensation — Mesne profits — Equitable interest — Entitlement of purchaser pendente lite.

Appellant-purchaser acquired land (29-07-2011) for ₹ 1.17 crore while land already under governmental use. Though not entitled to “rental compensation,” held entitled to interest at 8% p.a. on ₹ 1.17 crore from 29-07-2011 to 08-05-2017 (date of award/possession) as mesne profits/compensatory interest, applying equitable principle under S. 28 (seventhly). (Paras 36 – 39)

(E) Land Acquisition — Compensation — Enhancement by Reference Court — Restoration of award.

Award of Resettlement Authority (Nagpur) dated 18-03-2021 enhancing compensation to ₹ 20,20,11,533 restored — Includes enhanced market rate and statutory benefits under S. 26 and Schedule of 2013 Act — Interest at 9% p.a. for one year from 09-01-2017 (notification date) and 15% thereafter till realisation, deducting amount awarded by SLAO (29-04-2017). (Para 42)

(F) Practice and Procedure — Adverse judicial remarks — Expunction — Costs — Waiver.

Observations made by High Court against Appellant held unjustified as he was prosecuting statutory remedy bona fide — Adverse remarks expunged and cost of ₹ 10 lakh imposed by High Court waived. (Paras 40 – 41, 45)

Held :

1. Reference Court’s assessment of market rate ₹ 26,814 per sq m based on genuine sale deeds satisfies S. 26; High Court erred in substituting its view.

2. Appellant not entitled to rental compensation for period prior to purchase; however, entitled to 8% interest p.a. on ₹ 1.17 crore from 29-07-2011 to 08-05-2017.

3. Enhanced compensation ₹ 20.20 crore with statutory interest restored.

4. Adverse remarks expunged and cost waived.
   (Paras 42 – 45)

Result:

Appeal allowed in part — Award of Reference Court restored — High Court order modified — Observations expunged — Costs waived — No order as to costs.2025 INSC 1236

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No.18305/2023 Page 1 of 28

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.18305 OF 2023)

PRADYUMNA MUKUND KOKIL … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

NASHIK MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

AND OTHERS …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal arises from a long-standing dispute

concerning land situated at Survey No. 8/1, Village

Deolali, District Nashik, measuring 1 hectare and 38

Ares (13,800 sq. meters). By Resolution No. 14 dated

03.05.1972, the Nashik Road-Deolali Municipal

Council (now Nashik Municipal Corporation) resolved

to reserve the entire above-mentioned parcel of land

for a high school, playground, and development plan 

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No.18305/2023 Page 2 of 28

(DP) roads under the Maharashtra Regional and

Town Planning Act, 1966 (“MRTP Act”). On

22.06.1972, the Municipal Council took possession

of 37 Ares (3,700 sq. meters) from Survey No. 8/1 for

public use, albeit without recourse to the formal

acquisition process prescribed under the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894. Subsequently, a notification

under Section 126(2) of the MRTP Act read with

Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was

issued on 02.03.1978, acquiring only 1 hectare and

1 Ares (10,100 sq. meters) for the stated public

purpose, leaving the remaining 37 Ares (3,700 sq.

meters) outside the acquisition. Nevertheless, the

Corporation continued to retain possession and use

of the unacquired portion for road purposes, without

any legal title as alleged.

3. After the passing of the award, no further steps were

taken for acquiring the remaining land measuring

3700 sq. meters. The predecessor in interest of the

Appellant (hereinafter referred to as “Original Owner”)

submitted an application dated 11.08.1995 along

with a development plan under Section 127 of the

MRTP Act to the Respondent - Corporation for 

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No.18305/2023 Page 3 of 28

development of the land, on the assertion that the

reservation upon the land stood lapsed as per the

MRTP Act and thus, the title continued to vest with

the original owner.

4. When no response was received from the Respondent

- Corporation, Writ Petition (Civil) No.4184 of 1995

was preferred by the Original Owner in the High

Court for acceptance of the prayer as made in the

representation. On 12.11.1998, the High Court

accepted the plea of the Original Owner that the

reservation over the land in question had indeed

lapsed. As regards the development plan and its

approval are concerned, direction to submit fresh

plans with an observation that the respondents

would consider the same without raising the question

of reservation were issued. The Original Owner, in

pursuance to the above order again approached the

Respondent - Corporation and sought sanction of the

development of the land measuring 37 Ares. The said

request was rejected by the Corporation on

27.12.1999 by observing that the land was owned

and possessed by the Respondent - Corporation and

therefore the sanction could not be granted. 

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No.18305/2023 Page 4 of 28

5. An appeal against the said order as provided under

Section 47 of the MRTP Act was preferred on

09.02.2002 which came to be rejected by the State

Government on 05.03.2007 on the ground that post

the proposed acquisition of the land as per the

reservation of site, the possession had been taken by

the Corporation and the land in question measuring

37 Ares had gone into construction as a road.

Direction was, however, issued to the Corporation by

the Appellate Authority to compensate the Original

Owner in respect of the said land in cash or through

issue of Transferable Development Rights (TDR).

6. Being aggrieved, the Original Owner filed Writ

Petition No.3560 of 2009 on 05.03.2009 which came

to be decided vide order dated 18.11.2009 by setting

aside the order impugned passed by the Appellate

Authority and remanded it back to the State

Government for fresh hearing and decision. Direction

was further issued to the State Government to survey

the entire land and clearly identify the acquired land

measuring 1.01 hectares both on map and on site.

The remaining unacquired land for which

development permission was also sought by the 

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No.18305/2023 Page 5 of 28

Original Owner was to be identified, with liberty to

move a fresh application for the development of the

said identified land.

7. A Special Leave Petition was preferred by the State of

Maharashtra against this order of the High Court

being SLP (Civil) No. CC11311 of 2010, which came

to be dismissed vide order dated 20.09.2010.

8. It is at this stage that the Appellant purchased the

land measuring 37 Ares in Survey No.8/1 from the

original owner vide a registered Conveyance Deed

dated 29.07.2011 for ₹1,17,00,000/- (Rupees One

Crore Seventeen Lakhs Only).

9. On 15.09.2011, in compliance with the order passed

by the High Court on 18.11.2009 in Writ Petition

No.3560 of 2009 the Respondents prepared map

No.929 of 2011 which depicted 3700 sq. meters of

land being used as roads.

10. Before the appeal, as remanded by the High Court

could be decided, a fire broke out in the Department

of the Government because of which the records were

destroyed. Various reminders were submitted by the

Appellant but without any result. In these 

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No.18305/2023 Page 6 of 28

circumstances, the Appellant again approached the

High Court by way of Writ Petition No.11709 of 2012

praying therein for a direction that the land

measuring 3700 sq. meters be acquired by the State

after it had been utilised for constructing the roads.

The Respondent - Corporation took a stand therein

that by the efflux of time and being continuously in

possession of the said land, it had become the owner

of the land by adverse possession. Vide order dated

13.06.2013, the High Court allowed the writ petition

returning a finding that the land was in possession of

the Respondent - Corporation and hence the same

ought to be acquired, leaving it open for the

Respondent - Corporation to pursue the plea of

adverse possession.

11. The appellant, being aggrieved with the liberty

granted to the Corporation to put forth the claim of

adverse possession, challenged the order of the High

Court by filing SLP (Civil) No.35634 of 2013 which

was converted into Civil Appeal No.3874 of 2015.

The Civil Appeal was allowed by this Court to the

extent of setting aside the liberty granted to the

Corporation to pursue the plea of adverse possession

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No.18305/2023 Page 7 of 28

while rest of the order of the High Court was

confirmed.

12. When the order of the Court directing acquisition

proceedings to be initiated by the State Government

was not complied with, Contempt Petition (Civil)

No.823 of 2016 was filed before this Court. Upon

notice being issued and response having been filed by

the respondents, this Court vide order dated

03.01.2017 directed the State Government to

expeditiously complete the acquisition and for that

purpose granted exemption to the Corporation from

complying with Section 4 to 15 of the Right to Fair

Compensation and Transparency in Land

Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,

2013 (“2013 Act”’). In pursuance of the said

directions, preliminary Notification under Section 11

for acquisition of 3700 sq. meters of land forming part

of the Survey No.8/1 was issued on 09.01.2017

culminating into the award dated 29.04.2017 by

Special Land Acquisition Officer, Nasik (SLAO).

According to the said award, total compensation of

₹8,69,46,650/- (Rupees Eight Crore Sixty-Nine Lakh

Forty-Six Thousand Six Hundred and Fifty Only) was 

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No.18305/2023 Page 8 of 28

assessed as payable. It would not be out of place to

mention here that this included extended benefit

contemplated under Section 26 and Schedule of 2013

Act, that is, solatium and additional compensation at

the rate of 12% per annum from the date of

notification till the date of award along with other

statutory entitlements.

13. After passing of the award and the amount having

been deposited by the Municipal Corporation, the

Appellant, while accepting the awarded amount,

under protest, issued a Possession Receipt dated

08.05.2017 in execution of the transfer of possession

and ownership of the acquired land as per award.

14. The Appellant, being aggrieved with regard to the

assessment of the compensation as well as the non

grant of any benefit with regard to the illegal

occupation of the land by the Municipal Corporation

prior to the acquisition of the land i.e., from the year

1972 till 2017 preferred reference dated 26.05.2017

against the said award.

15. The Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and

Resettlement Authority, Nagpur (“Resettlement

Authority”) allowed the Reference and enhanced the 

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No.18305/2023 Page 9 of 28

compensation to ₹20,20,11,533/- (Rupees Twenty

Crore Twenty Lakh Eleven Thousand Five Hundred

and Thirty-Three Only) vide award dated 18.03.2021.

Apart from the said amount resorting to Section 26

Clause (vii) granted rental compensation for the

period 22.06.1972 to 22.04.1979 at the rate of 6% per

annum and thereafter till the date of notification i.e.,

09.01.2017 at the rate of 8% per annum on the

amount of enhanced compensation as awarded now

i.e., ₹20,20,11,533/- (Rupees Twenty Crore Twenty

Lakh Eleven Thousand Five Hundred and ThirtyThree Only) to the tune of ₹238,87,00,000/- (Rupees

Two Hundred Thirty-Eight Crores and Eighty-Seven

Lakhs only) for illegal occupation/possession of the

land in question by the Municipal Corporation. In

addition, interest at the rate of 6% per annum for

delayed payment of rental compensation from 1973

to 09.01.2017 was also awarded.

16. This award dated 18.03.2021 came to be challenged

by the Respondent - Corporation by way of First

Appeal No.602 of 2021 before the High Court which

finally came to be decided vide the impugned

judgment and order dated 04.05.2023 setting aside 

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No.18305/2023 Page 10 of 28

the award passed by the Resettlement and

Rehabilitation Authority and restoring the award as

passed by the SLAO dated 29.04.2017.

17. The learned senior counsel for the Appellant while

challenging the impugned judgment has put forth

two submissions. First being with reference to the

compensation as was awarded by the Reference

Court by enhancing the same over and above the one

which was awarded by the SLAO making specific

reference to Section 26 of the 2013 Act. It is asserted

that the SLAO had erred in not taking into

consideration the sale instances which were brought

on record and pointed out by the Appellant while

proceeding to take into consideration the rates as

fixed under the ready reckoner by ignoring the same.

Referring to the award passed by the Resettlement

Authority, senior counsel has pointed out the sale

transactions given by the Appellant as references for

the evaluation of rate of the property in his

application, which sale instances have not been

denied by the Respondent - Corporation, the

Reference Authority had rightly proceeded to take

into consideration the rate per square meters. As per 

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No.18305/2023 Page 11 of 28

the provisions of the Statute the three sale instances

on the higher rate of the acquired land being of the

year 2014 required to be brought at the market rate

by enhancing it at 10% increase in the sale price of

the deeds. The three sale instances having higher

price were referred to by the counsel and asserted

that the average as taken comes to ₹26,814/- per

square meter. With the said amount having been

assessed as per the settlement principles and the

Statute along with the grant of the statutory benefits,

the amount as assessed and the compensation as

awarded totalling ₹20,20,11,533/- (Rupees Twenty

Crore Twenty Lakh Eleven Thousand Five Hundred

and Thirty-Three Only) cannot be faulted with. He

therefore contends that the High Court was not right

in interfering with the said findings returned by the

Reference Court.

18. Secondly, as regards the setting aside of the grant of

rental value in the form of compensation for

unauthorised and illegal occupation of the land

which was owned by the Appellant at the time of

acquisition, learned senior counsel supports the

same on the basis of the settlement principle by 

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No.18305/2023 Page 12 of 28

making reference to the judgments of this Court and

High Court including Udho Dass v. State of Haryana

and Others1, R.L. Jain (D) by LRs v. DDA and Others2,

Dinkar Sandipan Gholve & Others v. State of

Maharashtra and Others3 and government

resolutions, which endorse rental relief for

unauthorized government occupation of land before

acquisition. He presses into service the seventh

parameter of Section 28 i.e., benefit to affected

families, equity and justice, explicitly authorizing

additional compensation of this nature in the form of

rent for unauthorised occupation. Senior Counsel

submitted that the appellant, being deprived of

beneficial ownership from 1972, was entitled to such

rental compensation under both statutory and

equitable principles. On this basis, prayer has been

made that the findings returned by the Reference

Court needed to be restored in light of settled

jurisprudential principles and the legislative intent.

19. The learned senior counsel for the Appellant has

submitted that the personal observations made

1 (2010) 12 SCC 51

2 (2004) 4 SCC 79

3 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 696 : 2009 Supp Bom CR 891

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No.18305/2023 Page 13 of 28

against the Appellant by the High Court are

unjustified and uncalled for as the Appellant was

bonafidely asserting his right and claim based on the

pleadings. The said observations therefore may be set

aside. Similarly, he asserts that the cost as imposed

of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs) may be set

aside as these were as a consequence of the

observations against the Appellant. On this basis, he

prays for acceptance of the present appeal by setting

aside the impugned order passed by the High Court.

20. On the other hand, learned senior counsel for the

respondents has supported the order passed by the

High Court by asserting that the valuation as has

been assessed by the SLAO was based upon the

records which were made available to him at the time

of working out the value of the land. As the instances

which were pointed out and were made available to

him pertained to small pieces of land or were not in

immediate vicinity of the land in question which were

sought to be acquired, the resort to the ready

reckoner cannot be faulted with. It has further been

asserted that the assessment as has been made by

the SLAO being in accordance with the rates as has 

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No.18305/2023 Page 14 of 28

been assessed and fixed by the competent authority,

the same has been rightly relied upon for fixing the

market rate and granting the compensation to the

Appellant.

21. The senior counsel submits that the High Court was

right in denying the Appellant the rental

compensation. The rental compensation could not

have been granted as the same is not specifically

provided for under the 2013 Act. Clause 7(3) of

Section 26 of the 2013 Act cannot be expanded to

include and grant a benefit which was not specifically

made available under the Statute. Had it been the

intention of the Legislature to grant such a benefit, it

could have been so mentioned as has been mentioned

in the earlier clauses. The factors which were

required to be taken into consideration have been

duly considered by the SLAO and rightly denied the

grant of rental compensation as sought for by the

Appellant. Prayer has thus been made for dismissal

of the appeal by upholding the order under challenge.

22. Having considered the submission made by the

counsel for the parties and on going through the

records which have been made available and referred 

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No.18305/2023 Page 15 of 28

to during the course of hearing, we proceed to decide

the case in hand.

23. Facts, as has been narrated above, are not in dispute

and therefore the two basic issues as has been raised

by the learned counsel for the Appellant need to be

considered and decided.

(i) the assessment of the value of the land in

question which has been acquired i.e., 3700 sq.

meters from the Survey No.8/1, and

(ii) the entitlement or otherwise of the claim of

rental compensation and if yes, then the date

and amount payable.

24. Taking the first issue first i.e., the assessment of the

amount of compensation as claimed by the Appellant.

The governing factor would be the provisions as

contained under the 2013 Act. Section 26 of the Act,

therefore, essentially is required to be looked into,

which deals with the determination of the market

value of the land by the Collector. The relevant

portion thereof would read as follows:-

“26. Determination of market value of land by

Collector.–(1) The Collector shall adopt the

following criteria in assessing and determining the

market value of the land, namely:––

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(a) ….

(b) The average sale price for similar type of

land situated in the nearest village or

nearest vicinity area; or

(c) …..

xxx xxx xxx

Explanation 1.––The average sale price referred to in

clause (b) shall be determined taking into account

the sale deeds or the agreements to sell registered

for similar type of area in the near village or near

vicinity area during immediately preceding three

years of the year in which such acquisition of land

is proposed to be made.

Explanation 2.––For determining the average sale

price referred to in Explanation 1, one-half of the

total number of sale deeds or the agreements to sell

in which the highest sale price has been mentioned

shall be taken into account.

…”

25. Section 26(1)(b) read with Explanations 1 and 2

prescribes a statutory method for arriving at the

market value by reference to the average sale price of

similar lands in the nearest village or nearest vicinity,

computed from sale-deeds or agreements to sell

registered in the immediately preceding three years;

Explanation 2 supplies the selection rule by directing

mode to arrive at the average, one-half of the total

number of deeds or agreements in which the highest

sale price has been mentioned shall be taken into

account.

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26. The Reference Court, while determining the market

value, noted that the claimant had produced six

registered sale transactions of lands situated in the

vicinity of the acquired land and pertaining to the

same period as the acquisition. Upon perusal of the

sale deeds, the Court recorded that the said

transactions were genuine and undisputed and that

they reflected the prevailing market value in the

locality at the relevant time. The Court observed that

the exemplar sale deeds were of lands similarly

situated, abutting the same approach road and

possessing comparable potentiality for development.

The acquired land is situated in a fully developed area

having both residential and commercial localities; it

is surrounded by schools, malls and hospitals and is

at a distance of about 1 k.m. from Nashik Road

Railway Station. Thus, holds high potential for both

commercial and residential use.

27. The Reference Court proceeded to compute the

average sale price as contemplated under Section

26(1)(b) read with Explanation 2 of the 2013 Act, by

making reasonable adjustments keeping in view the

size of the plots, their situation and the time-gap 

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between the sale instances and the notification under

Section 11. The sale instances taken into

consideration by the Reference Court where the three

out of the cited six which were highest in value when

taken per square meter. Since these sale instances

are of the year 2014 to 2016, with Section 11

notification being of 09.01.2017 to reach at the

market price 10% increase was added. The market

rate came out to ₹26,814/- (Rupees Twenty-Six

Thousand Eight Hundred and Fourteen Only). The

said amount being in accordance with the Statutory

provisions could not have been interfered with by the

High Court. The principles and the judgments as has

been relied upon by the High Court would not be

applicable to the facts of the case as well as the

mandate of the Statute referred to above.

28. As regards the second aspect i.e., claim of the

Appellant relating to the rental compensation for the

unauthorised occupation of the land in question, the

same needs to be looked into from the perspective of

the pleadings. Both the parties all through have been

claiming possession of the same as is reflected from

and culled out in the claims and counter claims 

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during the course of the lis. Although, all through the

claim of the Respondent - Corporation has been that

it had been in possession of the land in question since

the year 1972.

29. The factum with regard to the assertion relatable to

the title has been settled by various orders which

have been passed by the High Court and this Court

in favour of the Appellant till the date of passing of

the award and taking over of the possession after the

passing of the award i.e., 08.05.2017.

30. On the other hand, there are pleadings as well as the

documents on record which indicate that the

Respondent - Corporation has not been in exclusive

possession of the subject land. This is apparent from

the pleadings of the Original Owner as well as the

Appellant in the writ petitions which have been

preferred by them in the High Court from time to

time. Starting with the first writ petition i.e., Writ

Petition No.4184 of 1995, where on the basis of the

lapse of reservation, notice under Section 127 of the

MRTP Act was served upon the Respondent -

Corporation for re-development of the land, where the

specific assertion was made that the possession 

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remained with the Original Owner. All through

thereafter the possession has been claimed and

asserted by the Original Owner which is apparent

from the subsequent writ petitions also which have

been preferred i.e., Writ Petition No. 3560 of 2009,

Writ Petition No. 11709 of 2012, and others where

continuous possession and ownership claims by the

Original Owner have been maintained and reiterated.

31. Another fact, which has not been disputed by the

Appellant, pointing towards the possession of the

land in question of the Original Owner is mortgage of

the property including the subject property contained

in Survey No.8/1/1A for availing loan. It is also not

in dispute that the proceedings under the SARFAESI

Act 2002 were initiated on default and on order

passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal on 10.09.2008

appointing a Receiver, who, took over the possession

of the said property. This much with regard to the

possession and utilisation of the land by the Original

Owner – the predecessor in interest in title of the

Appellant.

32. Now coming on to the date when the title was

conferred upon the Appellant vide sale deed dated 

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29.07.2011. A perusal of this sale deed would clearly

depict that the possession of the land in question had

all through been with the Original Owner. Reference

in this regard can be made to Para 6 of the sale deed,

where it is clearly mentioned that the family of Shri

Sonwane was residing in the property in question as

tenants which got lapsed leading to filing of two

tenancy cases which led to the passing of an order of

eviction by the Tehsildar on 22.06.2000. Possession

of the same was obtained from the tenants. The sale

deed further indicates that the possession was

handed over to the Appellant by way of the said

document which he received and acknowledged.

33. It is, therefore, established from the above documents

that the Original Owner had not been deprived of the

benefit of possession or usage of the property in

question all through, which, as a matter of fact has

been claimed by the Appellant. The documents

clearly reveal, as has been referred to above, that the

property had not been in exclusive possession of the

Respondent - Corporation rather actual physical

possession of the subject-property was with the

Original Owner and utilisation thereof for all intent 

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and purposes including taking benefit of ownership

of the said property either in the form of loan or rent

thereof stands admitted and established. The claim

of rental compensation advanced by the Appellant,

particularly for the period prior to the purchase date

29.07.2011, is untenable in light of the settled

position in law which confines the grant of rental

compensation to cases involving unlawful and

unauthorized occupation. As held in R.L. Jain (supra),

rental or damages for use shall be awarded only

where possession is unlawfully detained by the

acquiring authority prior to notification or

acquisition. The claim thus with regard to the rental

compensation as put forth by the Appellant at least

prior to the date of purchase of the land at the hands

of the Appellant cannot be accepted.

34. Section 28 directs the Collector to take into account

specified parameters while determining the amount

of compensation, and the seventh parameter “any

other ground which may be in the interest of equity,

justice and beneficial to the affected families” is a

residuary provision designed to meet cases of

equitable exigency which are not expressly covered by 

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the first six heads; it empowers the Collector to award

such ancillary compensation as may be necessary to

do justice between the parties, including

compensation for use and occupation or other heads

of damage where the facts so warrant.

35. As has been discussed above, there is evidence on

record in particular the order dated 22.06.2000 of the

Tehsildar ordering eviction of tenant in favour of the

Original Owner, together with subsequent SARFAESI

proceedings in which a Receiver was appointed which

establishes occupation, use and enjoyment of the

land which is subject matter of acquisition by the

Original Owner – the predecessor of the appellant and

thus rental compensation as claimed on the basis of

displacement and unauthorised occupation by the

Respondent - Corporation is falsified.

36. It is admitted by the Appellant that, acting on the

assurance of ownership and to secure the title, the

Appellant funded the acquisition by paying

₹1,17,00,000/– (Rupees One Crore and Seventeen

Lakh Only). In the circumstances, and having regard

to the equitable mandate of Section 28 (seventhly) to

do complete justice to the affected parties, the 

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Appellant is entitled to compensatory mesneprofits/interest on that payment for the period of the

State’s occupation up to the date of actual payment

of compensation. The approach accords with the

established practice of this Court to award preacquisition interest/mesne-profits where the

possession of land is taken by the acquiring Authority

prior to completing the process of acquisition as a

remedial measure under the equitable limb of the

statute. Reference can be made to the judgment of

this Court in Shankarrao Bhagwantrao Patil and

Others v. State of Maharashtra4.

37. The Appellant, although, as per the sale deed received

possession of the land purchased, but has not

claimed that he had utilised the said land for any

purpose, rather had approached the High Court to

direct the Respondent to acquire the land purchased

by him by filing Writ Petition No.11709 of 2012 as the

Respondent - Corporation was in possession of the

land which fact was not denied rather admitted on

the part of the Respondent - Corporation of it being

in possession, the benefit, if any, would be available

4 (2022) 15 SCC 657 : 2021 INSC 501

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to the Appellant with effect from the date of sale deed

i.e., 29.07.2011 till the date of passing of the award

and receipt of compensation i.e., 08.05.2017.

38. As is admitted at hands of the Appellant that the land

in question was sought to be purchased after having

been assured of the ownership in the light of the

orders passed by this Court, the cost of which as paid

by the Appellant was ₹1,17,00,000/- (Rupees One

Crore and Seventeen Lakh Only), he would be entitled

to compensation in the form of interest at the rate of

8% per annum on the said amount for the period

referred to above.

39. In the light of the above, the judgment and order of

the High Court with regard to the denial of

rental/compensation to the Appellant from the

Respondent - Corporation is upheld. However, for

the period 29.07.2011 to 08.05.2017 the Appellant is

held entitled to compensation to the extent indicated

above.

40. As regards, the submission and prayer of the learned

senior counsel for the Appellant about the adverse

observations recorded by the High Court in the

impugned order against the Appellant and the 

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consequential imposition of costs of ₹10,00,000/-

(Rupees Ten Lakh Only) is concerned, we find that

the Appellant was prosecuting the remedy as

available to him under the Statute and advanced

evidence in support of his such claims. In those

circumstances the observations and the order for an

exaction of costs of ₹10,00,000/– (Rupees Ten Lakh

Only) ought not to be permitted to stand.

41. The observation as made against the Appellant by the

High Court in the impugned order may not be

justified in the given facts and circumstances of the

present case, as dealt with above, and therefore

needs to be expunged. The cost as imposed would

also be waived.

42. In the light of the above discussion, the present

appeal is allowed to the extent of restoring the award

as passed by the Reference Court dated 18.03.2021

granting enhanced compensation of ₹11,50,64,883/-

(Rupees Eleven Crore Fifty Lakh Sixty-Four

Thousand Eight Hundred and Eighty-Three Only),

total compensation being ₹20,20,11,533/- (Rupees

Twenty Crores Twenty Lakhs Eleven Thousand Five

Hundred and Thirty-Three Only) with interest on the 

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No.18305/2023 Page 27 of 28

awarded amount at the rate of 9% per annum from

the date of notification issued under Section 11 i.e.,

09.01.2017 for one year and thereafter at the rate of

15% per annum till realisation of the full amount on

the awarded amount of ₹20,20,11,533/- (Rupees

Twenty Crore Twenty Lakh Eleven Thousand Five

Hundred and Thirty-Three Only), deducting

compensation awarded and disbursed by Land

Acquisition Officer vide Award dated 29.04.2017.

43. As regards the claim of rental compensation of the

Appellant, the same is denied by upholding the

impugned judgment of the High Court for the period

1972 onwards.

44. Appellant is however, held entitled to grant of interest

at the rate of 8% per annum on ₹1,17,00,000/-

(Rupees One Crore and Seventeen Lakh Only) as

mesne profit/compensation with effect from

29.07.2011 till 08.05.2017.

45. The personal observations as made in the impugned

order against the Appellant by the High Court stand

expunged in the facts and circumstances of the case

and costs as imposed shall stand waived off.

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No.18305/2023 Page 28 of 28

46. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.

47. There shall be no order as to costs.

48. Pending application(s), if any, shall be disposed of.

.…...……….……………………..CJI.

[ B. R. GAVAI ]

.……..………..……………………..J.

[ AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH ]

NEW DELHI;

OCTOBER 15, 2025.