Motor vehicles — Claim for compensation under Section 166 read with Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Two fatal accidents on 02.08.2015 involving Ambulance No. AP-05-VJTR-7645 — MACT awarded Rs.4,82,000 (M.V.O.P. No.157) and Rs.11,99,000 (M.V.O.P. No.158) — Insurer (New India Assurance Co. Ltd.) appealed contending (i) vehicle’s temporary registration had expired before accident (ii) driver did not have transport endorsement and (iii) policy conditions breached — Question: whether insurer can be exonerated for fundamental breach and/or for want of registration/endorsement; and adequacy of compensation. —
Held:
-
On facts, temporary registration expired on 29.07.2015 and regular registration was effected on 03.12.2015; insurance policy in force covered 30.06.2015 to 29.06.2016. Absence of registration is a statutory breach but where the policy covers third-party risk and subsequent registration is effected, third parties should not be denied remedy; in such cases court may adopt the policy of “pay and recover” rather than allow total repudiation by insurer. (Para 29–31.)
-
Driver’s lack of transport endorsement does not automatically absolve insurer where vehicle’s unladen/gross weight is not shown to exceed the threshold (7,500 kg) — following Mukund Dewangan line of authority and Bajaj Alliance v. Rambha Devi (conclusion that LMV licence may suffice for certain transport vehicles under 7,500 kg). No evidence was produced by insurer to establish vehicle weight or absence of required endorsements; defence fails. (Para 33–36.)
-
Insurer is liable to pay compensation to claimants but is entitled to recover the amount from the owner (pay-and-recover). (Para 36, 52.)
-
Quantum: applying Sarla Verma / Pranay Sethi / Magma / Rajesh principles — Court fixed monthly notional incomes (treated as inclusive of future prospects) and applied multiplier 16 to both deceased; adjusted heads and fixed total awards as follows: M.V.O.P. No.157 — modified to Rs.4,62,000 (from Rs.4,82,000); M.V.O.P. No.158 — modified and enhanced to Rs.12,14,000 (from Rs.11,99,000). Interest @7.5% p.a. from date of petition till realization; amounts apportioned to respective claimants; insurer entitled to recover from owner. (Para 50–52.)
Cases referred to: Narinder Singh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.; United India Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Sushil Kumar Godara; Mukund Dewangan v. Oriental Ins. Co. Ltd.; Bajaj Alliance Gen. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi; Sarla Verma v. DTC; Pranay Sethi; Magma Gen. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram; Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh; relevant High Court & Supreme Court precedents summarized in judgment.
Held that : Appeals partly allowed in terms of modified awards; insurer liable but entitled to recover from owner; claimants may withdraw amount on deposit within two months; claimants to pay court fee on enhanced portion, if any.
1
APHC010465022017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
[3520]
FRIDAY,THE TENTH DAY OF OCTOBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 1218/2017
Between:
1. THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. E.GODAVARI DIST, REP.BY
ITS DIVIL.MANAGER, D.O, RAJAHMUNDRY, E.G.DISTRICT.
...APPELLANT
AND
1. C SATYAVATHI W GODAVARI DIST 5 OTHERS, W/O.SATTIBABU,
AGED 27 YRS, R/O.THOKKIREDDIGUDEM VILLAGE, GOPALAPURAM
MANDAL, W.G.DISTRICT, KOVVUR PJCJC.
2. CHALLA NAGA SIRISHA, D/O.SATTIBABU, AGED 8 YRS, MINOR,
REP.BY RESP.NO.1 MOTHER.
3. CHALLA MANGARAJU, S/O.SATTIBABU, AGED 5 YRS, MINOR, REP.BY
RESP.NO.1 MOTHER.
4. CHALLA SUBBA LAKSHMI, W/O.SUBBARAO, AGED 52 YRS,
R/O.THOKKIREDDIGUDEM VILLAGE, GOPALAPURAM MANDAL,
W.G.DISTRICT, KOVVUR PJCJC.
5. GERA HERAMS RATNA PRAVEEN, S/O.MOSES, AGED 34 YRS,
DRIVER OF AMBULANCE NO.AP-05-VJTR-7645, R/O.OPPOSITE BSNL
OFFICE, JANGAREDDIGUDEM VILLAGE AND MANDAL,
W.G.DISTRICT., JANGAREDDIGUDEM PJCJC.
2025:APHC:42607
2
6. KANCHARLA PAVAN KUMAR, S/O.DURGARAO, AGED 42 YRS,
OWNER OF AMBULANCE NO.AP-05-VJTR-7645, R/O.D.NO. 4-73,
TIRUMALADEVIPETA, MADYAHAPURVARIGUDEM VILLAGE,
T.NARSAPURAM MANDAL, W.G.DISTRICT. (R-5 IS NOT NECESSARY)
...RESPONDENT(S):
Appeal filed under Order 41 of CPC praying thet the Highcourt may be
pleased toaggrieved by the orders passed by way of judgment and decree in
MVOP.No. 158 of 2015, dated 31.01.2017 on the file of the Chairman, MACTcum-IX Addl. District Judge's Court, West Godavari at Kovvur
IA NO: 1 OF 2017(MACMAMP 2368 OF 2017
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in
the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to stay
the execution of decree and judgment passed in MVOP.No. 158 of 2015, dated
31.01.2017 on the file of the Chairman, MACT-cum-IX Addl. District Judge's
Court, West Godavari at Kovvur, and pass
Counsel for the Appellant:
1.G HARAGOPAL
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1.MANGENA SREE RAMA RAO
MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 1227/2017
Between:
1. THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD., E.G.DIST, REP.BY ITS
DIVIL.MANAGER, D.O, RAJAHMUNDRY, E.G.DISTRICT.
...APPELLANT
AND
1. MUTTANABOYINA VENKATESULU W G DIST 4 OTHERS,
S/O.RAMARAO, AGED 42 YRS, R/O.THOKKIREDDIGUDEM VILLAGE,
2025:APHC:42607
3
GOPALAPURAM MANDAL, W.G.DISTRICT, KOVVUR PJCJC.
2. MUTTANABOYINA SOMARAJU, S/O.RAMARAO, AGED 37 YRS,
R/O.THOKKIREDDIGUDEM VILLAGE, GOPALAPURAM MANDAL,
W.G.DISTRICT, KOVVUR PJCJC.
3. MUTTANABOYINA SATYANARAYANA, S/O.RAMARAO, AGED 32 YRS,
R/O.THOKKIREDDIGUDEM VILLAGE, GOPALAPURAM MANDAL,
W.G.DISTRICT, KOVVUR PJCJC.
4. GERA HERAMS RATNA PRAVEEN, S/O.MOSES, AGED 34 YRS,
DRIVER OF AMBULANCE NO.AP-05-VJTR-7645, R/O.OPPOSITE BSNL
OFFICE, JANGAREDDIGUDEM VILLAGE AND MANDAL,
W.G.DISTRICT., JANGAREDDIGUDEM PJCJC.
5. KANCHARLA PAVAN KUMAR, S/O.DURGARAO, AGED 42 YRS,
OWNER OF AMBULANCE NO.AP-05-VJTR-7645, R/O.D.NO. 4-73,
TIRUMALADEVIPETA, MADYAHAPURVARIGUDEM VILLAGE,
T.NARSAPURAM MANDAL, W.G.DISTRICT.
...RESPONDENT(S):
Appeal filed under Order 41 of CPC praying thet the Highcourt may be
pleased toaggrieved by the orders passed by way of judgment and Decree in
M.V.O.P.No.157 of 2015, dated 31.01.2017 on the file of the Chairman, Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal-cum-IX Addl. District Judge's Court, West Godavari at
Kovvur,
IA NO: 1 OF 2017(MACMAMP 2379 OF 2017
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in
the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to stay
the execution of decree and judgment passed in M.V.O.P.No. 157 of 2015, dated
31.01.2017 on the file of the Chairman, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-cum-IX
Addl. District Judge's Court, West Godavari at Kovvur, pending the final disposal
of the main appeal and pass
2025:APHC:42607
4
Counsel for the Appellant:
1.G HARAGOPAL
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1.MANGENA SREE RAMA RAO
The Court made the following:
2025:APHC:42607
5
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
M.A.C.M.A.Nos.1218 and 1227 of 2017
COMMON JUDGMENT:
Introductory:
1. M.V.O.P.Nos.157 and 158 of 2015 on the file of the Motor Accidents
Claims Tribunal-cum-IX Additional District Judge‟s Court, West Godavari at
Kovvur (for short “the learned MACT”) were filed by the legal representatives of
one Muttanaboyina Prasad (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased No.1”) and
One Challa Sattibabu (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased No.2”), claiming
compensation for the death of respective deceased in a motor vehicle accident
that occurred on 02.08.2015.
2. Separate awards and decrees dated 31.01.2017 passed by the learned
MACT, awarding compensation of Rs.4,82,000/- in M.V.O.P.No.157 of 2015 and
Rs.11,99,000/- in M.V.O.P.No.158 of 2015.
3. Before the learned MACT, the driver, the owner of the Ambulance bearing
Registration No.AP 05 VJTR 7645 (hereinafter referred to as “the offending
vehicle”) and the Insurance Company of the offending vehicle are arrayed as
Respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 in the same order.
4. Feeling aggrieved by the liability imposed and quantum of compensation
awarded, the Insurance Company filed the present appeals i.e.
2025:APHC:42607
6
M.A.C.M.A.Nos.1227 and 1218 of 2017, now under consideration questioning the
liability and compensation awarded.
5. Since the accident referred to in both cases and the contentious issues are
substantially the same, barring quantification of compensation and as common
arguments were advanced, common judgment.
6. For the sake of convenience, parties will be hereinafter referred to with
reference to their status before the learned MACT.
Factual Matrix common for both cases:
7(i). On 02.08.2015, deceased Nos.1 and 2, were returning from Gopalapuram
to their Village Tokkireddygudem, West Godavari District on their motor cycle, at
about 07:00 P.M., when they were near Peddagudem road on Gopalapuram by
pass road, the offending vehicle driven by Respondent No.1 came in a rash and
negligent manner in the opposite direction and dashed the motor cycle, whereby
both the deceased fell down and sustained grievous injuries and they were
shifted to Government Hospital, Kovvur, where they were declared as dead.
(ii). The negligence of Respondent No.1 is the cause for the accident. There
was no fault on the part of the deceased No.1 in riding the motor cycle.
Respondent No.2 and 3, being the owner and Insurance Company of the
offending vehicle are liable to compensate.
2025:APHC:42607
7
(iii). A case in Crime No.119 of 2015 was registered on the file of Gopalapuram
Police Station and after necessary inquiry, charge sheet was laid against the
driver of the offending vehicle viz. Respondent No.1.
Specific case of claimants in M.V.O.P.No.157 of 2015:
8. Deceased No.1 was aged about 25 years, a lorry driver by occupation,
earning Rs.10,000/- per month. Petitioners are brothers of the deceased and
they are legal heirs and dependents of deceased No.1. Hence, they are entitled
for just and reasonable compensation.
Specific Case of claimants in M.V.O.P.No.158 of 2015:
9. Deceased No.2 was aged about 29 years, lorry driver by profession and he
was earning Rs.10,000/- per month apart from beta etc. The 1st claimant is the
wife, 2nd claimant is the daughter, 3rd claimant is the son and 4th claimant is the
mother of the deceased. They are legal heirs and dependents. Hence, they are
entitled for just and reasonable compensation.
Defence of Respondent No.3 Insurance Company:
10(i). The offending vehicle was insured under the policy covering the period
from 12:00:01 A.M. on 30.06.2015 to 29.06.2016, 11:59:59 P.M. (date of
accident 02.08.2015). The liability shall be in accordance with the policy
conditions and provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act.
(ii). The valid and effective driving license for Respondent No.1 and a permit
for the offending vehicle to run on the road etc. shall be shown. The negligence
2025:APHC:42607
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of Respondent No.1 in occurrence of the accident shall be proved. Age,
occupation and income of the respective deceased including the dependency of
the claimants in each case shall be shown with strict proof.
(iii). The offending vehicle in question was given only temporary registration
certificate which is valid for the period from 30.06.2015 to 29.07.2015 i.e. for a
period of one month. Before the temporary registration expired, the vehicle is to
be registered before the RTA, West Godavari, Eluru. The date of accident is
02.08.2015 i.e. beyond / more than one month after the temporary registration.
Therefore, the vehicle should not have been plied on the road without
registration. Hence, there is violation.
(iv). Further, respondent No.1 had a licence to drive only a non transport vehicle
and a proper driving licence to drive the offending vehicle / ambulance was not
there with the Respondent No.1. Hence, there is violation of conditions of policy.
Therefore, respondent No.3 is not liable to pay compensation.
11. Issues settled by the learned MACT and evidence adduced in both cases
is as follows:
Sl.
No.
Case No. Issues
1. M.V.O.P.No.157 of 2015 1. Whether the accident, that occurred on
02.08.2015 at 07:00 P.M near Gopalapuram in
which the deceased Muttanaboyina Prasad died is
due to rash and negligent driving of Ambulance
bearing No.AP 05 VJTR 7645 by 1st respondent?
2025:APHC:42607
9
2. Whether petitioners are entitled for
compensation? If so, how much and from whom?
3. To what relief?
2. M.V.O.P.No.158 of 2015 1. Whether the accident, that occurred on
02.08.2015 at 07:00 P.M. near Gopalapuram in
which the deceased Muttanaboyina Prasad died is
due to rash and negligent driving of Ambulance
bearing No.AP 05 VJTR 7645 by 1st respondent?
2. Whether petitioners are entitled for
compensation? If so, how much and from whom?
3. To what relief?
Evidence before the learned MACT:
12(i).M.V.O.P.No.157 of 2015:
Description Remarks
Oral
evidence
P.W.1: M. Somaraju Claimant No.2
P.W.2: B. Venkanna Lorry driver
P.W.3: V. Krishna Eye witness to accident
R.W.1: Y. Bhavannarayana A.O. in Respondent No.3
Insurance Company
R.W.2: K. Jhon Victor Senior Assistant in RTA
R.W.3: P. Raja Kiran Kumar Junior Assistant in RTA
Documentary
evidence
Ex.A1: Attested copy of F.I.R. in
Cr.No.119/2015 of Gopalapuram
Police Station.
Ex.A2:Attested copy of Inquest
Report.
Ex.A3:Attested copy of PME
certificate.
Marked on behalf of the
petitioner(s)
2025:APHC:42607
10
Ex.A4: Attested copy of Charge
Sheet filed in Cr.No.119 of 2015.
Ex.A5: Original driving licence of
deceased.
Ex.B1: True copy of policy issued
by Respondent No.3 in favour of
Respondent No.2.
Ex.B2: Rough sketch of scene of
offence.
Marked on behalf of
Respondent No.3.
Ex.X1: Authorisation given by
employer of R.W.2
Ex.X2: Extract of driving licence
of Respondent No.1.
Ex.X3: Authorisation given by
employer of R.W.3.
Ex.X4: Extract of B register of
vehicle of Respondent No.2.
Marked on behalf of third
parties.
12(ii). M.V.O.P.No.158 of 2015:
Description Remarks
Oral
evidence
P.W.1: Ch. Satyavathi Claimant No.1
P.W.2: B. Venkanna Lorry driver
P.W.3:V. Krishna Eye witness to accident
R.W.1: Y. Bhavannarayana A.O. in Respondent No.3
Insurance Company
R.W.2: K. Jhon Victor Senior Assistant in RTA
R.W.3: P. Raja Kiran Kumar Junior Assistant in RTA
Documentary
evidence
Ex.A1: Attested copy of F.I.R. in
Cr.No.119/2015 of Gopalapuram
Police Station.
Ex.A2:Attested copy of Inquest
Report.
Ex.A3:Attested copy of PME
certificate.
Marked on behalf of the
petitioner(s)
2025:APHC:42607
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Ex.A4: Attested copy of Charge
Sheet filed in Cr.No.119 of 2015.
Ex.A5: Original driving licence of
deceased.
Ex.B1: True copy of policy issued
by Respondent No.3 in favour of
Respondent No.2.
Ex.B2: Rough sketch of scene of
offence.
Marked on behalf of
Respondent No.3.
Ex.X1: Authorisation given by
employer of R.W.2
Ex.X2: Extract of driving licence
of Respondent No.1.
Ex.X3: Authorisation given by
employer of R.W.3.
Ex.X4: Extract of B register of
vehicle of Respondent No.2.
Marked on behalf of third
parties.
Findings of the learned MACT:
13(i) On negligence:
(i). The accident is not in dispute. P.W.3-eye witness to the accident,
deposed about the offending vehicle coming in the wrong side and hitting the
motor cycle. Further, P.W.3 is cited as witness in the charge sheet. The driver
of the offending vehicle did not file any written statement. No steps are taken to
examine the Respondent No.1, the driver of the offending vehicle. Therefore, the
evidence placed by the claimants is convincing to accept the negligence on the
part of the driver of the offending vehicle.
13(ii). Absence of regular registration for the offending vehicle.
(i). Regular registration was obtained on 03.12.2015.
2025:APHC:42607
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(ii). There is no reference to necessity of registration in the conditions of policy
particularly in Ex.B1.
(iii). Further, Section 149(2) of Motor Vehicles Act does not indicate the absence
of registration as an exemption to avoid liability.
On quantum:
In M.V.O.P.No.157 of 2015
13(iii). By referring to the age of the deceased, the multiplier applicable is „16”
and personal deduction to the extent of 50%. While accepting the income of
deceased No.1 at Rs.4,500/-, considering the extent of dependency of the
claimants being brothers, the learned MACT awarded compensation of
Rs.4,82,000/-.
In M.V.O.P.No.158 of 2015
13(iv). In respect of claim of deceased No.2, accepting the income at Rs.8,000/-
notionally per month, deducting 1/3rd towards personal expenditure, the learned
MACT awarded compensation of Rs.11,99,000/-.
Arguments in the appeals:
For the appellant-Insurance Company:
14(i). The learned MACT failed to see that as per Section 39 of the Motor
Vehicles Act no motor vehicle shall be driven in any Public Place or in any other
place without registration.
2025:APHC:42607
13
(ii). The compensation awarded under the heads of non-pecuniary damages,
funeral expenditure etc. are on the higher side and not in accordance with the
guidance in Sarala Verma‟s case.
(iii). Compensation awarded in both cases is excessive, more so where there is
no dependency of the brothers of the deceased in respect of the claim in
M.V.O.P.No.157 of 2015.
For the claimants:
15(i). The claimants are third parties. The vehicle was registered when it was
purchased. Although the temporary registration was expired, regular registration
has taken place and the vehicle was registered subsequently.
(ii). The compensation awarded by the learned MACT in both the cases is just
and reasonable and requires enhancement.
(iii). There are no grounds to interfere with the liability. However, the
compensation awarded can be enhanced in these appeals.
16. Heard both sides extensively. Thoughtful consideration is given to the
arguments advanced by both sides.
17. Now the points that arise for determination in these appeals are:
(1) Whether the liability imposed on the Insurance Company / appellant, ignoring
the expiry of the temporary registration of the offending vehicle bearing
Registration No. AP 05 VJTR 7645 and the violations thereof, is sustainable in
law and on facts?
2025:APHC:42607
14
(2) Whether the compensation of Rs.4,82,000/- awarded in M.V.O.P.No.157 of
2015 is just and reasonable or requires any modification?
(3) Whether the compensation of Rs.11,99,000/- awarded in M.V.O.P.No.158 of
2015 is just and reasonable or requires any modification?
(4) What is the result of the appeal in M.A.C.M.A.No.1227 of 2017?
(5) What is the result of the appeal in M.A.C.M.A.No.1218 of 2017?
Point No.1:
Liability of the Insurance Company:
Precedential Guidance:
18. In United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Sushil Kumar
Godara1
, the Hon‟ble Apex Court considered the scope of Sections 39, 43, 149
and 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It was a case where respondent /
complainant purchased a car and got it insured with the appellant Insurance
Company. At the time of insurance, the vehicle was temporarily registered. After
the expiry of registration, the complainant took the vehicle out for his work related
travel and it was parked outside a guest house in another city. During the night
stay, the vehicle was stolen and a claim was made before the District Forum.
The claim was dismissed by the District Forum. In appeal, the State Commission
allowed the claim in favour of the complainant. The Insurance Company filed a
1
(2021) 14 SCC 519
2025:APHC:42607
15
revision before the National Commission and the same was dismissed and the
matter went up to the Hon‟ble Supreme Court.
19. The Hon‟ble Apex Court considered the scope of liability of the Insurance
Company with reference to the facts in the case as well as the earlier
observations of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Narinder Singh vs. New India
Assurance Company Limited and Others2
and also in Naveen Kumar vs.
National Insurance Company Limited3
, the observations in the National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, made in paragraph
Nos.10 to 14 are as follows:
10. The learned Amicus Curie, on the other hand, urged that this Court
should not disturb the findings of the State Commission or NCDRC. It
was argued by the learned counsel that the judgment in Narinder
Singh [Narinder Singh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC
324 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 43] pertained to claim for compensation for a
damaged vehicle on account of accident, and not on account of theft of
a vehicle, and was thus not applicable to the present case. She urged
that in the present case, it could not be said that the policy holder's
vehicle was an unregistered one; rather a temporary number had been
assigned to it, but a few days after its expiry, the theft occurred. In the
given circumstances, the preclusion of liability, in the manner
expressed in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. New India Assurance
Co. Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 324 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 43] by this Court, was
inapplicable.
11. What is discernible from the above narration of facts, is that the
policy holder had purchased a new Bolero which had a temporary
registration. That registration lapsed on 19-7-2011. The respondent
complainant never alleged or proved that he applied for a permanent
registration, or sought extension of the temporary registration beyond
19-7-2011. He travelled outside his residence, to Jodhpur, in his car,
and stayed overnight in a guest house. In the morning of 28-7-2011, he
2
(2014) 9 SCC 324
3
2019 SCC OnLine NCDRC 1738
2025:APHC:42607
16
discovered that the car had been stolen, when parked outside the
guest house premises in Jodhpur.
12. In Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.,
(2014) 9 SCC 324 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 43], the claim was in the
context of an accident, involving a vehicle, the temporary registration of
which had expired. This Court held that the insurer was not liable, and
observed that : (SCC p. 328, paras 11-12)
“11. A bare perusal of Section 39 shows that no person shall
drive the motor vehicle in any public place without any valid
registration granted by the registering authority in accordance
with the provisions of the Act. However, according to Section
43, the owner of the vehicle may apply to the registering
authority for temporary registration and a temporary
registration mark. If such temporary registration is granted by
the authority, the same shall be valid only for a period not
exceeding one month. The proviso to Section 43 clarified that
the period of one month may be extended for such a further
period by the registering authority only in a case where a
temporary registration is granted in respect of chassis to
which body has not been attached and the same is detained
in a workshop beyond the said period of one month for being
fitted with a body or unforeseen circumstances beyond the
control of the owner.
12. Indisputably, a temporary registration was granted in
respect of the vehicle in question, which had expired on 11-1-
2006 and the alleged accident took place on 2-2-2006 when
the vehicle was without any registration. Nothing has been
brought on record by the appellant to show that before or
after 11-1-2006, when the period of temporary registration
expired, the appellant, owner of the vehicle, either applied for
permanent registration as contemplated under Section 39 of
the Act or made any application for extension of period as
temporary registration on the ground of some special
reasons. In our view, therefore, using a vehicle on the public
road without any registration is not only an offence
punishable under Section 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act but
also a fundamental breach of the terms and conditions of
policy contract.”
13. In Naveen Kumar [Naveen Kumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.,
2019 SCC OnLine NCDRC 1738] , NCDRC decided a reference Naveen
2025:APHC:42607
17
Kumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [Naveen Kumar v. National
Insurance Co. Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine NCDRC 1739] , to its Bench,
and held that : (Naveen Kumar case [Naveen Kumar v. National
Insurance Co. Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine NCDRC 1738] , SCC OnLine
NCDRC para 10)
“10. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the reference is
answered in the following terms:
(i) If a vehicle without a valid registration is or has been
used/driven on a public place or any other place that would
constitute a fundamental breach of the terms and conditions of
the contract of insurance even if the vehicle is not being driven
at the time it is stolen or is damaged.
(ii) If a vehicle without a valid registration is used/driven on a
public place or any other place, it would constitute a
fundamental breach of terms and conditions of the policy even
if the owner of the vehicle has applied for the issuance of a
registration in terms of Section 41 of the Act before expiry of
the temporary registration, but the regular registration has not
been issued.”
14. In the present case, the temporary registration of the respondent's
vehicle had expired on 28-7-2011. Not only was the vehicle driven, but
also taken to another city, where it was stationed overnight in a place
other than the respondent's premises. There is nothing on record to
suggest that the respondent had applied for registration or that he was
awaiting registration. In these circumstances, the ratio of Narinder
Singh [Narinder Singh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC
324 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 43] applies, in the opinion of this Court.
That Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.,
(2014) 9 SCC 324 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 43] was in the context of an
accident, is immaterial. Despite this, the respondent plied his vehicle
and took it to Jodhpur, where the theft took place. It is of no
consequence, that the car was not plying on the road, when it was
stolen; the material fact is that concededly, it was driven to the place
from where it was stolen, after the expiry of temporary registration. But
for its theft, the respondent would have driven back the vehicle. What is
important is this Court's opinion of the law, that when an insurable
incident that potentially results in liability occurs, there should be no
fundamental breach of the conditions contained in the contract of
insurance. Therefore, on the date of theft, the vehicle had been
driven/used without a valid registration, amounting to a clear violation
2025:APHC:42607
18
of Sections 39 and 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. This results in
a fundamental breach of the terms and conditions of the policy, as held
by this Court in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. New India
Assurance Co. Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 324 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 43] ,
entitling the insurer to repudiate the policy.
Analysis:
20. The facts in the present case and applicability of the observations of the
Hon‟ble Apex Court in United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Sushil
Kumar Godara (1 Supra) are:
(i) It was a case of claim between the insurer and the insured.
(ii) The case before this Court is a claim by the third party.
(iii) The claim in the case referred was for the benefit of the insured.
(iv) The claim in the present case is not only for the benefit of the insured but
also third party. Insurance Policy obtained is for the benefit of third parties, as per
the statutory mandate that a vehicle shall not run without insurance.
21. There is no apparent conflict between Sections 39 and 149 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, but from the point of view of their intended purposes, the
registration contemplated under Section 39 is for identification of the vehicle and
the insurance obtained is for the purpose of indemnifying the owner for self
claims as well as well as third party claims.
22. The statutory mandate requires compulsory third-party insurance for
running a vehicle and it is an offence if not opting insurance. Section 196 of the
Motor Vehicles Act which reads as follows:
2025:APHC:42607
19
196. Driving uninsured vehicle: Whoever drives a motor vehicle or
causes or allows a motor vehicle to be driven in contravention of the
provisions of section 146 shall be punishable [for the first offence] with
imprisonment which may extend to three months, or with fine [of two
thousand rupees,], or with both [and for a subsequent offence shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three
months, or with fine of four thousand rupees, or with both.].
23. The consequence of running a vehicle without registration under Section
192, is a breach for which fine is contemplated. Whereas, the provisions under
Section 196 contemplate punishment for the first offense itself. The necessity of
third party insurance is aimed at social welfare as well as the social security
measure in case of third party risks. In the present case, the duty of care on the
part of the owner of the vehicle with reference to obtaining third party insurance
is complied with and it is not the case that the period of insurance covered by the
policy issued is expired. It is only the registration expired. It is to be seen that,
the registration lapse is also a breach and the same will amounts to a
fundamental breach, in terms of the observation of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in
United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Sushil Kumar Godara (1
Supra).
24. Similarly, the observations in respect of absence of permit and inflexion
thereof give the right to the Insurance Company to take the defence of
fundamental breach in terms of Section 149(2), as observed in Pareed Pillai vs.
2025:APHC:42607
20
Oriental Insurance Company Limited4
and National Insurance Company
Limited vs. Challa Upendra Rao and Others5
. But absence of permit is a
factor is to be viewed distinctly from absence of registration.
25. The lead that can be drawn from the observation of Hon‟ble Apex Court in
United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Sushil Kumar Godara
(1 Supra) case vide para 14 is that, there is nothing on record to suggest that the
respondents applied for registration or that they were awaiting registration. It
was a case where the vehicle in question was stolen and a claim was made by
the insured against the insurer in respect of theft. However, the context of case
of accident was also considered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court with reference to the
Narinder Singh vs. New India Assurance Company Limited and Others case
(2 supra) but it was also a case between the insured and the insurer as to
damage to the vehicle. It was not a case of a third party claim. The principle
underlying is whether the breach would give rise to avoid liability. Provisions of
Motor Vehicles Act like Section 43 and subsequent registration are noted by the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in para No.14 of the judgment in United India Insurance
Company Limited vs. Sushil Kumar Godara (1 Supra).
26. In the present case, there was subsequent registration of the vehicle which
can be seen from the observations in the impugned judgment and also the
evidence vide Ex.X4.
4
2018 SCC OnLine Ker 3543
5
(2004) 8SCC 517
2025:APHC:42607
21
27. It is also relevant to note that, even in respect of want of fitness certificate
etc. contemplated under section 66, Section 66(3) provides that the embargo
contemplated under Section 66(1) has some exceptions. Section 66(3)(d) covers
the exemption in respect of ambulances. In the case on hand before this Court,
the offending vehicle is an ambulance. The claimants are third parties. Nothing
is elicited as to whether any application for registration was made and pending
during the interregnum period. But it is relevant to note that the temporary
registration expired on 29.07.2015 and the accident taken place on 02.08.2015
and the regular registration of vehicle was effected on 03.12.2015 vide Ex.X4.
Insurance Policy under Ex.B1 is covering the period from 30.06.2015 12:00:01
A.M to 29.06.2016 11:59:59 P.M.
28. The learned MACT imposed the liability jointly and severally on both the
respondents i.e. the owner and the Insurance Company. The reasoning of the
learned MACT for imposing the liability on the Insurance Company is that as per
evidence of R.W.3 to run an ambulance no permit is required and the ambulance
is LMV. The driving licence possessed by the respondent No.1 is sufficient to
drive the ambulance. By the date of accident, temporary registration was
obtained by respondent No.2 although the same was expired and regular
registration was obtained thereafter under Section 149(2) there is no reference
about the registration of the vehicle as a defence to avoid the liability. Even
Ex.B1 does not contain such condition. Therefore, it is not possible to accept
2025:APHC:42607
22
that there is a condition in the policy exempting the Insurance Company from
liability on the ground of registration.
29. Factual justification alone addressed by the learned MACT. The mandate
to obtain insurance, making it statutory affair, has a social purpose and such
mandate has been complied with. The mandate of registration is also important
one and its violation is having some consequences. Upon juxtaposition of the
importance of both registration and obtaining of insurance and on visualization of
the purposes for which both provisions are there, particularly from the point of
view of the third party, this Court is of the humble view that it is a fit case to adopt
the policy of „pay and recovery‟ instead of total exemption of the Insurance
Company from liability.
30. When the statute itself provides scope for registration after expiry of
temporary registration and such registration was effected, putting a third party to
denial of remedy does not work in achieving the legislative intendment.
31. Fitness to run the vehicle on road is different from having a fitness
certificate to run the vehicle on the road. Having fitness certificate is different
from having a registration certificate. Having temporary registration and
subsequently having permanent registration is a saving grace in the present
case. The case in United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Sushil Kumar
Godara (1 supra) and Narinder Singh vs. New India Assurance Company
2025:APHC:42607
23
Limited and Others (2 supra) are pertaining to the claim inter se insured and
insurer with reference to the Consumer Protection Act.
32. National Insurance Company Limited vs. Challa Upendra Rao and
Others (5 supra) decided by the Hon‟ble Apex Court and Pareed Pillai vs.
Oriental Insurance Company Limited (4 supra) decided by the Kerala High
Court with reference to fitness certificate.
Violation as to Driving Licence:
33. The defence as to want of transport endorsement does not merit any
consideration in the context of judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. The legal
position as to a person holding of non-transport category driving licence of „Light
Motor Vehicle‟ driving transport vehicle has been addressed by the Hon‟ble Apex
Court in Mukund Dewangan vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited6
[Mukund Dewangan(2016)] and Mukund Dewangan vs. Oriental Insurance
Company Limited7
[Mukund Dewangan(2017)].
34. Further, the reference made on the point whether “a person holding a licence
for a „Light Motor Vehicle‟ class non transport can drive a „Transport Vehicle‟
without a specific endorsement, provided the „Gross Vehicle Weight (GVW)‟ of
the vehicle does not exceed 7,500 Kgs?” is answered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court
in Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Company Limited vs. Rambha Devi and
6
(2016) 4 SCC 298
7
(2019) 12 SCC 816
2025:APHC:42607
24
Others8
at length and the observation are made under the caption of conclusions
are as follows:
131. Our conclusions following the above discussion are as under:—
(I) A driver holding a license for Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) class, under
Section 10(2)(d) for vehicles with a gross vehicle weight under 7,500
kg, is permitted to operate a „Transport Vehicle‟ without needing
additional authorization under Section 10(2)(e) of the MV Act
specifically for the „Transport Vehicle‟ class. For licensing purposes,
LMVs and Transport Vehicles are not entirely separate classes. An
overlap exists between the two. The special eligibility requirements will
however continue to apply for, inter alia, e-carts, e-rickshaws, and
vehicles carrying hazardous goods.
(II) The second part of Section 3(1), which emphasizes the necessity of
a specific requirement to drive a „Transport Vehicle,‟ does not
supersede the definition of LMV provided in Section 2(21) of the MV
Act.
(III) The additional eligibility criteria specified in the MV Act and MV
Rules generally for driving „transport vehicles‟ would apply only to
those intending to operate vehicles with gross vehicle weight
exceeding 7,500 kg i.e. „medium goods vehicle‟, „medium passenger
vehicle‟, „heavy goods vehicle‟ and „heavy passenger vehicle‟.
(IV) The decision in Mukund Dewangan (2017) is upheld but for
reasons as explained by us in this judgment. In the absence of any
obtrusive omission, the decision is not per incuriam, even if certain
provisions of the MV Act and MV Rules were not considered in the said
judgment.
35. It is relevant to note that the evidence relating to the unladen weight of the
vehicle in question is not placed by the Insurance Company. Further, if a person
driving a transport category vehicle with non-transport endorsement, where the
unladen weight of the vehicle is less than 7500 kgs, it will not entitle the
8
2024 SCC Online SC 3183
2025:APHC:42607
25
Insurance Company to claim exoneration from the liability is the settled legal
proposition, as per the Judgments referred above i.e. Mukund Dewangan vs.
Oriental Insurance Company Limited [Mukund Dewangan(2016)] and Mukund
Dewangan vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited [Mukund
Dewangan(2017)] and Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Company Limited
vs. Rambha Devi and Others.
36. In view of the discussion made above, with reference to the factual matrix
in the case and the precedential guidance, this Court finds that the liability
imposed on Insurance Company is proper. However, it is fit to be modified as to
the pay and recovery. The Insurance Company shall pay and recover the same
from the owner of the offending vehicle. The point framed is answered
accordingly.
Point Nos.2 and 3:
Quantum on both cases:
Precedential guidance:-
a) Adoption of Multiplier, Multiplicand and Calculation:
37(i). Hon‟ble Apex Court to have uniformity of practice and consistency in
awarding just compensation provided certain guidelines in Sarla Verma (Smt.)
and Ors. Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr.9
vide paragraph Nos.18
and 19, while prescribing a table directed adoption of suitable multiplier
9
2009 (6) SCC 121
2025:APHC:42607
26
mentioned in column No.4 of the table. As per the observations in the judgment
the claimants have to establish the following:
1. Age of the deceased.
2. Income of the deceased.
3. Number of dependents.
(ii). Hon‟ble Apex Court directed certain steps while determining the
compensation, they are:
Step No.1:
Ascertain the multiplicand, which shall be the income of the deceased he /
she should have contributed to the dependents and the same can be arrived
after deducting certain part of personal living expenses of the deceased.
Step No.2:
Ascertaining Multiplier with reference to the age of the deceased. This
shall be as per the table provided in judgment itself.
Step No.3:
Calculation of the compensation.
Final Step:
After calculation adding of certain amount towards conventional heads
towards loss of estate, loss of consortium, funeral expenditure, cost of transport,
cost of medical expenses for treatment of the deceased before the death etc. are
advised.
2025:APHC:42607
27
b) Adding of future prospects:
38(i). Enhancing the scope for awarding just compensation, the Hon‟ble Apex
Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi and Others10 case
guided for adding of future prospect. In respect of permanent employment, 50%
where the deceased is below 40 years, 30% where the deceased is 40-50 years
and 15% where the deceased is 50-60 years.
(ii). The actual salary to be taken shall be after deducting taxes. Further, in
respect of self employed on fixed salary addition is recommended, at 40% for the
deceased below 40 years, at 25% where the deceased is between 40-50 years,
at 10% where the deceased is between 50-60 years. Further, adding of
compensation for loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses at
Rs.15,000/- and Rs.40,000/- and Rs.15,000/- respectively is recommended by
Hon‟ble Apex court with an addition of 10% for every three years in Pranay
Sethi’s case.
c) Loss of Consortium under the heads of parental and filial consortium:
39. Further enlarging the scope for awarding just and reasonable compensation
in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanu Ram and Others11
,
Hon‟ble Apex Court observed that compensation can be awarded under the
10 2017(16) SCC 680
11 (2018) 18 SCC 130
2025:APHC:42607
28
heads of loss of consortium not only to the spouse but also to the children and
parents under the heads of parental and filial consortium.
d) Just Compensation:
40. In Rajesh and others vs. Rajbir Singh and others12, the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in para Nos.10 and 11 made relevant observations, they are as follows:
10. Whether the Tribunal is competent to award compensation in
excess of what is claimed in the application under Section 166 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is another issue arising for consideration in
this case. At para 10 of Nagappa case [Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh,
(2003) 2 SCC 274 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 523 : AIR 2003 SC 674] , it was
held as follows: (SCC p. 280)
“10. Thereafter, Section 168 empowers the Claims Tribunal to „make
an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it
to be just‟. Therefore, the only requirement for determining the
compensation is that it must be „just‟. There is no other limitation or
restriction on its power for awarding just compensation.”
The principle was followed in the later decisions in Oriental Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Mohd. Nasir [(2009) 6 SCC 280 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 877 :
(2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 987] and in Ningamma v. United India Insurance Co.
Ltd. [(2009) 13 SCC 710 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 241 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri)
1213]
11. Underlying principle discussed in the above decisions is with regard
to the duty of the court to fix a just compensation and it has now
become settled law that the court should not succumb to niceties or
technicalities, in such matters. Attempt of the court should be to equate,
as far as possible, the misery on account of the accident with the
compensation so that the injured/the dependants should not face the
vagaries of life on account of the discontinuance of the income earned
by the victim.
e) Granting of more compensation than what claimed, if the claimants are
otherwise entitled:-
41. The legal position with regard to awarding more compensation than what
claimed has been considered and settled by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court holding
12 (2013) 9 SCC 54
2025:APHC:42607
29
that there is no bar for awarding more compensation than what is claimed. For
the said preposition of law, this Court finds it proper to refer the following
observations of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court made in:
(1) Nagappa Vs. Gurudayal Singh and Others13
, at para 21 of the
judgment, that –
“..there is no restriction that the Tribunal/Court cannot award compensation
amount exceeding the claimed amount. The function of the Tribunal/Court is
to award “just” compensation, which is reasonable on the basis of evidence
produced on record.”
(2) Kajal Vs. Jagadish Chand and Ors.
14 at para 33 of the judgment, as
follows:-
“33. We are aware that the amount awarded by us is more than the amount
claimed. However, it is well settled law that in the motor accident claim
petitions, the Court must award the just compensation and, in case, the just
compensation is more than the amount claimed, that must be awarded
especially where the claimant is a minor.”
(3) Ramla and Others Vs. National Insurance Company Limited and
Others15 at para 5 of the judgment, as follows:-
13 (2003) 2 SCC 274
142020 (04) SCC 413
15 (2019) 2 SCC 192
2025:APHC:42607
30
“5. Though the claimants had claimed a total compensation of Rs 25,00,000
in their claim petition filed before the Tribunal, we feel that the compensation
which the claimants are entitled to is higher than the same as mentioned
supra. There is no restriction that the Court cannot award compensation
exceeding the claimed amount, since the function of the Tribunal or Court
under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is to award “just
compensation”. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial and welfare legislation.
A “just compensation” is one which is reasonable on the basis of evidence
produced on record. It cannot be said to have become time-barred. Further,
there is no need for a new cause of action to claim an enhanced amount. The
courts are duty-bound to award just compensation.”
42. In respect of M.V.O.P.No.157 of 2015, the income of the deceased,
adopted at Rs.4,500/- per month, when seen with reference to his age, socioeconomic circumstances from which the deceased hails and the bachelor status
of the deceased, is found justified.
43. It is also relevant to note that the claimants are the brothers and total
dependency factor on the Income of the deceased may not be there for them.
44. P.W.1 stated that due to sudden death of the deceased, they lost the love
and affection and moral support of the deceased and they are suffering mental
agony.
2025:APHC:42607
31
45. In Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad vs.
Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and another16, the point considered was, whether a
brother of a person who is killed in a motor vehicle accident can claim
compensation in a proceeding instituted before the Motor Accidents Claims
Tribunal and observed that the Court should remember that in an Indian family
brothers, sisters and brothers children and sometimes foster children live
together and they are dependent upon bread winner of the family. If the bread
winner is killed on account of motor vehicle accident, there is no justification to
deny them compensation. It was a case where a „14‟ years old boy died in a
motor vehicle accident and the brothers of the deceased instituted a petition for
compensation. The compensation awarded was questioned. In that scenario, the
above observations are made with reference to Fatal Accidents Act etc.
46. In a case between The Branch Manager, United India Insurance
Company Ltd. Vs. Dhamodhara Pandian17
, while addressing an appeal filed
under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the principles relating to entitlement
of legal representatives to claim compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act,
even if they are not financially dependent on the deceased has been considered
by the Hon‟ble High Court of Madras vide para Nos.11 to 14, after referring to
Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad vs. Ramanbhai
16 1987 Supreme (SC) 522
17 2025 Supreme (Online) (Mad) 55911
2025:APHC:42607
32
Prabhatbhai and another case mentioned above, the observations in para 11 to
14 are as follows:
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Ltd., Vs.
Birender and others reported in (2020)11 Supreme Court Cases 356, has
specifically held that all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased
can move application for compensation and the relevant passages are
extracted hereunder:
“12. The legal representatives of the deceased could move
application for compensation by virtue of clause (c) of Section
166(1). The major married son who is also earning and not fully
dependant on the deceased, would be still covered by the
expression “legal representative” of the deceased. This Court in
Manjuri Bera (supra) had expounded that liability to pay
compensation under the Act does not cease because of absence
of dependency of the concerned legal representative. Notably,
the expression “legal representative” has not been defined in the
Act. In Manjuri Bera (supra), the Court observed thus:
“9. In terms of clause (c) of subsection (1) of Section
166 of the Act in case of death, all or any of the legal
representatives of the deceased become entitled to
compensation and any such legal representative can file
a claim petition. The proviso to said subsection makes
the position clear that where all the legal representatives
had not joined, then application can be made on behalf
of the legal representatives of the deceased by
impleading those legal representatives as respondents.
Therefore, the High Court was justified in its view that the
appellant could maintain a claim petition in terms of
Section 166 of the Act.
2025:APHC:42607
33
10. …..The Tribunal has a duty to make an award,
determine the amount of compensation which is just and
proper and specify the person or persons to whom such
compensation would be paid. The latter part relates to
the entitlement of compensation by a person who claims
for the same.
11. According to Section 2(11) CPC, “legal
representative” means a person who in law represents
the estate of a deceased person, and includes any
person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased
and where a party sues or is sued in a representative
character the person on whom the estate devolves on
the death of the party so suing or sued. Almost in similar
terms is the definition of legal representative under the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 i.e. Under Section
2(1)(g).
12. As observed by this Court in Custodian of Branches of BANCO
National Ultramarino v. Nalini Bai Naique [1989 Supp (2) SCC 275 the
definition contained in Section 2(11) CPC is inclusive in character and its
scope is wide, it is not confined to legal heirs only. Instead it stipulates that
a person who may or may not be legal heir competent to inherit the
property of the deceased can represent the estate of the deceased
person. It includes heirs as well as persons who represent the estate even
without title either as executors or administrators in possession of the
estate of the deceased. All such persons would be covered by the
expression “legal representative”. As observed in Gujarat SRTC v.
Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai [(1987) 3 SCC 234 a legal representative is one
who suffers on account of death of a person due to a motor vehicle
accident and need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent and child.”
2025:APHC:42607
34
13. In paragraph 15 of the said decision, while adverting to the provisions
of Section 140 of the Act, the Court observed that even if there is no loss
of dependency, the claimant, if he was a legal representative, will be
entitled to compensation. In the concurring judgment of Justice S.H.
Kapadia, as His Lordship then was, it is observed that there is distinction
between “right to apply for compensation” and “entitlement to
compensation”. The compensation constitutes part of the estate of the
deceased. As a result, the legal representative of the deceased would
inherit the estate. Indeed, in that case, the Court was dealing with the case
of a married daughter of the deceased and the efficacy of Section 140 of
the Act. Nevertheless, the principle underlying the exposition in this
decision would clearly come to the aid of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2
(claimants) even though they are major sons of the deceased and also
earning.
14. It is thus settled by now that the legal representatives of the deceased
have a right to apply for compensation. Having said that, it must
necessarily follow that even the major married and earning sons of the
deceased being legal representatives have a right to apply for
compensation and it would be the bounden duty of the Tribunal to
consider the application irrespective of the fact whether the concerned
legal representative was fully dependant on the deceased and not to limit
the claim towards conventional heads only. .......
12. A learned Judge of this Court in K.Sivakumar Vs. R.Muthu
Kumar and Others reported in 2022(2) TN MAC 403 after
considering the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this
Court, has held that there is no iota of doubt that the legal
representatives can maintain the claim under Section 167 of the
Motor Vehicles Act and so, the issue as to whether the brother of
2025:APHC:42607
35
the deceased can maintain a claim and whether he is entitled for
compensation is answered in favour of the appellants/claimants.
13. As already pointed out, in the case on hand, the first claimant
being the brother of the deceased along with his wife and
children have laid the above application claiming compensation
for the death of his brother Lakshmana Kumar. Considering the
above and the legal position above referred, this Court has no
hesitation to hold that the claimants are entitled to claim
compensation under the loss of dependency and others heads.”
11. Recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Jithendra kumar and
another Vs. Sanjay Prasad and another in Civil Appeal No.7199
of 2025, dated 22.05.2025, has specifically held that the legal
representatives, including married and earning sons and
daughters, are entitled to claim compensation under the Motor
Vehicles Act irrespective of financial dependency on the
deceased and the relevant passages are extracted hereunder :
13.In our considered opinion, the view on this issue cannot be
faulted. The exposition of law in Birender (Supra) is clear,
wherein it was observed as under:
“14. It is thus settled by now that the legal representatives of the
deceased have a right to apply for compensation. Having said
that, it must necessarily follow that even the major married and
earning sons of the deceased being legal representatives have a
right to apply for compensation and it would be the bounden duty
of the Tribunal to consider the application irrespective of the fact
whether the legal representative concerned was fully dependent
on the deceased and not to limit the claim towards conventional
heads only.”
14.Such exposition came to be followed by this Court in Seema
Rani and Ors. v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. 6 , wherein
2025:APHC:42607
36
it was observed that the application for compensation, even by
married sons and daughters, must be considered, irrespective of
whether they are fully dependant or not. In the present case, it
cannot be disputed that the claimant-appellant(s) became partner
in the consultancy firm run by the deceased. Moreover, it is not in
dispute that that the Flour Mill being run by the deceased, is still
being run by the claimant-appellant(s). In such a factual
circumstance, it cannot be said that the claimant-appellant(s)
were financially dependent upon the deceased.
47. In a judgment, the High Court of Madras referred to the judgment of the
Hon‟ble Apex Court in Jithendra Kumar and another vs. sanjay Prasad and
another in Civil Appeal No.7199 of 2025 dated 22.05.2025, with regard to the
entitlement of legal representatives, including married and earning sons and
daughters. In the said case, High Court of Madras positively held entitlement of
brothers for compensation and approved awarding of compensation by the
learned MACT by applying the principles in Sarla Verma‟s and Pranay Sethi‟s
etc. cases. Therefore, the contention of Insurance Company found not tenable.
48. The other argument of the Insurance Company is that the income of the
deceased adopted is excessive. When the same is considered with reference to
the year of accident 2015. The counter argument of the claimants is that future
prospects are not added. Since there is no apparent basis for accepting the
income adopted by the learned MACT which is the notional basis, if the same is
2025:APHC:42607
37
fit to be considered as excessive the argument of the claimants that future
prospects are not added required to be answered.
49. The income adopted by the learned MACT in respect of both claimants if
taken as inclusive of future prospects, the grievance of the Insurance Company
as well as the claimants would get addressed. Therefore, the income adopted is
considered as inclusive of future prospects in the factual scenario of the cases
before this Court.
50. Upon considering entire case and contentions, the entitlement of claimants
in both cases for compensation in comparison to compensation awarded by the
learned MACT is concluded as follows:
Details of entitlement of claimants in respect of deceased Nos.1 and 2 and
relevant aspects as to quantification of compensation:
Sl.
N0.
Head Deceased No.1
(Muttanaboyina Prasad)
in M.V.O.P.No.157 of 2015 /
M.A.C.M.A.No.1227 of 2017
Deceased No.2
(Challa Sattibabu)
in M.V.O.P.No.158 of 2014 /
M.A.C.M.A.No.1218 of 2017
Adopted by the
learned MACT
Accepted by
this Court
Granted by the
learned MACT
Fixed by this
Court
1. Income of the
deceased
Rs.27,000/- Rs.27,000/- Rs.64,000/- Rs.64,000/-
2. Multiplier
applied is
16 16 16 16
3. Calculation Rs.27,000/- x 16
=Rs.4,32,000/-
Rs.27,000/- x
16=
Rs.4,32,000/-
Rs.64,000/-x16=
Rs.10,24,000/-
Rs.64,000/-x16=
Rs.10,24,000/-
2025:APHC:42607
38
4. Loss of
dependency /
financial loss
Rs.4,32,000/- Rs.4,32,000/- Rs.10,24,000/- Rs.10,24,000/-
5. Non
pecuniary
damages
Rs.25,000/- -NilRs.1,50,000/-
-NilLoss of
consortium
-Nil- -Nil- Rs.1,60,000/-
@ 40,000/- to each
claimant
6. Loss of
Estate
-Nil- Rs.15,000/- -Nil- Rs.15,000/-
7. Funeral
Expenditure
Rs.25,000/-
(Including
transportation)
Rs.15,000/- Rs.25,000/-
(Including
transportation)
Rs.15,000/-
Total Rs.4,82,000/- Rs.4,62,000/- Rs.11,99,000/- Rs.12,14,000/-
51. For the aforesaid reasons stated, Point Nos.2 and 3 are answered
concluding that the claimants in respect of deceased No.1 in M.V.O.P.No.157 of
2015 are entitled for compensation at Rs.4,62,000/- and the claimants in respect
of deceased No.2 in M.V.O.P.No.158 of 2015 are entitled for compensation at
Rs.12,14,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum.
Point Nos.4 and 5:
52. For the aforesaid reasons and in view of the findings of point Nos.1 to 3,
Point Nos.4 and 5 are answered as follows:
In the result,
M.A.C.M.A.No.1227 of 2017
(i) The appeal is partly allowed.
(ii) Compensation awarded by the learned MACT in M.V.O.P.No.157 of
2015 at Rs.4,82,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum is
2025:APHC:42607
39
modified to Rs.4,62,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum
from the date of petition till the date of realization.
(iii) The compensation amount shall be equally apportioned among all
the claimants.
(iv) The respondents before the learned MACT are jointly and severally
liable. However, the Insurance Company is entitled to recover the
amount on payment from owner of the offending vehicle viz.
Respondent No.2 before the learned MACT.
(v) Claimants are entitled to withdraw the compensation amount at once
on deposit.
(vi) Time for deposit is two months.
M.A.C.M.A.No.1218 of 2017:
(i) The appeal is partly allowed.
(ii) Compensation awarded by the learned MACT in M.V.O.P.No.158 of
2015 at Rs.11,99,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum is
modified and enhanced to Rs.12,14,000/- with interest at the rate of
7.5% per annum from the date of petition till the date of realization.
(iii) Claimant No.1 / the mother of the deceased is entitled for
Rs.4,85,600/- with proportionate interest and total costs.
(iv) Claimant No.2 / the daughter of the deceased is entitled for
Rs.2,42,800/- with proportionate interest.
2025:APHC:42607
40
(v) Claimant No.3 / the son of the deceased is entitled for Rs.2,42,800/-
with proportionate interest.
(vi) Claimant No.4 / the mother of the deceased is entitled for
Rs.2,42,800/- with proportionate interest.
(vii) Claimants are liable to pay the Court fee, if any, for the enhanced
part of the compensation, before the learned MACT.
(viii) Respondents before the learned MACT are jointly and severally
liable. However, the Insurance Company is entitled to recover the
amount on payment from owner of the offending vehicle viz.
Respondent No.2 before the learned MACT.
(ix) Claimants are entitled to withdraw the compensation amount at once
on deposit.
(x) Time for deposit is two months.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in these appeals
shall stand closed.
____________________________
A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA, J
Date:10th, October, 2025
Note:
L.R. copy to be marked.
B/o.
Knr
2025:APHC:42607
41
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
M.A.C.M.A.Nos.1218 & 1227 of 2017
October, 2025
Knr
2025:APHC:42607
42
2025:APHC:42607
