Constitution of India – Writ – Scope of jurisdiction of High Court – Wages – Revision – The demands of the Union would appear from the charter of demand and they primarily relate to prayers for revision in pay scale/wages/salaries along with certain allowances such as leave facilities and gratuity – The Tribunal, in its award passed, granted relief to the employees – Writ petitions filed – The High Court entered into the factfinding exercise while testing legality of an award – The High Court allowed the workmen’s writ petition by setting aside the award of the Tribunal so far as the first four demands as per the charter are concerned and upheld the Tribunal’s verdict regarding Demand No. 5-11 – Correctness:

* Author

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 576 : 2024 INSC 293

The VVF Ltd. Employees Union

v.

M/S. VVF India Limited & Anr.

(Civil Appeal Nos. 2744-2745 of 2023)

09 April 2024

[Aniruddha Bose* and Sanjay Kumar, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

The two appeals arise out of a judgment delivered by a Single

Judge of the High Court of Bombay on 25.07.2019 directing, inter

alia, wage revisions pertaining to the workmen of employer-VVF

Ltd. working in two units at Sewree and Sion. Whether the High

Court had travelled beyond its jurisdiction in appreciating facts

and in that process substituted the finding of the Tribunal with its

own finding on facts.

Headnotes

Constitution of India – Writ – Scope of jurisdiction of High

Court – Wages – Revision – The demands of the Union would

appear from the charter of demand and they primarily relate

to prayers for revision in pay scale/wages/salaries along with

certain allowances such as leave facilities and gratuity – The

Tribunal, in its award passed, granted relief to the employees

– Writ petitions filed – The High Court entered into the factfinding exercise while testing legality of an award – The High

Court allowed the workmen’s writ petition by setting aside the

award of the Tribunal so far as the first four demands as per

the charter are concerned and upheld the Tribunal’s verdict

regarding Demand No. 5-11 – Correctness:

Held: Analysis of the various judgments of the Supreme Court

reflect the position of law that though the High Court ought not to

re-appreciate evidence and substitute its own finding for that of

the Tribunal, it would not be beyond the jurisdiction of the High

Court in its power of judicial review to altogether eschew such a

process – The High Court, in the impugned judgment, however,

re-appreciated the evidence led before the Tribunal in identifying

comparable concerns for applying the industry-cum-region test – In

particular, the employer has emphasised that the High Court ignored

the negative financial status of the company on the ground that 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 577

The VVF Ltd. Employees Union v. M/S. VVF India Limited & Anr.

the losses made by it was miniscule – The financial capacity of an

employer is an important factor which could not be ignored in fixing

wage structure – In the given facts where the employer seriously

contested the use of the concerned units as comparable ones, and

highlighted its difficult financial position, the proper course would

have been to remit the matter to the Industrial Tribunal rather than

entering into these factual question independently in exercise of

the writ jurisdiction – This exercise would have required leading

of evidence before the primary forum, the Industrial Tribunal in

this case. [Para 15]

Case Law Cited

Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and Others [2003]

Supp. 2 SCR 290 : (2003) 6 SCC 675; General

Management, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project,

Orrisa and Others v. Giridhari Sahu and Others [2019]

12 SCR 293 : (2019) 10 SCC 695; M/S Unichem

Laboratories Ltd. v. Workmen [1972] 3 SCR 567 : (1972)

3 SCC 552, Shail (SMT) v. Manoj Kumar and Others

[2004] 3 SCR 649 : (2004) 4 SCC 785; IEL Supervisors’

Association and Others v. Duncans Industries Ltd. and

Another (2018) 4 SCC 505; Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd.

and Others v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha and

Others [1980] 2 SCR 146 : (1980) 2 SCC 593; The Silk

and Art Silk Mills Association Ltd. v. Mill Mazdoor Sabha

[1973] 1 SCR 277 : (1972) 2 SCC 253; Shivraj Fine

Arts Litho Works v. State Industrial Court, Nagpur & Ors.

[1978] 3 SCR 411 : (1978) 2 SCC 601; A.K. Bindal v.

Union of India & Ors. [2003] 3 SCR 928 : (2003) 5 SCC

163; Mukand Ltd. v. Mukand Staff & Officers Association

[2004] 2 SCR 951 : (2004) 10 SCC 460 – referred to.

Workmen v. New Egerton Woollen Mills (1969) 2 LLJ

782; French Motor Car Co. Ltd. v. Workmen (1962) 2

LLJ 744 – referred to.

List of Acts

Constitution of India.

List of Keywords

Wages; Revision; Writ; Jurisdiction of High Court; Re-appreciation

of facts; Legality of award

578 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.2744-2745 of

2023

From the Judgment and Order dated 22.06.2021 and 25.07.2019 of

the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in RPL No. 82 of 2019 and

WP No. 1920 of 2014 respectively

With

Civil Appeal No. 2754 of 2023

Appearances for Parties

Jamshed P. Cama, Sanjay Singhvi, Sr. Advs., Anil Kumar Mishra-i,

Prashant Pavaskar, Supantha Sinha, Anand Amrit Raj, Bennet D’

Costa, Ms. Jignasha Pandya, Nitin S. Tambwekar, Seshatalpa Sai

Bandaru,, Advs. for the appearing parties.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Aniruddha Bose, J.

The two appeals (i.e. Civil Appeal Nos.2745 and 2754 of 2023) arise

out of a judgment delivered by a learned Single Judge of the High

Court of Bombay on 25.07.2019 directing, inter alia, wage revisions

pertaining to the workmen of VVF India Limited (“the employer”)

working in two units at Sewree and Sion. Civil Appeal No.2744 of

2023 has been instituted by the employees union (“the union”) against

a judgment of the High Court delivered on 22.06.2021 dismissing the

union’s petition for review of the judgment passed on 25.07.2019.

Argument of the union in the review petition was that their submissions

relating to certain allowances were not considered in the main

judgment. The employer is the appellant in Civil Appeal No.2754 of

2023 and the union is the appellant in Civil Appeal No.2744 of 2023

as also Civil Appeal No.2745 of 2023.

2. The present proceedings have their origin in a charter of demand

raised by the union on 04.03.2008. The demand was in respect

of altogether 146 workmen, out of which 80 were engaged at the

employer’s establishment at Sewree and 66 of them employed at

Sion, both being situated within Mumbai. We find from the judgment

delivered on 24.07.2019 (which we shall henceforth refer to as the 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 579

The VVF Ltd. Employees Union v. M/S. VVF India Limited & Anr.

judgment under appeal) that the original corporate entity VVF Ltd.,

underwent a demerger process and the units of the company at Sion

and Taloja went to VVF India Ltd., the resulting company, during

pendency of the reference, arising from the charter of demand.

3. The demands of the Union would appear from the charter of demand

and they primarily relate to prayers for revision in pay scale/wages/

salaries along with certain allowances such as leave facilities and

gratuity. The charter of demand for the year 2008 to 2011 were under

the following heads:-

“The Charter of Demand for the corresponding year 2008

to 2011 is as follows1. Revision in the Pay Scale / Salary: The Old Pay

Scale / Salary grade should be replaced by the New

or Revised Pay Scale to the Categories of Workmen

and Staff, which is annexed hereto as Annexure I & II.

2. Adjustment :

a) The present basic of employees/staff as in

annexure I & II should brought up to the level

of minimum of wage-scales wherever they are

below.

b) ‘Those whose present wages of basic do not

fit in any stages of their respective revised

wage-scales and fall in between two stages,

they should be stepped up to nearest highest

stages in the scales.

c) On doing so (a) & (b) above every employees/

staff should be granted additional increment

in their respective wage-scales as indicated

below :-

i) Those who have put service of up to 5

years - 1 increment

ii) Those who have put service of more than 5

years but less than 10 years - 2 increment

iii) Those who have put service of more than

10 year but less than 15 years - 3 increment

580 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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iv) Those who have put service of more than 15

years but less than 20 years - 4 increment

v) those who have put service of more than 20

years but less than 25 years – 5 increment

vi) Those who have put service of more than

25 years - 6 increment

3. Fixed Dearness Allowance (FDA): The Fixed

Dearness Allowance should be revised from Rs.

225/- per month to Rs.2225/- per month, which shall

stand reduced oil pro-rata on loss of pay.

4. Variable Dearness Allowance: Tbc Variable Dearness

Allowance should be revised and increased to

50% respective grade wise of the present Variable

Dearness Allowance.

5. House Remuneration Allowance: The House

Remuneration Allowance to be increased to 20% of

the basic wages and Dearness Allowance or to Rs

2000/- per month, whichever is higher

6. Shift Allowance: The Shift Allowances should be

increased in all categories irrespective of any shift

he worked, which is as follows–

1st Shift Allowance - Rs.20/-

2nd Shift Allowance - Rs.30/-

3rd Shift Allowance - Rs.50/-

7. Travelling Conveyance Allowance: Tite Travelling

Conveyance allowances should be given to all

Employees amounting to Rs. 1000 per month.

8. Medical Allowance: The Medical Allowance shall be

raised to Rs. 15,000 per annum to all categories of

Workmen, which falls out of the purview of ESI Act.

9. Education Allowance: An Education Allowance should

be introduced to all the Workmen whose Children

are studying in School or College. The Education

Allowance should also be provided to those Workmen 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 581

The VVF Ltd. Employees Union v. M/S. VVF India Limited & Anr.

who are studying to an amount of Rs. 15,000 per

annum for their higher Studies.

10. Leave Travel Allowance: The old Leave Travel

Allowance should be revised from 1,200/- per year

to Rs.6000/- per year.

11. Leave Facilities:

a) Sick Leave to be increased from 7 days per

year to 15 days per year.

b) Casual Leave to be increased from 10 days per

year to 12 days per year.

c) Privilege Leave to be increased from 15 days

per year to 33 days per year.

d) Paternity Leave to be introduced to 7 days per

year.

12. Mediclaim Policy to the Family Members: The family

of the Employees who falls out of purview of ESI

Act shall be provided with a General Insurance

Mediclaim Policy to the family members amounting

to Rs.3 lacs only.

13. Gratuity: The Gratuity of the Employees should be

increased to 30 days per year instead of 15 days

per year.

14. Housing Loan facility: The. Employees who have

completed his 5 years of service or more should

be entitled to Housing Loan @ 5% per annum or a

rebate of @.5 % per annum on the loan availed in

any Bank or Society.

15. Personal Loan Facility: The Employees who have

completed his 2 years of service or more should

be entitled to Personal Loan @9% per annum or a

rebate of @ 5% per annum on the loan availed from

any Bank or Society.”

4. The Tribunal, in its award passed on 29.03.2014, granted relief to

the employees represented by the union under the following heads

and in the following manner:- 

582 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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"i) Reference is answered partly in affirmative.

ii) The following demands raised by the Second Party

Workmen are granted as follows:-

1) Demand No. 5:- House Rent(Remuneration)

Allowance- The First Party Company is directed

to increase the HRA to 20% of the basic wages

and dearness allowance or to Rs.2000/- per

month whichever is higher.

2) Demand No.6:- Shift Allowance- The First Party

Company is directed to pay the shift allowance

to all the workers irrespective of any shift they

worked, as follows:-

1st Shift Allowance - Rs.20/-

2nd Shift Allowance - Rs.30/-

3rd Shift Allowance - Rs.50/-

This allowance will not be reckoned for provident

fund, HRA, Leave encashment, bonus, gratuity,

overtime, etc. or any other benefits.

3) Demand No. 7:- Travelling Conveyance

Allowance- This demand is allowed partly. The

First Party Company is directed to increase this

allowance from Rs. 600 to Rs.800 per month.

This allowance will not be reckoned for provident

fund, HRA, Leave encashment, bonus, gratuity,

overtime, etc. or any other benefits.

4) Demand No.8:- Medical Allowance This demand

is allowed partly. The First Party Company

is directed to pay the medical allowance

@ Rs.1000/- per month to all categories of

workmen, who fall out of the purview of the

ESI Act. This allowance will not be reckoned for

provident fund, HRA, Leave encashment, bonus,

gratuity, overtime, etc. or any other benefits.

5) Demand No. 9:- Education Allowance- This

demand is allowed partly. The First Party

Company is directed to pay the education 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 583

The VVF Ltd. Employees Union v. M/S. VVF India Limited & Anr.

allowance @ Rs.1000/- per month to all the

workmen whose children are studying in school

or college or even doing higher studies. This

allowance will not be reckoned for provident

fund, HRA, Leave encashment, bonus, gratuity,

overtime, etc. or any other benefits.

6) Demand No.10:- Leave Travel AllowanceThe First Party Company is directed to grant

Leave Travel Allowances to all the employees

concerned in this Reference at par with that

given to Taloja factory workmen on the same

terms and conditions. This demand is allowed

partly. This allowance will not be reckoned

for provident fund, HRA, Leave encashment,

bonus, gratuity, overtime, etc. or any other

benefits.

7) Demand No.11:- Mediclaim Policy to the Family

Member~:-This demand is partly allowed. The

First Party Company is directed to provide to the

family of the concerned workmen who fall out of

the purview of the ESI Act with the Mediclaim

Policy amounting to Rs.1 lac only, at par with

that being given to the Taloja factory workmen

on the same terms and conditions.

iii) The following demands of the Second Party Workmen

are rejected:-

1) Demand No.1 :- Revision in the Pay Scale/

Salary.

2) Demand No.2:- Adjustment.

3) Demand No.3:- Fixed Dearness Allowance.

4) Demand No.4:-Variable Dearness Allowance.

iv) The First Party Company is directed to extend the

benefits arising out of the grant of the aforementioned

demands in clause (ii) herein to the workmen

concerned in this Reference w.e.f 13.11.2009.Arrears

of these allowances upto 31-03-2014 be paid the 

584 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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workmen concerned within 60 days from the date of

publication of this award by the appropriate Authority.

v) The First Party Company is at liberty to adjust the

interim amount paid to the concerned employees

from their arrears.

vi) In the circumstances, no order as to cost.”

5. Both the employer and the union challenged the said award by

instituting separate writ petitions before the High Court of Bombay

and these writ petitions were disposed of by a common judgment

by a learned Single Judge of the High Court, being the judgment

under appeal before us. The Union’s writ petition was registered

as Writ Petition No. 1920 of 2014 whereas the writ petition of the

company was registered as Writ Petition No.3152 of 2014. The High

Court allowed the workmen’s writ petition by setting aside the award

of the Tribunal so far as the first four demands as per the charter

are concerned and upheld the Tribunal’s verdict regarding Demand

No. 5-11. The particulars thereof would appear from the following

passages of the judgment: -

“25. The Petitioner union is demanding increase in basic

wages from 1 January 2010. The proposed revised pay

scale is as follows :

GRADE

USK 10 1 13 2 19 3 28 4 40 5 55

SSK 20 2 26 3 35 5 50 7 71 9 98

SK 30 3 39 5 54 7 75 10 105 14 147

HSK 1000 100 1300 150 1750 225 24258 325 3400 450 4750

l” CLASS

BOILER

ATTENDANT

1100 110 1430 165 1925 250 2675 375 3800 525 5375

WATCHMAN 500 50 650 75 875 115 1220 165 1715 250 2465

PEON 400 40 520 60 700 90 970 130 1360 180 1900

HEAD

WATCHMAN

750 75 975 125 1350 200 1950 300 2850 425 4125

DRIVER 750 75 975 125 1350 200 1950 300 2850 425 4125

JR.

SUPERVISOR

1200 120 1560 180 2100 270 2910 400 4110 550 5760

SR.

SUPERVISOR

2500 250 3250 350 4300 550 5950 825 8425 1175 11950

OFFICER

SUPERVISOR

3000 300 3900 450 5250 675 7275 1000 10275 1450 14625

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 585

The VVF Ltd. Employees Union v. M/S. VVF India Limited & Anr.

The following adjustments are proposed so as to rationalize

the transition from the present basic wage structure to the

revised scale proposed as above:

A. The present basic of employees I staff as in annexure

I & II should brought up to the level of minimum of

wage scales wherever they are below.

B. Those whose present wages of basic do not fit in any

stages of their respective revised wage scales and

fall in between two stages, they should be stepped

up to earnest highest stages in the scales.

C. On doing so (a) and (b) above every employee /

staff should be granted additional increment in their

respective wage scales as indicated below:-

i) Those who have put service up to 5 years

increment

-1

ii) Those who have put service more than

5 years but less than 10 years increment

-2

iii) Those who have put service more than

10 years but less than 15 years increment

-3

(iv) Those who have put service more than

15 years but less than 20 years increment

-4

(v) Those who have put service more than

20 years but less than 25 years increment

-5

vi) Those who have put service more than 25

years increment

-6”

"29. To arrive at the proposed revision, the existing

fixed dearness allowance of Rs.225/- for daily

rated unskilled (USK), Semi skilled (SSK) and

skilled workmen (SK) as also monthly rated Highly

Skilled workmen (HSK), 1st class boiler attendants,

watchmen, head watchman, drivers, peons (i.e. all

employees other than supervisors and officers) can

be appropriately raised by Rs.1000/- per month so

as to make it Rs.1225/- per month. Fixed dearness

allowance for monthly rated junior supervisors,

supervisors and senior supervisors and officers 

586 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

may not be increased. So far as variable dearness

allowance is concerned, no increase may be in order

till 2011. Increase, if any, deserves to be considered

from 2011 onwards, which demand, anyway, is the

subject matter of a separate reference (for the period

2011-2014).”

So far as the employer’s writ petition is concerned the same was

dismissed. The High Court held that there was no serious anomaly

in the demands of the union allowed by the Tribunal.

6. The union, in its writ petition, argued that the Tribunal had failed to

consider the plea of the workmen for parity with similarly situated

units in the vicinity as well as its claim for overtime allowances. The

test applied by the High Court as regards comparison with the similar

units would appear from paragraph 26 of the impugned judgment,

which reads:-

“26 In Justification, what was submitted was that this,

along with the applicable allowances (as revised), would

bring the Mumbai workmen on par with their counterparts

in the Taloja unit. To assess this submission, I called upon

both parties to submit their respective charts of Mumbai

and Taloja salaries for all classes of workers and the

impact of revision in pay scales proposed by the union.

According to the union, the revision proposed would bring

up the salaries of skilled grade workmen having 15 years

of service (taken as a representative case) to Rs.16,250/-

per month as against the salaries of Rs.16,248/- of their

Taloja counterparts (as of October 2010). (Comparative

chart of Godrej Industries, Deepak Fertilizers and Hikal

Ltd. shows their comparable salaries, as of October 2010,

of Rs.28,621/-, Rs.20,492/- and Rs.21,419/- respectively.)

The monthly and annual burdens on the Respondent

employer occasioned by the increase work out to between

Rs.6.58 lacs to Rs.14.01 lacs per month, and Rs.78.94

lacs to Rs.1.68 crores, for the particular wage fixation

period, namely, from 2008 to 2011.”

7. The employer has assailed the judgment questioning the jurisdiction

of the Writ Court in entering into fact-finding exercise while testing

legality of an award. The employer’s case argued by Mr. Cama, 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 587

The VVF Ltd. Employees Union v. M/S. VVF India Limited & Anr.

learned Senior Advocate, sought to fault the approach of the High

Court mainly on this ground. He has also argued that the units

with which the High Court had made comparison to arrive at its

finding were not similarly situated, having regard to their industrial

output and financial position. He submits further that the High Court

in any event would not sit in appeal over the Tribunal’s award in

exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review, primarily applying the

scope of the writ of certiorari. He has relied on judgments of this

Court in the cases of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and

Others [(2003) 6 SCC 675], General Management, Electrical

Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orrisa and Others -vs- Giridhari

Sahu and Others [(2019) 10 SCC 695]. In the former judgment,

it has been held:-

“12. In the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction, the High

Court proceeds on an assumption that a court which has

jurisdiction over a subject-matter has the jurisdiction to

decide wrongly as well as rightly. The High Court would

not, therefore, for the purpose of certiorari assign to itself

the role of an appellate court and step into reappreciating

or evaluating the evidence and substitute its own findings

in place of those arrived at by the inferior court.”

Broadly the same principle has been laid down in the case of

Giridhari Sahu (supra). Mr. Cama has also submitted that in the

event the High Court found flaw in the reasoning of the Tribunal on

factual basis, instead of undertaking the exercise of revision of pay

scale and wages as also other facilities itself in substituting its view

in place of the Tribunal’s, the High Court ought to have remanded

the matter to the Tribunal itself.

8. The union was represented by Mr. Sanjay Singhvi, learned

senior counsel. His submission is that it would be well within the

jurisdiction of the High Court to undertake some form of exercise

of appreciation of facts and on judgments he has relied on the

judgment of this Court in the cases of M/S Unichem Laboratories

Ltd. -vs- Workmen [(1972) 3 SCC 552], Workmen -vs- New

Egerton Woollen Mills [(1969) 2 LLJ 782], Shail (SMT) -vsManoj Kumar and Others [(2004) 4 SCC 785], IEL Supervisors’

Association and Others -vs- Duncans Industries Ltd. and

Another [(2018) 4 SCC 505]. 

588 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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9. Relying on this line of authorities, and also a judgment of this Court

in the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. and Others -vs- Gujarat

Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha and Others [(1980) 2 SCC 593], he

has argued that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226

of the Constitution of India is wide enough and can decide factual

issues instead of remanding a matter. In the latter authority, it was

held, inter-alia, that in appropriate cases, the High Court’s jurisdiction

could be coordinate to that of the Tribunal.

10. On behalf of both the parties, a large body of authorities has been

relied upon but in this judgment, we shall deal with those decisions

only which we find relevant for effective adjudication of the present

appeal.

11. As we have already indicated, the main question which has been

argued by the learned counsel appearing for the employer is on the

issue as to whether the High Court had travelled beyond its jurisdiction

in appreciating facts and in that process substituted the finding of

the Tribunal with its own finding on facts. To substantiate the point,

as we have already discussed, the cases of Giridhari (supra) and

Surya Dev Rai (supra) have been relied on by Mr. Cama.

12. There are authorities, to which we have referred to earlier in this

judgment that lay down the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court.

In the cases of Unichem Laboratories Ltd. (supra), Shail (SMT)

(supra), IEL Supervisors’ Assn. (supra) as also the case of Gujarat

Steel Tubes Ltd. (supra), it has been held that the High Court in

appropriate cases can go into facts while examining an award of a

Tribunal.

13. For revision of wages and other facilities, the standard criteria which

is followed by the industrial adjudicator is to apply industry-cumregion test, which in substance implies that the prevailing pay and

other allowances should be compared with equally placed or similarly

situated industrial units in the same region. To determine comparability

of units applying the industry-cum-region test, inter alia, the financial

capacity of the employer would be a strong factor. Reliance on this

point has been placed on the cases of French Motor Car Co. Ltd.

-vs- Workmen [(1962) 2 LLJ 744], The Silk and Art Silk Mills

Association Ltd. -vs- Mill Mazdoor Sabha [(1972) 2 SCC 253]

and Shivraj Fine Arts Litho Works -vs- State Industrial Court,

Nagpur & Ors. [(1978) 2 SCC 601].

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 589

The VVF Ltd. Employees Union v. M/S. VVF India Limited & Anr.

14. Substantial argument of Mr. Cama was on selection of comparable

units. His submission is that the High erred in identifying the matching

units and also calling for fresh charts in course of hearing of the writ

petition with respect to Taloja unit of the original employer. It is the

stand of the employer that such evidence gathering exercise ought not

to have been undertaken by the High Court. It was also pointed out

on behalf of the employer that it was making losses barring in three

financial years between 2008-09 and 2021-22. Further submission

of Mr. Cama is that the workmen of the Taloja unit were not of the

same employer after the demerger had taken place and that they

were involved in a separate set of activities when compared to the

other units in question.

15. Analysis of the authorities relied on by the learned counsel for parties

reflect the position of law on this point to be that, though the High

Court ought not to reappreciate evidence and substitute its own finding

for that of the Tribunal, it would not be beyond the jurisdiction of the

High Court in its power of judicial review to altogether eschew such

a process. The High Court, in the impugned judgment, however,

reappreciated the evidence led before the Tribunal in identifying

comparable concerns for applying the industry-cum-region test. In

particular, the employer has emphasised that the High Court ignored

the negative financial status of the company on the ground that the

losses made by it was miniscule. In this regard, the judgments of

this Court in the case of A.K. Bindal -vs- Union of India & Ors.

[(2003) 5 SCC 163] Mukand Ltd. -vs- Mukand Staff & Officers

Association [(2004) 10 SCC 460] have been relied upon. Both

these authorities lay down the financial capacity of an employer is an

important factor which could not be ignored in fixing wage structure.

In the given facts where the employer seriously contested the use of

the concerned units as comparable ones, and highlighted its difficult

financial position, the proper course would have been to remit the

matter to the Industrial Tribunal rather than entering into these

factual question independently in exercise of the writ jurisdiction.

This exercise would have required leading of evidence before the

primary forum, the Industrial Tribunal in this case.

16. On behalf of the employer, it was also specifically argued that various

allowances like house rent, shift allowance, travelling, medical,

education and leave travel were granted without any evidence. The

employer’s witness no.2 had given his deposition in detail, particularly 

590 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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on financial position of the company. From the judgment impugned,

we do not find proper analysis of the employer’s evidence in that

regard. So far as the union’s appeal is concerned, their point is

confined to treatment of overtime wages in computing allowances

admissible to them. That question also ought to be re-examined.

17. We, accordingly, set aside the judgment of the High Court delivered on

25.07.2019 as also the Tribunal’s award. Let the Tribunal re-examine

the cases of the respective parties afresh. We are conscious of the

fact that these proceedings arise from a charter of demand made

in 2008. We direct the Tribunal to conclude the reference within a

period of six months. The Civil Appeal No.2744 of 2023 against the

review order dated 22.06.2021 also stands disposed of.

18. Thus, all the three appeals stand disposed of in the above terms.

19. There shall be no order as to costs.

20. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case:

Appeals disposed of.

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.27 – Prosecution relied on the memorandum of the appellants-accused u/s.27 and the subsequent recovery of the dead body of the deceased from the pond at Bhatgaon – Correctness:

* Author

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 558 : 2024 INSC 299

Ravishankar Tandon

v.

State of Chhattisgarh

(Criminal Appeal No. 3869 of 2023)

10 April 2024

[B.R. Gavai* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

In a case based on circumstantial evidence wherein the appellantsaccused persons were convicted u/s.302 r/w s.34, ss.120B and 201,

s.302 r/w ss.34 and 120B, IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for

life, whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable

doubt that the recovery of the dead body of the deceased from the

pond was on the basis of the information given by the appellants

in the statement recorded u/s.27, Evidence Act, 1872.

Headnotes

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.27 – Prosecution relied on the

memorandum of the appellants-accused u/s.27 and the

subsequent recovery of the dead body of the deceased from

the pond at Bhatgaon – Correctness:

Held: For bringing the case u/s.27, it will be necessary for the

prosecution to establish that, based on the information given by

the accused while in police custody, it had led to the discovery of

the fact, which was distinctly within the knowledge of the maker

of the said statement – It will have to establish that before the

information given by the accused persons on the basis of which

the dead body was recovered, nobody had the knowledge about

the existence of the dead body at the place from where it was

recovered – Insofar as the memorandum u/s.27 is concerned, the

prosecution relied on the depositions of PW-5 (brother-in-law of

the deceased) and PW-18 (another witness of the memorandum)

– Evidence of PW-2 (brother of the deceased) read with that of

PW-5 revealed that the police as well as these witnesses knew

about the death of the deceased occurring and the dead body

being found at village Bhatgaon prior to the statements of the

accused persons being recorded u/s.27 – All the statements were

recorded after 10:00 am whereas PW-2 stated that at around

08:00 am, police informed him about the accused persons killing 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 559

Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh

the deceased and thereafter they going to Bhatgaon – PW-5

admitted that he arrived at village Kunda and on his arrival, he

was informed by his brother-in-law and nephew (PW-2) about

the murder of the deceased – His evidence showed that though

his statement was taken at Kunda police station, it was signed

at Bhatgaon – As such, the possibility of these documents being

created to rope in the accused persons cannot be ruled out – PW18 also admitted that he had signed the papers without reading

them and that too on the instructions of the police – Furthermore,

insofar as the statement of accused No.3 is concerned, even the

statement recorded u/s.27 was not at all related to the discovery of

the dead body of the deceased – Prosecution failed to prove that

the discovery of the dead body of the deceased from the pond at

Bhatgaon was only on the basis of the disclosure statement made

by the accused persons u/s.27 and that nobody knew about the

same before that – It utterly failed to prove any of the incriminating

circumstances against the appellants – Chain of circumstances not

so complete leading to no other conclusion than the guilt of the

accused persons – Impugned judgment as well as the judgment

of the trial court, quashed and set aside – Appellants acquitted.

[Paras13-15, 21-23, 26, 27]

Evidence – Circumstantial evidence – Law as regards

conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence – Discussed.

Case Law Cited

Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra

[1985] 1 SCR 88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 INSC

121; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan

Guru [2003] Supp. 1 SCR 130 : (2005) 11 SCC 600 :

2005 INSC 333; Asar Mohammad and Others v. State

of Uttar Pradesh [2018] 13 SCR 248 : (2019) 12 SCC

253 : 2018 INSC 985; Boby v. State of Kerala [2023] 1

SCR 335 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 50 : 2023 INSC 23.

List of Acts

Evidence Act, 1872; Penal Code, 1860.

List of Keywords

Circumstantial evidence; Beyond reasonable doubt; Disclosure

statement made by accused persons; Subsequent recovery of

dead body; Information given by accused while in police custody; 

560 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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Discovery of fact distinctly within the knowledge of the maker of

the statement; Documents created to rope in accused persons;

Incriminating circumstances not proved; Chain of circumstances

not complete.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 3869

of 2023

From the Judgment and Order dated 02.01.2023 of the High Court

of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in CRLA No. 194 of 2013

With

Criminal Appeal No. 2740 of 2023 and Criminal Appeal Nos. 2046

And 2047 of 2024

Appearances for Parties

Manish Kumar Saran, Ms. Ananya Tyagi, Chandrika Prasad Mishra,

Ms. Nishi Prabha Singh, Ms. Prashasti Singh, Ms. Swati Surbhi,

Upendra Narayan Mishra, Ms. Aswathi M.K., Prashant Kumar Umrao,

V. Ramasubbu, Rishesh Sikarwar, Advs. for the Appellant.

Praneet Pranav, Dy. A.G., Prashant Singh, Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

B.R. Gavai, J.

1. Leave granted in SLP (Criminal) Nos. 837 and 1174 of 2024.

2. These appeals challenge the judgment and order dated 2nd January,

2023 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh

at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal Nos. 194, 232 and 277 of 2013 wherein

the Division Bench dismissed the criminal appeals preferred by the

appellants, namely Ravishankar Tandon (accused No.1), Umend

Prasad Dhrutlahre (accused No.2), Dinesh Chandrakar (accused

No.3) and Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No.4) and upheld the

order of conviction and sentence dated 5th February, 2013 as recorded

by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mungeli (hereinafter

referred to as the ‘trial court’) in Sessions Trial No. 10 of 2012.

3. Shorn of details, the facts leading to the present appeals are as under:-

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 561

Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh

3.1 On 2nd December 2011, Ramavtar (PW-1) lodged a missing

person report being Missing Person Serial No. 10/11 at Police

Station Kunda after his son Dharmendra Satnami (deceased)

went missing. While an extensive search was being conducted,

on the basis of suspicion, the police interrogated the appellants.

During the interrogation, the appellants disclosed that they

had strangulated the deceased to death on the Bhatgaon

Canal Road and had thereafter thrown his body into a pond at

Village Bhatgaon. Thereafter, on 3rd December 2011, the police

recorded the memorandum statements of accused Nos.1 to

3 at about 10:00 am, 10:30 am and 11:00 am, respectively,

whereas the memorandum statement of accused No.4 came to

be recorded on 6th December 2011 at 07:00 pm. On the basis

of the aforesaid memorandum statements, the police recovered

the dead body of the deceased from the pond at Bhatgaon on

3rd December 2011 at about 04:05 pm and the dead body was

identified. Thereafter, on the very same day, a First Information

Report (‘FIR’ for short) being No. 402 of 2011 was registered at

Police Station Mungeli, District Bilaspur wherein it is recorded

that the aforesaid offences were committed between the days

of 30th November 2011 and 3rd December 2011. According to

the Post-Mortem Report (Ext. P-22), the cause of death of the

deceased was asphyxia due to strangulation and the nature

of death was homicidal.

3.2 The prosecution case stems from the memorandum statements

of the appellants wherein the appellants had admitted that

Dinesh Chandrakar (accused No.3) had instructed Ravishankar

Tandon (accused No.1) and Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused

No.4) to murder the deceased in exchange for Rs.90,000/-,

which was to be paid upon the execution of the said murder.

Upon receiving the aforesaid instruction, Ravishankar Tandon

(accused No.1) and Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No.4)

along with Umend Prasad Dhritalhare (accused No.2) hatched

a criminal conspiracy to kill the deceased and worked out a

plan to execute the same. Accordingly, the aforesaid three

accused persons called the deceased to Mungeli on 30th

November 2011 under the ruse of purchasing silver. While

Umend Prasad Dhritalhare (accused No. 2) and Satyendra

Kumar Patre (accused No.4) reached Datgaon which fell 

562 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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within the ambit of Police Station Mungeli, on a motorcycle

belonging to a relative of Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused

No.4), Ravishankar Tandon (accused No.1) and the deceased

reached Datgaon by a bus. Thereafter, the three accused

persons along with the deceased went to visit the house of

the brother-in-law of Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No.4),

namely, Sunil. On that same night, after taking the dinner, they

left Sunil’s house on the pretext of returning to their homes.

However, when they reached near Bhatgaon, Ravishankar

Tandon (accused No.1), Umend Prasad Dhritalhare (accused

No.2) and Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No.4) strangulated

the deceased to death and in order to screen themselves from

the said act of murder, the accused persons tied the dead body

of the deceased with his own clothes and stuffed it into a jute

sack which had been procured from Sunil’s house. Thereafter,

the appellants transported the dead body of the deceased to

a pond at Village Bhatgaon, on the motorcycle of Satyendra

Kumar Patre (accused No.4), and threw the dead body into

the said pond, wherefrom it was subsequently recovered.

3.3 Upon the conclusion of the investigation, a charge-sheet came

to be filed before the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate,

Mungeli, Chhattisgarh, wherein accused Nos. 1, 2 and 4 had

been charged for the offences punishable under Sections 302

read with 34, Sections 120B and 201 of the Indian Penal Code,

1860 (‘IPC’ for short) whereas accused No.3 had been charged

for the offences punishable under Sections 302 read with 34

and 120B of the IPC. Since the case was exclusively triable

by the Sessions Court, the same came to be committed to the

Sessions Court.

3.4 Charges came to be framed by the trial court for the aforesaid

offences. The accused/appellants pleaded not guilty and claimed

to be tried.

3.5 The prosecution examined 18 witnesses and exhibited 37

documents to bring home the guilt of the accused/appellants.

The defence, on the other hand, did not examine any witness

or exhibit any document.

3.6 At the conclusion of the trial, the trial Court found that the

prosecution had proved the case against the appellants beyond 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 563

Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh

reasonable doubt and accordingly convicted accused Nos. 1, 2

and 3 for the offences punishable under Sections 302 read with

34, Sections 120B and 201 of the IPC and convicted accused

No. 4 for the offences punishable under Sections 302 read with

34 and 120B of the IPC and sentenced all of them to undergo

imprisonment for life along with fine.

3.7 Being aggrieved thereby, the appellants preferred three

Criminal Appeals before the High Court. The High Court vide

the impugned judgment dismissed the Criminal Appeals and

affirmed the order of conviction and sentence awarded by the

trial Court.

4. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeals.

5. We have heard Shri Manish Kumar Saran, learned counsel appearing

on behalf of the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 3869 of 2023, Shri

Chandrika Prasad Mishra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 2740 of 2023, appeals arising out of

SLP (Criminal) Nos. 837 and 1174 of 2024, and Shri Praneet Pranav,

learned Deputy Advocate General (‘Dy. AG’ for short) appearing on

behalf of the respondent-State at length.

6. Shri Saran and Shri Mishra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the appellants, submitted that the present case rests on circumstantial

evidence. It is submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove any

of the incriminating circumstances beyond reasonable doubt. It is

submitted that, in any case, the prosecution has failed to establish

the chain of proven circumstances which leads to no other conclusion

than the guilt of the accused persons. They therefore submitted that

the appeals deserve to be allowed and the judgments and orders of

conviction need to be quashed and set aside.

7. Shri Pranav, learned Dy. AG appearing on behalf of the respondentState, on the contrary, submitted that both the High Court and

the trial court have concurrently held that the prosecution has

proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. He submitted that

the findings of the trial court and the High Court are based upon

cogent appreciation of evidence and as such, no interference is

warranted.

8. Undoubtedly, the prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence.

The law with regard to conviction on the basis of circumstantial 

564 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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evidence has very well been crystalized in the judgment of this Court

in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra1

,

wherein this Court held thus:

“152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High

Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature,

character and essential proof required in a criminal case

which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most

fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant

v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952

SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129]. This case

has been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in

a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance,

the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh

[(1969) 3 SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 55] and Ramgopal v.

State of Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC 625 : AIR 1972 SC

656]. It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid

down in Hanumant case [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC

343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] :

“It is well to remember that in cases where

the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the

circumstances from which the conclusion of

guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance

be fully established, and all the facts so

established should be consistent only with the

hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again,

the circumstances should be of a conclusive

nature and tendency and they should be such

as to exclude every hypothesis but the one

proposed to be proved. In other words, there

must be a chain of evidence so far complete

as not to leave any reasonable ground for a

conclusion consistent with the innocence of the

accused and it must be such as to show that

within all human probability the act must have

been done by the accused.”

1 [1985] 1 SCR 88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 INSC 121

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 565

Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh

153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the

following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against

an accused can be said to be fully established:

(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion

of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.

It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the

circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may

be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal

distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should

be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao

Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973

SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations

were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]

“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused

must be and not merely may be guilty before

a court can convict and the mental distance

between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and

divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.”

(2) the facts so established should be consistent

only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the

accused, that is to say, they should not be

explainable on any other hypothesis except that

the accused is guilty,

(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive

nature and tendency,

(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis

except the one to be proved, and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so

complete as not to leave any reasonable ground

for the conclusion consistent with the innocence

of the accused and must show that in all human

probability the act must have been done by the

accused.

154. These five golden principles, if we may say so,

constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based

on circumstantial evidence.” 

566 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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9. It can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the prosecution

that the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be

drawn should be fully established. The Court held that it is a primary

principle that the accused ‘must be’ and not merely ‘may be’ proved

guilty before a court can convict the accused. It has been held that

there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may

be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’. It has been held that

the facts so established should be consistent only with the guilt of

the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any

other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. It has further been

held that the circumstances should be such that they exclude every

possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. It has been held that

there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any

reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence

of the accused and must show that in all human probabilities the act

must have been done by the accused.

10. It is settled law that suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take

the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be

convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An

accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.

11. In the light of these guiding principles, we will have to examine the

present case.

12. The prosecution case basically relies on the circumstance of the

memorandum of the accused under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence

Act, 1872 (for short “Evidence Act”) and the subsequent recovery of

the dead body from the pond at Bhatgaon. The learned Judges of the

High Court have relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of

State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru2

. The High

Court has relied on the following observations of the said judgment:

“121. The first requisite condition for utilising Section 27

in support of the prosecution case is that the investigating

police officer should depose that he discovered a fact in

consequence of the information received from an accused

person in police custody. Thus, there must be a discovery

2 [2003] Supp. 1 SCR 130 : (2005) 11 SCC 600 : 2005 INSC 333

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 567

Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh

of fact not within the knowledge of police officer as a

consequence of information received. Of course, it is

axiomatic that the information or disclosure should be free

from any element of compulsion. The next component of

Section 27 relates to the nature and extent of information

that can be proved. It is only so much of the information

as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered that

can be proved and nothing more. It is explicitly clarified in

the section that there is no taboo against receiving such

information in evidence merely because it amounts to a

confession. At the same time, the last clause makes it

clear that it is not the confessional part that is admissible

but it is only such information or part of it, which relates

distinctly to the fact discovered by means of the information

furnished. Thus, the information conveyed in the statement

to the police ought to be dissected if necessary so as to

admit only the information of the nature mentioned in the

section. The rationale behind this provision is that, if a fact

is actually discovered in consequence of the information

supplied, it affords some guarantee that the information is

true and can therefore be safely allowed to be admitted in

evidence as an incriminating factor against the accused. As

pointed out by the Privy Council in Kottaya case [AIR 1947

PC 67 : 48 Cri LJ 533 : 74 IA 65] : (AIR p. 70, para 10)

“clearly the extent of the information admissible

must depend on the exact nature of the fact

discovered”

and the information must distinctly relate to that fact.

Elucidating the scope of this section, the Privy Council

speaking through Sir John Beaumont said: (AIR p. 70,

para 10)

“Normally the section is brought into operation

when a person in police custody produces from

some place of concealment some object, such

as a dead body, a weapon, or ornaments, said

to be connected with the crime of which the

informant is accused.”

(emphasis supplied)

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We have emphasised the word “normally” because the

illustrations given by the learned Judge are not exhaustive.

The next point to be noted is that the Privy Council rejected

the argument of the counsel appearing for the Crown that

the fact discovered is the physical object produced and

that any and every information which relates distinctly to

that object can be proved. Upon this view, the information

given by a person that the weapon produced is the one

used by him in the commission of the murder will be

admissible in its entirety. Such contention of the Crown’s

counsel was emphatically rejected with the following words:

(AIR p. 70, para 10)

“If this be the effect of Section 27, little

substance would remain in the ban imposed

by the two preceding sections on confessions

made to the police, or by persons in police

custody. That ban was presumably inspired by

the fear of the legislature that a person under

police influence might be induced to confess

by the exercise of undue pressure. But if all

that is required to lift the ban be the inclusion

in the confession of information relating to

an object subsequently produced, it seems

reasonable to suppose that the persuasive

powers of the police will prove equal to the

occasion, and that in practice the ban will

lose its effect.”

Then, Their Lordships proceeded to give a lucid exposition

of the expression “fact discovered” in the following passage,

which is quoted time and again by this Court: (AIR p. 70,

para 10)

“In Their Lordships’ view it is fallacious to

treat the ‘fact discovered’ within the section

as equivalent to the object produced; the fact

discovered embraces the place from which the

object is produced and the knowledge of the

accused as to this, and the information given

must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 569

Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh

to past user, or the past history, of the object

produced is not related to its discovery in the

setting in which it is discovered. Information

supplied by a person in custody that ‘I will

produce a knife concealed in the roof of my

house’ does not lead to the discovery of a knife;

knives were discovered many years ago. It

leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is

concealed in the house of the informant to his

knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have

been used in the commission of the offence,

the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to

the statement the words be added ‘with which

I stabbed A’ these words are inadmissible since

they do not relate to the discovery of the knife

in the house of the informant.”

(emphasis supplied)

128. So also in Udai Bhan v. State of U.P. [1962 Supp (2)

SCR 830 : AIR 1962 SC 1116 : (1962) 2 Cri LJ 251] J.L.

Kapur, J. after referring to Kottaya case [AIR 1947 PC

67 : 48 Cri LJ 533 : 74 IA 65] stated the legal position as

follows: (SCR p. 837)

“A discovery of a fact includes the object found,

the place from which it is produced and the

knowledge of the accused as to its existence.”

The above statement of law does not run counter to the

contention of Mr. Ram Jethmalani, that the factum of

discovery combines both the physical object as well as

the mental consciousness of the informant accused in

relation thereto. However, what would be the position if

the physical object was not recovered at the instance of

the accused was not discussed in any of these cases.”

13. As such, for bringing the case under Section 27 of the Evidence

Act, it will be necessary for the prosecution to establish that, based

on the information given by the accused while in police custody, it

had led to the discovery of the fact, which was distinctly within the

knowledge of the maker of the said statement. It is only so much of

the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered 

570 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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would be admissible. It has been held that the rationale behind this

provision is that, if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of the

information supplied, it affords some guarantee that the information is

true and it can therefore be safely allowed to be admitted in evidence

as an incriminating factor against the accused.

14. We will have to therefore examine as to whether the prosecution

has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the recovery of the

dead body was on the basis of the information given by the

accused persons in the statement recorded under Section 27

of the Evidence Act. The prosecution will have to establish that,

before the information given by the accused persons on the basis

of which the dead body was recovered, nobody had the knowledge

about the existence of the dead body at the place from where it

was recovered.

15. The prosecution, insofar as the memorandum under Section 27 of the

Evidence Act is concerned, has relied on the depositions of Ramkumar

(PW-5) and Ajab Singh (PW-18). According to the prosecution, the

statement of Ravishankar Tandon (accused No. 1) was recorded on

3rd December 2011 at 10:00 am. On the same day, the statement of

Umend Prasad Dhritalhare (accused No. 2) was recorded at 10:30

am, and that of Dinesh Chandrakar (accused No. 3) at 11:00 am.

Whereas the statement of Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No. 4)

was recorded on 6th December 2011 at 07:00 pm. It will be relevant

to refer to the relevant part of the evidence of Ramkumar (PW-5),

which reads thus:

“2. In front of me, accused Ravishankar have told to the

police that at the behest of accused Dinesh, they have

killed Dharmender for Rs. 90,000 and made a plan and

Ravishankar called Dharmender called him to buy silver

and killed him in Bhatgaon stuffed his dead body in a sack

and threw it in the pond. On being shown the memorandum

statement of Exhibit P- l0 have told to be his signature

on Part A to A.

3. Umed had also told the police in front of me that Sattu

along with Ravi Shankar had killed Dharmendra and threw

him in Bhatagaon’s lake on the advice of Dinesh. Witness

Memo statement is Exhibit P-11 and accepts his signature

on part A to A. 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 571

Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh

4. Dinesh had told in front of me that 6 months back

he had made a deal with Ravishankar and sattu to kill

Dharmender for 90 thousand rupees. Dinesh also told

that Shankar had said that the work is done, give him the

money. On being shown Exhibit P-12, accepted to have

his signature on Part A to A. Witness states that it was

seized from the pond in front of me.

5. Village Kunda is 16 km away from my village. It is

correct that Dharmendra had come to know about the

murder on 3rd. Witness states that it was informed by

the police. On that other morning, at about 7 -8 o’clock

in the morning, it is correct that on my arrival in village

Kunda, my brother-in-law and nephew Narendra had told

me about the murder which was done by the accused. By

that time we did not reach the spot that’s why whether it

was Dharmender’s body or not I cannot.”

6. I went from Kunda to Bhatgaon on 2nd with the police,

then he says that at that time it was about two and a half

o’clock in the evening. It is correct that when I reached

Bhatgaon there were many people of the village. It is correct

that because of dead body there were many people there.

It is correct to say that police have brought the dead body

to Mungeli police station where PM was done.

7. It is correct that accused were brought to Mungeli police

station. It is incorrect that I had taken the signature of

accused at Mungeli police station. Accused have given

the statement at Kunda police station, in front of me. Apart

from the accused we were 5-6 other family members in

the Police station Kunda. The police took the statement

at around 12 o’clock.

…………..

14. We have reached Bhatgaon at 4.30-5. And reached

Mungeli before sunset. It is incorrect to· say that the police

have taken my signature Witness itself states that I have

signed in Bhatgaon. It is incorrect to say that I did not

read the papers before signing them. Witness says that

the I have read the main part. It is incorrect to say that I 

572 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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am seeing accused for the first time today. It is incorrect

to say that I know accused by name only, witness states

that I know him by face also. It is incorrect to say that the

name of the accused was revealed by my brother-in-:law

and Narendra it was told by the police.”

16. It is to be noted that Ramkumar (PW-5) is the brother-in-law of the

deceased. A perusal of his evidence would reveal that he has admitted

that, on his arrival in village Kunda, he was informed by his brotherin-law and nephew Narendra Kumar (PW-2) about the murder of the

deceased which was done by the accused persons. He stated that,

by that time they had not reached the spot and that is why they were

not aware as to whether it was the body of Dharmendra or not. He

further admitted that when they reached Bhatgaon, many people of

the village were there. He has also admitted that because of the

dead body, many people were there. He has further admitted that the

accused persons had given their statements at Kunda police station.

He has further admitted that they had reached Bhatgaon at around

04:30 pm to 05:00 pm and had reached Mungeli before sunset. He

has also stated that he had signed the panchnama at Bhatgaon.

17. It could thus be seen that, according to this witness (PW-5), though

the statement was taken at Kunda, it was signed at Bhatgaon.

18. Ajab Singh (PW-18) is another witness on the memorandum recorded

under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and the subsequent recovery

of the dead body. He states that Ravishankar informed the police

that Dharmendra had been killed and thrown into the pond. However,

he states in examination-in-chief that Umend and Dinesh did not tell

anything to the police in front of him. It will be relevant to refer to

his cross-examination, which reads thus:

“4. It is true that I used to work as Kotwari. It is true that

I did not have read the paper. It is true that I had signed

3-4 papers on the instructions of the police. It is true that

due to being Kotwar had to visit police station regularly. It

is true that I signed on documents on the instructions of

the police. It is wrong to say that I signed in police station,

Kunda. Witnesses say that it was signed in Dandaon.”

19. It could thus be seen that Ajab Singh (PW-18) has clearly admitted

that he did not read the papers before putting his signature on them. 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 573

Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh

He has admitted that he had signed 3-4 papers on the instructions

of the police. He has also stated that he had signed the statement

at Dandaon.

20. Narendra Kumar (PW-2) is the brother of the deceased. He has stated

that, after his brother went missing; on the next day at around 08:00

o’clock in the morning, the police came to his place and informed that

his brother Dharmendra had been killed by Ravishankar, Satnami,

Umend and Satyendra. After that, they went to Bhatgaon with the

police. The extract of the evidence of Narendra Kumar (PW-2) is

as under:

“3. At around 8 in morning the police came to my place

and informed that my brother Dharmendra was killed by

Ravishankar, Satnami, Umend and Satyendra. After that

we went to Bhatgaon with the police. Ramkumar, Krishna,

Banshee had gone with me.”

21. A perusal of the evidence of Narendra Kumar (PW-2) read with that

of Ramkumar (PW-5) would clearly reveal that the police as well

as these witnesses knew about the death of Dharmendra Satnami

occurring and the dead body being found at Bhatgaon prior to the

statements of the accused persons being recorded under Section 27

of the Evidence Act. All the statements are recorded after 10:00 am

whereas Ramkumar (PW-2) stated that at around 08:00 am, police

informed him about the accused persons killing the deceased and

thereafter they going to Bhatgaon. Ramkumar (PW-5) also admitted

that he arrived at village Kunda and on his arrival, he was informed

by his brother-in-law and nephew about the murder which was done

by the accused persons.

22. We therefore find that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove that

the discovery of the dead body of the deceased from the pond at

Bhatgaon was only on the basis of the disclosure statement made by

the accused persons under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and that

nobody knew about the same before that. It is further to be noted that

Ajab Singh (PW-18) has clearly admitted that he had signed the papers

without reading them and that too on the instructions of the police.

23. The evidence of Ramkumar (PW-5) would show that though his

statement was taken at Kunda police station, it was signed at

Bhatgaon. As such, the possibility of these documents being created 

574 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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to rope in the accused persons cannot be ruled out. In any case,

insofar as the statement of Dinesh Chandrakar (accused No. 3) is

concerned, even the statement recorded under Section 27 of the

Evidence Act is not at all related to the discovery of the dead body of

the deceased. As a matter of fact, nothing in his statement recorded

under Section 27 of the Evidence Act has led to discovery of any

incriminating fact.

24. Another aspect that needs to be noted is that, the only evidence

with regard to recording of the memorandum of accused persons

under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is concerned, is that of B.R.

Singh, the then Investigating Officer (IO) (PW-16). The relevant part

thereof reads thus:

“1. ….I wrote the statement of accused Ravi Shankar as

per memorandum Ex. P-10 after taking him into custody in

which my signature is on part B to B. I wrote the statement

of accused· Um end as per his memorandum Ex. P-11

and accused Dinesh as per his memorandum Ex. P-12

in which my signature is on part B to B.”

25. It could thus be seen that the IO (PW-16) has failed to state as

to what information was given by the accused persons which led

to the discovery of the dead body. The evidence is also totally

silent as to how the dead body was discovered and subsequently

recovered. We find that therefore, the evidence of the IO (PW-16)

would also not bring the case at hand under the purview of Section

27 of the Evidence Act. Reliance in this respect could be placed on

the judgments of this Court in the cases of Asar Mohammad and

Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh3

 and Boby v. State of Kerala4

.

26. We therefore find that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove any

of the incriminating circumstances against the appellants herein. In

any case, the chain of circumstances must be so complete that it

leads to no other conclusion than the guilt of the accused persons,

which is not so in the present case.

27. In the result, we pass the following order:

3 [2018] 13 SCR 248 : (2019) 12 SCC 253 : 2018 INSC 985

4 [2023] 1 SCR 335 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 50 : 2023 INSC 23

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 575

Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh

(i) The appeals are allowed;

(ii) The judgment dated 2nd January 2023 passed by the High Court

and the judgment dated 5th February 2013 passed by the trial

court are quashed and set aside; and

(iii) The appellants are directed to be acquitted of all the charges

charged with and are directed to be released forthwith, if not

required in any other case.

28. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey Result of the case:

Appeals allowed.

Constitution of India – Art. 226 – Cases related to recovery of dues of banks and auction sale – Exercise of power u/Art 226 by filing writ petition, in spite of availability of an alternative remedy – Maintainability of the writ petition:

* Author

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 541 : 2024 INSC 297

PHR Invent Educational Society

v.

UCO Bank and Others

(Civil Appeal No. 4845 of 2024)

10 April 2024

[B.R. Gavai,* Rajesh Bindal and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Matter pertains to the High Courts entertaining petitions arising

out of the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act in spite of availability

of an effective alternative remedy.

Headnotes

Constitution of India – Art. 226 – Cases related to recovery of

dues of banks and auction sale – Exercise of power u/Art 226

by filing writ petition, in spite of availability of an alternative

remedy – Maintainability of the writ petition:

Held: Ordinarily the High Court would not entertain a petition u/Art.

226 if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person –

This rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery

of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of

banks and other financial institutions – While dealing with such

petitions, the High Court must keep in mind that the statutes enacted

for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch

as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery

of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies

for redressal of the grievance – Though the powers of the High

Court u/Art. 226 are of widest amplitude, still the Courts cannot

be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint – On facts, the

High Courts entertained petitions arising out of the DRT and the

SARFAESI Act in spite of availability of an effective alternative

remedy – High Court interfered with the writ petition only on the

ground that the matter was pending for sometime before it and if

the petition not entertained, the Borrower would be left remediless

– However the High Court failed to take into consideration the

conduct of the Borrower – Though the High Court was specifically

informed that, on account of confirmation of sale and registration

thereof, the position had reached an irreversible stage, the High

Court failed to consider that aspect – High Court ought to have 

542 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

taken into consideration that the confirmed auction sale could have

been interfered with only when there was a fraud or collusion, which

was not a case – Effect of the order of the High Court would be

again reopening the issues which attained finality – Also instant

case would not come under any of the exceptions – Thus, the

High Court grossly erred in entertaining the petition – Impugned

order passed by the High Court quashed and set aside – Costs

of Rs.1,00,000/- imposed upon the Borrower – Securitization and

Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security

Interest Act, 2002. [Paras 15, 24, 26, 32, 34]

Constitution of India – Art. 226 – Power of High Courts to issue

certain writs – Exceptions, when a petition u/Art. 226 could

be entertained in spite of availability of an alternative remedy:

Held: It is when the statutory authority has not acted in accordance

with the provisions of the enactment in question; it has acted in

defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure; it has

resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed; and when

an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of

natural justice [Para 29]

Case Law Cited

United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and Others

[2010] 9 SCR 1 : (2010) 8 SCC 110 : 2010 INSC 428;

Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Private Limited and

Others [2023] 13 SCR 53 : (2024) 2 SCC 1 : 2023 INSC

838; South Indian Bank Limited and Others v. Naveen

Mathew Philip and Another [2023] 4 SCR 18 : (2023)

SCC OnLine SC 435 : 2023 INSC 379; State of U.P.

v. Mohammad Nooh [1958] 1 SCR 595 : AIR 1958 SC

86 : 1957 INSC 81; Agarwal Tracom Private Limited v

Punjab National Bank and Others [2017] 11 SCR 164 :

(2018) 1 SCC 626 : 2017 INSC 1146; Authorized Officer,

State Bank of Travancore and Another v Mathew K.C

[2018] 1 SCR 233 : (2018) 3 SCC 85 : 2018 INSC

71; Phoenix ARC Private Limited v Vishwa Bharati

Vidya Mandir and Others [2022] 1 SCR 950 : (2022)

5 SCC 345 : 2022 INSC 44; Varimadugu OBI Reddy

v B Sreenivasulu and Others [2022] 16 SCR 1108 :

(2023) 2 SCC 168:2022 INSC 1205; Valji Khimji and

Company v. Official Liquidator of Hindustan Nitro Product

(Gujarat) Limited and Others [2008] 12 SCR 1 : (2008) 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 543

PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank and Others

9 SCC 299 : 2008 INSC 925; Dwarika Prasad v. State

of Uttar Pradesh and Others [2018] 3 SCR 29 : (2018)

5 SCC 491 : 2018 INSC 210; Commissioner of Income

Tax and Others v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal (2014) 1 SCC

603 – referred to.

List of Acts

Constitution of India; Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial

Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002.

List of Keywords

Alternative remedy; Effective remedy; Recovery of taxes, cess, fees,

other types of public money; Dues of banks and other financial

institutions; Quasi-judicial bodies; Rule of exhaustion of alternative

remedy; Rules of self-imposed restraint; Deprecation; Alternative

statutory remedy; Debts Recovery Tribunal; Securitization

application; Sale of his mortgaged properties; Rule of self-restraint;

Redressal of grievance; Costs; Principles of judicial procedure;

Principles of natural justice.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATEJURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.4845 of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 04.02.2022 of the High Court

for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in WP No. 5275 of 2021

Appearances for Parties

R. Basant, Sr. Adv., Khalid M.S, A. Karthik, Manu Krishnan, Ms.

Gunjan Rathore, Kavinesh R M, Advs. for the Appellant.

Jayant Bhushan, Sr. Adv., Partha Sil, Sanjiv Kr. Saxena, Chirag Joshi,

Ms. Sayani Bhattacharya, Abhiraj Chaudhary, Venkateswara Rao

Anumolu, Sunny Kumar, Puneet Aggarwal, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

B.R. Gavai, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal challenges the order dated 4th February 2022, passed

by the Division Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana 

544 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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at Hyderabad in Writ Petition No. 5275 of 2021, whereby the High

Court disposed of the writ petition filed by Dr. M.V. Ramana Rao,

respondent No. 3 herein (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Borrower’).

The High Court set aside the order dated 2nd February 2021, passed

by the Debts Recovery Tribunal-II at Hyderabad (hereinafter referred

to as ‘DRT’) and allowed Miscellaneous Application (M.A.) No.

97 of 2020 in Securitization Application (S.A.) No. 1476 of 2017

filed by the Borrower for the restoration of the said S.A. No. 1476

of 2017 filed by him under Section 17 of the Securitization and

Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security

Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI Act’ for short). The Borrower had

filed S.A. No. 1476 of 2017 against the Notice dated 2nd September

2017 issued by the UCO Bank (hereinafter referred to as the

‘Respondent-Bank’) for the sale of his mortgaged properties which

was to be conducted by the Authorized Officer (Respondent No.2)

of the Respondent-Bank in light of the default in repayment of loan

by the Borrower. The DRT, in its aforementioned order dated 2nd

February 2021, had dismissed the M.A. No. 97 of 2020 for the

restoration of S.A. No. 1476 of 2017, which had been previously

dismissed as withdrawn vide DRT vide order dated 21st September

2020. The Division Bench of the High Court, in the impugned

order, while setting aside the order of DRT dated 2nd February

2021, further directed DRT to proceed with S.A. No. 1476 of 2017

in accordance with law.

3. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeal are as under:

3.1 The Borrower had availed a loan from the Respondent-Bank and

in order to secure the said loan, the Borrower had mortgaged

four properties (hereinafter referred to as ‘scheduled properties’)

situated at Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh as collateral security.

However, the Borrower defaulted in the repayment of the loan

amount, which led the Respondent-Bank to initiate proceedings

against the borrower under the SARFAESI Act.

3.2 Thereafter, the Respondent-Bank issued an Auction Sale

Notice on 2nd September 2017 for auctioning off the scheduled

properties and published information about the same in the Times

of India and one other vernacular newspaper. According to the

said Auction Sale Notice, the auction was to be conducted on

14th December 2017.

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 545

PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank and Others

3.3 Aggrieved by the Auction Sale Notice, the Borrower preferred

a securitization application being S.A. No.1476 of 2017 before

DRT under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, thereby inter alia

praying for setting aside of the same.

3.4 In the meanwhile, the auction was conducted on 14th December

2017 by the Respondent-Bank through Respondent No.2. The

PHR Invent Educational Society, (hereinafter referred to as

the ‘auction purchaser’), i.e., the appellant herein participated

in the said auction and emerged as the highest bidder for a

bid of Rs.5,72,22,200/-. The appellant deposited 25% of the

bid amount i.e. Rs. 1,38,05,550/- including the Earnest Money

Deposit of the said amount. The fact remains that the Borrower

did not deposit the amount.

3.5 On the same day i.e., 14th December 2017, DRT passed an

interim order in S.A. No. 1476 of 2017, thereby refusing to

interfere with the sale of the scheduled properties which was to

be conducted on that very day. The Borrower had also filed an

interlocutory application being I.A. No. 3446 of 2017, thereby

praying for stay of further proceedings qua the auction of the

scheduled properties, wherein DRT directed the RespondentBank not to confirm the sale of the scheduled properties subject

to the Borrower depositing 30% of the outstanding dues as

claimed for in the Auction Sale Notice in two equal installments.

The first installment of 15% amount was to be deposited within a

week from the date of the said order, and the second installment

of 15% amount was to be deposited within two weeks thereafter.

The DRT further directed that, in the event that the Borrower

failed to make the aforesaid deposits, the interim stay would

stand vacated and the Respondent-Bank would be at liberty

to confirm the sale in favor of the highest bidder, although the

sale itself was made subject to the final outcome in S.A. No.

1476 of 2017.

3.6 Subsequently, the appellant deposited Rs.4,29,16,650/- towards

the payment of the balance auction price on 28th December 2017.

3.7 In the meanwhile, the Borrower proposed One Time Settlement

(‘OTS’ for short) for all the outstanding loan accounts. However,

the Respondent-Bank refused to accept the same and requested

the Borrower to settle all the outstanding loan accounts with 

546 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

interest payable at the contractual rate, as applicable thereon

vide letter dated 12th May 2020.

3.8 Following which, DRT passed an order dated 21st September

2020, whereby S.A. No. 1476 of 2017 was dismissed as

withdrawn at the behest of the Borrower who submitted that

the matter had been settled out of court. On the other hand,

the Respondent-Bank filed a Memo of Non-Settlement before

DRT thereby informing that no such out-of-court settlement

had been reached.

3.9 Upon S.A. No. 1476 of 2017 being dismissed as withdrawn,

the Respondent-Bank confirmed the sale of the scheduled

properties in favor of the appellant herein. A Sale Certificate

was issued by the Respondent-Bank on 2nd November 2020

and the possession of the scheduled properties was accordingly

delivered to the appellant. Subsequently, on 11th November

2020, the Sale Certificate came to be registered in favor of

the appellant herein.

3.10 In the meantime, the Borrower preferred M.A. No. 97 of 2020 in

S.A. No. 1476 of 2017 before DRT, praying for the restoration of

S.A. No. 1476 of 2017 to the file and setting aside the aforesaid

order of DRT dated 21st September 2020. However, on 2nd

February 2021, DRT passed an order thereby dismissing the

said M.A. filed by the Borrower.

3.11 Aggrieved thereby, the Borrower filed writ petition before the

High Court. The High Court, by the impugned order, disposed

of the said writ petition, thereby setting aside the order of

DRT, and further directing it to proceed with S.A. No. 1476

of 2017 in accordance with law. The M.A. No. 97 of 2020 in

S.A. No. 1476 of 2017 was thus allowed restoring S.A. No.

1476 of 2017.

4. Being aggrieved thus, the auction purchaser has preferred the

present appeal.

5. We have heard Shri R. Basant, learned Senior Counsel appearing

on behalf of the appellant-auction purchaser, Shri Partha Sil,

learned counsel appearing on behalf of the UCO Bank and Shri

Jayant Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of

the respondent No.3-Borrower.

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 547

PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank and Others

6. Shri Basant, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellantauction purchaser submitted that the High Court has grossly erred in

entertaining the writ petition filed by the Borrower when an efficacious

alternative remedy of statutory appeal was available to the Borrower

under the SARFAESI Act. He relies on the judgments of this Court

in the cases of United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and

Others1

, Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Private Limited and

Others2 and South Indian Bank Limited and Others v. Naveen

Mathew Philip and Another3

.

7. Shri Basant further submitted that the conduct of the Borrower also

disentitled him to an equitable relief. It is submitted that the Borrower

had filed the writ petition after the entire payment was made by the

appellant-auction purchaser and a Sale Certificate was also issued

in its favour. The learned Senior Counsel therefore submitted that

the writ petition filed by the Borrower deserves to be dismissed and

the present appeal deserves to be allowed.

8. Shri Partha Sil, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the UCO

Bank, also advanced similar arguments and prayed for dismissal of

the writ petition filed by the Borrower.

9. Shri Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the

Borrower, on the contrary, submitted that non-exercising of the

jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India on

the ground of availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of selfrestraint. It is submitted that, in deserving cases, the High Court is

not precluded from entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the

Constitution in order to do justice to the parties. The learned Senior

Counsel relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of State of

U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh4

.

10. The facts in the present case are not disputed. It is not in dispute

that in the auction held on 14th December 2017, the appellantauction purchaser was the highest bidder having offered a bid for an

amount of Rs.5,72,22,200/- and that the appellant-auction purchaser

deposited 25% of the bid amount i.e. Rs.1,38,05,550/- immediately.

1 [2010] 9 SCR 1 : (2010) 8 SCC 110 : 2010 INSC 428

2 [2023] 13 SCR 53 : (2024) 2 SCC 1 : 2023 INSC 838

3 [2023] 4 SCR 18 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 435 : 2023 INSC 379

4 [1958] 1 SCR 595 : AIR 1958 SC 86 : 1957 INSC 81

548 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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It is also not in dispute that on 14th December 2017, the learned

DRT, though refused to interfere with the sale but directed the

Respondent-Bank not to confirm the sale of the scheduled properties

subject to the Borrower depositing 30% of the outstanding dues in

two equal installments within one week and two weeks thereafter

respectively. The learned DRT had also directed that, in case of

failure of compliance, the interim stay would stand automatically

vacated and the Respondent-Bank would be entitled to confirm the

sale. It is also not in dispute that the Borrower did not comply with

the said order of the learned DRT. It is thus clear that, on non-deposit

of the amount as directed by the learned DRT vide order dated

14th December 2017, the interim direction passed on the said date

stood automatically vacated. After the aforesaid period was over,

the appellant-auction purchaser deposited the balance amount of

Rs.4,29,16,650/-.

11. It appears that, during the pendency of the proceedings before

the learned DRT, the Borrower submitted an OTS proposal to the

Respondent-Bank on 29th March 2019, thereby offering to settle the

accounts for an amount of Rs.3,75,00,000/-. It further appears that the

Borrower also deposited 10% upfront amount i.e. Rs.37,50,000/. On

12th May 2020, the Respondent-Bank, in reply to the OTS application,

asked the Borrower to settle all the four loan accounts with interest

at the contractual rate.

12. On 20th August 2020, the Borrower filed an application being I.A. No.

1691 of 2020 in the proceedings pending before DRT requesting for

advancing the date of hearing stating that there was urgency in the

matter and also that the appellant-auction purchaser had withdrawn

from the auction. Thereafter, vide order dated 21st September 2020,

the said S.A. No. 1476 of 2017 came to be withdrawn on a statement

made by the counsel for the Borrower that the matter had been settled

out of court. It is also relevant to mention that on 5th October 2020,

the Respondent-Bank had filed a memo before DRT informing that

there was no settlement.

13. After the disposal of the S.A. No. 1476 of 2017 as withdrawn, the

Respondent-Bank confirmed the sale in favour of the appellant-auction

purchaser on 2nd November 2020. Thereafter, on 4th November 2020,

the Borrower filed a miscellaneous application being M.A. No. 97 of

2010 for restoration of the said S.A. No. 1476 of 2017 on the ground 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 549

PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank and Others

that the said S.A. No. 1476 of 2017 had been withdrawn because

the Chief Manager and AGM of the Respondent-Bank had orally told

the Borrower that unless the S.A. No. 1476 of 2017 was withdrawn,

they could not process the OTS proposal. It is further relevant to

note that on 11th November 2020, the Sale Certificate was registered.

Vide order dated 2nd February 2021, DRT dismissed the said M.A.

No. 97 of 2010. Thereafter, the writ petition being No. 5275 of 2021

came to be filed by the Borrower on 25th February 2021 before the

High Court. Vide the impugned order, the High Court set aside the

order passed by DRT and directed it to proceed with S.A. No. 1476

of 2017.

14. The law with regard to entertaining a petition under Article 226

of the Constitution in case of availability of alternative remedy is

well settled. In the case of Satyawati Tondon (supra), this Court

observed thus:

“43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled

law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition

under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy

is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule

applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery

of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the

dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view,

while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the

action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High

Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by

Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such

dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not

only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of

the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial

bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved

person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must

insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the

Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available

under the relevant statute.

44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are

conscious that the powers conferred upon the High

Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to

any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, 

550 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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any Government, directions, orders or writs including the

five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the

rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are

very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise

of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be

oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved

by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep

in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the

Constitution.

45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative

remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion,

but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court

should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the

Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that

the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by

filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular

legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal

of his grievance.”

15. It could thus be seen that, this Court has clearly held that the High

Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the

Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved

person. It has been held that this rule applies with greater rigour in

matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public

money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. The

Court clearly observed that, while dealing with the petitions involving

challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc.,

the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by

Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code

unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive

procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of

quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved

person. It has been held that, though the powers of the High Court

under Article 226 of the Constitution are of widest amplitude, still

the Courts cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint

evolved by this Court. The Court further held that though the rule

of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not

one of compulsion, still it is difficult to fathom any reason why the

High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the

Constitution.

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 551

PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank and Others

16. The view taken by this Court has been followed in the case of

Agarwal Tracom Private Limited v. Punjab National Bank and

Others5

.

17. In the case of Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and

Another v. Mathew K.C.6

, this Court was considering an appeal

against an interim order passed by the High Court in a writ petition

under Article 226 of the Constitution staying further proceedings at

the stage of Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. After considering

various judgments rendered by this Court, the Court observed thus:

“16. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained

and the interim order granted for the mere asking

without assigning special reasons, and that too without

even granting opportunity to the appellant to contest the

maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice

the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The

opinion of the Division Bench that the counter-affidavit

having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be

sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient

justification to have declined interference.”

18. The same position was again reiterated by this Court in the case of

Phoenix ARC Private Limited v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir

and Others7

.

19. Again, in the case of Varimadugu OBI Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu

and Others8

, after referring to earlier judgments, this Court observed

thus:

“34. The order of the Tribunal dated 1-8-2019 was an

appealable order under Section 18 of the SARFAESI

Act, 2002 and in the ordinary course of business, the

borrowers/person aggrieved was supposed to avail the

statutory remedy of appeal which the law provides under

Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. In the absence

of efficacious alternative remedy being availed, there was

5 [2017] 11 SCR 164 : (2018) 1 SCC 626 : 2017 INSC 1146

6 [2018] 1 SCR 233 : (2018) 3 SCC 85 : 2018 INSC 71

7 [2022] 1 SCR 950 : (2022) 5 SCC 345 : 2022 INSC 44

8 [2022] 16 SCR 1108 : (2023) 2 SCC 168 : 2022 INSC 1205

552 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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no reasonable justification tendered by the respondent

borrowers in approaching the High Court and filing writ

application assailing order of the Tribunal dated 1-8-2019

under its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution

without exhausting the statutory right of appeal available

at its command.”

20. It could thus be seen that this Court has strongly deprecated the

practice of entertaining writ petitions in such matters.

21. Recently, in the case of Celir LLP (supra), after surveying various

judgments of this Court, the Court observed thus:

“101. More than a decade back, this Court had expressed

serious concern despite its repeated pronouncements

in regard to the High Courts ignoring the availability of

statutory remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI

Act and exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution. Even after, the decision of this Court in

Satyawati Tondon [United Bank of India v. Satyawati

Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 260] , it

appears that the High Courts have continued to exercise

its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 ignoring the statutory

remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act.”

22. It can thus be seen that it is more than a settled legal position of law

that in such matters, the High Court should not entertain a petition

under Article 226 of the Constitution particularly when an alternative

statutory remedy is available.

23. The only reasoning that could be seen from the impugned order

given by the learned Division Bench of the High Court is as under:

“11. It is true that under Section 18 of the SARFAESI

Act, petitioner has the alternative remedy against the

impugned order by filing appeal before the appellate

Tribunal. However, having regard to the fact that the writ

petition is pending before this Court for quite some time

and also considering the fact that if the impugned order is

allowed to stand, petitioner would be left without a remedy

to ventilate his grievance, we deem it fit and proper not

to non-suit the petitioner on the ground of not availing the

alternative remedy.

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 553

PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank and Others

12. Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act provides that any

person including a borrower who is aggrieved by the action

of secured creditor under Section 13 (4) of the SARFAESI

Act may file an application thereunder. Supreme Court

has held time and again that the Tribunal exercises wide

jurisdiction under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, even

to the extent of setting aside an auction sale. In the instant

case, we are consciously not referring to the merit of the

case. All that we are concerned is whether for whatever

reason a person who is aggrieved in law should be left

remediless. In the instant case, petitioner had invoked his

remedy by filing securitization application under sub-section

(1) of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The application

was pending for three years before the Tribunal. From

the docket order dated 21.09.2020, we find that a junior

counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had reported

that the matter was settled out of Court and therefore, leave

was sought for withdrawing the securitization application

which was accordingly granted.

13. When the settlement did not materialize, petitioner

went back to the Tribunal for revival of the securitization

application which was however dismissed on the ground

that version of the petition did not deserve acceptance.

14. On thorough consideration of the matter we are of the

view that dismissal of the miscellaneous application of the

petitioner by the Tribunal dies not appear to be justified.

15. Though subsequent developments may have a bearing

on the grant of ultimate relief to a litigant but the same by

itself cannot denude the adjudicating authority of its power

to adjudicate the grievance raised by the aggrieved person

which it otherwise possess.”

24. It can thus clearly be seen that though it was specifically contended

on behalf of the appellant herein that the writ petition was not

maintainable on account of availability of alternative remedy, the High

Court has interfered with the writ petition only on the ground that the

matter was pending for sometime before it and if the petition was not

entertained, the Borrower would be left remediless. We however find

that the High Court has failed to take into consideration the conduct 

554 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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of the Borrower. It is further to be noted that, though the High Court

had been specifically informed that, on account of subsequent

developments, that is confirmation of sale and registration thereof,

the position had reached an irreversible stage, the High Court has

failed to take into consideration those aspects of the matter.

25. This Court, in the case of Valji Khimji and Company v. Official

Liquidator of Hindustan Nitro Product (Gujarat) Limited and

Others9

, has observed thus:

“30. In the first case mentioned above i.e. where the

auction is not subject to confirmation by any authority, the

auction is complete on the fall of the hammer, and certain

rights accrue in favour of the auction-purchaser. However,

where the auction is subject to subsequent confirmation

by some authority (under a statute or terms of the auction)

the auction is not complete and no rights accrue until the

sale is confirmed by the said authority. Once, however, the

sale is confirmed by that authority, certain rights accrue in

favour of the auction-purchaser, and these rights cannot be

extinguished except in exceptional cases such as fraud.

31. In the present case, the auction having been confirmed

on 30-7-2003 by the Court it cannot be set aside unless

some fraud or collusion has been proved. We are satisfied

that no fraud or collusion has been established by anyone

in this case.”

26. In our view, the High Court ought to have taken into consideration

that the confirmed auction sale could have been interfered with only

when there was a fraud or collusion. The present case was not a

case of fraud or collusion. The effect of the order of the High Court

would be again reopening the issues which have achieved finality.

27. It is further to be noted that this Court, in the case of Dwarika Prasad

v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others10, has clearly held that the

right of redemption stands extinguished on the execution of the

registered sale deed. In the present case, the sale was confirmed

on 2nd November 2020 and registered on 11th November 2020.

9 [2008] 12 SCR 1 : (2008) 9 SCC 299 : 2008 INSC 925

10 [2018] 3 SCR 29 : (2018) 5 SCC 491 : 2018 INSC 210

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 555

PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank and Others

28. Insofar as the contention of the Borrower and its reliance on the

judgment of this Court in the case of Mohammad Nooh (supra) is

concerned, no doubt that non-exercise of jurisdiction under Article

226 of the Constitution on the ground of availability of an alternative

remedy is a rule of self-restraint. There cannot be any doubt with that

proposition. In this respect, it will be relevant to refer to the following

observations of this Court in the case of Commissioner of Income

Tax and Others v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal11:

“15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognised

some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where

the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with

the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance

of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has

resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or

when an order has been passed in total violation of the

principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in

Thansingh Nathmal case [AIR 1964 SC 1419] , Titaghur

Paper Mills case [Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of

Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 131] and other

similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a

petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective

alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person

or the statute under which the action complained of has

been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of

grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory

forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ

petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory

dispensation.”

29. It could thus clearly be seen that the Court has carved out certain

exceptions when a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution

could be entertained in spite of availability of an alternative remedy.

Some of them are thus:

(i) where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with

the provisions of the enactment in question;

(ii) it has acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial

procedure;

11 (2014) 1 SCC 603

556 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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(iii) it has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed; and

(iv) when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles

of natural justice.

30. It has however been clarified that the High Court will not entertain a

petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative

remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under

which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a

mechanism for redressal of grievance.

31. Undisputedly, the present case would not come under any of the

exceptions as carved out by this Court in the case of Chhabil Dass

Agarwal (supra).

32. We are therefore of the considered view that the High Court has

grossly erred in entertaining and allowing the petition under Article

226 of the Constitution.

33. While dismissing the writ petition, we will have to remind the High

Courts of the following words of this Court in the case of Satyawati

Tondon (supra) since we have come across various matters wherein

the High Courts have been entertaining petitions arising out of the

DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act in spite of availability of an effective

alternative remedy:

“55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite

repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts

continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies

under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise

jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which

have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and

other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope

and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their

discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and

circumspection.”

34. In the result, we pass the following order:

(i) The appeal is allowed;

(ii) The impugned order dated 4th February 2022 passed by the

High Court in Writ Petition No. 5275 of 2021 is quashed and

set aside; and

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 557

PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank and Others

(iii) Writ Petition No. 5275 of 2021 is dismissed with costs quantified

at Rs.1,00,000/- imposed upon the Borrower.

35. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case:

Appeal allowed.