Cancellation – Appellant-domicile of Maharashtra and son of Constable in BSF, passed his SSC and HSC exams from an institution outside the State of Maharashtra – Applied for admission to an MBBS course under the Other Backward Class/Non-Creamy Layer category – Despite being issued a provisional selection letter, his admission was cancelled – Writ petition challenging the cancellation on the ground that he was entitled to the exception under clause 4.8 of the NEET UG-2023 Information Brochure pertaining to the ‘Children of employees of Government of India or its Undertaking’ – High Court dismissed the petition holding that the appellant did not satisfy the requirements of clauses 4.8 and 9.4.4 of the Brochure since he did not select specified reservation, in the category of Children of Defence personnel while submitting the online application form – Correctness:

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 705: 2024 INSC 235

Vansh S/o Prakash Dolas

v.

The Ministry of Education & The Ministry of Health &

Family Welfare & Ors.

(Civil Appeal No(s). 4427-4428 of 2024)

20 March 2024

[B.R. Gavai, Rajesh Bindal and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Matter pertains to MBBS admission to a Maharashtra State domicile

in Maharashtra despite his father’s deployment outside Maharashtra

as a paramilitary personnel.

Headnotes

Education/Educational Institutions – Medical admission –

Cancellation – Appellant-domicile of Maharashtra and son

of Constable in BSF, passed his SSC and HSC exams from

an institution outside the State of Maharashtra – Applied for

admission to an MBBS course under the Other Backward

Class/Non-Creamy Layer category – Despite being issued a

provisional selection letter, his admission was cancelled – Writ

petition challenging the cancellation on the ground that he

was entitled to the exception under clause 4.8 of the NEET

UG-2023 Information Brochure pertaining to the ‘Children of

employees of Government of India or its Undertaking’ – High

Court dismissed the petition holding that the appellant did

not satisfy the requirements of clauses 4.8 and 9.4.4 of the

Brochure since he did not select specified reservation, in the

category of Children of Defence personnel while submitting

the online application form – Correctness:

Held: As per clause 4.8.1 of Information Brochure, the children

of employees of the Government of India or its Undertaking have

been made eligible for admission even though they might have

passed SSC and/or HSC or equivalent exam from a recognised

institution situated outside the State of Maharashtra – However,

while making such relaxation, a condition has been imposed that

the employee of Government of India or its Undertaking being the

parent of the candidate should have been transferred back to the

State of Maharashtra and also have reported for duty and must 

706 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

be working as on the last date of the document verification at a

place located in Maharashtra – This condition creates a stipulation

which would be impossible for the candidate or his parent to

fulfill – Place of posting is not within the control of the employee

or the candidate – Candidate born in Maharashtra and whose

parents are also domicile of the State of Maharashtra and are

employees of the Government of India or its Undertaking, such

candidate would be entitled to a seat under the Maharashtra State

quota irrespective of the place of posting of the parent because

the place of deployment would not be under the control of the

candidate or his parents – Impugned judgment is unsustainable

in facts as well as in law – Furthermore, letter/communication

cancelling the admission without giving opportunity to show cause

also illegal and arbitrary – More than six months have passed

by since the session started and no seat is lying vacant in any

college in Maharashtra State quota as on date – Appellant has

been illegally deprived from his rightful admission in the first year

of the MBBS course owing to the insensitive, unjust, illegal and

arbitrary approach of the respondents and so also on account

of the delay occasioned in the judicial process – As regards the

restitutive relief, it would neither be desirable nor justifiable to

grant admission to the appellant in the on-going session of the

MBBS(UG) course – However, the appellant entitled to restoration

of his seat in the first year of MBBS(UG) course in the same

college in the next session-NEET UG-2024 – Impugned orders set

aside – Respondents-college and the State to pay compensation

to the tune of Rs. 1 lakh (Rs. 50,000/-) each to the appellant for

the deprivation of one year and harassment on the account of

illegal and arbitrary cancellation of admission. [Paras 21-23, 26,

28, 31, 32]

Case Law Cited

Archana Sudhakar Mandulkar v. Dean, Govt. Medical

College, Nagpur and others (1986) SCC OnLine Bom

262; Rajiv Purshottam Wadhwa v. State of Maharashtra

(through it’s Dept of Medical Education and Drugs &

Others) (2000) SCC Online Bom 359; Manoj Kumar v.

Union of India and Others [2024] 2 SCR 409 : (2024)

SCC OnLine SC 163; S. Krishna Sradha v. State of

Andhra Pradesh and Others [2017] 2 SCR 466 : (2017)

4 SCC 516 – referred to.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 707

Vansh S/o Prakash Dolas v. The Ministry of Education &

The Ministry of Health & Family Welfare & Ors.

List of Keywords

Admission to MBBS course; Other Backward Class/Non-Creamy

Layer category; Children of employees of Government of India or

its Undertaking; Specified reservation in the category of Children of

Defence personnel; Place of posting; Domicile of State; Cancelling

the admission; Compensation.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.4427-4428 of

2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 05.09.2023 in WP No.5141 of

2023 and dated 26.10.2023 in MCAR No.980 of 2023 of the High

Court of Judicature at Bombay at Nagpur

Appearances for Parties

Kshitij Kothale, Satyajit A Desai, Siddharth Gautam, Abhinav K.

Mutyalwar, Gajanan N Tirthkar, Vijay Raj Singh Chouhan, Ananya

Thapliyal, Ms. Anagha S. Desai, Advs. for the Appellant.

Sarad Kumar Singhania, Mrs Rashmi Singhania, Aaditya Aniruddha

Pande, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Bharat Bagla, Sourav Singh,

Aditya Krishna, Ms. Preet S. Phanse, Adarsh Dubey, Advs. for the

Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Mehta, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The appellant has approached this Court for assailing orders dated

5th September, 2023 and 26th October, 2023 passed by the Division

Bench of the Bombay High Court Bench at Nagpur in Writ Petition

No. 5141 of 2023 and Misc. Civil Application (Review) No. 980 of

2023 in Writ Petition No. 5141 of 2023, respectively.

3. The appellant is a domicile of the State of Maharashtra and his

father is employed in the Border Security Force (BSF) as a Head

Constable (General Duty) [HC(GD)]. Owing to the deployment of his

father outside the State of Maharashtra, the appellant was compelled 

708 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

to complete his Secondary School Certificate (Standard X)(SSC)

and Higher School Certificate (Standard XII)(HSC) education from

a school outside the State of Maharashtra.

4. The appellant appeared in NEET-UG, 2023 craving admission in the

undergraduate MBBS course against the State quota and upon being

found meritorious, he was issued a provisional selection letter (CAP1)

by the State Common Entrance Cell, Maharashtra on 4th August, 2023

and was allotted a seat in respondent No.6-College. The appellant

completed the requisite formalities and paid an amount of Rs.13,500/-by

way of admission fees. It may be noted that the appellant had applied

for admission under the Other Backward Class/Non-Creamy Layer

(OBC/NCL) category as being domicile of the State of Maharashtra.

5. However, without issuing notice and without providing any opportunity

of being heard to the appellant, respondent No.6-College issued a

letter/communication dated 9th August, 2023 cancelling the admission

of the appellant.

6. The letter/communication cancelling the admission was challenged

by the appellant by filing Writ Petition No. 5141 of 2023 before

the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench raising a pertinent ground

that the appellant was entitled to the exception as provided under

clause 4.8 of the NEET UG-2023 Information Brochure (hereinafter

referred to as ‘Information Brochure’) which pertains to the ‘Children

of employees of Government of India or its Undertaking’ and that

cancellation of his admission was totally illegal and arbitrary.

7. The High Court, after considering the entirety of facts and

circumstances dismissed the Writ Petition No. 5141 of 2023 vide order

dated 5th September, 2023 holding that the appellant did not satisfy the

requirements of clauses 4.8 and 9.4.4 of the Information Brochure. It

was held that since the appellant did not select specified reservation

i.e., in the category of Children of Defence personnel(DEF), while

submitting the online application form, he was precluded from raising

such a claim at a belated stage, as being impermissible in view of

the rider contained in clause 9.4.4 of the Information Brochure.

8. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 5th September,

2023, the appellant filed Misc. Civil Application (Review) No. 980 of

2023 which too was rejected vide order dated 26th October, 2023.

These two orders are assailed in the present appeals.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 709

Vansh S/o Prakash Dolas v. The Ministry of Education &

The Ministry of Health & Family Welfare & Ors.

9. Mr. Kshitij Kothale, learned counsel representing the appellant urged

that the High Court misconstrued the appellant’s claim to be one

under Children of Defence personnel(DEF) category because the

appellant had sought admission under the OBC/NCL category as

being domicile of the State of Maharashtra.

10. He contended that the appellant and his parents are domicile of

the State of Maharashtra. The appellant fulfils the requisite criteria

for being admitted in the State quota and stood in merit and was

allotted a seat in the OBC/NCL category as a domicile of the State

of Maharashtra and, thus, cancellation of appellant’s admission by

the order dated 9th August 2023 is absolutely unjust and arbitrary

in addition to being in gross violation of principles of natural justice.

11. Learned counsel urged that two Division Benches of the Bombay

High Court, one at Nagpur Bench in Archana Sudhakar Mandulkar

v. Dean, Govt. Medical College, Nagpur and others1

 and the other

at Principal Seat at Bombay in Rajiv Purshottam Wadhwa v. State

of Maharashtra(through it’s Dept of Medical Education and Drugs

& Others2 examined a similar set of rules/guidelines as prevailing in

the present case and while reading down the rules, provided relief

to the candidates therein who were similarly circumstanced as the

appellant. He placed reliance on the following excerpts(infra) from

the judgment in the case of Archana Sudhakar Mandulkar(supra)

and contended that the impugned orders are bad in the eyes of law

and the appellant herein deserves the relief sought for by directing

the respondents to create an additional seat and thereby protecting

admission of the appellant in the ongoing session of MBBS (UG)

course:-

“3. Shri Kherdekar, the learned counsel for the petitioner,

contended that having regard to the object of the Rules,

its background, the language used in Clause B(5) and

the ratio of various Supreme Court decisions on the

validity of various reservations on region/residence basis,

the requirement of passing Indian School Certificate

Examination “from an institution located in Maharashtra

State” is not intended to be applied to the candidates

1 1986 SCC OnLine Bom 262

2 2000 SCC Online Bom 359

710 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

covered by Rule B(3). It seems to us that the contention

is well-founded. Course and the examination of the Indian

School Certificate Examination is common all over India.

Serviceman has no control on his posting which can be

anywhere. Rule of denial of admission to a meritorious son/

daughter of a serviceman who is domicile of Maharashtra

only because of a fortuitous circumstance of his being not

posted at the time of his ward studying in 12th Standard

within the State of Maharashtra cannot have any nexus to

the object of the Rule. Mere chance cannot be the valid

disqualifying factor. Such a Rule will not only be arbitrary

and unreasonable but will permit discrimination between

two classes of servicemen of Maharashtra domicile lactually

posted at material time (i) in Maharashtra and (ii) outside

Maharashtra. This classification will be clearly invidious

having no nexus whatsoever to the object sought to be

achieved. Supreme Court has repeatedly held against

denial of admissions only on the basis of residence

and/or region. Canons of interpretation mandates that

interpretation which leads to unconstitutionality has to be

avoided, and harmonious construction to be preferred, if

possible. Thus the Rule will have to be interpreted keeping

the above principles in view. The Rule is not clearly worded

and does present some difficulty in construing it. It is not as

if that Clause C applies universally and without exception

to all admissions under the Rule. Take for example cases

covered by Rule B(4)(iii) — reservation for son or daughter

of Non-resident Indians of Maharashtra origin. Even 20 per

cent seats out of category B(3) are reserved for Defence

Personnel transferred to the Maharashtra Region. It is in

this light and background that Rule B(5) has to be read.

The terminology “after excluding validly reserved seats”

used in Rule B(5) is significant. It means that all parts of

Clause C do not universally apply to validly reserved seats

under Clause B. This is not to suggest that no part of

Clause C applies to any varieties of reservations mentioned

in Clause B. All will depend upon a specie of reservation

and its intendment. Construed in that light it seems to

us that the last part of Rule C(3)(ii) reading as “from an 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 711

Vansh S/o Prakash Dolas v. The Ministry of Education &

The Ministry of Health & Family Welfare & Ors.

institution located in Maharashtra State” is not intended to

be applied to candidate covered by Clause B(3).”

12. Per contra, learned counsel representing the respondents

controverted the submissions advanced by the appellant’s counsel.

He submitted that the appellant could not have been considered for

admission under OBC/NCL category under the State quota because

he is not covered under clauses 4.5, 4.6 & 4.8 of the Information

Brochure. The appellant did not stake a claim for admission in

defence personnel quota and hence, he could not have been

given a seat under the said category by virtue of the stipulations

contained in clause 9.4.4 of the guidelines. On these grounds, he

sought dismissal of the appeals.

13. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions

advanced at bar and have gone through the impugned orders.

14. There is no dispute that the appellant and his parents are domicile

of the State of Maharashtra. The appellant’s father is serving in

the Border Security Force(BSF). Owing to deployment of his father

outside the State of Maharashtra, the appellant passed his SSC and

HSC exams from an institution outside the State of Maharashtra.

15. Clause 4.8 of the Information Brochure provides an exception/

relaxation for claiming seat in the Maharashtra State quota to

Children of employees of Government of India or its Undertaking

who have passed SSC and/or HSC or equivalent examination

from the recognized institutions situated outside the State of

Maharashtra. However, this clause imposes a rider that such

employee of Government of India or its Undertaking being the

parent of the candidate seeking admission in the course under

the State quota “must have been transferred from outside the

State of Maharashtra at a place of work, located in the State of

Maharashtra and also must have reported for duty and must

be working as on the last date of document verification at a

place located in the State of Maharashtra”. The appellant’s father

was deployed outside the State of Maharashtra in connection with

service of the nation and thus, proviso to Clause 4.8 was relied

upon by the respondents while cancelling the admission granted to

the appellant in CAP1.

(emphasis supplied)

712 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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16. Undisputably, but for the above rider in the guidelines, the appellant

is qualified to seek admission in the State Domicile (OBC/NCL)

category by virtue of clause 4.8 of the Information Brochure and

also stands in merit. However, the proviso creates a situation which

would be impossible for the appellant to surmount. The appellant who

is a domicile of the State of Maharashtra, cannot control the place

of deployment of his father who is serving in the paramilitary force

i.e., Border Security Force(BSF). Needless to state that the place of

deployment cannot be the choice of the employee serving in the armed

forces or a paramilitary force. Being the child of a soldier serving on

the country’s frontiers, the discriminatory and arbitrary treatment meted

out to the appellant under the guidelines cannot be countenanced.

The High Court, while denying relief to the appellant held that he had

not selected any specified reservation under the head of Children of

Defence personnel(DEF) as provided in Clause 9.4.4 of the Information

Brochure. However, the fact remains that the appellant had submitted

his OBC/NCL credentials/certificates along with the application form

and, his claim for admission was clearly against the Maharashtra State

quota as being a domicile of the State of Maharashtra whose father

was deployed as a Head Constable(General Duty)[HC(GD)] in BSF.

17. The appellant’s application was considered favourably and vide

communication dated 4th August, 2023, he was granted admission

in respondent No.6-College. He also paid the admission fees etc.

However, without issuing any notice and without providing opportunity

of being heard to the appellant, respondent No.6-College issued the

letter/communication dated 9th August, 2023 cancelling his admission

in the course. The said letter/communication was promptly challenged

by the appellant by filing the captioned writ petition before the Nagpur

Bench of the Bombay High Court on the very next day i.e. 10th August,

2023 and he was also provided interim protection by the Court.

18. Before the High Court, the appellant had placed reliance on

the Division Bench judgment in the case of Archana Sudhakar

Mandulkar(supra). The relevant guidelines/rules of admission as

extracted in the judgment of Archana Sudhakar Mandulkar(supra)

are quoted hereinbelow for the sake of ready reference: -

“Relevant Clauses of Rules for admission (M.B.B.S.)

1986–87:

Clause B deals with “Reservations”.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 713

Vansh S/o Prakash Dolas v. The Ministry of Education &

The Ministry of Health & Family Welfare & Ors.

Sub clause (1) of Clause B refers to Backward Class etc.,

sub-clause (2) to Central Government, sub-clause (3) to

sons and daughters of servicemen and ex-servicemen, subclause (4) to miscellaneous other reservations including

son/daughter of Nonresident Indians of Maharashtra origin

and sub-clause (5) to Regional Reservation.

Clause B(3) reads thus:—

“(3) Reservation for sons and daughters of servicemen

and ex-servicemen— 5 percent seats of the intake

capacity of the college limited to five shall be reserved

for the children of servicemen as well as ex-servicemen

who are domiciles of Maharashtra. The seats so reserved

are inclusive of merit;

Clause B(5) reads thus:-

“(5) Regional Reservation— Subject to the exception

mentioned in Rule C(6)(iv) below, 70 percent of open

seats, after excluding validly reserved seats, available

in Government Medical Colleges situated within the

jurisdiction of any University in Maharashtra, shall be

reserved for the candidates who are eligible as per Rule C

below and have passed the requisite qualifying examination

from the School/College situated within the jurisdiction of

the same University.”

19. The relevant extract from guidelines/rules of admission prevailing

in NEET-UG, 2023 germane to the controversy at hand is quoted

hereinbelow for sake of ready reference: -

“4.8 Exception for SSC (10th) and HSC (12th) or

equivalent examinations:

Children of employees of Government of India or its

Undertakings:-

4.8.1 The children of the employees of Government of

India or its Undertaking shall be eligible for admission even

though they might have passed the S.S.C. (Std.X) and/or

H.S.C. (Std. XII) or equivalent exam from the recognized

Institutions situated outside the State of Maharashtra,

provided that such an employee of Government of India or 

714 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

its Undertaking must have been transferred from outside

State of Maharashtra at a place of work, located in the

State of Maharashtra and also must have reported for duty

and must be working as on the last date of Document

verification at a place located in Maharashtra.

4.8.2….”

20. On going through the extracted portion of the Division Bench judgment

in the case of Archana Sudhakar Mandulkar(supra), we find that in

an almost identical situation which prevails in the case at hand, the

Division Bench read down the rule/guideline which provided that the

ward of servicemen should have passed his/her 12th standard from

an institution located in the State of Maharashtra. The Division Bench

held that the servicemen or his ward desiring admission under the

State quota could not have had any control over his posting which

can be anywhere. The Division Bench held that the rule of denial

of admission to a meritorious son/daughter of a serviceman who is

domicile of Maharashtra only because of a fortuitous circumstance of

his being not posted at the time of his ward studying in 12th standard

within the State of Maharashtra cannot have any nexus to the object

of the rule. Mere chance cannot be a valid disqualifying factor.

Such rule will not only be arbitrary and unreasonable but will permit

discrimination between two classes of servicemen of Maharashtra

domicile actually posted at the material time (i) in Maharashtra and

(ii) outside Maharashtra. This classification will be clearly invidious

having no nexus whatsoever to the object sought to be achieved.

21. In the extant admission process, a slight modification has been made

in the guidelines inasmuch as, now as per clause 4.8.1 of Information

Brochure, the children of employees of the Government of India or

its Undertaking have been made eligible for admission even though

they might have passed SSC and/or HSC or equivalent exam from

a recognised institution situated outside the State of Maharashtra.

However, while making such relaxation, a condition has been imposed

that the employee of Government of India or its Undertaking being

the parent of the candidate should have been transferred back to the

State of Maharashtra and also have reported for duty and must be

working as on the last date of the document verification at a place

located in Maharashtra. We feel that this condition as imposed by the

guidelines, creates a stipulation which would be impossible for the 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 715

Vansh S/o Prakash Dolas v. The Ministry of Education &

The Ministry of Health & Family Welfare & Ors.

candidate or his parent to fulfill. It may be reiterated that the place

of posting is not within the control of the employee or the candidate.

Thus, the distinction drawn by the clause between two categories

of employees in the Government of India services (i) those posted

in Maharashtra and (ii) those posted outside Maharashtra has no

nexus with the intent and purpose of the guidelines/rules and hence

the same deserves to be read down to such extent. Thus, this Court

has no hesitation in providing that the candidate(s) who are born in

Maharashtra and whose parents are also domicile of the State of

Maharashtra and are employees of the Government of India or its

Undertaking, such candidate(s) would be entitled to a seat under

the Maharashtra State quota irrespective of the place of posting of

the parent(s) because the place of deployment would not be under

the control of the candidate or his parents.

22. The Division Bench of Bombay High Court at Nagpur while rejecting

the writ petition filed by the appellant, fell into manifest error in not

considering case of the appellant in the correct perspective. For that

reason, the impugned judgment is unsustainable in facts as well as

in law. A fortiori, the letter/communication dated 9th August, 2023

issued by respondent No. 6 cancelling the admission granted to

the appellant against the Maharashtra State quota in CAP1 without

giving opportunity to show cause is also illegal and arbitrary and

deserves to be quashed and set aside.

23. However, there is a practical hurdle which comes in the way of the

appellant for being provided admission in the MBBS course in the

current session which has progressed significantly from August, 2023.

More than six months have passed by since the session started.

As per the reply of the respondents, no seat is lying vacant in any

college in Maharashtra State quota as on date.

24. Undisputably, the appellant has been illegally deprived from his

rightful admission in the first year of the MBBS course owing to the

insensitive, unjust, illegal and arbitrary approach of the respondents

and so also on account of the delay occasioned in the judicial process.

25. This Court in the case of Manoj Kumar v. Union of India and

Others3 considered the concept of restitutive relief. Hon’ble P.S.

3 2024 SCC OnLine SC 163

716 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Narasimha, J. speaking for the Bench, observed that concomitant

duty of the Constitutional Court is to take reasonable measures to

restitute the injured which is the overarching Constitutional purpose.

The relevant paras from the aforesaid judgment are extracted below:-

"19. We are of the opinion that while the primary duty of

constitutional courts remains the control of power, including

setting aside of administrative actions that may be illegal or

arbitrary, it must be acknowledged that such measures may

not singularly address repercussions of abuse of power.

It is equally incumbent upon the courts, as a secondary

measure, to address the injurious consequences arising

from arbitrary and illegal actions. This concomitant duty

to take reasonable measures to restitute the injured is our

overarching constitutional purpose. This is how we have

read our constitutional text, and this is how we have built

our precedents on the basis of our preambular objective

to secure justice.

20. In public law proceedings, when it is realised that the

prayer in the writ petition is unattainable due to passage

of time, constitutional courts may not dismiss the writ

proceedings on the ground of their perceived futility. In the

life of litigation, passage of time can stand both as an ally

and adversary. Our duty is to transcend the constraints of

time and perform the primary duty of a constitutional court

to control and regulate the exercise of power or arbitrary

action. By taking the first step, the primary purpose and

object of public law proceedings will be subserved.

21. The second step relates to restitution. This operates

in a different dimension. Identification and application

of appropriate remedial measures poses a significant

challenge to constitutional courts, largely attributable to

the dual variables of time and limited resources.

22. The temporal gap between the impugned illegal or arbitrary

action and their subsequent adjudication by the courts

introduces complexities in the provision of restitution.

As time elapses, the status of persons, possession, and

promises undergoes transformation, directly influencing

the nature of relief that may be formulated and granted.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 717

Vansh S/o Prakash Dolas v. The Ministry of Education &

The Ministry of Health & Family Welfare & Ors.

23. The inherent difficulty in bridging the time gap between

the illegal impugned action and restitution is certainly not

rooted in deficiencies within the law or legal jurisprudence

but rather in systemic issues inherent in the adversarial

judicial process. The protracted timeline spanning from

the filing of a writ petition, service of notice, filing of

counter affidavits, final hearing, and then the eventual

delivery of judgment, coupled with subsequent appellate

procedures, exacerbates delays. Take for example this

very case, the writ petition was filed against the action of

the respondent denying appointment on 22.05.2017. The

writ petition came to be decided by the Single Judge on

24.01.2018, the Division Bench on 16.10.2018, and then

the case was carried to this Court in the year 2019 and

we are deciding it in 2024. The delay in this case is

not unusual, we see several such cases when our final

hearing board moves. Appeals of more than two decades

are awaiting consideration. It is distressing but certainly

not beyond us. We must and we will find a solution to

this problem.”

26. Seen in the light of the above judgment, it is now to be considered

as to the measures of restitutive relief which can be provided to the

appellant in the present case.

27. This Court in the case of S. Krishna Sradha v. State of Andhra

Pradesh and Others4 examined the issue of wrongful denial of

admission in a medical course, and propounded the theory of

‘restitutive justice’ by holding as below:-

"13. In light of the discussion/observations made

hereinabove, a meritorious candidate/ student who

has been denied an admission in MBBS course illegally

or irrationally by the authorities for no fault of his/her

and who has approached the Court in time and so

as to see that such a meritorious candidate may not

have to suffer for no fault of his/her, we answer the

reference as under:

4 (2017) 4 SCC 516

718 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

13.1. That in a case where candidate/student has

approached the court at the earliest and

without any delay and that the question is

with respect to the admission in medical

course all the efforts shall be made by

the court concerned to dispose of the

proceedings by giving priority and at the

earliest.

13.2. Under exceptional circumstances, if the

court finds that there is no fault attributable

to the candidate and the candidate has

pursued his/her legal right expeditiously

without any delay and there is fault only

on the part of the authorities and/or there

is apparent breach of rules and regulations

as well as related principles in the process

of grant of admission which would violate

the right of equality and equal treatment to

the competing candidates and if the time

schedule prescribed – 30th September, is

over, to do the complete justice, the Court

under exceptional circumstances and in

rarest of rare cases direct the admission

in the same year by directing to increase

the seats, however, it should not be more

than one or two seats and such admissions

can be ordered within reasonable time, i.e.,

within one month from 30th September, i.e.,

cut off date and under no circumstances,

the Court shall order any Admission in the

same year beyond 30th October. However, it

is observed that such relief can be granted

only in exceptional circumstances and in

the rarest of rare cases. In case of such

an eventuality, the Court may also pass

an order cancelling the admission given

to a candidate who is at the bottom of

the merit list of the category who, if the

admission would have been given to a more 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 719

Vansh S/o Prakash Dolas v. The Ministry of Education &

The Ministry of Health & Family Welfare & Ors.

meritorious candidate who has been denied

admission illegally, would not have got the

admission, if the Court deems it fit and

proper, however, after giving an opportunity

of hearing to a student whose admission

is sought to be cancelled.

13.3. In case the Court is of the opinion that

no relief of admission can be granted to

such a candidate in the very academic

year and wherever it finds that the action

of the authorities has been arbitrary and

in breach of the rules and regulations or

the prospectus affecting the rights of the

students and that a candidate is found to

be meritorious and such candidate/student

has approached the court at the earliest and

without any delay, the court can mould the

relief and direct the admission to be granted

to such a candidate in the next academic

year by issuing appropriate directions by

directing to increase in the number of seats

as may be considered appropriate in the

case and in case of such an eventuality and

if it is found that the management was at

fault and wrongly denied the admission to

the meritorious candidate, in that case, the

Court may direct to reduce the number of

seats in the management quota of that year,

meaning thereby the student/students who

was/were denied admission illegally to be

accommodated in the next academic year

out of the seats allotted in the management

quota.

13.4. Grant of the compensation could be an

additional remedy but not a substitute

for restitutional remedies. Therefore, in

an appropriate case the Court may award

the compensation to such a meritorious

candidate who for no fault of his/her has to 

720 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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lose one full academic year and who could

not be granted any relief of admission in

the same academic year.

13.5. It is clarified that the aforesaid directions

pertain to Admission in MBBS Course only

and we have not dealt with post graduate

medical course.”

(emphasis supplied)

28. In the light of the above judgment, it would neither be desirable nor

justifiable to grant admission to the appellant in the on-going session

of the MBBS(UG) course. However, considering the fact that the

order cancelling the admission of the appellant herein was issued

on 9th August, 2023 and the writ petition came to be filed before the

High Court promptly i.e. on 10th August, 2023, without any delay

whatsoever, the appellant is entitled to restoration of his seat in

the first year of MBBS(UG) course in the same college in the next

session, i.e., NEET UG-2024.

29. We further direct that until a suitable rectification is made in the

guidelines/rules, candidate(s) domicile of the State of Maharashtra

having acquired SSC and/or HSC qualification from any recognized

institution: -

(i) Whose parent(s) are domiciles of Maharashtra and employed

in the Central Government or its Undertaking, defence services

and/or in paramilitary forces viz. CRPF, BSF, etc. and;

(ii) Such parent(s) are posted at any place in the country as on the

last date of document verification, shall be entitled for a seat

in MBBS Course in the Maharashtra State quota.

30. It is further directed that the appellant shall be provided admission in

the ‘OBC category domicile of State of Maharashtra child of person

serving the Government of India’ in the first year of the MBBS(UG)

course commencing from the year 2024 by creating an additional

seat so as to ensure that there is no reduction in the quota of seats

to the candidates who succeed in the NEET UG-2024.

31. The impugned orders are set aside. The appeals are accordingly

allowed. 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 721

Vansh S/o Prakash Dolas v. The Ministry of Education &

The Ministry of Health & Family Welfare & Ors.

32. We also direct respondent No.6-College and respondent No.5-State

of Maharashtra to pay compensation to the tune of Rs.1 lakh(Rs.

50,000/- each) to the appellant for the deprivation of one year and

harassment on the account of illegal and arbitrary cancellation of

his admission.

33. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case:

Appeals allowed.

Penal Code, 1860 – s.420 – Ingredients – s.420 when not attracted: Held: For attracting the provision of s.420, IPC, the FIR/complaint must show that the ingredients of s.415, IPC are made out – It must be shown that the FIR/complaint discloses the deception of any person; fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to deliver any property to any person; and dishonest intention of the accused at the time of making the inducement – In the present case, no role of inducement at all has been attributed to the appellant – Allegations w.r.t inducement are only against accused Nos.1 and 2 – Rather, from the perusal of the FIR and the charge-sheet, it would reveal that there was no transaction of any nature directly between the appellant and the complainant – FIR or the charge-sheet, even if taken at its face value, does not disclose the ingredients to attract the provision of s.420, IPC qua the appellant – Dishonest inducement is the sine qua non to attract the provisions of ss.415 and 420 of IPC and the same is totally lacking qua the appellant – In that view of the matter, continuation of the criminal proceedings against the appellant would be nothing else but amount to abuse of process of law resulting in miscarriage of justice – Impugned orders and the FIR alongwith the chargesheet filed against the appellant, quashed and set aside. [Paras 13, 15, 19, 20 and 24]

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 722 : 2024 INSC 233

A.M. Mohan

v.

The State Represented by SHO and Another

(Criminal Appeal No. 1716 of 2024)

20 March 2024

[B.R. Gavai,* Rajesh Bindal and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

FIR registered against accused Nos.1, 2 and 3 (appellant) for

offences punishable u/s.420 r/w s.34, Penal Code, 1860. High

Court whether justified in rejecting the petition filed by the appellant

u/s.482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Section 420, IPC, if

attracted qua the appellant.

Headnotes

Penal Code, 1860 – s.420 – Ingredients – s.420 when not

attracted:

Held: For attracting the provision of s.420, IPC, the FIR/complaint

must show that the ingredients of s.415, IPC are made out – It

must be shown that the FIR/complaint discloses the deception

of any person; fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person

to deliver any property to any person; and dishonest intention

of the accused at the time of making the inducement – In the

present case, no role of inducement at all has been attributed

to the appellant – Allegations w.r.t inducement are only against

accused Nos.1 and 2 – Rather, from the perusal of the FIR and

the charge-sheet, it would reveal that there was no transaction of

any nature directly between the appellant and the complainant –

FIR or the charge-sheet, even if taken at its face value, does not

disclose the ingredients to attract the provision of s.420, IPC qua

the appellant – Dishonest inducement is the sine qua non to attract

the provisions of ss.415 and 420 of IPC and the same is totally

lacking qua the appellant – In that view of the matter, continuation

of the criminal proceedings against the appellant would be nothing

else but amount to abuse of process of law resulting in miscarriage

of justice – Impugned orders and the FIR alongwith the chargesheet filed against the appellant, quashed and set aside. [Paras

13, 15, 19, 20 and 24]

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 723

A.M. Mohan v. The State Represented by SHO and Another

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Exercise of

jurisdiction under – Discussed.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – FIR registered

against appellant u/s.420 r/w s.34, Penal Code, 1860 – High

Court rejected the petition filed by the appellant u/s.482 –

Present appeal filed – Contention of the respondents that

since the charge-sheet has been filed, the present appeal is

liable to be dismissed:

Held: Said contention has no merit – As rightly held in Anand

Kumar Mohatta and Another v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department

of Home and Another, [2018] 13 SCR 1028, there is nothing

in the words of this section which restricts the exercise of the

power of the Court to prevent the abuse of process of court or

miscarriage of justice only to the stage of the FIR – High Court

can exercise jurisdiction u/s.482 CrPC even when the discharge

application is pending with the trial court – Indeed, it would be a

travesty to hold that proceedings initiated against a person can

be interfered with at the stage of FIR but not if it has advanced

and the allegations have materialised into a charge-sheet – On

the contrary it could be said that the abuse of process caused

by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a

charge-sheet after investigation – The power is undoubtedly

conferred to prevent abuse of process of power of any court.

[Paras 21, 23]

Case Law Cited

Prof. R.K. Vijayasarathy and Another v. Sudha

Seetharam and Another [2019] 2 SCR 185 : (2019)

16 SCC 739; Anand Kumar Mohatta and Another v.

State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home and Another

[2018] 13 SCR 1028 : (2019) 11 SCC 706; Haji Iqbal

alias Bala through S.P.O.A. v. State of U.P. and Others

(2023) SCC OnLine SC 946 – relied on.

Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Limited and Others

[2006] Suppl. 3 SCR 704 : (2006) 6 SCC 736; G. Sagar

Suri and Another v. State of U.P. and Others [2000] 1

SCR 417 : (2000) 2 SCC 636; Archana Rana v. State of

Uttar Pradesh and Another (2021) 3 SCC 751; Deepak

Gaba and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another 

724 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

(2023) 3 SCC 423; Mariam Fasihuddin and Another v.

State by Adugodi Police Station and Another [2024] 1

SCR 623 : (2024) SCC OnLine SC 58 – referred to.

List of Acts

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860.

List of Keywords

Quashing; Cheating; Deception; Dishonest intention; Dishonest

inducement; Abuse of process of law; Miscarriage of justice.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.1716

of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 15.07.2022 of the High Court

of Judicature at Madras in CRLOP No.20716 of 2020

Appearances for Parties

S. Nagamuthu, Sr. Adv., S. Hariharan, S. Sathiaseelan, Amaan

Shreyas, Ms. Mannat Tipnis, Anshul Syal, Ms. Bhavana Duhoon,

Advs. for the Appellant.

V. Krishnamurthy, Sr. A.A.G., D. Kumanan, Sheikh F. Kalia, Mrs.

Deepa. S, G. Ananda Selvam, Ms. Lakshmi Ramamurthy, Advs. for

the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

B.R. Gavai, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The present appeal challenges the order dated 15th July 2022 passed

by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Madras

in Criminal O.P. No. 20716 of 2020 and Crl. M.P. No. 8763 of 2020,

whereby the High Court rejected the petition filed by the present

appellant under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 (“Cr.P.C.” for short), to call for the records and to quash the

First Information Report (“FIR” for short) registered as Crime No. 21

of 2020, on the file of SHO, District Crime Branch, Kancheepuram, 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 725

A.M. Mohan v. The State Represented by SHO and Another

in connection with the offence punishable under Section 420 read

with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC” for short).

FACTS

3. Shorn of details, the facts leading to the present appeal are as under:

3.1 The case of the prosecution is that, during the year 2016,

accused No. 2-Suresh Prathaban, being a college friend,

approached the complainant Karthick Krishnamurthy for

some help to clear his hand loan. The accused No. 2 further

told that he had business with accused No. 1-Lakshmanan,

who is running a hotel and also doing real estate business.

Upon the insistence of accused No. 2, the complainant had

agreed to extend financial help to accused No. 1 to the tune

of Rs.1,60,00,000/- for the business project(s) at Oragadam

and around Kancheepuram District with condition to repay the

same within 20 months with 100% profit.

3.2 Accordingly, the complainant transferred a sum of Rs.49,25,000/-

on 18th March 2016, Rs.20,01,000/- on 31st May 2016,

Rs.36,25,000/- on 13th June 2016, Rs.30,24,166/- on 8th July

2016 through RTGS and Rs. 24,25,834/- in cash to accused

Nos. 1 and 2, totalling to the tune of Rs.1,60,01,000/- (though

mentioned in complaint as Rs.1,60,00,000/-). To secure the

same, accused No. 1 had executed a registered simple mortgage

deed dated 18th March 2016 in favour of the complainant relating

to 100 plots at Sumangali Village, Thiruvannamalai District,

registered vide document No.768 of 2016 for Rs.1,00,00,000/-.

3.3 Thereafter, at the insistence of accused Nos. 1 and 2, the

complainant entered into an unregistered memorandum of

understanding and paid a sum of Rs.1,50,00,000/- and a further

sum of Rs.50,00,000/- by RTGS and cheque to accused No. 1’s

bank. In the said amount, the complainant directly transferred

a sum of Rs.20,00,000/- in favour of the present appellantA.M. Mohan (accused No.3). Further, accused No.1 also

transferred a sum of Rs.1,80,00,000/- to the present appellant

for the purchase of the land admeasuring 9.80 acres situated

at Chittoor Village, Sriperumbudur Taluk. To secure the said

payment of Rs.2,00,00,000/- with returns of Rs.10,00,00,000/-,

accused No. 1 executed a registered deed of General Power of 

726 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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Attorney (“GPA” for short) dated 3rd February 2017, in favour of

the complainant, vide document No. 3733/2017, in respect of

the above said land and also executed a registered sale deed

relating to the land admeasuring 2.52 acres situated at Vellarai

Village, Kancheepuram District vide document No.386/2017

dated 9th February 2017 in favour of the complainant.

3.4 The accused No. 1 also executed a mortgage deed for land

admeasuring 2.14 acres at Sunguvarchatram Village (though

mentioned in the complaint as ‘a registered Agreement to Sell

land admeasuring 1.64½ acres’) in favour of the complainant

registered vide document No.373/2017 dated 27th February

2017. Thereafter, accused Nos. 1 and 2 had received an amount

of Rs.49,85,500/- and executed unregistered loan agreement

dated 5th March 2017, in favour of the complainant and agreed

to repay with interest quantified at Rs.60,000/- per month. For

repayment of the said amount along with interest, accused No.

1 had given a cheque for Rs.58,50,000/- and the same was

returned dishonoured due to insufficient funds.

3.5 Apart from all these transactions, on insistence of accused

Nos. 1 and 2, the complainant joined in the “gold chit business”

conducted by accused No. 1 and paid a sum of Rs.1,20,000/-

per month, from March 2016 to August 2017, totalling to the

tune of Rs.21,60,000/-. The accused persons swindled all the

amounts and cheated the complainant. The accused No. 1

had disposed of about 58 plots on his own and failed to return

the mortgaged amount of Rs.1,00,00,000/- with interest. He

also cancelled the power of attorney standing in favour of the

complainant relating to 9.80 acres of land at Chittoor Village and

without notice to the complainant, he sold out the same to third

parties. Accordingly, the appellant and other accused persons

cheated the complainant to the tune of Rs.16,01,00,000/- (though

mentioned in complaint as Rs.16,06,00,000/-) by their willful

and intentional action of fraud, cheating and criminal breach

of trust. Hence the complaint.

3.6 On the strength of the complaint filed before the Judicial

Magistrate, a FIR being Crime No. 21 of 2020 came to be

registered on 7th November 2020, at District Crime Branch,

Kancheepuram District, against accused Nos. 1, 2 and 3, for 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 727

A.M. Mohan v. The State Represented by SHO and Another

the offences punishable under Section 420 read with 34 of

the IPC.

3.7 Aggrieved thereby, the appellant herein filed a Criminal O.P.

No. 20716 of 2020 before the High Court, under Section 482

of the Cr.P.C., to call for the records and to quash the said FIR.

3.8 Vide impugned order dated 15th July 2022, the learned Single

Judge of the High Court, observed that it is clear that the

intention of the appellant and other accused persons was only

to cheat the complainant and that it can be seen from the FIR

that there are specific allegations against the appellant to attract

the offence, which has to be investigated in depth.

3.9 The Single Judge held that the FIR discloses prima facie

commission of a cognizable offence and as such, the High

Court cannot interfere with the investigation. As a result, the

High Court rejected the petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

for quashing of the FIR, but directed the investigating agency

to complete the investigation and file a final report within a

period of twelve weeks.

3.10 Aggrieved thereby, the appellant filed the present appeal, in

which notice came to be issued vide order dated 21st October

2022.

3.11 As per the additional documents filed in this Court, the chargesheet in relation to the subject FIR, came to be filed on 4th

January 2023.

4. We have heard Shri S. Nagamuthu, learned Senior Counsel appearing

for the appellant, Shri V. Krishnamurthy, learned Senior Additional

Advocate General (AAG) for respondent No. 1 and Shri G. Ananda

Selvam, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2.

SUBMISSIONS

5. Shri Nagamuthu, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of

the appellant submits that even if the averments made in the FIR

are taken at their face value, no case is made out for the offence

punishable under Section 420 of IPC against the present appellant.

It is further submitted that a reading of the charge-sheet would reveal

that none of the ingredients to attract the provision of Section 420

of IPC could be found therein.

728 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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6. Shri Nagamuthu, relying on various judgments of this Court, submits

that, for attracting the offence of ‘cheating’ as defined under Section

415 of IPC and punishable under Section 420 of IPC, it is necessary

that the FIR should make out a case of “intentional inducement”,

“dishonesty” or “fraudulence”. It is submitted that for the offence of

‘cheating’, there should not only be cheating, but as a consequence

of such cheating, the accused should also have dishonestly induced

the person deceived to deliver any property to a person. It is submitted

that neither the FIR nor the charge-sheet contain a whisper with

respect to any inducement, fraud or dishonesty qua the appellant

that caused the complainant to deliver the sum of Rs.20,00,000/- to

his bank account on 2nd February 2017.

7. Shri Nagamuthu further submitted that the complainant has

deliberately suppressed the fact that the appellant had transferred

the land in favour of accused No. 1 by way of a Sale Deed dated

3rd February 2017 i.e., on the very next day of receiving the sum

of Rs.20,00,000/- from the complainant. It is further submitted that,

on the very same day i.e. 3rd February 2017, accused No. 1 had

executed a GPA in favour of the complainant vide Document No.

3733 of 2017. The GPA specifically states that the complainant had

received the GPA in respect of the land purchased by accused No. 1

from the appellant. It is therefore submitted that the appellant has no

role to play after 3rd February 2017 and almost all the allegations are

with regard to cancellation of GPA etc., and execution of subsequent

sale deed in favour of accused No. 4-Seeralan and accused No.

5-Kavitha by accused No. 1, are not related to the appellant.

8. As against this, Shri G. Ananda Selvam, learned counsel appearing

for respondent No. 2 submits that since the charge-sheet has already

been filed, the appeal is rendered infructuous. It is submitted that the

appellant can very well file an application for discharge. It is further

submitted that the averments in the FIR would clearly show that the

present appellant along with other accused persons has cheated

the complainant and defrauded with the huge amount. It is therefore

submitted that no interference is warranted in the present appeal.

CONSIDERATION

9. The law with regard to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482

of Cr.P.C. to quash complaints and criminal proceedings has been

succinctly summarized by this Court in the case of Indian Oil 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 729

A.M. Mohan v. The State Represented by SHO and Another

Corporation v. NEPC India Limited and Others1

 after considering

the earlier precedents. It will be apposite to refer to the following

observations of this Court in the said case, which read thus:

“12. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash

complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and

reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention

a few—Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao

Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri)

234], State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC

335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar

Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059],

Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries

Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 591 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1045], State of

Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla [(1996) 8 SCC 164 : 1996

SCC (Cri) 628], Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999)

3 SCC 259 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 401], Medchl Chemicals &

Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 269 :

2000 SCC (Cri) 615], Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v.

State of Bihar [(2000) 4 SCC 168 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 786],

M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [(2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC

(Cri) 19] and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd.

Sharaful Haque [(2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 283].

The principles, relevant to our purpose are:

(i) A complaint can be quashed where the

allegations made in the complaint, even if they

are taken at their face value and accepted in

their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any

offence or make out the case alleged against

the accused.

For this purpose, the complaint has to be

examined as a whole, but without examining

the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed

inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the

material nor an assessment of the reliability or

genuineness of the allegations in the complaint,

1 [2006] Suppl. 3 SCR 704 : (2006) 6 SCC 736 : 2006 INSC 452

730 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

is warranted while examining prayer for quashing

of a complaint.

(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it

is a clear abuse of the process of the court,

as when the criminal proceeding is found to

have been initiated with mala fides/malice

for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or

where the allegations are absurd and inherently

improbable.

(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be

used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution.

The power should be used sparingly and with

abundant caution.

(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim

reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence

alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is

laid in the complaint, merely on the ground

that a few ingredients have not been stated in

detail, the proceedings should not be quashed.

Quashing of the complaint is warranted only

where the complaint is so bereft of even the

basic facts which are absolutely necessary for

making out the offence.

(v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a

civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or

(c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A

commercial transaction or a contractual dispute,

apart from furnishing a cause of action for

seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve

a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of

a civil proceeding are different from a criminal

proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint

relates to a commercial transaction or breach

of contract, for which a civil remedy is available

or has been availed, is not by itself a ground

to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is

whether the allegations in the complaint disclose

a criminal offence or not.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 731

A.M. Mohan v. The State Represented by SHO and Another

13. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a

growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil

disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account

of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time

consuming and do not adequately protect the interests

of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several

family disputes also, leading to irretrievable breakdown

of marriages/families. There is also an impression that

if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal

prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement.

Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do

not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure

through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and

discouraged. In G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. [(2000) 2

SCC 636 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513] this Court observed: (SCC

p. 643, para 8)

“It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially

of a civil nature, has been given a cloak of

criminal offence. Criminal proceedings are not

a short cut of other remedies available in law.

Before issuing process a criminal court has

to exercise a great deal of caution. For the

accused it is a serious matter. This Court has

laid certain principles on the basis of which the

High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction under

Section 482 of the Code. Jurisdiction under this

section has to be exercised to prevent abuse of

the process of any court or otherwise to secure

the ends of justice.”

14. While no one with a legitimate cause or grievance

should be prevented from seeking remedies available

in criminal law, a complainant who initiates or persists

with a prosecution, being fully aware that the criminal

proceedings are unwarranted and his remedy lies only

in civil law, should himself be made accountable, at

the end of such misconceived criminal proceedings,

in accordance with law. One positive step that can be

taken by the courts, to curb unnecessary prosecutions

and harassment of innocent parties, is to exercise their 

732 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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power under Section 250 CrPC more frequently, where

they discern malice or frivolousness or ulterior motives

on the part of the complainant. Be that as it may.”

10. The Court has also noted the concern with regard to a growing

tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into

criminal cases. The Court observed that this is obviously on

account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time

consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/

creditors. The Court also recorded that there is an impression that

if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution,

there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. The Court, relying on

the law laid down by it in the case of G. Sagar Suri and Another v.

State of U.P. and Others2 held that any effort to settle civil disputes

and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying

pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and

discouraged. The Court also observed that though no one with a

legitimate cause or grievance should be prevented from seeking

remedies available in criminal law, a complainant who initiates

or persists with a prosecution, being fully aware that the criminal

proceedings are unwarranted and his remedy lies only in civil law,

should himself be made accountable, at the end of such misconceived

criminal proceedings, in accordance with law.

11. This Court, in the case of Prof. R.K. Vijayasarathy and Another v.

Sudha Seetharam and Another3

 has culled out the ingredients to

constitute the offence under Sections 415 and 420 of IPC, as under:

“15. Section 415 of the Penal Code reads thus:

“415. Cheating.—Whoever, by deceiving any

person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the

person so deceived to deliver any property to

any person, or to consent that any person shall

retain any property, or intentionally induces the

person so deceived to do or omit to do anything

which he would not do or omit if he were not

so deceived, and which act or omission causes

2 [2000] 1 SCR 417 : (2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 INSC 34

3 [2019] 2 SCR 185 : (2019) 16 SCC 739 : 2019 INSC 216

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 733

A.M. Mohan v. The State Represented by SHO and Another

or is likely to cause damage or harm to that

person in body, mind, reputation or property, is

said to “cheat”.”

16. The ingredients to constitute an offence of cheating

are as follows:

16.1. There should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement

of a person by deceiving him:

16.1.1. The person so induced should be intentionally

induced to deliver any property to any person or to consent

that any person shall retain any property, or

16.1.2. The person so induced should be intentionally

induced to do or to omit to do anything which he would

not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and

16.2. In cases covered by 16.1.2. above, the act or omission

should be one which caused or is likely to cause damage

or harm to the person induced in body, mind, reputation

or property.

17. A fraudulent or dishonest inducement is an essential

ingredient of the offence. A person who dishonestly induces

another person to deliver any property is liable for the

offence of cheating.

18. Section 420 of the Penal Code reads thus:

“420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing

delivery of property.—Whoever cheats and

thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived

to deliver any property to any person, or to

make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a

valuable security, or anything which is signed or

sealed, and which is capable of being converted

into a valuable security, shall be punished with

imprisonment of either description for a term

which may extend to seven years, and shall

also be liable to fine.”

19. The ingredients to constitute an offence under Section

420 are as follows:

734 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

19.1. A person must commit the offence of cheating under

Section 415; and

19.2. The person cheated must be dishonestly induced to

(a) deliver property to any person; or

(b) make, alter or destroy valuable security or anything signed

or sealed and capable of being converted into valuable

security.

20. Cheating is an essential ingredient for an act to

constitute an offence under Section 420.”

12. A similar view has been taken by this Court in the cases of Archana

Rana v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another4, Deepak Gaba

and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another5 and Mariam

Fasihuddin and Another v. State by Adugodi Police Station and

Another6

.

13. It could thus be seen that for attracting the provision of Section 420

of IPC, the FIR/complaint must show that the ingredients of Section

415 of IPC are made out and the person cheated must have been

dishonestly induced to deliver the property to any person; or to make,

alter or destroy valuable security or anything signed or sealed and

capable of being converted into valuable security. In other words,

for attracting the provisions of Section 420 of IPC, it must be shown

that the FIR/complaint discloses:

(i) the deception of any person;

(ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to deliver any

property to any person; and

(iii) dishonest intention of the accused at the time of making the

inducement.

14. The averments with regard to the present appellant as have been

found in the FIR is as under:

4 (2021) 3 SCC 751 : 2021 INSC 135

5 (2023) 3 SCC 423 : 2023 INSC 1

6 [2024] 1 SCR 623 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 58 : 2024 INSC 49

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 735

A.M. Mohan v. The State Represented by SHO and Another

“At the instance of the said Lakshmanan (accused

No.1), I (complainant) paid directly Rs. 20,00,000/- to

one Mohan (appellant-accused No. 3) and the said

Lakshmanan (accused No.1) transferred the remaining

sale consideration of over 18 odd crores to Mohan for

the purchase of his lands at Sunguvarchatram. But

suppressed the execution of sale deed dated 03.02.2017

by the appellant/accused No.3.”

15. A perusal thereof would reveal that even in the said averments, the

allegation with regard to inducement is only qua accused No. 1.

We have perused the entire FIR. Except the aforesaid allegations,

there are no other allegation with regard to the present appellantaccused No. 3. The rest of the allegations are against accused No.

1 (Lakshmanan). Even the allegations with regard to inducement

are only against accused Nos. 1 and 2.

16. Not only that, even in the charge-sheet, the only role attributed to

the present appellant could be found as follows:

“Thereafter, A2 had lured the complainant once again

saying that A1 is going to layout the 9.80 acre land in

Chittoor Village, Thiruperumbudur Taluk, which is under

A3’s general power of attorney and that the complainant

would gain huge profits if he invests Rs. 2 crores in this

project as well. A1 too, as he had already done, lured

the complainant that he would pay him a share out of the

profit, and executed a General Power of Attorney Deed

in favour of the complainant in respect of the 9.80 acre

land in Chittoor Village in Thiruperumbudur Taluk which he

purchased from A3 and registered it as Doc. No. 3733/2017

in Sunguvarchattiram Sub Registrar Office on 03.02.2017,

in a manner instilling confidence in the complainant.

……..

Moreover, upon instructions from A1 to transfer Rs.

20,00,000/- to A3’s Tamil Nadu Mercantile Bank Account

towards sale of the land made by A3 to A1, the complainant

had transferred online a sum of Rs.20,00,000/- to A3’s

Tamil Nadu Mercantile Bank Account from his Yes Bank

Account on 02.02.2017.”

736 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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17. It could thus be seen that the only allegation against the present

appellant is that accused No. 1 executed the GPA in favour of the

complainant in respect of the land which is purchased from the

present appellant-accused No.3. The other allegation is that upon

instructions of accused No. 1 to transfer Rs. 20,00,000/- to accused

No. 3’s Tamil Nadu Mercantile Bank Account towards sale of the

land made by the appellant-accused No.3 to accused No.1, the

complainant had transferred online a sum of Rs.20,00,000/-.

18. It is an undisputed position that upon receipt of the said amount of

Rs.20,00,000/-, the present appellant had transferred the land in

question by sale deed in favour of accused No.1. It is also undisputed

that thereafter accused No. 1 executed the GPA in favour of the

complainant on the same day. After the sale deed was executed in

favour of accused No.1 by the appellant-accused No.3, though the

complaint narrates various instances thereafter, no role is attributed

to the present appellant.

19. At the cost of repetition, it has to be noted that no role of inducement

at all has been attributed to the present appellant. Rather, from the

perusal of the FIR and the charge-sheet, it would reveal that there was

no transaction of any nature directly between the appellant and the

complainant. The version, if accepted at its face value, would reveal

that, at the instance of accused No. 1, the complainant transferred

the amount of Rs.20,00,000/- in the account of the appellant. On

receipt of the said amount, the appellant immediately executed the

sale deed in favour of accused No.1, who thereafter executed the

GPA in favour of the complainant. After that, no role is attributed

to the present appellant and whatever happened thereafter, has

happened between accused No. 1, the complainant and the other

accused persons. In that view of the matter, we find that the FIR or

the charge-sheet, even if taken at its face value, does not disclose

the ingredients to attract the provision of Section 420 of IPC qua

the appellant.

20. The dishonest inducement is the sine qua non to attract the provisions

of Sections 415 and 420 of IPC. In our considered view, the same is

totally lacking qua the present appellant. In that view of the matter,

we find that continuation of the criminal proceedings against the

present appellant would be nothing else but amount to abuse of

process of law resulting in miscarriage of justice.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 737

A.M. Mohan v. The State Represented by SHO and Another

21. Insofar as the contention of the respondents that since the chargesheet has been filed, the present appeal is liable to be dismissed,

is concerned, it will be relevant to refer to the following observations

of this Court, in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta and Another v.

State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home and Another7

:

“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of

the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once

the charge-sheet is filed, petition for quashing of FIR is

untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission,

keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph

Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v.

State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri)

23] . In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of

Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] , this

Court while deciding the question whether the High Court

could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of

FIR, when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during

the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed : (SCC

p. 63, para 16)

“16. Thus, from the general conspectus of the

various sections under which the appellant is

being charged and is to be prosecuted would

show that the same are not made out even

prima facie from the complainant’s FIR. Even

if the charge-sheet had been filed, the learned

Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of

Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have

still examined whether the offences alleged to

have been committed by the appellant were

prima facie made out from the complainant’s

FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.”

15. Even otherwise it must be remembered that the

provision invoked by the accused before the High Court

is Section 482 CrPC and that this Court is hearing an

appeal from an order under Section 482 CrPC. Section

482 CrPC reads as follows:

7 [2018] 13 SCR 1028 : (2019) 11 SCC 706 : 2018 INSC 1060

738 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

“482. Saving of inherent powers of the High

Court.—Nothing in this Code shall be deemed

to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High

Court to make such orders as may be necessary

to give effect to any order under this Code, or

to prevent abuse of the process of any court or

otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

16. There is nothing in the words of this section which

restricts the exercise of the power of the Court to

prevent the abuse of process of court or miscarriage

of justice only to the stage of the FIR. It is settled

principle of law that the High Court can exercise

jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC even when the

discharge application is pending with the trial court

[G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636, para 7 :

2000 SCC (Cri) 513. Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P., (2013)

10 SCC 591, para 20 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 338 : (2014)

2 SCC (L&S) 237] . Indeed, it would be a travesty to

hold that proceedings initiated against a person can

be interfered with at the stage of FIR but not if it has

advanced and the allegations have materialised into a

charge-sheet. On the contrary it could be said that the

abuse of process caused by FIR stands aggravated

if the FIR has taken the form of a charge-sheet after

investigation. The power is undoubtedly conferred

to prevent abuse of process of power of any court.”

[emphasis supplied]

22. A similar view has been taken by this Court in the case of Haji Iqbal

alias Bala through S.P.O.A. v. State of U.P. and Others8

.

23. In that view of the matter, contention in this regard has no merit.

CONCLUSION

24. In the result, we are inclined to allow the appeal. The order of the

High Court dated 15th July 2022 in Criminal O.P. No.20716 of 2020

and Criminal M.P. No. 8763 of 2020 is quashed and set aside. The

8 2023 SCC OnLine SC 946 : 2023 INSC 688

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 739

A.M. Mohan v. The State Represented by SHO and Another

FIR in Crime No.21 of 2020 and the consequential charge-sheet filed

against the present appellant shall stand quashed and set aside.

25. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey Result of the case:

Appeal allowed.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Powers of the High Court under – Quashing of FIR filed by Respondent No.2 against Appellants – Appellants, employees of a bicycle manufacturing company engaged Respondent No.2 for assembling, transporting and delivering bicycles – Respondent No.2 aggrieved by the fact of payment not being commensurate with the service rendered - FIR filed under Sections 406, 420, 506, Indian Penal Code – Subsequently, settlement arrived at between the parties – Appellants paid an additional amount of INR 26,00,000/- to Respondent No.2 as full and final settlement, duly accepted by Respondent No.2 – Payment and receipt of settlement amount not disputed by parties – Chargesheet filed against Appellants – Appellants sought quashing of the FIR and proceedings arising therefrom under Section 482, CrPC on the ground of the dispute being civil in nature – Respondent No.2 objected to settlement on the ground of it being vitiated by coercion – High Court’s refusal to exercise powers under Section 482, CrPC on the ground of a prima facie case being made out – Challenged:

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 740 : 2024 INSC 196

Naresh Kumar & Anr.

v.

The State of Karnataka & Anr.

(Criminal Appeal No. 1510 of 2024)

12 March 2024

[Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Refusal by High Court to quash criminal proceedings against

Appellants/Accused arising out of a civil transaction between

Appellants and Respondent No.2, if justified.

Headnotes

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Powers of the

High Court under – Quashing of FIR filed by Respondent

No.2 against Appellants – Appellants, employees of a

bicycle manufacturing company engaged Respondent No.2

for assembling, transporting and delivering bicycles –

Respondent No.2 aggrieved by the fact of payment not being

commensurate with the service rendered - FIR filed under

Sections 406, 420, 506, Indian Penal Code – Subsequently,

settlement arrived at between the parties – Appellants paid

an additional amount of INR 26,00,000/- to Respondent No.2

as full and final settlement, duly accepted by Respondent

No.2 – Payment and receipt of settlement amount not

disputed by parties – Chargesheet filed against Appellants

– Appellants sought quashing of the FIR and proceedings

arising therefrom under Section 482, CrPC on the ground of

the dispute being civil in nature – Respondent No.2 objected

to settlement on the ground of it being vitiated by coercion

– High Court’s refusal to exercise powers under Section

482, CrPC on the ground of a prima facie case being made

out – Challenged:

Held: Section 482 empowers High Court to prevent abuse of

process and secure ends of justice – Though the power under

Section 482 should be exercised sparingly, the High Court

must not hesitate in quashing criminal proceedings which are

essentially of a civil nature – Judgement in Paramjeet Batra 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 741

Naresh Kumar & Anr. v. State of Karnataka

v. State of Uttarakhand (2013) 11 SCC 673 relied upon –

Reference to observations in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P.

(2021) 14 SCC 626 regarding misuse of criminal proceedings as

a weapon of harassment and also Usha Chakraborty & Anr.

v. State of West Bengal & Anr. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90 for

exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section

482 to quash civil disputes cloaked in criminal offence – High

Court erred in holding that a prima facie case was made out based

on the ground that Appellants’ intention to cheat Respondent

No.2 from the beginning was evident from the fact that the

Appellants had cumulatively paid Respondent No.2 an amount

much higher than what the latter was entitled to receive for the

services rendered by him – Additional amount paid in light of the

settlement, cannot be presumed as an act of cheating – Nature

of dispute in present case is civil and allegation of a coerced

settlement is unlikely – No FIR or Complaint by Respondent

No.2 alleging coercion, amount also duly accepted by him –

Mere breach of contract would not attract criminal prosecution in

every case, Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab and Anr. (2023)

5 SCC 360 relied upon – Every breach of contract would not

amount to cheating and it must be proved that fraudulent or

dishonest intention to cheat existed while making the promise,

as held in Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8

SCC 293 – Present dispute was not only civil in nature but also

stood settled subsequently – In the instant case, no criminal

element present, only an abuse of process – Impugned Order

of the High Court set aside – FIR and criminal proceedings

quashed – Appeal allowed. [Para 4-8]

Case Law Cited

Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand (2013) 11 SCC

673; Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab and Anr. (2023)

5 SCC 360; Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala

[2015] 4 SCR 27 : (2015) 8 SCC 293 - relied on.

Randheer Singh v. State of U.P. (2021) 14 SCC 626,

Usha Chakraborty & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Anr.

2023 SCC OnLine SC 90 – referred to.

List of Acts

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860.

742 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

List of Keywords

Quashing of FIR; Inherent powers of the High Court; Criminal

case arising from civil dispute; Inherent powers; Criminal breach

of trust; Cheating; Settlement; Compromise.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.1510

of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 02.12.2020 of the High Court

of Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRLP No.8003 of 2019

Appearances for Parties

Aman Lekhi, Sr. Adv., Abhishek Gupta, Chaitanya Mahajan, Ms. Payal

Kakra, Ritwiz Rishabh, Ujjwal Sinha, Aniket Seth, Ms. Snehilsonam,

Snehil Sonam, Kunal K., Ms. Ishika Jain, Advs. for the Appellants.

Anand Sanjay M Nuli, Sr. Adv., D. L. Chidananda, Ravindera Kumar

Verma, Dharm Singh, Shiva Swaroop, M/s. Nuli & Nuli, Advs. for

the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.

Leave granted.

2. The appellants before this Court have challenged the order dated

02.12.2020 of the Karnataka High Court by which their petition

under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the

FIR has been dismissed. The case of the appellants before the

High Court of Karnataka was that the FIR which was instituted by

the complainant i.e. respondent no. 2 is primarily a civil dispute and

has no criminal element and the entire criminal proceedings initiated

against the appellants is nothing but an abuse of the process and

consequently, they had invoked the extraordinary powers of the High

Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The two

appellants before this Court are the Assistant Manager (Marketing)

and the Manging Director of a company, which is a manufacturer

of bicycles. Respondent no.2 was given a contract, as it has been

stated before this Court, for the assembly of bicycles, their transport 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 743

Naresh Kumar & Anr. v. State of Karnataka

and their delivery, at the rate of Rs.122/- for each bicycle, and

since they had assembled 83,267 bicycles, they raised invoices

amounting to Rs. 1,01,58,574/- and were liable to be paid the same.

However, respondent no.2 contends that instead, a payment of only

Rs.35,37,390/- was given by the appellants. Hence, it was a case

of criminal breach of trust and cheating and the First Information

Report No. 113 of 2017 against the appellant no. 1 was filed on

24.05.2017 under Sections 406, 420 and 506 of the Indian Penal

Code at P.S. Doddaballapura, Bangalore Rural District. Subsequently,

a Chargesheet dated 30.05.2019, was filed in the court where both

the appellants were made an accused.

3. Meanwhile, an important fact occurred, of which no importance

seems to have been given by the High Court. Subsequent to the

filing of FIR there is an admitted settlement between the appellants

and respondent No. 2 by a Compromise Deed dated 27.12.2017

by which as a full and final settlement between the two parties, an

additional amount of Rs. 26 lakhs were to be paid by the appellant,

which has been duly given and accepted. This amount was deposited

in the account of respondent no. 2 on 29.12.2017. This was done by

the appellants in order to give a quietus to the whole situation and

to bring peace, according to the appellants. Therefore, as of now, a

total amount of Rs.62 lakhs as against Rs. 1,01,58,574/- which was

claimed by the complainant has been admittedly paid. The case of

the respondent no. 2 against the settlement dated 27.12.2017 is that

the respondent no. 2 was coerced in entering into this settlement and

this is not a settlement arrived at by the free will of the complainant

and therefore the prosecution of the appellants is necessary under

the criminal law. The High Court has refused to accept the contention

of the appellants that the dispute between the parties in any case

is civil in nature. The High Court was of the opinion that since the

appellants had claimed that the complainant assembled only 28,995

bicycles, which would make them liable to pay only an amount of

Rs.35 lakhs, but instead the appellants had paid an amount of Rs.62

lakhs which shows that the actual number of bicycles which were

assembled by the complainant was much more than 28,995 bicycles,

as claimed by the appellants and therefore, the appellants had an

intention to cheat the complainant right from the beginning. Thus,

it was held by the High Court that prima facie a case of cheating is

made out against the appellants. 

744 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

4. Having heard the learned counsel for both the parties, we are of

the considered view that the findings of the High Court on this

aspect are not correct. We do not agree with the findings arrived at

by the High Court for two reasons. Firstly, the dispute between the

parties is primarily, civil in nature. It is after all a question of how

many bicycles the complainant had assembled and the dispute

between the parties is only regarding the figure of bicycles and

consequently of the amount liable to be paid. This is a civil dispute.

The complainant has not been able to establish that the intention

to cheat the complainant was there with the appellants right from

the beginning. Merely because the appellants admit that only

28,995 bicycles were assembled, but they have admittedly paid an

amount of Rs. 62,01,746/- to the complainant, which is of a much

higher number of bicycles, would not prove that the intention of the

appellants right from the beginning was to cheat. This amount i.e. the

additional amount of Rs. 26 lacs have been paid by the appellants

pursuant to a settlement. The reasons and the logic for arriving at

a settlement are quite different. In this case it seems, it is primarily

to bring a quietus to the dispute and to have peace and to avoid

litigation. The mere fact that the appellants have paid an additional

amount pursuant to the settlement, cannot be presumed as an act

of cheating. Moreover, the complainant does not deny the fact that a

settlement was reached between the parties though he says he was

coerced into the settlement. He does not dispute that the additional

amount paid by the appellants under the terms of the compromise

deed, which is an amount of Rs.25,75,442 (after deducting TDS) was

received by the complainant, as this amount has been received in a

bank transaction through NEFT on 29.12.2017. The allegation that

the complainant was coerced into a settlement, looks unlikely for

two reasons. First, there is no FIR or Complaint that the complainant

was coerced into this settlement. Secondly, this amount was duly

accepted by the complainant.

5. Under these circumstances, we are of the considered view that this

is a case where the inherent powers should have been exercised by

the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code

as the powers are there to stop the abuse of the process and to

secure the ends of justice.

6. In the case of Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand (2013) 11

SCC 673, this Court recognized that although the inherent powers of 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 745

Naresh Kumar & Anr. v. State of Karnataka

a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

should be exercised sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate

in quashing such criminal proceedings which are essentially of a

civil nature. This is what was held:

“12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482

of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This

power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of

preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise

to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses

a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts

alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal

offence are present or not has to be judged by the High

Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may

also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must

see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil

nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a

situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact,

adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court

should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings

to prevent abuse of process of the court.”

(emphasis supplied)

Relying upon the decision in Paramjeet Batra (supra), this Court in

Randheer Singh v. State of U.P. (2021) 14 SCC 626, observed that

criminal proceedings cannot be taken recourse to as a weapon of

harassment. In Usha Chakraborty & Anr. v. State of West Bengal

& Anr. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90, relying upon Paramjeet Batra

(supra) it was again held that where a dispute which is essentially

of a civil nature, is given a cloak of a criminal offence, then such

disputes can be quashed, by exercising the inherent powers under

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

7. Essentially, the present dispute between the parties relates to a

breach of contract. A mere breach of contract, by one of the parties,

would not attract prosecution for criminal offence in every case, as

held by this Court in Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab and Anr.

(2023) 5 SCC 360. Similarly, dealing with the distinction between the

offence of cheating and a mere breach of contractual obligations,

this Court, in Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8

SCC 293, has held that every breach of contract would not give rise 

746 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

to the offence of cheating, and it is required to be shown that the

accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making

the promise.

8. In the case at hand, the dispute between the parties was not only

essentially of a civil nature but in this case the dispute itself stood

settled later as we have already discussed above. We see no criminal

element here and consequently the case here is nothing but an abuse

of the process. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the order

of the High Court dated 02.12.2020. The criminal proceedings arising

out of FIR No.113 of 2017 will hereby stand quashed.

Headnotes prepared by: Result of the case:

Niti Richhariya, Hony. Associate Editor Appeal allowed.

(Verified by: Kanu Agrawal, Adv.) 

1) Whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict the accused; 2) Whether burden of proof u/s. 106 Evidence Act can be on accused before the prosecution proves its case; 3) Whether recovery pursuant to statement made u/s. 27 Evidence Act can be admissible, when recovery was from a place known to all and not exclusively within knowledge of maker

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 767 : 2024 INSC 211

Ravinder Kumar

v.

State of NCT of Delhi

(Criminal Appeal No. 918 of 2024)

06 March 2024

[B.R. Gavai* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

1) Whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict the

accused; 2) Whether burden of proof u/s. 106 Evidence Act can

be on accused before the prosecution proves its case; 3) Whether

recovery pursuant to statement made u/s. 27 Evidence Act can

be admissible, when recovery was from a place known to all and

not exclusively within knowledge of maker.

Headnotes

Penal Code, 1860 – s. 302 - Conviction based on circumstantial

evidence – Evidence Act, 1872 – ss. 106, 27 – Appellant’s wife

found dead with throat slit – Appellant convicted by trial court for

offences punishable under ss. 302, 304B/34, 498A/34 IPC – High

Court set aside conviction under ss. 304B/34 but sustained under

ss. 302, 498A/34 IPC – Prosecution relying on circumstantial

evidence to sustain conviction under s. 302 – Courts below

found: (i) plea of alibi without substance (ii) bloodstained clothes

recovered at Appellant’s parental home (iii) English calendar with

Appellant’s name found in the house (iv) Appellant created a

scene in the house so as to make it seem like robbery.

Held: (1) When prosecution case relies on circumstantial evidence,

circumstances from which conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should

be fully established – Accused ‘must be’ and not merely ‘may be’

guilty – Facts so established should be consistent only with guilt

of accused, not explainable on any another hypothesis – Chain of

evidence must be so complete to show beyond reasonable doubt

that act was committed by accused – (2) Before burden shifts on

accused under s. 106 Evidence Act, prosecution has to establish

before death occurred, deceased and accused were seen in the

house- more so when accused raises specific plea of alibi – (3)

For recovery to be admissible on statement made under S. 27 

768 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Evidence Act, recovery must be from place exclusively within

knowledge of maker – In present case, recovery was from place

accessible to all [Paras 8, 9, 10 11, 13, 17].

Case Law Cited

Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra

[1985] 1 SCR 88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 INSC

121 – relied on.

Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra [2006]

Suppl. 7 SCR 156 : (2006) 10 SCC 681 : 2006 INSC

691 – relied on.

List of Acts

Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872.

List of Keywords

Principles of Circumstantial evidence; S. 106 Evidence Act; Burden of

proof – Alibi; Recovery under S. 27 Evidence Act, when admissible.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 918

of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 12.10.2015 of the High Court

of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLA No.287 of 2015

Appearances for Parties

Ms. Neha Kapoor, Kaushal Mehta, Pulkit Srivastava, Ankit Bhutani,

Advs. for the Appellant.

Rajan Kumar Chourasia, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Nachiketa Joshi, P

V Yogeshvaran, Udai Khanna, Vishnu Shankar Jain, Sachin Sharma,

Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

B.R. Gavai, J.

1. This appeal arises against the judgment and order passed by the

Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi on 12th

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 769

Ravinder Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi

October, 2015 in Criminal Appeal No.287 of 2015, thereby dismissing

the appeal filed by the appellant herein.

2. The facts in brief leading to the filing of the present appeal are as

under:

2.1 Deceased-Meena, daughter of Mani Ram (PW.3) and Gyanwati

(PW.6), got married to the appellant-Ravinder Kumar (accused

No.1) on 20.06.1999. A male child named Harry was born out of

the said wedlock on 26.08.2000. On 27.04.2001, at 0055 hours,

a First Information Report (“FIR” for short) bearing No.129/2001

(Ext. PW-9/A) was registered at the instance of deceased-Meena

in the Police Station Civil Lines, Delhi for investigation into the

offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for

short. ‘IPC’). In the said FIR, deceased-Meena made allegations

with regard to cruelty made by her husband-Ravinder Kumar

(accused No.1) and his two brothers, namely, Pushpender Singh

(accused No.2) and R. Harshinder (accused No.4) during her

stay at the matrimonial home at H.No.252, Old Chandrawal, Civil

Line, Delhi. In the said FIR, after completion of the investigation

a Report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C’) was submitted. However, it appears

that there was a compromise between the parties and she

made a statement before the Metropolitan Magistrate (Mahila

Court), Delhi that she does not want to proceed with the case

any further. She further stated that she has no grievance against

the accused persons and that the complaint had been made

by her out of frustration and anger. She had also stated that

she was living separately with her husband and child happily,

as such criminal proceedings were terminated and the accused

were discharged vide judgment dated 21.10.2003.

2.2 On the morning of 29.05.2004, dead body of Meena was

discovered at about 0820 hours lying in a pool of blood on the

floor of the room on the ground floor, her throat slit with a sharp

edged weapon and her son Harry aged about three and a half

years was found sitting nearby.

2.3 The FIR No.211/04 (Ext. PW-1/A) came to be registered for

the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC on the basis

of rukka (Ex.PW-15/B) sent by Sub Inspector Ram Chander

(PW.15). The FIR was later converted into a case involving for

offence punishable under Section 304-B/498-A/34 of the IPC 

770 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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on the basis of the statements made by Mani Ram (PW.3),

Shiv Kumar (PW.4) and Gyanwati (PW.6), father, brother and

mother of deceased Meena respectively.

2.4 On conclusion of the investigation, charges were framed

against Ravinder Kumar (accused No.1), the husband of the

deceased, Babu Lal (accused No.4), who is the father-in-law

of the deceased, Phoolwati (accused No.3), who is the motherin-law of the deceased and Pushpender (accused No.2) and

R. Harshinder (accused No.5), who are the brothers-in-law

of the deceased. At the conclusion of the trial, by judgment

and order dated 25.11.2014/08.01.2015, the Addl. Sessions

Judge-02, North District, Rohini Courts, Delhi (hereinafter

referred to as “trial court”) convicted the appellant herein for the

offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him

to undergo life imprisonment with a fine of Rs.25,000/-. All the

accused were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for

ten years with fine of Rs.20,000/- for the offences punishable

under Section 304B/34 IPC and rigorous imprisonment for three

years with fine of Rs.25,000/- each for offence under Section

498A/34 IPC with further direction that in case of default in

payment of fine they would undergo rigorous imprisonment for

six months and three months respectively.

2.5 Being aggrieved thereby, two criminal appeals came to be

preferred by the convicted persons. Mani Ram (PW.3), the father

of the deceased also filed an independent appeal being Criminal

Appeal No.569 of 2015, being aggrieved by the acquittal of

accused Nos.2 to 5 for the offences punishable under Section

302/34 IPC. The appeals were heard together. The High Court,

vide impugned judgment and order dated 12th October 2015,

held the appellant herein and Pushpender (accused No.2)

guilty for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with

Section 34 IPC. The conviction and sentence of the appellant

herein and Pushpender (accused No.2) was set aside for the

offence punishable under Section 304B read with Section 34

IPC while maintaining the sentence awarded by the trial court to

the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302/34

IPC. The High Court also sentenced Pushpinder (accused

No.2) to undergo life imprisonment with fine of Rs.25,000/- for

the offence punishable under Section 302/34 IPC. In case of 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 771

Ravinder Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi

default in payment of fine, he was directed to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for three months. The conviction of Phoolwati

(accused No.3), Babu Lal (accused No.4) and R. Harshinder

(accused No.5) for the offence punishable under Section 304-

B read with Section 34 IPC and conviction of all accused for

offence under Section 498-A read with Section 34 IPC and

sentences awarded thereagainst were maintained.

2.6 Babu Lal (accused No.4), who is the father-in-law of the

deceased had preferred Criminal Appeal No.2025 of 2017

before this Court. Since Phoolwati (accused No.3), who is the

mother-in-law of the deceased died during the pendency of

the appeal, the appeal came to be abated against her. In the

said appeal, insofar as Babu Lal (accused No.4) is concerned,

though this Court did not find any ground to interfere with

the conviction passed by the trial court and the High Court,

it reduced the sentence for the period already undergone by

accused No.4-Babu Lal.

2.7 Pushpender (accused No.2) had preferred Criminal Appeal

Nos.938-939 of 2016. This Court, vide order dated 15th February

2022 partly allowed the appeals and set aside the conviction

and sentence recorded against Pushpender (accused No.2) for

offence punishable under Section 302 IPC, however it restored

the conviction and sentence in respect of offences under

Sections 304B and 498A read with Section 34 IPC.

2.8 Insofar as R. Harshinder (accused No.5) is concerned, he had

preferred Criminal Appeal No.244 of 2022. His appeal was also

partly allowed by reducing the sentence to the period already

undergone by him, vide order dated 15th February 2022.

2.9 After the aforesaid appeals were decided, the appellant herein

has preferred the present appeal in October, 2023. Leave was

granted in this matter on 13.02.2024.

3. We have heard Ms. Neha Kapoor, learned counsel for the appellant

and Mr. Rajan Kumar Chourasia, learned counsel for the respondent.

4. Ms. Kapoor submits that the conviction is based on circumstantial

evidence. She further submits that no incriminating circumstances

have been proved against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

She submits that insofar as recovery of the bloodstained clothes is 

772 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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concerned, it is found at a place accessible to one and all and she

further submits that the recovery panchnama also does not mention

the date of recovery. She therefore submits that, the conviction under

Section 302 IPC is not at all tenable.

5. Ms. Kapoor further submits that even the conviction under Section

304B and 498A would not be tenable. She submits that the matter

was compromised between the deceased and the accused. It is

submitted that taking into consideration the above aspect, the

amended charge came to be framed on 14.03.2007, restricting the

claim with regard to cruelty only for the period between 21.10.2003

and 29.05.2004 i.e. from the date of the discharge by the learned

Magistrate in the earlier proceedings till the date on which Meena

was found dead. Ms. Kapoor further submits that during this period

there is no allegation against the appellant herein, which would

attract the provisions of Section 498A IPC. It is submitted that the

prosecution fails to prove the guilt. The conviction under Section

304B IPC would also not be tenable.

6. Shri Rajan Kumar Chourasia, learned counsel appearing for the

respondent, on the contrary, submits that both the Courts, upon correct

appreciation of evidence, have concurrently found the appellant

herein guilty for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. It

is, therefore, submitted that no interference is warranted with the

conviction recorded under Section 302 IPC. It is submitted that insofar

as conviction under Section 498A and 304B IPC are concerned, the

same has been affirmed by this Court in the case of three co-accused

persons, as such the said finding has attained finality.

7. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties, we have

scrutinized the evidence.

8. Undoubtedly, the case of the prosecution rests on circumstantial

evidence. The law with regard to conviction on the basis of

circumstantial evidence has very well been crystalized in the judgment

of this Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of

Maharashtra1

, wherein this Court held thus:

“152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High

Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature,

1 (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 INSC 121

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 773

Ravinder Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi

character and essential proof required in a criminal case

which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most

fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant

v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952

SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] . This case

has been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in

a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance,

the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh

[(1969) 3 SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 55] and Ramgopal v.

State of Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC 625 : AIR 1972 SC

656] . It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has

laid down in Hanumant case [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952

SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] :

“It is well to remember that in cases where

the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the

circumstances from which the conclusion of

guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance

be fully established, and all the facts so

established should be consistent only with the

hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again,

the circumstances should be of a conclusive

nature and tendency and they should be such

as to exclude every hypothesis but the one

proposed to be proved. In other words, there

must be a chain of evidence so far complete

as not to leave any reasonable ground for a

conclusion consistent with the innocence of the

accused and it must be such as to show that

within all human probability the act must have

been done by the accused.”

153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the

following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against

an accused can be said to be fully established:

(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion

of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.

It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the

circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may

be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a 

774 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be

or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji

Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC

793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where

the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC

(Cri) p. 1047]

“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the

accused must be and not merely may be guilty

before a court can convict and the mental

distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is

long and divides vague conjectures from sure

conclusions.”

(2) the facts so established should be consistent

only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the

accused, that is to say, they should not be

explainable on any other hypothesis except that

the accused is guilty,

(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive

nature and tendency,

(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis

except the one to be proved, and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so

complete as not to leave any reasonable ground

for the conclusion consistent with the innocence

of the accused and must show that in all human

probability the act must have been done by the

accused.

154. These five golden principles, if we may say so,

constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based

on circumstantial evidence.”

9. It can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the prosecution

that the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to

be drawn should be fully established. The Court holds that it is a

primary principle that the accused ‘must be’ and not merely ‘may

be’ guilty before a court can convict the accused. It has been held

that there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between

‘may be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’. It has been 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 775

Ravinder Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi

held that the facts so established should be consistent only with the

guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable

on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. It has

further been held that the circumstances should be such that they

exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. It

has been held that there must be a chain of evidence so complete

as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent

with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human

probabilities the act must have been done by the accused.

10. It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot

take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot

be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is.

An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt.

11. In the light of the aforesaid judgment, we have examined the present

case. In the present case, the trial court and the High Court have

basically convicted and affirmed the conviction under Section 302

IPC, finding the plea of the alibi to be without substance. It is a settled

proposition of law that before the burden shifts on the accused under

Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the prosecution will have to prove

its case. No doubt that in view of the law laid down by this Court

in the case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra2

,

which is a case like the present one, where husband and wife reside

together in a house and the crime is committed inside the house, it

will be for the husband to explain how the death occurred in the house

where they cohabited together. However, even in such a case, the

prosecution will have to first establish that before the death occurred,

the deceased and the accused were seen in the said house. In the

present case, the incident had occurred on the intervening night of

28th/29th May, 2004. It was necessary for the prosecution to lead

some evidence to establish that on the night of 28th/29th May 2004,

deceased and accused were together in the house. This will be

more necessary in view of the specific plea of the defence of alibi.

12. We will have to consider as to whether the prosecution has established

other circumstances beyond reasonable doubts, which led to no

other conclusion than the guilt of the accused.

2 (2006) 10 SCC 681 : 2006 INSC 691

776 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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13. The prosecution has relied upon the CDRs with regard to mobile

phone of the Saroj, Pushpender (accused No.2) and Ravinder

Kumar (accused No.1). However, both the Courts found the said

evidence to be inadmissible as it was not proved in terms of

Section 65A of the Evidence Act. The circumstances relied upon

by the prosecution is with regard to the seizure of the bloodstained

clothes allegedly used by the appellant at the time of commission

of the crime beneath the double bed from his parental home at

Chandrawal. We find that the said recovery cannot be relied for

more than one reasons. For a recovery to be admissible on the

statement made under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, it has to be

from such a place which is exclusively within the knowledge of the

maker thereof. Indisputably, the recovery is from a place accessible

to one and all and the recovery panchnama also does not mention

the date regarding such a recovery. Apart from that, there is no

entry in malkhana register with regard to the deposit of the said

articles and sending them to the FSL for chemical examination.

We, therefore, find that the said circumstances cannot be said to

be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

14. Apart from that, the prosecution has not been in a position to prove

any other circumstance beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court

and the High Court have heavily relied on the circumstance that

an English calendar (Ex. PX) was found to be hanged in the room.

On one side, two sheets of paper both similar computer print outs

has been pasted. On one of the sheets, on the left top corner, the

name Ravinder followed by mobile telephone number 9818419048

preceded by a drawing of mobile phone with arrow sign, all written

in hand can be noticed. On the other sheet pasted on the top, above

the calendar, it was printed thus:-

“In-Laws: 2791 3334

Self: 9818419048

My Home: 55153285”

15. It has been held that the appellant had hung calendar (Ex.PX) on

the wall of the house, where he was residing and the calendar (Ex.

PX) would catch the attention of anybody entering the house. It was

held that it was deliberate and had an objective. It was also held

that Chandrawal house was qualified by the expression “my home” 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 777

Ravinder Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi

and the house where the other phone was functional as that of his

“in-laws”. The High Court observed thus:-

“...The phone number of Chandrawal house was qualified

by the expression “my home” and the house where the other

phone (27913334) was functional as that of his “In-laws”

16. With this finding and coupled with the finding that in the house the

appellant has created a scene so as to make it seem like a robbery, it

was held that it was only the appellant who was guilty for commission

of murder of his wife.

17. We are of the considered view that the High Court has failed to

draw a distinction between the “may have committed the crime” or

“must have committed the crime”, as held by this Court in the case

of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra). As held by this Court, the

suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof

beyond reasonable doubt. We, therefore, find that the prosecution

has failed to prove any incrimination circumstance beyond reasonable

doubt and in any case failed to establish a chain of events intertwined

with each other, which leads to no other conclusion than the guilt

of the accused.

18. Considering the facts and circumstances, the appeal is partly allowed

and the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant herein for

the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside. However,

the conviction and sentence in respect of the offences punishable

under Sections 304B, 498A read with Section 34 IPC are restored.

19. In the present case, the appellant has undergone incarceration for

a period of more than fifteen years. In that view of the matter, we

direct that it will not be necessary for the appellant to deposit the

fine amount. The appellant is directed to be set at liberty forthwith,

if not required in any other case.

20. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Result of the case:

Aandrita Deb, Hony. Associate Editor Appeal partly allowed.

(Verified by: Madhavi Divan, Sr. Adv.)