Sentence/Sentencing – Murder – Appropriate period of sentence to be imposed under the Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka [2008] 11 SCR 93 principle wherein it was held that to avoid a death sentence, the courts can device a graver form of imprisonment for life beyond fourteen years – Aggravating and mitigating circumstances – Relevant factors for arriving at the number of years which the convict will have to undergo before which remission could be sought – Trial Court sentenced the accused to death for the offence punishable u/s.302, IPC – High Court confirmed the conviction, however modified the death sentence to imprisonment for 30 years without remission following the Swamy Shraddananda line of cases – Correctness:

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 913 : 2024 INSC 215

Navas @ Mulanavas

v.

State of Kerala

(Criminal Appeal No. 1215 of 2011)

18 March 2024

[B. R. Gavai, K.V. Viswanathan* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Appellant-accused was held guilty for the offences punishable u/

ss.302, 449, 309, IPC and sentenced accordingly. For the offence

punishable u/s.302, IPC, he was sentenced to death. High Court

confirmed the conviction, however the sentence of death was

modified and reduced to imprisonment for life with a direction

that he shall not be released from prison for a period of 30 years

including the period already undergone with set off u/s.428, Cr.P.C.

alone. What should be the appropriate sentence and whether the

High Court was justified in adopting the Swamy Shraddananda v.

State of Karnataka [2008] 11 SCR 93 line of cases and whether

the fixing of the quantum at 30 years without remission was the

appropriate sentence, in the facts and circumstances of the case?

Headnotes

Sentence/Sentencing – Murder – Appropriate period of

sentence to be imposed under the Swamy Shraddananda v.

State of Karnataka [2008] 11 SCR 93 principle wherein it was

held that to avoid a death sentence, the courts can device a

graver form of imprisonment for life beyond fourteen years –

Aggravating and mitigating circumstances – Relevant factors

for arriving at the number of years which the convict will

have to undergo before which remission could be sought –

Trial Court sentenced the accused to death for the offence

punishable u/s.302, IPC – High Court confirmed the conviction,

however modified the death sentence to imprisonment for 30

years without remission following the Swamy Shraddananda

line of cases – Correctness:

Held: Circumstances of the present case were by themselves

consistent with the sole hypothesis that the accused and the

accused alone was the perpetrator of the murders – On the

aggravating side, act committed by the accused was pre-planned/

914 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

premeditated; he brutally murdered 4 unarmed and defenseless

persons, one of whom was a child and the other an aged lady –

By the act of the accused, three generations of single family lost

their lives for no fault of theirs; nature of injuries inflicted on ‘L’

and two others highlights the brutality and cold-bloodedness of

the act – On the mitigating side, the accused was quite young

(28 years old) when he committed the act; the act committed was

not for any gain or profit; he did not try to flee and in fact tried

to commit suicide as he was overcome with emotions after the

dastardly act; he had been in jail for 18 years and 4 months and

the case was based on circumstantial evidence – Further, conduct

report of the appellant indicated that no disciplinary actions were

initiated against him in the prison and his conduct and behavior

had been satisfactory so far – Judgment of the High Cout is upheld

insofar as the conviction of the appellant u/ss.302, 449, 309 IPC

is concerned – Sentence imposed for the offence u/ss.449, 309,

IPC also not interfered with – High Court was justified on the

facts of the case in following Swamy Shraddananda principle

while imposing sentence for the offence u/s.302 IPC – However,

the sentence u/s.302 imposed by the High Court is modified from

a period of 30 years imprisonment without remission to that of a

period of 25 years imprisonment without remission, including the

period already undergone. [Paras 13, 58-60]

Sentence/Sentencing – Murder – Remission – Commutation of

death penalty to life imprisonment, however convict cannot be

released on the expiry of 14 years (the normal benchmark for

life imprisonment) – Aggravating and mitigating circumstances

– Appropriate period of sentence to be imposed under the

Swamy Shraddananda principle – Relevant factors for arriving

at the number of years which the convict will have to undergo

before which remission could be sought:

Held: Once the court decides that the death penalty is not to be

imposed and also that the convict cannot be released on the expiry

of 14 years, the guidelines set out in Swamy Shraddananda, V.

Sriharan and the line of cases which applied these judgments will

have to be considered and principles, if any, set out therein have

to be applied – There can be no straitjacket formulae – Pegging

the point up to which remission powers cannot be invoked is an

exercise that has to be carefully undertaken and the discretion

should be exercised on reasonable grounds – The principle in

Swamy Shraddananda as affirmed in V. Sriharan was evolved as 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 915

Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala

the normally accepted norm of 14 years was found to be grossly

disproportionate on the lower side – At the same time, since it is

a matter concerning the liberty of the individual, courts should also

guard against any disproportion in the imposition, on the higher

side too – A delicate balance has to be struck – 27 previously

decided cases applying the Swamy Shraddananda principle,

surveyed – A journey through the cases shows that the fundamental

underpinning is the principle of proportionality – The aggravating

and mitigating circumstances which the Court considers while

deciding commutation of penalty from death to life imprisonment,

have a large bearing in deciding the number of years of compulsory

imprisonment without remission, too – Some of the relevant factors

that the courts bear in mind for arriving at the number of years

which the convict will have to undergo before which the remission

powers could be invoked are number of deceased who were

victims of that crime, their age and gender; the nature of injuries

including sexual assault if any; the motive for which the offence

was committed; whether the offence was committed when the

convict was on bail in another case; the premeditated nature of

the offence; the relationship between the offender and the victim;

the abuse of trust if any; the criminal antecedents; and whether

the convict, if released, would be a menace to the society – Some

of the positive factors are age of the convict; the probability of

reformation of convict; the convict not being a professional killer;

the socioeconomic condition of the accused; the composition

of the family of the accused and conduct expressing remorse –

Additionally, the Court would be justified in considering the conduct

of the convict in jail; and the period already undergone – Aforesaid

factors not exhaustive but illustrative and each case would depend

on the facts and circumstances therein. [Paras 26, 27, 57]

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.106 – According to the prosecution,

appellant had illicit intimacy with ‘L’ however, after she tried

to distance herself, the appellant was seriously aggrieved

– Allegedly, on the fateful night he gained access into her

house by making a hole in the eastern side wall of the house

and murdered ‘L’ along with three others in the house –

Appellant was the only other person inside the house, no

cogent explanation came from him as to what transpired at

the scene of occurrence:

Held: Evidence of the prosecution witnesses and even the

version of the accused establishes his presence at the scene of 

916 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

occurrence – Appellant was the only other person inside the house,

with the other three being dead and one ‘KA’, who was injured

and unconscious and who later died in that state itself – There

was no cogent and plausible explanation forthcoming from the

accused as to what transpired at the scene of occurrence – This

coupled with the fact that his relationship with the deceased ‘L’

was strained clearly point to his guilt – s.106 states that when any

fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden

of proving that fact is upon him – s.106 is not intended to relieve

the prosecution of its duty – However, in exceptional cases where

it could be impossible or at any rate disproportionately difficult for

the prosecution to establish the facts which are especially within

the knowledge of the accused, the burden will be on the accused

since he could prove as to what transpired in such scenario,

without difficulty or inconvenience – In this case, when an offence

like multiple murders is committed inside a house in secrecy, the

initial burden has to be discharged by the prosecution – Once

the prosecution successfully discharged the burden cast upon

it, the burden did shift upon the appellant being the only other

person inside the four corners of the house to offer a cogent

and plausible explanation as to how the offences came to be

committed but he miserably failed on that score. [Para 12 (xiv)]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.293 – Prosecution case

was that there were writings on the wall and on certain objects

in the southern room of the ground floor where the accused

was found – Specimen of these writings was taken and referred

to the handwriting expert – Handwriting Expert produced P-42

report – Appellant contended that the handwriting expert had

not been examined:

Held: The submission flies in the face of s.293 – Exhibit P-42

Report was prepared by Dr. KPJ, Joint Director (Research),

Forensic Science Laboratory, Thiruvananthapuram – The report

was duly marked and exhibited and proved as Exhibit P-42 – The

Joint Director who occupies a position above the Deputy Director

and Assistant Director, is encompassed in the phrase “Director”

used in s.293(4)(e) – Hence, the report Ex. P-42 is admissible

even without the examination of Dr. KPJ. [Para 12 (vii)]

Criminal Law – Cases falling short of the rarest of the rare

category – Sentencing – Principle laid down in Swamy

Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka [2008] 11 SCR 93, discussed.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 917

Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala

Evidence – Case based on circumstantial evidence – Principles

to be kept in mind while convicting an accused – Discussed.

Case Law Cited

Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan and Others

[2015] 14 SCR 613 : (2016) 7 SCC 1 – followed.

Ammini & Others v. State of Kerala [1997] 5 Suppl. SCR

181 : (1998) 2 SCC 301; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda

v. State of Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR 88 : (1984) 4

SCC 116; Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka

[2008] 11 SCR 93 : (2008) 13 SCC 767 – relied on.

Padum Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2020] 1 SCR

57  : (2020) 3 SCC 35; Bhupinder Singh v. State of

Punjab [1988] 3 SCR 409 : (1988) 3 SCC 513; State

of H.P. v. Mast Ram [2004] Suppl. 4 SCR 269 : (2004)

8 SCC 660; Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of

Ajmer [1956] 1 SCR 199; Bachan Singh v. State of

Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684; Machhi Singh v. State of

Punjab [1983] 3 SCR 413 : (1983) 3 SCC 470; Haru

Ghosh v. State of West Bengal [2009] 13 SCR 847 :

(2009) 15 SCC 551; Mulla & Another v. State of U.P.

[2010] 2 SCR 633 : (2010) 3 SCC 508; Ramraj v. State

of Chhattisgarh [2009] 16 SCR 367 : (2010) 1 SCC

573; Ramnaresh and Others v. State of Chhattisgarh

[2012] 3 SCR 630 : (2012) 4 SCC 257; Neel Kumar

v. State of Haryana [2012] SCR 5 696 : (2012) 5 SCC

766; Sandeep v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2012] 5 SCR

952 : (2012) 6 SCC 107; Shankar Kisanrao Khade v.

State of Maharashtra [2013] 6 SCR 949 : (2013) 5

SCC 546; Sahib Hussain v. State of Rajasthan [2013]

2 SCR 1019 : (2013) 9 SCC 778; Gurvail Singh & Anr.

v. State of Punjab [2013] 1 SCR 783 : (2013) 2 SCC

713; Alber Oraon v. State of Jharkhand [2014] 9 SCR

330 : (2014) 12 SCC 306; Rajkumar v. State of Madhya

Pradesh [2014] 3 SCR 212 : (2014) 5 SCC 353; Selvam

v. State (2014) 12 SCC 274; Birju v. State of Madhya

Pradesh [2014] 1 SCR 1047 : (2014) 3 SCC 421; Tattu

Lodhi v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2016] 3 SCR 561 :

(2016) 9 SCC 675; Vijay Kumar v. State of Jammu

& Kashmir (2019) 12 SCC 791; Parsuram v. State of 

918 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Madhya Pradesh (2019) 8 SCC 382; Nand Kishore v.

State of Madhya Pradesh [2019] 1 SCR 260 : (2019) 16

SCC 278; Swapan Kumar Jha v. State of Jharkhand and

Another (2019) 13 SCC 579; Raju Jagdish Paswan v.

State of Maharashtra (2019) 16 SCC 380; X v. State of

Maharashtra [2019] 6 SCR 1 : (2019) 7 SCC 1; Irappa

Siddappa Murgannavar v. State of Karnataka [2021] 11

SCR 51 : (2022) 2 SCC 801; Shiva Kumar v. State of

Karnataka [2023] 4 SCR 669 : (2023) 9 SCC 817; Manoj

and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2022] 9 SCR

452 : (2023) 2 SCC 353; Madan v. State of U.P. 2023

SCC OnLine SC 1473; Sundar v. State by Inspector

of Police [2023] 5 SCR 1016 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC

310; Ravinder Singh v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi

[2023] 4 SCR 480 : (2024) 2 SCC 323 – referred to.

List of Acts

Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872; Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973.

List of Keywords

Sentence/Sentencing; Modification; Aggravating and mitigating

circumstances; Remission; Remission powers; Commutation of

penalty from death to life imprisonment; Principle of proportionality;

Rarest of the rare category; Illicit intimacy; Handwriting expert.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.1215

of 2011

From the Judgment and Order dated 09.02.2010 of the High Court

of Kerala at Ernakulam in CRLA No.1620 of 2007

Appearances for Parties

Renjith B. Marar, Ms. Lakshmi N. Kaimal, Rajkumar Pavothil, Arun

Poomulli, Vishnu Pazhanganat, Keshavraj Nair, Davesh Kumar

Sharma, Ms. Ashu Jain, Jaleen Johnson, Harsh Vardhan Shah

Shyam, Advs. for the Appellant.

Jayanth Muthraj, Sr. Adv., Nishe Rajen Shonker, Mrs. Anu K Joy,

Alim Anvar, Abraham Mathew, Advs. for the Respondent.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 919

Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

K.V. Viswanathan, J.

1. The present Appeal arises out of the judgment of a Division Bench

of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in D.S.R. No. 4 of 2007

and Criminal Appeal No. 1620 of 2007 dated 09.02.2010. The Death

Sentence Reference and the Criminal Appeal arose out of the

judgment of the Court of the III Additional Sessions Judge (Adhoc),

Fast Track Court No. 1, Thrissur in Sessions Case No. 491 of 2006.

2. The trial Court found the appellant (the sole accused) guilty for the

offences punishable under Sections 302 and 449 IPC for having

committed the murder of Latha (aged 39 years), Ramachandran (aged

45 years), Chitra (aged 11 years) and Karthiayani Amma (aged 80

years) after committing house-trespass. After committing the above

said act, the accused attempted to commit suicide for which he was

also found guilty under Section 309 IPC. The trial Court sentenced the

accused to death for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.

For the offence under Section 449 IPC, the accused was sentenced

to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine

of Rs.1,000/- and, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for

six months. The accused was also sentenced to undergo simple

imprisonment for two months and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- for the

offence under Section 309 IPC, and in default of the payment of fine

to undergo simple imprisonment for one month.

3. When the matter went for confirmation before the High Court, the

High Court, while confirming the conviction, modified the sentence.

The sentence of death was modified and reduced to imprisonment

for life with a further direction that the accused shall not be released

from prison for a period of 30 (thirty) years including the period

already undergone with set off under Section 428 Cr.P.C. alone.

Aggrieved, the appellant is before us in the present appeal by way

of special leave.

Brief Facts:

4. The prosecution story, in brief, is that in the household of the

deceased Ramachandran, there were four people residing. Apart

from Ramachandran, there was his wife Latha, their daughter Chitra 

920 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

and Ramachandran’s mother Karthiayani Amma. The appellant,

according to the prosecution, had, at an earlier point in time, illicit

intimacy with Latha so much so that Latha even became pregnant,

later leading to termination of pregnancy. It is the prosecution case

that after Latha tried to distance herself, the appellant was seriously

aggrieved, and they advert to an occurrence of 03.02.2005 when

the appellant is supposed to have trespassed into the house where

Latha lived and even tried to harm her. They rely on Ext. P-9 to

Ext.P-11 complaints.

5. The macabre incident, out of which the present case arose, happened

on the night intervening 03.11.2005 and 04.11.2005. It is alleged

that the accused reached the house of the deceased late at night

on 03.11.2005. Having reached the house, he made a hole in the

eastern side wall of the house and gained access into the house.

It is the prosecution case that, having gained access and being

armed with 2 (two) knives and an iron rod, he caused the death of

Ramachandran and Chitra with the iron rod in the upper floor room

in the northern side of the house; that he caused serious injuries to

Karthiayani Amma in the northern room on the ground floor (resulting

in her death subsequently) and caused the death of Latha with

multiple stab injuries in the hall near the stairs on the ground floor.

6. The prosecution case is that PW-1 Thankamani, the domestic help,

who had seen the family hale and hearty the previous evening

i.e., 03.11.2005, had come to sweep the house on the morning of

04.11.2005 at around 07:00 a.m. While sweeping the courtyard, she

found that, unlike on normal days when the family would come out of

the house in the morning, no one came out that day. While sweeping,

she found that a hole had been dug on the eastern side wall of the

house and to her horror also found that blood was dripping from a

pipe adjoining the western side wall of the house. She raised an

alarm resulting in the neighbours converging on the property.

7. It is PW-2 (Shyama Sundaran), a neighbour, who called the police after

witnessing the commotion outside the house. PW-30 (KT Kumaran)

the ASI rushed to the spot with his police party and reached at 08:25

AM. He also found a hole in the wall on the eastern side of the house

and also that telephone cable was cut. He instructed PW-6 (Balan)

& PW-23 (Rajan) to break open the door on the western side of the

house first. PW-6 & PW-23 broke open the outer door but found

that the inner door was also locked and it could not be opened. It 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 921

Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala

was then decided to break open the door on the front side of the

house. PW-4 (Sandeep) removed the tile portion above the porch

and entered the porch. He then broke open the door using a pestle

and entered the poomukham (veranda). PW-4 then broke the glass

ventilator above the main door and inserted his hand to open the

door latch. As they entered, they found Latha’s dead body in the

passage near the stairs. The body of Ramachandran and Chitra

were found dead in the upper floor room on the northern side of

the house. Karthiyani Amma was found in the northern room on the

ground floor unconscious. PW-6 & PW-23 took Karthiyani Amma to

hospital. It was PW-32 (Ajaya Kumar), the Investigating Officer of

the case, who reached the spot at 09:15 AM and saw blood droplets

starting from the northern room on the ground floor to the room on

the south. When he opened the door, he found the accused lying

on the floor with a cut injury on his left wrist.

8. PW-30, ASI registered the suo motu FIR and PW-32, conducted the

investigation. The appellant was sent up for trial. In all, the prosecution

examined 32 witnesses (PWs 1-32) and proved Exhibits P1 to P45

series. Material Objects [M.Os.] 1-122 were also marked by the

prosecution. The accused did not examine any defence witnesses;

but proved Exhibits D1-D5. The accused also gave a statement while

being examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. At the Section 313 stage,

he advanced a version to the effect that there was a pact between

him and Latha to commit suicide; that he had come to the house

of Latha on 03.11.2005 with the intention that both of them shall

commit suicide; that Latha had kept the door open as usual and he

gained entry into the house through such door; that after he entered

the house, he found Latha and others were all lying dead/injured;

that on account of grief, he had cut his left wrist in an attempt to

commit suicide and that he was found available in the house in an

unconscious state. The appellant was clearly implying that somebody

else had gained access into the house and caused the death of all

victims. It is then that he proceeded to commit suicide.

9. The case entirely rests on circumstantial evidence. Both the trial

Court and the High Court have closely marshalled the circumstantial

evidence in the case to arrive at the conclusion that the accused

alone is responsible for the death of the four deceased. Additionally,

it also relied on the fact that the accused having been found present

in the house had offered no plausible and cogent explanation about 

922 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

the sequence of events that had transpired inside, leading to the

sole and irresistible conclusion that the accused has perpetrated

the heinous crime.

Contentions:

10. We have heard Mr. Renjith B. Marar, learned counsel for the appellant,

who advanced elaborate arguments, covering the entire spectrum by

making available a chart setting out the summary of the deposition

of the prosecution witnesses, the relevant exhibits marked and the

argument of the defence in separate columns. He mainly contended

that the case made out by the prosecution falls short of the proof

needed in a case which is based entirely on circumstantial evidence.

Learned counsel contended that with the available evidence it would

be unsafe to sustain the conviction and pleaded for outright acquittal.

The specific contentions of the learned counsel challenging certain

individual circumstances have been dealt with hereinbelow while

tabulating the circumstances. Alternatively, learned counsel pleaded

that the sentence of 30 years without remission is excessive and

prayed that the sentence may be appropriately tailored to meet the

ends of justice.

11. Shri Jayanth Muth Raj, learned senior counsel, for the State

vehemently rebutted the arguments of the counsel for the appellant

and contended that the trial Court and the High Court have correctly

arrived at the conclusion of guilt. Learned senior counsel contended

that the case actually warranted death penalty but the High Court

has modified it to a sentence of imprisonment for 30 years without

remission for the offence under Section 302. According to the learned

senior counsel, the sentence did not deserve any further modification.

Discussion:

12. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel

for the respective parties and have perused the material on record,

including the relevant original trial Court records. The circumstances

that unerringly point to the guilt of the appellant as it emerges from

the deposition of the witnesses and the duly proved exhibits can be

summarized as under:

(i) There was the incident on 03.02.2005 when the accused

allegedly trespassed into the house and had thrown a koduval

(curved sword) at deceased Latha. This highlights the friction 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 923

Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala

between the accused and deceased Latha. Ext. P9 - P11

complaint of 03.02.2005 has been marked by the prosecution.

It also forms an important piece of evidence to establish motive.

ii) PW-3, Raman, an auto driver, deposed that on the night

of 03.11.2005, the accused engaged his services to go to

Orumanayur. The accused asked him to stop at a place called

Muthenmavu (which is the place where the house of the

deceased was situated) and he paid him Rs.70/-. We have seen

the original deposition and it clearly records that it was at 10.30

PM on the night of 03.11.2005 that the accused engaged the

services of PW-3 at Guruvayur auto stand to reach the area

where the house of the deceased was located. Mr. Renjith B.

Marar, learned counsel, has challenged the evidence of PW-3

on the ground that no test identification parade was held and

the identification was for the first time at the police station.

This submission need not detain the court as nothing much

turns on it. The presence of the accused even otherwise, at

the scene of occurrence has been spoken to by PW-1, PW2, PW-4, PW-6, PW-23, PW-30 and PW-32, as has been

discussed hereinbelow.

iii) PW-1 Thankamani has clearly spoken about the fact that, on

03.11.2005, when she left the house after her work at 7.30

p.m. all the deceased were hale and hearty. On the morning of

04.11.2005, it was she who detected the dripping of the blood

from the pipe adjoining the western wall, and a hole being made

in the eastern side wall of the house.

iv) The evidence of PW-1, 2, 4, 6, 23, 30 and 32 speaks about the

appellant lying in the southern room of the house and being

taken to the hospital from there. PWs 1,2,4,6,23 & 30 also speak

about the hole that has been made on the eastern wall of the

house. The seizure of M.O. 29,30,31,32,33 & 34 items i.e., 2

(two) knives, 2 (two) knife sheaths, iron rod and bag recovered

also contributes as a link in the chain.

v) On 4.11.2005, M.O. 29 & 30 (Knives found in the southern room

on the ground floor where the accused was found) were seized

and taken into custody under Ext. P-12 (Scene Mahazar). M.O.

33 (Iron rod) was also seized and taken from the northern room

in the upper floor, vide the same Ext. P-12. 

924 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

vi) Another important circumstance is the report of the Finger Print

Expert (Ext.P-22). The Finger Print Expert has opined that

the chance finger print on the water bottle found at the scene

of the crime (marked as C-9 by the Expert) was identified as

the left thumb impression of the appellant in the slip made

available with the Expert for verification (marked as “S” by

the expert). The Expert concluded in P-22 that since the

identical ridge characteristics are present in their nature and

relative possessions, the finger impressions “C9” and “S” are

identical i.e. that they are the impressions of the same finger

of the person. The Expert concluded that, in his opinion, that

the chance print marked as C-9 and developed by him from

the scene of crime on 04.11.2005 is made by the left thumb

of the appellant.

vii) The prosecution case is also that there were writings on the

wall and on certain objects in the southern room of the ground

floor where the accused was found. The writings indicate that

these were parting messages of the accused (as the High

Court labels them) since he had decided to commit suicide.

The writings were in the following words “Do not enter here”;

“Shyaman, you are a O, you should not desire the ruppam of a

woman, money will make people traitors, you are O, you should

not destroy the local area”; The mirror had the writing with pen

on it reading ‘Latha, I love you’ and same was underlined and

below that it was written ‘Salim, I love you’ and ‘Yahio I lo” and

below that ‘Shabna I lo”; The aforesaid wall had one wall clock

with the label ‘Samaya Quartz’ inside. On it, it was written with

marker pen ‘Latha, I love you’; On the wall, below the clock, it

was written “My name is Nawas, reason for my death is Latha,

so myself and Latha decided to die together.....Confirm by

Navaz P.M.”; “Yahayikka knows that now I shall not be there,

wherever, no harm should happen to Yahayikka. I may be an

idiot”; “For Salim to know, even if I am not there, you shall

always be in my eyes”. Near to that it was written “night =12

O’clock, I am at the house of Latha” in two lines. Below that

it was written “6 to 7= Finishing”; “I have no role in the looting

of 6 lakhs. I was present in the said vehicle. This is true” and

near to that it was written “for police to know where I was for

all these days, no child knows”.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 925

Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala

Specimen of these writings was taken and referred to the handwriting

expert. The Handwriting Expert produced P-42 report. PW-32, the

Investigating Officer spoke about the seizure of a mirror, a samaya

quartz clock and the November-December, 2005 page of Guruvayur

Cooperative Urban Bank Calendar. All these items had writings on

them at the scene of the crime. Twenty black and white photographs

of the handwritings were taken. These were termed ‘question’ writings

and marked by the Handwriting Expert in the report for his reference

as Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q5A, Q6, Q6A to Q6P. The Expert was also

furnished with the ‘standard’ writings by Appellant marked by the Expert

for his reference as S1 to S49. In Ext. P-42, the Handwriting Expert

concludes that, on comparison, the ‘question’ and ‘standard’ writings

are by the same person. He concluded that they agree in general

writing characteristics such as skill, speed, spacing, relative size

and proportionate spelling errors. The Expert opined that similarities

found between the question and standard writings are significant

and numerous and there did not exist any material differences. Only

with regard to the signature stamp in Q6(q), the expert concluded

that it was not possible to arrive at any definite conclusion regarding

the authorship for want of sufficient data on that score. With regard

to all others, it was concluded that the person who wrote the blue

enclosed writings stamped and marked as ‘standard’ writings also

wrote the red enclosed ‘question’ writings. The High Court has found

that this aspect of handwriting was not even seriously challenged by

the accused. Mr. Renjith B. Marar, learned counsel, contended that

the handwriting expert had not been examined. In support thereof,

he relies on the judgment of this Court in Padum Kumar v. State

of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 3 SCC 35. The submission flies in the

face of Section 293 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Exhibit P-42

Report is prepared by Dr. K.P. Jayakumar, Joint Director (Research),

Forensic Science Laboratory, Thiruvananthapuram. The report is duly

marked and exhibited and proved as Exhibit P-42. The Joint Director

who occupies a position above the Deputy Director and Assistant

Director, is encompassed in the phrase “Director” used in Section

293(4)(e). This position is expressly settled by the judgment of this

Court in Ammini & Others v. State of Kerala, (1998) 2 SCC 301.

The relevant para of which is extracted hereinbelow:

“11. …..The trial court was also wrong in holding that

the report given by the Forensic Science Laboratory with 

926 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

respect to the contents of MO 44 was not admissible in

evidence as it was signed by its Joint Director and not by

the Director. On a true construction of Section 293(4) CrPC

it has to be held that Joint Director is comprehended by

the expression “Director”. The amendment made in clause

(e) of Section 293(4) now indicates that clearly. If the Joint

Director was not comprehended within the expression

Director then the legislature would have certainly named

him while amending the clause and providing that Section

293 applies to the Deputy Director or Assistant Director of

a Central Forensic Science Laboratory or a State Forensic

Science Laboratory. A Joint Director is a higher officer

than a Deputy Director or an Assistant Director and,

therefore, it would be unreasonable to hold that a

report signed by Joint Director is not admissible in

evidence though a report signed by the Deputy Director

or Assistant Director is now admissible. In our opinion

the High Court was right in holding that the report made

by the Joint Director was admissible in evidence and that

it deserved to be relied upon.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

Hence, the report Ex. P-42 is admissible even without the examination

of Dr. K. P. Jayakumar. (See also Bhupinder Singh v. State of

Punjab, (1988) 3 SCC 513 & State of H.P. v. Mast Ram, (2004)

8 SCC 660)

viii) The evidence of the doctors PWs-10 & 19, who conducted the

post-mortem of Latha & Chitra respectively, fixed the timing

of death between 6-18 hours prior to 6.25 PM on 04.11.2005.

Evidence of PW-25, Doctor who conducted post-mortem of

Ramachandran stated that the death occurred 12-18 hours prior

to 6:25PM. This synchronizes with the time that the accused

made entry into the house.

ix) The hair strands found on the body of Chitra were found to be

similar and identical to the hair of the accused. In Ext.P41(b),

which is the report of Dr. R. Sreekumar, Assistant Director

(Biology) in the forensic laboratory, it is opined that the hairs in

Item 45 (hairs from the belly of Chitra) are human scalp hairs

which are similar to the sample scalp hairs in Item 58 (a tuft 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 927

Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala

of black hairs) which is the combed hair and cut hair of the

appellant. Challenging the circumstances, Mr. Renjith B. Marar,

learned counsel, contends that PW-27 Annamma John does

not speak about the hair being seized and that there was no

seizure memo spoken to in her 161 statement. This submission

has no merit since Exhibit P-26 is the seizure mahazar of the

objects collected by PW-27 on 04.11.2005, the day the sordid

incident was unravelled. In the Inquest Report also PW-14

mentions about the collection of hair from the body of the

deceased Chitra by PW-27.

x) It is also important to note that the 2 (two) strands of hair found

on one of the knives, was found to be Latha’s as per FSL

Report (Ex. P. 41(b)).

xi) The testimonies of the Doctors PWs, 10, 19, 25 and 26, clearly

bring out that the injuries sustained by the deceased could be

caused by means of M.O. 29, 30 and 33. This is an additional

circumstance.

xii) Ext.P41(c), which is the report of the Scientific Assistant

(Chemistry), FSL, Thiruvananthapuram, clearly establishes

that the black coloured ink in Item 66 (the marker pen with

trade brand label as Kolor Pik permanent XL marker) and 67

(1 black coloured plastic cap) is similar to the ink used in the

black coloured writings in Item 63 (wooden frame) item 64

(wall clock) with trade label samay and item 65 (calendar of

Guruvayur Cooperative Urban Bank). Item numbers referred to

here are the ones given for reference by the Scientific Assistant

in her report. The Marker pen (part of M.O. 95) was recovered

from the southern room where the Appellant was found, and

rightly an inference has been drawn that the writings on M.O.

43 (Wall Clock) M.O. 90 (Mirror) and M.O. 94 (2005 Calendar)

are the writings of the accused by using M.O 95 (marker pen)

xiii) At the site where the hole was drilled, soil/powder was available.

It is found in the forensic report that the soil/powder on M.O.

34 bag (found in the room where the accused was found) and

seized as per Ext.P-12 scene mahazar, was apparently similar

to the soil/powder seized near the hole. Equally so, in the

M.O. 71 shirt belonging to the accused, apparently similar soil/

powder was found. These are established by the FSL report 

928 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

(Exh. 41(a)). Further, the nail clippings of the accused taken

by PW-31 dated 14.11.2005 revealed apparently similar soil/

powder to the soil/powder found at the site of the hole as per

FSL report (Exh. 41(a)). This is a circumstance relied upon by

the prosecution to establish that the accused gained access

through the hole that he dug. The argument of the accused that

the nail clippings were taken on 14.11.2005 and no importance

could be attached has rightly been rejected by the High Court

saying that it is not even the case of the accused that the soil/

powder detected from the hole at the scene of occurrence was

planted on his nail. Mr. Renjith B. Marar, learned counsel for the

appellant contended that Exhibit P-41(a) report was not put in

the Section 313 questioning in the context of the soil particles on

the wall tallying with the soil particles in the nail clippings and on

the shirt and the bag found in the room where the accused was

present. We have called for the original record and examined

the Section 313 statement and had the Malayalam version read

over to us. We have also seen the translated version of Section

313. Exhibit P-41(a) was put in question no. 52 but it was in the

context of item 68 cable and as to how it could be cut with the

knives (item 22 and 23). To that extent, Mr. Renjith B. Marar is

right that the report was not put in this context. The report was

put to the accused albeit in the context of the cable and knives.

However, viewed in the conspectus of the other circumstances

even if this circumstance is eschewed, it will not make any

difference to the ultimate conclusion. The further argument

that there was no seizure memo for the nail clippings is clearly

incorrect. PW-31 Dr. Hitesh Shankar has clearly deposed that

he had collected the nail clippings and hair samples and the

blood of the accused-appellant and after sealing and labeling

them handed it over to the police constable-4628. Exhibit P-45(i)

marked by PW-32 Ajay Kumar, Investigating Officer as part of

the property list, mentions about the collection of nail clippings,

hair sample and sodium fluoride tube. Hence, the contention that

the chain of custody is not established cannot be countenanced.

There is no reason to disbelieve PW-31 Dr. Hitesh Shankar and

the documents in support of the same.

xiv) The evidence of the prosecution witnesses and even the

version of the accused establishes his presence at the scene of 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 929

Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala

occurrence. His explanation that deceased Latha would always

leave the door open for him to enter and that when he entered,

he found them already dead and lying on the floor wounded

has been found to be false. If the appellant’s own case is that

he entered the house that night, no cogent explanation has

been given as to who opened the door. However, we have

not gone by his version. His presence at the scene of crime

is established by the evidence of PW-1, PW-2, PW-4, PW-6,

PW-23, PW-30 and PW-32.

xv) The appellant was the only other person inside the house, with

the other three being dead and one Karthiayani Amma, who was

injured and unconscious and who later died in that state itself.

There is no cogent and plausible explanation forthcoming from

the accused as to what transpired at the scene of occurrence

on the night intervening 03.11.2005 and 04.11.2005. This

coupled with the fact that his relationship with the deceased

Latha was strained clearly point to his guilt. Section 106 of

the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 states that when any fact is

especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of

proving that fact is upon him. We are conscious of the warning

administered by Justice Vivian Bose, rightly, in Shambhu Nath

Mehra vs. The State of Ajmer, 1956 SCR 199 to the effect

that Section 106 is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its

duty. However, Shambhu Nath Mehra (supra) itself recognizes

that in exceptional cases where it could be impossible or

at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to

establish the facts which are especially within the knowledge

of the accused, the burden will be on the accused since he

could prove as to what transpired in such scenario, without

difficulty or inconvenience. In this case, when an offence like

multiple murders is committed inside a house in secrecy, the

initial burden has to be discharged by the prosecution. Once

the prosecution successfully discharged the burden cast upon

it, the burden did shift upon the appellant being the only other

person inside the four corners of the house to offer a cogent

and plausible explanation as to how the offences came to be

committed. The appellant has miserably failed on that score.

This can be considered as a very important circumstance,

constituting a vital link in the chain.

930 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

13. Though the trial Court and the High Court have adverted to few

other circumstances, we are satisfied that the circumstances set out

hereinabove are by themselves consistent with the sole hypothesis

that the accused and the accused alone is the perpetrator of these

murders which were most foul.

14. It is also to be noted that the law on the appreciation of circumstantial

evidence is well settled and it will be an idle parade of familiar learning

to deal with all the cases. We do no more than set out the holding

in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984)

4 SCC 116, which dealt with the panchsheel or the five principles

essential to be kept in mind while convicting an accused in a case

based on circumstantial evidence:

“153. A close analysis of this decision would show that

the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case

against an accused can be said to be fully established:

(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt

is to be drawn should be fully established.

It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the

circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may

be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a

legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be

or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji

Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC

793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where

the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC

(Cri) p. 1047]

“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must

be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict

and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is

long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.”

(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with

the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say,

they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis

except that the accused is guilty,

(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature

and tendency,

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 931

Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala

(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except

the one to be proved, and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as

not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion

consistent with the innocence of the accused and must

show that in all human probability the act must have been

done by the accused.

154. These five golden principles, if we may say so,

constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based

on circumstantial evidence.”

15. We are convinced that the circumstances presented in evidence

in this case more than meets the ingredients that are required to

be established. We find no reason to interfere with the concurrent

conviction recorded by the trial Court and the High Court against the

appellant for the offences under Section 302 (murder), 449 (housetrespass) and 309 (attempt to commit suicide) and we maintain the

conviction.

Discussion on Sentence:

16. Coming to the sentencing, while the trial Court imposed the sentence

of death, the High Court has modified it to that of imprisonment for

30 years with no remission. Mr. Renjith B. Marar, learned counsel,

made an impassioned plea as part of his alternative submission

that imprisonment for 30 years without remission is excessive and

disproportionate. Mr. Jayanth Muth Raj, learned senior counsel, left

no stone unturned in contending that the appellant has got away

lightly and that he is fortunate to have escaped the gallows.

17. The question before us is what should be the appropriate sentence

and whether the High Court was justified in adopting the Swamy

Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 line of

cases and even it was justified whether the fixing of the quantum

at 30 years without remission was the appropriate sentence, in the

facts and circumstances of the case?

18. The trial court imposed the sentence of death as far as the offence

punishable under Section 302 IPC was concerned. The trial court

recorded that the appellant had committed the murder of four

persons; that the appellant was blood-thirsty; that he had illicit love

affair with deceased Latha, the wife of deceased Ramachandran; 

932 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

that she even became pregnant because of him and then fell out

with the appellant; that there was an attempt to cause bodily injury

earlier to Latha by throwing a koduval (curved sword) on 03.02.2005;

that the nature of the injuries inflicted upon the deceased persons

indicate that the murders were committed in an extremely brutal and

dastardly manner; that they were premeditated and cold blooded

murders; that the entire family was eliminated including an innocent

child aged eleven years and a hapless 80 years old lady and that the

collective conscience of the community was shocked. The trial court

also noted that the accused attempted to commit suicide by cutting

the vein in his left forearm but however discarded that circumstance

and passed a sentence of death.

19. The High Court first recorded that there was no question of interfering

with the sentence under Sections 449 and 309 IPC and the question

was only whether the sentence of death ought to be confirmed or

not. Thereafter, the High Court delved into the balance sheet of

aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The High Court, while

recording the argument of the prosecution, noticed that there was prior

planning; that four lives were snuffed out and the entire family was

wiped out including a child and an aged woman; that the deceased

were unarmed and defenceless and no provocation or resistance was

offered by them; that the offence was committed after mischievously

planning the operation and after gaining access to the closed house

in the night by making a hole on the wall; that the incident reflected a

dare devil attitude; that the nature of weapons used by the accused,

namely, the knife and the iron bar is also taken as an aggravating

circumstance; that the nature and number of injuries inflicted on

deceased Latha (43 of which 38 were stab injuries) was also an

aggravating circumstance and that there were prior instances of

involvement by the accused in attempting to assault Latha.

20. Dealing with the mitigating circumstance, the High Court noticed the

contention of the defence, to the effect that there was no semblance

of any element of gain, profit or advantage for the accused; that

rightly or wrongly the accused was labouring under an impression

of deprivation in love; that the accused was in an extremely agitated

and excited state of mind; that there was indication to show that at

some point of time deceased Latha had herself suggested commission

of suicide together; that the accused had no motive whatsoever

against Ramachandran, Chitra and Karthiayani Amma; that he had 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 933

Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala

great affection for Chitra and referred to Ramachandran in endearing

terms; that he had not used any weapon against Karthiayani Amma;

that he did not make any attempt to flee from justice and in fact

attempted to commit suicide; that he was a young man of twenty

eight years; that he was still young and not lost to civilization and

humanity and the final contention of the defence that he was not a

menace to the society.

21. Thereafter, the High Court dealt with the precedents laid down by

this Court in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684,

Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470 to examine

whether the litmus test, namely, that the alternative option being

unquestionably foreclosed was fulfilled or not. Thereafter, the High

Court noticed the judgment of this Court in Swamy Shraddananda

(supra) and the holding thereon that to avoid a sentence of death,

it is possible for the courts to device a graver form of sentence of

imprisonment for life beyond fourteen years which would ensure that

the society is insulated from the criminal for such period as the court

may specify, including if the facts warranted, the entire rest of his life.

22. Thereafter applying Swamy Shraddananda (supra), the High Court

observed as follows:

“54. A question still remains whether the instant case is

one in which the graver alternatives of a life sentence are

also unquestionably foreclosed. We have rendered our

anxious consideration to all that all the relevant inputs.

We are unable to agree that all the options now available

can be said to be unquestionably foreclosed in the given

circumstances. In every case of death sentence, the court

must consider the purpose of the sentence. The theory

of reformation will have no place whatsoever in a case of

imposition of death sentence. In a case like the instant

one, the consideration of compensation/restoration cannot

also have any place, as all the members of the family

have been liquidated by the conduct of the accused. The

purpose of a death sentence - of eliminating the menace

to the society in the form of a hardened criminal and to

save society from the activities of such criminal may not

also have much role, given the alternative option of a life

sentence which will ensure that the accused does not

come into contact with the society thereafter.

934 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

59. Let it not be assumed that this court does not perceive

the instant one to be a serious and dastardly crime. We,

to say the least, are convinced that the offence committed

calls for societal abhorrence and disapproval. But, the

totality of circumstances instill in us the satisfaction that this

is not a case where the range of further options available

to the court after Swamy Shraddananda (supra) are

unquestionably foreclosed. Placing fetter on the powers

of the Executive under Section 432 and 433 Cr.P.C. for a

prescribed period (and with due caution administered that

the powers under Article 72 and Article 161 should not be

lightly invoked to get over the prescription of such period

fixed by this Court) a sentence of imprisonment for life

which shall ensure that the offender does not get exposed

to society for a period of 30 years can be imposed. We are

not prescribing the ‘entire rest of the life’ as the period, as

fixed by their Lordships in Swamy Shraddananda (supra),

considering the totality of circumstances and because of

the optimistic faith in the infinite capacity of the human

soul to repent and reform.”

Holding so, the High Court modified the sentence of death to that

of imprisonment for life with the further direction that the accused

shall not be released from prison for a period of 30 (thirty) years

including the period already undergone with set off under Section

428 Cr.P.C. alone.

23. The State is not in appeal, having accepted the verdict of the High

Court. It is only the appellant who is in appeal. It is his submission

that the imposition of 30 (thirty) years sentence without remission

is excessive and the counsel urges that a suitable lesser sentence

be imposed under the Swamy Shraddananda principle. This is the

alternative submission advanced.

24. Swamy Shraddananda (supra), since affirmed subsequently in

Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan and Others, (2016)

7 SCC 1, resolved a judge’s dilemma. Often it happens that a case

that falls short of the rarest of the rare category may also be one

where a mere sentence of 14 years (the normal benchmark for life

imprisonment) may be grossly disproportionate and inadequate.

The Court may find that while death penalty may not be warranted 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 935

Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala

keeping in mind the overall circumstances, a proportionate penalty

would be to fix the period between 14 years and for the imprisonment

till rest of the life without remission. Addressing this issue felicitously

in Swamy Shraddananda (supra) Justice Aftab Alam speaking for

the court, held as follows:

“92. The matter may be looked at from a slightly different

angle. The issue of sentencing has two aspects. A sentence

may be excessive and unduly harsh or it may be highly

disproportionately inadequate. When an appellant comes

to this Court carrying a death sentence awarded by the

trial court and confirmed by the High Court, this Court

may find, as in the present appeal, that the case just

falls short of the rarest of the rare category and may feel

somewhat reluctant in endorsing the death sentence.

But at the same time, having regard to the nature of the

crime, the Court may strongly feel that a sentence of life

imprisonment subject to remission normally works out

to a term of 14 years would be grossly disproportionate

and inadequate. What then should the Court do? If the

Court’s option is limited only to two punishments, one a

sentence of imprisonment, for all intents and purposes,

of not more than 14 years and the other death, the Court

may feel tempted and find itself nudged into endorsing the

death penalty. Such a course would indeed be disastrous.

A far more just, reasonable and proper course would be

to expand the options and to take over what, as a matter

of fact, lawfully belongs to the Court i.e. the vast hiatus

between 14 years’ imprisonment and death. It needs to

be emphasised that the Court would take recourse to the

expanded option primarily because in the facts of the case,

the sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment would amount to

no punishment at all.”

25. In V. Sriharan (supra), a Constitution Bench of this Court affirmed

the principle laid down in Swamy Shraddananda (supra). It first

affirmed the principle that imprisonment for life meant imprisonment

for rest of the life, subject however, to the right to claim remission,

as provided in the Constitution and the statutes. It was further held

that the judgment in Swamy Shraddananda (supra) did not violate

any statutory prescription. The Court went on to observe that all that 

936 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Swamy Shraddananda (supra) sought to declare was that within the

prescribed limit of the punishment of life imprisonment, having regard

to the nature of offence committed by imposing life imprisonment for

a specified period would be proportionate to the crime as well as

the interest of the victim. Thereafter, in the same judgment Ibrahim

Kalifulla, J., in a passage which repays study held as under:

“98. While that be so, it cannot also be lost sight of

that it will be next to impossible for even the lawmakers

to think of or prescribe in exactitude all kinds of such

criminal conduct to fit into any appropriate pigeonhole for

structured punishments to run in between the minimum

and maximum period of imprisonment. Therefore, the

lawmakers thought it fit to prescribe the minimum and the

maximum sentence to be imposed for such diabolic nature

of crimes and leave it for the adjudication authorities,

namely, the Institution of Judiciary which is fully and

appropriately equipped with the necessary knowledge

of law, experience, talent and infrastructure to study the

detailed parts of each such case based on the legally

acceptable material evidence, apply the legal principles

and the law on the subject, apart from the guidance it gets

from the jurists and judicial pronouncements revealed

earlier, to determine from the nature of such grave

offences found proved and depending upon the facts

noted, what kind of punishment within the prescribed limits

under the relevant provision would appropriately fit in. In

other words, while the maximum extent of punishment of

either death or life imprisonment is provided for under the

relevant provisions noted above, it will be for the courts

to decide if in its conclusion, the imposition of death

may not be warranted, what should be the number of

years of imprisonment that would be judiciously and

judicially more appropriate to keep the person under

incarceration, by taking into account, apart from the

crime itself, from the angle of the commission of such

crime or crimes, the interest of the society at large

or all other relevant factors which cannot be put in

any straitjacket formulae.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 937

Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala

It will be clear from the paragraph above that the question of fixing the

number of years within the maximum, in the case of life imprisonment,

was to be left to the courts. It was mandated that the courts would

with its experience, knowledge of law, the talent and infrastructure

after studying the detailed parts of each case, with the guidance

from the jurists and judicial pronouncements revealed earlier would

decide judiciously about the period of incarceration which the case

warranted. It was also indicated that for this, apart from the crime

itself; the angle of the commission of such crime or crimes; the interest

of society at large and all other relevant facts which cannot be put

in any straitjacket formulae would be taken into account.

26. Once the court decides that the death penalty is not to be imposed

and also that the convict cannot be released on the expiry of 14

years, the guidelines set out in Swamy Shraddananda (supra), V.

Sriharan (supra) and the line of cases which have applied these

judgments will have to be considered and principles, if any, set out

therein have to be applied.

27. How much is too much and how much is too little? This is the difficult

area we have tried to address here. As rightly observed, there can

be no straitjacket formulae. Pegging the point up to which remission

powers cannot be invoked is an exercise that has to be carefully

undertaken and the discretion should be exercised on reasonable

grounds. The spectrum is very large. The principle in Swamy

Shraddananda (supra) as affirmed in V. Sriharan (supra) was

evolved as the normally accepted norm of 14 years was found to be

grossly disproportionate on the lower side. At the same time, since

it is a matter concerning the liberty of the individual, courts should

also guard against any disproportion in the imposition, on the higher

side too. A delicate balance has to be struck. While undue leniency,

which will affect the public confidence and the efficacy of the legal

system, should not be shown, at the same time, since a good part of

the convict’s life with freedom is being sliced away (except in cases

where the Court decides to impose imprisonment till rest of the full

life), in view of his incarceration, care should be taken that the period

fixed is also not harsh and excessive. While by the very nature of the

task mathematical exactitude is an impossibility, that will not deter

the Court from imposing a period of sentence which will constitute

“a just dessert” for the convict. Precedents can be good pointers as

advised in V. Sriharan (supra). A survey of the previously decided 

938 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

cases applying the Swamy Shraddananda (supra) principle would

be a safe and legitimate guide. It is in pursuance of that mandate that

we have made a survey of some of the cases to see how Swamy

Shraddananda (supra) had come to be applied in the course of

the last decade and a half.

28. In Swamy Shraddananda (supra) itself, on facts, after finding that it

was a murder of the wife in a systematic preplanned manner coupled

with the fact that it was a murder for gain, this Court directed that the

appellant therein be not released from prison for the rest of his life.

29. In Haru Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (2009) 15 SCC 551 which

involved the murder of two individuals and the attempt to murder

the third by the accused who was out on bail in another case, after

conviction, this Court while commuting the death penalty after taking

into account the aggravating and mitigating circumstances imposed

a sentence of 35 (thirty five) years of actual jail sentence without

remission. It was noted that commission of the offence was not

premeditated since he did not come armed and that the accused

was the only bread earner for his family which included two minor

children.

30. In Mulla & Another v. State of U.P., (2010) 3 SCC 508 the

accused/appellant, along with other co-accused, was found guilty of

murdering five persons, including one woman. This Court confirmed

the conviction but modified the sentence. This Court stressed on the

fact that socio-economic factors also constitute a mitigating factor

and must be taken into consideration as in the case the appellants

belonged to extremely poor background which prompted them

to commit the act. The sentence was reduced from death to life

imprisonment for full life, subject to any remission by the Government

for good reasons.

31. In Ramraj v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2010) 1 SCC 573 which

involved the murder of his wife, this Court imposed a sentence of

20 (twenty) years including remissions.

32. In Ramnaresh and Others vs. State of Chhattisgarh., (2012) 4

SCC 257 the convicts were sentenced to death by the lower court,

with the High Court confirming the sentence, on finding them guilty

of raping and murdering an innocent woman while she was alone in

her house. This Court confirmed the conviction but found the case

did not fall under the ‘rarest of rare’ category for awarding death 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 939

Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala

sentence. Ultimately, after setting out the well-established principles

and on consideration of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances,

this Court, while commuting the sentence from death imposed a

sentence of life imprisonment of 21 (twenty one) years.

33. Neel Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2012) 5 SCC 766 was a case

where the accused committed murder of his own four-year old

daughter. This Court, after considering the nature of offence, age,

relationship and gravity of injuries caused, awarded the accused 30

(thirty) years in jail without remissions.

34. In Sandeep v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2012) 6 SCC 107 which

involved the murder of paramour and the unborn child (foetus), this

Court, while considering the facts and circumstances awarded a

period of 30 (thirty) years in jail without remission.

35. In Shankar Kisanrao Khade vs State of Maharashtra, (2013)

5 SCC 546, the accused was convicted for raping and murdering

a minor girl aged eleven years and was sentenced to death for

conviction under S. 302 of IPC, life imprisonment under S. 376,

seven years RI under S. 366-A and five years RI under S. 363 r/w

S. 34. This Court confirmed the conviction but modified the death

sentence to life imprisonment for natural life and all the sentences

to run consecutively.

36. Sahib Hussain v. State of Rajasthan, (2013) 9 SCC 778, concerned

killing of five persons including three children. This Court, taking note

of the fact that the guilt was established by way of circumstantial

evidence and the fact that the High Court had already imposed a

sentence of 20 (twenty) years without remission, did not interfere

with the judgment of the High Court.

37. In Gurvail Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, (2013) 2 SCC 713

which involved the murder of four persons, this Court weighed

the mitigating factors i.e., age of the accused and the probability

of reformation and rehabilitation, and aggravating factors i.e., the

number of deceased, the nature of injuries and the totality of facts

and circumstances directed that the imprisonment would be for a

period of 30 (thirty) years without remission.

38. In Alber Oraon v. State of Jharkhand, (2014) 12 SCC 306 which

involved the murder by the accused of his live-in partner and the

two children of the partner, this Court, even though it found the 

940 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

murder to be brutal, grotesque, diabolical and revolting, applied the

proportionality principle and imposed a sentence of 30 (thirty) years

over and above the period already undergone. It was ordered that

there would be no remission for a period of 30 (thirty) years.

39. In Rajkumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2014) 5 SCC 353, which

involved the rape and murder of helpless and defenceless minor girl,

this Court commuting the death penalty imposed a sentence of 35

(thirty five) years in jail without remission.

40. In Selvam v. State, (2014) 12 SCC 274, the accused was found

guilty of rape and murder of nine year old girl. This Court imposed

a sentence of imprisonment for a period of 30 (thirty) years without

any remission, considering the diabolic manner in which the offence

has been committed against the child.

41. In Birju v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2014) 3 SCC 421, the accused

was involved in the murder of a one-year-old child. This Court noted

that various criminal cases were pending against the accused but

stated that it cannot be used as an aggravating factor as the accused

wasn’t convicted in those cases. While commuting the death penalty,

this Court imposed a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a period

of 20 (twenty) years over and above the period undergone without

remission, since he would be a menace to the society if given any

lenient sentence.

42. In Tattu Lodhi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 9 SCC 675 this

Court was dealing with an appeal preferred by the accused who was

sentenced to death after he was found guilty of committing murder of

a minor girl and for kidnapping and attempt to rape after destruction

of evidence. This Court reduced the sentence from death to life

imprisonment for a minimum 25 (twenty five) years as it noted that

there exists a possibility of the accused committing similar offence

if freed after fourteen years. This Court also opined that the special

category sentence developed in Swamy Shradhanand (supra)

serves a laudable purpose which takes care of genuine concerns of

the society and helps the accused get rid of death penalty.

43. Vijay Kumar v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (2019) 12 SCC 791

was a case where the accused was found guilty of murder of three

minor children of the sister-in-law of the accused. This Court, taking

note of the fact that the accused was not a previous convict or a

professional killer and the motive for which the offence was committed, 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 941

Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala

namely, the grievance that the sister-in-law’s family was not doing

enough to solve the matrimonial problem of the accused, imposed

a sentence of life imprisonment till natural death of the accused

without remission.

44. In Parsuram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2019) 8 SCC 382, the

accused had raped and murdered his own student. The Trial Court

sentenced the accused to death which was affirmed by the High

Court. This Court took into consideration the mitigating factors i.e.,

that the accused was twenty two years old when he committed the

act and the fact that there exists a possibility of reformation and

the aggravating factors i.e., that the accused abused the trust of

the family of the victim. After complete consideration and reference

to some precedents, this Court imposed a sentence of thirty years

without any remission.

45. In Nand Kishore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2019) 16 SCC

278, the accused was sentenced to death by the Trial Court and

the High Court for committing rape and murder of minor girl aged

about eight years old. This Court noted the mitigating factors i.e.,

age of the accused at the time of committing the act [50 years] and

possibility of reformation and imposed a sentence of imprisonment

for a period of 25 (twenty five) years without remission.

46. Swapan Kumar Jha v. State of Jharkhand and Another, (2019)

13 SCC 579 was a case relating to abduction of deceased for

ransom and thereafter murder by the accused. This Court took into

consideration the mitigating factors i.e., young age of the accused,

possibility of reformation and the convict not being a menace to

society. On the other side of the weighing scale, was the fact that

the accused had betrayed the trust of the deceased who was his

first cousin and the fact that the act was premeditated. This Court

modified the death sentence to one of imprisonment for a period of

25 (twenty five) years with remissions.

47. Raju Jagdish Paswan v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 16 SCC

380 was a case where the accused was convicted for the rape

and murder of minor girl aged about nine years and sentenced to

death by the trial court which was affirmed by the High Court. This

Court noted the mitigating factors i.e., murder was not pre-planned,

young age of the accused, no evidence to show that the accused

is a continuing threat to society and the aggravating factors i.e., the 

942 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

nature of the crime and the interest of society, if petitioner is let out

after fourteen years, imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for

30 (thirty years) without remission.

48. In X v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 7 SCC 1 the accused was

sentenced to death by this Court on his conviction for committing rape

and murder of two minor girls who lived near his house. However,

in review, the question placed before the Court was whether postconviction mental illness be a mitigating factor. This Court answered

it in the affirmative but cautioned that in only extreme cases of mental

illness can this factor be taken into consideration. The Court reduced

the sentence from death to life imprisonment for the remainder of

his life as he still poses as a threat to society.

49. In Irappa Siddappa Murgannavar v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2

SCC 801, this Court affirmed conviction of the accused, inter alia,

under S. 302 and 376 but modified the sentence from death to life

imprisonment for minimum 30 (thirty years). This Court stated that

mitigating factors such as young age of the accused, no criminal

antecedents, act not being pre-planned, socio-economic background

of the accused and the fact that conduct of the accused inside jail

was ‘satisfactory’ concluded that sufficient mitigating circumstances

exists to commute the death sentence.

50. In Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 817, this

Court opined that the facts of the case shocked the conscience

of the Court. The accused was found guilty of rape and murder

of a twenty eight year old married woman who was returning from

her workplace. Despite noting that the case did not fall under the

‘rarest of rare’ category, the Court stated that while considering the

possibility of reformation of the accused, Courts held that showing

undue leniency in such a brutal case will adversely affect the public

confidence in the efficacy of the legal system. It concluded that a

fixed term of 30 (thirty years) should be imposed.

51. In Manoj and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2023) 2 SCC

353, the three accused were sentenced to death by the lower court

and confirmed by the High Court on their conviction under Section

302 for committing murder, during the course of robbery, of three

women. This Court, while modifying the sentence from death to

life imprisonment for a minimum 25 (twenty five) years, took into

consideration the non-exhaustive list of mitigating and aggravating 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 943

Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala

factors discussed in Bachan Singh (supra) to establish a method

of principled sentencing. This Court also imposed an obligation on

the State to provide material disclosing psychiatric and psychological

evaluation of the accused which would help the courts understand

the progress of the accused towards reformation.

52. In Madan vs State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1473, this Court

was dealing with a case wherein the accused was sentenced to death,

along with other co-accused, for murdering six persons of his village.

This Court called for the jail conduct report and psychological report

of the accused which were satisfactory and depicted nothing out of

the ordinary. This Court also took into consideration the old age of

the accused and period undergone [18 yrs.] as mitigating factors.

This Court concluded that the case did not fall under the rarest of

rare category and commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment

for minimum 20 (twenty years) including sentence undergone.

53. In Sundar vs State by Inspector of Police - 2023 SCC OnLine SC

310, this Court, while sitting in review, commuted death sentence

awarded to accused therein to life imprisonment of minimum 20

(twenty years). The accused had committed rape and murder of a

7-year-old girl. Factors that influenced this Court to reach such a

decision were the fact that no court had looked at the mitigating factors.

It called for jail conduct and education report from the jail authorities

and found that the conduct was satisfactory and that accused had

earned a diploma in food catering while he was incarcerated. Apart

from the above, the Court noted the young age of the accused, no

prior antecedents to reach a conclusion warranting modification in

the sentence awarded.

54. In Ravinder Singh vs State Govt. of NCT of Delhi - (2024) 2 SCC

323, the accused was convicted under Sections 376, 377 & 506

of the IPC for raping his own 9-year-old daughter by the Sessions

court and conviction was confirmed by the High Court. The Sessions

Court, while imposing life imprisonment, also stated that the accused

would not be given any clemency by the State before 20 years.

This Court clarified that, as discussed in V. Sriharan (supra), the

power to impose a special category sentence i.e., a sentence more

than 14 years but short of death sentence can only be imposed by

the High Court or if in appeal, by this Court. Considering the nature

of the offence committed by the accused and the fact that if the 

944 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

accused is set free early, he can be a threat to his own daughter,

this Court imposed a minimum 20 (twenty years) life imprisonment

without remissions.

55. A survey of the 27 cases discussed above indicates that while in

five cases, the maximum of imprisonment till the rest of the life is

given; in nine cases, the period of imprisonment without remission

was 30 years; in six cases, the period was 20 years (In Ramraj

(supra), this Court had imposed a sentence of 20 years including

remission); in four cases, it was 25 years; in another set of two

cases, it was 35 years and in one case, it was 21 years.

56. What is clear is that courts, while applying Swamy Shraddananda

(supra), have predominantly in cases arising out of a wide array of

facts, keeping the relevant circumstances applicable to the respective

cases fixed the range between 20 years and 35 years and in few

cases have imposed imprisonment for the rest of the life. So much

for statistics. Let us examine how the judgments guide us in terms

of discerning any principle.

57. A journey through the cases set out hereinabove shows that the

fundamental underpinning is the principle of proportionality. The

aggravating and mitigating circumstances which the Court considers

while deciding commutation of penalty from death to life imprisonment,

have a large bearing in deciding the number of years of compulsory

imprisonment without remission, too. As a judicially trained mind

pores and ponders over the aggravating and mitigating circumstances

and in cases where they decide to commute the death penalty they

would by then have a reasonable idea as to what would be the

appropriate period of sentence to be imposed under the Swamy

Shraddananda (supra) principle too. Matters are not cut and dried

and nicely weighed here to formulate a uniform principle. That is

where the experience of the judicially trained mind comes in as

pointed out in V. Sriharan (supra). Illustratively in the process of

arriving at the number of years as the most appropriate for the case

at hand, which the convict will have to undergo before which the

remission powers could be invoked, some of the relevant factors

that the courts bear in mind are:- (a) the number of deceased who

are victims of that crime and their age and gender; (b) the nature

of injuries including sexual assault if any; (c) the motive for which

the offence was committed; (d) whether the offence was committed 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 945

Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala

when the convict was on bail in another case; (e) the premeditated

nature of the offence; (f) the relationship between the offender and the

victim; (g) the abuse of trust if any; (h) the criminal antecedents; and

whether the convict, if released, would be a menace to the society.

Some of the positive factors have been, (1) age of the convict; (2)

the probability of reformation of convict; (3) the convict not being a

professional killer; (4) the socio-economic condition of the accused;

(5) the composition of the family of the accused and (6) conduct

expressing remorse.

These were some of the relevant factors that were kept in mind in

the cases noticed above while weighing the pros and cons of the

matter. The Court would be additionally justified in considering the

conduct of the convict in jail; and the period already undergone

to arrive at the number of years which the Court feels the convict

should, serve as part of the sentence of life imprisonment and before

which he cannot apply for remission. These are not meant to be

exhaustive but illustrative and each case would depend on the facts

and circumstances therein.

58. How do these factors apply to the case at hand? The act committed

by the accused was pre-planned/premeditated; the accused brutally

murdered 4 (four) persons who were unarmed and were defenseless,

one of whom was a child and the other an aged lady. It is also to

be noted that by the act of the accused, three generations of single

family have lost their lives for no fault of theirs; Nature of injuries

inflicted on Latha, Ramachandran and Chitra highlights the brutality

and cold-bloodedness of the act.

59. On the mitigating side, the accused was quite young when he

committed the act i.e., 28 years old; The act committed by the accused

was not for any gain or profit; accused did not try to flee and in fact

tried to commit suicide as he was overcome with emotions after the

dastardly act he committed; accused has been in jail for a period

of 18 years and 4 months and the case is based on circumstantial

evidence. We called for a conduct report of the appellant from the

Jail Authorities. The report dated 05.03.2024 of the Superintendent,

Central Prison and Correctional Home, Viyyur, Thrissur has been

made available to us. The report indicates that ever since his

admission to jail, he had been entrusted with prison labour work such

as duty of barber, day watchman and night watchman. Presently, 

946 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

he has been assigned the job as convict supervisor for the last one

and a half years. The report clearly indicates that no disciplinary

actions were initiated against him in the prison and that the conduct

and behavior of the appellant in prison has been satisfactory so far.

Conclusion:

60. For the reasons stated above, we uphold the judgment of the High

Cout insofar as the conviction of the appellant under Sections 302,

449 and 309 IPC is concerned. We also do not interfere with the

sentence imposed on the accused for the offence under Section 449

and Section 309 of IPC. We hold that the High Court was justified

on the facts of the case in following Swamy Shraddananda (supra)

principle while imposing sentence for the offence under Section 302

IPC. However, in view of the discussion made above, we are inclined

to modify the sentence under Section 302 imposed by the High Court

from a period of 30 years imprisonment without remission to that of

a period of 25 years imprisonment without remission, including the

period already undergone. In our view, this would serve the ends

of justice.

For the reasons stated above, the Appeal is partly allowed in the

above terms.

Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey Result of the case:

Appeal partly allowed.

SUPREME COURT RULES, 2013 - Order XII, Rule 3 – Scope thereof, explained – Filing of applications after disposal of the statutory appeal: Held: Impermissible – A post disposal application for modification and clarification of an order shall lie only in rare cases, where the order passed by the Supreme Court is executory in nature and the directions of the Supreme Court have become impossible to be implemented because of certain subsequent events or developments – After disposal of an appeal / petition, the Supreme Court becomes functus officio and does not retain jurisdiction to entertain any application. [Para 20] SUPREME COURT RULES, 2013 – Practice and Procedure – Application projected as an application for clarification, though it was registered as a miscellaneous application – Practice deprecated. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXIII, Rule 1 – Scope thereof, explained.

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1023 : 2024 INSC 213

Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors.

v.

Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.

Miscellaneous Application Diary No. 21994 of 2022

In

Civil Appeal Nos. 8625 – 8626 of 2019

18 March 2024

[Aniruddha Bose* and Sanjay Kumar, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

When can a litigant apply for modification of a judgment or an

order in a matter which stands finally concluded; and can a party

file an application after disposal of the statutory appeal by invoking

inherent powers of the Supreme Court.

Headnotes

SUPREME COURT RULES, 2013 - Order XII, Rule 3 – Scope

thereof, explained – Filing of applications after disposal of

the statutory appeal:

Held: Impermissible – A post disposal application for modification

and clarification of an order shall lie only in rare cases, where the

order passed by the Supreme Court is executory in nature and

the directions of the Supreme Court have become impossible

to be implemented because of certain subsequent events or

developments – After disposal of an appeal / petition, the Supreme

Court becomes functus officio and does not retain jurisdiction to

entertain any application. [Para 20]

SUPREME COURT RULES, 2013 – Practice and Procedure –

Application projected as an application for clarification, though

it was registered as a miscellaneous application – Practice

deprecated.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXIII, Rule 1 – Scope

thereof, explained.

Held: There are two Orders in the Supreme Court Rules, 2013

which permit review of a judgment or an order of the Supreme

Court, Orders XLVII and XLVIII – The former Order, contained in 

1024 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Part IV of the 2013 Rules, relates to “Review of a Judgment” and

the latter relates to “Curative Petition” – There is no other provision

in the 2013 Rules, whereby a litigant can apply for modification of

a judgment or an order of the Supreme Court in a matter which

stands finally concluded – By taking out a Miscellaneous Application,

the applicant cannot ask for reliefs which were not granted in the

main judgment itself. [Para 10]

Through this miscellaneous application, the applicant seeks a

direction upon the Rajasthan Discoms for making payment of

Rs.1376.35 crores – The present application has been captioned

as “APPLICATION FOR DIRECTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE

RESPONDENT NO.1/APPLICANT (ADANI POWER RAJASTHAN

LIMITED)” in the said appeals which stood disposed of by a

common judgment of a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme

Court delivered on 31.08.2020 – Review petitions filed against

this judgment by the Rajasthan Discoms stood dismissed on

02.03.2021. [Para 2]

In the course of hearing, it was projected as an application for

clarification, though the same was registered as a miscellaneous

application – The reliefs asked for in this application do not refer

to any clarification. [Para 9]

The applicant had expressed its desire to withdraw the present

application on the last date of hearing, i.e., 24.01.2024 – The

Supreme Court, however, decided not to permit such simpliciter

withdrawal – Even if an applicant applies for withdrawal of an

application, in exceptional cases, it would be within the jurisdiction of

the Supreme Court to examine the application and pass appropriate

orders – So far as the present proceeding is concerned, an important

question of law has arisen as regards jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court to entertain an application taken out in connection with a set

of statutory appeals which stood disposed of – Judgment of the

Supreme Court in Supertech Limited v. Emerald Court Owner

Resident Welfare Association & Others, (2023) 10 SCC 817

deals with this question and the ratio of the said judgment would

apply to the present proceeding as well. [Para 19]

The Supreme Court becomes functus officio and does not retain

jurisdiction to entertain an application after the appeal was disposed

of by the judgment of a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme

Court – This is not an application for correcting any clerical or

arithmetical error – Neither it is an application for extension of 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1025

Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v.

Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.

time – A post disposal application for modification and clarification

of the order of disposal shall lie only in rare cases, where the

order passed by the Supreme Court is executory in nature and the

directions contained in the judgment may become impossible to

be implemented because of subsequent events or developments–

The factual background of this Application does not fit into that

description. [Para 20]

SUPREME COURT RULES, 2013 - Order XII, Rule 3 read with

Rule 6 of Order LV – Filing of applications after disposal of the

statutory appeal by invoking inherent powers of the Supreme

Court – Held, impermissible.

Held: The maintainability of the present application cannot be

explained by invoking the inherent power of the Supreme Court

either – The applicant has not applied for review of the main

judgment – In the contempt action, it failed to establish any wilful

disobedience of the main judgment and order – Now the applicant

cannot continue to hitchhike on the same judgment by relying on

the inherent power or jurisdiction of this Court. [Para 13]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 152 read with Order XII,

Rule 3 of the SUPREME COURT RULES, 2013 – Rectification

of an arithmetic order – permissibility thereof.

Held: A miscellaneous application had been filed for modification

of the content of judgment dated 1st September 2020 passed

in M.A. (D) No. 9887 of 2020 in Civil Appeal Nos. 6328-6399

of 2015 – In the said proceeding, clarification was also sought

on the aspect that the judgment did not bar the Union of India

from considering and rectifying the clerical/arithmetical errors

in computation of certain dues – This was an order permitting

rectification of an arithmetic error, which is implicit in Section 152

of the CPC read with Order XII Rule 3 of the 2013 Rules. [Para 18]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 148 read with Section

112 - Power of the Supreme Court to extend time.

Held: The power to extend time beyond that fixed by a Court on a

legitimate ground is incorporated in Section 148 of the CPC – If the

time to do something requires to be extended, it would be within

the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to go beyond the

maximum period of 30 days prescribed in the aforesaid Section,

after sufficient reason is shown – Section 112 of the Code itself

provides that nothing contained in the CPC shall affect the inherent 

1026 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

powers of the Supreme Court under Article 136 or any other

provision of the Constitution. [Para 17]

SUPREME COURT RULES, 2013 - Order XII, Rule 3 – Imposition

of costs on filing of applications after disposal of the statutory

appeal.

Held: The Supreme Court dismissed the present application and

imposed costs of Rs. 50,000/- to be paid by the applicant to be

remitted to the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee as it was

listed several times. [Para 23]

Case Law Cited

Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons Private Limited v.

Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited,

[2021] 13 SCR 738 : M. A. No. 1166 of 2021 in CA

No. 8129 of 2019 – relied on.

Supertech Limited v. Emerald Court Owner Resident

Welfare Association & Others [2021] 10 SCR 569 :

(2023) 10 SCC 817 – Relied on.

State (UT of Delhi) v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Others

[2000] Suppl. 2 SCR 496 : (2000) 7 SCC 296; Sone

Lal and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1982) 2 SCC

398; Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi and Others

[2003] Suppl. 4 SCR 543; (2004) 12 SCC 713; Common

Cause v. Union of India and Others (2004) 5 SCC 222;

Zahira Habibullah Sheikh and Another v. State of Gujarat

and Others [2004] Suppl. 2 SCR 571 : (2004) 5 SCC

353; P.N. Eswara Iyer and Others v. Registrar, Supreme

Court of India [1980] 2 SCR 889 : (1980) 4 SCC 680;

Suthendraraja alias Suthenthira Raja alias Santhan

and Others v. State through DSP/CBI, SIT, Chennai

[1999] Suppl. 3 SCR 540 : (1999) 9 SCC 323; Ramdeo

Chauhan alias Raj Nath v. State of Assam [2001] 3 SCR

669 : (2001) 5 SCC 714; Devendra Pal Singh v. State

(NCT of Delhi) and Another [2002] Suppl. 5 SCR 332

: (2003) 2 SCC 501; Rashid Khan Pathan in re (2021)

12 SCC 64 – referred to.

Energy Watchdog v. Central Electricity Regulatory

Commission and Others, MA Nos. 2705 – 2706 of 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1027

Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v.

Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.

2018 in Civil Appeal Nos. 5399 – 5400 of 2016;

Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Anr. V. Adani

Power (Mundra) Limited, MA (D) No. 18461 of 2023 in

Civil Appeal No. 2908 of 2022; Kalpataru Properties

Pvt. Ltd. v. Indiabulls Housing Finance Ltd., MA No.

2064 of 2022 in Civil Appeal No. 7050 of 2022;

Supertech Limited v. Emerald Court Owner Resident

Welfare Association & Ors., MA No. 1918 of 2021

in Civil Appeal No. 5041 of 2021; Union of India v.

Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers of

India and Ors., MA No. 83 of 2021 in MA (D) No.

9887 of 2020 in Civil Appeal No. 6328-6399 of

2015] – distinguished.

List of Acts

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Supreme Court Rules, 2013.

List of Keywords

Miscellaneous Application, Clarification Application, Modification

Application, Costs, Inherent Powers, Maintainability, Post Dismissal

Application.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Miscellaneous Application Diary

No.21994 of 2022

In

Civil Appeal Nos.8625-8626 of 2019

From the Judgment and Order dated 31.08.2020 in C. A. Nos.8625-

8626 of 2019 of the Supreme Court of India

Appearances for Parties

Dushyant Dave, Sr. Adv., Kartik Seth, Anshul Chowdhary, Prashanth

R. Dixit, Ms. Arushi Rathore, Abhishek Kandwal, Amit Goyal, Mahesh

Bhati, Saurabh Chaturvedi, M/s. Chambers of Kartik Seth, Advs. for

the Appellants.

Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Sr. Adv., Mahesh Agarwal, Ms. Poonam Sengupta,

Arshit Anand, Shashwat Singh, Ms. Sakshi Kapoor, Saunak Rajguru,

Sidharth Seem, E. C. Agrawala, Advs. for the Respondents/Applicants.

1028 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Aniruddha Bose, J.

The applicant, Adani Power Rajasthan Limited (APRL), is a generating

company as per Section 2(28) of the Electricity Act, 2003 (“2003

Act”). It operates a thermal power plant in the State of Rajasthan.

There were three appellants (1 to 3) in the main set of appeals, in

connection with which the present application has been taken out,

being the distribution licensees of the State of Rajasthan as per the

provisions of the 2003 Act. They shall, henceforth in this judgment,

be collectively referred to as “Rajasthan Discoms”. Rajasthan Urja

Vikas Nigam Limited was the 4th appellant in the main set of appeals.

It appears to have been formed by the Government of Rajasthan for

the purpose of coordination among the aforesaid three Discoms, as

also other distribution licensees of the State.

2. Through this miscellaneous application, the applicant seeks a direction

upon the Rajasthan Discoms for making payment of Rs.1376.35

crore towards Late Payment Surcharge (“LPS”). This claim has been

raised by the applicant citing Article 8.3.5 of the Power Purchase

Agreement dated 28.01.2010 (“PPA-2010”) entered into between

the Rajasthan Discoms and the applicant. The present application

has been captioned as “APPLICATION FOR DIRECTIONS ON

BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO.1/APPLICANT (ADANI

POWER RAJASTHAN LIMITED)” in the said appeals which stood

disposed of by a common judgment of a three-Judge Bench of this

Court delivered on 31.08.2020. Review petitions filed against this

judgment by the Rajasthan Discoms stood dismissed on 02.03.2021.

3. The appeals arose out of a dispute involving certain additional

payments claimed by the applicant as per the PPA-2010. Under the

agreement, the applicant was to supply electricity to the Rajasthan

Discoms, which had to be generated by the applicant. For this

purpose, the PPA-2010 postulated domestic coal as the primary

source of energy, while imported coal was to be used as a backup

option. The applicant’s complaint was that, due to non-availability

of sufficient domestic coal, it could not be allocated a domestic coal

linkage by the Government of India and it was compelled to rely on

imported coal from Indonesia, which had a higher cost. Claim for

compensation of loss, caused on account of non-supply of domestic 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1029

Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v.

Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.

coal, was raised by the applicant before the Rajasthan Electricity

Regulatory Commission (“RERC”), invoking the change in law clause

of the PPA-2010. Change in law was one of the conditions under

the PPA-2010, for which tariff adjustment payment could be made

by the seller of electricity following the procedure stipulated in the

aforesaid agreement. By an order dated 17.05.2018, RERC held

that the applicant would be entitled to relief on account of change

in law, which was held to be the difference between actual landed

cost of alternative/imported coal (as certified by the auditor) and

actual landed cost of domestic linkage coal. This was recorded in

an order passed on 25.02.2022 by a Coordinate Bench of this Court

in a contempt action brought by the applicant [Contempt Petition

(Civil) No(s) 877-878 of 2021]. We shall refer to the said proceeding

later in this judgment. We also need not delve into the question of

eligibility of the applicant to get additional sum on account of change

in law, as that question stands finally decided in the main judgment.

4. The applicant had also raised another claim for additional payment

before the RERC, under the head of carrying cost which was

disallowed by the RERC. Rajasthan Discoms, being aggrieved by

the grant of change-in-law compensation, as also the applicant, being

aggrieved by rejection of the claim for carrying costs appealed against

the order of the RERC before the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity

(“APTEL”). By a common decision dated 14.09.2019, the APTEL

found that the applicant’s claim based on “change in law” was valid

and opined that the applicant was entitled to compensation for the

loss caused to it because of change in law under a subsequent coal

supply scheme, termed as the SHAKTI scheme, which failed to provide

domestic coal linkage. The APTEL further found that the applicant

would also be entitled for payment towards applicable carrying cost.

The Rajasthan Discoms had appealed against the common decision

of APTEL before this Court. The three-Judge Bench of this Court,

by the judgement dated 31.08.2020, dismissed the appeals with the

following observations and directions: -

“66. Considering the facts of this case and keeping in

view that the RERC and APTEL have given concurrent

findings in favour of the respondent with regard to change

in law, with which we also concur, we may now deal with

the question of liability of appellants-Rajasthan Discoms

with regard to late payment surcharge. In this regard, the 

1030 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

following Articles 8.3.5 and 8.8 of PPA, which are relevant

for the present purpose, are extracted hereunder:

“8.3.5. In the event of delay in payment of a Monthly Bill

by the Procurers beyond its Due Date, a Late Payment

Surcharge shall be payable by such Procurers to the Seller

at the rate of two percent (2%) in excess of the applicable

SBAR per annum, on the amount of outstanding payment,

calculated on a day to day basis (and compounded with

monthly rest), for each day of the delay. The Late Payment

Surcharge shall be claimed by the Seller through the

Supplementary Bill.

8.8 Payment of Supplementary Bill

8.8.1 Either Party may raise a bill on the other Party

(supplementary bill) for payment on account of:

i) Adjustments required by the Regional Energy

Account (if applicable):

ii) Tariff Payment for change in parameters,

pursuant to provisions in Schedule 4; or

iii) Change in Law as provided in Article 10, and

such Supplementary Bill shall be paid by the

others party.

8.8.2 The Procurers shall remit all amounts due

under a Supplementary Bill raised by the Seller to

the Seller’s Designated Account by the Due Date and

notify the Seller of such remittance on the same day

or the Seller shall be eligible to draw such amounts

through the Letter of Credit. Similarly, the Seller shall

pay all amounts due under a Supplementary Bill

raised by Procurer(s) by the Due Date to concerned

Procurer’s designated bank account and notify such

Procurer(s) of such payment on the same day.

For such payments by the Procurer(s), Rebate as

applicable to Monthly Bills pursuant to Article 8.3.6

shall equally apply.

8.8.3 In the event of delay in payment of a

Supplementary Bill by either Party beyond its Due 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1031

Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v.

Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.

Date, a Late Payment Surcharge shall be payable

at the same terms applicable to the Monthly Bill in

Article 8.3.5.

8.9 The copies of all; notices/offers which are required

to be sent as per the provisions of this Article 8, shall

be sent by a party, simultaneously to all parties.”

Liability of the Late Payment Surcharge which has been

saddled upon the appellants is at the rate of 2% in

excess of applicable SBAR per annum, on the amount of

outstanding payment, calculated on a day to day basis

(and compounded with monthly rest) for each day of the

delay. Therefore, there shall be huge liability of payment

of Late Payment Surcharge upon the appellants-Rajasthan

Discoms.

67. With regard to the question of interest/late payment

surcharge, we notice that the plea of change in law was

initially raised by APRL in the year 2013. A case was also

filed by APRL in the year 2013 itself raising its claim on

such basis. However, the appellants-Rajasthan Discoms

did not allow the claim regarding change in law, because

of which APRL was deprived of raising the bills with effect

from the date of change in law in the year 2013. We

are, thus, of the opinion that considering the totality of

the facts of this case and in order to do complete justice

and to reduce the liability of the appellants-Rajasthan

Discoms, payment of 2 per cent in excess of the applicable

SBAR per annum with monthly rest would be on higher

side. In our opinion, it would be appropriate to direct the

appellants-Rajasthan Discoms to pay interest/late payment

surcharge as per applicable SBAR for the relevant years,

which should not exceed 9 per cent per annum. It is also

provided that instead of monthly rest, the interest would

be compounded per annum.

68. We accordingly direct that the rate of interest/late

payment surcharge would be at SBAR, not exceeding 9

per cent per annum, to be compounded annually, and the

2 per cent above the SBAR (as provided in Article 8.3.5

of PPA) would not be charged in the present case. 

1032 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

69. Before we part with the case, we may notice that

Shri Prashant Bhushan, raised the submission with

respect to over-invoicing. He attracted our attention to the

investigation pending before the DRI. He has submitted

that 40 importers of coal are under investigation by the DRI

concerning alleged over-invoicing. The letter of rogatory

was issued. However, leamed counsel conceded that there

is no ultimate conclusion in the investigation reached so far.

Thus, we are of the opinion that until and unless there is

a finding recorded by the competent court as to invoicing,

the submission cannot be accepted. At this stage, it cannot

be said that there is over-invoicing. We have examined

the case on merits with abundant caution, and we find

that there are concurrent findings of facts recorded by the

RERC and the APTEL. With respect to the aspect that

bid was premised on domestic coal, we find that findings

recorded do not call for any interference.”

5. The applicant had filed contempt proceedings alleging disobedience

of the said judgment and order, which were registered as Contempt

Petition (C) Nos. 877-878 of 2021. We have already referred to this

proceeding. In the contempt proceeding, the applicant’s position

gets reflected in the submissions of its learned senior counsel,

recorded in paragraph 6 of the order passed on 25.02.2022 (One

of us, Aniruddha Bose, J., was a party to this order). The relevant

portion of that order is reproduced below:-

“6. Shri Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel

appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the only

dispute which was to be resolved by RERC, APTEL and

this Court was with regard to the payment due because of

“change in law”, which was held to be the actual landed

cost of alternate coal/imported coal as certified by the

auditor minus landed cost of domestic linkage coal. There

was no other dispute which was to be resolved by this

Court. Learned Senior Counsel has submitted that it is

now contended by the respondents that certain payments

have been made by the respondents which, according to

the learned Senior Counsel, was towards regular payment

on the basis of domestic linkage coal and nothing else.

Since, the “change in law” ground of the petitioner has been 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1033

Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v.

Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.

accepted by all the authorities i.e. RERC, APTEL and this

Court and also confirmed by the dismissal of the Review

Petition filed before this Court, the question cannot now be

reopened at this stage. It is, thus, submitted that since the

actual landed cost of alternate coal/imported coal as was

submitted by the petitioner has been duly certified by the

auditors, which has not been disputed by the respondents,

the payment, as claimed, ought to have been made and

since the same has not been paid, the respondents are

liable for contempt. The further contention of the learned

Senior Counsel of the petitioner is that the claim of the

respondents that they had paid certain amount towards

energy charges regularly month by month, which included

certain amount of price of alternate coal/imported coal

charges cannot be accepted, as at that stage i.e. in the

year 2013, the respondents had not accepted the claim

of the petitioner with regard to “change in law”, and the

assertion now being made by the respondents that they had

paid certain amount after partially accepting the “change

in law” theory cannot be accepted, as this issue had never

been raised by respondents in any proceedings earlier, as

the respondents had, in fact, throughout contested that

the petitioner is not entitled to the “change in law” benefit.”

6. The allegations of non-compliance with the judgment of the threeJudge Bench were dealt with by the Coordinate Bench in the aforesaid

order passed on 25.02.2022. It was, inter-alia, observed and directed

in the said order:-

“9. Firstly, what we have to consider is only the effect of

“change in law”, which as per RERC, API’EL and this Court

would be the actual landed cost of alternate coal/ imported

coal minus the landed cost of domestic linkage coal. The

question of any claim which the respondents may have

against the petitioner, is not an issue before us. As per the

principle laid down by RERC and affirmed up till this Court,

the petitioner has claimed an amount of Rs.5344. 75 crores

up to March, 2021. The said principle having been affirmed

by the APTEL as well as by this Court and even in Review

Petition, cannot be reopened now. It cannot be disputed

that after March, 2021 also, the petitioner would be entitled 

1034 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

to payment on the basis of the same calculation, which up

to November, 2021 comes to Rs.130.69 crores. As such,

the due amount up to November 2021 would be Rs.5344.

75 + Rs.130.69 = 54 75.44 crores. Out of this amount of

Rs.54 75.44 crores, the petitioner has been paid a sum

of Rs.2426.81 crores in terms of the interim order passed

by this Court. Hence, as per the petitioner, the balance

amount of Rs.3048.63 crores would remain due to be

paid up to November, 2021. The interest at the maximum

rate of 9% per annum, as capped by this Court vide its

judgment and order dated 31.08.2020, is to be applied on

the said amount, from the date the amount became due,

till the date of actual payment. The further claim of late

payment surcharge, amounting to Rs.2477.70 crores, as

per the petitioner, would be a subject matter which the

petitioner, if so advised, can claim before the appropriate

forum, as the same is not the subject in question in the

present proceedings, regarding which no directions have

also been issued by this Court.

10. As such, considering the totality of facts and

circumstances of this case, prima face we are of the

opinion that the respondents are liable for contempt for

not complying this Court’s order dated 31.08.2020. We,

thus, direct the respondents to pay to the petitioner, the

principal amount (as per the terms/norms laid down in the

judgment of this Court dated 31.08.2020) minus Rs.2426.81

crores deposited by the respondents in terms of the interim

order dated 29.10.2018 (which, as per the petitioner, the

balance payable amount would be Rs.3048.63 crores)

along with interest as per the applicable SBAR for the

relevant years, which should not exceed 9% per annum

(to be compounded annually), from the date the amount

became due till the date of actual payment, within four

weeks from today, failing which the respondents shall

appear before this Court in person, on the next date, so

as to enable this Court to frame charges.”

7. The contempt petitions were subsequently directed to be closed by

another Coordinate Bench of this Court and order to that effect was

passed on 19.04.2022. In this order, it was, inter-alia, observed:-

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1035

Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v.

Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.

“With regard to the first question it may only be observed

that by order dated 25.02.2022 passed in these contempt

petitions, this court, in paragraph no. 9, has observed as

under:

“The further claim of late payment surcharge,

amounting to Rs.2477.70 crores, as per the

petitioner, would be a subject matter which

the petitioner, if so advised, can claim before

the appropriate forum, as the same is not the

subject in question in the present proceedings,

regarding which no directions have also been

issued by this Court.”

As such, since according to the respondent(s) the payment

made is only towards the principal amount plus 9% interest

per annum, we are not inclined to pass any further orders

as we have already left the question of late payment

surcharge open, which the petitioner, if so advised, can

claim before the appropriate forum.

As regards the second question of the alleged noncompliance, by the respondents after November, 2021

of the judgment and order dated 31.08.2020, we would

not like to make any observation as there is neither. any

material before us with regard to that nor the same was

in question when the contempt petitions were filed. As

such, we leave this question open to be agitated by the

petitioner, of it is so advised.

With regard to the last issue raised by the respondents,

which is to the effect that the claim of the Rajasthan

Utilities against the petitioner outside the judgment dated

31.08.2020 be permitted to be made, we would only like to

observe that the same cannot be a matter to be considered

in a contempt petition and as such neither we are inclined

to grant any such relief nor stop them from raising any

such issue, if the respondents are so advised and found

entitled under the law. With the aforesaid observations,

we close these contempt petitions.”

8. After institution of the present application on 19.07.2022, it was heard

from time to time and finally on 24.01.2024, when this matter was 

1036 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

called on for hearing, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned senior

counsel, appearing for the applicant, sought leave to withdraw the

application. Mr. Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel appearing for

the Rajasthan Discoms, however, opposed such prayer and his case

was that the present application, having been taken out in an appeal

which stood disposed of, did not lie and it should be dismissed on

the ground that it is not maintainable. Mr. Dave drew our attention

to paragraph 67 of the judgment of the three-Judge Bench, which

we have quoted above. The issue of LPS has been dealt with by

the three-Judge Bench in the said passage.

9. In the course of hearing, it was projected as an application for

clarification, though the same was registered as a miscellaneous

application. The reliefs asked for in this application do not refer to

any clarification. We have referred to the substance of the reliefs

prayed for in this application earlier in this judgment.

10. Order XII Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 (“2013 Rules”)

framed in pursuance of Article 145 of the Constitution of India,

stipulates:-

“3. Subject to the provisions contained in Order XLVII of

these rules, a judgment pronounced by the Court or by

a majority of the Court or by a dissenting Judge in open

Court shall not afterwards be altered or added to, save for

the purpose of correcting a clerical or arithmetical mistake

or an error arising from any accidental slip or omission.”

There are, however, two chapters in the 2013 Rules which permit

review of a judgment or order of this Court, being Order XLVII and

XLVIII. The former Order, contained in Part IV of the 2013 Rules

relates to “Review of a Judgment” and the latter relates to “Curative

Petition”. There is no other provision in the 2013 Rules, whereby a

litigant can apply for modification of a judgment or an order of this

Court in a matter which stands finally concluded. On rare occasions,

a litigant may apply for clarification of an order if the same is ex-facie

incomprehensible, but we do not expect any judgment or order to

bear such a character. So far as the applicant is concerned, it did

not apply for review of the judgment delivered by the three-Judge

Bench. Neither in the contempt action initiated by the applicant, did

this Court find that any case of willful disobedience of the judgment

of the three-Judge Bench was made out on the question of LPS. 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1037

Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v.

Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.

This would be apparent from the orders passed by this Court in

the contempt petitions which have been reproduced earlier in this

judgement. The judgment of the three-Judge Bench has already

examined the question of LPS and by taking out a Miscellaneous

Application, the applicant cannot ask for reliefs which were not

granted in the main judgment itself.

11. In the case of Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons Private Limited -vsEdelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited [M.A. No. 1166

of 2021 in CA No. 8129 of 2019], a two-Judge Bench of this Court

in its judgment delivered on 17th August 2022 observed and held:-

“4. Having heard learned senior counsel for the parties

and having perused the relevant materials placed on

record, we are of the considered view that the present

applications are nothing else but an attempt to seek review

of the judgment and order passed by this Court on 13th

April 2021 under the garb of miscellaneous application.

5. We find that there is a growing tendency of

indirectly seeking review of the orders of this Court

by filing applications either seeking modifications or

clarifications of the orders passed by this Court.

6. In our view, such applications are a total abuse of

process of law. The valuable time of Court is spent in

deciding such application which time would otherwise

be utilized for attending litigations of the litigants who

are waiting in the corridors of justice for decades

together.”

(emphasis supplied)

12. Subsequently in the judgment of this Court in the case of Supertech

Limited-vs- Emerald Court Owner Resident Welfare Association

& Others [(2023) 10 SCC 817], a two-Judge Bench of this Court

examined the maintainability of miscellaneous applications “for

clarification, modification or recall” and was pleased to observe the

following in the context of that case:-

“12. The attempt in the present miscellaneous application is

clearly to seek a substantive modification of the judgment

of this Court. Such an attempt is not permissible in a

miscellaneous application. While Mr Mukul Rohatgi, learned 

1038 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Senior Counsel has relied upon the provisions of Order

LV Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, what is

contemplated therein is a saving of the inherent powers of

the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for

the ends of justice or to prevent an abuse of the process

of the Court. Order LV Rule 6 cannot be inverted to bypass

the provisions for review in Order XLVII of the Supreme

Court Rules, 2013. The miscellaneous application is an

abuse of the process.”

The authorities which were cited in the said Judgment by the

Coordinate Bench are the cases of State (UT of Delhi) -vs- Gurdip

Singh Uban and Others [(2000) 7 SCC 296], Sone Lal and Others

-vs- State of Uttar Pradesh [(1982) 2 SCC 398], Ram Chandra

Singh -vs- Savitri Devi and Others [(2004 12 SCC 713], Common

Cause -vs- Union of India and Others [(2004) 5 SCC 222], Zahira

Habibullah Sheikh and Another -vs- State of Gujarat and Others

[(2004) 5 SCC 353], P.N. Eswara Iyer and Others -vs- Registrar,

Supreme Court of India [(1980) 4 SCC 680], Suthendraraja alias

Suthenthira Raja alias Santhan and Others -vs- State through

DSP/CBI, SIT, Chennai [(1999) 9 SCC 323], Ramdeo Chauhan

alias Raj Nath -vs- State of Assam [(2001) 5 SCC 714], Devendra

Pal Singh -vs- State (NCT of Delhi) and Another [(2003) 2 SCC

501] and Rashid Khan Pathan in re, [(2021) 12 SCC 64]. These

authorities broadly stipulate that multiple attempts to reopen a

judgment of this Court should not be permitted. Hence, we do not

consider it necessary to deal with these authorities individually.

13. Rule 6 of Order LV of the 2013 Rules stipulates: -

“6. Nothing in these rules shall be deemed to limit or

otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to make

such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice

or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.”

The maintainability of the present application cannot be explained by

invoking the inherent power of this Court either. The applicant has

not applied for review of the main judgment. In the contempt action,

it failed to establish any willful disobedience of the main judgment

and order on account of non-payment of LPS. Now the applicant

cannot continue to hitchhike on the same judgment by relying on

the inherent power or jurisdiction of this Court. 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1039

Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v.

Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.

14. Appearing on behalf of the applicant, Dr. Singhvi, learned Senior

Counsel, relied on five orders of this Court in which post-disposal

applications were entertained. The first one was an order dated

29.10.2018 in the case of Energy Watchdog -vs- Central Electricity

Regulatory Commission and Others, [MA Nos.2705-2706 of 2018

in Civil Appeal Nos.5399-5400 of 2016]. In that case, an application

for impleadment on behalf of the State of Gujarat was allowed, upon

going through a High Power Committee’s report, which was given

after the judgment was delivered. The judgment disposing of the

Civil Appeal was delivered on 11.04.2017, but in the miscellaneous

application, the applicant was given liberty to approach the Central

Electricity Regulatory Commission for approval of the proposed

amendments to be made to a power purchase agreement. That

was a case where this Court, after the judgment was delivered,

considered certain events which accrued subsequently and had a

bearing on the main decision. The subsequent event was taken into

account for modifying the order but there was no substantive change

in the judgment itself.

15. The next order, on which Dr. Singhvi placed reliance, was passed

on 04.05.2023 in the case of Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd.

& Anr. -vs- Adani Power (Mundra) Limited [MA (D) No. 18461 of

2023 in Civil Appeal No.2908 of 2022]. The substantive part of the

order is contained in Paragraph 2 thereof and this paragraph reads:-

“2. As agreed by the learned counsel for the parties, the

words “As per the details given in the PPA, the mode of

transportation is through railway” shown in paragraph 32

of the judgment dated 20.04.2023 passed in C.A. No. 2908

of 2022 be read as “As per the details given in the FSA,

the mode of transportation is through railway”.

But this order appears to be in the nature of correcting an error

which was clerical in nature and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

(“the Code”) itself provides for such correction under Section 152

thereof, as also Order XII Rule 3 of the 2013 Rules.

16. The third order relied on by Dr. Singhvi was passed on 09.12.2022 in

the case of Kalpataru Properties Pvt. Ltd. -vs- Indiabulls Housing

Finance Ltd. [MA No.2064 of 2022 in Civil Appeal No.7050 of 2022].

The applicant therein had approached this Court contending that he

was not heard when the civil appeal was decided. In that case, the 

1040 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

appellant had approached this Court against an Order passed by

NCLAT in Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 880/2021 and the

said appellant sought to withdraw the appeal on deposit of certain

amount by the first respondent in the said appeal. The request was

accepted by this Court and by the Order passed on 26.09.2022, the

appeal pending before the NCLAT was also disposed of by this Court.

The applicant was an intervenor before the NCLAT and his submission

was that in the appeal before the NCLAT which was disposed of,

he also sought to raise some grievances before the NCLAT, in his

capacity as an intervenor. His case was that he should have been

given the liberty to be heard as an intervenor before the NCLAT. A

Coordinate Bench of this Court entertained that application and held: -

“We do believe that this controversy should be resolved

by the NCLAT itself i.e. whether on the appellants seeking

to withdraw the appeal, there can be any impediment in

withdrawal of the appeal and is the NCLAT really required

to comment on the merits of the order of the NCLT at the

behest of an intervener. We further make it clear that we

are not expanding the array of parties before the NCLAT

as a number of entities seems to have jumped into the

picture as the matter has gone on before the Court. We

make it clear that only the parties/existing interventionist

before the NCLAT will have the right of hearing.

In view of the orders passed in Civil Appeal No. 9062/2022,

this appeal will also to be listed before the Bench presided

over by the Chairman.

In view thereof, the final picture which would emerge would

be before the NCLAT and to that extent the order passed

by us on 14.11.2022 would be kept in abeyance till the

NCLAT resolves the issue.”

Again, this Order was in the nature of a review order by the applicant

who was a party to the proceeding before the NCLAT. All the appeals

before the NCLAT were disposed of without hearing him. The context

is entirely different from the one in which the applicant has presently

approached this Court.

17. The fourth order on which the present applicant relied was passed

on 12.08.2022 in the case of Supertech Limited -vs- Emerald 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1041

Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v.

Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.

Court Owner Resident Welfare Association & Ors. [MA No.1918

of 2021 in Civil Appeal No.5041 of 2021]. The Coordinate Bench

of this Court granted extension of time, as sought by the applicant

therein, in effecting demolition of two building towers which were

approved by the Court while disposing of the civil appeal. The power

to extend time beyond that fixed by a Court on a legitimate ground is

incorporated in Section 148 of the Code. If the time to do something

requires to be extended, it would be within the inherent jurisdiction of

this Court to go beyond the maximum period of 30 days prescribed

in the aforesaid Section, after sufficient reason is shown. Section

112 of the Code itself provides that nothing contained in the Code

shall affect the inherent powers of the Supreme Court under Article

136 or any other provision of the Constitution.

18. The fifth order referred to by the applicant was passed on 23.07.2021

in the case of Union of India -vs- Association of Unified Telecom

Service Providers of India and Ors. [MA No.83 of 2021 in MA

(D) No. 9887 of 2020 in Civil Appeal No.6328-6399 of 2015]. A

miscellaneous application had been filed for modification of the

content of judgment dated 1st September 2020 passed in M.A. (D)

No. 9887 of 2020 in Civil Appeal Nos. 6328-6399 of 2015. In the

said proceeding, clarification was also sought on the aspect that

the judgment did not bar the Union of India from considering and

rectifying the clerical/arithmetical errors in computation of certain

dues. This was again an Order, in substance, permitting rectification

of an arithmetic error, which is implicit in Section 152 of the Code

read with Order XII Rule 3 of the 2013 Rules.

19. We have indicated in the earlier part of this judgment that Dr. Singhvi

had expressed his desire to withdraw the present application on

the last date of hearing, i.e., 24.01.2024. Ordinarily, we would not

have had set out the background leading to the filing of the present

application and the course of the application that was taken before

this Court in view of such submission. Any plaintiff would be entitled

to abandon a suit or abandon part of the claim made in the suit at

any time after institution of the suit, as provided in Rule 1 of Order

XXIII of the Code. We, however, decided not to permit such simpliciter

withdrawal, as the Rajasthan Discoms sought imposition of costs.

Secondly, in our opinion, the provision which pertains to a suit would

not ipso facto apply to a miscellaneous application invoking inherent

powers of this Court, instituted in a set of statutory appeals which 

1042 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

stood disposed of. Even if an applicant applies for withdrawal of an

application, in exceptional cases, it would be within the jurisdiction

of the Court to examine the application and pass appropriate orders.

So far as the present proceeding is concerned, an important question

of law has arisen as regards jurisdiction of the Court to entertain an

application taken out in connection with a set of statutory appeals

which stood disposed of. Judgment of this Court in Supertech

Limited (supra) deals with this question and in our opinion, the ratio

of the said judgment would apply to the present proceeding as well.

20. We felt it necessary to examine the question about maintainability of

the present application as we are of the view that it was necessary

to spell out the position of law as to when such post-disposal

miscellaneous applications can be entertained after a matter is

disposed of. This Court has become functus officio and does not

retain jurisdiction to entertain an application after the appeal was

disposed of by the judgment of a three-Judge Bench of this Court

on 31.08.2020 through a course beyond that specified in the statute.

This is not an application for correcting any clerical or arithmetical

error. Neither it is an application for extension of time. A post disposal

application for modification and clarification of the order of disposal

shall lie only in rare cases, where the order passed by this Court

is executory in nature and the directions of the Court may become

impossible to be implemented because of subsequent events or

developments. The factual background of this Application does not

fit into that description.

21. Our attention was drawn to an order passed on 14.12.2022 in which

a Coordinate Bench was of the prima facie opinion that the applicant

may be entitled to LPS as per Article 8.3.5 of PPA-2010, at least

from 31.08.2020, till the actual payment was made pursuant to the

order passed by this Court in the contempt proceedings. This prima

facie view was expressed in the course of hearing of the present

application only. We have examined the issue in greater detail. As

we have already indicated, the applicant, after the three-Judge Bench

decision was delivered, did not file any petition for review. On the

other hand, it was the Rajasthan Discoms that had filed the review

petitions which stood dismissed. In the contempt action instituted by

the applicant, the question concerning payment of LPS was raised,

but the Bench of this Court found that the same was not the subject

in question in the contempt proceedings regarding which no direction 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1043

Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v.

Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.

had been issued by this Court. Hence the Coordinate Bench decided

not to address that question in the contempt proceedings. In this

judgement, we have already quoted the observations regarding the

question of LPS made by the Contempt Court on 25.02.2022 and

19.04.2022. Despite that question being left open by the Contempt

Court, we are of the view that a miscellaneous application is not the

proper legal course to make demand on that count. A relief of this

nature cannot be asked for in a miscellaneous application which was

described in the course of hearing as an application for clarification.

22. So far as the observations made in the order passed in the present

proceedings on 14.12.2022 are concerned, they were made only at

a prima facie stage and do not have binding effect at the hearing

stage. Moreover, the question whether such a prayer could be made

in an application labeled as a “Miscellaneous Application” taken

out in connection with a set of appeals which have been finally

decided, does not appear to have been considered by this Court at

the time of making of the order dated 14.12.2022. The order of this

Court does not reflect any discussion on the issue of maintainability

of the present application. It also does not appear to us that the

maintainability issue was raised at that stage. Thus, mere making

of such observations cannot be construed to mean that this Court

found such application to be maintainable.

23. We, accordingly, dismiss the present application. This application was

listed before us on several occasions and for that reason we impose

costs of Rs. 50,000/- to be paid by the applicant to be remitted to

the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee.

Headnotes prepared by: Result of the case:

Raghav Bhatia, Hony. Associate Editor Application dismissed

(Verified by: Abhinav Mukerji, Sr. Adv.)