LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Tuesday, February 13, 2024

Whether the High Court had the power to direct the State Government to notify Rules proposed by the Chief Justice pertaining to post-retiral benefits for former Judges of the High Court; whether the power of criminal contempt could be invoked by the High Court against officials of the State Government on the ground that the application for recall was ‘contemptuous’; and as regards the broad guidelines to guide courts when they direct the presence of government officials before the court.

Whether the High Court had the power to direct the State Government to notify Rules proposed by the Chief Justice pertaining to post-retiral benefits for former Judges of the High Court; whether the power of criminal contempt could be invoked by the High Court against officials of the State Government on the ground that the application for recall was ‘contemptuous’; and as regards the broad guidelines to guide courts when they direct the presence of government officials before the court.


* Author

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 211 : 2024 INSC 4

Case Details

The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

v.

Association of Retired Supreme Court and High Court

Judges at Allahabad & Ors.

(Civil Appeal Nos 23-24 of 2024)

03 January 2024

[Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud*, CJI, J B Pardiwala

and Manoj Misra, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Whether the High Court had the power to direct the State

Government to notify Rules proposed by the Chief Justice pertaining

to post-retiral benefits for former Judges of the High Court; whether

the power of criminal contempt could be invoked by the High Court

against officials of the State Government on the ground that the

application for recall was ‘contemptuous’; and as regards the

broad guidelines to guide courts when they direct the presence

of government officials before the court.

Headnotes

Constitution of India – Arts 226, 229 – Summoning of

government officials – Invocation of criminal contempt –

Writ petition by the first respondent-Association seeking

an increase in the allowance granted to former judges of

the High Court for domestic help and other expenses –

Issuance of direction by the High Court directing the State

Government to inter alia notify rules proposed by the Chief

Justice of the High Court pertaining to ‘Domestic Help to

Former Chief Justices and Former Judges of the Allahabad

High Court’ by the next date of hearing – Also directed the

certain officials to be present before the court on the next

date if the order was not complied with – Application filed

by the State seeking recall of the aforesaid Order – High

Court held that the recall application was ‘contemptuous’

and initiated criminal contempt proceedings against various

officials of the Government – Also the officials present in

the court, including the Secretary (Finance) and Special

Secretary (Finance) taken into custody and bailable warrants 

212 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

issued against Chief Secretary and Additional Chief Secretary

(Finance) – Correctness:

Held: High Court did not have the power to direct the State

Government to notify Rules proposed by the Chief Justice

pertaining to post-retiral benefits for former Judges of the High

Court – Power of criminal contempt could not be invoked by

the High Court against officials of the Government of Uttar

Pradesh on the ground that the application for recall of the First

Impugned Order was ‘contemptuous’ – Conduct of the High

Court in frequently summoning government officials to exert

pressure on the government, under the threat of contempt,

is impermissible – Issuance of bailable warrants by the High

Court against officials, who was not even summoned in the

first place, indicates the attempt by the High Court to unduly

pressurise the government – Thus, both the Impugned Orders

set aside – Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on personal

appearance of government officials in court proceedings framed

by this Court. [Paras 46, 47]

Constitution of India – Art. 229(2) – High Court directing the

State Government to notify the Rules proposed by the Chief

Justice pertaining to post-retiral benefits for former Judges

of the High Court – Correctness:

Held: High Court did not have the power to direct the State

Government to notify Rules proposed by the Chief Justice pertaining

to post-retiral benefits for former Judges of the High Court – Chief

Justice did not have the competence to frame the said rules u/Art.

229 – High Court, acting u/Art. 226, cannot usurp the functions

of the executive and compel the executive to exercise its rulemaking power in the manner directed by it – Compelling the State

Government to mandatorily notify the Rules by the next date of

hearing, in the First Impugned Order, virtually amounted to the High

Court issuing a writ of mandamus to notify the Rules proposed

by the Chief Justice – Such directions by the High Court are

impermissible and contrary to the separation of powers envisaged

by the Constitution – High Court, acting on the judicial side, could

not compel the State Government to notify Rules proposed by the

Chief Justice in the purported exercise of his administrative powers

– Thus, the High Court acted beyond its jurisdiction u/Art. 226 by

frequently summoning officers to expedite the consideration of the

Rules and issuing directions to notify the Rules by a fixed date,

under the threat of criminal contempt. [Paras 25, 26, 28-30, 46a]

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 213

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED

SUPREME COURT AND HIGH COURT JUDGES AT ALLAHABAD & ORS

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Criminal Contempt – Initiation

of – Officials of the Government of Uttar Pradesh availing legal

remedies and raising a legal challenge to an order – Criminal

contempt invoked by the High Court against the officials on

the ground that the application for recall was ‘contemptuous’

– Correctness:

Held: Power of criminal contempt could not be invoked by the

High Court against officials of the Government of Uttar Pradesh

on the ground that the application for recall of the first impugned

order was ‘contemptuous’ – High Court acted in haste by invoking

criminal contempt and taking the government officials into custody

and the same was not warranted – Actions of the officials did not

meet the standard of both ‘criminal contempt’ and ‘civil contempt’

– In the second Impugned Order, the High Court held that the

actions of the officials of the State Government constituted

criminal contempt as there was no “valid reason” to not comply

with the earlier Order wherein the High Court directed the State

Government to inter alia notify rules proposed by the Chief Justice

of the High Court pertaining to ‘Domestic Help to Former Chief

Justices and Former Judges of the High Court’ by the next date

of hearing – Even if the High Court’s assessment is assumed to

be correct, non-compliance with the first impugned order could

at most, constitute civil contempt – High Court failed to give any

reasoning for how the purported non-compliance with the first

impugned order was of the nature to meet the standard of criminal

contempt – However, even the standard for civil contempt was not

met – While initiating proceedings of contempt of court, the court

must act with great circumspection – It is only when there is a

clear case of contemptuous conduct that the alleged contemnor

must be punished – Power of the High Courts to initiate contempt

proceedings cannot be used to obstruct parties or their counsel

from availing legal remedies. [Paras 33-36, 46 b]

Summons – Summoning of Government Officials before

Courts – Broad guidelines for the courts:

Held: Appearance of government officials before courts must not

be reduced to a routine measure in cases where the government

is a party and can only be resorted to in limited circumstances –

Conduct of the High Court in frequently summoning government

officials to exert pressure on the government, under the threat

of contempt, is impermissible – Summoning officials repeatedly,

instead of relying on the law officers representing the government 

214 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

or the submissions of the government on affidavit, runs contrary

to the scheme envisaged by the Constitution – Courts must be

cognizant of the role of law officers before summoning the physical

presence of government officials – Law officers act as the primary

point of contact between the courts and the government – Instead

of adjudicating on the legal position taken by the State Government

on affidavit or hearing the Additional Advocate General present

in the court, the High Court repeatedly summoned government

officials – Government was also directed to notify the Rules – Such

situations can be avoided where submissions on affidavit can be

sought and the law officers of the Government are present in court,

with instructions – Courts must refrain from summoning officials as

the first resort – Thus, Standard Operating Procedure(SOP) framed

specifically addressing the appearance of Government Officials

before the courts. [Para 38, 39, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46c]

Practice and procedure – Personal Appearance of Government

Officials in Court Proceedings – Framing of Standard Operating

Procedure (SOP):

Held: SOP on personal appearance of government officials in court

proceedings emphasizes the critical need for courts to exercise

consistency and restraint – It aims to serve as a guiding framework,

steering courts away from the arbitrary and frequent summoning

of government officials and promoting maturity in their functioning

– SOP framed to be followed by all courts across the country – All

High Courts to consider framing rules to regulate the appearance

of Government officials in court, after taking into account the SOP

formulated. [Paras 45, 46d]

Constitution of India – Arts 76 and 165 – Law officers-Attorney

General for India and Advocate General for the State – Role of:

Held: U/Art. 76, the Attorney General is appointed by the President

and serves in an advisory capacity, providing legal counsel to the

Union Government – Similarly, u/Art. 165, the Advocate General

is appointed by the Governor of each state – Several other law

officers also represent the Union and the states including the

Solicitor General, Additional Solicitor General, and Additional

Advocates General for the States – They inter alia obtain instructions

from the various departments of the government and represent

the government before the courts – Courts must be cognizant of

the role of law officers before summoning the physical presence

of government officials – Law officers act as the primary point of

contact between the courts and the government – They not only 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 215

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED

SUPREME COURT AND HIGH COURT JUDGES AT ALLAHABAD & ORS

represent the government as an institution but also represent the

various departments and officials that comprise the government –

Exercising restraint, avoiding unwarranted remarks against public

officials, and recognizing the functions of law officers contribute to

a fair and balanced judicial system – Courts across the country

must foster an environment of respect and professionalism, duly

considering the constitutional or professional mandate of law

officers, who represent the government and its officials before the

courts. [Paras 40, 41, 44].

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – s. 2 – Civil contempt and

criminal Contempt – Distinction:

Held: ‘Wilful disobedience’ of a judgment, decree, direction, order,

writ, or process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given

to a court amounts to ‘civil contempt’ – Criminal contempt involves

‘scandalising’ or ‘lowering’ the authority of any court; prejudicing or

interfering with judicial proceedings; or interfering with or obstructing

the administration of justice. [Para 32]

List of Citations and Other References

P Ramakrishnan Raju vs. Union of India Writ Petition

(Civil) No. 521/2002; Justice V.S. Dave, President, the

Association of Retired Judges of Supreme Court and

High Courts vs. Kusumjit Sidhu and Others Contempt

Petition (Civil) Nos. 425-426 of 2015; Leila David v.

State of Maharashtra [2009] 15 SCR 317:(2009) 10 SCC

337; Mohd. Iqbal Khandaly v. Abdul Majid Rather [1994]

3 SCR 396:(1994) 4 SCC 34; State of Uttar Pradesh v.

Manoj Kumar Sharma (2021) 7 SCC 806 – referred to.

List of Acts

Constitution of India; Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

Keywords

Separation of powers; Criminal contempt jurisdiction; Summoning

government officials to court; recall application; Allowance granted

to former judges of the High Court for domestic help; Post retiral

benefits to former judges of the High Courts; Writ of mandamus;

Policymaking; Summoning; Civil Contempt; Criminal Contempt;

Law officers; Judicial review; Unwarranted remarks; Standard

Operating Procedure.

216 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Other Case Details Including Impugned Order and

Appearances

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.23-24 of 2024.

From the Judgment and Order dated 04.04.2023 and 19.04.2023 in

WC No.38595 of 2011 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.

Appearances:

Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, K.M. Nataraj, A.S.G., Sharan Dev

Singh Thakur, A.A.G., Ms. Ruchira Goel, Siddharth Thakur, Adit J.

Shah, Mustafa Sajjad, Ms. Keerti Jaya, Prem Prakash, Ms. Deepali

Nanda, Nishit Agrawal, Ms. Kanishka Mittal, Ms. Vanya Agrawal,

Vatsal Joshi, Shlok Chandra, Akshit Pradhan, Raghav Sharma,

Arvind Kumar Sharma, Raj Bahadur Yadav, Mrs. Sunita Sharma,

Gaurav Agrawal, Ms. Preetika Dwivedi, Abhisek Mohanty, Advs. for

the appearing parties.

Judgment / Order of The Supreme Court

Judgment

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI

Table of Contents

I. Factual Background .............................................................4

II. The High Court did not have the power to direct the

notification of the Rules proposed by the Chief

Justice..................................................................................15

III. Criminal Contempt cannot be initiated against a

party for availing legal remedies and raising a

legal challenge to an order................................................19

IV. Summoning of Government Officials before Courts...... 22

1. Leave granted.

2. The present appeals arise from two orders of the Division Bench of

the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad1

 dated 4 April 2023 and

19 April 2023.2

 The Impugned Orders have given rise to significant

1 “High Court”

2 “Impugned Orders”

* Ed Note: Pagination as per original Judgment.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 217

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED

SUPREME COURT AND HIGH COURT JUDGES AT ALLAHABAD & ORS

questions about the separation of powers, the exercise of criminal

contempt jurisdiction, and the practice of frequently summoning

government officials to court.

3. By its order dated 4 April 2023,3 the High Court directed the

Government of Uttar Pradesh to inter alia notify rules proposed by

the Chief Justice of the High Court pertaining to ‘Domestic Help to

Former Chief Justices and Former Judges of the Allahabad High

Court’ by the next date of hearing. The High Court further directed

certain officials of the Government of Uttar Pradesh to be present

before the court on the next date if the order was not complied with.

4. The State of Uttar Pradesh moved an application before the High

Court to seek a recall of the Order dated 4 April 2023 highlighting

legal obstacles in complying with the directions of the High Court.

By its order dated 19 April 2023,4

 the High Court held that the recall

application was ‘contemptuous’ and initiated criminal contempt

proceedings against various officials of the Government of Uttar

Pradesh. The officials present in the court, including the Secretary

(Finance) and Special Secretary (Finance) were taken into custody

and bailable warrants were issued against the Chief Secretary and

the Additional Chief Secretary (Finance).

I. Factual Background

5. The Impugned Orders arise from a writ petition instituted in 2011

before the High Court by the first respondent, the Association of

Retired Supreme Court and High Court Judges at Allahabad. The

petition inter alia sought an increase in the allowance granted to

former judges of the High Court for domestic help and other expenses.

6. While the petition was pending before the High Court, a three-judge

bench of this Court in P Ramakrishnan Raju vs. Union of India,

5

decided a batch of cases pertaining inter alia to the post-retiral benefits

payable to former judges of the High Courts. In its judgement dated

31 March 2014, this Court appreciated the scheme formulated by

the State of Andhra Pradesh and recommended that other States

also formulate similar schemes for post-retiral benefits to former

3 “First Impugned Order”

4 “Second Impugned Order”

5 Writ Petition (Civil) No. 521/2002

218 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

judges of the High Courts, preferably within six months from the

Judgement. The Court held:

“34. While appreciating the steps taken by the Government

of Andhra Pradesh and other States who have already

formulated such scheme, by this order, we hope and

trust that the States who have not so far framed such

scheme will formulate the same, depending on the local

conditions, for the benefit of the retired Chief Justices and

retired Judges of the respective High Courts as early as

possible preferably within a period of six months from the

date of receipt of copy of this order.”

(emphasis supplied)

7. Subsequently, contempt petitions were instituted before this Court

for non-compliance with the Court’s decision in P Ramakrishnan

Raju (supra). This Court directed all states to file affidavits detailing

the steps taken to comply with the directions. By an Order dated

27 October 2015, reported as Justice V.S. Dave, President, the

Association of Retired Judges of Supreme Court and High Courts

vs. Kusumjit Sidhu and Others6

, this Court closed the contempt

proceedings against the State of Uttar Pradesh, noting that it had

already framed a scheme in accordance with the Court’s directions.

The Court further held that a slight variation from the yardstick in the

Andhra Pradesh scheme is permissible keeping in mind the local

conditions and directed that states that are paying less than the

yardstick, shall consider upward revision at the ‘appropriate stage

and time’. The court held:

“State of Meghalaya, Manipur, Maharashtra, Goa,

Mizoram, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra

Pradesh, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Telangana,

Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Tripura, Government

of NCT of Delhi, Haryana, Uttarakhand, Rajasthan,

Chhattisgarh, Kerala, Gujarat and Assam

The counter-affidavits/responses filed on behalf of each

of the aforesaid States indicate that a scheme has been

framed in accordance with the directions of the Court.

6 Contempt Petition (Civil) Nos. 425-426 of 2015.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 219

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED

SUPREME COURT AND HIGH COURT JUDGES AT ALLAHABAD & ORS

While some of the States are paying more than what the

State of Andhra Pradesh (Adopted as the yardstick by

the Court) is paying by way of post-retirement allowances

some others are affording lesser amount(s). A little

variation from the yardstick can be understood in terms

of the flexibility contemplated in paragraphs 33 and 34

of the judgment which enable the States to frame their

respective schemes keeping in mind the local conditions.

As all the aforesaid States have framed their schemes,

we direct that the contempt proceedings insofar as these

states are concerned are closed.

We also direct that such of the states where the allowances

paid are lesser than the State of Andhra Pradesh, shall

consider the necessity of an upward revision of such

allowances at the appropriate stage and time.”

(emphasis supplied)

8. The Government of Uttar Pradesh issued a Government Order dated

3 July 2018 and revised the post-retiral benefits for former judges

of the High Court. The domestic help allowance payable to retired

Chief Justices and Judges of the High Court was increased to Rs.

20,000/- (per month) for former Chief Justices and Rs.15,000/- (per

month) for former judges. Under this revised scheme, after the death

of a former Chief Justice or judge, the surviving spouse would be

entitled to receive Rs. 10,000/- and Rs 7,500/- per month, respectively

for life. In 2022, the Government of Andhra Pradesh increased the

allowance to Rs. 50,000 for former Chief Justices and Rs. 45,000 for

former judges of the High Court. The first respondent preferred an

application to amend the prayers in the writ petition and sought parity

with the new scheme framed by the Andhra Pradesh government.

9. From the submissions of the parties and documents on the record,

it appears that sometime between 2019 and 2023, the Chief Justice

of the High Court proposed certain ‘Rules for providing Domestic

Help to Former Chief Justices and Former Judges of Allahabad High

Court’.7

 The preamble to the Rules indicates that they were framed

by the Chief Justice in the exercise of his purported powers under

7 “Rules”

220 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Article 229 of the Constitution. The operative portion of the Rules,

which lie at the heart of the present case, follows:

“In exercise of the powers conferred by Article 229 of

the Constitution of India, the Chief Justice of the High

Court of Judicature at Allahabad is pleased to frame the

following rules for providing the domestic help to former

Chief Justices and former Judges of the High Court.

“6. Selection of Domestic Help: The former Chief Justice

or former Judge may at her, or his discretion select a

person to be engaged as a Domestic Help.

7. Contractual appointment: The engagement of a

Domestic Help under Rule 6 shall be on a contractual basis

and will be available until the former Chief Justice or former

Judge is entitled to the benefit of the facility under Rule 5

and until the Domestic Help performs duties satisfactorily

subject to the certification of the former ChiefJustice or

former Judge.

8. Reimbursement: Upon engagement, the monthly

remuneration payable to the Domestic Help shall be

reimbursed by the High Court to the former Chief Justice or

former Judge after completion of the month in each month.

9. Wages: The wages to be reimbursed by the High

Court to the former Chief Justice or former Judge for the

engagement of the Domestic Help shall be equivalent to

the salary payable to a Class-IV employee of the High

Court in the grade of a peon or equivalent at the minimum

of the scale of pay inclusive of dearness allowance.

…”

(emphasis supplied)

10. In the above factual background, the High Court heard the writ

petition, summoned officials of the Government of Uttar Pradesh

and passed various orders, including the two Impugned Orders. The

orders of the High Court passed before the Impugned Orders are

pertinent to understand the course of events before the High Court

while adjudicating the subject writ petition. 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 221

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED

SUPREME COURT AND HIGH COURT JUDGES AT ALLAHABAD & ORS

11. On 5 January 2023, the High Court allowed the first respondent’s

amendment application. The High Court directed the Principal

Secretary, Law and Justice, Government of Uttar Pradesh to appear

in-person along with the records to “expedite the matter”. The High

Court held:

“On specific query, the learned Standing Counsel submits

that the scheme pursuant to the direction of the Supreme

Court is already there and the amount is being duly paid

by the State Government. However, the quantum of

amount towards the benefits being granted to the retired

Judges has not been revised since then. It is submitted

that the matter for revision, if any, is to be considered at

the highest level.

Be that as it may, in order to expedite the matter, before

any further order is passed, it would be appropriate that

the Principal Secretary, Law and Justice, Government of

Uttar Pradesh, shall appear along with the records and

apprise the Court of the stand of the State Government

in the matter.

Amendment application is allowed. Learned counsel for

the petitioner to file an amended copy of the writ petition.”

(emphasis supplied)

12. When the writ petition was heard on 12 January 2023, the Principal

Secretary, Law and Justice, Government of Uttar Pradesh was present

before the High Court. Further, it was submitted before the High

Court that the Rules proposed by the Chief Justice were pending

consideration, certain queries were made to the High Court and the

matter would be placed before the Cabinet for approval. The High

Court listed the case for 19 January 2023 and noted that “on the said

date, it is expected that the queries/clarification would be addressed

by the concerned committee.” (of the High Court).

13. On 19 January 2023, the counsel on behalf of the High Court

submitted that while the queries about the Rules were resolved

by the High Court, the State Government was raising queries in a

piecemeal manner to keep the matter pending for a long period.

The Additional Advocate General submitted that the Rules involve

an amendment to the existing scheme and would be examined by

the State Government expeditiously. 

222 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

14. On the next date, 23 March 2023, the High Court expressed its

displeasure about the delay by the State Government in notifying

the Rules and revising the post-retiral benefits granted to former

judges of the High Court. The High Court stated that it is “constrained

to summon the Finance Secretary, Government of UP and all the

associated Officers dealing with the file along with the Principal

Secretary (Law), Government of UP to appear along with the records

on the next date fixed.”

15. On 4 April 2023, the High Court passed the First Impugned Order.

As directed, the Special Secretary, Finance and Principal Secretary,

Law, Government of Uttar Pradesh were present. The High Court

noted the submission by the Principal Secretary, Law that the matter

was placed before the Finance Department on six occasions, but

approval was not accorded. On the other hand, the Secretary,

Finance submitted that the Rules are beyond the competence of

the Chief Justice and do not fall within the ambit of Article 229 of

the Constitution. The High Court observed that the objection with

regard to the competence of the Chief Justice was being raised for

the first time before the High Court. The High Court observed that:

“5. On perusal of the record with the assistance of the

learned Additional Advocate General, we do not find any

such objection which is being pressed before this Court.

In other words, the attitude of the officers of the Finance

Department is not only contemptuous, but at the same

time their stand/submission with regard to the competence

of the Hon’ble Chief Justice/ Article 229 is not reflected

from the record”

16. The High Court further recorded the submissions of the counsel for

the High Court that the Finance Department was attempting to stall

all the recommendations of the High Court in the recent past and that

the objections being raised by the Finance Department should have

been raised with the Law Department. The High Court observed:

“6. […] The audacity of the officers to raise the issue

of competence of the Hon’ble Chief Justice, is not only

unbecoming of a civil servant, but at the same time

contemptuous. These objections are not available on

record, nor have it been brought to the notice of the Law

Department for legal advice. The Government Order

granting benefits to the retired Judges is already in place, 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 223

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED

SUPREME COURT AND HIGH COURT JUDGES AT ALLAHABAD & ORS

the proposal of the High Court merely seeks to incorporate

the same by amending, and/or, in supercession of the

earlier Government Order. Article 229 is unnecessarily

being ·pressed with the sole purpose of creating hindrance

when there is none.

17. The High Court observed that the Rules were pursuant to the

assurances given by the State of Uttar Pradesh in P Ramakrishnan

Raju (supra) and Justice V.S. Dave (supra). Further, the High Court

recorded that the Secretary, Finance conceded that the Rules could

be notified by way of a Government Order amending or superseding

the Government Order dated 3 July 2018. The High Court relied on

this purported ‘no objection’ and directed as follows:

“22. Secretary, Finance, fairly states that the Finance

Department would have no objection in the event the

Government Order to that effect is issued incorporating the

proposals submitted by the High Court in the form of Rules.

He further submits that the Finance Department does not

have objections with regard to the financial implications

in according approval to the proposed Rules/Guidelines.

25. Having regard to the categorical stand of the Principal

Secretary Law and Secretary Finance Department, the

following directions are issued:

1. The Rules/Guidelines as proposed by the High

Court shall be notified by amending/incorporating/

superceeding the Government Order dated 3 July

2018, forthwith;

2. The Finance Department would accord approval

within a week thereafter;

3. The notification of the Government Order and the

approval, thereof, shall be placed on record on the

date fixed;

4. In the event the order is not complied, Additional

Chief Secretary, Finance and the officers present

today shall appear on the date fixed.”

(emphasis supplied)

224 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

18. The State of Uttar Pradesh filed a recall application before the High

Court on 19 April 2023 seeking a recall of the First Impugned Order

on the grounds that:

a. The High Court did not have the power to pass the above

directions;

b. The rules do not fall within the ambit of Article 229 of the

Constitution;

c. The direction for the Rules to be notified and the Finance

Department to accord approval thereafter cannot be complied

with as the concurrence/advice of the Finance Department must

be taken before notifying the rules; and

d. Only the Parliament and the Union government are competent

to frame legislation/rules pertaining to post-retiral benefits for

former judges of the High Courts.

19. On 19 April 2023, the High Court passed the Second Impugned

Order. The High Court noted that the Additional Chief Secretary

(Finance) was not present, while the Secretary (Finance) and the

Special Secretary (Finance), who also appeared on the previous

date, were present. The High Court noted that on the date of the First

Impugned Order, the officials of the Finance Department categorically

stated that they have “no objection” if the Government Order issued

in 2018 is modified or amended. The recall application, according

to the High Court, constituted “ex-facie criminal contempt”, as it did

not indicate any valid reasons for non-compliance with the First

Impugned Order. The High Court held:

“30. [..] From perusal of the entire affidavit, it is not clear

as to which part of the order the officers intend to recall,

rather, the prayer made therein is to recall the entire order,

but no reason has been assigned as to how the order is

obnoxious on the whole. In other words, the affidavit that

has been filed today is false, misleading and averments,

therein, constitute ex-facie criminal contempt.

31. On specific query, it is informed by the· officers present

in the Court, on perusal of the record, that pursuant to

the order dated 4 April 2023, the Chief Secretary had 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 225

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED

SUPREME COURT AND HIGH COURT JUDGES AT ALLAHABAD & ORS

convened a meeting of the officers on 13 April 2023. The

Advocate General had opined to comply the order. Further,

the office of the Law Department on 6 April 2023, had

forwarded the proposed Government Order/amendment to

confer benefits upon the retired Judges for approval of the

Finance Department. The proposal is not to frame Rules

under Article 229 of the Constitution. These facts have

been suppressed. As per the stand of the officers, it is only

after approval by the Finance Department, submitted by

the Law Department, the matter would be placed before

the Cabinet. In this backdrop, affidavit is not only false but

also misleading as the affidavit does not disclose as to why

the proposal submitted by the Law Department was not

approved or the reason for not approving it, rather, frivolous

issues have been raised with regard to the procedure to

be adopted while notifying the Government Order or the

issue of Article 229 of the Constitution. Affidavit does not

clarify as to why the Government Order as proposed by

the Law Department was not approved by the Finance

Department till date. The approach of the officers of

the Finance Department is writ large, that the proposal

submitted by the High Court, would not be complied and

in their overzealous approach and adamant attitude are

opposing compliance of the writ court order without any

valid basis.

32. In the circumstances, having regard to the averments

made in the affidavit and the conduct of the officers

suppressing material facts and misleading the Court, prima

facie, have committed criminal contempt of the Court.”

(emphasis supplied)

20. The High Court directed that the officials present in the court, the

Secretary (Finance) and the Special Secretary (Finance) be taken into

custody and produced before the Court on the next day for framing

of charges. Further, the Court issued bailable warrants against the

Chief Secretary and the Additional Chief Secretary (Finance) to

ensure their presence before the Court on the next day. 

226 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

21. The above Orders dated 4 April 2023 and 19 April 2023 have been

challenged by the State of Uttar Pradesh by the present appeal. By

an interim order dated 20 April 2023, this Court stayed the operation

of the Impugned Orders and the officials of the Government of Uttar

Pradesh, who were taken into custody were directed to be released.

This Court directed:

“4 Till the next date of listing, there shall be a stay” of the

operation of the orders of the Division Bench of the High

Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated 4 April 2023 and

19 April 2023.

5 The officers of the Government of Uttar Pradesh, who

have been taken into custody, shall be released forthwith

6 The Registrar (Judicial) of this Court shall communicate

the order of this Court both telephonically and on the email

to the Registrar General of the High Court of Judicature

at Allahabad for immediate compliance.”

22. We have heard Mr Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General with Mr K.M.

Natraj, Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the Union

of India, Mr Nishit Agrawal, counsel appearing on behalf of the

Association of Retired Supreme Court and High Court Judges at

Allahabad and Ms Preetika Dwivedi, counsel appearing on behalf of

the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad on the administrative side.

23. Having heard the rival submissions advanced by the parties and

examined the record, the following broad points of law arise for our

consideration:

(i) Whether the High Court had the power to direct the State

Government to notify Rules proposed by the Chief Justice

pertaining to post-retiral benefits for former Judges of the High

Court;

(ii) Whether the power of criminal contempt could be invoked by

the High Court against officials of the Government of Uttar

Pradesh on the ground that the application for recall was

‘contemptuous’; and

(iii) The broad guidelines that must guide courts when they direct

the presence of government officials before the court. 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 227

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED

SUPREME COURT AND HIGH COURT JUDGES AT ALLAHABAD & ORS

II. The High Court did not have the power to direct the notification

of the Rules proposed by the Chief Justice

24. The preamble to the Rules proposed by the Chief Justice expressly

states that the Rules have been made pursuant to Article 229 of

the Constitution. Article 229 pertains to ‘officers and servants’ of the

High Courts. Article 229(2) provides that the conditions of service of

officers and servants of the High Court shall be as may be prescribed

by rules made by the Chief Justice of the High Court or any other

Judge or officer authorized by the Chief Justice for the purpose. The

proviso to the Article mandates that the rules made under Article

229(2) require the approval of the Governor of the State, in so far as

they relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions. The provision

reads as follows:

229. Officers and servants and the expenses of High

Courts. — (1) Appointments of officers and servants of

a High Court shall be made by the Chief Justice of the

Court or such other Judge or officer of the Court as he

may direct:

Provided that the Governor of the State may by rule require

that in such cases as may be specified in the rule no person

not already attached to the Court shall be appointed to

any office connected with the Court save after consultation

with the State Public Service Commission.

(2) Subject to the provisions of any law made by the

Legislature of the State, the conditions of service of officers

and servants of a High Court shall be such as may be

prescribed by rules made by the Chief Justice of the Court

or by some other Judge or officer of the Court authorised

by the Chief Justice to make rules for the purpose:

Provided that the rules made under this clause shall, so far

as they relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions,

require the approval of the Governor of the State.

(3) The administrative expenses of a High Court, including

all salaries, allowances and pensions payable to or in

respect of the officers and servants of the Court, shall be 

228 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

charged upon the Consolidated Fund of the State, and

any fees or other moneys taken by the Court shall form

part of that Fund

(Emphasis Supplied)

25. Article 229(2) pertains only to the service conditions of ‘officers and

servants’ of the High Courts and does not include Judges of the High

Court (both sitting and retired judges). The Chief Justice does not

have the power, under Article 229, to make rules pertaining to the

post-retiral benefits payable to former Chief Justices and judges of

the High Court. Therefore, the Rules proposed by the Chief Justice,

in the present case, do not fall within the competence of the Chief

Justice under Article 229. The reliance placed on the provision in

the preamble to the Rules is misplaced.

26. It is a settled principle of law that merely because reference is made

to a wrong provision of law while exercising power, that by itself

does not vitiate the exercise of power so long as the power of the

authority can be traced to another source of law. However, in the

Rules, the Impugned Orders or in its submissions before this Court,

the High Court has not brought to the fore any other source of law

which empowers the Chief Justice to frame binding rules for postretiral benefits of former judges of the High Court. In the Impugned

Orders, the High Court merely adverts to the judgements of this Court

in P Ramakrishnan Raju (supra) and Justice V.S. Dave (supra) to

justify the imposition of the Rules on the state government.

27. In our considered opinion, the reliance on the judgements of this

Court to justify the promulgation of Rules by the Chief Justice is based

on an erroneous and over-expansive interpretation of the directions

of this Court. As stated above, this Court in P Ramakrishnan Raju

(supra) appreciated the scheme in Andhra Pradesh and observed

that the Court “hopes and trusts that the States who have not so far

framed such scheme will formulate the same, depending on the local

conditions”. Further, in Justice V.S. Dave (supra), the Court closed

the contempt proceedings against the State of Uttar Pradesh noting

that the state had already framed a scheme for post-retiral benefits.

The Court held that slight variations from the scheme adopted in

Andhra Pradesh were permissible and flexibility was contemplated

in P Ramakrishnan Raju (supra) for states to frame their respective 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 229

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED

SUPREME COURT AND HIGH COURT JUDGES AT ALLAHABAD & ORS

schemes. Further, the court directed that “states where the allowances

paid are lesser than the State of Andhra Pradesh, shall consider the

necessity of an upward revision of such allowances at the appropriate

stage and time.”

28. There is no iota of doubt that in the above judgements, this Court

directed the state governments to frame schemes for post-retiral

benefits. The above judgements of this Court did not grant the Chief

Justices of High Courts, acting on the administrative side, the power

to frame rules about post-retiral benefits for former judges that must

mandatorily be notified by the State Governments. Further, the Court

recognized the need for flexibility and granted state governments

the leeway to duly account for local conditions.

29. Further, the High Court’s conduct on the judicial side in the Impugned

Orders was also erroneous. The High Court, acting under Article 226

of the Constitution, cannot usurp the functions of the executive and

compel the executive to exercise its rule-making power in the manner

directed by it. Compelling the State Government to mandatorily notify

the Rules by the next date of hearing, in the First Impugned Order,

virtually amounted to the High Court issuing a writ of mandamus to

notify the Rules proposed by the Chief Justice. Such directions by

the High Court are impermissible and contrary to the separation of

powers envisaged by the Constitution. The High Court cannot direct

the State Government to enact rules on a particular subject, by a

writ of mandamus or otherwise.

30. The High Court, acting on the judicial side, could not compel the

State Government to notify Rules proposed by the Chief Justice in

the purported exercise of his administrative powers. Policymaking

by the government envisages various steps and the consideration of

various factors, including local conditions, financial considerations,

and approval from various departments. The High Court cannot use

its judicial powers to browbeat the State Government to notify the

Rules proposed by the Chief Justice. As the Rules were promulgated

by the Chief Justice without competence, at best, they amounted

to inputs to the State Government. The State Government was free

to constructively consider the desirability of the Rules within its

own decision-making apparatus. Therefore, the High Court acted

beyond its jurisdiction under Article 226 by frequently summoning

officers to expedite the consideration of the Rules and issuing 

230 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

directions to notify the Rules by a fixed date, under the threat of

criminal contempt.

III. Criminal Contempt cannot be initiated against a party for availing

legal remedies and raising a legal challenge to an order

31. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines ‘civil contempt’ and ‘criminal

contempt’ in the following terms:

2. Definitions. — In this Act, unless the context otherwise

requires, —

[...]

(b) “civil contempt” means wilful disobedience to any

judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of

a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court;

(c) “criminal contempt” means the publication (whether

by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible

representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing

of any other act whatsoever which—

(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends

to lower the authority of, any court; or

(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the

due course of any judicial proceeding; or

(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or

tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any

other manner;

32. The Act makes a clear distinction between two types of contempt.

‘Wilful disobedience’ of a judgement, decree, direction, order, writ,

or process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a

court amounts to ‘civil contempt’. On the other hand, the threshold

for ‘criminal contempt’ is higher and more stringent. It involves

‘scandalising’ or ‘lowering’ the authority of any court; prejudicing or

interfering with judicial proceedings; or interfering with or obstructing

the administration of justice.

33. In the second Impugned Order, the High Court held that the actions of

the officials of the Government of Uttar Pradesh constituted criminal

contempt as there was no “valid reason” to not comply with the

earlier Order. Even if the High Court’s assessment is assumed to be 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 231

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED

SUPREME COURT AND HIGH COURT JUDGES AT ALLAHABAD & ORS

correct, non-compliance with the First Impugned Order could at most,

constitute civil contempt. The High Court failed to give any reasoning

for how the purported non-compliance with the First Impugned Order

was of the nature to meet the standard of criminal contempt. The

High Court acted in haste by invoking criminal contempt against the

officials of the Government of Uttar Pradesh and directing for them

to be taken into custody.

34. In our considered opinion, however, even the standard for civil

contempt was not met in the facts of the present case. In a consistent

line of precedent, this Court has held that while initiating proceedings

of contempt of court, the court must act with great circumspection.

It is only when there is a clear case of contemptuous conduct that

the alleged contemnor must be punished. The power of the High

Courts to initiate contempt proceedings cannot be used to obstruct

parties or their counsel from availing legal remedies.

35. In the present case, the State of Uttar Pradesh was availing its

legitimate remedy of filing a recall application. From a perusal of

the record, it appears that the application was filed in a bona fide

manner. Not only had the Finance Department raised its concerns

regarding the competence of the Chief Justice before the High Court

but its previous conduct, including file notings of the department

and letters to the Central Government, indicate that this objection

had been raised by them in the past. The legal position taken by

the Government in the recall application was evidently based on

their desire to avail their legal remedy and not to willfully disobey

the First Impugned Order.

36. The objections raised by the Government of Uttar Pradesh with

regard to legal obstacles in complying with the First Impugned Order

were never adjudicated by the High Court. Instead, the High Court

regarded the objection as an attempt to obstruct justice, without

even a cursory attempt to provide reasons. Applying the standards

delineated above, it is clear that the actions of the government

of Uttar Pradesh did not constitute even ‘civil contempt’ let alone

‘criminal contempt’. The circumstances most definitely did not warrant

the High Court acting in haste, by directing that the officials present

before the court be taken into custody. This summary procedure,

although, permitted under Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act

cannot be invoked as a matter of routine and is reserved for only

extraordinary circumstances. 

232 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

37. Such summary procedure, as has been held by this Court, in Leila

David v. State of Maharashtra,8 can only be invoked in exceptional

cases, such as instances where:

“36. ….after being given an opportunity to explain their

conduct, not only have the contemnors shown no remorse

for their unseemly behavior, but they have gone even

further by filing a fresh writ petition in which apart from

repeating the scandalous remarks made earlier, certain

new dimensions in the use of unseemly and intemperate

language have been resorted to further denigrate and

scandalize and overawe the Court. This is one of such

cases where no leniency can be shown as the contemnors

have taken the liberal attitude shown to them by the Court

as license for indulging in indecorous behavior and making

scandalous allegations not only against the judiciary but

those holding the highest positions in the country.”

No such situation prevailed in the present case. Therefore, the

invocation of criminal contempt and taking the government officials

into custody was not warranted.

IV. Summoning of Government Officials before Courts

38. Before concluding, we must note the conduct of the High Court in

frequently summoning officials of the Government of Uttar Pradesh.

The appearance of government officials before courts must not be

reduced to a routine measure in cases where the government is a

party and can only be resorted to in limited circumstances. The use

of the power to summon the presence of government officials must

not be used as a tool to pressurize the government, particularly,

under the threat of contempt.

39. The Court must also refrain from relying on mere undertakings

by government officials in court, without consent on affidavit or

instructions to law officers such as the Attorney General, Solicitor

General, or the Advocate Generals of the states.  Courts must be

cognizant of the role of law officers before summoning the physical

presence of government officials.

8 (2009) 10 SCC 337

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 233

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED

SUPREME COURT AND HIGH COURT JUDGES AT ALLAHABAD & ORS

40. Under Article 76 of the Constitution, the Attorney General is appointed

by the President and serves in an advisory capacity, providing legal

counsel to the Union Government. The responsibilities of the Attorney

General include advising on legal matters, performing assigned

legal duties, and representing the government in various courts.

Similarly, under Article 165 of the Constitution, the Advocate General

is appointed by the Governor of each state. The Advocate General

provides legal advice to the state government, performs legal duties

as assigned, and discharges functions conferred by the Constitution.

Several other law officers also represent the Union and the states

including the Solicitor General, Additional Solicitor General, and

Additional Advocates General for the states. They inter alia obtain

instructions from the various departments of the government and

represent the government before the courts.

41. Law officers act as the primary point of contact between the courts

and the government. They not only represent the government as an

institution but also represent the various departments and officials

that comprise the government. This Court in Mohd. Iqbal Khandaly

v. Abdul Majid Rather,

9 had occasion to observe that there was no

justification to direct the Additional Advocate General, not to appear

for the appellant in a contempt petition and to direct that he should

merely assist the court.

42. In the present case, instead of adjudicating on the legal position

taken by the Government of Uttar Pradesh on affidavit or hearing

the Additional Advocate General present in the court, the High Court

repeatedly summoned government officials. The government was

also directed to notify the Rules based on a “no objection” from the

officials of the Finance Department purportedly made before the

High Court, which is now contested by the state. Such situations can

be avoided in cases where submissions on affidavit can be sought

and the law officers of the Government are present in court, with

instructions. The issuance of bailable warrants by the High Court

against officials, including the Chief Secretary, who was not even

summoned in the first place, further indicates the attempt by the

High Court to unduly pressurise the government.

9 (1994) 4 SCC 34. 

234 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

43. This Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Manoj Kumar Sharma,10

frowned upon the frequent summoning of government officials “at

the drop of a hat”. This Court held:

“17. A practice has developed in certain High Courts

to call officers at the drop of a hat and to exert direct

or indirect pressure. The line of separation of powers

between Judiciary and Executive is sought to be crossed

by summoning the officers and in a way pressurizing them

to pass an order as per the whims and fancies of the Court. 

18. The public officers of the Executive are also performing

their duties as the third limbs of the governance. The

actions or decisions by the officers are not to benefit them,

but as a custodian of public funds and in the interest of

administration, some decisions are bound to be taken. It

is always open to the High Court to set aside the decision

which does not meet the test of judicial review, but

summoning officers frequently is not appreciable at all. The

same is liable to be condemned in the strongest words.

21. Thus, we feel, it is time to reiterate that public officers

should not be called to court unnecessarily. The dignity and

majesty of the court is not enhanced when an officer is

called to court. Respect to the court has to be commanded

and not demanded and the same is not enhanced by calling

the public officers. The presence of public officer comes

at the cost of other official engagement demanding their

attention. Sometimes, the officers even have to travel long

distance. Therefore, summoning of the officer is against

the public interest as many important tasks entrusted to

him get delayed, creating extra burden on the officer or

delaying the decisions awaiting his opinion. The court

proceedings also take time, as there is no mechanism

of fixed time hearing in courts as of now. The courts

have the power of pen which is more effective than the

presence of an officer in court. If any particular issue

10 (2021) 7 SCC 806.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 235

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED

SUPREME COURT AND HIGH COURT JUDGES AT ALLAHABAD & ORS

arises for consideration before the court and the advocate

representing the State is not able to answer, it is advised

to write such doubt in the order and give time to the State

or its officers to respond.”

(emphasis supplied)

44. Courts must refrain from summoning officials as the first resort.

While the actions and decisions of public officials are subject to

judicial review, summoning officials frequently without just cause is

not permissible. Exercising restraint, avoiding unwarranted remarks

against public officials, and recognizing the functions of law officers

contribute to a fair and balanced judicial system. Courts across the

country must foster an environment of respect and professionalism,

duly considering the constitutional or professional mandate of law

officers, who represent the government and its officials before the

courts. Constantly summoning officials of the government instead of

relying on the law officers representing the government, runs contrary

to the scheme envisaged by the Constitution.

45. Enriched by the valuable insights shared in discussions with my

esteemed colleagues Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Misra,

we have framed a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) specifically

addressing the appearance of Government Officials before the

courts. At its core, this SOP emphasizes the critical need for courts

to exercise consistency and restraint. It aims to serve as a guiding

framework, steering courts away from the arbitrary and frequent

summoning of government officials and promoting maturity in their

functioning. The SOP is set out below:

Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on Personal Appearance

of Government Officials in Court Proceedings

This Standard Operating Procedure is applicable to all court

proceedings involving the government in cases before the Supreme

Court, High Courts and all other courts acting under their respective

appellate and/or original jurisdiction or proceedings related to

contempt of court.

1. Personal presence pending adjudication of a dispute

1.1 Based on the nature of the evidence taken on record,

proceedings may broadly be classified into three categories:

236 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

a. Evidence-based Adjudication: These proceedings

involve evidence such as documents or oral

statements. In these proceedings, a government

official may be required to be physically present for

testimony or to present relevant documents. Rules

of procedure, such as the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908, or Criminal Procedure Code 1973, govern

these proceedings.

b. Summary Proceedings: These proceedings, often

called summary proceedings, rely on affidavits,

documents, or reports. They are typically governed

by the Rules of the Court set by the High Court and

principles of Natural Justice.

c. Non-adversarial Proceedings: While hearing nonadversarial proceedings, the court may require the

presence of government officials to understand a

complex policy or technical matter that the law officers

of the government may not be able to address.

1.2 Other than in cases falling under para 1.1(a) above, if the issues

can be addressed through affidavits and other documents,

physical presence may not be necessary and should not be

directed as a routine measure.

1.3 The presence of a government official may be directed, inter

alia, in cases where the court is prima facie satisfied that specific

information is not being provided or is intentionally withheld, or

if the correct position is being suppressed or misrepresented. 

1.4 The court should not direct the presence of an official solely

because the official’s stance in the affidavit differs from the

court’s view. In such cases, if the matter can be resolved based

on existing records, it should be decided on merits accordingly.

2. Procedure prior to directing personal presence

2.1 In exceptional cases wherein the in-person appearance of

a government official is called for by the court, the court

should allow as a first option, the officer to appear

before it through video conferencing.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 237

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED

SUPREME COURT AND HIGH COURT JUDGES AT ALLAHABAD & ORS

2.2 The Invitation Link for VC appearance and viewing, as

the case may be, must be sent by the Registry of the

court to the given mobile no(s)/e-mail id(s) by SMS/email/

WhatsApp of the concerned official at least one day before

the scheduled hearing

2.3 When the personal presence of an official is directed,

reasons should be recorded as to why such presence is

required.

2.4 Due notice for in-person appearance, giving sufficient time

for such appearance, must be served in advance to the

official. This would enable the official to come prepared and

render due assistance to the court for proper adjudication

of the matter for which they have been summoned. 

3. Procedure during the personal presence of government

officials: In instances where the court directs the personal

presence of an official or a party, the following procedures are

recommended:

3.1 Scheduled Time Slot: The court should, to the extent

possible, designate a specific time slot for addressing

matters where the personal presence of an official or a

party is mandated.

3.2 The conduct of officials: Government officials participating

in the proceedings need not stand throughout the hearing.

Standing should be required only when the official is

responding to or making statements in court.

3.3 During the course of proceedings, oral remarks with the

potential to humiliate the official should be avoided.

3.4 The court must refrain from making comments on the

physical appearance, educational background, or social

standing of the official appearing before it.

3.5 Courts must cultivate an environment of respect and

professionalism. Comments on the dress of the official

appearing before the court should be avoided unless

there is a violation of the specified dress code applicable

to their office.

238 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

4. Time Period for compliance with judicial orders by the

Government 

4.1 Ensuring compliance with judicial orders involving intricate

policy matters necessitates navigating various levels of

decision-making by the Government. The court must

consider these complexities before establishing specific

timelines for compliance with its orders. The court should

acknowledge and accommodate a reasonable timeframe,

as per the specifics of the case.

4.2 If an order has already been passed, and the government

seeks a revision of the specified timeframe, the court may

entertain such requests and permit a revised, reasonable

timeframe for the compliance of judicial orders, allowing

for a hearing to consider modifications.

5. Personal presence for enforcement/contempt of court

proceedings

5.1 The court should exercise caution and restraint when

initiating contempt proceedings, ensuring a judicious and

fair process.

5.2 Preliminary Determination of Contempt: In a proceeding

instituted for contempt by wilful disobedience of its order,

the court should ordinarily issue a notice to the alleged

contemnor, seeking an explanation for their actions, instead

of immediately directing personal presence.

5.3 Notice and Subsequent Actions: Following the issuance

of the notice, the court should carefully consider the

response from the alleged contemnor. Based on their

response or absence thereof, it should decide on the

appropriate course of action. Depending on the severity of

the allegation, the court may direct the personal presence

of the contemnor.

5.4 Procedure when personal presence is directed: In

cases requiring the physical presence of a government

official, it should provide advance notice for an in-person

appearance, allowing ample time for preparation. However,

the court should allow the officer as a first option, to appear

before it through video conferencing. 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 239

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED

SUPREME COURT AND HIGH COURT JUDGES AT ALLAHABAD & ORS

5.5 Addressing Non-Compliance: The court should

evaluate instances of non-compliance, taking into account

procedural delays or technical reasons. If the original order

lacks a specified compliance timeframe, it should consider

granting an appropriate extension to facilitate compliance.

5.6 When the order specifies a compliance deadline and

difficulties arise, the court should permit the contemnor

to submit an application for an extension or stay before

the issuing court or the relevant appellate/higher court.

46. In a nutshell, the conclusions reached in this Judgement are as follows:

a. The High Court did not have the power to direct the State

Government to notify Rules proposed by the Chief Justice

pertaining to post-retiral benefits for former Judges of the

High Court. The Chief Justice did not have the competence to

frame the rules under Article 229 of the Constitution. Further,

the High Court, acting on the judicial side, does not have the

power to direct the Government to frame rules proposed by it

on the administrative side.

b. The power of criminal contempt could not be invoked by the High

Court against officials of the Government of Uttar Pradesh on

the ground that the application for recall of the First Impugned

Order was ‘contemptuous’. The actions of the officials do not

meet the standard of both ‘criminal contempt’ and ‘civil contempt’.

c. The conduct of the High Court in frequently summoning

government officials to exert pressure on the government, under

the threat of contempt, is impermissible. Summoning officials

repeatedly, instead of relying on the law officers representing the

government or the submissions of the government on affidavit,

runs contrary to the scheme envisaged by the Constitution.

d. The SOP on Personal Appearance of Government Officials

in Court Proceedings framed by this Court in Para 45 of this

Judgement must be followed by all courts across the country.

All High Courts shall consider framing rules to regulate the

appearance of Government officials in court, after taking into

account the SOP which has been formulated above.

240 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

47. Both the Impugned Orders dated 4 April 2023 and 19 April 2023

are set aside and the appeals are disposed of. The High Court is

at liberty to hear the writ petition, in view of the observations made

in this judgement.

48. The Registry is directed to communicate the judgment to the Registrar

General of every High Court.

49. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case: Appeals

disposed of.

The High Court took a firm stance against the appellant’s continued failure to fulfil his financial obligations, culminating in the cancellation of his bail and the order of suspension of sentence. Whether the High Court was justified. Headnotes Judicial Directives – Disregard for – The High Court cancelled the order of suspension of sentence and bail granted to the appellant and intervenor (petitioner before the High Court) as they violated the undertaking given before the High Court and further violated the condition in an order granting extension of time to comply – Propriety: Held: Before the High Court the appellant and the intervenor filed an undertaking based on a settlement on 03.07.2018 according to which it was agreed that a total sum of Rs.4,63,50,000/- (Out of the said amount Rs.73,50,000/- was already paid and remaining amount of Rs.3,90,00,000/- was to be paid in instalments) would be paid to the complainant-respondent no.2 – Based on the said undertaking an interim protection was granted by suspending the sentence of imprisonment and they were directed to be released on bail on furnishing a personal bond – However, there was a failure to fulfil financial obligations – Appellant and intervenor made submissions before the Supreme Court regarding, who is to pay how much amount – The Court not inclined to go into the said question – The fact remains that the total amount agreed to be paid has not been paid and as per the order of the High Court, the revisionists (appellant and intervenor) being in default in payment of the agreed amount, the interim protection granted by way of bail and suspension of sentence, would stand withdrawn without reference to the Court – No infirmity in the impugned order of the High Court – The appeal is accordingly dismissed 242 [2024] 1 S.C.R. DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS with costs quantified at Rs. 5 lakhs to be paid to the respondent No. 2 (Complainant). [Paras 7, 8, 17, 19]

The High Court took a firm stance against the appellant’s continued

failure to fulfil his financial obligations, culminating in the cancellation

of his bail and the order of suspension of sentence. Whether the

High Court was justified.

Headnotes

Judicial Directives – Disregard for – The High Court cancelled

the order of suspension of sentence and bail granted to the

appellant and intervenor (petitioner before the High Court) as

they violated the undertaking given before the High Court and

further violated the condition in an order granting extension

of time to comply – Propriety:

Held: Before the High Court the appellant and the intervenor filed

an undertaking based on a settlement on 03.07.2018 according to

which it was agreed that a total sum of Rs.4,63,50,000/- (Out of

the said amount Rs.73,50,000/- was already paid and remaining

amount of Rs.3,90,00,000/- was to be paid in instalments) would

be paid to the complainant-respondent no.2 – Based on the said

undertaking an interim protection was granted by suspending the

sentence of imprisonment and they were directed to be released

on bail on furnishing a personal bond – However, there was a

failure to fulfil financial obligations – Appellant and intervenor

made submissions before the Supreme Court regarding, who is

to pay how much amount – The Court not inclined to go into the

said question – The fact remains that the total amount agreed

to be paid has not been paid and as per the order of the High

Court, the revisionists (appellant and intervenor) being in default in

payment of the agreed amount, the interim protection granted by

way of bail and suspension of sentence, would stand withdrawn

without reference to the Court – No infirmity in the impugned

order of the High Court – The appeal is accordingly dismissed 

242 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

with costs quantified at Rs. 5 lakhs to be paid to the respondent

No. 2 (Complainant). [Paras 7, 8, 17, 19]


* Author

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 241 : 2024 INSC 16

Case Details

Satish P. Bhatt

v.

The State of Maharashtra & Anr

(Criminal Appeal No.42 of 2024)

03 January 2024

[Vikram Nath* and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

The High Court took a firm stance against the appellant’s continued

failure to fulfil his financial obligations, culminating in the cancellation

of his bail and the order of suspension of sentence. Whether the

High Court was justified.

Headnotes

Judicial Directives – Disregard for – The High Court cancelled

the order of suspension of sentence and bail granted to the

appellant and intervenor (petitioner before the High Court) as

they violated the undertaking given before the High Court and

further violated the condition in an order granting extension

of time to comply – Propriety:

Held: Before the High Court the appellant and the intervenor filed

an undertaking based on a settlement on 03.07.2018 according to

which it was agreed that a total sum of Rs.4,63,50,000/- (Out of

the said amount Rs.73,50,000/- was already paid and remaining

amount of Rs.3,90,00,000/- was to be paid in instalments) would

be paid to the complainant-respondent no.2 – Based on the said

undertaking an interim protection was granted by suspending the

sentence of imprisonment and they were directed to be released

on bail on furnishing a personal bond – However, there was a

failure to fulfil financial obligations – Appellant and intervenor

made submissions before the Supreme Court regarding, who is

to pay how much amount – The Court not inclined to go into the

said question – The fact remains that the total amount agreed

to be paid has not been paid and as per the order of the High

Court, the revisionists (appellant and intervenor) being in default in

payment of the agreed amount, the interim protection granted by

way of bail and suspension of sentence, would stand withdrawn

without reference to the Court – No infirmity in the impugned

order of the High Court – The appeal is accordingly dismissed 

242 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

with costs quantified at Rs. 5 lakhs to be paid to the respondent

No. 2 (Complainant). [Paras 7, 8, 17, 19]

List of Keywords

Disregard for judicial directives; undermining judicial efficacy.

Other Case Details Including Impugned Order and

Appearances

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.42 of

2024.

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.07.2019 of the High Court

of Judicature at Bombay in CRLAP No.244 of 2019.

Appearances:

Atul Babasaheb Dakh, Diganta Gogoi, Bitu Kumar Singh, Advs. for

the Appellant.

Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Bharat Bagla,

Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna, Siddharth Sangal, Ms. Richa Mishra,

Chirag Sharma, Ms. Nilanjani Tandon, Ms. Harshita Agrawal, Manoj

K. Mishra, Ghanshyam Upadhyay, A. Baskar, J.K. Mishra, Umesh

Dubey, Vishal, Ms. Madhulika, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of The Supreme Court

Judgment

Vikram Nath, J.

1. The facts of this case bring to light a situation marked by a persistent

disregard for judicial directives and a lackadaisical approach to legal

and financial obligations. The behaviour of the Petitioner stands

as a testament to how an individual’s nonchalant attitude towards

financial responsibilities and court orders can undermine the essence

of judicial efficacy.

2. The High Court took a firm stance against the appellant’s continued

failure to fulfil his financial obligations, culminating in the cancellation

of his bail and suspension of sentence. This decision, reflecting the

frustration of the legal system with repeated non-compliance, sets

the stage for our deliberation.

3. Leave granted.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 243

SATISH P. BHATT v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR

4. The present appeal assails the correctness of the judgment and

order dated 23.07.2019 passed by the High Court of Judicature at

Bombay cancelling the order of suspension of sentence and bail

granted to the appellant as also the intervenor (petitioner before

the High Court) vide order dated 03.07.2018 as they violated the

undertaking given before the High Court on 03.07.2018 and recorded

in the order of even date and further violated the condition contained

in paragraph 3 of the order dated 20.03.2019 granting extension

of time to comply.

5. The appellant-Satish P.Bhatt and the intervenor Vishwanath

Ramakrishna Nayak were Chairman-cum-Managing Director and

Vice-Chairman of a company by the name of M/s.Astral Glass

Private Limited (in short the AGPL). The company AGPL as also

the appellant and the intervenor were convicted for offence under

Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 18811

 vide judgment

and order of the Trial Court dated 26.08.2011 in three separate cases

and were awarded sentence of ten months with total liability of Rs.5

crores cumulatively in all the three cases. The operative portion of

the conviction and sentence as recorded by the Trial Court in one

of the cases is reproduced hereunder:

“I) Accused No.2 Mr.Satish Padamanath Bhat,

aged 54 years and accused no.3 Mr.Vishwanath

Ramakrsishna Nayak, aged 50 years both r/o.Borivali

(E), Mumbai-400 066 are hereby convicted vide

provisions under Section 255(2) of Cr.P.C. for offence

under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act and

they are sentenced to suffer Simple Imprisonment for

10 (ten) months each.

II) Both accused shall also to pay in total Rs.1,10,00,000/-

(Rupees one crore and ten lakhs only) as compensation

to Complainant vide provisions under Section 357(3)

of Cr.P.C. within 3 months. In default to suffer further

Simple imprisonment for 6 (six) months each.

III) Cash security of Rs.3000/- of accused no.2 shall

stand continued till appeal period is over and P.R.

bond of accused no.3 stands cancelled….”

1 NI Act

244 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

6. Three appeals jointly filed by the appellant, the intervenor as also

AGPL were dismissed by the Sessions Court vide common judgment

and order dated 30.01.2014. The Sessions Court granted a month’s

time to surrender in order to undergo the sentence.

7. Aggrieved by the same, they preferred three revisions before the

High Court as originally there were three complaints. Before the High

Court the appellant and the intervenor filed an undertaking based on

a settlement on 03.07.2018 according to which it was agreed that

a total sum of Rs.4,63,50,000/- would be paid to the complainantrespondent no.2. Out of the said amount Rs.73,50,000/- had already

been paid before the appeal Court. As such, the remaining amount

of Rs.3,90,00,000/- was to be paid in installments. The payment

schedule was also laid down in paragraphs 6 and 7 whereas

paragraph 5 mentioned amount of settlement. Paragraph 8 of the

settlement mentioned that the said amount would be paid equally

by the appellant and the intervenor. However, in default of payment

by either of them as per their agreed share in the settlement they

would be held liable and would be prosecuted as per law.

8. Based on the undertaking, the learned Single Judge of the High

Court passed an order on the same day i.e. 03.07.2018 and granted

interim protection by suspending the sentence of imprisonment and

they were directed to be released on bail on furnishing a personal

bond in the sum of Rs.25,000/- with one or more sureties in the like

amount. The Court further directed that no further extension shall be

granted for payment of the settled amount and fixed 8th October,

2018 for reporting compliance.

9. As per the undertaking, Rs.2 crores was to be paid on or before

30th September, 2018, in addition to Rs.25 lakhs which was paid on

the date of passing of the order. Remaining amount of Rs. 1 crore

65 lakhs was to be paid on or before 15th March, 2019. Thereafter

the matter was taken up by the High Court on 20th March, 2019 by

which time they had paid only Rs.82 lakhs. Further time was sought

to pay the balance amount till 20th April, 2019. The counsel for the

complainant pointed out that the amount due was Rs.1,69,10,000/-.

The High Court on 20.03.2019 extended the time for payment of

Rs.1,69,10,000/- till 20th April, 2019 and further provided that if

the said amount was not paid then the order granting bail and also

suspending the sentence shall stand cancelled forthwith without

further reference to Court. 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 245

SATISH P. BHATT v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR

10. Thereafter it appears that the present appellant Satish P.Bhatt filed

a criminal application in the pending revision on 16th April, 2019

stating that he had paid his share of Rs.1,95,00,000/- being 50% of

Rs.3,90,00,000/- as mentioned in the order dated 3rd July, 2018 and,

therefore, he may be absolved of the charges and acquitted. On the

said application, notice was issued to the complainant on 19th June,

2019 fixing 10th July, 2019. On that date, it was adjourned to 16th

July, 2019. Thereafter on 16th July it was adjourned to 23rd July,

2019. On 23rd July, 2019, the High Court passed the impugned order

cancelling the suspension of sentence and bail granted vide order

dated 3rd July, 2018 for non-compliance of the undertaking and in

view of the order dated 20th March, 2019 wherein while extending

the time it was observed that in case of default, the bail order and the

suspension of sentence order would stand automatically withdrawn

without reference to the Court.

11. Learned counsel for the appellant has sought to argue that out of

Rs.3,90,00,000/- his half share would amount to Rs.1,95,00,000/-

which has duly been paid and, therefore, the order of the High Court

cancelling his bail and suspension of sentence was not warranted

and deserves to be set aside.

12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the complainant has submitted

that as of date there is still an outstanding amount of Rs.83,10,000/-

and has, therefore, claimed that the complainant would be entitled

to receive Rs.83,10,000/- along with compound interest @ 12% p.a.

from 15th March, 2019 till actual payment is made along with costs

against the appellant as also the intervenor.

13. The intervenor has also filed his response and according to him the

partnership between the appellant and the intervenor was in the ratio

of 60:40 and that they had actually agreed to pay the settled amount

of Rs.4,63,50,000/- in that proportion as per their shares in the firm.

It is also his case that the amount of Rs.73,50,000 had been paid by

him alone prior to 03.07.2018 during the time when the appeal was

pending before the Sessions Court and, therefore, he was entitled

to adjustment of the said amount. Further his case is that out of the

settled amount to be paid to the complainant i.e. Rs.4,63,50,000/-

his share being 40%, the amount liable to be paid by him would be

Rs.1,85,00,000/-. As he had paid Rs.73,50,000 earlier he was liable

to pay a further amount of Rs.1,11,90,000/-. According to him, he 

246 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

has paid the said amount of Rs.1,11,90,000/- after the order dated

03.07.2018. The outstanding amount of Rs.83,10,000/- falls in the

share of the appellant whose total liability being 60% of the settled

amount would come to Rs.2,78,10,000/- and he having paid only

Rs.1,95,00,000/- there is a shortfall of Rs.83,10,000/- which the

appellant should pay.

14. It is further submitted that the intervenor is being unnecessarily

suffering because of remaining amount not being paid by the

appellant. It is also the case of the intervenor that as per the e-mails

exchanged between them which have been duly placed on record

prior to the undertaking dated 03.07.2018, it was decided and agreed

between them that the amount would be paid as per their respective

shares i.e. in the ratio of 60:40. The said exchange of e-mails and

the draft settlement was also shared with the lawyer and the same

was duly accepted. The intervenor was not dealing with the lawyer

directly and it was the appellant who was dealing with the lawyer.

The appellant has mischievously and fraudulently altered the words

“as per the respective shares” by substituting it with “equally”. The

intervenor was hurriedly made to sign the undertaking on the date

it was being filed i.e. 03.07.2018 and he trusted the appellant and

the lawyer who was appearing for both of them. It is further stated

that the intervenor has also filed before the High Court by way of a

modification application to deal with this aspect of the matter, which

application is still pending.

15. We have perused the undertaking dated 03.07.2018 as also the order

dated 03.07.2018 and also the subsequent orders passed by the High

Court. It is apparent from the same that the complainant was entitled

to receive a total amount of Rs.4,63,50,000/-. The undertaking as

also the order dated 03.07.2018 clearly mention that both of them

will pay the amount equally as agreed by and between them and it

further contains a stipulation that in default of the payment by either

of them as per their agreed share in the settlement, they shall be

held liable and prosecuted as per law.

16. The settlement between the two directors i.e. the appellant and the

intervenor is inter se these two only and the complainant is not bound

by the same. Complainant’s agreement or consent was only to the

extent of accepting Rs.4,63,50,000/- only. He was not a signatory to

the agreement which was signed by the two parties. Admittedly, both 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 247

SATISH P. BHATT v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR

the appellant and the intervenor were Chairman and Vice-Chairman

of the company AGPL and, therefore, were convicted by the Trial

Court and their conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Court.

17. We are not inclined to go into this question as to who is to pay how

much amount. The fact remains that the total amount agreed to

be paid has not been paid and as per the order of the High Court

dated 20.03.2019 the revisionists being in default in payment of the

agreed amount, the interim protection granted by way of bail and

suspension of sentence, would stand withdrawn without reference

to the Court. We find no infirmity in the impugned order.

18. There is a protection provided by this Court vide order dated

26.08.2019 regarding stay of arrest, as a result of which the appellant

and the intervenor have still not undergone the sentence. On the

other hand, the complainant has still not reaped not only the fruits

of the order dated 03.07.2018 but also of the order of the Trial Court

dated 26.08.2011. He agreed to receive a much lesser amount than

he was entitled to under the order of the Trial Court. He has been

litigating since 2007 almost 16 years by now.

19. We, accordingly, do not find any illegality in the order passed by the

High Court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs quantified

at Rs. 5 lakhs to be paid to the respondent No. 2 (Complainant) within

four weeks from today. It is clarified that this amount of costs will not

be adjusted against the compensation awarded to the respondent

No.2 but will be in addition to it.

20. It is further directed that the appellant and the intervenor to surrender

within a period of four weeks from today to undergo the sentence. If

they do not surrender, the High Court to take appropriate coercive

measures to get the sentence executed. The revisions before the

High Court are still pending. The High Court will proceed to decide

the revisions as also pending applications if any and ensure that the

undertaking is fully complied with and the complainant is suitably

compensated for the further harassment caused.

21. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case: Appeal

dismissed.

Whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt, the entire chain of circumstances, not leaving any link missing for the appellant to escape from the clutches of law. Headnotes Penal Code, 1860 – s. 302 rw s. 34 – Murder – Prosecution case that the appellant along with the lady with whom he had illicit relations, administered poison to the appellant’s wife, with the motive to eliminate her and caused her death – Conviction u/s.302/34 and sentenced to life imprisonment – High Court upheld the order of conviction and sentence against the appellant while acquitted the lady – Correctness: Held: There was no eye-witness to the incident – Prosecution case rested on circumstantial evidence – Presence of the appellant and the lady in the appellant’s house in the intervening night not firmly and cogently established – Several omissions and improvements in the cross examination of the prosecution witnesses – There was a strong hypothesis that the deceased had committed suicide, which explanation was led by the appellant in his statement u/s.313 CrPC and is sufficient to create doubt – Furthermore, evidence of prosecution witnesses not sufficient to prove presence of the lady at the appellant’s house, as a natural corollary, such evidence cannot be relied on to conclude that the appellant was present in the house – Also the manner in which the High Court sought to distinguish the case of the appellant from the lady is perverse – When the conviction is to be based on circumstantial evidence solely, then there should not be any snap in the chain of circumstances – Failure [2024] 1 S.C.R. 249 DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB to prove a single circumstance cogently can cause a snap in the chain of circumstances and make the accused entitled to benefit of doubt – In view thereof, the concurrent findings of conviction set aside – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Evidence. [Paras 25, 30, 33, 36-38] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 161 – Examination of witnesses by the police – Failure of the prosecution witnesses to mention in their statements u/s 161 about the involvement of an accused – However, their subsequent statement before court during trial regarding involvement of that particular accused – Reliance upon: Held: It cannot be relied upon – Prosecution cannot seek to prove a fact during trial through a witness which such witness had not stated to police during investigation – Evidence of that witness regarding the said improved fact is of no significance. [Para 26] Evidence – Circumstantial evidence – Evidentiary value: Held: Circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established – Those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused – Circumstances taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion, that within all human probability, the crime was committed by the accused and they should be incapable of explanation on any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence. [Para 9] Evidence – Rustic/illiterate witness – Evidentiary value: Held: Appreciation of evidence led by such a witness has to be treated differently from other kinds of witnesses – It cannot be subjected to a hyper-technical inquiry – Evidence of a rustic/ illiterate witness must not be disregarded if there were to be certain minor contradictions or inconsistencies in the deposition – Witness. [Para 27]

Whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt,

the entire chain of circumstances, not leaving any link missing for

the appellant to escape from the clutches of law.

Headnotes

Penal Code, 1860 – s. 302 rw s. 34 – Murder – Prosecution

case that the appellant along with the lady with whom he

had illicit relations, administered poison to the appellant’s

wife, with the motive to eliminate her and caused her death

– Conviction u/s.302/34 and sentenced to life imprisonment

– High Court upheld the order of conviction and sentence

against the appellant while acquitted the lady – Correctness:

Held: There was no eye-witness to the incident – Prosecution case

rested on circumstantial evidence – Presence of the appellant and

the lady in the appellant’s house in the intervening night not firmly

and cogently established – Several omissions and improvements

in the cross examination of the prosecution witnesses – There

was a strong hypothesis that the deceased had committed suicide,

which explanation was led by the appellant in his statement u/s.313

CrPC and is sufficient to create doubt – Furthermore, evidence of

prosecution witnesses not sufficient to prove presence of the lady at

the appellant’s house, as a natural corollary, such evidence cannot

be relied on to conclude that the appellant was present in the house

– Also the manner in which the High Court sought to distinguish

the case of the appellant from the lady is perverse – When the

conviction is to be based on circumstantial evidence solely, then

there should not be any snap in the chain of circumstances – Failure 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 249

DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB

to prove a single circumstance cogently can cause a snap in the

chain of circumstances and make the accused entitled to benefit

of doubt – In view thereof, the concurrent findings of conviction

set aside – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Evidence. [Paras

25, 30, 33, 36-38]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 161 – Examination of

witnesses by the police – Failure of the prosecution witnesses

to mention in their statements u/s 161 about the involvement

of an accused – However, their subsequent statement before

court during trial regarding involvement of that particular

accused – Reliance upon:

Held: It cannot be relied upon – Prosecution cannot seek to prove

a fact during trial through a witness which such witness had not

stated to police during investigation – Evidence of that witness

regarding the said improved fact is of no significance. [Para 26]

Evidence – Circumstantial evidence – Evidentiary value:

Held: Circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought

to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established – Those

circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing

towards the guilt of the accused – Circumstances taken cumulatively

should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from

the conclusion, that within all human probability, the crime was

committed by the accused and they should be incapable of

explanation on any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the

accused and inconsistent with his innocence. [Para 9]

Evidence – Rustic/illiterate witness – Evidentiary value:

Held: Appreciation of evidence led by such a witness has to be

treated differently from other kinds of witnesses – It cannot be

subjected to a hyper-technical inquiry – Evidence of a rustic/

illiterate witness must not be disregarded if there were to be

certain minor contradictions or inconsistencies in the deposition

– Witness. [Para 27]

* Author

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 248 : 2024 INSC 19

Case Details

Darshan Singh

v.

State of Punjab

(Criminal Appeal No. 163 of 2010)

04 January 2024

[B. R. Gavai, Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and

Aravind Kumar*, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt,

the entire chain of circumstances, not leaving any link missing for

the appellant to escape from the clutches of law.

Headnotes

Penal Code, 1860 – s. 302 rw s. 34 – Murder – Prosecution

case that the appellant along with the lady with whom he

had illicit relations, administered poison to the appellant’s

wife, with the motive to eliminate her and caused her death

– Conviction u/s.302/34 and sentenced to life imprisonment

– High Court upheld the order of conviction and sentence

against the appellant while acquitted the lady – Correctness:

Held: There was no eye-witness to the incident – Prosecution case

rested on circumstantial evidence – Presence of the appellant and

the lady in the appellant’s house in the intervening night not firmly

and cogently established – Several omissions and improvements

in the cross examination of the prosecution witnesses – There

was a strong hypothesis that the deceased had committed suicide,

which explanation was led by the appellant in his statement u/s.313

CrPC and is sufficient to create doubt – Furthermore, evidence of

prosecution witnesses not sufficient to prove presence of the lady at

the appellant’s house, as a natural corollary, such evidence cannot

be relied on to conclude that the appellant was present in the house

– Also the manner in which the High Court sought to distinguish

the case of the appellant from the lady is perverse – When the

conviction is to be based on circumstantial evidence solely, then

there should not be any snap in the chain of circumstances – Failure 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 249

DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB

to prove a single circumstance cogently can cause a snap in the

chain of circumstances and make the accused entitled to benefit

of doubt – In view thereof, the concurrent findings of conviction

set aside – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Evidence. [Paras

25, 30, 33, 36-38]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 161 – Examination of

witnesses by the police – Failure of the prosecution witnesses

to mention in their statements u/s 161 about the involvement

of an accused – However, their subsequent statement before

court during trial regarding involvement of that particular

accused – Reliance upon:

Held: It cannot be relied upon – Prosecution cannot seek to prove

a fact during trial through a witness which such witness had not

stated to police during investigation – Evidence of that witness

regarding the said improved fact is of no significance. [Para 26]

Evidence – Circumstantial evidence – Evidentiary value:

Held: Circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought

to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established – Those

circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing

towards the guilt of the accused – Circumstances taken cumulatively

should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from

the conclusion, that within all human probability, the crime was

committed by the accused and they should be incapable of

explanation on any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the

accused and inconsistent with his innocence. [Para 9]

Evidence – Rustic/illiterate witness – Evidentiary value:

Held: Appreciation of evidence led by such a witness has to be

treated differently from other kinds of witnesses – It cannot be

subjected to a hyper-technical inquiry – Evidence of a rustic/

illiterate witness must not be disregarded if there were to be

certain minor contradictions or inconsistencies in the deposition

– Witness. [Para 27]

List of Citations and Other References

Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra

[1985] 1 SCR 88: (1984) 4 SCC 116; Rohtash Vs. State

of Haryana [2012] 6 SCR 62: (2012) 6 SCC 589; Sunil 

250 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Kumar Shambhu Dayal Gupta Vs. State of Maharashtra

2011 (72) ACC 699 (SC); Rudrappa Ramappa Jainpur

Vs. State of Karnataka (2004) 7 SCC 422; Vimal Suresh

Kamble Vs. Chaluverapinake, (2003) 3 SCC 175;

Pramila vs State of Uttar Pradesh 2021 SCC OnLine

SC 711; Periasami Vs. State of Tamil Nadu [1996] 6

Suppl. SCR 757: (1996) 6 SCC 457; Bhimsingh Vs.

State of Uttarakhand (2015) 4 SCC 281 – relied on.

Jaipal V. State of Haryana [2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 714:

(2003) 1 SCC 169; Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of

Maharashtra [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 156: (2006) 10 SCC

681; State of U.P. Vs. Chhoteylal [2011] 1 SCR 406:

AIR 2011 SC 697; Dimple Gupta (minor) Vs. Rajiv

Gupta [2007] 11 SCR 213: AIR 2008 SC 239; Sidhartha

Vashisht Vs. State of NCT of Delhi [2010] 4 SCR 103:

AIR 2010 SC 2352 – referred to.

List of Acts

Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Keywords

Murder; Acquittal; Imprisonment for life; Homicide; Suicide; Motive;

Benefit of doubt; Circumstantial evidence; Onus of proof; Improved

fact; Minor contradictions or inconsistencies; Omissions and

improvements; Seen together; Rustic/illiterate witness; Reliable

witness; Chance witness; Chemical examiner’s report; Plea of alibi.

Other Case Details Including Impugned Order and

Appearances

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.163

of 2010.

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.07.2009 of the High Court

of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRLA No.593-DB of 2000.

Appearances:

Abhimanyu Tewari, Ms. Eliza Bar, Siddhant Saroha, Tushar Bathija,

Praveer Singh, Parth Jain, Manav Bhalla, Advs. for the Appellant.

Prateek Chadha, DAG, Sreekar Aechuri, Pragya Ganjoo, Ms. Muskan

Singla, Ms. Rooh-e-hina Dua, Advs. for the Respondent.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 251

DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB

Judgment / Order of The Supreme Court

Judgment

Aravind Kumar, J.

1. This appeal by special leave arises out of judgment and order dated

23.07.2009 passed in Criminal Appeal No.593-DB of 2000 by the

High Court of Punjab & Haryana. The High Court has upheld the

order of conviction and sentence, as against Darshan Singh (the

appellant) and has allowed the appeal of Rani Kaur (Accused No.

2), thereby acquitting her of all charges. The State of Punjab has

not challenged the acquittal of Rani Kaur by filing any special leave

petition. It is in this background that Darshan Singh had sought

special leave to appeal before us and leave came to be granted by

order dated 22.01.2010.

Case of the Prosecution:

2. The facts can be summed up in brief as follows:

The deceased, Amrik Kaur was married to Darshan Singh,

the appellant, some time in 1988. The marriage was arranged

through Melo Kaur (PW-3), the cousin sister of the deceased. The

prosecution alleges that their marital relationship was strained

owing largely to the fact that Darshan Singh had developed an illicit

partnership with Rani Kaur (A2). Several relatives had prevailed

on the appellant to put an end to his relationship with Rani Kaur,

but to no avail. The illicit relationship between Darshan Singh and

Rani Kaur is said to have lasted for at least three years before the

fateful day. It is the case of the prosecution that on the intervening

night of 18.05.1999 and 19.05.1999, Darshan Singh and Rani

Kaur, with the motive of eliminating the deceased, administered

poison and intentionally caused the death of Amrik Kaur.

3. On these allegations, Darshan Singh and Rani Kaur were prosecuted

for charges under Section 302 r/w Section 34 IPC. The Trial Court

convicted both the accused persons for the offence under Section 302

r/w Section 34 and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life. 

252 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Findings of the Trial Court and High Court:

4. The Trial Court has concluded that it was a case of homicide and

not suicide. It has found that the appellant had a strong motive

to commit the murder of his wife. It further held that the appellant

and Rani Kaur were present in the house on the intervening

night of 18.05.1999 and 19.05.1999 and therefore, the burden

lay on them to explain as to ‘how the body of Amrik Kaur who

was alive on the night of 18.05.1999 turned into a corpse’ the

next morning. The Court has completely disbelieved the theory

of suicide sought to be advanced on behalf of appellant. It was

noted that merely because there were no injuries on the body of

the deceased, that by itself would not obviate the possibility of

forceful administration of the poisonous substance. On the basis

of the above circumstances taken together, the Trial Court held

that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt

against the appellant and Rani Kaur.

5. In appeal, the High Court has agreed with the findings of the Trial

Court in so far as the appellant is concerned and has acquitted

Rani Kaur by extending her the benefit of doubt. It has found that

there is no other evidence except the testimony of PW3 and PW4,

to prove the presence of Rani Kaur on the intervening night of

18.05.1999 and 19.05.1999 at the appellant’s house.

ARGUMENTS OF MR. ABHIMANYU TEWARI, COUNSEL

APPEARING FOR APPELLANT:

6. PW3, Melo Kaur, is not a reliable witness. The presence of the

appellant, Darshan Singh, at the house on the intervening night

of 18.05.1999 and 19.05.1999 is sought to be established based

on her testimony. She has made several improvements in her

version, and her testimony suffers from several contradictions, and

therefore, it is not safe to rely on such a witnesses’ uncorroborated

testimony. It would be prejudicial to the appellant to rely on only

a part of her testimony and exclude the rest. If her testimony is

ignored in toto, there is no other evidence to establish the key

circumstance of appellant’s presence at the spot of crime.

6.1 That aluminium phosphide is rather impossible to administer

in a deceitful manner owing to its pungent smell and odour. 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 253

DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB

No injury marks have been found on the deceased, which

further establishes that there could not have been any forceful

administration of the poison. Therefore, it is submitted that it

is nothing but a case of suicide, the driving force for which,

was the confrontation with Melo Kaur. It is the appellants’ case

that Amrik Kaur was having an illicit affair with Melo Kaur’s

husband, Gurmel Singh PW4, and embarrassed with her sister

finding out, she self-administered the poisonous substance and

committed suicide. Counsel has submitted judgments to support

the proposition that aluminium phosphide has a pungent smell

similar to garlic.

6.2 Reliance has been placed on Jaipal V. State of Haryana –

(2003) 1 SCC 169 wherein the Apex Court discussed the nature

of aluminium phosphide. The relevant paragraphs have been

extracted below for reference:

“16. According to Modi, symptoms and signs of

poisoning by aluminium phosphide are similar to

poisoning by zinc phosphide (p. 197, ibid.). The chief

symptoms after the administration of zinc phosphide

are a vacant look, frequent vomiting with retching,

tremors and drowsiness followed by respiratory distress

at death. Zinc phosphide acts as a slow poison and is

decomposed by hydrochloric acid in the stomach with

the liberation of phosphine which acts as a respiratory

poison. Being a very fine powder zinc phosphide

adheres firmly to the crypts in the mucous membrane

of the stomach, and a very small quantity only in the

stomach even after vomiting is sufficient to cause death

by slow absorption.

17. Phosphine released from zinc phosphide (rat poison)

and from aluminium phosphide, is mainly used as a

fumigant to control insects and rodents in foodgrains

and fields. Liberated from the metal phosphides by the

action of water or acids, gaseous phosphine exerts

more potent pesticidal action, for it penetrates to all

areas otherwise inaccessible for pesticide application.

Pathological findings from phosphine inhalation are 

254 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

pulmonary hyperaemia and oedema. It causes both

fatty degeneration and necrosis of liver (p. 174, ibid.).

18. Our attention was invited, as was done in the High

Court and the trial court, to a paper entitled “Toxicology

— Acute Aluminium Phosphide Poisoning in Northern

India” written by Dr Mitra Basu and Prof. S.B. Siwach,

Head, Department of Medicine, Postgraduate Institute

of Medical Sciences, Rohtak and published in Current

Medical Journal, Vol. I, No. 5, July 1995. The authenticity

of this article has not been doubted by the High Court nor

questioned either in the High Court or in this Court. The

learned authors have noticed the aluminium phosphide

having emerged as a major health problem in northern

India when these cases first started coming in 1984

and hardly any literature being available earlier on this

malady. In Postgraduate Institute of Medical Sciences,

Rohtak about 2000 cases were reported which were

all suicidal.

19. We may briefly sum up the opinion of the learned

authors from their published paper. Phosphine gas

(active ingredient of ALP) causes sudden cardiovascular

collapse; most patients die of shock, cardiac arrhythmia,

acidosis and adult respiratory distress syndrome

(ARDS). Aluminium phosphide is available in the form

of chalky-white tablets. When these tablets are taken

out of the sealed container, they come in contact with

atmospheric moisture and the chemical reaction takes

place liberating Phosphine gas (PH3) which is the active

ingredient of ALP. This gas is highly toxic and effectively

kills all insects and thus preserves the stored grains.

When these tablets are swallowed, the chemical reaction

is accelerated by the presence of hydrochloric acid in the

stomach and within minutes phosphine gas dissipates

and spreads into the whole body. The gas is highly toxic

and damages almost every organ but maximal damage

is caused to heart and lungs. Sudden cardiovascular

collapse is the hallmark of acute poisoning. Patients 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 255

DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB

come with fast, thready or impalpable arterial pulses,

unrecordable or low blood pressure and icy-cold skin.

Somehow these patients remain conscious till the end

and continue to pass urine despite unrecordable blood

pressure. Vomiting is a prominent feature associated

with epigastric burning sensation. The patients will be

smelling foul (garlic-like) from their breath and vomitus.

Many of them will die within a few hours. Those who

survive for some time will show elevated jugular venous

pressure, may develop tender hepatomegaly and still

later adult respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS),

renal shutdown and in a very few cases, toxic hepatic

jaundice. The active ingredient of ALP is phosphine

gas which causes extensive tissue damage. A spot

clinical diagnosis is possible in majority of cases of ALP

poisoning. However, ALP on account of its very pungent

smell (which can drive out all inmates from the house

if left open) cannot be taken accidentally.”

6.3 It was also argued that the courts below have failed to give

sufficient weight to the evidence led on behalf of the defence,

in particular, the testimony of DW3 and DW4.

6.4 Lastly, it was argued that Rani Kaur (A2) having been

extended benefit of doubt, it was rather anomalous to

exclude such benefit to A1- the appellant, when the case of

the prosecution was that both of them were present at the

scene of crime.

Arguments of Mr. Prateek Chaddha, learned counsel on behalf

of State of Punjab:

7. Melo Kaur was an illiterate person who cannot be expected to

be aware of the intricacies of law and cross examination and

therefore, it was rather natural for minor inconsistencies to creep

into the testimony of such a witness. The Trial Court has rightly

appreciated her testimony by excluding the uncorroborated parts

from the corroborated parts of her testimony. In that sense, the

Trial Court has separated the chaff from the grain, as is expected

to be done when it has to appreciate the evidence of a partly 

256 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

reliable and partly unreliable witness. Moreover, the accused

himself has never denied his presence at the scene of crime.

In his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., he has

admitted his presence. This, coupled with the testimony of PW3,

4 and 5, is sufficient to prove the presence of the accused at the

spot of crime.

7.1 The case rests on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution

has proved the circumstances from which an inference of

guilt is sought to be drawn, cogently and convincingly. The

circumstances relied on include -– (1) Motive; (2) Presence

of the appellant at the scene of crime; (3) Cause of Death: By

Poisoning (4) Opportunity to administer poison; (5) Conduct

(6) False explanation in 313 Statement.

7.2 He has further relied on the principle laid down in Trimukh

Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra1

 to contend that

the degree of evidence needed to prove the case resting

on circumstantial evidence in the given facts cannot be as

high as is normally the case. In view of Section 106 of the

Evidence Act, the appellant was under a burden to explain the

circumstances leading to the death of the deceased. Merely

remaining quiet or offering a false explanation would provide

an additional link in the chain of circumstances to make it

complete. Remaining quiet, or offering a false explanation

would therefore provide an additional link in the chain of

circumstances to make it complete. He has also sought to

distinguish the cases relied on behalf of the appellant.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:

8. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant and respondent

and perused the materials on record.

9. There is no eye-witness to the incident. The case of the prosecution

rests on circumstantial evidence. The normal approach in a case

based on circumstantial evidence is that the circumstances from

which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently

1 (2006) 10 SCC 681

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 257

DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB

and firmly established; that those circumstances should be of

a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the

accused; that the circumstances taken cumulatively should form

a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion,

that within all human probability, the crime was committed by

the accused and they should be incapable of explanation on

any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused and

inconsistent with his innocence. [See Sharad Birdhichand Sarda

v. State of Maharashtra2

]

10. Let us, therefore, examine whether the prosecution had proved

beyond reasonable doubt, the entire chain of circumstances,

not leaving any link missing for the appellant to escape from the

clutches of law. The circumstances which are said to have been

proved on behalf of the prosecution is as follows:

1. Motive

2. Presence at the spot

3. False explanation in 313 statement

4. Death by Poisoning – Doctor’s opinion on cause of death

5. Conduct of the Appellant

6. Opportunity to administer poison.

11. According to the case of the prosecution, the illicit relationship

that existed between Darshan Singh and Rani Kaur served as the

key motive for them to jointly eliminate the deceased. The fact

that they were in an illicit relationship has been sufficiently proved

from the testimony of PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4. This circumstance,

therefore, has been cogently established.

12. The most important circumstance, among all, must be the circumstance

of the appellant and Rani Kaur having been present in the appellant’s

house on the intervening night of 18.05.99 and 19.05.99 and they

having been seen leaving the house in the early hours of the day.

For, the proof of presence has the effect of triggering into operation,

2 (1984) 4 SCC 116

258 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Section 106 of the Evidence Act and the principle laid down in the

case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra. Even the

circumstance that the appellant had the ‘opportunity’ to administer

poison was strongly linked to aspect of proving the presence of the

appellant and Rani Kaur in the appellants house.

13. In Trimukh’s case, it has been held:

i. “If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house

and in such circumstances where the assailants have

all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at

the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be

extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence

to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle

of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted

upon by the Courts……………………Where an offence

like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the

initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly

be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of

evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot

be of the same degree as is required in other cases

of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of

a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section

106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding

burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent

explanation as to how the crime was committed. The

inmates of the house cannot get away by simply

keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the

supposed premise that the burden to establish its

case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is

no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation”

14. In Trimukh (supra), this Court has pointed out that there are

two important consequences that play out when an offence is

said to have taken place in the privacy of a house, where the

accused is said to have been present. Firstly, the standard of

proof expected to prove such a case based on circumstantial

evidence is lesser than other cases of circumstantial evidence.

Secondly, the appellant would be under a duty to explain as to

the circumstances that led to the death of the deceased. In that 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 259

DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB

sense, there is a limited shifting of the onus of proof. If he remains

quiet or offers a false explanation, then such a response would

become an additional link in the chain of circumstances.

15. Both the Courts below have in fact applied the principle referred to

in Trimukh’s case. Their presence having been held to be proved,

the Court relied on Section 106 of the Evidence Act and shifted

the onus of proof on the accused to explain the circumstances

which led to the unnatural death of the deceased.

16. Whereas the Trial Court found both the accused guilty, the High

Court has confirmed the order of conviction only against the

appellant and extended benefit of doubt to Rani Kaur. The appellant

having failed to give a proper and believable explanation was, in

fact, used as an additional link in the chain of circumstances. The

proof of presence in that sense triggered the two consequences

as laid down in Trimukh’s case (supra)

17. In this case, the presence was sought to be proved by the

prosecution on the basis of the testimony of PW-3, PW-4, PW-5

and the statements of the accused at the 313 stage. The Courts

below had also relied on the testimony of PW 3 and PW 4 to

conclude that the appellant was present in the house. Therefore,

it becomes necessary to carefully evaluate this circumstance,

given the consequences that flow from proof of this circumstance.

18. PW-3 has deposed that her husband, Gurmel Singh (PW-4), on

his return home from work around 8 pm on 18.05.99, had informed

her that he saw the appellant along with Rani Kaur present in the

appellant’s house. He further informed her that it would not be

appropriate to visit their house at that time since he anticipated

the possibility of a flare up among the family members. He told

her that they could talk to the appellant in the morning. PW-3

stated that she visited the house of the appellant in the morning

at around 4:45 am, only to find her sister lying dead. She states

that she saw the appellant and Rani Kaur present in the house.

She further states that both of them pushed her aside and left

in a jeep, belonging to the appellant. She then states that she

called her husband (PW-4) to the spot. 

260 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

19. In the cross examination of PW-3 on behalf of the appellant, several

omissions have been brought on record by drawing her attention

to her previous statement given to the police under Section 161

CrPC. For instance, it has come out in the evidence that PW-3

had omitted to state in her Section 161 statement that: (a) her

husband had informed her that he saw the appellant and Rani

Kaur in the appellant’s house when he was returning back home

from work around 8 pm; (b) she had seen the appellant and Rani

Kaur in the early hours on 19.05.99 in the appellant’s house and

they pushed her aside before escaping in a jeep. (c) her husband

had advised her not to visit the deceased in the night. It had been

specifically suggested to her that she was falsely deposing and

that the appellant was being falsely implicated on account of him

having strained relations with PW-4, the husband of PW3.

20. In the cross examination of PW-3 on behalf of Rani Kaur, it was

elicited that PW-3 had personally witnessed the appellant and Rani

Kaur putting poison in the mouth of the deceased. This, according

to PW-3, was seen by her through the chinks of the door.

21. PW-4 has stated that he met the appellant and Rani Kaur on his

way home, while he was returning from work around 7.00 PM

on 18.05.99. He stated that both of them went to the appellant’s

house. He informed his wife that it would not be appropriate to visit

their house at this time since there was a possibility of a quarrel

arising between Amrik Kaur and her husband, the appellant, since

he had brought Rani Kaur home. Instead, he asked her to go and

visit her sister on the next morning. In the morning, around 5.30

am, his wife left to visit her sister at the appellant’s house after

serving tea to him and his children. On having received a message

from his wife, he set about to reach the appellant’s house and

found Amrik Kaur lying dead and his wife, weeping and wailing.

22. Similarly, in the cross examination of PW-4, it has been brought

on record that PW-4 had omitted to state the following aspects

in his statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. before the

police – (a) that PW-4 had seen the appellant and Rani Kaur

entering the house of the appellant in a jeep; (b) PW-4 had told

PW-3 not to visit the appellant’s house since they were intoxicated 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 261

DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB

and there was a strong possibility of some dispute arising. (c)

PW-4’s statement that PW-3 had left for the appellant’s house

at 5.00 am in the morning on 19.05.99 after serving him tea.

It has been specifically suggested to this witness that he had

strained relations with the appellant, and owing to this fact, he

has falsely implicated the appellant. It was further suggested that

on account of the quarrel that occurred in the night on 18.05.99,

the deceased had committed suicide by taking poison.

23. PW 5 is an independent witness having no relationship with any

of the persons involved, either as an accused or as witnesses,

in this incident. He stated that on the morning of 19.05.99, at

about 6.00 am, he had gone to answer the call of nature. At that

time, he states that he saw the appellant and Rani Kaur were

going in a jeep to Hiro Kalan and that jeep was covered with

black cloth. He then returned to the bus stop and found a lot of

persons having gathered and there, he heard the news that the

appellant had murdered his wife.

24. PW-5’s deposition that he had heard from persons at the bus stop

that the appellant had murdered his wife, was an omission since

he had not stated as such in his statement before the police. It

has been elicited from him that the jeep came from behind and

then passed by his side. It has been further elicited that the black

cloth which was used to cover the jeep was opened on both sides.

25. In the face of the above evidence on record, can it be said that

the presence of the appellant and Rani Kaur in the appellant’s

house in the intervening night of 18.05.99 and 19.05.99, has been

firmly and cogently established? According to us, the answer must

be in the negative. There are several omissions that have been

brought out in the cross examination of PW-3 and PW-4, which

seriously dent the credibility of their testimony.

26. If the PWs had failed to mention in their statements u/s 161 CrPC

about the involvement of an accused, their subsequent statement

before court during trial regarding involvement of that particular

accused cannot be relied upon. Prosecution cannot seek to prove

a fact during trial through a witness which such witness had not

stated to police during investigation. The evidence of that witness 

262 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

regarding the said improved fact is of no significance. [See :

(i) Rohtash Vs. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 (ii) Sunil

Kumar Shambhu Dayal Gupta Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2011

(72) ACC 699 (SC). (iii) Rudrappa Ramappa Jainpur Vs. State

of Karnataka, (2004) 7 SCC 422 (iv) Vimal Suresh Kamble Vs.

Chaluverapinake, (2003) 3 SCC 175]

27. Of course, PW-3 claims to be an illiterate witness and therefore,

her testimony must be interpreted in that light. We are cognizant

that the appreciation of evidence led by such a witness has to

be treated differently from other kinds of witnesses. It cannot be

subjected to a hyper-technical inquiry and much emphasis ought

not to be given to imprecise details that may have been brought

out in the evidence. This Court has held that the evidence of a

rustic/illiterate witness must not be disregarded if there were to be

certain minor contradictions or inconsistencies in the deposition.3

28. However, the testimony of PW-3 suffers not merely from technical

imperfections, there are glaring omissions and improvements that

have been brought out in the cross-examination, which cannot

be attributed to the illiteracy of the individual deposition. If there

were minor contradictions and inconsistencies, that could have

been ignored since the recollection of exact details as to location

and time can be attributed to the lack of literacy. However, such

is not the case here. PW-3 had only heard from her husband that

the appellant and Rani Kaur were seen together in the appellant’s

house on 18.05.99. To that extent, it is merely hearsay. Moreover,

PW-4 has omitted to state this fact to PW3 in his statement before

the police. He has also omitted to state that he advised his wife

(PW-3) against going to the appellant’s house in the night since

there may arise a quarrel between all of them. If these facts are

ignored from consideration, we only wonder as to why PW-3

would visit the house of the appellant in the wee hours of the

morning on 19.05.99. It seems quite unnatural for PW-3 to visit

the house of the appellant at 430 am in the morning without any

reason. If PW-3 was aware that the appellant and Rani Kaur

3 State of U.P. Vs. Chhoteylal, AIR 2011 SC 697 ;

Dimple Gupta (minor) Vs. Rajiv Gupta, AIR 2008 SC 239

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 263

DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB

were in an illicit relationship for a sufficiently long duration, there

was no reason to suspect all of a sudden that the two of them

would get together, administer poison and murder the deceased

on 19.05.1999, which fact, prompted her to visit the house of

the appellant at such odd hours in the morning. Both the Courts

have failed to take notice of the several significant omissions and

improvements in the evidence of PW 3 and PW 4.

29. Further, PW-5 is a chance witness. He was in his village, answering

the call of nature at 6 am, at which point he claimed to have seen

the accused persons going in a jeep. It was elicited in his cross

examination that he had a side-on view since he stated the jeep

came from behind and he got a side-on glimpse. The side-on view

would have been only for a couple of seconds at best, since they

were travelling in a jeep. Therefore, it is not safe to rely on this

testimony solely to prove that the appellant was escaping along

with Rani Kaur after having murdered his wife.

30. The appellant had set up a defence that the deceased had

committed suicide. The Trial Court has disbelieved it on the

premise that the appellant and Rani Kaur were present in the

house, and if the deceased were to have committed suicide, it

was but natural for the appellant to take her to the hospital and

inform concerned persons/authorities. However, we have come

to the finding above that the circumstance of appellant and Rani

Kaur being present in the house has not been convincingly

proved beyond doubt. Therefore, the reasoning given by the Trial

Court loses its legs to stand on. In any case, we believe that the

appellant has raised a doubt in our minds as regards his defence

that the deceased had committed suicide. There appears to be

no dispute as to the fact that the death was caused by poisoning.

The doctor’s testimony on the basis of the chemical examiner’s

report that the cause of death was linked to aluminium phosphide

poisoning remains unchallenged. In fact, in his 313 statement,

even the appellant states that the deceased consumed poison

(aluminum phosphide) and committed suicide. In Jaipal’s case,

this Court has considered the characteristic features of death

caused by poisoning through aluminum phosphide. Review of

scholarly literature and research papers suggests that the nature 

264 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

of this substance (aluminum phosphide) is such that it is not

conducive for deceitful administration since it carries a pungent

garlic-like odour, which cannot go unmissed. It was suspected

that the substance was mixed in tea and served to the deceased

since 200ml brownish liquid was found in her stomach as per

the PMR. We find it doubtful that the deceased would have

been made to consume tea deceitfully given the nature of the

substance. Forceful administration of this substance also seems

doubtful since there are no injury marks suggestive of a scuffle.

In light of the evidence on record, even assuming for a moment

that the appellant and Rani Kaur were present, it still cannot be

said with certainty that it was a case of homicide and not suicide.

The main principle to be satisfied in a case of conviction based

on circumstantial evidence is that the proved circumstances must

be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis

than that of the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with

his innocence- in other words, the circumstances should exclude

every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. In this

case, it cannot be said that the proved circumstances, even if

presence was proved, taken with other circumstances would lead

to an unfailing conclusion that the appellant and Rani Kaur were

guilty of murdering his wife. There was alive a strong hypothesis

that the deceased had committed suicide, which explanation was

led by the appellant in his statement under Section 313 CrPC,

and it is sufficient to create a doubt in our minds.

31. This Court has held that the standard of proof to be met by an

accused in support of the defence taken by him under Section

313 of Code of Criminal Procedure is not beyond all reasonable

doubt, as such, a burden lies on the prosecution to prove the

charge. The accused has merely to create a doubt and it is for

the prosecution then to establish beyond reasonable doubt that

no benefit can flow from the same to the accused. [See: Pramila

vs State of Uttar Pradesh 2021 SCC OnLine SC 711]

32. Learned Counsel for the respondent-State has argued that no

specific plea of alibi was taken in the statement of the appellant

recorded under Section 313 CrPC. In fact, it is submitted that

there is an implicit admission as to his presence in the house. It 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 265

DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB

is too well settled that the statement of an accused under Section

313 CrPC is no ‘evidence’ because, firstly, it is not on oath and,

secondly, the other party i.e. the prosecution does not get an

opportunity to cross examine the accused. [ Sidhartha Vashisht

Vs. State of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2010 SC 2352]

33. It is trite law that the statement recorded u/s. 313 CrPC cannot

form the sole basis of conviction. Therefore, the presence of

the appellant cannot be found solely based on his statement,

notwithstanding the lack of independent evidence led by the

prosecution. Further, this Court has previously considered the

consequences when a particular defence plea was not taken by

accused u/s 313 CrPC and held that mere omission to take a

specific plea by accused when examined u/s 313 CrPC, is not

enough to denude him of his right if the same can be made out

otherwise. See: Periasami Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1996) 6

SCC 457

34. The case of the prosecution has, from the very start, been

that the appellant was seen jointly along with Rani Kaur in the

appellant’s house on 18.05.99 and they were seen leaving the

house together on 19.05.99. They were both tried together on

charges of having administered poison and killing the deceased

on the intervening night of 18.05.99 & 19.05.99. Though the

Trial Court has convicted both of them under Section 302, the

High Court has extended the benefit of doubt to Rani Kaur and

acquitted her of all criminal charges. According to the High Court,

‘apart from the evidence of Melo Kaur PW3 and Gurmel Singh

PW4, there is no other evidence to show that she was present

in the house on the fateful night’. However, even though it was

the very same evidence that was sought to be used to prove the

presence of the appellant in the house, the benefit of doubt has

not been similarly extended to him. The High Court reasoned that

the appellant, being the husband, it was only natural for him to

be present in the house.

35. It is important to notice that the respondent-State has not

challenged the acquittal of Rani Kaur before this Court. It has

accepted the verdict and therefore, the acquittal has reached 

266 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

finality. The State cannot on the one hand accept the verdict of

the Court that the presence of Rani Kaur along with the appellant

is doubtful and at the same time, maintain its case that the two

of them were jointly present, committed the offence together and

escaped together.

36. According to us, if the evidence of PW 3 and PW 4 was not sufficient

to prove presence of Rani Kaur at the appellant’s house, as a

natural corollary, such evidence cannot be relied on to conclude

that the appellant was present in the house. The manner in which

the High Court has sought to distinguish the case of the appellant

from Rani Kaur is perverse and does not seem to impress us. The

case of the prosecution has consistently been that the accused

persons were seen present together in the house on the night

of 18.05.99 and seen leaving together in the wee hours of the

next morning. In fact, PW 5 has deposed that he had seen them

together in the jeep travelling towards Hiro Kurd. If the presence

of Rani Kaur in the house on the date of the alleged incident is

doubtful, then, the testimony of PW 5 that he had seen her along

with the appellant in the jeep, will also lose its strength.

37. Seen in this background, we need not go further and consider

the evidence qua other circumstances sought to be proved by

the prosecution since the failure to prove a single circumstance

cogently can cause a snap in the chain of circumstances. There

cannot be a gap in the chain of circumstances. When the conviction

is to be based on circumstantial evidence solely, then there

should not be any snap in the chain of circumstances. If there is

a snap in the chain, the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt. If

some of the circumstances in the chain can be explained by any

other reasonable hypothesis, then also the accused is entitled to

the benefit of doubt. [See: Bhimsingh Vs. State of Uttarakhand,

(2015) 4 SCC 281.]

38. Therefore, we allow this appeal and set aside the concurrent

findings of conviction.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case: Appeal allowed.