As regards the principles of judicial discipline, if the lower or subordinate Courts could contradict the decisions of higher courts. Headnotes Judicial Discipline – Rule and importance of: Held: Rule of ‘Judicial Discipline and Propriety’ promotes certainty and consistency in judicial decisions providing assurance to individuals as to the consequences of their actions – When a decision of a coordinate Bench of same High court is brought to the notice of the bench, it is to be respected and is binding subject to right of the bench of such co-equal quorum to take a different view and refer the question to a larger bench – Following the principles of judicial discipline, lower or subordinate Courts do not have the authority to contradict the decisions of higher courts – On facts, the trial court and the High Court, in the second round of litigation, violated the judicial discipline by adopting a position contrary to the High Court’s final judgment dated 30.03.1990, from the first round of litigation – Judgment dated 30.03.1990 attained finality and should be regarded as the conclusive and binding order from the initial litigation – Interpreting the said judgment which was clear in itself any differently would clearly amount to judicial indiscipline – Also the Sub-Judge in its judgment rightly observed that the trial court had no business to interpret the judgment of the High Court dated 30.03.1990 in any other way than what was recorded therein – Thus, the impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside and that of the first appellate court is restored. [Paras 1, 15, 16, 20]

As regards the principles of judicial discipline, if the lower or

subordinate Courts could contradict the decisions of higher courts.

Headnotes

Judicial Discipline – Rule and importance of:

Held: Rule of ‘Judicial Discipline and Propriety’ promotes certainty

and consistency in judicial decisions providing assurance to

individuals as to the consequences of their actions – When a

decision of a coordinate Bench of same High court is brought to

the notice of the bench, it is to be respected and is binding subject

to right of the bench of such co-equal quorum to take a different

view and refer the question to a larger bench – Following the

principles of judicial discipline, lower or subordinate Courts do not

have the authority to contradict the decisions of higher courts –

On facts, the trial court and the High Court, in the second round

of litigation, violated the judicial discipline by adopting a position

contrary to the High Court’s final judgment dated 30.03.1990, from

the first round of litigation – Judgment dated 30.03.1990 attained

finality and should be regarded as the conclusive and binding order

from the initial litigation – Interpreting the said judgment which

was clear in itself any differently would clearly amount to judicial

indiscipline – Also the Sub-Judge in its judgment rightly observed

that the trial court had no business to interpret the judgment of

the High Court dated 30.03.1990 in any other way than what was

recorded therein – Thus, the impugned judgment and order of

the High Court is set aside and that of the first appellate court is

restored. [Paras 1, 15, 16, 20]

* Author

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 11 : 2024 INSC 8

Case Details

Mary Pushpam

v.

Telvi Curusumary & Ors.

(Civil Appeal No. 9941 of 2016)

03 January 2024

[Vikram Nath* and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

As regards the principles of judicial discipline, if the lower or

subordinate Courts could contradict the decisions of higher courts.

Headnotes

Judicial Discipline – Rule and importance of:

Held: Rule of ‘Judicial Discipline and Propriety’ promotes certainty

and consistency in judicial decisions providing assurance to

individuals as to the consequences of their actions – When a

decision of a coordinate Bench of same High court is brought to

the notice of the bench, it is to be respected and is binding subject

to right of the bench of such co-equal quorum to take a different

view and refer the question to a larger bench – Following the

principles of judicial discipline, lower or subordinate Courts do not

have the authority to contradict the decisions of higher courts –

On facts, the trial court and the High Court, in the second round

of litigation, violated the judicial discipline by adopting a position

contrary to the High Court’s final judgment dated 30.03.1990, from

the first round of litigation – Judgment dated 30.03.1990 attained

finality and should be regarded as the conclusive and binding order

from the initial litigation – Interpreting the said judgment which

was clear in itself any differently would clearly amount to judicial

indiscipline – Also the Sub-Judge in its judgment rightly observed

that the trial court had no business to interpret the judgment of

the High Court dated 30.03.1990 in any other way than what was

recorded therein – Thus, the impugned judgment and order of

the High Court is set aside and that of the first appellate court is

restored. [Paras 1, 15, 16, 20]

12 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Suit – Suit for possession – Accurate description of the actual

boundary or the measurements of the property – Requirement:

Held: Suit for possession has to describe the property in question

with accuracy and all details of measurement and boundaries –

When the same is lacking, the suit for possession with respect to

such a property would be liable to be dismissed on the ground of

its identifiability. [Para 23]

Doctrines – Doctrine of merger – Basis of:

Held: Doctrine of merger is rooted in the idea of maintenance

of the decorum of hierarchy of courts and tribunals – Doctrine is

based on the simple reasoning that there cannot be, at the same

time, more than one operative order governing the same subject

matter. [Para 17]

Doctrines – Doctrine of precedent – Rule of:

Held: It promotes certainty and consistency in judicial decisions

providing assurance to individuals as to the consequences of their

actions – When a decision of a coordinate Bench of same High

Court is brought to the notice of the bench, it is to be respected

and is binding subject to right of the bench of such co-equal

quorum to take a different view and refer the question to a larger

bench – It is the only course of action open to a bench of co-equal

strength. [Para 1]

List of Citations and Other References

Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr., [2000]

1 Suppl. SCR 538 : (2000) 6 SCC 359; State of

Punjab & Anr. v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd. & Anr.,

[2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 930 : (2004) 11 SCC 26; Central

Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community & Anr. vs. State

of Maharashtra & Anr., [2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 1054 :

(2005) 2 SCC 673 – referred to.

Lists of Key Words

Judicial Discipline; Judicial Indiscipline; Judicial Propriety; Doctrine

of precedents; Consistency in judicial decisions; Co-equal quorum;

Doctrine of merger; Maintenance of the decorum; Hierarchy of

courts and tribunals; Civil suit; Declaration of title; Possession;

Permanent injunction; Accurate measurement and boundaries.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 13

MARY PUSHPAM v. TELVI CURUSUMARY & ORS.

Other Case Details Including Impugned Order and

Appearances

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.9941 of 2016

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.07.2009 of the High Court

of Madras in SA No.451 of 2004.

Appearances:

Ms. N. S. Nappinai, V. Balaji, Atul Sharma, Asaithambi, C. Kannan,

Nizamuddin, S. Devendran, Rakesh K. Sharma, Advs. for the

Appellant.

Vikas Mehta, Vinayak Sharma, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of The Supreme Court

Judgment

Vikram Nath, J.

1. The rule of ‘Judicial Discipline and Propriety’ and the Doctrine of

precedents has a merit of promoting certainty and consistency

in judicial decisions providing assurance to individuals as to the

consequences of their actions. The Constitution benches of this

court have time and again reiterated the rules emerging from Judicial

Discipline. Accordingly, when a decision of a coordinate Bench of

same High court is brought to the notice of the bench, it is to be

respected and is binding subject to right of the bench of such coequal quorum to take a different view and refer the question to a

larger bench. It is the only course of action open to a bench of coequal strength, when faced with the previous decision taken by a

bench with same strength.

2. The plaintiff is in appeal assailing the correctness of the judgment

and order dated 21.07.2009 passed by the Madurai Bench of

Madras High Court, whereby, the Second Appeal filed by the

defendant-respondent was allowed, the judgment and decree

passed by the Sub-Judge, Padmanabhapuram dated 13.10.2003

was set aside and that of the Trial Court dated 30.06.1997 was

restored and confirmed.

3. The appellant instituted a civil suit for declaration of title, possession

and permanent injunction against the respondents which was

registered as OS No. 308 of 1995 in the Court of District Munsiff-

14 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

cum-Judicial Magistrate at Eraniel. The basis for filing the suit was

that earlier in 1976, the respondents had filed a suit for ejectment

of the appellant which was registered as OS No. 70 of 1976. The

said suit was dismissed, First Appeal was dismissed and the Second

Appeal was also dismissed by the High Court, vide judgment dated

30.03.1990. The same became final as it was not carried any further.

4. The appellant continued in possession of the property in suit. However,

as the respondents were trying to interfere with the possession of

the appellant, she filed the suit.

5. The respondents contested the suit and filed their written statements.

According to them, the defence taken was that they had purchased

8 cents of land by way of registered sale deed on 13.03.1974 which

was with respect to an open piece of land and did not contain any

building as such. The suit of 1976 filed by them was with respect

to the constructions raised by the appellant and not with respect to

8 cents of land. The appellant had no right, title or interest over the

suit property. The suit was liable to be dismissed.

6. The Trial Court framed the following six issues:

(i). Whether the suit property properly absolutely belongs to the

plaintiffs?

(ii). Whether the decision of the Honourable High Court of Madras

in S.A. No. 2082/1990 relates to the entire 8 cents of the suit

property or whether it pertains to the house in a portion of the

suit property?

(iii). Whether the plaintiffs have been in possession and enjoyment

of the entire suit property?

(iv). Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of permanent

injunction as prayed for?

(v). Whether the suit property is to be demarcated and northern

boundary is put up as prayed for?

(vi). What reliefs are the Plaintiffs entitled to?

7. Issue No. 2 related to the question whether the judgment of the High

Court in Second Appeal No. 2082 of 1990 related to the entire 8

cents of the property or whether it pertained only to the house in a

portion of the land in dispute.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 15

MARY PUSHPAM v. TELVI CURUSUMARY & ORS.

8. The Trial Court, vide judgement dated 30.06.1997, decreed the suit

for declaration of title, possession and permanent injunction but

only with respect to the portion over which the house property was

situated out of the total extent of 8 cents of the suit property. With

respect to the other property, the suit was dismissed.

9. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit, the appellant preferred an

Appeal which was registered as Appeal No. 169 of 1997. The SubJudge vide judgement dated 13.10.2003 modified the judgement

and decree of the Trial Court and declared that the appellants were

entitled for the entire suit property for relief of declaration of title,

permanent injunction and for setting up their boundary for securing

the said property. The learned Sub-Judge had mainly relied upon

the judgment of the High Court dated 30.03.1990 in the earlier round

of litigation.

10. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Sub-Judge, the respondents

preferred second appeal before the High Court registered as Second

Appeal No. 451 of 2004. The High Court, by the impugned judgment

dated 21.07.2009, allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the

Sub-Judge and restored the decree of the Trial Court. Aggrieved by

the same, the plaintiff has preferred the present appeal.

11. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on

record.

12. The main argument advanced on behalf of the appellant is that

the High Court in the first round in its judgment dated 30.03.1990

had specifically recorded that the dispute was with respect to 8

cents of land and the construction standing thereon. The Trial

Court or the High Court therefore in the present round of litigation

could not have confined it only to the construction and not the

entire portion of land measuring 8 cents. It is further submitted

that under the law of merger, the judgment of the Trial Court

and the First Appeal Court in the first round of litigation merged

with the judgment of the High Court dated 30.03.1990 and it is

that judgment alone which has to be read as final and binding

between the parties. It is also submitted that the First Appeal

Court in its judgement dated 13.10.2003 in the present round had

specifically recorded that the Trial Court had no jurisdiction to go

against the judgement of the High Court. The High Court in its

impugned judgement has in fact breached the judicial discipline

by taking a view contrary to the earlier judgement.

16 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

13. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that

the judgements of the Trial Court and the High Court in the present

round is correct in law and facts. The earlier round of litigation initiated

by the respondents was only with respect to the constructions raised

by the appellant which of course they had lost. The respondents had

throughout been in possession of the 8 cents of land. The appellants

were never in possession thereof. The judgement of the Trial Court

and that of the High Court deserves to be maintained.

14. In the judgement of the High Court in the first round dated 30.03.1990,

it is not at one place but at number of places that the High Court

has recorded that the suit property comprised of 8 cents of land

which was the land purchased by the respondents in 1974. It would

be relevant to refer to such facts noted in the said judgment. In the

opening paragraph the High Court mentioned as follows:

“The suit property is consisting of 8 cents. The defendant

was residing in this property even prior to the purchase

of this property by the plaintiff.”

Then again in paragraph no.2, the High Court records as follows:

“The learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended

that the suit property is comprised of 8 cents of land and

the appellant purchased the same by a sale deed dated

13.03.1974, which is marked as Exhibit A-1”.

The above clearly shows that not only the High Court notes that it

was 8 cents of land which was in dispute but also the Counsel for

the appellants therein (respondents herein) whose submissions are

recorded understood it in the same manner. Again, in paragraph

no.3, the High Court records as follows:

“In the sale deed dated 13.03.1974 (Exhibit A1) there is no

mention about the superstructure in which the respondent

herein is residing. The sale deed merely states about

the sale of 8 cents of land. As already stated, that the

respondent was residing in the suit property even prior

to the purchase by the appellant.”

Lastly, the High Court records its finding as follows:

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 17

MARY PUSHPAM v. TELVI CURUSUMARY & ORS.

“The courts below found that all the documents produced by

the respondent herein are in the name of the respondent.

Therefore, considering all these documents, the courts

below came to the conclusion that the respondent herein

is in possession of the suit property for more than the

statutory period and so she had perfected her title by

adverse possession.”

15. In the light of the above facts, arguments and findings recorded

by the High Court in its judgment dated 30.031990, apparently no

defence was left for the respondents to take as it was already held

that the appellant had perfected her rights by adverse possession

over the suit property which was 8 cents of land. The construction of

the appellant was standing over the 8 cents of land may be on part

of it but she was found in possession of the entire 8 cents.

16. The respondents never sought any clarification of the findings of the

High Court or the observations made therein nor did they assail the

same before any higher forum. The judgement dated 30.03.1990

attained finality. Interpreting the said judgement which was clear in

itself any differently would clearly amount to judicial indiscipline. The

Sub-Judge in its judgement dated 13.10.2003 had rightly observed

that the Trial Court had no business to interpret the judgement of

the High Court dated 30.03.1990 in any other way than what was

recorded therein.

17. The doctrine of merger is a common law doctrine that is rooted in

the idea of maintenance of the decorum of hierarchy of courts and

tribunals. The doctrine is based on the simple reasoning that there

cannot be, at the same time, more than one operative order governing

the same subject matter. The same was aptly summed up by this

Court when it described the said doctrine in Kunhayammed & Ors.

v. State of Kerala & Anr.1

:

“44 (i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an

order passed by a court, tribunal or any other authority

before superior forum and such superior forum modifies,

reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the

1 (2000) 6 SCC 359

18 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

decision by the subordinate forum merges in the decision

by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists,

remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the

eye of the Law.”

18. The legal position on Coordinate Benches has further been elaborated

by this Court in State of Punjab & Anr. v. Devans Modern Breweries

Ltd. & Anr.2

:

“339. Judicial discipline envisages that a coordinate Bench

follow the decision of an earlier coordinate Bench. If a

coordinate Bench does not agree with the principles of law

enunciated by another Bench, the matter may be referred

only to a larger Bench.

340. In Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edn.), Vol. 26

at pp. 297-98, para 578, it is stated: “A decision is given

per incuriam when the court has acted in ignorance of a

previous decision of its own or of a court of coordinate

jurisdiction which covered the case before it, in which case

it must decide which case to follow.”

19. We have already discussed about the importance of ensuring judicial

discipline and the same has also been upheld by various judgement

of this Court. In Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community &

Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr.3

, this Court has summed up

the legal position of rules of judicial discipline as follows:

“12. ***

(1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered

by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any

subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal strength.

(2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent

from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger

quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser

quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief

Justice and request for the matter being placed for

hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the

2 (2004) 11 SCC 26

3 (2005) 2 SCC 673

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 19

MARY PUSHPAM v. TELVI CURUSUMARY & ORS.

Bench whose decision has come up for consideration.

It will be open only for a Bench of coequal strength

to express an opinion doubting the correctness of the

view taken by the earlier Bench of coequal strength,

whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing

before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than

the one which pronounced the decision laying down

the law the correctness of which is doubted.”

20. In the current case, as previously mentioned, the High Court’s

judgment from the initial round dated 30.03.1990, noted that the

disputed property included 8 cents of land, not just the building

structure on it. As per the Doctrine of Merger, the judgments of the

Trial Court and the First Appellate Court from the first round of litigation

are absorbed into the High Court’s judgment dated 30.03.1990. This

1990 judgment should be regarded as the conclusive and binding

order from the initial litigation. Following the principles of judicial

discipline, lower or subordinate Courts do not have the authority to

contradict the decisions of higher Courts. In the current case, the

Trial Court and the High Court, in the second round of litigation,

violated this judicial discipline by adopting a position contrary to the

High Court’s final judgment dated 30.03.1990, from the first round

of litigation.

21. The argument of the Counsel for respondents is mainly that the

judgment of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court in the first

round of litigation clearly stated in the case of the plaintiff that

it was with respect to the constructed portion only in which the

mother of the appellant was residing and not the whole area of

8 cents purchased by them. The High Court committed a bona

fide error in recording that the suit property was 8 cents along

with constructions standing over it. As such the Trial Court and

the High Court in the present round were correct in limiting the

decree only to the constructions and not the entire area of 8 cents.

22. In order to test the above agreement, we carefully examined the

judgement of the Trial Court as also the First Appellate Court.

What is discernible is that nowhere it is recorded the actual

boundary or the measurements of the property in possession of

the mother of the appellant (defendant therein). The respondents-

20 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

plaintiff therein had based her case on the ground that they had

purchased 8 cents of open piece of land and the defendant

therein had raised construction over some adjoining land, and

had trespassed over part of her purchased land as such decree

of possession be granted.

23. We are unable to appreciate the said argument of the respondents.

Suit for possession has to describe the property in question with

accuracy and all details of measurement and boundaries. This

was completely lacking. A suit for possession with respect to such

a property would be liable to be dismissed on the ground of its

identifiability. Further, it may be noted that if the construction by

the defendant were not made over 8 cents of purchased land,

then the plaintiff therein would not have a claim to possession

of the same. The argument thus has to be rejected not only on

facts but also on legal grounds as discussed above.

24. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned judgment

and order of the High Court is set aside and that of the First

Appellate Court dated 13.10.2003 passed by the Sub-Judge,

Padmanabhapuram is restored and maintained.

25. There shall be no order as to costs.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

Service Law – Recruitment – Inadvertent error in application form – Final result reflected failed – Appellant applied for the post of Police Constable – He cleared the written exam and the Physical Eligibility Test – However, the final result reflected him as failed – The only reason was that the application form uploaded online, appellant’s date of birth was shown as 08.12.1997, in the school mark sheet, his date of birth was reflected as 18.12.1997 – Propriety:

Service Law – Recruitment – Inadvertent error in application form – Final result reflected failed – Appellant applied for the post of Police Constable – He cleared the written exam and the Physical Eligibility Test – However, the final result reflected him as failed – The only reason was that the application form uploaded online, appellant’s date of birth was shown as 08.12.1997, in the school mark sheet, his date of birth was reflected as 18.12.1997 – Propriety: 

Held: The appellant’s application uploaded from the cyber café did mention the date of birth as 08.12.1997, while his date of birth as recorded in the educational certificate was 18.12.1997 – It is also undisputed that it is the appellant who produced the educational certificates – He was oblivious of the error that had crept into his application form – On the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the error was so grave as to constitute wrong or mis-leading information – There is an exception for trivial errors or omissions as law does concern itself with trifles – This principle is recognized in the legal maxim-De minimis non curat lex – Also, admittedly the appellant derived no advantage as even if either of the dates were taken, he was eligible; the error also had no bearing on the selection process – Considering the background in which the error occurred, the cancellation is set aside and the respondent-State is directed to treat the appellant as a candidate who has ‘passed’ in the selection process. [Paras 11,12,15, 25, 26] 2 [2024] 1 S.C.R. DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS List of Citations and Other References Yogesh Kumar and Others vs. Govt. of NCT, Delhi and Others, [2003] 2 SCR 662 : (2003) 3 SCC 548 – distinguished. Divya vs. Union of India & Ors., 2023 INSC 900 : 2023 (13) SCALE 730; Prince Jaibir Singh vs. Union of India & Ors., C.A. No. 6983 of 2021 decided by the Supreme Court – referred to. Rohit Kumar and Another vs. Union of India and Others, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1219; Pradeep Kumar vs. Union of India and Others, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 239 – distinguished. Ajay Kumar Mishra vs. Union of India & Ors., [2016] SCC OnLine Del 6563; Arkshit Kapoor vs. Union of India, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 10154; Anuj Pratap Singh vs. Union Public Service Commission, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 10982; K. Sangeetha vs. Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (2018) SCC OnLine Mad 5075; Shubham Tushir vs. Union of India, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 9831; Staff Selection Commission & Anr. Vs. Shubham Tushir, LPA No. 237 of 2020; Poonam Pal vs. M.P. Gramin Bank, (2022) SCC OnLine MP 2921; Pankaj Paswan vs. State of Bihar Anr., 2015 SCC On Line Patna 8739 – referred to. List of

* Author

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1 : 2024 INSC 2

Case Details

Vashist Narayan Kumar

v.

The State of Bihar & Ors.

(Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2024)

02 January 2024

[J.K. Maheshwari and K.V. Viswanathan*, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Whether an error committed in the application form, which was

uploaded is a material error or a trivial error and was the State

justified in declaring the appellant as having failed on account of

the same.

Headnotes

Service Law – Recruitment – Inadvertent error in application

form – Final result reflected failed – Appellant applied for the

post of Police Constable – He cleared the written exam and

the Physical Eligibility Test – However, the final result reflected

him as failed – The only reason was that the application form

uploaded online, appellant’s date of birth was shown as

08.12.1997, in the school mark sheet, his date of birth was

reflected as 18.12.1997 – Propriety:

Held: The appellant’s application uploaded from the cyber café did

mention the date of birth as 08.12.1997, while his date of birth as

recorded in the educational certificate was 18.12.1997 – It is also

undisputed that it is the appellant who produced the educational

certificates – He was oblivious of the error that had crept into his

application form – On the peculiar facts and circumstances of the

case, it cannot be said that the error was so grave as to constitute

wrong or mis-leading information – There is an exception for trivial

errors or omissions as law does concern itself with trifles – This

principle is recognized in the legal maxim-De minimis non curat

lex – Also, admittedly the appellant derived no advantage as even

if either of the dates were taken, he was eligible; the error also had

no bearing on the selection process – Considering the background

in which the error occurred, the cancellation is set aside and the

respondent-State is directed to treat the appellant as a candidate

who has ‘passed’ in the selection process. [Paras 11,12,15, 25, 26]

2 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

List of Citations and Other References

Yogesh Kumar and Others vs. Govt. of NCT, Delhi

and Others, [2003] 2 SCR 662 : (2003) 3 SCC 548 –

distinguished.

Divya vs. Union of India & Ors., 2023 INSC 900 : 2023

(13) SCALE 730; Prince Jaibir Singh vs. Union of India &

Ors., C.A. No. 6983 of 2021 decided by the Supreme

Court – referred to.

Rohit Kumar and Another vs. Union of India and

Others, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1219; Pradeep Kumar

vs. Union of India and Others, 2022 SCC OnLine Del

239 – distinguished.

Ajay Kumar Mishra vs. Union of India & Ors., [2016] SCC

OnLine Del 6563; Arkshit Kapoor vs. Union of India,

2017 SCC OnLine Del 10154; Anuj Pratap Singh vs.

Union Public Service Commission, 2018 SCC OnLine

Del 10982; K. Sangeetha vs. Tamil Nadu Public Service

Commission (2018) SCC OnLine Mad 5075; Shubham

Tushir vs. Union of India, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 9831;

Staff Selection Commission & Anr. Vs. Shubham Tushir,

LPA No. 237 of 2020; Poonam Pal vs. M.P. Gramin

Bank, (2022) SCC OnLine MP 2921; Pankaj Paswan

vs. State of Bihar Anr., 2015 SCC On Line Patna 8739

– referred to.

List of Acts

Constitution of India – Article 142.

List of Keywords

Service Law; Recruitment; Application form; Inadvertent error;

De minimis non curat lex.

Other Case Details Including Impugned Order and

Appearances

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.1 of 2024.

From the Judgment and Order dated 22.08.2022 of the High Court

of Judicature at Patna in LPA No.1271 of 2019.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 3

VASHIST NARAYAN KUMAR v. THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.

Appearances:

Shivam Singh, Ms. Shaswati Parhi, Gopal Singh, Advs. for the

Appellant.

Azmat Hayat Amanullah, Tirupati Gaurav Shahi, Advs. for the

Respondents.

Judgment / Order of The Supreme Court

Judgment

K.V. Viswanathan, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Vashist Narayan Kumar (the appellant) hails from a small village

named Dheodha in Bihar. He belongs to the downtrodden segment of

the society. He aspired to become a Police Constable and had applied

for the said post under the reserved category. Having possessed

the eligibility criteria of being an intermediate (10+2 pass), he also

cleared the written examination and the Physical Eligibility Test.

3. The appellant submitted his educational certificates/mark sheet as

well as his caste certificate for document verification. On 11.06.2018,

the final results reflected him as having failed. The only reason was

that, while in the application form uploaded online, his date of birth

was shown as 08.12.1997, in the school mark sheet, his date of

birth was reflected as 18.12.1997.

4. Distraught, the appellant represented and thereafter having failed to

receive any response, filed a writ petition before the High Court. His

explanation was simple and straight forward. He stated in his writ

petition that, after noticing the advertisement issued by the Central

Selection Board on 29.07.2017, he from his remote village went to the

Cyber café at Pakribarawan - a nearby town. With the assistance of

a person running the Cyber café, he filled in his form and uploaded

it online and he received application No. 7236126 indicating thereby

that the online application had been duly filled. His case was that,

while filling up the form, by an inadvertent error, the date of birth had

got recorded as “08.12.1997” instead of “18.12.1997”. He derived

no benefit from it as either way he fulfilled the eligibility criteria and

the age requirement. He prayed for the relief in the nature of a 

4 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

mandamus to the respondents to consider his claim for selection

and direct them to issue an appointment letter treating the date of

birth as 18.12.1997, as reflected in his educational certificates.

5. The respondents vehemently opposed the writ petition. It was their

stand that the advertisement had clearly stipulated that candidates

should correctly mention their date of birth according to their 10th

board certificate; that if any discrepancy was found while matching the

information, the candidature would be cancelled; that the candidate

should read the instructions carefully and if any information is

found false or wrong, then the application form would be cancelled

and legal action will also be taken. It was further averred that the

advertisement also mentioned the method of making corrections and

that the appellant never availed that facility.

6. They contended that out of 9900 vacancies advertised, 9839

candidates were declared successful. They submitted that 61

vacancies remained unfilled due to non-availability of suitable Gorkha

candidates. They prayed for the dismissal of the writ petition.

7. The learned Single Judge, after referring to the clauses in the

advertisement, including the clause providing for correction, held that

since incorrect information was provided, no relief could be given. The

appellant filed a Letters Patent Appeal to the Division Bench, which

has been dismissed by the impugned order. The Division Bench,

while affirming the order of the learned Single Judge, additionally

recorded a finding that the appellant had not sought for quashing of

the result, as declared on 11.06.2018, on the website.

8. Being aggrieved, the appellant is before us in this Appeal.

9. We have heard Ms. Shaswati Parhi, learned counsel for the appellant

and Mr. Azmat Hayat Amanullah, learned counsel for the State.

Learned counsels have reiterated their respective contentions as

advanced in the Courts below. They have also relied on the judgments

of this Court and of some High Courts, in support of their respective

propositions. Learned counsels have also filed comprehensive written

submissions.

Question for Consideration

10. The question that arises for consideration is whether the error

committed in the application form, which was uploaded is a material 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 5

VASHIST NARAYAN KUMAR v. THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.

error or a trivial error and was the State justified in declaring the

appellant as having failed on account of the same?

Discussion

11. Admittedly, the appellant derived no advantage as even if either

of the dates were taken, he was eligible; the error also had no

bearing on the selection and the appellant himself being oblivious

of the error produced the educational certificates which reflected his

correct date of birth.

12. The facts are undisputed. The appellant’s application uploaded

from the cyber café did mention the date of birth as 08.12.1997

while his date of birth as recorded in the educational certificate

was 18.12.1997. It is also undisputed that it is the appellant who

produced the educational certificates. He was oblivious of the error

that had crept into his application form. It is also undisputed that

the advertisement had all the clauses setting out that in case the

information given by the candidates is wrong or misleading, the

application form was to be rejected and necessary criminal action

was also to be taken. It also had a clause that the candidates

had to fill the correct date of birth, according to their 10th board

certificate. The clause further stated that candidates will fill their

name, father’s name, address etc. correctly in the application form. It

states that any discrepancy, if found, while checking the documents,

the candidature of the candidate will stand cancelled. There was

also a clause providing for correction of wrong/erroneously filled

application forms, which stated that the errors can be corrected once

by re-depositing the application fee and filling a new application. It

also provided that those filling the application on the last date could

correct the application till the following day.

13. Equally undisputed is the fact that after filling out the application, the

appellant cleared the written examination and the Physical Eligibility

Test. It was also stated in the counter affidavit that there were 61

unfilled vacancies though it was submitted that it was meant for the

Gorkha candidates.

14. We are not impressed with the argument of the State that the error

was so grave as to constitute wrong or mis-leading information. We

say on the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. Even the 

6 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

State has not chosen to resort to any criminal action, clearly implying

that even they did not consider this error as having fallen foul of the

following clause in the advertisement:-

“Instructions to fill online application form are available

on the website. It is recommended to all the candidates

to carefully read the instructions before filling the online

application form and kindly fill the appropriate response

in the following tabs. In case, the information given by

the candidates found wrong or misleading, the application

form will get rejected and necessary criminal actions will

also be taken against the candidate.”

15. Recently this Bench in Divya vs. Union of India & Ors.,

2023:INSC:900 = 2023 (13) Scale 730, while declining relief to

candidates who acquired eligibility after the date mentioned in the

notification carved out a narrow exception. There, the judgment in

Ajay Kumar Mishra vs. Union of India & Ors., [2016] SCC OnLine

Del 6563, a case very similar to the facts of the present case, was

noted. In Ajai Kumar Mishra (supra), Indira Banerjee, J. (as Her

Ladyship then was) speaking for the Division Bench of the Delhi

High Court in para 9 stated as under:-

9. It is true that whenever any material discrepancy

is noticed in the application form and/or when any

suppression and/ or mis-representation is detected, the

candidature might be cancelled even after the application

has been processed and the candidate has been allowed

to participate in the selection process. However, after a

candidate has participated in the selection process and

cleared all the stages successfully, his candidature can

only be cancelled, after careful scrutiny of the gravity of

the lapse, and not for trivial omissions or errors.”

(emphasis supplied)

The exception for trivial errors or omissions is for the reason that

law does not concern itself with trifles. This principle is recognized

in the legal maxim - De minimis non curat lex.

16. Learned counsel for the appellant, in her written submissions, cited

the following judgments in support of her proposition that inadvertent 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 7

VASHIST NARAYAN KUMAR v. THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.

error in filling up the date of birth when no advantage is derived will

not constitute a wilful mis-representation and contended that in all

those cases reliefs were given to the candidates:

i) Arkshit Kapoor vs. Union of India, 2017 SCC OnLine Del

10154 [para 20]

ii) K. Sangeetha vs. Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission

(2018) SCC OnLine Mad 5075 [Paras 9 & 11]

iii) Anuj Pratap Singh vs. Union Public Service Commission,

2018 SCC OnLine Del 10982 [Paras 15,16 & 21]

iv) Shubham Tushir vs. Union of India, 2019 SCC OnLine Del

9831 [Paras 4 & 10]

v) Staff Selection Commission & Anr. Vs. Shubham Tushir

LPA No. 237 of 2020 before the Delhi High Court

vi) Poonam Pal vs. M.P. Gramin Bank, (2022) SCC OnLine MP

2921 [Paras 9-12]

17. In fact, in Anuj Pratap Singh (supra), as is clear from para 14 of

the said judgment, the candidate unable to correct the error at the

first point was forced to repeat it while submitting the application for

sitting in the main exam since he had no other option. The Court

accepted the explanation and condoned the error in the filling up of

the column pertaining to the date of birth.

18. The learned counsel for the State drew attention to the verification

by the appellant, of the details in a printed form furnished by the

selection board. He contended that the appellant signed the form

which carried the date of birth. First of all, the form was a printed

form which reflected the date of birth as given by the appellant and

the appellant signed the printed form on 10.03.2018. We are inclined

to accept the explanation of the appellant that since the appellant

was unaware of his own mistake he had mechanically signed the

printed form. It is only later, on 11.06.2018, on the publication of

the result that the appellant realized the error. We do not think that

the appellant could be penalised for this insignificant error which

made no difference to the ultimate result. Errors of this kind, as

noticed in the present case, which are inadvertent do not constitute

misrepresentation or wilful suppression. 

8 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

19. In this case, the appellant has participated in the selection process

and cleared all the stages successfully. The error in the application

is trivial which did not play any part in the selection process. The

State was not justified in making a mountain out of this molehill.

Perhaps the rarefied atmosphere of the cybercafe, got the better of

the appellant. He omitted to notice the error and even failed to avail

the corrective mechanism offered. In the instant case, we cannot turn

a Nelson’s eye to the ground realities that existed. In the order dated

22.11.2021 in C.A. No. 6983 of 2021 [Prince Jaibir Singh vs. Union

of India & Ors.], this Court rightly observed that though technology

is a great enabler, there is at the same time, a digital divide.

20. In one of the cases cited as a precedent in the counter affidavit,

before the High Court, Pankaj Paswan vs. State of Bihar Anr.,

2015 SCC On Line Patna 8739, the State had taken a defence that

many candidates applied in more than one place and hence there

could be deliberate tweaking in the date of birth to take advantage

of the selection process in more than one district or region. It is very

important to notice that there is no such plea taken in the present

case. If any such device or trick had been adopted, the State would

have easily detected the same and placed the same before the Court.

The fact that the same has not been done shows that there was no

trick or device resorted to by the appellant. It is a trivial error which

appears to be a genuine and bona fide mistake. It will be unjust to

penalise the appellant for the same.

21. Learned counsel for the State, in the written submissions, stated that

the instructions clearly stipulated that if two or more candidates obtain

the same marks in the Physical Eligibility Test, their relative rank in

the final merit list could be determined on the basis of their date of

birth. The implication in the submission is that the date of birth is a

significant aspect. On that basis, he submits that the cancellation

ought to be upheld. We do not find merit in the submission. The

original date of birth, as available is 18.12.1997, in the educational

certificates. There is no dispute that the appellant’s date of birth was,

in fact, 18.12.1997. In view of that, we do not see the said clause in

the instructions as an impediment for the selection of the appellant.

22. Learned counsel for the State has also, in the written submissions,

cited the judgment of this Court in Yogesh Kumar and Others

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 9

VASHIST NARAYAN KUMAR v. THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.

vs. Govt. of NCT, Delhi and Others, (2003) 3 SCC 548. The said

judgment is clearly distinguishable. There the issue was about allowing

entry of ineligible persons into the selection. While the eligibility

prescribed was Teacher’s Training Certificate from a recognized

institute or intermediate or equivalent from a recognized Board/

University with an elective subject in the required language at the

matric level, candidates with B.Ed. degree sought appointment as

Assistant Teacher. Negating their claim, this Court held that the

B.Ed. qualification cannot be treated as a qualification higher than

the Teacher’s Training Certificate, because the nature of the training

imparted for grant of certificate and for grant of degree was totally

different. In that context, this Court held that deviating from the rules

and allowing entry to ineligible persons would deprive many others

who could have competed for the post. Yogesh Kumar (supra) has

no application to the facts of the present case. Equally distinguishable

are the judgments of the Delhi High Court in Rohit Kumar and

Another vs. Union of India and Others, 2022 SCC OnLine Del

1219 and Pradeep Kumar vs. Union of India and Others, 2022

SCC OnLine Del 239.

23. In the case of Rohit Kumar (supra), the undisputed facts, as is

clear from para 10 of the judgment, was that the candidate was

declared unsuccessful on two counts, namely, that the OBC certificate

uploaded by the candidate was not as per the format as mentioned

in the advertisement and additionally on the ground that the date

of issuance of the certificate was wrongly mentioned in the online

application.

24. In Pradeep Kumar (supra), the identity proof (Aadhaar Card) was not

uploaded and instead the self photograph of the candidate has been

uploaded. We find that the said two judgments are distinguishable

on facts for the reasons set out above.

25. On the peculiar facts of this case, considering the background in which

the error occurred, we are inclined to set aside the cancellation. We

are not impressed with the finding of the Division Bench that there

was no prayer seeking quashment of the results declared over the

web. A reading of the prayer clause in the writ petition indicates that

the appellant did pray for a mandamus directing the respondents

to consider the candidature treating his date of birth as 18.12.1997 

10 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

and also sought for a direction for issuance of an appointment letter.

A Writ Court has the power to mould the relief. Justice cannot be

forsaken on the altar of technicalities.

Conclusion

26. For the reasons stated above, we set aside the judgment of the

Division Bench of the Patna High Court in LPA No. 1271 of 2019 dated

22.08.2022 and direct the respondent-State to treat the appellant as a

candidate who has “passed”, in the selection process held under the

advertisement No. 1 of 2017 issued by the Central Selection Board

(Constable Recruitment), Patna with the date of birth as 18.12.1997.

We further direct that if the appellant is otherwise not disqualified,

the case of the appellant be considered and necessary appointment

letter issued. We further direct that, in the event of there being no

vacancy, appointment letter will still have to be issued on the special

facts of this case. We make the said direction, in exercise of powers

under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. We further direct that the

State will be at liberty in that event to adjust the vacancy in the next

recruitment that they may resort to in the coming years. We notice

from the written submissions of the State that 21,391 vacancies have

been notified in Advertisement No.1 of 2023 and it is stated that the

procedure for selection is ongoing. We place the said statement on

record. We direct compliance to be made of the aforesaid direction

within a period of four weeks from today.

27. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. No order as to costs.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

Undoubtedly, the question regarding the time barred nature of an underlying debt or liability in proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act is a mixed question of law and fact which ought not to be decided by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC.

“8. Once a cheque is issued and upon getting dishonoured a

statutory notice is issued, it is for the Accused to dislodge the legal

presumption available Under Sections 118 and 139 reply of the N.I.

Act. Whether the cheque in question had been issued for a time

barred debt or not, itself prima facie, is a matter of evidence and

could not have been adjudicated in an application filed by the

Accused Under Section 482 of the CrPC.”

2024 INSC 84

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 516 OF 2024

[arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 298 of 2023]

ATAMJIT SINGH …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)

O R D E R

1. Leave granted.

2. This is an appeal instituted at the instance of the original complainant of a

complaint lodged under inter alia Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,

1881 (the “NI Act”) (the “Underlying Complaint”) assailing an order dated

06.09.2022 passed by the High Court of Delhi (the “High Court”) in CRL. M.C.

No. 556 of 2019 whereunder the High Court quashed an order dated 03.08.2017

passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate -10, South-East, Saket Court (the “Trial

Court”) summoning Mr. Amrit Sandhu Coaster/Respondent No. 2 in relation to the

commission of an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act (the “Impugned

Order”).

3. The High Court by way of the Impugned Order deemed it appropriate to quash

the underlying proceedings on the principal premise that as on the date of the

issuance of the summoning order, the underlying debt and/or liability qua

Respondent No. 2 was time barred.

Page 1 of 3

4. Prima-facie from the materials placed before us, it is revealed that pursuant to

various transactions entered into by and between the (i) Appellant; (ii) Respondent

No. 2; and (iii) Jasween Sandhu i.e., Accused No. 2 in the Underlying Complaint,

allegedly pertaining to year 2011, the Appellant was owed a sum of approximately

Rs.20,10,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lakh Ten Thousand). Accordingly Respondent No. 2

issued a cheque bearing number 329623 dated 06.03.2017 drawn on Syndicate Bank,

Branch West Punjabi Bagh, Central Market, New Delhi-110026 for a sum of

Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lakh) in favour of the appellant (the “Subject

Cheque”).

5. Upon a perusal of the Impugned Judgement, it is disclosed that High Court has

relied upon (i) the Assured Returns Agreement dated 16.09.2011; and (ii) other

receipts issued by the Appellant to Respondent No. 2, all of which pertain to

transaction(s) entered into in the year 2011 to conclude that in the absence of an

acknowledgment of any underlying debt between 2011 and the date of issuance of

the Subject Cheque i.e., 06.03.2017, the underlying debt could not be held to be

legally enforceable debt or liability on account of being barred by limitation.

Accordingly, in the aforesaid circumstances, the prosecution of Respondent No.

2 under Section 138 of the NI Act was held to be improper; and accordingly, by way

of impugned judgment, the High Court quashed the summoning order issued by the

Trial Court; and the Underlying Complaint.

6. At the threshold, it would be apposite to refer to decisions of this Court in

Yogesh Jain v. Sumesh Chadha, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1760-1761 of 2022

whereunder this Court has opined on the scope of interference by the High Court in

proceedings under 138 of the NI Act qua an allegedly time barred debt at the stage of

issuance of summons, whilst exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the “CrPC”). The operative paragraph in Yogesh

Jain (Supra) has been reproduced as under:

Page 2 of 3

“8. Once a cheque is issued and upon getting dishonoured a

statutory notice is issued, it is for the Accused to dislodge the legal

presumption available Under Sections 118 and 139 reply of the N.I.

Act. Whether the cheque in question had been issued for a time

barred debt or not, itself prima facie, is a matter of evidence and

could not have been adjudicated in an application filed by the

Accused Under Section 482 of the CrPC.”

7. From a perusal of legal position enunciated above, it is clear that the

classification of the underlying debt or liability as being barred by limitation is a

question that must be decided based on the evidence adduced by the parties. We

agree with aforesaid opinion. Undoubtedly, the question regarding the time barred

nature of an underlying debt or liability in proceedings under Section 138 of the NI

Act is a mixed question of law and fact which ought not to be decided by the High

Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC.

8. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, and the Impugned Order is set aside. The

proceedings emanating from the Underlying Complaint i.e., CC No. 6437 of 2017 is

restored to the file of the Trial Court.

9. Pending application(s), if any, are disposed of. No order as to costs.

 ……………………………………J.

 (VIKRAM NATH)

……………………………………J.

 (SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA)

NEW DELHI

JANUARY 22, 2024

Page 3 of 3

ITEM NO.49 COURT NO.8 SECTION II-C

 S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 298/2023

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 06-09-

2022 in CRLMC No. 556/2019 passed by the High Court Of Delhi At

New Delhi)

ATAMJIT SINGH Petitioner(s)

 VERSUS

STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR. Respondent(s)

(IA No. 199663/2022 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED

JUDGMENT)

Date : 22-01-2024 This matter was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKRAM NATH

 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA

For Petitioner(s) Mr. Sudeep Sehgal, Adv.

 Mr. Sandeep Singh, AOR

For Respondent(s) Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, Adv.

 Mr. Mukesh Kumar Maroria, AOR

 Mr. Bharat Sood, Adv.

 Mr. Saransh Kumar, Adv.

 Mr. Vishnu Shankar Jain, Adv.

 Mr. Shaurya Rai, Adv.

 Mr. Madhav Sinhal, Adv.

 Ms. Deeksha Ladi Kakar, AOR

 UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

 O R D E R

Leave granted.

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed

order.

Pending application(s), if any, are disposed of.

(NEETU KHAJURIA)

ASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS

(RANJANA SHAILEY)

COURT MASTER

 (Signed order is placed on the file.)

Page 4 of 3

“Before the reward, there must be labour. You plant before you harvest. You sow in tears before you reap joy.” – attributed to author Ralph Ransom perfectly encapsulates the current situation, emphasising upon the inherent connection between effort and reward. As soon as the bhondedar had ceased rendering services, the concerned land should have returned to the common village pool. The bhondedar could not have transferred his limited possessory rights or alienated the said property to the Appellants. In turn, the Appellants, as transferees, could not have derived any legal right over the suit land either.

 decreed the Respondents’ suit and declared Narain Dass (Defendant No. 1/Dfdt. 1) as only a bhondedar but not the owner of the shamlatdeh land (land reserved & used for common purpose in villages). It was held that the Dfdt. No. 1 had been granted limited  possessory rights, to the shamlatdeh land, in lieu of service rendered to the village temple and when he, as the bhondedar, ceased to render such service, the land would automatically revert back to the common village pool.

2023 INSC 1091

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 2835-2836/2011

LAJJA RAM & ORS. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

RATI CHAND & ORS.ETC. RESPONDENT(S)

O R D E R

1. Heard Mr. Shubham Seth, the learned counsel appearing for the

appellants. Also, heard Mr. Sujit Kumar Mishra, learned counsel

appearing for the respondents.

2. The present appeals have been preferred challenging the

judgement and order dated 12.08.2009 in RSAs No. 4041/2007 &

2552/2008, passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana.

Under the impugned order, the High Court upheld the decision

dated 15.10.2007 of the Additional District Judge, Faridabad

(‘First Appellate Court’), reversing the Civil Judge (Jr. Division),

Palwal (‘Trial Court’) order dated 28.02.2003, and thereby, decreed

the Respondents’ suit and declared Narain Dass (Defendant No.

1/Dfdt. 1) as only a bhondedar but not the owner of the

shamlatdeh land (land reserved & used for common purpose in

villages). It was held that the Dfdt. No. 1 had been granted limited

Page 1 of 12

possessory rights, to the shamlatdeh land, in lieu of service

rendered to the village temple and when he, as the bhondedar,

ceased to render such service, the land would automatically revert

back to the common village pool.

3. In the year 1982, Narain Dass (Dfdt. No. 1) initiated an earlier

proceeding for declaration and occupancy rights, before Asst.

Collector (Grade-I), Faridabad against the Gram Panchayat, Palwal.

The Asst. Collector while disposing the said proceeding observed in

the order dated 06.03.1986 that Narain Dass was entitled to

hereditary rights, under Sections 5 & 8 of the Punjab Mujara Act,

1887 (also referred to as the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887) and the

Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1953.

This arises from the longstanding service of Narain Dass’ ancestors

as mujaras (tenants) relating to the shamlatdeh land, for over 60

years. Additionally, it was held that the land did not vest in the

Gram Panchayat.

4. Subsequently, Narain Dass sold the shamlatdeh land to Lajja Ram

& his sons (Defendant Nos. 2-5) through multiple sale deeds on

24.07.1987, 31.08.1987 and 07.06.1988, respectively.

5. Aggrieved by the above alienation of the common village land, the

inhabitants of the village & biswedars (proprietors) of the land

Page 2 of 12

(‘Respondents’) filed the Suit No. 878/1996 for declaration,

possession & injunction before the Civil Judge (Jr.), Palwal.

However, the Trial Court dismissed the suit on 28.02.2003 as nonmaintainable on the grounds that it was time-barred and also that

the plaintiffs had no locus standi to file the suit. It was also held

that the sale deeds transferring ownership rights from Narain Dass

(Dfdt. 1) to Lajja Ram & sons (Dfdts. 2-5) were valid. The Court

noted that Narain Dass, while serving as the bhondedar of the

shamlatdeh land, continued to provide service to the landlord, and

such service would be considered equivalent to payment of rent,

thereby making Narain Dass also a tenant of the suit land.

6. Displeased with the Trial Court’s decision favouring Dfdt. No. 1,

the Respondents approached the Additional District Judge,

Faridabad by filing the Civil Appeal No. 17 on 01.04.2003.

Simultaneously, Respondents (Defendant Nos. 5-12) also filed a

separate Civil Appeal No. 25. The First Appellate Court with the

common judgment dated 15.10.2007 decreed the suit for

declaration, injunction, and possession of land measuring 33

kanals 5 marlas. Simultaneously, the Court negated Narain Dass’

(Dfdt. 1) claim, since he had limited right and was not competent

to alienate the suit property. The Court also found that Dfdt. 1 had

Page 3 of 12

taken recourse to self-contradictory pleas asserting ownership

rights as well as occupancy rights. Thus, the annulment of sale

deeds to Dfdts No. 2-5 with a directive to restore the suit land

possession to the common village pool was ordered.

7. The transferee Lajja Ram & sons (Dfdts. No. 2-5) then filed the

RSA No. 4041 of 2007 and RSA No. 2552 of 2008 before the High

Court. In the impugned order dated 12.08.2009, the High Court

noted that the prior decree granted by the Asst. Collector against

the Gram Panchayat could not have been used against the

biswedars of the village given their absence as parties in the

previous proceedings. Additionally, it was found that the

ownership of the shamlatdeh land did not vest with the Gram

Panchayat.

8. The High Court particularly noted that Narain Dass had no title or

authority to sell the suit land to Dfdts. No. 2-5. The sale, executed

by an incompetent party without a valid title, was deemed by the

High Court as insufficient to confer valid title to Dfdts. No. 2-5.

Moreover, the sale by a vendor without any title could be

disregarded even in a collateral proceeding, i.e., the present suit by

the proprietors. The High Court deemed the later suit to be within

the period of limitation since reckoning time would not commence

Page 4 of 12

from the date of sale deed's registration but from the date of

knowledge of the sales, by the biswedars. Consequently, the High

Court upheld the First Appellate Court's decision decreeing the

suit against Dfdts. No. 2-5, and dismissed the second appeal

under the impugned judgment.

9. In order to adjudicate the present lis, we need to briefly refer to the

concept of a bhondedar, and the nature & extent of rights that a

bhondedar exercises with respect to shamlatdeh lands.

10. The term ‘bhondedar’ has no statutory or legislative definition. But

over a period of time, the term is equated with limited grant of land

for service to be rendered by the grantee. It is a customary practice

in the Punjab region (present-day areas comprising largely in the

states of Punjab & Haryana)1

 for proprietors of land as well as the

larger village community, to set apart a parcel of land to be held

rent-free towards a temple, mosque or shrines, or granted on

favourable terms to a saint, pandit or any other person belonging

to a religious order. As long as such grant (also known as a ‘dholi’

in erstwhile Punjab) was being used for the assigned purpose, the

person assigned such dholi (referred to as a ‘dholidar’ in erstwhile

Punjab), could not be asked to vacate the same. The terms

1 Gurgaon District Gazetteer, Gurgaon DG – Administrative Section A to C, 1910,

pg. 177.

Page 5 of 12

dholidar and bhondedar are often interchangeably used albeit with

minor variance. While a dholi is granted in lieu of a service directly

connected with religion, a bhonda would ordinarily be granted

towards rendering secular services like that of a village messenger

or watchman, towards the proprietors of the said land.2

 The

bhondedar could be ejected upon failure to fulfil the conditions of

such grant or even at the will of the proprietors. Essentially, it was

a method of compensation for certain services, by granting rentfree land.

11. A bhondedar typically possesses the following characteristic

features:

(i) He renders secular services towards the village community

as well as the biswedars (proprietors),

(ii) He is granted a parcel of land rent-free, within a village by

the biswedars in lieu of payment for services rendered, and

(iii) A bhondedar can be ejected from such piece of land in case

of failure to render assigned services or fulfil conditions of

such grant.

12. The aforementioned characteristic features suggest that the rights

available to Dfdt. No. 1 as the bhondedar, were conditional and not

boundless. He could exercise limited rights as long as he rendered

2 Mamala & Ors. vs. ISA & Anr., 1983 Punjab Law Journal 231; Gurgaon District

Gazetteer, Gurgaon DG – Administrative Section A to C, 1910, pg. 177.

Page 6 of 12

service towards the village in his capacity as the bhondedar.

13. Proceeding with the above understanding, let us now examine the

nature & extent of a bhondedar’s right over a shamlatdeh property

and also whether the bhondedar can exercise ownership rights

over the granted land. The conditional and limited rights a dholi or

a bhonda can exercise over the granted land, can be culled out

from the decision in Lahore High Court in Sewa Ram vs. Udegir3

where the following was expressed

“…… in the revenue records the proprietary body are

recorded as the owners of the property, and the grantee is

recorded as a tenant in the column of cultivation. So long as

the purpose, for which the grant is made, is carried out, it

cannot be resumed, but should the holder fail to carry out

the duties of his office, the proprietors can eject him and put

in someone else under a like tenure……. …….. It is beyond

dispute that tenure of this kind cannot be alienated by sale

or mortgage, and there can be little doubt that any

 alienation of that character, if made by the Dohlidar, would

be absolutely void……… As the transaction was altogether

void, we consider that even the alienor could have

successfully pleaded in answer to the plaintiff's suit that the

latter could not enforce it in a Court of law……. For the

foregoing reasons we are of opinion that the Dohlidar had

no right to make the alienation relied upon by the plaintiff,

and that the defendant is not precluded from impeaching its

validity………”

14. The above would suggest that a bhondedar had only limited right

and should he fail to carry out his assigned duties, even this

limited right becomes unavailable to the grantee of the property.

3 1921 SCC OnLine Lah 237.

Page 7 of 12

The very nature of the tenure(s) does not bestow upon the holder,

any right to alienate the granted land, by sale or mortgage.

Consequently, all alienation made by the limited holder of property,

would be manifestly void. This is because bhondedar or dholidar do

not possess title or ownership right of the property that is granted

to him, as a bhonda or dholi.

15. The inter-play of claims over shamlatdeh category land vis-à-vis the

bhondedar, the Gram Panchayat and the proprietors of such land,

may now be seen. The ownership to such lands rested in

proportion to other lands of the village. For instance, an individual

owning some land in the village also possessed additional

proprietary rights and interest over shamlatdeh lands.4

 However,

with the enactment of the Punjab Village Common Lands

(Regulation) Act, 1961, the nature of vesting of such lands with the

village community was somewhat altered. The following discussion

in State of Haryana vs. Jai Singh & Ors.5

 would assist us in

understanding the implication for community lands in the village:

Ҧ24. Shamilat land in terms of Section 4 of the 1961

Act vested in the Gram Panchayat of the village. The

vesting of shamilat land in a village panchayat brought

about a paradigm shift in the ownership of rights in

‘ shamilat deh’. The proprietary rights of the proprietary

 body of the village in shamilat land were extinguished

4 Gram Panchayat of Village Jamalpur vs. Malwinder Singh, (1985) 3 SCC 661.

5 2022 SCC OnLine SC 418.

Page 8 of 12

by a statutory declaration. The proprietary and

possessory rights of proprietors and non-proprietors

 in shamilat deh were to henceforth vest in a Gram

Panchayat and used for common purposes of the entire

village community, under the aegis of the Gram

Panchayat. The shamilat deh lands as defined under

Section 2 (g) of the 1961 Act now vest completely, that

is, with ownership and title, in the Panchayat of the

village concerned. The vesting of the shamilat deh lands

or the village common lands in the Panchayat has been

for agrarian reforms and such vesting is protected by

Article 31A of the Constitution.”

16. While such lands owned by the proprietors came to be vested in

the Gram Panchayat, the Section 4 of the Punjab Village Common

Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, noted certain important exceptions.

The existing rights, title or interest of persons, who though not

entered as occupancy tenants in the revenue records are accorded

a similar status by custom like a bhondedar, dholidar, etc. and

those would not be affected by such vesting of lands in the Gram

Panchayat.

17. In the present matter, the Dfdt. No.1 (Narain Dass) held conditional

and limited possessory rights as a bhondedar, subject to services

being rendered towards the village community, as recorded in the

jamabandi. Such limited right remains unaffected and unaltered

as long as the bhondedar fulfills their service obligations toward

the village. The facts in this case however indicates that the Dfdt.

No. 1 not only ceased to render the required services but also

Page 9 of 12

relocated to a different place soon after unauthorisedly selling the

suit land to Dfdts. 2-5. Consequently, the bhondedar Narain Dass

can have no legitimate claim whatsoever, over the suit land.

18. Addressing the issue of limitation on account of the decision of

Asst. Collector favouring Narain Dass in the previous proceeding,

the High Court observed that the biswedars or other inhabitants of

the village were not parties in the proceedings before Asst.

Collector. It was therefore held that the decree obtained from the

Asst. Collector against the Gram Panchayat, could not be invoked

to argue that the biswedars had relinquished their rights, title,

and/or interest in the land.

19. Observing that the sale deeds were executed by an individual

lacking valid title, the High Court opined that those could also be

disregarded in collateral proceedings as well. It was also found that

the decision in the previous proceeding cannot extinguish the

rights of the plaintiffs and the Gram Panchayat in the suit simply

because the biswedars were unaware of the Asst. Collector’s order.

As soon as the biswedars learnt of such decree in Narain Dass’

favour against the Gram Panchayat, they filed Suit No.878/1996

before the Trial Court and as such the suit was found to be in

order. In our assessment, the High Court has rightly held that

Page 10 of 12

the suit was filed within time as the biswedars' right to challenge

the sales by the bhondedar would commence only from the date on

which they became aware of such sales.

20. The upshot of the aforementioned discussion is that when the

services were ceased to be rendered towards the management,

maintenance and upkeep of the shamlatdeh land, the limited grant

so made to the bhondedar, by the proprietors i.e., the biswedars, in

lieu of such services, stood extinguished.

21. No specific material is produced before us to show the precise

terms of arrangement between the biswedars and the bhondedar.

However, it is evident that Narain Dass could have retained

possession of the land only till such time that he continued to

discharge the services tied to the limited grant. Moreover, by

relocating to Nangli Gurdhana, i.e., a different village over 50 years

ago (around 1970-71), he obviously ceased rendering services to

the village temple. By the very nature of the conditional grant, the

grantee was naturally incompetent to alienate the shamlatdeh land

to any third parties, including the Dfdts. Nos. 2-5.

22. The limited right available to Narain Dass to continue to avail the

rent-free land would be extinguished immediately upon cessation

of service. To attract the exception, Narain Dass could not prove

that the suit land was gifted by the biswedars. The only

Page 11 of 12

exceptional circumstance that could have possibly validated

ownership and subsequent sales to the Appellants is also not

applicable here.

23. The oft-quoted statement full of wisdom – “Before the reward, there

must be labour. You plant before you harvest. You sow in tears before

you reap joy.” – attributed to author Ralph Ransom perfectly

encapsulates the current situation, emphasising upon the inherent

connection between effort and reward. As soon as the bhondedar

had ceased rendering services, the concerned land should have

returned to the common village pool. The bhondedar could not

have transferred his limited possessory rights or alienated the said

property to the Appellants. In turn, the Appellants, as transferees,

could not have derived any legal right over the suit land either.

24. Therefore, the High Court’s decision in favour of the plaintiffs and

the Gram Panchayat is consistent with the above opinion of this

Court. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed without any

imposition of costs.

..............................J.

[ HRISHIKESH ROY ]

..............................J.

[ SANJAY KAROL ]

NEW DELHI;

NOVEMBER 9, 2023

Page 12 of 12

There is a clear distinction between burden of proof and standard of proof. This distinction is well-known to civil as well as criminal practitioners in common law jurisprudence. What Ms. Ruchira sought to point out is that the documents relied on by the plaintiff did not point out the existence of title at all. She is right to the extent that no single document in itself 4 concludes title in favour of the plaintiff, but this is not an issue of burden of proof. This is a matter relating to the sufficiency of evidence. While inquiring into whether a fact is proved3, the sufficiency of evidence is to be seen in the context of standard of proof, which in civil cases is by preponderance of probability. By this test, the High Court has correctly arrived at its conclusion regarding the existence of title in favour of the plaintiff on the basis of the evidence adduced.

 suit for declaration of title and injunction.

2024 INSC 88

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 722 OF 2016

GOVERNMENT OF GOA ...Appellant(s)

THROUGH THE CHIEF SECRETARY

 Vs.

MARIA JULIETA D’SOUZA (D) & ORS. ...Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.

1. This is an appeal against the final judgment of the High

Court of Bombay at Goa allowing the first appeal against the

judgment of the Trial Court dated 25.07.2007 that dismissed the

suit filed by the respondent herein.

2. The suit came to be filed by the respondent(s) herein for

declaration of title and injunction. The Trial Court dismissed

the suit on two grounds: first, the plaintiff could not

establish her title by way of a clear document of title in her

favour. Second the suit is itself barred by limitation.

3. In appeal, the High Court considered the matter in detail

and in so far as the first ground is concerned, the High Court

referred to various documents including deeds evidencing the

presence of title in favour of the plaintiffs’ predecessor

followed by their continuous possession and came to the

2

conclusion that her title over the property is well-established.

So far as limitation is concerned, the High Court held that the

suit is within the period of limitation, apart from also noting

that the question of limitation was not pressed by the

Government before the Trial Court.

4. We heard Ms. Ruchira Gupta, who was well-prepared on law

and fact. She prepared a detailed list of dates and has also

taken us through the relevant portions of the pleadings in the

suit and other documents. She has pointed out the findings of

fact as arrived by the Trial Court. Referring to the reasoning

of the High Court, she submitted that the High Court had wrongly

shifted the burden of proof on to the State (defendant) rather

than requiring the plaintiff to prove its title. She further

submitted that the High Court wrongly asked for proof of

possession of the property rather than for proof of title of

the property, which is the only inquiry in a suit for

declaration. In support of her submission, she has referred to

the precedents of this Court in Sebastiao Luis Fernandes (Dead)

through LRs. v. K.V.P. Shastri (Dead) through LRs.1 and Union

of India v. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited2.

5. Having considered the matter in detail, we are of the

opinion that the High Court has correctly reappreciated the

facts and evidence while exercising first appellate jurisdiction

and has also followed the law as applicable in proving a suit

1(2013)15 SCC 161

2(2014)2 SCC 269

3

for declaration. The High Court has also examined the plea of

limitation and held that the suit is within the period of

limitation.

6. While Ms. Ruchira Gupta submitted that the High Court

wrongly shifted the plaintiff’s burden to prove its own case

for declaration on to the State and that the plaintiff must

prove its own case, we found that what she was submitting was

not about the burden of proof but the standard of proof. We will

explain this in the context of fact as well as law.

7. On fact, the High Court referred to multiple pieces of

evidence, orders, and documents and string them together to come

to a clear conclusion that the title subsists in the plaintiff.

Suffice for us to say that these pieces of evidence were adduced

and proved by the plaintiff alone. The High Court did not solely

rely on the lack of evidence by the State to establish its own

title in coming to its conclusion. Thus, the burden of proof

was well-discharged by the plaintiff and the High Court

correctly examined and concluded its findings based on the

plaintiff’s evidence.

8. On law, the position is as follows. There is a clear

distinction between burden of proof and standard of proof. This

distinction is well-known to civil as well as criminal

practitioners in common law jurisprudence. What Ms. Ruchira

sought to point out is that the documents relied on by the

plaintiff did not point out the existence of title at all. She

is right to the extent that no single document in itself

4

concludes title in favour of the plaintiff, but this is not an

issue of burden of proof. This is a matter relating to the

sufficiency of evidence. While inquiring into whether a fact is

proved3, the sufficiency of evidence is to be seen in the context

of standard of proof, which in civil cases is by preponderance

of probability. By this test, the High Court has correctly

arrived at its conclusion regarding the existence of title in

favour of the plaintiff on the basis of the evidence adduced.

9. For these reasons, Civil Appeal arising out of judgment

of the High Court in First Appeal No. 282 of 2007 dated

21.10.2010 is dismissed.

10. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

11. No order as to costs.

 …………………………………………………………………………J.

 [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]

…………………………………………………………………………J.

[ARAVIND KUMAR]

NEW DELHI;

JANUARY 31, 2024

3 Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act defines the terms as:

“Proved”.––A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters

before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence

so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular

case, to act upon the supposition that it exists