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The promoter cannot shirk from the responsibilities/liabilities under the RERA Act and the contractual terms do not have an overriding effect ...........


The promoter cannot shirk from the responsibilities/liabilities under the RERA Act and the contractual terms do not have an overriding effect ........... Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC-LKO:76514

Page 1 of 94

A.F.R.

Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC-LKO:76514

RESERVED

Court No. - 30

(1) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 67 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lucknow Thru.

Its Executive Engineer Construction Division

Respondent :- Dhruv Kumar Chaturvedi

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

Connected With

(2) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 68 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Thru. Housing

Commissioner, Lucknow

Respondent :- Arun Kumar Dwivedi

Counsel for Appellant :- Shikhar Srivastava

With

(3) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 69 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Its

Add. Housing Commissioner/Secy. Niraj Shukla

Respondent :- Pramod Kumar

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(4) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 70 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Add.

Housing Commissioner/Secy. Niraj Shukla

Respondent :- Mahendra Yadav

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(5) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 71 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Add. Housing Commissioner/Secy. Niraj Shukla

Respondent :- Smt. Pooja Maurya

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

Counsel for Respondent :- Jay Krishna Shukla

With

(6) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 72 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Add. Housing Commissioner/Secy. Niraj Shukla

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 2 of 94

Respondent :- Dinesh Kumar Singh

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(7) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 73 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Add. Housing Commissioner/Secy. Niraj Shukla

Respondent :- Ku. Anju Prajapati

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(8) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 74 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Addl. Housing Commissioner/Secretary

Respondent :- Ashish Kumar Verma

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

Counsel for Respondent :- Jay Krishna Shukla

With

(9) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 75 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Addl. Housing Commissioner/Secretary

Respondent :- Navin Prakash Singh

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(10) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 76 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Addl. Housing Commissioner/Secretary

Respondent :- Mahesh Tiwari

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

Counsel for Respondent :- Jay Krishna Shukla

With

(11) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 77 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Addl. Housing Commissioner/Secretary

Respondent :- Anant Kumar

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

Counsel for Respondent :- Jay Krishna Shukla

With

(12) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 78 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 3 of 94

Addl. Housing Commissioner/Secretary

Respondent :- Vivek Srivastava

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(13) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 79 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Addl. Housing Commissioner/Secretary

Respondent :- Ajitabh Singh

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(14) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 80 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Addl. Housing Commissioner/Secretary

Respondent :- Smt. Sunita Singh

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(15) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 81 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Addl. Housing Commissioner/Secretary

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal, Lko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(16) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 82 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Addl. Housing Commissioner/Secy. Niraj Shukla

Respondent :- Vinay Kumar Patel

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(17) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 83 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, Lko. Thru. Addl.

Housing Commissioner/Secy.

Respondent :- Amit Kumar Pandey

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(18) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 84 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru. Its

Addl. Housing Commissioner/Secretary

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 4 of 94

Respondent :- Abhishek Kr. Gupta

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(19) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 85 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Addl.

Housing Commissioner/Secy.

Respondent :- Hanumant Prasad

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(20) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 86 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Thru. Housing

Commissioner Lko.

Respondent :- Satya Narayan Agnihotri

Counsel for Appellant :- Shikhar Srivastava

Counsel for Respondent :- Lalta Prasad Misra,Dwijendra

Mishra

With

(21) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 87 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Avas Evam Parishad,Lko. Thru. Addl.

Housing Commissioner/ Secy.

Respondent :- Manoj Kumar Chaturvedi

Counsel for Appellant :- Umesh Chandra Pandey

With

(22) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 88 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru.

Authorized Singnatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal,

Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(23) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 89 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad,Lko. Thru.

Authorize Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate.

Tribunal, Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

Counsel for Respondent :- Pradeep Kumar Singh

With

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 5 of 94

(24) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 90 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru.

Authorize Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(25) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 91 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Auth.

Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(26) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 92 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Addl.

Housing Commissioner Dr. Neeraj Shukla

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And 3 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(27) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 93 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko.Thru.

Authorize Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(28) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 94 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Dr.

Neeraj Shukla Addl. Housing Commissioner

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(29) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 95 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Dr.

Neeraj Shukla, Addl. Housing Commissioner

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 6 of 94

Tribunal, Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(30) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 96 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru.

Authority, Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(31) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 97 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru.

Authorize Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Offcer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(32) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 98 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad, Lko. Thru.

Authorize Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. Thru. Secy. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(33) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 99 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru.

Authorize Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal, Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh

With

(34) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 100 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad, Lko. Thru.

Authorize Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal, Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 7 of 94

(35) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 101 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru.

Authorize Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal, Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(36) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 102 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad, Lko. Thru. Its

Authorize Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Utkarsh Kumar,Anurag Singh

With

(37) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 103 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad, Lko. Thru.

Authorize Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(38) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 104 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru.

Authorize Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal, Lko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Utkarsh Kumar,Anurag Singh

With

(39) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 105 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru.

Housing Commissioner Dr. Neeraj Shukla

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

Counsel for Respondent :- Santosh Kumar Bhatt

With

(40) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 106 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad, Lko. Thru. Addl.

Housing Commissioner Dr. Neeraj Shukla

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 8 of 94

Tribunal, Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(41) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 107 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Addl.

Housing Commissioner Dr.Neerj Shukla

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunla

Lko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(42) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 108 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Addl.

Housing Commissioner Dr. Neeraj Shukla

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh,Utkarsh Kumar

With

(43) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 109 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Addl.

Housing Commissioner Dr. Neeraj Shukla

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Utkarsh Kumar,Anurag Singh

With

(44) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 110 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Its

Authorized Signatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh

With

(45) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 111 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Its

Authorized Singnatory Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh

With

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 9 of 94

(46) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 112 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P Awas Evam Vikas Paris. Lko. Thru. Its Auth.

Singna. Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Offic. Real Estate Appel. Trib. Lko.

And 2 Other

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh

With

(47) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 113 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Dr.

Neeraj Shukla

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh

With

(48) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 114 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Its

Author. Signa. Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presid. Offfi. Real Estate Appell. Tribu. Lko.

And 2 Other

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh

With

(49) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 115 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Autho.

Sign. Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

Lko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh

With

(50) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 116 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Its

Author. Signa. Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presid. Offic. Real Eatate Appell. Trib. Lko.

And 2 Other

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh

With

(51) Case :- RERA APPEAL No. - 117 of 2023

Appellant :- U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Lko. Thru. Autho.

Sign. Pankaj Verma

Respondent :- Presiding Officer Real Estate Appellate

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 10 of 94

Tribunallko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Anurag Singh

Hon’ble Om Prakash Shukla, J.

(1) At the outset, this Court deem it apt to divide the judgment into

sections to facilitate analysis, which are as follows :-

INDEX PAGE NO

A. Introduction 11

B. Decision in RERA Appeal Nos. 67, 69, 70,

71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82,

83, 84, 85, 87 of 2023

12

C. Decision in RERA Appeal No. 68 of 2023 54

D Decision in RERA Appeal No. 81 of 2023 56

E. Decision in RERA Appeal No. 86 of 2023 58

F. Decision in RERA Appeal Nos. 88, 89, 90,

91, 93, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103,

104 of 2023

61

G. Decision in RERA Appeal No. 92 of 2023 66

H. Decision in RERA Appeal No. 94 of 2023 69

I. Decision in RERA Appeal No. 95 of 2023 73

J. Decision in RERA Appeal No. 105 of 2023 76

K. Decision in RERA Appeal No. 106 of 2023 79

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 11 of 94

L. Decision in RERA Appeal No. 107 of 2023 81

M. Decision in RERA Appeal Nos. 108, 109 of

2023

85

N. Decision in RERA Appeal Nos. 110, 111,

112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117 of 2023

89

A. Introduction

(2) Heard Shri Anurag Singh, Shri Umesh Chandra Pandey and

Shri Shikhar Srivastava, learned Counsel representing the

appellant and Shri Pradeep Kumar Singh and Shri Santosh

Kumar Bhatt, learned Counsel representing the respondent.

(3) The above-captioned appeals have been filed by the appellant-

“U.P Avas Evam Vikas Parishad” under Section 58 of the Real

Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (hereinafter

referred to as “RERA Act, 2016”), wherein by virtue of the

impugned order, the learned U.P. Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Tribunal’)

has dismissed appeals filed by the appellant and it has been

directed that the amount deposited in terms of Section 43 (5) of

the RERA Act, 2016 by the appellant to be transferred to the

concerned account of the Regulatory Authority for disposal as

per the provisions of the Act.

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 12 of 94

(4) Due to reasons recorded by this Court in its earlier order dated

28.1.2023, the delay in filing of these appeals has already been

condoned and as such these bunch of appeals were heard

together for their disposal on merits.

B. RERA Appeal Nos. 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79,

80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87 of 2023

(5) These appeals arise out of the common judgment/order dated

25.11.2022 passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal.

(6) Since common question of law has been raised by the appellant

in all these appeals, it would be in the interest of justice that all

these appeals are consolidated and taken together for hearing

and disposal. However, before this Court deals with the

question of law raised in these appeals, the brief facts

culminating into these appeals be narrated to appreciate the law

in its proper perspective. In this regard, the facts of the lead

matter being RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 (complainantDhruv Kr. Chaturvedi) is taken into consideration.

Factual Matrix

(7) It has been submitted that the appellant is a public institution

constituted under the provisions of U.P Avas Evam Vikas

Adhiniyam, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Adhiniyam,

1973’) and is an instrumentality of State which works on ‘no

profit and no loss’ basis. The appellant had been constituted for

the welfare of the public and is engaged in providing planned

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 13 of 94

development of the city and answering to the residential needs

of the public at large in a regularised manner.

(8) It is claimed that the appellant has acquired the land for

development of housing projects under the provisions of U.P

Awas Evam Vikas Adhiniyam and the provisions of Land

Acquisition Act, 1894 as provided under law. It is the case of

the appellant that a Scheme was launched in Vrindavan Yojna

and after delivery of possession made by the Land Acquisition

in the year 2011 and during the project was to be in progress, a

new Act, namely, “The Right of Fair Compensation &

Rehabilitation Act, 2013” came into force, which caused

various hindrances in meaningful acquisition of the land and as

such some delay has occurred in the said project, which was

beyond the control of the appellant.

(9) It appears that registration for allotments of flats were opened

by the appellant for Vrindavan Yojna, Nilgiri Enclave under

self-finance scheme for a housing colony of 640 flats in March,

2013 and, as such, on an application by the respondent

(complainant before the authority), the appellant allotted a Flat

to the respondent on 31.08.2013 for an estimated sale

consideration of Rs. 20,88,000/-. As per the respondent, the

said amount of sale consideration was payable in installments

and the possession was to be given by the appellant within 24

months. However, the appellant failed to offer for possession to

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 14 of 94

the respondent within the said stipulated time period, which

resulted in increase in the Flat price and additional burden of

GST was made applicable to him. It was the case of the

respondent before the Authority that although he had regularly

paid all the installments, however. as per the registration

booklet, no windows in the Flat, no car parking, no sewage and

no other facilities were made available to him and most

importantly the possession was delayed.

(10) Admittedly, the sale deed for the said Flat was executed on

08.12.2017 and possession was given on 27.01.2018 and the

complaint was filed almost after one year of taking possession

by the respondent on various grounds including delay of

delivering possession of the flats, no windows in flats, parking

issue etc.

(11) On the other hand, the appellant took a ground before the

authority that the price of the flat was not fixed and was merely

tentative and similarly 24 months of possession was a tentative

date. According to them, construction was delayed because of

pendency of litigation in the High Court being Writ Petition No.

110 of 11 and 3869 of 11. Further delay was because of dharna

pradarshan of farmer’s union, for which a report/complaint was

also filed by the appellant. According to the appellant, the

registration booklet also mentions that in case the

respondent/allottee pays the last installment and still is not

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 15 of 94

given the possession of the flat, he was well within his right to

demand for refund of money, which in this case has not been

done by the respondent/allottee, meaning thereby that they have

volunteered to waive off their right to award of any

compensation. The appellant also stated before the authority

that the claim for compensation for delay under Section 12, 14,

18 and 19 of the Adhiniyam, 1973 was not maintainable.

According to them, window has been provided and car parking

has also been given.

(12) An objection was raised by the appellant before the Authority

as to the maintainability of the complaint, wherein the

Authority transferred the said compliant to the Adjudicating

Officer under Section 71 of the Act, 1973 for determination of

compensation for delay and other issues etc.

(13) The Adjudicating Authority, after discussing the contention of

both the parties in great detail, returned a finding dated

11.02.2021 that there had been a delay in giving the possession

of flat by the appellant. Thus, the authority, while accepting the

complaint of the respondent, directed the appellant to pay

interest as compensation on the amount of Flat i.e Rs.

20,88,000/- for the period of delay between 31.08.2015 to

18.08.2017 at the rate of MCLR+1% per annum within 45 days

of the passing of orders. Further direction was that in case the

said amount of compensation in the form of Interest is not paid

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 16 of 94

within the said 45 days, the respondent would be entitled for

interest at the same rate till the receipt of actual amount from

appellant.

(14) The appellant being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the

Adjudicating Authority filed an appeal under Section 44 of the

RERA Act, 2016 before the Appellate Tribunal.

(15) The said appeal was taken for hearing along with 22 other

appeals, lead matter being Appeal No. 245 of 2020 (U.P Avas

Evam Vikas Parishad V/s Sangeeta Singh), wherein the

Appellate Tribunal painstakingly prepared a tabular chart of the

pending 23 appeals, giving brief description of the flat allotted,

date of allotment, total price paid, date of impugned order, date

of filing of appeal and the relief sought in each appeal.

(16) The Appellate Tribunal having recorded the facts of each appeal

in a tabular form, went on to narrate the brief facts of the lead

appeal and the grounds preferred by the appellant along with

the relief sought. Further, the objection against the appeal by

the respondent was also noted by the Appellate Tribunal along

with the relevant judgments. Apparently, the Appellate Tribunal

after discussing the various issues raised by the appellant as

well as the respondent, rejected the appeal vide the common

impugned order dated 25.11.2022 along with almost 22 other

appeals on the same issue. It is this order which is subject

matter of challenge in these appeals.

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 17 of 94

Contention of the parties

(17) The learned Counsel for the appellant has strenuously argued

that the impugned order has been passed without considering

the fact that any claim under the RERA Act can be raised or

compensation can be granted only on the basis of contract

existing between the parties. According to him, after execution

of the sale deed, the prior contract of year 2013 having been

extinguished, the complaint itself was not maintainable and as

such he has argued that the impugned order has been passed

without any jurisdiction. The learned Counsel as an extension

of his argument has cited judgments of the National Consumer

Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) to suggest that the

complaint before the RERA was not maintainable of the

respondent/allottee, in case he had taken possession with an

open eye and without raising any objection. Further, grounds

were agitated relating to non-applicability of Section 18 of the

RERA Act, 2016 relating to grant of interest or compensation as

there existed no privity of contract between the parties. Further

thrust of the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant

were on the issue that when the allotment was made at a

tentative rate subject to calculation of final cost, there could not

had been any question about revised higher rates.

(18) Thus, the learned Counsel has attacked the impugned order

from all four corners and has also buttressed to frame almost six

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 18 of 94

substantial question of law, as could also be found in the memo

of appeals.

(19) Per contra, the learned Counsel for the respondent/allotee has

supported the impugned judgment. According to him, there is

no substantial question of law involved in the present appeal

and as such he has prayed for dismissal of the present appeal.

Discussion & Findings

(20) Before this Court embarks on to the onerous path of deciding

the present bunch of appeals, it would be apt to consider the

scope and purport of the provision of law under which these

appeals have been sought to be preferred by the appellant.

Admittedly, these appeals have been filed under section 58 of

the RERA Act, 2016, which inter-alia states :-

"58. Appeal to High Court-(1) Any

person aggrieved by any decision or order of

the Appellate Tribunal, may, file an appeal

to the High Court, within a period of sixty

days from the date of communication of the

decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal,

to him, on any one or more of the grounds

specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908:

Provided that the High Court may entertain

the appeal after the expiry of the said period

of sixty days, if it is satisfied that the

appellant was prevented by sufficient cause

from preferring the appeal in time.

Explanation-The expression "High Court"

means the High Court of a State or Union

territory where the real estate project is

situated.

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(2) No appeal shall lie against any

decision or order made by the Appellate

Tribunal with the consent of the parties."

(21) A plain reading of the aforesaid provision although sufficiently

provides for an appeal against the decision or order of the

Appellate Tribunal on any one and more grounds specified in

Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, however, the word

“Second Appeal” is missing from the aforesaid Section 58 of

the Act. In any case, the very mention of the availability of

grounds as specified in Section 100 of CPC makes the said

provision of the CPC relevant for consideration of any appeal

under Section 58 of the RERA Act, especially when technically

it is an appeal against an Appellate Tribunal’s decision or order

and in that sense is virtually a second appeal. It would be

profitable at this stage to quote Section 100 C.P.C, which reads

as under:

"100.Second appeal-(1) Save as otherwise

expressly provided in the body of this Code

or by any other law for the time being in

force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court

from every decree passed in appeal by any

Court subordinate to the High Court, if the

High Court is satisfied that the case

involves a substantial question of law.

(2) An appeal may lie under this section

from an appellate decree passed ex parte.

(3) In an appeal under this section, the

memorandum of appeal shall precisely

state the substantial question of law

involved in the appeal.

(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a

substantial question of law is involved in

any case, it shall formulate that question.

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(5) The appeal shall be heard on the

question so formulated and the respondent

shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be

allowed to argue that the case does not

involve such question:

Provided that nothing in this sub-section

shall be deemed to take away or abridge

the power of the Court to hear, for reasons

to be recorded, the appeal on any other

substantial question of law, not formulated

by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves

such question.]”

(22) There is no gainsaying that a right to appeal is always conferred

by the statute and any party does not have an inherent right to

appeal. In the present case, it has been mentioned that an appeal

under Section 58 of the RERA Act can be preferred on one or

more grounds specified in Section 100 CPC. Apparently,

Section 100 CPC provides for an appeal to the High Court, if it

is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.

Thus, it can be safely deduced that the existence of substantial

question of law is sine quo non for the exercise of jurisdiction

under Section 100 of the CPC as well as Section 58 of the

RERA Act.

(23) The principles for deciding when a question of law becomes a

substantial question of law, have been enunciated by a

Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sir Chunilal v. Mehta

& Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd : AIR 1962 SC

1314 wherein it was held :-

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“The proper test for determining whether a

question of law raised in the case is

substantial would, in our opinion, be

whether it is of general public importance

or whether it directly and substantially

affects the rights of the parties and if so

whether it is either an open question in the

sense that it is not finally settled by this

Court or by the Privy Council or by the

Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or

calls for discussion of alternative views. If

the question is settled by the highest court

or the general principles to be applied in

determining the question are well settled

and there is a mere question of applying

those principles or that the plea raised is

palpably absurd the question would not be

a substantial question of law.”

(24) Although, under Section 58 of the RERA Act, the jurisdiction

of this Court is confined to substantial question of law, which as

a corollary means that a finding of fact is not open to challenge

in this proceeding, even if the appreciation of evidence is

palpably erroneous and the finding of fact is incorrect as has

been held by the Apex Court in Ramchandra Vs.

Ramalingam: AIR 1963 SC 302, however the same is always

to the exceptions that (i) the conclusions drawn by the court

below do not have a basis in the evidence led or (ii) the

appreciation of evidence “suffers from material irregularity”.

(25) Recently, the Apex Court in the case of Nazir Mohamed V/s J.

Kamala and Ors. : (2020) 19 SCC 57 at paragraph 37

formulated the principles relating to Section 100 CPC as to how

and in what circumstances the substantial question of law can

be framed in the following words :-

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“37. The principles relating to Section 100

CPC relevant for this case may be

summarised thus:

An inference of fact from the recitals or

contents of a document is a question of

fact, but the legal effect of the terms of a

document is a question of law.

Construction of a document, involving the

application of any principle of law, is also a

question of law. Therefore, when there is

misconstruction of a document or wrong

application of a principle of law in

construing a document, it gives rise to a

question of law.

The High Court should be satisfied that the

case involves a substantial question of law,

and not a mere question of law. A question

of law having a material bearing on the

decision of the case (that is, a question,

answer to which affects the rights of parties

to the suit) will be a substantial question of

law, if it is not covered by any specific

provisions of law or settled legal principle

emerging from binding precedents, and,

involves a debatable legal issue.

A substantial question of law will also arise

in a contrary situation, where the legal

position is clear, either on account of

express provisions of law or binding

precedents, but the Court below has

decided the matter, either ignoring or acting

contrary to such legal principle. In the

second type of cases, the substantial

question of law arises not because the law

is still debatable, but because the decision

rendered on a material question, violates

the settled position of law.

The general rule is, that High Court will not

interfere with the concurrent findings of the

Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule.

Some of the well-recognised exceptions

are where (i) the courts below have ignored

material evidence or acted on no evidence;

(ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences

from proved facts by applying the law

erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly

cast the burden of proof. A decision based

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on no evidence, does not refer only to

cases where there is a total dearth of

evidence, but also refers to case, where

the evidence, taken as a whole, is not

reasonably capable of supporting the

finding.”

(26) Having traced the scope and power of interference by this Court

under Section 58 of the RERA Act, 2016 to an order passed by

the Appellate Tribunal, this Court finds it profitable to quote the

various question of law as mentioned by the appellant in the

memo of appeal, so as to examine its relevance keeping in view

the limited scope of provisions of Section 58 of the RERA Act,

2016. The question of law framed by the appellant are thus :-

“ (a) Whether the order and judgment

impugned suffers from illegality on account

of improper consideration of material and

law as well as exercising the jurisdiction not

vested in it?

(b) Whether the order of the tribunal

upholding the order of adjudicating officer

can be just, legal and proper ignoring that

the complaint itself was not maintainable as

was filed much before to the RERA Act

came into force and was not an ongoing

project in view to rule 2(h)?

(c) Whether the impugned judgment and

order about awarding the interest of

compensation for delayed period, ignoring

that it was not due to fault of the appellant

can be just and liable to be set aside in

view of principles of force majeure?

(d) Whether after dismissal of complaint

by authority vide order dated 19.10.2019

the compensation or interest can be

awarded in view to section 12, 14 & 18 of

the Act and the order be held to be just and

proper.

(e) Whether in deciding all 18 appeals by

common order without considering the fact

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of each cases or appreciating the points

involved and argument made, the finding

can be held to be a speaking order and not

in violation to principles of natural Justice?

(f) Whether the finding of the impugned

judgment and order specially awarding

interest on delayed possession is being

contrary to the law laid down by Apex Court

is totally illegal arbitrary and is otherwise

not valid in the eyes of law hence liable to

be set-aside.”

(27) The aforesaid issues framed by the appellant apparently seems

to have been already decided by the Appellate Tribunal,

wherein the issues framed by the Tribunal subsumes the

question of law framed by the appellant in the present petitions.

Apparently, the Appellate Tribunal applauding the main aim of

the RERA Act is to protect the home buyers and also to make

sure that the investments in the field of the real estate industry

get uplifted with time had proceeded to answer these questions,

keeping in view that the RERA Act was brought in the scenario

to see to the fact that the sale to a Home buyer whether it be an

apartment or a plot transparently takes place between the

promoter/developer and the allotee/Home buyers.

(28) Now the Court proceeds to see whether the six ''substantial

questions of law”, as have been framed by the appellants, are

invoked ''substantially' or not, so as to invoke the jurisdiction of

this Court. A three Bench Judge of the Apex Court some more

than a decade ago in Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam

Tiwari: (2001) 3 SCC 179, which was also reiterated and

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followed in Chandrabhan v. Saraswati : 2022 SCC Online SC

1273 and Government of Kerala Vs Joseph : 2023 SCC

Online SC 961 had held that to constitute a substantial question

of law, (i) the issue should not be previously settled by law of

land or a binding precedent, (ii) the said issue should have

material bearing on the decision of the case and (iii) the issue

raised should not be a fresh point raised for the first time before

the High Court, unless it goes to the root of the matter.

(29) Although, this Court exercising its Jurisdiction under Section

58 of the RERA Act is not enthroned as a Second Appellate

body, however, a fiction has been created by the Section itself,

which cast a duty and somewhat provide an embargo on the

appellant to file an appeal under the said section on any one or

more of the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908. Thus, a restriction has been cast upon

the appellant to prefer the appeal on a limited ground of

“substantial question of law” and in that sense this Court could

be held to have exercising its power of Second Appeal under

Section 58 of the RERA as envisioned under Section 100 of the

Civil Procedure Code. Pertinently, no such restriction is

attributable to this Court of considering the present appeal only

on the point of substantial question of law.

(30) From perusal of the bunch of appeals being decided by this

common order, it comes out that the respondents in each of the

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cases have booked a flat with the U.P. Awas Evam Vikas

Parishad and paid a booking amount in terms of scheme floated

by the Parishad. Apparently, the respondents were allotted a flat

in Neelgiri Enclave (Vrindavan Yojna) during the period 2013-

2014. The Parishad, thereafter, demanded certain amount

towards allotted flats. The respondent claims to have submitted

the aforesaid amount as and when the demands were raised by

the Parishad. It is admitted that the possession of the flat was

supposed to be given within 30 months from the date of

allotment as per Clause 9.1 of the brochure. However, it was

only in 2017, that the respondents were asked to deposit the

final amount, so that the sale deed can be registered of the Flats

and it was subsequently only that the possession of these Flats

were given to the respondents. It is after having received the

possession and after registration of the sale deed, the

respondents filed a Complaint Case before the U.P. Real Estate

Regulatory Authority (hereinafter referred to as ''Authority')

claiming refund of certain excess amount, refund of interest,

compensation for delayed possession and other ancillary noncompliance of the RERA provisions relating to construction and

parking. Apparently, the complaint was allowed by the

Authority, wherein the Parishad was directed to pay interest on

the total amount of sale consideration paid till the date of

possession of the apartment at the rate of MCLR + 1% as

compensation. Subsequently, the Parishad filed various appeals

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before the Appellate Tribunal, which came to be decided by the

impugned common order dated 25.11.2022, by virtue of which

the order of the Authority was upheld and hence the present

second appeals.

(31) This Court has gone through the appeals filed by the Parishad

with assistance of the learned Counsel appearing for the

appellant and the alleged substantial questions of law.

(32) Having traced the principles of law for consideration of the

present appeal under Section 58 of the RERA Act, it is apparent

that none of the ''substantial' questions of law” as have been

framed by the appellant fall within the ambit of being

''substantial” questions of law. The reason for the same is that

the ''substantial” questions of law as have been framed by the

appellant are specifically covered by the specific provisions of

law as per the interpretation given to them and do not involve

any debatable legal issue as has been also held in Nazir

Mohamed Vs J. Kamala and Ors.: (2020) 19 SCC 57 at

paragraph 32, which inter-alia observes :-

“32. To be “substantial”, a question of law

must be debatable, not previously settled

by the law of the land or any binding

precedent, and must have a material

bearing on the decision of the case and/or

the rights of the parties before it, if

answered either way.”

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(33) The learned Counsel for the appellant has during the course of

his argument emphatically stressed on a recent order of the

learned RERA Appellate Tribunal passed in Appeal No. 70 of

2023 (GNIDA Vs. Ranjan Mishra) and two other connected

matters to argue that the RERA Tribunal has itself vide the said

judgment dated 20.04.2023 has held that the Adjudicating

Officer does not have the jurisdiction to grant interest in the

form of compensation under section 18(1) of the RERA Act and

that according to the learned Counsel, the Appellate Tribunal

has itself recorded in the said order that the competence and

jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Officer was being examined by

the Appellate Tribunal for the first time in the said case. While

the order of an Appellate Tribunal is not binding on this Court,

which has been designated as a Court of Second Appeal under

the scheme of RERA Act and even the judicial proprietary does

not permit this Court to consider the said order for adjudication

of these appeals, however, as is being discussed hereinafter, the

issue raised and decided in both the cases are at stark

differences.

(34) This Court on the specific query having put to the learned

Counsel for the appellant as to whether any ground had been

taken by him before the RERA Appellate Tribunal or before this

Hon’ble Court relating to the competence or jurisdiction of the

Adjudicating Authority for grant of interest as compensation

under Section 18(1) of the RERA Act, learned Counsel has

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neither admitted nor denied the said query and has instead

relied on the following judgments to buttress his submission

that a pure question of law, not dependent upon any question of

facts can be allowed to be raised for the first time even before

the Appellate Court.

(I) Chittoori Subbanna Vs Kudappa

Subbanna, AIR 1965 SC 1325,

(II) State of Punjab Vs Dr. R.N.

Bhatnagar & Ors. (1999) 2 SCC 330,

(III) T.C. Appanda Mudaliar Vs State of

Madras, (1976) 4 SCC 821,

(IV) Dr. Jagmittar Sain Bhagat Vs Dir. of

Health Services, (2013) 10 SCC 136,

(V) Saroj Rani Vs Sudarshan Kr.

Chadha (1984) 4 SCC 90,

(VI) State of Uttar Pradesh & others Vs

Dr. Anupam Gupta & Ors. (1993)

Suppl(1) SCC 594,

(VII) Lakshmi Shankar Mehrotra

& Ors. Vs S.M. Sengupta & Ors, (1995)

Suppl(4) SCC 40.

(35) There could not be any doubt about the aforesaid legal

precedent, however, as held in various judgment that a decision

is an authority for the questions of law determined by it and

while applying the ratio, the Court may not pick out a word or a

sentence from the judgment divorced from the context in which

the said question arose for consideration. Thus Court finds that

there is no quarrel about the proposition of law argued by the

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learned Counsel for the appellant, however, the fact of the

matter remains that jurisdiction is an issue, which ought to have

been decided at a preliminary stage itself.

(36) At this juncture, it would be apt to quote the question of

determination formulated by the learned RERA Appellate

Tribunal, which inter-alia enumerates as follows:

“ I. Whether the complaint filed before

the Adjudicating officer is maintainable as

cause of action arose in year, 2013 before

RERA Act, 2016 came into force as

pleaded by appellant- UP Avas evam Vikas

Parishad, Lucknow in its Appeal ? .

II. Whether the project in question of the

appellant- UP Avas evam Vikas Parishad,

Lucknow is delayed ?

III. Whether the judgment and order

dated 13.03.2020 passed by the

Adjudicating Officer awarding the interest in

terms of compensation to the respondent/

complainant for delayed period from

30.07.2016 to 24.09.2019 is liable to be set

aside for the reasons mentioned in

appeal?”

(37) Thus, apparently the issue of competence and jurisdiction was

neither raised by the appellant before the Appellate Tribunal,

nor the same has been raised in the present memo of appeals

filed in this Court.

(38) Moreover, there is another aspect of the matter. This Court de

hors the aforesaid belated challenge to the Jurisdiction by the

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appellant would had entertained the said challenge even at this

stage, however, a plain reading of the facts of the present case

leads one to the conclusion that both the matters are

distinguishable on facts.

(39) Apparently, it is available from the impugned order of the

Adjudicating Officer that the allottee had filed a complaint

seeking compensation for various reasons, including (i) relating

to delay in possession, (ii) there being no windows in the flat

and (iii) non-providing of parking area etc., wherein the RERA

Authority vide an order dated 19.10.2019 marked the said case

for adjudication to the said Adjudicating Officer because

Section 18 of the Act related to grant of interest as well as

compensation. The learned Adjudicating Officer after hearing

the parties and recording the findings came to a conclusion that

there had been a delay in providing possession to the allottee

during the period from 31.08.2015 to 18.08.2017 and as such

for that period granted compensation to be calculated as an

interest at the rate of SBI Home loan rate MCLR+ 1%

calculated annually. The Adjudicating Officer held that interest

amount would be the compensation granted.

(40) Thus, this Court finds that the Adjudicating Officer has awarded

compensation in the form of interest, which in this case is “SBI

Home loan rate MCLR+ 1% calculated annually”. This Court

needs not burden this judgement any further in explaining the

meaning of compensation, which may be both monetary as well

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as non-monetary, direct or indirect etc. In the present case,

apparently, it seems that the appellant is so engrossed with the

word “Interest” that it is not able to visualize interest and

compensation separately. Needless to say, interest is a sub-set

of compensation and not vice-versa. Further, a Division bench

of the Bombay High Court in the case of Neelkamal Realtors

Suburban Pvt. Ltd. And others Vs. Union of India : AIR

2018 (NOC) 398 (BOM.), while deciding the constitutionality

of various provisions of RERA, observed as follows :-

“Section 18(1)(b) lays down that if the

promoter fails to complete or is unable to

give possession of an apartment due to

discontinuance of his business as a

developer on account of suspension or

revocation of the registration under the Act

or for any other reason, he is liable on

demand to the allottees, in case the allottee

wishes to withdraw from the project, without

prejudice to any other remedy available, to

return the amount received by him in

respect of that apartment with interest at

such rate as may be prescribed in this

behalf including compensation. If the

allottee does not intend to withdraw from

the project he shall be paid by the promoter

interest for every month's delay till handing

over of the possession. The requirement to

pay interest is not a penalty as the payment

of interest is compensatory in nature in the

light of the delay suffered by the allottee

who has paid for his apartment but has not

received possession of it. The obligation

imposed on the promoter to pay interest till

such time as the apartment is handed over

to him is not unreasonable. The interest is

merely compensation for use of money.”

(41) In any case, the point being raised by the learned Counsel for

the appellant in challenging the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating

Authority vis-à-vis the RERA Authority for grant of interest for

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an allottee who wishes to remain invested with the project and

eventually takes the possession, is not under challenge, as

proviso to Section 18(1) clearly mandates that where an allottee

does not intend to withdraw from the project, he shall be paid

by the promoter, interest for every month of delay, till the

handing over of the possession, at such rate as may be

prescribed. Therefore, by raising the point of jurisdiction, the

learned Counsel has waived to certain extent the grant of

interest, as the resurrected challenge is as to who can grant

interest, whether the Authority or the Adjudicating Officer. This

Court finds that the aforesaid challenge has been already

answered by the Apex Court at paragraph 86 of the judgment

reported as M/s Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt.

Ltd. Vs. State of U.P (Civil Appeal No. 6745-6749 of 2021)

decided on 11.11.2021, which inter-alia states;

“86. From the scheme of the Act of which

a detailed reference has been made and

taking note of power of adjudication

delineated with the regulatory authority and

adjudicating officer, what finally culls out is

that although the Act indicates the distinct

expressions like ‘refund’, ‘interest’, ‘penalty’

and ‘compensation’, a conjoint reading of

Sections 18 and 19 clearly manifests that

when it comes to refund of the amount,

and interest on the refund amount,

or directing payment of interest for delayed

delivery of possession, or penalty and

interest thereon, it is the regulatory

authority which has the power to

examine and determine the outcome

of a complaint. At the same time, when

it comes to a question of seeking the relief

of adjudging compensation and interest

thereon under Sections 12, 14, 18

and 19, the adjudicating officer

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exclusively has the power to

determine, keeping in view the

collective reading of Section 71 read with

Section 72 of the Act. If the adjudication

under Sections 12, 14, 18 and 19 other

than compensation as envisaged, if

extended to the adjudicating officer as

prayed that, in our view, may intend to

expand the ambit and scope of the powers

and functions of the adjudicating officer

under Section 71 and that would be against

the mandate of the Act 2016.”

(42) It is no gain saying that both RERA Authority and Adjudicating

Authority operates in different hemisphere, inasmuch as RERA

Authority is empowered to grant interest whereas Adjudicating

Authority is empowered to adjudge compensation and interest

and thus the jurisdiction of grant of Interest in the form of

compensation by the Adjudicating Authority for and in place of

the RERA Authority cannot be faulted with.

(43) Further, there is another aspect of the matter. An examination of

Section 71 of the Act reveals that an Adjudicating Officer is to

be appointed by the Regulatory Authority in consultation with

the Government. The Adjudicating Officer alone has the power

to deal with the application for adjudging compensation under

Section 71 read with Sections 12, 14, 18 and 19 of the Act as

could be well deduced on a simple reading of section 71(1) and

71(2) of the Act. However, Section 71(3) of the Act provides

that the Adjudicating Officer has powers to direct to pay such

compensation or interest, as the case may be, if he is satisfied

that the person has failed to comply with the provisions of any

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of the section as provided in subsection (1) i.e section 12, 14,

18 & 19 of the Act. as the case may, as much as subsection (3)

of section 18 of the Act, 2016 signifies that if the promoter fails

to discharge any other obligations imposed on him under this

Act or the rules or regulations, made thereunder or in

accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement for

sale, he shall be liable to pay such compensation to the allottee,

in the manner as provided under the Act, 2016. Moreover,

section 71 relating to factors to be taken into account by

adjudicating officer signifies various factors which are to be

taken into consideration by the Adjudicating Officer, while

adjudging the quantum of compensation or Interest as the case

may be under section 71 of the Act. Thus, the provisions of

RERA are wide enough to empower the adjudicating Officer to

adjudicate the quantum of compensation and grant the same in

the form of Interest as has been done in the present case.

(44) According to this Court, the challenge to the competence and

jurisdiction of the Adjudicating officer in the present set of facts

is wholly misplaced as the Adjudicating Officer has awarded

compensation in the form of interest and not interest simplicitor

as is being construed by the appellant, which according to him

is the prerogative of the RERA Authority. This Court also finds

that the Apex Court in the aforesaid M/s Newtech Promoters

and Developers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) has nowhere discussed the

form of compensation to be awarded to the allottee. Therefore,

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in the present case, in case the Adjudicating Officer has

awarded compensation in the form of Interest, nothing illegal or

infirmity could be found in the competence or Jurisdiction of

the Adjudicating Officer. The said finding also is being given

keeping in view the beneficial legislation for which RERA Act

was enacted by the legislation for safeguarding the interest of

Home Buyers by ensuring fair practice, providing timely

information and resolving disputes between an allottee and the

Developers.

(45) Having perused the records, this Court is of the view that no

substantial question of law arises in these petitions. In any case,

a perusal of the impugned judgment would reveal that the

Appellate Tribunal has not missed the woods of the tree and has

dealt all the issues which are being raised herein by the

Appellant in a very elaborate manner by following the

provisions of the Act 2016 and the various judgment of the

Apex Court in the said subject.

(46) Notwithstanding the above, as the memo of appeal has been

preferred and since the counsel for the appellant has strenuously

urged this Court to decide on the substantial question of law

framed by him in the appeal, this Court finds its bounden duty

to deal with these question (which has been termed by the

Appellant as substantial question of law) as has been

enumerated in the memo of appeal.

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(47) Having regard to the question No. 1 i.e. “ (a)Whether the order

and judgment impugned suffers from illegality on account of

improper consideration of material and law as well as

exercising the jurisdiction not vested in it?, learned counsel for

the appellant is unable to show from records as to how the

impugned judgment suffers from any illegality and as to which

specific material or law has been improperly considered by the

Appellate Tribunal. Learned Counsel has drawn attention of this

Court to the provisions of Section 44 of the RERA Act in

general which bestows the jurisdiction of appeal to the

Appellate Tribunal and specifically Section 44(6) of the Act,

which inter-alia gives sweeping power of jurisdiction vested in

it as it says as under:-

“(6) The Appellate Tribunal may, for the

purpose of examining the legality or

propriety or correctness of any order or

decision of the Authority or the adjudicating

officer, on its own motion or otherwise, call

for the records relevant to deposing of such

appeal and make such orders as it thinks

fit.”

(48) This Court finds that the Appellate Tribunal after narrating the

facts and grounds of the contesting parties, went on to

formulate the following points for determination:

“(I) whether the complaint filed before the

Adjudicating Officer is maintainable as

cause of action arose in year, 2013 before

RERA Act, 2016 came into force as

pleaded by appellant- U.P Avas evam Vikas

Parishad, Lukcknow in its Appeal?

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(II) Whether the project in question of the

Appellant- U.P Avas evam Vikas Parishad,

Lukcknow is delayed?

(III) Whether the judgment and order

dated 13.03.2020 passed by the

Adjudicating Officer awarding the interest in

terms of compensation to the respondent/

complainant for delayed period from

30.07.2016 to 24.09.2019 is liable to be set

aside for the reasons mentioned in

appeal?”

(49) As far as the first issue is concerned, the Appellate Tribunal

extensively recorded the facts and returned a finding that

although the scheme was floated by the appellant in 2013 and

the respondent booked a flat in the same year and the RERA

Act, 2016 came into force on 1st May, 2016, however the

project being an “Ongoing project” before 24.09.2019 i.e the

date when Antim Pradeshan Patra was issued by the Appellant

for delivery of possession by them to the Respondent, the

provisions of RERA were applicable to the project in view of

Rule 2(h) of the U.P Real Estate ( Regulation & Development)

Rules, 2016.

(50) This Court finds that the Appellate Tribunal has returned the

aforesaid finding, after examining the expression and meaning

of “ongoing project” as is to be found in Rule 2(h) of U.P Real

Estate ( Regulation & Development) Rules, 2016, Completion

certificate as is defined in section 2(q) of the RERA Act, 2016,

section 4(5) of the U.P Apartment (promotion of construction,

Ownership and Maintenance) Act, 2010 relating to the

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requirement of “Completion Certificate” and “Occupancy

certificate” as defined in section 2(zf) of the RERA Act, 2016.

(51) Further, as far as the second issue relating to the delay in the

project, the Appellate Tribunal examined the provisions of

clause 2.1 of the Registration Booklet relating to the date of

possession proposed by the Appellant and the actual date of

possession and after referring to the judgment of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in M/s Fortune(now known as HICON

Infrastructure) and Anr. V/s Trevor D’lima & Ors. : (2018)

5 SCC 442, wherein it was held that a person cannot be made to

wait indefinitely, concluded that the project of the Appellant

was delayed.

(52) The Appellate Tribunal, while deciding the third point for

determination, cited the provisions of Clauses 2.1 and 9.1 of the

Registration Booklet along with Clauses 4.5 and 4.6 of the

Registration Booklet. Apparently, the Appellate Tribunal after

examining the various judgment including Lucknow

Development Authority Vs M.K. Gupta, 1994 (91) SCC 243,

Ghaziabad Development Authority V/s Balbir Singh, 2004

(5) SCC 65, Haryana Development Authority V/s Darsh

Kumar, 2005 (9) SCC 449 and also Ghaziabad Development

Authority V/s Union of India, 2000 (6) SCC 113 along with

Bangalore Development Authority V/s Syndicate Bank

reported in II (2007) CPJ 17 (SC) arrived at a conclusion that

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the tentative period or proposed period for construction of the

flat does not mean a “unreasonable period”. The Appellate

Tribunal also recording that the possession of the flat was not

given as per the proposed timeline of possession as mentioned

in the Registration Booklet and the possession came to be given

by the appellant much later. Thus, the Appellate Tribunal

upheld the finding of the Adjudicating Authority by holding that

the Authority had adopted a moderate view and has considered

the delay from the proposed expiry of the date of possession to

the date of issuance of Antim pradeshan patra by the Appellant

and not the execution of the sale deed, which ought to have

been the actual date of delivery of possession and as such held

the calculation for delay in possession by the Authority to be

not for an unreasonable period.

(53) As far as the other issues relating to failure of the appellant to

rectify the structural defects and common facilities, in violation

of Section 14 of the RERA Act, 2016 and the entitlement of

compensation by the respondent in addition to the delay in

possession as contended by the Respondent, the Appellant

argued that in case of delay in giving possession of the flat,

within prescribed period, the option was open to the

allottee/respondent to claim refund of the deposited amount at

the prescribed rate of interest and if despite the delay the

allottee preferred for possession of the flat rather than refund of

the deposited amount, the allottee’s right to claim

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

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interest/compensation did not existed, especially when after

execution of sale deed in favour of the allottee/respondent, the

question of any structural defect does not arise.

(54) This Court finds that the Appellate Tribunal has extensively

dealt with the aforesaid issue in the impugned order and while

referring to Chapter III of the RERA Act, 2016 comprising of

Sections 12 to 18 dealing with functions and duties of

promoters has recorded a finding that Section 71 of the Act

entails that in contravention of the provisions of section 12, 14,

18 and 19(4) by the promoter, the allottee is well within his

rights to get refund of his/her entire deposited amount along

interest “ as such rate as may be prescribed” and “compensation

in the manner provided under the Act”.

(55) The Appellate Tribunal also upheld the findings of the

Adjudicating Authority to the effect that if the amount of

interest was not paid within a period of 45 days, the respondent

was entitled to get interest at the same rate till the date of actual

payment, to be a means of check upon the appellant to honour

the time-line within which the awarded amount of interest had

been directed to be paid to the respondent/allottee. Even the last

submission of the appellant related to financial crisis and

running of the project on “no loss and no profit basis” to justify

that the interest was not payable for delayed period was rejected

on the ground that the same was immaterial and the award of

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interest in the case of delayed possession was as per the

provision of the RERA Act.

(56) Thus, a well-reasoned and detailed judgment was passed by the

Appellate Tribunal, wherein all the Appeals filed by the

Appellant was dismissed.

(57) The Appellate Tribunal examined the evidence on record at

length, and arrived at a reasoned conclusion, that there was a

delay in handing over of the possession of the project to the

respondent. This finding is based on cogent and binding

documents of Registration Document, occupation certificate,

including the registered sale deeds by which the respective

allottees have taken possession of the flats. There was no

erroneous inference from any proved fact.

(58) The learned Counsel was not able to produce any judgment to

espouse its cause of challenging the jurisdiction allegedly not

having been vested with the Appellate Tribunal.

(59) In view thereof, this Court is of the view that the order and

judgment impugned does not suffers from any illegality or

infirmity. There is no alleged improper consideration of

material and law nor the Tribunal has exercised its jurisdiction

not specifically vested by the provisions of RERA Act.

(60) As far as Question No.2 i.e. “(b) Whether the order of the

tribunal upholding the order of adjudicating officer can be just,

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legal and proper ignoring that the complaint itself was not

maintainable as was filed much before to the RERA Act came

into force and was not an ongoing project in view to rule 2(h)?

is concerned, this Court finds that admittedly, the completion

certificate has been issued to the Project after the

commencement of the RERA Act, 2016 and the sale deed and

possession has been granted in the year 2017-2018. Besides the

fact that the said issue has been extensively dealt with and

decided by the Appellate Tribunal as issue No.1, this court finds

that the said issue has already been settled by the Apex Court in

various judgments including in the case of M/s. Newtech

Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of UP & Ors.

(supra). The Apex Court, while deciding the issue as to

whether the RERA Act has retroactive or retrospective effect,

held that the Act is not retrospective in nature because it affects

the existing rights of the persons mentioned in the Act like

promoters, allotees etc. and the intent of the legislature was to

bring all "ongoing projects"2 which commenced prior to the Act

and for which the completion certificate had not been issued,

under the ambit of the Act. The relevant observation could be

found at paragraph 34 to 40, which are being curled out for

ready reference :-

“34. The term “ongoing project” has not

been so defined under the Act while the

expression “real estate project” is defined

under Section 2 (zn) of the Act which reads

as under:

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“2(zn) “real estate project” means the

development of a building or a building

consisting of apartments, or converting an

existing building or a part thereof into

apartments, or the development of land

into plots or apartments, as the case may

be, for the purpose of selling all or some of

the said apartments or plots or building, as

the case may be, and includes the

common areas, the development works, all

improvements and structures thereon, and

all easement, rights and appurtenances

belonging thereto;”

35. The Act is intended to comply even to

the ongoing real estate project. The

expression “ongoing project” has been

defined under Rule 2(h) of the Uttar

Pradesh Real Estate (Regulation and

Development) Rules, 2016 which reads as

under:-

“2(h) “Ongoing project” means a

project where development is going

on and for which completion

certificate has not been issued but

excludes such projects which fulfil

any of the following criteria on the

date of notification of these rules:

(i) Where services have been

handed over to the Local Authority

for maintenance.

(ii) where common areas and

facilities have been handed over to

the Association for the Residents'

Welfare Association for maintenance.

(iii) where all development work have

been completed and sale/lease

deeds of sixty percent of the

apartment/houses/plots have been

executed.

(iv) where all development works

have been completed and

application has been filed with the

competent authority for issue of

completion certificate.”

36. The expression “completion

certification” has been defined under

Section 2(q) and “occupancy certificate”

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under Section 2(zf) of the Act which reads

as under :-

“2(q) “completion certificate” means

the completion certificate, or such

other certificate, by whatever name

called, issued by the competent

authority certifying that the real

estate project has been developed

according to the sanctioned plan,

layout plan and specifications, as

approved by the competent authority

under the local laws;

2(zf). “occupancy certificate”

means the occupancy certificate, or

such other certificate, by whatever

name called, issued by the

competent authority permitting

occupation of any building, as

provided under local laws, which has

provision for civic infrastructure such

as water, sanitation and electricity;”

37. Looking to the scheme of Act 2016

and Section 3 in particular of which a

detailed discussion has been made, all

“ongoing projects” that commence prior to

the Act and in respect to which completion

certificate has not been issued are covered

under the Act. It manifests that the

legislative intent is to make the Act

applicable not only to the projects which

were yet to commence after the Act

became operational but also to bring under

its fold the ongoing projects and to protect

from its inception the inter se rights of the

stake holders, including allottees/home

buyers, promoters and real estate agents

while imposing certain duties and

responsibilities on each of them and to

regulate, administer and supervise the

unregulated real estate sector within the

fold of the real estate authority.

38. The emphasis of Mr. Kapil Sibal,

learned senior counsel for the appellant is

that the agreement of sale was executed in

the year 201011, i.e. much before the

coming into force of the Act and the

present Act has retrospective application

and registration of ongoing project under

the Act would be in contravention to the

contractual rights established between the

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promoter and allottee under the agreement

for sale executed which is impermissible in

law and further submits that Sections 13,

18(1), 19(4) of the Act 2016 to the extent of

their retrospective application is in violation

of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) of the Constitution

of India.

39. Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor

General, on the other hand, submits that a

bare perusal of the object and reasons

manifest that the Act does not take away

the substantive jurisdiction, rather it

protects the interest of homebuyers where

project/possession is delayed and further

submits that the scheme of the Act has

retroactive application, which is permissible

under the law. The provisions make it clear

that it operates in future, however, its

operation is based upon the character and

status which have been done earlier and

the presumption against retrospectively in

this case is ex-facie rebuttable. The literal

interpretation of the statute manifest that it

has not made any distinction between the

“existing” real estate projects and “new”

real estate projects as has been defined

under Section 2(zn) of the Act.

40. Learned counsel further submits that

the key word, i.e., “ongoing on the date of

the commencement of this Act” by

necessary implication, exfacie and without

any ambiguity, means and includes those

projects which were ongoing and in cases

where only issuance of completion

certificate remained pending, legislature

intended that even those projects have to

be registered under the Act. Therefore, the

ambit of Act is to bring all projects under its

fold, provided that completion certificate

has not been issued. The case of the

appellant is based on “occupancy

certificate” and not of “completion

certificate”. In this context, learned counsel

submits that the said proviso ought to be

read with Section 3(2)(b), which specifically

excludes projects where completion

certificate has been received prior to the

commencement of the Act. Thus, those

projects under Section 3(2) need not be

registered under the Act and, therefore, the

intent of the Act hinges on whether or not a

project has received a completion

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certificate on the date of commencement of

the Act.”

(61) Since the Authority and the Appellate Authority have returned a

finding of fact that the completion certificate was issued on

20.12.2018, i.e much later than the date of commencement of

the RERA Act, 2016 and there is no contrary argument by the

learned Counsel for the appellant, the Appellate Tribunal was

right in holding that the present project was an “ongoing

project” and the complaint filed by the respondent was

maintainable. Thus, no substantial question of law arises as

neither the issue raised is debatable nor the same has not been

decided by a binding principle of the Hon’ble Apex Court.

(62) As far as the Question No.3 raised by the appellant is

concerned, which inter-alia states that “(c) Whether the

impugned judgment and order about awarding the interest of

compensation for delayed period, ignoring that it was not due

to fault of the appellant can be just and liable to be set aside in

view of principles of force majeure?, this Court finds that the

aforesaid is essentially a question of fact and there are two

concurrent findings against the appellant. The Appellate

Authority have elaborately dealt with the said aspect and while

deciding issue No.2 has returned a finding that the project was

delayed. Further, this court finds that the factum of farmer

agitation to be construed as force majeure was also considered

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by the Appellate Tribunal in extenso and has also discussed the

principles of force majeure.

(63) The Tribunal also discussed the issue as to whether famers

agitation would be termed as “Force Majeure” or not and while

citing the explanation appended to section 6 of the RERA Act,

2016 and discussing the expression “ Act of God” or “Vis

Major” and the Judgment of Ramalinga Nadar V/s Narayan

Reddiar, AIR 1971 Kerala 197 which dealt with the term “VisMajor”, returned a finding that the case at hand and situation

narrated by the Appellant could not be covered under the

meaning of “Force majeure”

(64) This court also does not find any reason to interfere with the

findings arrived by the Appellate Tribunal, which are based on

precedent and sound legal principles. Thus, the present question

does not give rise to any debatable point nor the issue being

raised is in the nature of substantial question of law.

(65) Having regard to question No. 4 raised by the Appellant i.e. (d)

whether after dismissal of complaint by authority vide order

dated 19.10.2019 the compensation or interest can be awarded

in view to section 12, 14 & 18 of the Act and the order be held

to be just and proper, this court finds that the aforesaid issue is

a misconceived perception of the Appellant. Apparently, the

respondent had filed a cumulative complaint relating to delay in

possession, no window in flat and no parking having been

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provided to him and as such has sought for compensation. The

authority vide order dated 19.10.2019 has partially rejected the

contention of the respondent relating to car parking and window

not having been provided in the Flat taking cognizance of

section 12 and 14 of RERA Act, however the Authority finding

a delay in giving of possession to the respondent had referred

the complaint for award of compensation & disposal under

section 71 of the RERA Act to the Adjudicating Authority.

(66) The Appellate Tribunal has rightly observed that section 12 to

18 deals with “Functions and Duties of Promoter” and

invariably relates to duties which have been imposed upon the

promoter. Further, section 71 of the Act clearly says that in

contravention of the provisions of section 12, 14, 18 and 19(4)

by the promoter, the allottee is well within his right to get

refund of his/her entire deposited amount along with interest “at

such rate as may be prescribed” and “compensation in the

manner provided under the Act”. It goes without saying that

Section 18(1) of the Act provides as under :-

“18(1) If the promoter fails to complete or is

unable to give possession of an apartment,

plot or building,—

(a) in accordance with the terms of the

agreement for sale or, as the case may be,

duly completed by the date specified

therein; or

(b) due to discontinuance of his business

as a developer on account of suspension or

revocation of the registration under this Act

or for any other reason, he shall be liable

on demand to the allottees, in case the

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allottee wishes to withdraw from the

project, without prejudice to any other

remedy available, to return the amount

received by him in respect of that

apartment, plot, building, as the case may

be, with interest at such rate as may be

prescribed in this behalf including

compensation in the manner as provided

under this Act:

Provided that where an allottee does not

intend to withdraw from the project, he shall

be paid, by the promoter, interest for every

month of delay, till the handing over of the

possession, at such rate as may be

prescribed.”

(67) Thus, the said Section consists of two parts. Here this Court is

concerned with the second part, which invariably gives an

indefeasible right to the allottee in the case he does not intent to

withdraw from the project. The second part in clear and loud

terms say that the allottee in such a situation would be entitled

for interest for every month of delay, till the handing over of the

possession, at such rate as may be prescribed. Further, this court

finds that in order to determine the point of compensation the

power has been bestowed upon the adjudicating officer in terms

of section 71 & 72 of the RERA Act read with rule 34(1) of the

U.P RERA Rules, 2016. Thus, this also being a loosely

connection of fact and law does not qualify to be termed as

substantial question of law and as such needs no further

interference from this court.

(68) As far as question No. 5 i.e. (e) Whether in deciding all 18

appeals by common order without considering the fact of each

cases or appreciating the points involved and argument made,

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the finding can be held to be a speaking order and not in

violation to principles of natural Justice?, is concerned, this

Court finds that the Appellate Tribunal has painstakingly

recorded the facts of each case in a tabular chart at paragraph

No1 and has briefly given details of all the cases in the said

chart. Further, this court finds that although the facts relating to

flat no, sale consideration, project, allotment letter, final letter,

date of sale deed or date of possession might have been

different, but it is not the case of the Appellant that the

completion certificate in any of the case was not 20.12.2018 or

for that matter prior to the coming of force of the RERA Act. It

is also not the case of the Appellant that the duration of

completion of project was not 24/30 months but something

more or that the possession was given by them during the said

duration as provided in the registration booklet or that the

possession was not delayed. Apparently, the appellant has taken

a common defence in all the complaints filed by the respondent

and as such this court does not find any error of the Appellate

Tribunal in deciding these cases vide the present common

impugned order. In any case, this also does not qualify to be a

substantial question of law as has been projected by the

Appellant.

(69) The last question No. 6 as framed by the appellant i.e. (f)

whether the finding of the impugned judgment and order

specially awarding interest on delayed possession is being

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contrary to the law laid down by Apex Court is totally illegal

arbitrary and is otherwise not valid in the eyes of law hence

liable to be set-aside.” is concerned, a perusal of the order

passed by the Authority as well as the Tribunal would

sufficiently indicate that they have proceeded to grant

compensation in terms of provisions contained in Section 71

read with Section 72 of the RERA Act 2016.

(70) The learned Appellate Tribunal has also recorded in the

impugned order that the Adjudicating Officer has passed the

impugned order by exercising his power under section 71 and

71 of the Act read along with Rule 34(1) of the Rules, 2016.

Thus, the Tribunal while referring to the case reported as M/s

Imperia Structures Ltd. V/s Anil Patni and Another, Civil

Appeal Nos. 3581-3590 of 2020 decided on 02.11.2020 relating

to the choice available to an allottee to seek for refund along

with interest in terms of section 18(1) in case he chooses to not

withdraw from the project and alternative remedy to seek

interest for every month of delay till handing over of the

possession in terms of proviso to section 18(1) of the RERA

Act, 2016, in case he chooses to not to withdraw from the

project. The judgment of LIC of India and Anr. V/s

Consumer Education & Research Centre & Ors. : (1995) 5

SCC 482 was cited to hold that the terms & conditions of the

agreement must be reasonable. Further, Judgment passed in

Pioneer urban land and Infrastructure Ltd. V/s Govindan

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Raghavan, II (2019) CPJ 34(SC) was cited to refer that the

Hon’ble Apex court did not accept the plea of the builder that it

should not be directed to pay interest at the rate of 10.7% as the

agreement provided for 6% interest. Moreover, the judgment of

Wg. Cdr. Arifur Rahman Khan & Others V/s DLF Southern

Homes Pvt. Ltd. (2020) SCC Online 667 was cited to hold that

given the one-sided nature of the Apartment Buyer’s

Agreement, the consumer for a had the Jurisdiction to award

just and reasonable compensation as an incident of the power to

direct removal of deficiency in service.

(71) The contention of the appellant before the Appellate Tribunal

that as per clause 4.5 and clause 4.6 of the registration booklet/

Brochure there is no mention of any specific date of possession

or that as to whether any interest being payable, in case the

project is delayed or what amount of interest would be payable

by the Appellant, was held to be an omission against the

provisions of section 4(2) (b) of the U.P Apartment Act, 2010.

The Tribunal also recorded the judgment of HUDA and

another V/s Shakuntala Devi, (2017) 2 SCC 301 to hold that

even in cases, where the delivery of possession had been

directed there would be compensation for harassment/loss in a

consumer protection case and thus concluded that sicne the

possession of the allotted flat was delayed, the respondent was

entitled for interest/compensation as per the legal norms. The

Tribunal cited the judgment of M/s Newtech Promoters and

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Developers Pvt. Ltd. V/s State of U.P (supra) to ratify the

proposition that contractual terms do not have overriding effect

over the provisions of the Act.

(72) This Court does not find any reasons as to how the awarding of

interest on delayed possession by the Appellate Tribunal is in

any manner contrary to law as laid down by Apex Court. The

Learned Counsel for the appellant could not place nor refer to

any judgment of the Apex court to show any contrary view as

has been deduced by the Appellate Tribunal in arriving at the

impugned conclusion. In any case, the findings returned by the

Appellate Tribunal is based on sound principles of law &

precedents and as such, this Court does not find any substantial

question of law involved for the present question framed by the

Appellant.

(73) As a sequel to above, this Court does not find any merit in

RERA Appeal Nos. 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79,

80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87 of 2023 and the same are hereby

dismissed.

C. RERA Appeal No. 68 of 2023 (U.P Ewas Evam Vikas

Parishad Vs. Arun Kumar Dwivedi)

(74) It is seen from the records that the aforesaid appeal has been

filed by the appellant- “U.P Avas Evam Vikas Parishad” under

Section 58 of the RERA Act, 2016, against an order dated

05.09.2022 passed by the UP Real Estate Appellate Tribunal at

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Page 55 of 94

Lucknow. Apparently, by virtue of the impugned order, the

learned Appellate Tribunal with the consent of the parties has

directed the Parishad to pay interest from (30.10.2015 to

11.02.2000) instead of interest for the period from (30.06.2015

to 11.02.2000) as directed by the Adjudicating Authority. The

Appellate Authority has also directed both the parties to move

release Application regarding withdrawal of amount deposited

under Section 43(5) of the Act.

(75) This appeal has been filed under Section 58 of the RERA, 2016,

which inter-alia states :-

"58. Appeal to High Court-(1) Any

person aggrieved by any decision or order

of the Appellate Tribunal, may, file an

appeal to the High Court, within a period of

sixty days from the date of communication

of the decision or order of the Appellate

Tribunal, to him, on any one or more of the

grounds specified in Section 100 of the

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:

Provided that the High Court may entertain

the appeal after the expiry of the said

period of sixty days, if it is satisfied that the

appellant was prevented by sufficient

cause from preferring the appeal in time.

Explanation-The expression "High Court"

means the High Court of a State or Union

territory where the real estate project is

situated.

(2) No appeal shall lie against any

decision or order made by the Appellate

Tribunal with the consent of the parties."

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Page 56 of 94

(76) The learned Counsel for the appellant was requested to refer

section 58(2) of the RERA Act, 2016, which bars any appeal

against any decision or order made by the Appellate Tribunal

with the consent of the parties. The learned Counsel was asked

to address his arguments on the said point.

(77) The learned Counsel for the appellant raised the point of

competence & Jurisdiction of the Adjudicating officer in

deciding the matter and further raised the competence of

Appellate Tribunal to decide the issue. However, no arguments

were addressed on the point of maintainability of the present

Appeal on the point of section 58(2) of the RERA Act. Also

there was no argument denying or disputing the consensual

order passed by the Appellate tribunal vide the impugned order

dated 05.09.2022.

(78) Accordingly, this Court is of the opinion that in view of the

findings returned in the aforesaid appeals lead being “RERA

Appeal No. 67 of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi),

no substantial question of law arises in RERA APPEAL No. 68

of 2023 and as such the same is dismissed.

D. RERA Appeal No. 81 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam Vikas

Parishad Vs U.P Real Estate Appellate Tribunal and others).

(79) This appeal has been filed by the appellant against the

impugned order dated 13.08.2021 relating to relief of interest in

the form of compensation granted to the allottee- Somyata

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Page 57 of 94

Zaidi. The complainant in that case, i.e Somyata Zaidi was

allotted flat in Vrindvan Yojna, Part-4, sector-17, Niligiri

Enclave, wherein the sale deed was executed on 12.10.2017 and

the possession was granted on 17.10.2017. It was the case of

the complainant/ allottee therein that the possession was

delayed and he was entitled for compensation. Accordingly,

compensation was awarded by the adjudicating officer vide

order dated 20.09.2019 in the form of Interest.

(80) On perusal of the impugned judgment dated 13.08.2021, this

court finds that the Appellate Tribunal has framed three

question for determination as has been done by the Appellate

Tribunal in similar other matters, which were decided by this

court in the lead matter “RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023

(Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi).

(81) Thus, this Court does not find any new point agitated or any

new issue raised in the present Appeal by the learned counsel

for the appellant and as such RERA Appeal No. 81 of 2023 is

also decided in terms of the finding of the lead matter- “RERA

Appeal No. 67 of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi).

Accordingly, RERA Appeal No. 81 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam

Vikas Parishad Vs U.P Real Estate Appellate Tribunal and

others) is dismissed.

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 58 of 94

E. RERA Appeal No. 86 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam Vikas

Parishad V/s Satya Narain Agnihotri)

(82) This appeal has been filed by the Appellant against the

impugned order dated 30.06.2022 relating to relief of interest in

the form of compensation granted to the allottee- Satya Narain

Agnihotri at the rate of MCLR + 1% per annum for the delay

period from 30.03.2016 to 13.10.2017. The complainant in that

case, i.e Satya Narain Agnihotri was initially allotted a 3BHK

flat in Bhagirathi Enclave on 13.09.2013. However, the

Appellant failed to deliver possession of the allotted flat within

the stipulated date i. 30.03.2016 as mentioned in the Brochure

and demand letter dated 30.09.2013. The complainant being in

acute need of the flat as early as possible as he was to

superannuate on 29.04.2018, approached the promotor for

delivering the possession of the allotted flat so that he may shift

prior to demitting his office. The officials of the Appellant in

the month of October 2017 informed the complainant that he

may get his flat changed from 3 BHK to 3 BHK + Servant and

then the Appellant would be in a position to deliver the flat at

the time. The complainant, having no option except to agree

with oral offer of the promoter gave consent for 3 BHK +

Servant flat for which an extra payment of Rs. 11,50,000/- was

further required. Thereafter the complainant was allotted flat

no. 2B/T-1/306 vide letter dated 13.10.2017 at an additional

amount of Rs. 11,86,127/- along with the miscellaneous

expenses of Rs. 1,53,885/- by the appellant. The complainant

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deposited the said amount under protest and got the sale deed

executed on 25.11.2017 in respect of Flat No. 2B/T-1/306.

There has been considerable delay of 20 months’ delivery of

possession of the flat as mentioned in the Brochure issued in the

year 2013. However, the Adjudicating officer awarded interest

for delay in delivery of possession for the period from

30.03.2016 to 13.10.2017 at the rate of MCLR +1% per annum.

Accordingly, compensation was awarded by the adjudicating

officer vide order dated 20.11.2020 in the form of Interest.

(83) This Court finds that both the complainant Satya Narain

Agnihotri and the appellant (Avas Evam Vikas Parishad) filed

cross-Appeals, which was eventually decided by the impugned

order. On perusal of the impugned judgment dated 30.06.2022,

this court finds that the Appellate Tribunal has framed almost

Nine question for determination. The Appellate Tribunal in

deciding these issues arrived at a decision that the Act of 2016

provided a mechanism for determination of interest and/or

compensation for the delay in handing over possession of the

unto to the allottee, if the allottee wishes to stay with the

project. The Tribunal also held that in view the Newtech

Promoter’s case, the promoter cannot shirk from the

responsibilities/ liabilities under the Act and the contractual

terms do not have an overriding effect to the retrospective

applicability of the authority under the provisions of the Act. In

the facts of the case, the Tribunal held that there was delay of

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more than 18 months in delivery of possession by the Appellant

to the complainant. The Tribunal also held that a home buyer

does not lose his/her right to claim compensation for the delay

in possession even after execution of the conveyance deed and

taking of possession of the unit/Apartment/Fat booked by him.

The Appellate Tribunal while deciding the 5th point of

determination concluded that the rate of interest i.e MCLR +

1% granted by the Adjudication officer, as compensation for

delayed possession, if fair, just and reasonable as it balances the

equities between the parties and the Adjudicating Officer’s

action is in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The

learned Appellate Tribunal also held that as per the provisions

of the U.P Apartments (Promotion of construction, ownership

and Maintenacne Act, 2010 read with the provisions of the Act,

2016 a promoter is required to offer legal and habitable

possession to the allottees only after obtaining C.C/O.C and ask

for clearing dues by raising the final demand. The Tribunal also

affirmatively held that the amenities, facilities and services

advertised by the appellant in its Brochure are required to be

fulfilled and provided to the allottees of the project. The

Appellate authority after examining the facts in great detail and

considering the various Judgement, held that there was no

illegality or perversity in the impugned order of the

Adjudicating officer of the regulatory authority in awarding

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interest as compensation to the allottee/complaint for delay in

possession of the flat by the appellant.

(84) This Court finds that the appellant has primarily challenged the

aforesaid impugned order of the Appellate Tribunal primarily

on the ground, which has been a subject matter of challenge in

similar other matters, which were decided by this court in the

lead matter- “RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 (ComplainantDhruv Kr. Chaturvedi).

(85) Thus, this court does not find any new point agitated or any

new issue raised in the present Appeal by the learned counsel

for the appellant and as such the present Appeal is also decided

in terms of the finding of the lead matter- “RERA Appeal No.

67 of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi).

(86) Accordingly, RERA Appeal No. 86 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam

Vikas Parishad V/s Satya Narain Agnihotri) is dismissed.

F. RERA Appeals No. 88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101,

102, 103, 104 of 2023

(87) These appeals have been filed against the impugned common

order dated 21.01.2022 passed by the learned UP Real Estate

Appellate Tribunal at Lucknow.

(88) Since, common question of law has been raised by the

Appellant in all these appeals, which are all directed towards a

common order dated 21.01.2022, it would be in the interest of

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justice that all these appeals are consolidated and taken together

for hearing and disposal. However, before this court deals with

the question of law raised in these appeals, the brief facts

culminating into these appeals be narrated to appreciate the law

in its proper perspective. In this regard, the facts of the lead

mater being RERA Appeal No. 88 of 2023 (ComplainantKunwar Bahadur Singh) is taken into consideration.

(89) Succinctly, it is available from records that the complainant

(Kunwar Bahadur Singh) filed a complaint for compensation in

delay in offering possession, no window in the flat offered and

no parking allotted by the Appellant/ Promoter. The said

complaint was marked/referred to the Adjudicating Officer vide

order dated 25.11.2019 of the Authority. As per the complaint,

the complainant was allotted a flat in Vrindavan Yojna in

Nillgiri Enclave on 30.08.2013 for an amount of Rs.

20,88,000/-. The possession of the said flat was to be given in

24 months, however the same was not offered by the Promoter,

which resulted in increase in the price of the flat, levy of GST

etc. It was the case of the complainant that although he had

regularly paid the instalments, however the promoter failed to

provide window in the flat as well as the parking as promised in

Brochure. However, the appellant defended the said complaint

by stating that the price of the flat was never fixed, nor the date

of possession had been fixed and the same were only proposed.

They also took ground of certain litigation relating to

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acquisition of land pending before this court for the delay. They

also submitted that the complaint was not maintainable for

compensation under section 12, 14, 18 and 19 of the Act.

(90) This Court finds that the Adjudicating Officer after recording

the submission of the parties and dealing with the provisions of

the RERA Act gave a detailed Judgment vide order dated

13/08/2020, thereby returning a finding that the complainant

inspite of taking the possession of the flat is entitled for

compensation for delay in offering of possession and as such

the Adjudicating Officer awarded compensation in the form of

interest @ MCLR+ 1% on the total amount of consideration

for the period of delay between 30.08.2015 to 18.08.2017.

(91) This Court finds that the aforesaid order of the Adjudicating

officer was a subject matter of challenge by the Appellant

before the Appellate Tribunal in terms of section-44 of the

RERA Act. The said Appeal filed by the Appellant was decided

along with 25 other matters vide the impugned common order

dated 22.01.2022. On a perusal of the impugned judgment of

the Appellate Tribunal it is seen that the Tribunal has

painstakingly recorded details of facts of each Appeal in a

tabular chart and framed the following questions for

determination:

“ i. Whether the Adjudicating officer

ought to have examined the complaint of

the respondent only on the basis of agreed

terms and conditions mentioned in the

Registration Booklet, read with allotment

letter.

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ii. Whether there is any delay in handing

over of the possession to the allottee, and if

yes, on whose account?

iii. Whether an allottee is entitled for

claiming compensation/ interest for the

delayed possession of the flat and agreed

to pay the final cost of the flat?”

(92) This Court finds that the Appellate tribunal has exhaustively

dealt with each of the aforesaid issue and after recording

various precedents, arrived at a decision that as far as the first

issue is concerned, in terms of the Newtech Promoter’s case, the

promoter cannot shirk from the responsibilities/ liabilities under

the Act and the contractual terms do not have an overriding

effect to the retrospective applicability of the authority under

the provisions of the Act. On the facts, the Appellate Tribunal

returned a finding that the project was delayed by 2 years and 4

months in giving of the possession and that the Appellant/

Promoter was solely responsible for the said delay. Further, as

far as the third issue is concerned, the Tribunal after considering

various judgements including that of W. Cdr. Arifur Rahman

Khan and Aleya Sultan and others V/s DLF Southern Homes

Pvt. Ltd, held that a home buyer does not lose his/her right to

claim compensation for the delay in possession even after

execution of the conveyance deed and taking possession of the

unit/ Apartment/ flat booked by him. Thus, the Appellate

Tribunal did not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned

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order of the Adjudicating Officer and as such dismissed all the

Appeals.

(93) This Court finds that the appellant has filed an Appeal against

the aforesaid impugned order dated 22.01.2022, which are

largely premised on the same grounds and question of law as

has been decided by this court in “RERA Appeal No. 67 of

2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi). The fulcrum of the

Appeal hinges on the determination of question as to whether

the adjudicating officer appointed under Section 72 of the

RERA Act can grant compensation in form of interest in case

where allottee does not exit the project under Section 18 of the

RERA Act.

(94) This Court finds that the aforesaid ground has been a subject

matter of challenge in similar other matters, which were

decided by this court in the lead matter- “RERA Appeal No.

67/2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi), wherein this

court held that compensation in the form of interest can be

awarded by the Adjudicating Officer and as such has rejected

the said contention and dismissed the appeal of the Parishad.

(95) Thus, this Court does not find any new issue being raised in the

present bunch of Appeals by the Ld. counsel for the Appellant,

which requires any separate considerations either on facts or on

law and as such the present bunch of appeals are also decided in

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terms of the finding of the lead matter- “RERA Appeal No. 67

of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi).

(96) Accordingly, RERA Appeal No. 88 of 2023, RERA Appeal No.

89 of 2023, RERA Appeal No. 90 of 2023, RERA Appeal No.

91 of 2023, RERA Appeal No. 93 of 2023, RERA Appeal No.

96 of 2023, RERA Appeal No. 97 of 2023, RERA Appeal No.

98 of 2023, RERA Appeal No. 99 of 2023, RERA Appeal No.

100 of 2023, RERA Appeal No. 101 of 2023, RERA Appeal

No. 102 of 2023, RERA Appeal No. 103 of 2023 and RERA

Appeal No. 104 of 2023 are also dismissed.

G. RERA Appeal No. 92 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam Vikas

Parishad Vs U.P Real Estate Appellate Tribunal and

others).

(97) This appeal has been filed by the appellant against the

impugned order dated 07.07.2022 relating to relief of interest in

the form of compensation granted to the allottee- Abhai Verma

& Anju Verma. The complainant in that case, i.e Abhai Verma

& Anju Verma was allotted flat in Himalaya Enclave,

Vrindavan Yojna, Part-4, Sector-17, Nilgiri Enclave, wherein

the sale deed was executed on 12.10.2017 and the possession

was granted on 02.04.2019. It was the case of the complainant/

allottee therein that the possession was delayed and he was

entitled for compensation for delayed possession and other

issues. The regulatory authority vide an order dated 10.05.2019

after holding that the project was delayed and the delay period

was fixed as 25.08.2014 to 30.04.2018, marked the case to the

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Adjudicating Officer for determination of entitlement of

compensation. Accordingly, the Adjudicating Officer, vide

order dated 29.08.2019 allowed the complaint and directed the

promoter to pay interest as compensation at the rate of SBI

MCLR +1% per annum on the deposited amount for the

delayed period within 45 days of the order.

(98) The complainant filed an Appeal before the Appellate Tribunal

limited to the extent of granting of interest as provided under

section 2(za)(i) of the RERA Act. As per the said provisions, the

complainant claimed interest at the rate of 13.05% per annum

and sought parity with another case passed by the Tribunal in

Upasana Duggal Vs LDA.

(99) The Tribunal vide the impugned order dated 07.07.2022, which

has been interdicted in the present proceedings before this

court, has directed the Parishad/promoter for payment of

interest at the rate of SBI MCLR+1% per annum along with

other reliefs to the complainant. It is this directions, which the

Appellant is herein aggrieved with. On perusal of the impugned

judgment dated 07.07.2022, this court finds that interestingly,

there is no Appeal u/s 44 of the Act by the Appellant against the

order dated 29.08.2019 of the Adjudicating Officer. It is only

the order of the Appellate Tribunal, which has reduced the

interest rate and other reliefs that the Appellant are aggrieved

and as such has filed the present Appeal before this court. A

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glimpse of the impugned order of the Appellate Tribunal would

reveal that the Appellate Tribunal has recorded the Appeal,

reply and rejoinder field by the parties exhaustively in the said

impugned order and has framed the following three question for

determination:

“ (i) Whether appellants are entitled to get

interest @ 13.5% per annum for the

delayed period i.e from 24.08.2014 to the

actual date of realization ?

(ii) Whether respondent- U.P Avas Evam

Vikas Parishad is liable to pay Rs. 5 Lakhs

as compensation for mental harassment

and agony and Rs. 7,61,052/- for house

rent allowances to appellants.?

(iii) whether appellants are entitled to get

Rs. 50,000/- as cost of litigation.?”

(100) The Appellate Tribunal after formulating the aforesaid point of

determination, while deciding the 1st issue held that the delay

was to be fixed for a period from 25.08.2014 to 28.02.2019 and

not to be kept open. Further, as far as the rate of interest, the

Appellate Tribunal keeping in view Rule 9.2(ii) & 9.3(1) of the

“Uttar Pradesh Real Estate (Regulations and Development)

Rules, 2018, which came into effect from 17.10.2018 awarded

compensation in the form of interest at the rate of SBI

MCLR+1% to balance the equities and in line of the spirit of

the Act, which uses the phrase “interest at such rate as may be

prescribed” in section 12, 18 and 19(4) of the Act. The

Appellate Tribunal as far as the second issue formulated held

that the observation of the Adjudicating officer had legal

backing and did not interfere in the payment of compensation to

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the complainant. Similarly, as far as the third issue is

concerned, the Appellate Tribunal reduced the cost of litigation

from Rs. 50,000/- to Rs. 40,000/-.

(101) The Appellant have taken a plethora of grounds in the appeal

filed against the aforesaid impugned order of the Tribunal,

however a closer look would reveal that almost all the grounds

are related to facts and the hinge of the Appeal filed by the

Appellant lies on the issue, which were decided by this court in

the lead matter- “RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 (ComplainantDhruv Kr. Chaturvedi).

(102) Thus, this Court does not find any new point agitated or any

new issue raised in the present Appeal by the learned counsel

for the Appellant and as such the present Appeal is also decided

in terms of the finding of the lead matter- “RERA Appeal No.

67 of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi).

(103) Accordingly, RERA Appeal No. 92 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam

Vikas Parishad V/s U.P Real Estate Appellate Tribunal and

others) is dismissed.

H. RERA Appeal No. 94 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam Vikas

Parishad Vs Presiding Officer, U.P Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal and others).

(104) This appeal has been filed by the appellant against the

impugned order dated 08.09.2022 relating to relief of interest in

the form of compensation granted to the allottee- Shobit

Chaturvedi. The complainant in that case, i.e Shobit Chaturvedi

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was allotted flat in Neelgiri Enclave, a project of the appellant

located at Sector-17, Vrindavan Yojna, Lucknow. The

conveyance deed was executed on 08.03.2018 and the physical

possession was handed over to the complainant on 05.06.2018.

It was the case of the complainant/ allottee therein that the

possession was delayed and he was entitled for compensation

for delayed possession and other issues like not providing

window as per the registration booklet, car parking etc. were

also raised in the said complaint. The regulatory authority vide

an order dated 16.09.2020 marked the case to the Adjudicating

Officer for determination of entitlement of compensation.

Accordingly, the Adjudicating Officer, vide order dated

18.12.2020 allowed the complaint and directed the promoter to

pay interest as compensation at the rate of SBI MCLR +1% per

annum on the deposited amount for the delayed period of

30.08.2015 to 21.07.2017, within 45 days of the order.

(105) The appellant was obviously not happy with the said order of

the Adjudicating officer and as such interdicted the said order of

the adjudicating officer in Appeal u/s 44 of the Act, before the

Appellate Tribunal.

(106) The Tribunal vide the impugned order dated 08.09.2022, has

dismissed the Appeal of the Parishad/ promoter and has upheld

the direction of the Adjudicating officer for payment of interest

at the rate of SBI MCLR+1% per annum along with other

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Page 71 of 94

reliefs to the complainant. It is this directions, which the

Appellant is herein aggrieved with. On perusal of the impugned

judgment dated 08.09.2022, this court finds that the Appellate

Tribunal has recorded in detail the various contention of the

parties and discussed the case laws cited by them exhaustively

in the said impugned order and has framed the following three

question for determination:

“ (i) Whether the Adjudicating Officer

ought to have examined the complaint of

the respondent only on the basis of the

agreed terms and conditions mentioned in

the Registration Booklet, read with

allotment letter.

(ii) Whether there is any delay in handing

over of the possession to the allottee, and if

yes, on whose account?

(iii) Whether an allottee is entitled for

claiming compensation/ interest for the

delayed possession, even if the allottee has

already taken possession of the flat and

sale deed has been executed after the

allottees agreed to pay the final cost of the

flat.?

(iv) Whether there is any illegality or

perversity in the impugned order dated

16.07.2021 of the Adjudicating officer in

granting interest as compensation to the

respondent for delay in providing

possession of the flat by the Appellant?”

(107) The Appellate Tribunal after formulating the aforesaid point of

determination, while deciding the 1st issue held that tin view of

the observation of the Apex Court in Newtech’s case regarding

the terms of the contract to the effect that promoter cannot shirk

from the responsibilities/ liabilities under the act and the

contractual terms do not have an overriding effect to the

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Page 72 of 94

retrospective applicability of the authority under the provisions

of the Act. The Appellate Tribunal in answer to issue No.2

returned a finding of fact that the project was delayed by 1 year

and 11 months in offering of possession to the complainant and

that the Appellant was solely responsible for the same. As

regards the third issue, the Appellate Tribunal held that a home

buyer does not lose his/her right to claim compensation for the

delay in possession even after execution of the conveyance

deed and taking possession of the unit/ Apartment/ Flat booked

by him. The Appellate Tribunal after enumerating the various

provisions of RERA as well as the binding precedents

concluded that there was no illegality or perversity in the order

of the Adjudicating officer in awarding interest as compensation

to the complainant for delay in possession of the flat.

(108) The appellant have taken a plethora of grounds in the Appeal

filed against the aforesaid impugned order of the Tribunal,

however a closer look would reveal that almost all the grounds

are related to facts and the hinge of the Appeal is premised on

the issue, which were decided by this court in the lead matter-

“RERA Appeal No. 67/2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr.

Chaturvedi).

(109) Thus, this Court does not find any reasons to differ with the

findings, which stands already decided in the aforesaid matter.

Thus, the present Appeal, as such, is also decided in terms of

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the finding of the lead matter- “RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023

(Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi).

(110) Accordingly, for all the reasons as mentioned herein above,

RERA Appeal No. 94 of 2023 is also dismissed.

I. RERA Appeal No. 95 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam Vikas

Parishad V/s Presiding Officer, U.P Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal and others).

(111) This appeal has been filed by the appellant against the

impugned order dated 28.09.2022 relating to relief of interest in

the form of compensation granted to the allottee- Atul Kumar.

The complainant in that case, i.e Atul Kumar was allotted flat in

Neelgiri Enclave, a project of the Appellant located at Sector17, Vrindavan Yojna, Lucknow. The sale deed was executed on

08.03.2018 and the physical possession was handed over to the

complainant on 05.06.2018. It was the case of the complainant/

allottee therein that the possession was delayed and he was

entitled for compensation for delayed possession as well as for

other issues like not providing window as per the registration

booklet, car parking etc. The regulatory authority vide an order

dated 19.10.2019 marked the case to the Adjudicating Officer

for determination of entitlement of compensation. Accordingly,

the Adjudicating Officer, vide order dated 11.02.2021 allowed

the complaint and directed the promoter to pay interest as

compensation at the rate of SBI MCLR +1% per annum on the

deposited amount for the delayed period of 30.08.2015 to

01.11.2017, within 45 days of the order.

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Page 74 of 94

(112) The appellant was obviously not happy with the said order of

the Adjudicating officer and as such interdicted the said order of

the adjudicating officer in appeal under Section 44 of the Act,

before the Appellate Tribunal.

(113) The Tribunal vide the impugned order dated 08.09.2022, has

dismissed the appeal of the Parishad/promoter and has upheld

the direction of the Adjudicating officer for payment of interest

at the rate of SBI MCLR+1% per annum along with other

reliefs to the complainant. It is this directions, which the

Appellant is herein aggrieved with. On perusal of the impugned

judgment dated 08.09.2022, this court finds that the Appellate

Tribunal has recorded in detail the various contention of the

parties and discussed the case laws cited by them exhaustively

in the said impugned order and has framed the following four

question for determination:

“ (i) Whether the Adjudicating Officer

ought to have examined the complaint of

the respondent only on the basis of the

agreed terms and conditions mentioned in

the Registration Booklet, read with

allotment letter.

(ii) Whether there is any delay in

handing over of the possession to the

allottee, and if yes, on whose account?

(iii) Whether an allottee is entitled for

claiming compensation/ interest for the

delayed possession, even if the allottee

has already taken possession of the flat

and sale deed has been executed after the

allottees agreed to pay the final cost of the

flat.?

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 75 of 94

(iv) Whether there is any illegality or

perversity in the impugned order dated

11.02.2021 of the Adjudicating officer in

granting interest as compensation to the

respondent for delay in providing

possession of the flat by the Appellant?”

(114) The Appellate Tribunal after formulating the aforesaid point of

determination, while deciding the 1st issue held that tin view of

the observation of the Apex Court in Newtech’s case regarding

the terms of the contract to the effect that promoter cannot shirk

from the responsibilities/ liabilities under the act and the

contractual terms do not have an overriding effect to the

retrospective applicability of the authority under the provisions

of the Act. The Appellate Tribunal in answer to issue No.2

returned a finding of fact that the project was delayed by 1 year

and 5 months in offering of possession to the complainant and

that the Appellant was solely responsible for the same. As

regards the third issue, the Appellate Tribunal held that a home

buyer does not lose his/her right to claim compensation for the

delay in possession even after execution of the conveyance

deed and taking possession of the unit/ Apartment/ Flat booked

by him. The Appellate Tribunal after enumerating the various

provisions of RERA as well as the binding precedents

concluded that there was no illegality or perversity in the order

of the Adjudicating officer in awarding interest as compensation

to the complainant for delay in possession of the flat.

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 76 of 94

(115) The appellant have taken a plethora of grounds in the Appeal

filed against the aforesaid impugned order of the Tribunal,

however a closer look would reveal that almost all the grounds

are related to facts and the hinge of the Appeal is premised on

the issue, which were decided by this court in the lead matter-

“RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr.

Chaturvedi).

(116) Thus, this Court does not find any reasons to differ with the

findings, which stands already decided in the aforesaid matter.

Thus, the present Appeal, as such, is also decided in terms of

the finding of the lead matter- “RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023

(Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi).

(117) Accordingly, for all the reasons as mentioned herein above,

RERA Appeal No. 95 of 2023 is also dismissed.

J. RERA Appeal No. 105 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam Vikas

Parishad Vs. Presiding Officer, U.P Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal and others).

(118) This appeal has been filed by the appellant against the

impugned order dated 24.05.2022 relating to relief of interest in

the form of compensation granted to the allottee. The

allottee/complainant in that case, i.e Jitendera Kumar

Madheshiya was allotted flat in Himalaya Enclave, a project of

the Appellant. The sale deed was executed on 08.03.2018 and

the physical possession was handed over to the complainant on

05.06.2018. It was the case of the complainant/ allottee therein

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Page 77 of 94

that the possession was delayed and he was entitled for

compensation for delayed possession. The Adjudicating Officer,

vide order dated 04.08.2021 allowed the complaint and directed

the promoter to pay interest as compensation at the rate of SBI

MCLR +1% per annum on the deposited amount for the

delayed period of 31.12.2014 to 30.08.2018, within 45 days of

the order.

(119) The appellant was obviously not happy with the said order of

the Adjudicating officer and as such interdicted the said order of

the adjudicating officer in Appeal u/s 44 of the Act, before the

Appellate Tribunal.

(120) However, at the time of hearing, the appellant at the outset

stated that though in the relief clause he had challenged the

entire impugned order dated 04.08.2021 of the Adjudicating

Officer, whereby the adjudicating authority directed the

opposite party/appellant to pay interest @ MCLR+ 1% as

compensation to the complainant/respondent for the delay

period from 31.12.2014 to 30.08.2018, but he confined his

prayer only to the correction of amount from Rs. 16,60,000/- to

Rs. 15,75,000/- and the date of starting interest from

31.12.2014 to 28.02.2015. The Tribunal vide the impugned

order dated 04.08.2021, has recorded the no objection of the

complainant/respondent and on the basis of the said statement

of the parties, the the Appeal of the Parishad/ promoter was

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 78 of 94

disposed of by holding that the appellant/promoter shall be

liable to pay interest at the rate of SBI MCLR+1% per annum

as compensation on the amount of Rs. 15,75,000 ( deposited in

the year 2012) for delayed period from 01.03.2015 to

30.08.2018”.

(121) The present Appeal has been filed under section 58 of the

RERA, 2016. However, section 58(2) of the said Act, inter-alia

states:

“58 (2) No appeal shall lie against any

decision or order made by the Appellate

Tribunal with the consent of the parties."

(122) The learned Counsel for the appellant was requested to refer

section 58(2) of the RERA Act, 2016, which bars any appeal

against any decision or order made by the Appellate Tribunal

with the consent of the parties. The learned Counsel was asked

to address his arguments on the said point.

(123) The learned Counsel for the Appellant raised the point of

competence & Jurisdiction of the Adjudicating officer in

deciding the matter and further raised the competence of

Appellate Tribunal to decide the issue. However, no arguments

were addressed on the point of maintainability of the present

Appeal on the point of section 58(2) of the RERA Act. Also

there was no argument denying or disputing the consensual

order passed by the Appellate tribunal vide the impugned order

dated 24.05.2022. According, this court in view of the findings

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 79 of 94

returned in the aforesaid Appeals lead being “RERA Appeal

No. 67 of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi) does not

find any substantial question of law raised in the present Appeal

and as such RERA Appeal No. 105 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam

Vikas Parishad V/s Presiding Officer, U.P Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal and others is dismissed.

K. RERA Appeal No. 106 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam Vikas

Parishad V/s Presiding Officer, U.P Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal and others).

(124) This appeal has been filed by the Appellant against the

impugned order dated 28.03.2022 relating to relief of interest in

the form of compensation granted to the allottee. The

allottee/complainant in that case, i.e Charan Singh was allotted

flat in Brahmaputra Enclave, a project of the Appellant. On the

date of filing of the complaint, neither the sale deed was

executed in his favour nor the physical possession was handed

over to the complainant and as such a cumulative complaint

was filed for execution of sale deed, giving of possession and

delay compensation against the Appellant. The Adjudicating

Officer, vide order dated 22/01/2020 allowed the complaint

with various reliefs including a direction to the promoter to (i)

give possession along with all facilities till 29.02.2020, (ii) pay

interest as compensation at the rate of SBI MCLR +1% per

annum on the deposited amount for the delayed period of

31.01.2018 till the date of possession.

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 80 of 94

(125) The appellant was obviously not happy with the said order of

the Adjudicating officer and as such interdicted the said order of

the adjudicating officer in Appeal u/s 44 of the Act, before the

Appellate Tribunal.

(126) During the course of hearing, the Appellate Tribunal recorded

that the completion certificate was obtained by the Appellant on

31.12.2018 and the possession was offered to the complainant

on 06.12.2018 and in fact the physical possession was granted

to the complainant/respondent on 24.02.2020. Although the

Appellant tried to urge a point that the delay in possession was

due to non-submission of certain papers by the

complainant/respondent, which was opposed by the respondent,

however, the Appellate Tribunal noting that there had been a

delay in giving of possession by the appellant, without

considering other point, upheld order dated 22/01/2020 of the

Adjudicating Officer, whereby the adjudicating authority

directed the opposite party/appellant to pay interest @ MCLR+

1% as compensation to the complainant/respondent for the

delay period from 01.01.2018 to 31.12.2018.

(127) The learned Counsel for the appellant interdicting the impugned

order of the Appellate Tribunal has raised the point of

competence & Jurisdiction of the Adjudicating officer in

deciding the matter and further raised the competence of

Appellate Tribunal to decide the issue. However, no arguments

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 81 of 94

were addressed on the point of decision of the Appellate

Tribunal on merits. However, this court took that pain to go

through the memo of Appeal filed by the Appellant and as such

is of the considered view that the findings returned in the

aforesaid Appeals lead being “RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023

(Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi) is squarely applicable to

the present case. Thus, this court does not find any substantial

question of law raised in the present Appeal and as such RERA

Appeal No. 106 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam Vikas Parishad V/s

Presiding Officer, U.P Real Estate Appellate Tribunal and

others) is dismissed.

L. RERA Appeal No. 107 of 2023 (U.P Avas Evam Vikas

Parishad V/s Presiding Officer, U.P Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal and others).

(128) This appeal has been filed by the appellant against the

impugned order dated 23.06.2022 relating to relief of interest in

the form of compensation granted to the allottee- Vandana

Sharma. The complainant in that case, i.e Vandana Sharma was

allotted flat in Ganga, Yamuna & Hindon Enclave, a project of

the Appellant. On the date of filing of the complaint, neither the

sale deed was executed in his favour nor the physical

possession was handed over to the complainant and as such a

cumulative complaint was filed for execution of sale deed,

giving of possession and delay compensation against the

Appellant. The Adjudicating Officer, vide order dated

29/09/2020 allowed the complaint with various reliefs including

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 82 of 94

a direction to the promoter to (i) give possession along with all

facilities till 31.10.2020 (ii) pay interest as compensation at the

rate of SBI MCLR +1% per annum on the deposited amount for

the delayed period of 17.04.2018 to 28.02.2019.

(129) The appellant was obviously not happy with the said order of

the Adjudicating officer and as such interdicted the said order of

the adjudicating officer in Appeal under Section 44 of the Act,

before the Appellate Tribunal.

(130) The Tribunal vide the impugned order dated 30.06.2022, has

dismissed the Appeal of the Parishad/ promoter and has upheld

the direction of the Adjudicating officer for payment of interest

at the rate of SBI MCLR+1% per annum along with other

reliefs to the complainant. It is this directions, which the

Appellant is herein aggrieved with. On perusal of the impugned

judgment dated 30.06.2022, this court finds that the Appellate

Tribunal has recorded in detail the various contention of the

parties and discussed the case laws cited by them exhaustively

in the said impugned order and has framed the following five

question for determination:

“ (i) Whether under the scheme of the Act,

2016 and rules 2016 any mechanism has

been provided for determination of the

interest or the compensation for delay in

handing over possession of the

flat/apartment/ plot to the allottee and/or

refund with interest, if allottee does nto

want to continue/wish to withdraw from the

project?

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 83 of 94

(ii) Whether the Regulatory Auhtority

ought to have examined the complaint of

the respondent only on the basis of agreed

terms and conditions mentioned in the

registration Booklet read with allotment

letter.

(iii) Whether the project of the

appellant/promoter is delayed?

(iv) Whether an allottee is entitled for

interest for the delay in completion of the

project under the scheme of Act, 2016 if

yes, what rate of interest is required to be

paid by the promoter to the allottee?

(v) Whether it is necessary and

mandatory for the promoter to have first

completion certificate (CC) and occupation

certificate (OC) under the provisions of the

Act 2016 and Rules of 2016 read with the

UP Apartment (promotion of construction,

ownership and maintenance) Act, 2010

before offering possession as well as

asking the allottee to settle the account and

satisfy the final demand?.”

(131) The learned Appellate Tribunal after formulating the aforesaid

point of determination, while deciding the 1st issue held that the

Act, 2016 provides a mechanism for determination of interest

andor compensation for the delay in handing over possession of

the unit to the allottee, if the allottee wishes to stay with the

project and/or refund with interest, if allotee wants to withdraw

from the project. As far as the aforesaid second issue is

concerned, the Appellate Tribunal in view of the observation of

the Apex Court in Newtech’s case regarding the terms of the

contract to the effect that promoter cannot shirk from the

responsibilities/ liabilities under the act and the contractual

terms do not have an overriding effect to the retrospective

applicability of the authority under the provisions of the Act

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 84 of 94

and held that the regulatory authority is required to examine a

complaint as per the provisions of the Act, rules and regulations

and not merely on the basis of the terms and conditions of the

registration booklet or as provided in the demand letter only.

The Appellate Tribunal in answer to issue No.3 returned a

finding of fact that the project was delayed by 11 months in

offering of possession to the complainant and that the Appellant

was solely responsible for the same. As regards the fourth issue

relating to entitlement of interest on account of delay in

completion of the project, the Appellate Tribunal returned a

finding in affirmative. As far as the last issue is concerned, the

Tribunal held that a promoter is required to offer legal and

habitable possession to the allottees only after obtaining CC/OC

and ask for clearing dues by raising a final demand. The

Appellate Tribunal after enumerating the various provisions of

RERA as well as the binding precedents concluded that there

was no illegality or perversity in the order of the Adjudicating

officer in awarding interest as compensation to the complainant

for delay in possession of the flat.

(132) The appellant have taken a plethora of grounds in the Appeal

filed against the aforesaid impugned order of the Tribunal,

however a closer look would reveal that almost all the grounds

are related to facts and the hinge of the Appeal is premised on

the issue, which were decided by this court in the lead matterRERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 85 of 94

“RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr.

Chaturvedi).

(133) Thus, this Court does not find any irresistible reasons to differ

with the findings, which stands already decided in the aforesaid

matter. Thus, the present Appeal, as such, is also decided in

terms of the finding of the lead matter- “RERA Appeal No. 67

of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi).

(134) Accordingly, for all the reasons as mentioned herein above, the

present Appeal being RERA Appeal No. 107 of 2023 (U.P Avas

Evam Vikas Parishad V/s U.P Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

and others) is also dismissed.

M. RERA Appeals No. 108, 109 of 2023

(135) These appeals have been filed by the appellant against the

impugned common order dated 30.12.2022 relating to relief of

interest in the form of compensation granted to the allottees,

Indranath Agnihotri & Rajesh Kumar Singh. Both the original

complaints had been filed by the aforesaid complainant for (i)

Giving of possession, (ii) interest for delayed compensation and

(iii) mental harassment etc. It was the case of the complainant/

allottee therein that the possession was delayed and he was

entitled for compensation for delayed possession as well as for

other issues like not providing of possession, mental harassment

etc. The Adjudicating Officer, vide order dated 26.11.2019

allowed the complaint and directed the promoter to pay interest

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 86 of 94

as compensation at the rate of SBI MCLR +1% per annum on

the deposited amount for the delayed period of01.05.2018 to

19.08.2019, within 45 days of the order.

(136) The appellant was obviously not happy with the said order of

the Adjudicating officer and as such interdicted the said order of

the adjudicating officer in Appeal u/s 44 of the Act, before the

Appellate Tribunal.

(137) The Tribunal vide the impugned order dated 30.12.2022, has

dismissed the Appeal of the Parishad/ promoter and has upheld

the direction of the Adjudicating officer for payment of interest

at the rate of SBI MCLR+1% per annum along with other

reliefs to the complainant. It is this directions, which the

Appellant is herein aggrieved with. On perusal of the impugned

judgment dated 30.12.2022, this court finds that the Appellate

Tribunal has recorded in detail the various contention of the

parties and discussed the case laws cited by them exhaustively

in the said impugned order and has framed the following four

question for determination:

“ (i) Whether the Regulatory Authority has

jurisdiction to pass the impugned order

dated 26.11.2019 directing the appellantU.P Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, Lucknow

to handover possession of the flat to the

complainant within 45 days from the date of

order after taking the legal charges from

the complainant and the opposite party is

also directed to pay interest at the rate of

MCLR+1% per annum to the complainant

for the delayed period from 31.08.2018 till

date of offer of possession i.e 09.09.2019,

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 87 of 94

… as the matter is covered under sections

12, 14, 18 and 19 of the Act.

(ii) Whether the project of the appellantUP Avas Evma Vikas parishad, Lucknow is

delayed as stated by respondent in reply to

the Appeal.

(iii) Whether respondent/complainant is

entitled to get interest for the delayed

period, if so on what rate?

(iv) Whether the impugned judgment and

order dated 26.11.2019 is liable to set

aside?.”

(138) The Appellate Tribunal after formulating the aforesaid point of

determination, while deciding the 1st issue held that when it

comes to a question of seeking the relief of adjudging

compensation and interest thereon under section 12, 14, 18 and

19, the adjudicating officer exclusively has the power to

determine, keeping in view the collective reading of section 71

read with section 72 of the Act. If the adjudication under

sections 12, 14, 18 and 19 other than compensation as

envisaged, if extended to the adjudicating officer, it may intend

to expand the ambit and scope of the powers and function of the

adjudicating officer under section 71 and that would be against

the mandate of the Act, 2016. The Appellate Tribunal in answer

to issue No.2 returned a finding of fact that the project was

delayed from 31.08.2015 to 09.09.2019. As regards the third

issue, the Appellate Tribunal held that in view of “Uttar Pradesh

Real Estate (Regulation and development) Rules, 2018, it

would be just to award rate of interest MCLR + 1% per annum

as directed by the Authority. As far as the last issue is

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 88 of 94

concerned, the Appellate Tribunal decided to not interfere with

the Adjudicating officer order and as such confirmed the same.

The Appellate Tribunal after enumerating the various provisions

of RERA as well as the binding precedents concluded that there

was no illegality or perversity in the order of the Adjudicating

officer in awarding interest as compensation to the complainant

for delay in possession of the flat.

(139) The appellant have taken a plethora of grounds in the Appeal

filed against the aforesaid impugned order of the Tribunal,

however a closer look would reveal that almost all the grounds

are related to facts and the hinge of the Appeal is premised on

the issue, which were decided by this court in the lead matter-

“RERA Appeal No. 67/2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr.

Chaturvedi).

(140) Thus, this court does not find any reasons to differ with the

findings, which stands already decided in the aforesaid matter.

Thus, the present Appeal, as such, is also decided in terms of

the analogy & discussion in the lead matter- “RERA Appeal

No. 67 of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi).

(141) Accordingly, for all the reasons as mentioned herein above,

RERA Appeal Nos. 108 of 2023 and 109 of 2023 are also

dismissed.

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 89 of 94

N. RERA Appeals No. 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117 of

2023

(142) These appeals have been filed against the impugned common

order dated 14.03.2022 passed by the learned UP Real Estate

Appellate Tribunal at Lucknow.

(143) Since, common question of law has been raised by the appellant

in all these appeals, which are all directed towards a common

order dated 14.03.2022, it would be in the interest of justice that

all these appeals are consolidated and taken together for hearing

and disposal. However, before this court deals with the question

of law raised in these Appeals, the brief facts culminating into

the present Appeal be narrated to appreciate the law in its

proper perspective. In this regard, the facts of the lead mater

being RERA Appeal No. 110 of 2023 (Complainant- Ms. Arifa

Khatoon) is taken into consideration.

(144) Succinctly, it is available from records that the complainant

(Ms. Arifa Khatoon) filed a complaint for compensation in

delay in offering possession, no window in the flat offered and

no parking allotted by the Appellant/ Promoter. The said

complaint was marked/referred to the Adjudicating Officer vide

order dated 25.11.2019 of the Authority. As per the complaint,

the complainant was allotted a flat in Vrindavan Yojna in

Nillgiri Enclave on 31.08.2013 for an amount of Rs.

20,88,000/-. The possession of the said flat was to be given in

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 90 of 94

24 months, however the same was not offered by the Promoter,

which resulted in increase in the price of the flat, levy of GST

etc. It was the case of the complainant that although she had

regularly paid the instalments, however the promoter failed to

provide window in the flat as well as the parking as promised in

Brochure. However, the appellant defended the said complaint

by stating that the price of the flat was never fixed, nor the date

of possession had been fixed and the same were only proposed.

They also took ground of certain litigation relating to

acquisition of land pending before this court for the delay. They

also submitted that the complaint was not maintainable for

compensation under section 12, 14, 18 and 19 of the Act.

(145) This court finds that the Adjudicating Officer after recording

the submission of the parties and dealing with the provisions of

the RERA Act gave a detailed Judgment vide order dated

26/06/2020, thereby returning a finding that the complainant

inspite of taking the possession of the flat is entitled for

compensation for delay in offering of possession and as such

the Adjudicating Officer awarded compensation in the form of

interest @ MCLR+ 1% on the total amount of consideration

for the period of delay between 31.08.2015 to 25.07.2017.

(146) This Court finds that the aforesaid order of the Adjudicating

officer was a subject matter of challenge by the Appellant

before the Appellate Tribunal in terms of section-44 of the

RERA Act. The said Appeal filed by the Appellant was decided

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 91 of 94

along with 9 other matters vide the impugned common order

dated 14.03.2022. On a perusal of the impugned judgment of

the Appellate Tribunal it is seen that the Tribunal has

painstakingly recorded details of facts of each Appeal in a

tabular chart and framed the following questions for

determination:

“ i. Whether the Adjudicating officer

ought to have examined the complaint of the

respondent only on the basis of agreed terms

and conditions mentioned in the Registration

Booklet, read with allotment letter.

ii.Whether there is any delay in handing over

of the possession to the allottee, and if yes,

on whose account?

iii. Whether an allottee is entitled for

claiming compensation/ interest for the

delayed possession of the flat and sale deed

has been executed after the allottees agreed

to pay the final cost of the flat?

iv. Whether the respondent is entitled for

interest and/or compensation on account of

delayed possession under the scheme of the

Act, 2016 and whether the rate of interest

granted by the Adjudicating officer is in

accordance with the provisions of the Act,

2016, Rules 2016?”

(147) This Court finds that the Appellate Tribunal has exhaustively

dealt with each of the aforesaid issue and after recording

various precedents, arrived at a decision that as far as the first

issue is concerned, in terms of the Newtech Promoter’s case, the

promoter cannot shirk from the responsibilities/ liabilities under

the Act and the contractual terms do not have an overriding

effect to the retrospective applicability of the authority under

the provisions of the Act. On the facts, the Appellate Tribunal

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 92 of 94

returned a finding that the project was delayed by 2 years and 4

months in giving of the possession and that the Appellant/

Promoter was solely responsible for the said delay. Further, as

far as the third issue is concerned, the Tribunal after considering

various judgments including that of W. Cdr. Arifur Rahman

Khan and Aleya Sultan and others Vs. DLF Southern Homes

Pvt. Ltd, held that a home buyer does not lose his/her right to

claim compensation for the delay in possession even after

execution of the conveyance deed and taking possession of the

unit/ Apartment/ flat booked by him. The Appellate Tribunal

also returned a finding that the complainant was entitled for

interest on account of delayed possession and that the rate of

interest awarded i.e MCLR + 1% by the regulatory authority

was fair, just and reasonable. Thus, the Appellate Tribunal did

not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order of the

Adjudicating Officer and as such dismissed all the Appeals.

(148) This Court finds that the Appellant has filed an Appeal against

the aforesaid impugned order dated 14.03.2022, which are

largely premised on the same grounds and question of law as

has been decided by this court in “RERA Appeal (Defective)

No. 67 of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi). The

fulcrum of the Appeal hinges on the determination of question

as to whether the adjudicating officer appointed under the

RERA section 72 can grant compensation in form of interest in

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 93 of 94

case where allottee does not exit the project under section 18 of

the RERA Act.

(149) This Court finds that the aforesaid ground has been a subject

matter of challenge in similar other matters, which were

decided by this court in the lead matter- “RERA Appeal No. 67

of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr. Chaturvedi), wherein this

court held that compensation in the form of interest can be

awarded by the Adjudicating Officer and as such has rejected

the said contention and dismissed the appeal of the Parishad.

(150) Thus, this Court does not find any new issue being raised in the

present bunch of appeals by the learned counsel for the

Appellant, which requires any separate considerations either on

facts or on law and as such the present bunch of Appeals are

also decided in terms of the finding of the lead matter- “RERA

Appeal (Defective) No. 67 of 2023 (Complainant- Dhruv Kr.

Chaturvedi).

(151) Accordingly, RERA Appeal No. 110 of 2023, RERA Appeal

No. 111 of 2023, RERA Appeal No. 112 of 2023, RERA Appeal

No. 113 of 2023, RERA Appeal No. 114 of 2023, RERA Appeal

No. 115 of 2023, RERA Appeal No. 116 of 2023 & RERA

Appeal No. 117 of 2023 are also dismissed.

(152) As a priori, all these appeals are dismissed and interim orders,

if any, stands vacated.

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Page 94 of 94

(153) Office is directed to place a copy of this order in each of the

above-captioned appeals.

(154) There shall be no order as to cost.

(Om Prakash Shukla, J.)

Order Date : 18th November, 2023

Ajit/-

RERA Appeal No. 67 of 2023 and connected appeals

Charge sheet filed for offenses of extortion U/s 384 IPC, without fulfilling the ingredients of Section 383 IPC, is quashed with cost of Rs.2 lacs.....



Charge sheet filed for offenses of extortion U/s 384 IPC, without fulfilling the ingredients of Section 383 IPC, is quashed with cost of Rs.2 lacs..... 

Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC-LKO:82336

Court No. - 12

Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 11678 of 2023

Applicant :- Ram Gopal Gupta

Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Deptt.

Lko. And 3 Others

Counsel for Applicant :- Riyaz Ahmad,Divesh Sinha,Sunil

Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.

Hon'ble Rajeev Singh,J.

1. Counter affidavit filed by learned A.G.A. for the State is

taken on record.

2. Learned counsel for the applicant does not want to file any

rejoinder affidavit.

3. Heard learned counsel for the applicant as well as learned

A.G.A. for the State and perused the record.

4. The present application has been filed for quashing the

impugned charge-sheet dated 13.10.2020 arising out of the

F.I.R. No. 432 of 2020 dated 27.09.2020 U/s 384 I.P.C., Police

Station- Lonar, District- Hardoi as well as the impugned

summoning order dated 25.04.2022 and the impugned order

dated 02.08.2023 passed in criminal Case No. 6561/2022

including entire proceedings thereof.

5. On 30.11.2023 following order was passed:-

"1. Heard learned counsel for the applicant and learned A.G.A. for the

State.

2. The present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is filed with the

prayer to quash the proceedings of Criminal Case No.6561/2022, arising

out of Case Crime No.432/2020, under Section 384 I.P.C., Police Station

Lonar, District Hardoi.

3. Learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that case in question

was initiated on the basis of one aired video but the said video was not

made part of the investigation. He also submitted that charge sheet under

Section 384 I.P.C. was filed by the Investigating Officer in the most

mechanical manner and no offence is made out under Section 384 I.P.C.

He next submitted that for proving the said offence it is mandatory that

there must be a victim, therefore, indulgence of this Court is necessary.

4. Learned A.G.A. admitted this fact that video was not made part of the

case diary and he also does not dispute this fact that there is no victim in

the entire case diary. 

5. Considering the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, going

through the record of the application as well as other relevant documents,

as F.I.R. in question was lodged by the Sub Inspector, Rishi Kumar, P.S.

Lonar, Hardoi on the basis of some video but neither the same was made

part of the case diary nor sent to the F.S.L. for examination, therefore,

matter requires consideration.

6. List this case on 8.12.2023.

7. On the next date, Circle Officer, Police Station Lonar, District Hardoi

shall appear before this Court and explain how offence under Section 384

I.P.C. is made out and also file affidavit in this regard, failing which, cost

shall be imposed.

8. Till the next date of listing, impugned proceeding shall remain stayed."

6. In pursuance of aforesaid order, Circle Officer- Mr. Vinod

Kumar Dubey, Circle Officer, Harpalpur, Hardoi is present

today before this Court. He states that during the course of

investigation, victim was not traceable, as a result, the statement

of informant/sub inspector who prepared the recovery memo

was recorded and charge-sheet was submitted by Investigating

Officer on the basis of recovery as well as confessional

statement of applicant.

7. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that applicant has

been falsely implicated in the present case on the basis of

presumption that he was extorting the money from truck

drivers. He further submits that the F.I.R. of the case in question

was lodged by Sub Inspector- Rishi Kapoor, Police StationLonar, District- Hardoi with the averment that on 27.09.2020,

when he was patrolling along with Constable- Ram Singh in the

area of Police Outpost Bawan, he received a video, in which, he

found that at No Entry Point, one police personnel was

extorting the money from truck drivers and was keeping it in

his pocket. On taking cognizance of the said video, Sub

Inspector- Rishi Kapoor went at No Entry Point and the alleged

video was shown to the person who was deployed at No Entry

Point then the said person admitted that the photo in the alleged

video was of him but it was old video. In this regard, the name

of deployed police personnel was asked and search was also

conducted; then it was found that he was Ram Gopal Gupta, s/o

late Beche Lal r/o Husainpur Sahora, Post- Sakatpur, Police

Station- Lonar, District- Hardoi, who was deployed as home

guard at the No Entry Point. After search, total thirty rupees

(three notes of ten rupees) were found from his pocket and after

interrogation, he admitted that he was taking the money from

people those were passing from the No Entry Point; he also

stated that all the extorted money has already been spent, and he

also told that Rs. 30/- which were recovered from him was

brought from his house. Thereafter, statement of Constable-

Ram Singh and Sub Inspector- Rishi Kapoor was recorded U/s

161 Cr.P.C. and charge-sheet was submitted by Investigating

Officer.

8. Further submission of learned counsel for the applicant is

that as per the provisions of Section 384 I.P.C., it is necessary

that for the purpose of extortion, aggrieved person is a

necessary ingredient but in the present case, no one is aggrieved

as merely on the basis of presumption, applicant was implicated

and charge-sheet was submitted by Investigating Officer U/s

384 I.P.C. It is further submitted that the discharge application

was moved by applicant before learned trial court on

02.08.2022 which was rejected without considering the

ingredients of provisions of Section 383 I.P.C. Relying on the

decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana

and others Vs. Bhajan Lal and others reported in 1992 SCC

(Cri.) 426, it is, thus, submitted that summoning order dated

25.04.2022 as well as the impugned order dated 02.08.2023 and

charge-sheet dated 13.10.2020 may be quashed.

9. Learned A.G.A. opposes the prayer of applicant and submits

that after investigation, charge-sheet was submitted by

Investigating Officer and all the defense of applicant can be

considered at the appropriate stage during the trial. He also

concedes the fact that Rs. 30/- were recovered from applicant

and he was taken into custody on the basis of presumption. He

further submits that during the course of the

investigation, applicant had himself admitted that he extorted

the money at the No Entry Point. He also submits that there is

no illegality in the aforesaid charge-sheet which was bet by

Prosecuting Officer and approved by Circle Officer of the area

in question. Learned A.G.A. lastly submits that there is no

illegality in the summoning order and the order by which the

discharge application of applicant was rejected. However, he

does not dispute the fact that no aggrieved person was found

during the course of investigation.

10. Considering the submissions of learned counsel for the

applicant, learned A.G.A. and going through the contents of

application, F.I.R., impugned order as well as other relevant

enclosures; it is evident that as per the prosecution case, on

27.09.2020, informant- Sub Inspector- Rishi Kapoor received a

video on his phone, in which, it was shown that at No Entry

Point, one person in police dress was taking money from the

truck drivers after putting them under fear and was keeping the

money inside his pocket. Sub Inspector- Rishi Kapoor,

immediately, went to the No Entry Point and found that he was

the same person, as shown in video, who was extorting the

money. The alleged video was shown to the said police

personnel who accepted that the shown photo in the video was

of him. Thereafter, search was conducted and total Rs. 30/-

were found from his pocket for which he explained that this

amount was brought from his house when he was coming to his

duty. It is also evident that neither any extorted amount nor any

aggrieved person was found, at the time of search or during the

course of investigation. Moreover, admittedly no statement of

any aggrieved person was recorded.

11. The arrest/recovery memo which was prepared is as under:-

"नकल फरर गगिरफ्तताररी एक नफर अगभियक्त अन्तगि य रत धतारता-384 आई०परी०सरी० थतानता-

ललोनतार, जनपर-हररलोई आज गरनतानांक-27.09.2020 कलो मम उ 0 गन० ऋगषि कपपूर मय

हमरताहरी कता० रताम ससनांह कके चचौककी ककेत्र बतावन मम मतामपूर थता। जब म जगिररीशपयर चचौरताहता थता म

तलो फलोन पर एक वरीगडियलो वतायरल हहआ गक नलो इन्टटरी प्वताइन्ट पर वरर्दी गरखतायरी रके रहता हह

जलो टटकलो कलो चतालकलो कलो डिरता धमकताकर पहसके वसपूल कर रहता हह और अपनरी जकेब मम रख

रहता हह। उक्त वरीगडियलो कता सनांजतान लकेकर नलो इन्टटरी प्वताईन्ट पर पहहनांचता तलो वह व्यगक्त नलो

इन्टटरी प्वताईन्ट पर डपूटरी कर रहता हह। उस व्यगक्त कलो वरीगडियलो गरखताकर पहचतान करतायरी

गियरी तलो उस व्यगक्त नके कहता गक यह मकेररी फलोटलो ह। वरीगडियलो पयरतानता हह। नताम पतता पपूछतके ह म हए

जतामता तलताशरी ककी गियरी तलो उसनके अपनता नताम रताम गिलोपताल गियपता पयत्र स्व० बकेचके लताल

गनवतासरी-हहसहन सहलोरता, थतानता-ललोनतार, हररलोई उम्र कररीब 55 बततायता गक म हलोम गिताडि म र मम

तहनतात हहहूँ। मकेरता नम्बर-0450 हह। वतरमतान मम नलो इन्टटरी प्वताईन्ट पर डपूटरी कर रहता हहहूँ।

जतामता तलताशरी सके रतागहनके पकेन्ट ककी जकेब मम (10X3=30) तरीस रू० बरतामर हहए। उक्त

व्यगक्त पहसता वसपूलके ककी सम्बन्ध मम कडताई सके पपूछता तलो बततायता गक म नलो इन्ट म टरी प्वताईन्ट पर

आनके जतानके वतालके ललोगिगों सके डिरता धमकताकर पहसता लके रहता थता। उस गरन जलो पहसता महनके ललोगिलो

सके सलयता थता वह खचर हलो गियके ह। यह तरीस रू० म म म अपनके घर सके गकरतायके कके सलयके लकेकर

आयता थता। इनकता यह अपरताध एक रण्डिनरीय अपरताध हह। धतारता -384 आई०परी०सरी०

अवगित करतातके हहए समय 16.25 बजके पयसलस गहरतासत मम सलयता। रचौरतानके गगिरफ्तताररी मता०

सवर्वोच्च न्यतायतालय व मतानवतासधकतार आयलोगि कके आरकेशलो व गनररशगों कता पपूररततः पतालन

गकयता गियता। वरर्दी कता उतरवताकर सतारता कपडके पहनतायके गियके। फरर मचौकके पर सलखकर

पढ़कर सयनताकर सम्बनन्धत कके अलतामतात बनवतायके जता रह ह। रचौरतानके कताय म रवताहरी जनतता कके

कताफकी ललोगि आ गियके थके सजनसके गिवताहरी कके सलयके कहता गियता तलो बयरताई भिलताई कता वतास्तता

रकेकर कलोई भिरी व्यगक्त गिवताहरी रकेनके कलो तहयतार नहहीं हहआ। गगिरफ्तताररी ककी सपूचनता थतानता

आकर अगभियक्त कके पररजनगों अकब सके ररी जतायकेगिरी। फर य र ककी कताबरन कतापरी अगभियक्त कलो य

मचौकके पर ररी गियरी। ह० गहन्ररी रताम गिलोपताल, ह० गहन्ररी कता० रताम ससनांह गरनतानांक-27.09.20

थतानता ललोनतार, हररलोई, ह० अनांगकेजरी अपठनरीय एस०आई० 27.09.2020 (ऋगषि कपपूर

उ 0 गन0) थतानता ललोनतार, हररलोई।"

12. As per the provisions of Section 383 I.P.C., it is necessary

that there must be an aggrieved person in the case of extortion.

Section 383 I.P.C. reads as under:-

"Extortion- Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to

that person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so

put in fear to deliver to any person any property, or valuable security or

anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable

security, commits "extortion".

Illustrations

(a) A threatens to publish a defamatory libel concerning Z unless Z gives

him money. He thus induces Z to give him money. A has committed

extortion.

(b) A threatens Z that he will keep Z's child in wrongful confinement,

unless Z will sign and deliver to A a promissory note binding Z to pay

certain monies to A. Z sings and delivers the note. A has committed

extortion.

(c) A threatens to send club-men to plough up Z's field unless Z will sign

and deliver to B a bond binding Z under a penalty to deliver certain

produce to B, and thereby induces Z to sign and deliver the bond. A has

committed extortion.

(d) A, by putting Z in fear of grievous hurt, dishonestly induces Z to sign

or affix his seal to a blank paper and deliver it to A. Z sings and delivers

the paper to A. Here, as the paper so signed may be converted into a

valuable security. A has committed extortion."

13. Section 384 I.P.C. reads as under:-

"Punishment for extortion- Whoever commits extortion shall be punished

with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to

three years, or with fine, or with both."

14. Evidently, the trial court rejected the discharge application

in the most mechanical manner without considering the

aforesaid provisions as well as the pronouncement of Hon'ble

Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana and others Vs.

Bhajan Lal and others reported in 1992 SCC (Cri.) 426 (Para

102). In the aforesaid judgement, Hon'ble Apex Court observed

that, in case, no offense is made out after going through the

entire F.I.R. or the evidence collected by the Investigating

Officer, the F.I.R as well as charge-sheet and its consequential

proceedings are liable to be set aside.

15. Para 102 of the aforesaid judgement reads as under:-

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant

provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law

enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of

the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under

Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above,

we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein

such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of

any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be

possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently

channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an

exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be

exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the

complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their

entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case

against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other

materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable

offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)

of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of

Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint

and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the

commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable

offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is

permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as

contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and

inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever

reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding

against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions

of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is

instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or

where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,

providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide

and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior

motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite

him due to private and personal grudge."

16. In the aforesaid context, the observations made by Hon'ble

Apex Court in the case of Salib @ Shalu @ Salim vs. State of

U.P. and others reported in Criminal Appeal No. 2344 of 2023

(Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 3152 of 2023) dated

08.08.2023, in paragraphs nos. 22, 23, 24 & 25 are being

referred hereinbelow:-

"22. So from the aforesaid, it is clear that one of the necessary ingredients

of the offence of extortion is that the victim must be induced to deliver to

any person any property or valuable security, etc. That is to say, the

delivery of the property must be with consent which has been obtained by

putting the person in fear of any injury. In contrast to theft, in extortion

there is an element of consent, of course, obtained by putting the victim in

fear of injury. In extortion, the will of the victim has to be overpowered by

putting him or her in fear of injury. Forcibly taking any property will not

come under this definition. It has to be shown that the person was induced

to part with the property by putting him in fear of injury. The illustrations

to the Section given in the IPC make this perfectly clear.

23. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to the following observations

made by a Division Bench of the High Court of Patna in Ramyad Singh v.

Emperor in Criminal Revision No. 125 of 1931 (Pat):-

"If the facts had been that the complainant's thumb had been forcibly

seized by one of the petitioners and had been applied to the piece of paper

notwithstanding his struggles and protests, then I would agree that there is

good ground for saying that the offence committed whatever it may be,

was not the offence of extortion because the complainant would not have

been induced by the fear of injury but would have simply been the subject

of actual physical compulsion."

It was held:-

"It is clear that this definition makes it necessary for the prosecution to

prove that the victims Narain and Sheonandan were put in fear of injury to

themselves or to others, and further, were thereby dishonestly induced to

deliver papers containing their thumb impressions. The prosecution story

in the present case goes no further than that thumb impressions were

'forcibly taken from them. The details of the forcible taking were

apparently not put in evidence. The trial Court speaks of the wrists of the

victims being caught and of their thumb impressions being then 'taken'

The lower Courts only speak of the forcible taking of the victim's thumb

impression; and as this does not necessarily involve inducing the victim to

deliver papers with his thumb Impressions (papers which could no doubt

be converted into valuable securities). I must hold that the offence of

extortion is not established."

24. Thus, it is relevant to note that nowhere the first informant has stated

that out of fear, she paid Rs. 10 Lakh to the accused persons. To put it in

other words, there is nothing to indicate that there was actual delivery of

possession of property (money) by the person put in fear. In the absence of

anything to even remotely suggest that the first informant parted with a

particular amount after being put to fear of any injury, no offence under

Section 386 of the IPC can be said to have been made out.

25. However, as observed earlier, the entire case put up by the first

informant on the face of it appears to be concocted and fabricated. At this

stage, we may refer to the parameters laid down by this Court for

quashing of an FIR in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). The parameters

are:-

"(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the

complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their

entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case

against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other

materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable

offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)

of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of

Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint

and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the

commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable

offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is

permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as

contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and

inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever

reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding

against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions

of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is

instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or

where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,

providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide

and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior

motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite

him due to private and personal grudge."

17. It is evident from the record that no alleged photograph is

annexed with the case diary. Further when there is no aggrieved

person in the case of extortion, then merely on the basis of

imagination, no such person can be implicated. As the chargesheet was bet by Prosecuting Officer and approved by Circle

Officer of the area in question in the most negligent manner

without considering the ingredients of Section 383 I.P.C.,

therefore, this Court is of the view that the impugned chargesheet dated 13.10.2020 and its consequential proceedings as

well the summoning order dated 25.04.2022 along with the

order dated 02.08.2023 are liable to be set aside and are hereby

set aside.

18. With the above observations, the present application U/s

482 Cr.P.C. is allowed.

19. However, before parting with the judgement, it is worthy to

be noted that the present case is the classic example of false

implication, in which, the applicant has been victimized by

implicating him falsely and, hence, he should be compensated

with the cost of some token amount.

20. Accordingly, a cost/sum of Rs. 2 lakhs be paid to

applicant by District Magistrate, Hardoi who is head of

criminal justice system in the district (as per Para 06 of U.P.

Police Regulation) and Superintendent of Police, Hardoi

within two months from today and also file a compliance

report before Senior Registrar of this Court.

21. Office is directed to communicate this order to the

following authorities for information and necessary action,

forthwith:-

(i) The Trial Court,

(ii) Legal Remembrancer, Government of U.P., Lucknow,

(iii) Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Government of

U.P., Lucknow,

(iv) Director General of Police, U.P., Lucknow,

(v) Director General of Prosecution, U.P., Lucknow.

Order Date :- 14.12.2023

Arpan

where civil suit is for possession or for declaration of title in respect of the same property and where reliefs regarding protection of the property concerned can be applied for and granted by the civil Court that proceedings under Section 145 should not be allowed to continue.


where civil suit is for possession or for declaration of title in respect of the same property and where reliefs regarding protection of the property concerned can be applied for and granted by the civil Court that proceedings under Section 145 should not be allowed to continue.

Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:241628

A.F.R.

Court No. - 90

Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 9198 of 2021

Applicant :- Aman Deep Singh Shishya

Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another

Counsel for Applicant :- K.S. Tiwari,Amber Khanna,Raj Kumar

Khanna,Vivek Tiwari

Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Pawan Kumar Shukla,Santosh

Kumar Pandey,Sheshadri Trivedi

Hon'ble Dinesh Pathak,J.

1. Heard Sri Raj Kumar Khanna learned counsel for the applicant and Sri

Satish Trivedi (Senior Advocate) assisted by Sri Sheshadri Trivedi learned

counsel for the opposite party no.2 as well as learned A.G.A. for the State.

2. The present applicant has invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. beseeching the quashing of the order dated

04.03.2021 passed by City Magistrate, Mathura, under Section 145 (1)

Cr.P.C. in Case No.35 of 2021 (Aman Deep Singh vs. Adarsh Pal Gupta)

and entire proceeding of said case under Section 145 Cr.P.C.

3. Facts culled out from the record reveals that the property in question

known as Hari Nikunj Ashram exist in two separate buildings situated at

Sri Radha Rani Anna Kshetra, Sri Banke Bihari Colony, Vrindavan,

Mathura. Police has submitted report dated 02.03.2021 with an averment

that the first party (applicant herein) and the second party (contesting

opposite party herein) are claiming their right, title and possession over

the property in question, therefore, considering the strained situation on

spot both the parties may be summoned and Ashram (property in

question) may be attached till the decision with respect to the right and

possession of parties over there, so that, law and order could prevail.

Considering the police report, learned Magistrate, by order dated

04.02.2021, has passed preliminary order under Section 145 (1) Cr.P.C.

calling upon the parties to present their respective cases with respect to

the possession and title over the property in question, which is under

challenge before this Court.

4. Learned counsel for the applicant has hammered the preliminary order

under Section 145 (1) Cr.P.C. on the ground of pendency of the Civil Suit

No.15 of 2021 and submitted that the property in question namely Hari

Nikunj Ashram is run under the supervision and control of Panchayati

Akhada Nirmal. Owing to disturbance in the possession of Panchayat

Akhada Nirmal created by the opposite party no.2 (second party in

proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C.), Panchayati Akhada Nirmal along

with Hari Nikunj Ashram has filed a civil suit being O.S. No.15 of 2021

dated 06.01.2021 for permanent prohibitory injunction against the

opposite party no.2 herein. Considering delay in decision on the interim

injunction application plaintiff has approached before this Court by

moving a petition being mater Under Article 227 No.115 of 2021. Coordinate Bench of this Court, vide order dated 13.01.2021, has disposed of

the said petition with a direction to decide the interim injunction

application (7-C) within a period of one months, however, interim

protection for maintaining status-quo was granted as well for a period of

two months or till the decision on the aforesaid application, whichever is

earlier. During pendency of the aforesaid civil suit, preliminary order

dated 04.03.2021 under Section 145 (1) has been passed on the basis of

police report dated 02.03.2021. Interim injunction application was

rejected by order dated 09.09.2021 (Annexure-C.A.1), however, Misc.

Appeal No.28 of 2021 is still pending against said rejection order. It has

been emphasized that during the existence of interim order passed by

Hon’ble High Court, vide order dated 13.01.2021, and pendency of the

civil suit which was filed on 06.01.2021, learned Magistrate had inherent

lack of jurisdiction to entertain the police report and pass preliminary

order under Section 145 (1) Cr.P.C. It is further submitted that the

possession of the first party (applicant herein) is evident from the Ameen

2 of 10

report dated 14.01.2021 submitted in the civil suit and the observation

made by the trial court in its order dated 09.09.2021. It is further

submitted that in the light of the fact that the civil suit was pending before

the court competent and opposite party no.2 has a remedy to file an

appropriate application for the possession and appoint a receiver for the

purposes of protection of the property in question, there is no justification

of continuing a parallel proceeding in criminal side under Section 145

Cr.P.C. In support of the his submission learned counsel for the applicant

has relied upon and case of Ram Sumer Puri Mahant (appellant) vs.

State of U.P. and others (respondent), AIR 1985 Supreme Court 472,

and Amresh Tiwari (appellant) vs. Lalta Pradad Dubey and others

(respondents), AIR 2000 Supreme Court 1504.

5. Per contra learned counsel for private opposite party no.2 has

vehemently opposed the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the

applicant and contended that mere pendency of the civil suit between the

parties is not sufficient ground to drop the proceeding under Section 145

Cr.P.C. It is further contended that no interim protection has been granted

to the present applicant at any stage of civil litigation, even, interim

protection granted by Hon’ble High Court was vacated after two months

from the date of its order i.e. 13.01.2021. In absence of any interim order

or final decision from the court competent with respect to the right and

tile over the property in question, the initiation of proceeding under

Section 145 Cr.P.C. cannot be said to be illegal. It is further contended

that the applicant has still an opportunity to contest before the Magistrate

concerned by way of filing their objection and adducing evidence in

support of his case. Learned counsel for private opposite party has relied

upon the following cases :-

(I) Jhunamal @ Devandas vs. State of M.P. and others, AIR 1988

Supreme Court 173;

3 of 10

(II) Sanjay Kumar vs. VI Additional District Judge, Bareilly decided

by co-ordinate Bench of this court on 16.01.1996, 1996 1 AWC 277;

(III) Sanjay Sahai vs. State of U.P. and another decided by co-ordinate

Bench of this Court vide order dated 19.11.2022 passed in application

U/S 482 No.36518 of 2022.

6. Having considered the rival submissions advanced by learned

counsel for the parties and perusal of record, it is manifested that property

in question is known as Hari Nikunj Ashram. Present applicant (first

party) is claiming his right and title over the property in question on the

basis of registered sale deed and the gift deed said to have been executed

by then owners of the property in question in favour of the predecessor in

the interest of the applicant herein. However, opposite party no.2 is

claiming his right and title over the property in question through separate

society. At this juncture, it would not be befitting to consider this aspect of

the matter which relates to the right and title of the parties and the same is

subjudice before the civil court in Original Suit No.15 of 2021.

Admittedly, Original Suit No.15 of 2021 has been filed on 16.01.2021.

However, having considered the delay in decision on the interim

injunction application (7-C), present applicant has invoked the

supervisory jurisdiction of this Court by way of filing a petition under

Article 227 No.115 of 2021. Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order

dated 13.01.2021 has disposed of the aforesaid petition with a direction to

decide the interim injunction application (Paper No.7-C) within a period

of one month, however, for a period of two months or till the decision on

the interim injunction application, whichever is earlier, parties were

directed to maintain status-quo. During the existence of two months

protection for maintaining status-quo and the pendency of the suit, police

has submitted report dated 02.03.2021, which was taken into account

while passing the preliminary order under Section 145 (1) Cr.P.C. Thus,

order impugned has been passed not only during pendency of the suit but

also during existence of the interim order granted by this Court. Apart

4 of 10

from that while rejecting the interim injunction application, vide order

dated 09.09.2021, learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Mathura has

made an observation acknowledging the possession of the present

applicant over the property in question, however, he has refused to grant

interim injunction on the ground that plaintiff/applicant has failed to prove

his possession legal. Learned Civil Court might has not passed interim

injunction in favour of the present applicant, however, in my considered

opinion, his observation with respect to the possession of the present

applicant over the property in question cannot be ignored particularly for

the purposes of parallel criminal proceeding under Section 145 (1) Cr.P.C.

Opposite party no.2 herein has been arrayed as defendant no.1 in the

Original Suit No.15 of 2021 and he has an ample opportunity to move an

appropriate application before the Civil Court to get injunction in his

favour with respect to the property in question along with the counter

claim to establish his legal right and title over there. On the premise of

pendency of the civil suit which has already been instituted on 06.01.2021

prior to the police report dated 02.01.2021 and preliminary order dated

04.01.2021 under Section 145 (1) Cr.P.C., there is no justification to

continue the parallel criminal proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. to

examine the possession of the parties over the property in question. In the

matter of Amrish Tiwari (supra) proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C.

was dropped by learned Magistrate considering the pendency of the civil

suit, however, same was reversed by the higher court. Hon’ble Supreme

Court has upheld the order passed by learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate

and held that multiplicity of the litigation should be avoided as it is not in

the interest of the parties and the public time would be wasted over

meaningless litigation. It is further observed that when possession is being

examined by the civil court and the parties are in a position to approach

the civil court for adequate protection of the property during pendency of

the dispute, the parallel proceeding i.e. under Section 145 Cr.P.C. should

not continue. Hon’ble Supreme Court in said case has considered the ratio

5 of 10

decided by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ram Sumer Puri

Mahant (supra). For ready reference relevant paragraph Nos.12, 13 and 14

of the judgement passed in the case of Amresh Tiwari (supra) is quoted

hereinbelow:-

“12. The question then is whether there is any infirmity in the order of

the S.D.M. discontinuing the proceedings under Section 145 Criminal

Procedure Code. The law on this subject-matter has been settled by

the decision of this Court in the case of Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v.

State of U.P., reported in, (1985) 1 SCC 427: (AIR 1985 SC 472: 1985

Cri LJ 752). In this case it has been held as follows:

“When a civil litigation is pending for the property wherein the

question of possession is involved and has been adjudicated, we see

hardly any justification for initiating a parallel criminal proceeding

under Section 145 of the Code. There is no scope to doubt or dispute

the position that the decree of the civil court is binding on the

criminal Court in a matter like the one before us. Counsel for

respondents 2-5 was not in a position to challenge the proposition

that parallel proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in

the event of a decree of the civil Court, the Criminal Court should not

be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is

being examined by the civil court and parties are in a position to

approach the Civil Court for interim orders such as injunction or

appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property

during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the

interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted

over meaningless litigation. We are, therefore, satisfied that parallel

proceedings should not continue."

13. We are unable to accept the submission that the principles laid

down in Ram Sumers case (AIR 1985 SC 472: 1985 Cri LJ 752)

would only apply if the civil Court has already adjudicated on the

dispute regarding the property and given a finding. In our view Ram

Sumers case is laying down that multiplicity of litigation should be

avoided as it is not in the interest of the parties and public time would

be wasted over meaningless litigation. On this principle it has been

held that when possession is being examined by the civil Court and

parties are in a position to approach the civil Court for adequate

protection of the property during the pendency of the dispute, the

parallel proceedings i.e. Section 145 proceedings should not continue.

6 of 10

14. Reliance has been placed on the case of Jhummamal alias

Devandas v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in, (1988) 4 SCC 452:

(AIR 1988 SC 1973: 1989 Cri LJ 82). It is submitted that this

authority lays down that merely because a civil suit is pending does

not mean that proceedings under Section 145, Criminal Procedure

Code should be set at naught. In our view this authority does not lay

down any such broad proposition. In this case the proceedings under

Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code had resulted in a concluded

order. Thereafter the party, who had lost, filed civil proceedings. After

filing the civil proceedings he prayed that the final order passed in the

Section 145 proceedings be quashed. It is in that context that this

Court held that merely because a civil suit had been filed did not

mean that the concluded order under Section 145 Criminal Procedure

Code should be quashed. This is entirely a different situation. In this

case the civil suit had been filed first. An Order of status quo had

already been passed by the competent civil Court. Thereafter Section

145 proceedings were commenced. No final order had been passed in

the proceedings under Section 145. In our view on the facts of the

present case the ratio laid down in Ram Sumers case (AIR 1985 SC

472: 1985 Cri LJ 752) (supra) fully applies. We clarify that we are not

stating that in every case where a civil suit is filed. Section 145

proceedings would never lie. It is only in cases where civil suit is for

possession or for declaration of title in respect of the same property

and where reliefs regarding protection of the property concerned can

be applied for and granted by the civil Court that proceedings under

Section 145 should not be allowed to continue. This is because the

civil court is competent to decide the question of title as well as

possession between the parties and the orders of the civil Court would

be binding on the Magistrate.”

7. In a recent judgement of Hon’ble Apex Court, viz. Mohd. Shakir

vs. State of U.P. & others [2022 Live Law (SC) 727], it has been held that

during pendency of civil suit qua property in question, while dropping the

proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C., there is no justification for the

learned Magistrate to record any finding or issue any interim direction.

The Magistrate ought to have left all the relevant aspects for consideration

of the competent civil court, without recording any finding in the matter.

7 of 10

8. Having careful consideration to the ratio decided by Hon’ble

Supreme Court, in the matters as discussed above, in the given facts of the

present case, there is no room of doubt that while the civil suit is pending

between the parties with respect to the possession and title over the

property in question, parties could avail appropriate remedy before the

civil court concerned qua their possession and protection of the property

during pendency of the suit.

9. Judgement relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent does

not come in rescue to his contention. Case of Jhunamal @ Devandas

(supra) has been distinguished by Hon’ble Supreme Court in its

judgement passed in the case of Amresh Tiwari (supra). In the matter of

Jhunamal @ Devandas (supra), after culmination of proceeding under

Section 145 Cr.P.C. civil suit was filed and Hon’ble High Court has

quashed the order passed under Section 145 Cr.P.C. on the ground of

pendency of the civil suit. In this backdrop of the facts, Hon’ble Supreme

Court has observed that concluded proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C.

should not be set at naught merely because unsuccessful party has

approached before the civil court. So far as the case of Sanjay Kumar

(supra) is concerned, same is not much helpful as well to the opposite

party wherein proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. has been held to be

valid for want of adjudicate interim injunction from the civil court. It has

been observed by co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the cited case that

proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. should be dropped only when the

civil court has passed some effective order indicating as to which of the

parties was entitled to possession. Apart from that proceeding should also

be dropped when civil court has appointed a receiver or has made same

arrangement for maintenance of such property. But, when the civil court

does not clarify the position regarding the possession of contesting parties

by passing an effective order, the criminal proceeding are not to be

dropped because in that case both the parties may stake their claim for the

possession and the situation may lead to the breach of peace. Applying the

8 of 10

observation made by co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the given

circumstances of the present case, I am of the opinion that while deciding

the interim injunction application (Paper No.7-C), learned trial court has

made unequivocal observation acknowledging the possession of the

present applicant over the property in question, however, refused to grant

interim order on the ground that possession is not legal. While discussing

the prima-facie case and balance of convenience, learned trial court has

made observation that possession of the plaintiff (applicant) is for a short

period that too it was restrictive and was not peaceful. It has also been

observed that possession of the applicant was not in accordance with law.

Thus, learned civil court has unequivocally indicated the possession of the

plaintiff (applicant herein) over the property in question that might be

illegal or not peaceful. In the matter of Sandeep Sahai (supra), co-ordinate

Bench of this Court has declined to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. on the ground that the applicant in that matter had an

alternative remedy to approach before the authority concerned by filing an

appropriate application/objection against the preliminary order under

Section 145 (1) Cr.P.C.

10. In this conspectus, as above, I am of the considered view that in the

peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case wherein at the time of

passing the preliminary order dated 04.05.2021 under Section 145 (1)

Cr.P.C., interim order dated 13.01.2021 passed by Hon’ble High Court

was in existence and civil suit was pending and, precisely, learned civil

court in its order dated 0909.2020 has indicated the possession of the

plaintiff over the property in question, there is no justification to keep the

parties indulge in a parallel criminal proceeding as enunciated under

Section 145 Cr.P.C. Ratio decided by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the

matter of Amresh Tiwari is still a law of land in the matter pertaining to

proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. This Court found an abuse of

process of court in passing the impugned preliminary order dated

04.02.2021 under Section 145 (1) Cr.P.C., therefore, to secure the ends of

9 of 10

justice, same is liable to be quashed. There is no need to say that the right,

title and possession of the parties would be abided by the final outcome of

the civil suit pending before the court competent and in case of any

peculiar circumstances requiring interim protection parties can approach

before the civil court for appropriate order.

11. Resultantly, instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is hereby

allowed and the preliminary order dated 04.02.2021 passed by City

Magistrate, Mathura, under Section 145 (1) Cr.P.C. in Case No.35 of 2021

(Aman Deep Singh vs. Adarsh Pal Gupta), under challenge before this

Court, is hereby quashed.

Order Date :- 20.12.2023

Jitendra

10 of 10

Wednesday, January 3, 2024

2024 INSC 1- Whether the sale deed was registered with the interpolation made about the description/area of the property sold and the same is valid ? held that The corrections unilaterally made by the first defendant after the execution of the sale deed without the knowledge and consent of the purchaser will have to be ignored.

Whether the sale deed was registered with the interpolation made about the description/area of the property sold and the same is valid ?

held that The corrections unilaterally made by the first defendant after the execution of the sale deed without the knowledge and consent of the purchaser will have to be ignored. 

The first defendant admittedly made the said interpolation after it was executed but before it was registered. 

In terms of Section 47 of the Registration Act, a registered sale deed where entire consideration is paid would operate from the date of its execution. 

Thus, the sale deed as originally executed will operate. 

The corrections unilaterally made by the first defendant after the execution of the sale deed without the knowledge and consent of the purchaser will have to be ignored. 

Only if such changes would have been made with the consent of the original plaintiff, the same could relate back to the date of the execution. 

It is not even the first defendant's case that the subsequent correction or interpolation was made before its registration with the consent of the original plaintiff.


2024 INSC 1

 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9098 OF 2013 Page 1 of 8

NON REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9098 OF 2013

KANWAR RAJ SINGH (D) TH. LRS. …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

GEJO. (D) TH.LRS & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

ABHAY S. OKA, J.

FACTUAL ASPECTS

1. Unsuccessful defendants have preferred this Civil Appeal

for taking exception to the judgment and order dated 16th

March 2010 passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court.

The respondents are the legal representatives of Smt. Gejo. She

was the plaintiff in a suit for declaration. She claimed a

declaration of ownership over the land measuring 71 kanals 8

marlas (“suit property”) based on the sale deed executed on 6th

June 1975 and registered on 23rd July 1975. The first

defendant, Kanwar Raj Singh (predecessor of the present

appellants), executed the sale deed. Subsequently, the first

defendant executed a gift deed regarding a 2/3rd share in 

 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9098 OF 2013 Page 2 of 8

respect of the same property in favour of the eighth defendant

– Smt. Ravinder Kaur. The eighth defendant is the first

defendant’s wife. According to the case of the original plaintiff

– Smt. Gejo, before registration of the sale deed, an

interpolation was made in the sale deed by the first defendant

by adding that only 1/3rd share measuring 23 kanals and 8

marlas was being sold. The suit was contested by the first

defendant, contending that what was sold was the area of 23

kanals and 8 marlas, which was his 1/3rd share in the suit

property.

2. The Trial Court decreed the suit and held that what was

sold to the original plaintiff was the entire land measuring 71

kanals 8 marlas. The first and eighth defendants preferred an

appeal before the District Court. On 23rd August 1984, the

Additional District Judge allowed the said appeal and held that

the correction made in the sale deed was bona fide and was not

fraudulently made. The plaintiff preferred a second appeal

before the High Court. The plaintiff died during the pendency

of the second appeal. Respondent nos. 1(i) & 1(v) are the legal

representatives of the original plaintiff. By the impugned

judgment, the appeal was allowed, and the decree of the Trial

Court was restored.

SUBMISSIONS

3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted

that as the price of the property subject matter of the sale deed

was only Rs. 30,000/-, it is impossible that a vast area of 71

kanals 8 marlas was sold under the sale deed. The learned 

 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9098 OF 2013 Page 3 of 8

counsel submitted that the sale took effect from the date on

which the sale deed was registered and not from the date on

which it was executed. He submitted that what is conveyed by

the sale deed is what is mentioned in the registered sale deed.

He submitted that even the agreement for sale executed before

the execution of the sale deed refers to the sale of 1/3rd share

of the first defendant and not the entire property. He submitted

that the entry of the name of the original plaintiff in the revenue

records as the owner of the whole area would not confer any

title as what is relevant is the description of the property in the

registered sale deed. The learned counsel relied upon a decision

of the Constitution Bench in the case of Ram Saran Lall v.

Domini Kuer1 and submitted that in view of the said decision,

the sale would be completed when the sale deed was registered

and, therefore, the description of the property recorded in the

registered sale deed will prevail. The respondents are not

represented.

CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS

4. We have perused the judgments of the Trial Court,

District Court and the impugned judgment of the High Court.

The first Appellate Court recorded that it is the case of the

defendants that before registration of the sale deed, the first

defendant incorporated a change in the sale deed stating that

it was in respect of 1/3rd share in the area of 71 kanals and 8

marlas. The first Appellate Court noted that the original first

defendant's evidence was that the correction was made by him

1 AIR 1961 SC 1747

 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9098 OF 2013 Page 4 of 8

with his own pen in the sale deed before its registration. The

appellants are the legal representatives of the first defendant.

In this case, it is an admitted position that while executing the

sale deed, the area of the land sold was shown as 71 kanals

and 8 marlas and subsequently, the area was altered to 1/3rd

of the said area by the first defendant before the sale deed was

registered.

5. The High Court, in the impugned judgment, has relied

upon Section 47 of The Registration Act, 1908 (the Registration

Act), which reads thus:

“47. Time from which registered

document operates.—A registered

document shall operate from the time from

which it would have commenced to operate if

no registration thereof had been required or

made, and not from the time of its

registration.”

6. On plain reading of Section 47, it provides that a

registered document shall operate from the time from which it

would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof was

required. Thus, when a compulsorily registerable document is

registered according to the Registration Act, it can operate from

a date before the date of its registration. The date of the

operation will depend on the nature of the transaction. If, in a

given case, a sale deed is executed and the entire agreed

consideration is paid on or before execution of the sale deed,

after it is registered, it will operate from the date of its

execution. The reason is that if its registration was not

required, it would have operated from the date of its execution.

 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9098 OF 2013 Page 5 of 8

7. Now, we come to the decision of the Constitution Bench

in the case of Ram Saran Lall (Supra). In paragraph 8 of the

judgment, the Constitution Bench held thus:

“8. We do not think that the learned AttorneyGeneral's contention is well founded. We will

assume that the learned Attorney-General's

construction of the instrument of sale that the

property was intended to pass under it on the

date of the instrument is correct. Section 47

of the Registration Act does not, however, say

when a sale would be deemed to be complete.

It only permits a document when registered,

to operate from a certain date which may be

earlier than the date when it was registered.

The object of this section is to decide which of

two or more registered instruments in respect

of the same property is to have effect. The

section applies to a document only after it has

been registered. It has nothing to do with the

completion of the registration and therefore

nothing to do with the completion of a sale

when the instrument is one of sale. A sale

which is admittedly not completed until the

registration of the instrument of sale is

completed, cannot be said to have been

completed earlier because by virtue of Section

47 the instrument by which it is effected, after

it has been registered, commences to operate

from an earlier date. Therefore we do not

think that the sale in this case can be said, in

view of Section 47, to have been completed on

January 31, 1946. The view that we have

taken of Section 47 of the Registration Act

seems to have been taken in Tilakdhari

Singh v. Gour Narain [AIR (1921) Pat 150] . We

believe that the same view was expressed

in Nareshchandra Datta v. Gireeshchandra

Das [(1935) ILR 62 Cal 979] and Gobardhan

Bar v. Guna Dhar Bar [ILR (1940) II Cal 270].”

(underline supplied)

 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9098 OF 2013 Page 6 of 8

8. The Constitution Bench held that Section 47 of the

Registration Act does not deal with the issue when the sale is

complete. The Constitution Bench held that Section 47 applies

to a document only after it has been registered, and it has

nothing to do with the completion of the sale when the

instrument is one of sale. It was also held that once a document

is registered, it will operate from an earlier date, as provided in

Section 47 of the Registration Act.

9. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1984 (the

Transfer of Property Act) reads thus:

“54. “Sale” defined.—“Sale” is a transfer of

ownership in exchange for a price paid or

promised or part-paid and part-promised.

Sale how made.—Such transfer, in the case

of tangible immoveable property of the value

of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the

case of a reversion or other intangible thing,

can be made only by a registered instrument.

In the case of tangible immoveable property

of a value less than one hundred rupees,

such transfer may be made either by a

registered instrument or by delivery of the

property.

Delivery of tangible immoveable property

takes place when the seller places the buyer,

or such person as he directs, in possession of

the property.

Contract for sale.—A contract for the sale of

immoveable property is a contract that a sale

of such property shall take place on terms

settled between the parties.

It does not, of itself, create any interest in or

charge on such property.”

 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9098 OF 2013 Page 7 of 8

10. Every sale deed in respect of property worth more than

Rs. 100/- is compulsorily registerable under Section 54 of the

Transfer of Property Act. Thus, a sale deed executed by the

vendor becomes an instrument of sale only after it is registered.

The decision of the Constitution Bench only deals with the

question of when the sale is complete; it does not deal with the

issue of the date from which the sale deed would operate.

Section 47 of the Registration Act does not deal with the

completion of the sale; it only lays down the time from which a

registered document would operate.

11. Now, coming to the facts of this case, the consideration

was entirely paid on the date of the execution of the sale deed.

The sale deed was registered with the interpolation made about

the description/area of the property sold. The first defendant

admittedly made the said interpolation after it was executed

but before it was registered. In terms of Section 47 of the

Registration Act, a registered sale deed where entire

consideration is paid would operate from the date of its

execution. Thus, the sale deed as originally executed will

operate. The corrections unilaterally made by the first

defendant after the execution of the sale deed without the

knowledge and consent of the purchaser will have to be

ignored. Only if such changes would have been made with the

consent of the original plaintiff, the same could relate back to

the date of the execution. It is not even the first defendant's

case that the subsequent correction or interpolation was made

before its registration with the consent of the original plaintiff.

 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9098 OF 2013 Page 8 of 8

Therefore, in this case, what will operate is the sale deed as it

existed when it was executed.

12. Therefore, we find no error in the view taken by the High

Court.

13. As held in the case of Satyender and Ors. v. Saroj and

Ors.2 , the second appeal in the present case will be governed

by Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918. Under clause (a)

of sub-Section (1) of Section 41, a decision being contrary to

law is a ground for interference. The decision of the first

Appellate Court was contrary to Section 47 of the Registration

Act. The High Court was justified in interfering with the

decision of the first Appellate Court in a second appeal under

Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act.

14. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to

costs.

……………………..J.

(Abhay S. Oka)

……………………..J.

(Pankaj Mithal)

New Delhi;

January 02, 2024

2 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1026