whether the adjudicating authority (NCLT) or the appellate authority (NCLAT) can sit in an 2 appeal over the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors (hereinafter referred to as the “CoC”) or not.

  REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1811­1812 OF 2022

VALLAL RCK            ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

M/S SIVA INDUSTRIES AND HOLDINGS 

LIMITED AND OTHERS     ...RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

B.R. GAVAI, J.

1. These   appeals   challenge   the   common   judgment

dated   28th  January   2022   passed  by   the   learned  National

Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Chennai Bench, Chennai

(hereinafter referred to as the “NCLAT”) in Company Appeal

(AT)(CH)(Insolvency)   Nos.   211   and   212   of   2021,   thereby

dismissing the appeals filed by the present appellant, which

were   in   turn   filed,   challenging   the   two   orders   dated   12th

August 2021 passed by the learned National Company Law

Tribunal, Division Bench­II, Chennai (hereinafter referred to

1

as the “NCLT”), thereby rejecting the application filed by the

Resolution Professional (“RP” for short) under Section 12A of

the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC” for short)

read with Regulation 30A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy

Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate

Persons) Regulations, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as the

“2016 Regulations”), for withdrawal of the application filed

under Section 7 of the IBC in view of the Settlement Plan

submitted   by   the   appellant.   The   appellant   has   also

challenged the order passed by the learned NCLAT of the

even   date   vide   which   the   appeal   filed   by   the   present

appellant   against   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   NCLT

directing initiation of liquidation proceedings in respect of

M/s Siva Industries and Holdings Limited­respondent No.1

herein (hereinafter referred to as the “Corporate Debtor”),

was dismissed.

2. A short question that falls for consideration in the

present appeal is as to whether the adjudicating authority

(NCLT)   or   the   appellate   authority   (NCLAT)   can   sit   in   an

2

appeal   over   the   commercial   wisdom   of   the   Committee   of

Creditors (hereinafter referred to as the “CoC”) or not.

3. The facts in brief giving rise to the present appeals

are as under:

IDBI   Bank   Limited   had   filed   an   application   under

Section 7 of the IBC for initiation of Corporate Insolvency

Resolution Process (hereinafter referred to as the “CIRP”) in

respect of the Corporate Debtor.  The learned NCLT, vide its

order dated 4th July 2019, admitted the said application.  As

a result of which, CIRP in respect of the Corporate Debtor

was initiated.  The RP had presented a Resolution Plan before

the CoC, submitted by one M/s Royal Partners Investment

Fund Limited.   However, since the said Plan received only

60.90% votes of the CoC and could not meet the requirement

of receiving 66% votes, the said Plan could not be approved.

4. The RP, on 8th May 2020, filed an application being

IA/837/IB/2020 under Section 33(1)(a) of the IBC seeking

initiation of liquidation process of the Corporate Debtor.  The

appellant, who is the promoter of the Corporate Debtor, filed

3

a settlement application being IA/647/IB/2020 before the

NCLT under Section 60(5) of the IBC, showing his willingness

to   offer   one­time   settlement   plan.     The   appellant   sought

necessary directions to the CoC to consider the terms of

Settlement Plan as proposed by him.   From the month of

October to December 2020, the 13th, 14th and 15th meetings

of the CoC were held to consider the Settlement Plan as

submitted by the appellant.  Deliberations took place in the

said meetings with regard to the said Settlement Plan and

the final settlement proposal which was submitted by the

appellant   came   to   be   considered   by   the   CoC   in   its   16th

meeting   held   on   18th  January   2021.     Initially,   the   said

Settlement   Plan   received   only   70.63%   votes.     However

subsequently,   one   of   the   Financial   Creditors   viz.

International   Assets   Reconstruction   Co.   Ltd.   (hereinafter

referred   to   as   “IARCL”)   having   voting   share   of   23.60%,

decided to approve the said Settlement Plan and intimated

the RP about the same.

5. Since the said Settlement Plan stood approved by

more than 90% voting share, the RP filed an application

4

before the learned NCLT seeking necessary directions based

on the request of IARCL.   Vide its order dated 29th  March

2021,   the   learned   NCLT   ordered   the   RP   to   reconvene   a

meeting  of   CoC   and  place  the   e­mail  of   IARCL  before   it.

Accordingly, the 17th CoC meeting was convened on 1st April

2021, wherein the said Settlement Plan was approved with a

voting   majority   of   94.23%.     Accordingly,   the   RP   filed   an

application   being   MA/43/CHE/2021   in   IBA/453/2019

before the learned NCLT seeking withdrawal of CIRP initiated

against the Corporate Debtor in view of the approval of the

said Settlement Plan by CoC.

6. The learned NCLT, vide its order dated 12th August

2021, while holding that the said Settlement Plan was not a

settlement simpliciter under Section 12A of the IBC but a

“Business Restructuring Plan”, rejected the application for

withdrawal   of   CIRP   and   approval  of   the   Settlement   Plan.

Vide another order of even date, the learned NCLT initiated

liquidation   process   of   the   Corporate   Debtor   in

IA/837/IB/2020   as   well.     Being   aggrieved   thereby,   the

appellant preferred two appeals before the learned NCLAT.

5

Vide the common impugned judgment dated 28th  January

2022, the same came to be dismissed. Hence, the present

appeals.

7. Notice   was   issued   by   this   Court   in   the   present

appeals on 11th March 2022.  While issuing notice, this Court

also granted stay of the impugned judgment.  Insofar as the

respondent   No.1   is   concerned,   no   one   appeared.     Shri

Abhishek Swaroop, learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the respondent No.2 also does not wish to contest the matter.

As such, we could have very well allowed the appeals as

being uncontested.   However, since an important question

with regard to interpretation of Section 12A of the IBC arises,

we are inclined to consider the matter for deciding the said

issue.

8. We have heard Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned

Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant.

9. Dr. Singhvi submits that it is more than well­settled

that   the  adjudicating   authority   or  the   appellate  authority

cannot sit in an appeal over the commercial wisdom of CoC.

6

He submitted that the CoC, having accepted the Settlement

Plan with the voting majority of 94.23%, the learned NCLT

and the learned NCLAT have grossly erred in rejecting the

Settlement Plan and withdrawal of CIRP.

10. Dr. Singhvi submitted that one of the main objects of

the IBC is permitting the Corporate Debtor to continue as an

on­going concern and at the same time, paying the dues of

the   creditors   to   the   maximum.     He   submits   that   the

impugned judgment dated 28th January 2022 passed by the

learned   NCLAT   and   the   orders   dated   12th  August   2021

passed by the learned NCLT are totally contrary to the spirit

behind the IBC.

11. For   considering   these   submissions,   it   will   be

apposite to refer to Section 12A of the IBC, which reads thus:

“12­A.   Withdrawal   of   application   admitted

under   Section   7,   9   or   10.—The   Adjudicating

Authority may allow the withdrawal of application

admitted under Section 7 or Section 9 or Section

10, on an application made by the applicant with

the approval of ninety per cent. voting share of

the committee of creditors, in such manner as

may be specified.”

7

12. It is relevant to note that Section 12A of the IBC was

brought in the statute book vide Insolvency and Bankruptcy

Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018 (Act No. 26 of 2018).

The Statement of Objects and Reasons (for short “SOR”) of

the Act No. 26 of 2018 would reveal that after the IBC was

enacted in 2016, it had emerged that further fine tuning of

the   IBC   would   be   required.     The   Government   therefore

constituted   an   Insolvency   Law   Committee   (hereinafter

referred to as the “said Committee”) to review the functioning

and implementation of the IBC. The SOR would further reveal

that   the   recommendations   of   the   said   Committee   were

examined by the Government and it was accordingly decided

to amend the IBC. One of the amendments proposed was for

making a provision for withdrawal of application for initiation

of   CIRP   admitted   by   Adjudicating   Authority.     It   was

recommended that such an exit should be allowed provided

the CoC approves such action by 90% voting share. 

13. It will be relevant to refer to Clause (vii) of the key

recommendations in the Report of the said Committee dated

26th March 2018, which reads thus:

8

“(vii)     in   order   to   cater   to   exceptional

circumstances   warranting   withdrawal   of   an

application for CIRP post­admission, it has been

recommended to allow such exit provided the CoC

approves such action by ninety per cent of voting

share;”

14. It will also be relevant to refer to paragraph (29) of

the Report of the said Committee, which reads thus:

“29.   WITHDRAWAL   OF   CIRP   PROCEEDINGS

PURSUANT TO SETTLEMENT

29.1 Under rule 8 of the CIRP Rules, the NCLT

may permit withdrawal of the application on a

request   by   the   applicant   before   its   admission.

However, there is no provision in the Code or the

CIRP   Rules   in   relation   to   permissibility   of

withdrawal post admission of a CIRP application.

It was observed by the Committee that there have

been instances where on account of settlement

between the applicant creditor and the corporate

debtor, judicial permission for withdrawal of CIRP

was   granted.   This   practice   was   deliberated   in

light of the objective of the Code as encapsulated

in the BLRC Report, that the design of the Code is

based on ensuring that “all key stakeholders will

participate to collectively assess viability. The law

must   ensure   that   all   creditors   who   have   the

capability and the willingness to restructure their

liabilities must be part of the negotiation process.

The liabilities of all creditors who are not part of

the negotiation process must also be met in any

negotiated   solution.”   Thus,   it   was   agreed   that

once   the   CIRP   is   initiated,   it   is   no   longer   a

proceeding   only   between   the   applicant   creditor

and the corporate debtor but is envisaged to be a

9

proceeding involving all creditors of the debtor.

The intent of the Code is to discourage individual

actions   for   enforcement   and   settlement   to   the

exclusion of the general benefit of all creditors. 

29.2     On   a   review   of   the   multiple   NCLT   and

NCLAT judgments in this regard, the consistent

pattern that emerged was that a settlement may

be reached amongst all creditors and the debtor,

for the purpose of a withdrawal to be granted,

and   not   only   the   applicant   creditor   and   the

debtor. On this basis read with the intent of the

Code, the Committee unanimously agreed that

the relevant rules may be amended to provide

for   withdrawal   post   admission   if   the   CoC

approves  of  such  action  by  a  voting  share  of

ninety   per   cent.  It   was   specifically   discussed

that   rule   11   of   the   National   Company   Law

Tribunal Rules, 2016 may not be adopted for this

aspect of CIRP at this stage (as observed by the

Hon’ble   Supreme   Court   in   the   case   of  Uttara

Foods   and   Feeds   Private   Limited   v.   Mona

Pharmacem) and even otherwise, as the issue can

be specifically addressed by amending rule 8 of

the CIRP Rules.” 

15. It could thus be seen from the Report of the said

Committee that, the said Committee had observed that there

have been instances where on account of settlement between

the   applicant   creditor   and   the   corporate   debtor,   judicial

permission for withdrawal of CIRP was granted.  The Report

would further reveal that it refers to Banking Law Reforms

10

Committee   Report   which   emphasizes   that   the   law   must

ensure that all creditors who have the capability and the

willingness to restructure their liabilities must be part of the

negotiation process. It also emphasizes that the liabilities of

all creditors who are not part of the negotiation process must

also be met in any negotiated solution.  The said Committee

states   that   once   the   CIRP   is   initiated,   it   is   no   longer   a

proceeding   only   between   the   applicant   creditor   and   the

corporate debtor but is envisaged to be a proceeding involving

all   creditors   of   the   debtor.   The   intent   of   the   IBC   is   to

discourage individual actions for enforcement and settlement

to the exclusion of the general benefit of all creditors.   The

Report would further reveal that a settlement may be reached

amongst all creditors and the debtor, for the purpose of a

withdrawal to be granted, and not only the applicant creditor

and the debtor. The said Committee therefore recommended

that   the   relevant   rules   may   be   amended   to   provide   for

withdrawal post admission if the CoC approves of such action

by a voting share of ninety per cent. 

11

16. It could thus be seen that Section 12A of the IBC was

brought   in   the   statute   book  on   the   basis   of   the  said

Committee’s Report. It could be noticed that though by the

Amendment Act No. 26 of 2018, the voting share of 75% of

CoC for approval of the Resolution Plan was brought down to

66%,   Section   12A   of   the   IBC   which   was   brought   in   the

statute book by the same amendment, requires the voting

share of 90% of CoC for approval of withdrawal of CIRP.  It

could thus clearly be seen that a more stringent provision

has been made insofar as withdrawal of CIRP is concerned.

17. It is further to be noted that after Section 12A of the

IBC was brought in the statute book, Regulation 30A of the

2016 Regulations came to be inserted vide notification dated

3

rd  July   2018.     The   same   came   to   be   substituted   vide

notification dated 25th July 2019.  Regulation 30A of the 2016

Regulations reads thus:

“30­A.   Withdrawal   of   application.—(1)   An

application   for   withdrawal   under   Section   12­A

may be made to the Adjudicating Authority—

(a)   before   the   constitution   of   the

committee,   by   the   applicant   through

the interim resolution professional;

12

(b)   after   the   constitution   of   the

committee,   by   the   applicant   through

the interim resolution professional or

the resolution professional, as the case

may be:

Provided   that   where   the   application   is   made

under clause (b) after the issue of invitation for

expression of interest under Regulation 36­A, the

applicant   shall   state   the   reasons   justifying

withdrawal after issue of such invitation.

(2) The application under sub­regulation (1) shall

be   made   in   Form   FA   of   the   Schedule

accompanied by a bank guarantee—

(a)   towards   estimated   expenses

incurred   on   or   by   the   interim

resolution professional for purposes of

Regulation 33, till the date of filing of

the application under clause (a) of subregulation (1); or

(b)   towards   estimated   expenses

incurred for purposes of clauses (aa),

(ab), (c) and (d) of Regulation 31, till

the   date   of   filing   of   the   application

under clause (b) of sub­regulation (1).

(3) Where an application for withdrawal is under

clause   (a)   of   sub­regulation   (1),   the   interim

resolution   professional   shall   submit   the

application   to   the   Adjudicating   Authority   on

behalf of the applicant, within three days of its

receipt.

(4) Where an application for withdrawal is under

clause   (b)   of   sub­regulation   (1),   the   committee

shall consider the application, within seven days

of its receipt.

(5)   Where   the   application   referred   to   in   subregulation (4) is approved by the committee with

13

ninety   percent   voting   share,   the   resolution

professional shall submit such application along

with   the   approval   of   the   committee,   to   the

Adjudicating Authority on behalf of the applicant,

within three days of such approval.

(6)   The   Adjudicating   Authority   may,   by   order,

approve   the   application   submitted   under   subregulation (3) or (5).

(7) Where the application is approved under subregulation   (6),   the   applicant   shall   deposit   an

amount, towards the actual expenses incurred for

the purposes referred to in clause (a) or clause (b)

of sub­regulation (2) till the date of approval by

the Adjudicating Authority, as determined by the

interim   resolution   professional   or   resolution

professional, as the case may be, within three

days of such approval, in the bank account of the

corporate   debtor,   failing   which   the   bank

guarantee received under sub­regulation (2) shall

be invoked, without prejudice to any other action

permissible   against   the   applicant   under   the

Code.”

18. A perusal of the said Regulation would reveal that

where an application for withdrawal under Section 12A of the

IBC is made after the  constitution of  the  Committee, the

same   has   to   be   made   through   the   interim   resolution

professional or the resolution professional, as the case may

be.  The application has to be made in Form­FA.  It further

provides that when an application is made after the issue of

invitation for expression of interest under Regulation 36A, the

14

applicant   is   required   to   state   the   reasons   justifying

withdrawal of the same.  The RP is required to place such an

application  for   consideration   before   the  Committee.     Only

after such an application is approved by the Committee with

90% voting share, the RP shall submit the same along with

the approval of the Committee to the adjudicating authority.

It could thus be seen that a detailed procedure is prescribed

under Regulation 30A of the 2016 Regulations as well.

19. In the case of Swiss Ribbons Privated Limited and

Another   v.   Union   of   India   and   Others1

,   one   of   the

challenges made was with regard to validity of Section 12A of

the IBC.  It was argued that the figure of 90% voting share

was   arbitrary.   It   was   the   contention   that   though   the

withdrawal was just and proper, the CoC could exercise the

power arbitrarily to reject such a settlement. While rejecting

the said contention, this Court observed thus:

“83. The   main   thrust   against   the   provision   of

Section 12­A is the fact that ninety per cent of the

Committee of Creditors has to allow withdrawal.

This high threshold has been explained in the ILC

Report as all financial creditors have to put their

heads   together   to   allow   such   withdrawal   as,

1 (2019) 4 SCC 17

15

ordinarily,   an   omnibus   settlement

involving all creditors ought, ideally, to be entered

into. This explains why ninety per cent, which is

substantially all the financial creditors, have to

grant their approval to an individual withdrawal

or settlement. In any case, the figure of ninety per

cent, in the absence of anything further to show

that it is arbitrary, must pertain to the domain of

legislative policy, which has been explained by

the Report (supra). Also, it is clear, that under

Section   60   of   the   Code,   the   Committee   of

Creditors   do   not   have   the   last   word   on   the

subject. If the Committee of Creditors arbitrarily

rejects   a   just   settlement   and/or   withdrawal

claim, NCLT, and thereafter, NCLAT can always set

aside such decision under Section 60 of the Code.

For all these reasons, we are of the view that

Section 12­A also passes constitutional muster.”

20. It could thus be seen that this Court has found that

if   the   CoC   arbitrarily   rejects   a   just   settlement   and/or

withdrawal   claim,   the   learned   NCLT   and   thereafter   the

learned NCLAT can always set aside such decision under the

provisions of the IBC.

21. This Court has consistently held that the commercial

wisdom of the CoC has been given paramount status without

any judicial intervention for ensuring completion of the stated

processes within the timelines prescribed by the IBC. It has

been held that there is an intrinsic assumption, that financial

16

creditors   are   fully   informed   about   the   viability   of   the

corporate debtor and feasibility of the proposed resolution

plan. They act on the basis of thorough examination of the

proposed resolution plan and assessment made by their team

of experts.  A reference in this respect could be made to the

judgments of this Court in the cases of  K.   Sashidhar   v.

Indian   Overseas   Bank   and   Others2

,  Committee   of

Creditors   of   Essar   Steel   India   Limited   through

Authorised   Signatory   v.   Satish   Kumar   Gupta   and

Others3

,  Maharashtra   Seamless   Limited   v.

Padmanabhan   Venkatesh   and   Others4

,   Kalpraj

Dharamshi   and   Another   v.   Kotak   Investment   Advisors

Limited and Another5

, and Jaypee Kensington Boulevard

Apartments   Welfare   Association   and   Others   v.   NBCC

(India) Limited and Others6

.

2 (2019) 12 SCC 150

3 (2020) 8 SCC 531

4 (2020) 11 SCC 467

5 (2021) 10 SCC 401

6 (2022) 1 SCC 401

17

22. No doubt that the aforesaid observations have been

made by this Court while considering the powers of the CoC

while granting its approval to the Resolution Plan.

23. As already stated hereinabove, the provisions under

Section 12A of the IBC have been made more stringent as

compared to Section 30(4) of the IBC.  Whereas under Section

30(4) of the IBC, the voting share of CoC for approving the

Resolution Plan is 66%, the requirement under Section 12A

of the IBC for withdrawal of CIRP is 90%.

24. When 90% and more of the creditors, in their wisdom

after due deliberations, find that it will be in the interest of all

the stake­holders to permit settlement and withdraw CIRP, in

our   view,   the   adjudicating   authority   or   the   appellate

authority cannot sit in an appeal over the commercial wisdom

of CoC. The interference would be warranted only when the

adjudicating authority or the appellate authority finds the

decision   of   the   CoC   to   be   wholly   capricious,   arbitrary,

irrational and  de hors  the provisions of the statute or the

Rules.

18

25. In the present case, the proceedings of the 13th, 14th

and 15th meetings of CoC would clearly show that there were

wide deliberations amongst the members of the CoC while

considering   the   Settlement   Plan   as   submitted   by   the

appellant.  Not only that, the proceedings would also reveal

that after suggestions were made by some of the members of

the   CoC,   suitable   amendments   were   carried   out   in   the

Settlement Plan by the appellant.  One of the members of the

CoC having voting share of 23.60%, though initially opposed

the Settlement Plant, subsequently decided to support the

same.   Accordingly, the NCLT itself, vide order dated 29th

March 2021, directed the RP to reconvene the CoC meeting.

As per the directions of the NCLT, on 1st April 2021, the 17th

meeting of the CoC was reconvened, wherein the Settlement

Plan was approved by 94.23% votes.  

26. It is thus clear that the decision of the CoC was

taken after the members of the CoC, had due deliberation to

consider the pros and cons of the Settlement Plan and took a

decision   exercising   their   commercial   wisdom.     We   are

therefore   of   the   considered   view   that   neither   the   learned

19

NCLT nor the learned NCLAT were justified in not giving due

weightage to the commercial wisdom of CoC.

27. This Court has, time and again, emphasized the need

for minimal judicial interference by the NCLAT and NCLT in

the framework of IBC.  We may refer to the recent observation

of this Court made in the case of Arun Kumar Jagatramka

v. Jindal Steel and Power Limited and Another7

:

“95.  ….However, we do take this opportunity to

offer   a   note   of   caution   for   NCLT   and NCLAT,

functioning   as   the   adjudicatory   authority   and

appellate   authority   under   the   IBC   respectively,

from   judicially   interfering   in   the   framework

envisaged   under   the   IBC.   As   we   have   noted

earlier in the judgment, the IBC was introduced

in   order   to   overhaul   the   insolvency   and

bankruptcy   regime   in   India.   As   such,   it   is   a

carefully considered and well thought out piece of

legislation   which   sought   to   shed   away   the

practices   of   the   past.   The   legislature   has   also

been working hard to ensure that the efficacy of

this   legislation   remains   robust   by   constantly

amending   it   based   on   its   experience.

Consequently, the need for judicial intervention

or   innovation   from   NCLT   and NCLAT should   be

kept at its bare minimum and should not disturb

the foundational principles of the IBC…..”

28. In the result, we pass the following order:

7 (2021) 7 SCC 474

20

(i) The appeals are allowed;

(ii) The   impugned  judgment   dated  28th  January  2022

delivered by the learned NCLAT in Company Appeal

(AT)(CH)(Insolvency) Nos. 211 and 212 of 2021 and

the orders dated 12th  August 2021 passed by the

learned   NCLT   in   MA/43/CHE/2021   in

IBA/453/2019   and   in   IA/837/IB/2020   in

IBA/453/2019 are quashed and set aside; and 

(iii) The   application   bearing   No.   MA/43/CHE/2021   in

IBA/453/2019 filed by the Resolution Professional

before the learned NCLT for withdrawal of CIRP is

allowed.

29. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of

in the above terms.  No order as to costs.

…..….......................J.

[B.R. GAVAI]

             

    …….........................J.

[HIMA KOHLI]

NEW DELHI;

JUNE 03, 2022.

21

unsanctioned and unauthorised construction activities undertaken by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 within the prohibited area of the Shree Jagannath Temple complex in contravention of the provisions of The Ancient Monuments and 2 Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”)

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NO._4515 OF 2022

[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.10427 of

2022]

ARDHENDU KUMAR DAS     ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF ODISHA AND ORS.  ...RESPONDENT(S)

WITH 

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4516 OF 2022

[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.10428 of

2022]

JUDGMENT

B.R. GAVAI, J.

1. Both   these  petitions   challenge   the   interlocutory   order

dated 9th May, 2022, passed by the Division Bench of the High

Court of Orissa at Cuttack, in Writ Petition (Civil) No.6257 of

2022,   wherein   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   has

1

recorded   certain   submissions   and   statements   made   by   the

learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State of

Odisha and directed the matter to be posted on 22nd June, 2022

along with Writ Petition (Civil) No. 10153 of 2022.   From the

tenor of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the

petitioners, it appears that they are basically aggrieved since

the High Court has not granted an interim order restraining the

respondents from proceeding further with the construction.  

2. The factual background leading to the filing of the present

proceedings is thus:

3. A   Public   Interest   Litigation   being   Writ   Petition   (Civil)

No.6257 of 2022 came to be filed before the High Court of

Orissa   by   one   Dillip   Kumar   Baral   challenging   the   alleged

unsanctioned   and unauthorised   construction   activities

undertaken   by   the   respondent   Nos.   1   and   2   within   the

prohibited   area   of   the  Shree   Jagannath   Temple  complex   in

contravention of the provisions of The Ancient Monuments and

2

Archaeological   Sites   and   Remains   Act,   1958   (hereinafter

referred to as “the said Act”) 

4. It appears that initially the said writ petition was listed

before the Division Bench of the High Court on 8th April, 2022,

on   which   date,   certain   statements   made   by   the   learned

Advocate General were taken on record.   Subsequently, when

the matter was listed on 21st April, 2022, certain further orders

came to be passed.   Subsequently, the order dated 9th  May,

2022 has been passed by the High Court, which is impugned in

the present Special Leave Petitions.  

5. The   petitioner­Ardhendu   Kumar   Das   in   Special   Leave

Petition (Civil) Diary No.16718 of 2022 is not the petitioner

before the High Court.   However, he claims to be an ardent

devotee   of  Lord   Jagannath   and   therefore,   had   filed   an

Intervention   Application   before   the   High   Court,   which   is

pending consideration.   The petitioner has therefore filed an

Interlocutory Application seeking permission to file the present

3

Special Leave Petition challenging the order dated 9th May, 2022

of the Division Bench of the High Court.

6. The petitioner­Sumanta Kumar Ghadei in Special Leave

Petition (Civil) Diary No.17078 of 2022 is also not the petitioner

before the High Court.   The said petitioner had also filed an

Intervention Application in the writ petition before the High

Court,   which   is   pending   adjudication.     The   said   petitioner

claims to be a social activist and businessman, who is a devotee

of Lord Jagannath and also claims to have done research and

has keen interest in ancient monuments and sculptures of the

State.

7. Taking   into   consideration   the   fact   that   larger   issues

involving   public   interest   are   involved,   we   allow   the   said

applications for permission to file Special Leave Petitions.  We

also grant leave in both these Special Leave Petitions.  

8. An impleadment application has been filed by Raghunath

Gochhikar   and   others,   who   claim   to   be   Sevayats.     The

applicants support the stand of the State Government. We are

4

inclined to allow their application and permit them to intervene.

It is ordered accordingly. 

9. We have heard Ms. Mahalakshmi Pavani, learned Senior

Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant­Ardhendu Kumar

Das, Mr. Vinay Navare, learned Senior Counsel appearing on

behalf   of   the   appellant­Sumanta   Kumar   Ghadei,   Mr.   Ashok

Parija, learned Advocate General for State of Odisha, Mr. Kapil

Sibal and Mr. Pinaki Mishra, learned Senior Counsel appearing

on   behalf   of   the   respondent­State,   Mr.   A.D.N.   Rao,   learned

Senior   Counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   Archaeological

Survey of India (“ASI” for short), Mr. Swetaretu Mishra, learned

counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 5 to 7­

Shree   Jagannath   Temple   Managing   Committee   and   Mr.   Pai

Amit,   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the

applicants/interveners/impleaders.   

10. Ms. Mahalakshmi Pavani, learned Senior Counsel submits

that in view of sub­section (4) of Section 20A of the said Act, no

permission can be granted for carrying out any public work or

5

project essential to the public or other constructions in any

prohibited area on and after the date on which the Ancient

Monuments   and   Archaeological   Sites   and   Remains

(Amendment and Validation) Bill, 2010 receives the assent of

the   President.   Ms.   Pavani   further   submitted   that   the

communication   dated  5th  February,   2022,  addressed  by  the

Conservation Assistant, ASI, to the Sr. Project Manager, OBCC,

would show that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were carrying out

unauthorised construction within the prohibited area of the

Centrally   Protected   Monument   of   Shree   Jagannath   Temple.

She further submits that the inspection report would reveal

that there are serious irregularities in the work carried out by

the respondents­State.   She further submits that voluminous

excavation is being done  near the  Temple, which  would be

hazardous to the Temple, which is an old structure.   

11. Shri Vinay Navare, learned Senior Counsel submits that

insofar as the so­called “No Objection Certificate” (“NOC” for

short) issued by the National Monuments Authority (“NMA” for

6

short)   dated   4th  September,   2021,   is   concerned,   the   said

Authority   has   no   authority   in   law   to   permit   construction.

Relying on the provisions of Section 20­I of the said Act, he

submits that NMA is only a recommendatory authority and has

no authority in law to permit any construction either in the

prohibited area or in the regulated area.   He further submits

that   if   any   construction   activity   is   to   be   undertaken   in   a

prohibited area, the same has to be undertaken only by the ASI

and by no other authority.  

12. Both   the   learned   counsel   therefore   submit   that   it   is

necessary to injunct the respondents­State from carrying out

any further construction activity during the pendency of the

present appeals.

13. Shri Ashok Parija, learned Advocate General, submits that

under   clause   (da)   of   Section   2   of   the   said   Act,   the   word

“Authority”   has   been   defined   to   mean   the   NMA   constituted

under Section 20F.  He submits that clause (db) of Section 2 of

the said Act defines “competent authority” to mean an officer

7

not below the rank of Director of archaeology or Commissioner

of archaeology of the Central or State Government or equivalent

rank, specified, by notification in the Official Gazette, as the

competent authority by the Central Government.  He submits

that   the   Government   of   India   vide   Notification   dated   13th

February, 2012, in exercise of the powers conferred by the

proviso to clause (db) of Section 2 of the said Act has notified

Director,   Culture,   Department   of   Tourism   and   Culture

(Culture),   Government   of   Odisha,   Bhubaneshwar   as   the

“competent authority” for the State of Odisha for the purpose of

Sections 20C and 20D of the said Act.  The learned Advocate

General further submits that “grant of permission by competent

authority” is regulated by Section 20D of the said Act.   He

further submits that in view of the provisions of Section 20D of

the said Act, the competent authority for the State of Odisha

had made an application for grant of NOC to NMA.  NMA vide

order dated 4th September, 2021 granted its NOC for carrying

8

out various works within the prohibited area and the regulated

area.  

14. The   learned   Advocate   General   further   submitted   that

clause (dc) of Section 2 of the said Act defines “construction”.

He submits  that  the  definition  specifically  excludes  any  reconstruction, repair and renovation of an existing structure or

building, or, construction, maintenance and cleansing of drains

and drainage works and of public latrines, urinals and similar

conveniences, or, the construction and maintenance of works

meant   for   providing   supply   of   water   for   public,   or,   the

construction   or   maintenance,   extension,   management   for

supply and distribution of electricity to the public or provision

for similar facilities for public. 

15. The learned Advocate General further submitted that the

three­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of  Mrinalini

Padhi vs. Union of India and others1 has itself found that it

was necessary to construct separate toilets for male and female.

1 (2019) 18 SCC 1

9

He further submitted that this Court in the said case itself has

directed   ASI   to   cooperate   and   to   permit   the   activities   of

improvement which are necessary for providing facilities to the

public at large.

16. Mr. Pinaki Mishra, learned Senior Counsel, submits that

taking   into   consideration   the   fact   that   there   was   serious

inconvenience to the devotees who throng in lakhs during the

Rath Yatra period, it was found necessary that the area within

the radius of 75 meters surrounding the Temple be cleared for

passage to the devotees.   He submitted that on an average,

about 60,000 devotees visit the Temple every day. There are no

proper queues for the devotees to maintain discipline and enter

the Temple.   He submits that the basic facilities like toilets for

women   and   men   were   lacking.   As   such,   taking   into

consideration the larger public interest, the Government had

acquired the buildings in the vicinity which were constructed

as   lodges   decades   ago,   by   spending   an   amount   of   Rs.700

crores.   He submitted that the entire area surrounding the

10

Temple was acquired through negotiations without resorting to

the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.   He submits that

these   buildings   were   owned   by   Sevayats,   who   are   also   not

opposing the developmental work surrounding the Temple and,

on the contrary, support the same.  

17. Mr. Pai Amit, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

applicants/interveners/impleaders and Mr. Swetaretu Mishra,

learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   Shree   Jagannath

Temple   Managing   Committee   also   support   the   submissions

made by the learned Advocate General. 

18. Mr. A.D.N. Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for ASI

submits that the stand of the ASI is reflected in the affidavit

filed before the High Court of Orissa and states that the ASI

has no objection to the construction being carried out strictly in

conformity with the provisions of law.  

19. Though the present appeals challenge the interlocutory

order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court, since

lengthy arguments have been advanced on behalf of both the

11

parties, we find it appropriate to consider the submissions on

merits, as advanced. 

20. Before we consider the challenge with regard to violation

of the statutory provisions, it will be apposite to refer to an

earlier decision of this Court, which will have a bearing on the

decision in the present matter. 

21. A   three­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of

Mrinalini   Padhi  (supra),   had   an   occasion   to   consider   the

situation prevailing in the vicinity of Shree Jagannath Temple.

This Court in the said case had initially passed an order on 8th

June,   2018,   directing   the   District   Judge,   Puri   to   submit   a

report.   This Court thereafter vide order dated 9th  January,

2019, appointed Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Counsel as

Amicus   Curiae   and   Ms.   Priya   Hingorani,   learned   Senior

Counsel was requested to assist him in the matter.  Shri Ranjit

Kumar, learned Amicus Curiae has submitted interim reports

from time to time on the basis of which certain orders came to

be passed.   Finally, vide the order dated 4th November, 2019,

12

this   Court   issued   various   directions.     While   issuing   the

directions, this court had also taken on record the views of

various stakeholders.  

22. This Court in paragraph 17 of the judgment in the case of

Mrinalini  Padhi  (supra) had found that redevelopment plan

around the Temple is mainly to decongest the area for the

benefit of pilgrims and to make the city of Puri a world heritage

city.  This Court also recorded that nobody was opposing the

reforms for the betterment of the place.  This Court also noticed

in paragraph 18 that during the annual Rath Yatra, lakhs of

people   visit   the   Temple   town   and   the   congregation   is

unmanageable.  

23. This Court took on record the observations of Shri Ranjit

Kumar, learned Amicus Curiae as well as Ms. Priya Hingorani,

learned Senior Counsel, who had personally visited the Temple

premises.  A perusal of the order would reveal that this Court

had   also   requested   Shri   Tushar   Mehta,   learned   Solicitor

General of India to personally visit the Temple premises.  From

13

their observations, it was found that the Temples inside the

Mathas, their Gaadis, Samadhis and other artefacts have been

preserved.  

24. In paragraph 40, this Court issued various directions. In

paragraph 40.15, this Court directed that there was necessity

to   have  a   proper  darshan   by   people   at  large.     It  was   also

directed that it was necessary to avoid commotion and chaos as

large number of pilgrims visit the Temple every day.  This Court

therefore   directed   the   Temple   Administration   and   the   Chief

Administrator   including   the   State   Government   to   prepare   a

roadmap with the help of experts for having proper darshan by

the devotees/pilgrims.  In paragraph 40.16, this Court further

directed the Temple administration and also the Temple police

to ensure that there would be a dedicated section of personnel

to tighten security inside the Temple and ensure that no such

incident takes place in the Temples and no misbehaviour is

meted out to women.  

14

25. It   will   also   be   relevant   to   reproduce   the   directions   in

paragraph 40.19 and 40.20, which read thus:

“40.19. The   learned   Amicus   Curiae   has   also

pointed   out   that   there   is   a   necessity   for

separate toilets for male and female. We direct

that   let   the   toilets  be   provided   with  modern

amenities and should be kept absolutely clean.

The number of toilets shall be adequate having

regard   to   the   average   footfall   in   the   temple,

which is large in number.

40.20. There is a necessity pointed out about

the   cloak   rooms.   Let   steps   be   taken   by   the

Temple administration in this regard.”

26. It could thus be seen that the three­Judge Bench of this

Court has emphasized on the necessity to have separate toilets

for male and female. This Court further directed that the toilets

be   provided   with   modern   amenities   and   should   be   kept

absolutely clean.   This Court also directed that the number of

toilets shall be adequate having regard to the average footfall in

the Temple.   This Court further emphasized the necessity to

15

have cloak rooms and directed the Temple administration to

take steps in that regard.  

27. This Court further directed the ASI to cooperate and to

permit the activities of improvement which are not prima facie

objectionable and are necessary for public hygiene, sanitation

and public health.  This Court only put a rider that the form of

the new structure is maintained in the same manner as the

ancient one. 

28. It would thus clearly reveal that the nature of construction

which is undertaken by the respondents­State and the Temple

administration is in tune with the directions issued by this

Court. 

29. In   this   background,   we   will   proceed   to   consider   the

submissions with regard to the violation of the provisions of the

said Act.  

30. Clauses (da), (db) and (dc) of Section 2 of the said Act

define   “Authority”,   “competent   authority”   and   “construction”

respectively, which are as under:  

16

“2. Definitions.­   In   this   Act,   unless   the

context otherwise requires,­

(a) ………………………………………………….

(da)   “Authority”   means   the   National

Monuments   Authority   constituted   under

Section 20­F;

(db) “competent authority” means an officer

not   below   the   rank   of   Director   of

Archaeology   or   Commissioner   of

Archaeology   of   the   Central   or   State

Government or equivalent rank, specified,

by notification in the Official Gazette, as

the   competent   authority   by   the   Central

Government   to   perform   functions   under

this Act:

Provided   that   the   Central   Government

may,   by   notification   in   the   Official

Gazette,   specify   different   competent

authorities for the purpose of Sections 20­

C, 20­D and 20­E;

(dc) “construction” means any erection of a

structure   or   a   building,   including   any

addition   or   extension   thereto   either

vertically   or   horizontally,   but   does   not

include   any   re­construction,   repair   and

renovation   of   an   existing   structure   or

building,   or,   construction,   maintenance

and   cleansing   of   drains   and   drainage

works and of public latrines, urinals and

similar conveniences, or, the construction

and   maintenance   of   works   meant   for

providing supply of water for public, or,

the   construction   or   maintenance,

extension,   management   for   supply   and

17

distribution of electricity to the public or

provision for similar facilities for public;”

31. Section 20A of the said Act reads thus:

“PROHIBITED AND REGULATED AREAS

20A. Declaration of prohibited area and

carrying out public work or other works

in   prohibited   area.—Every   area,

beginning at the limit of the protected

area or the protected monument, as the

case may be, and extending to a distance

of one hundred metres in all directions

shall be the prohibited area in respect of

such   protected   area   or   protected

monument:

Provided that the Central Government

may,   on   the   recommendation   of   the

Authority, by notification in the Official

Gazette, specify an area more than one

hundred   metres   to   be   prohibited   area

having regard to the classification of any

protected monument or protected area,

as the case may be, under Section 4­A.

(2)   Save   as   otherwise   provided   in

Section 20­C, no person, other than an

archaeological officer, shall carry out any

construction in any prohibited area.

(3)   In   a   case   where   the   Central

Government or the Director­General, as

the case may be, is satisfied that—

18

(a) it is necessary or expedient for carrying

out   such   public   work   or   any   project

essential to the public; or

(b)   such   other   work   or   project,   in   its

opinion, shall not have any substantial

adverse   impact   on   the   preservation,

safety,   security   of,   or,   access   to,   the

monument   or   its   immediate

surrounding.

It   or   he   may,   notwithstanding

anything contained in sub­section (2), in

exceptional cases and having regard to

the   public   interest,   by   order   and   for

reasons to be recorded in writing, permit,

such public work or project essential to

the public or other constructions, to be

carried out in a prohibited area:

Provided   that   any   area   near   any

protected   monument   or   its   adjoining

area   declared,   during   the   period

beginning  on  or   after   the  16th   day  of

June, 1992 but ending before the date

on which the Ancient Monuments and

Archaeological   Sites   and   Remains

(Amendment and Validation) Bill, 2010,

receives the assent of the President, as a

prohibited   area   in   respect   of   such

protected monument, shall be deemed to

be   the   prohibited   area   declared   in

respect of that protected monument in

accordance   with   the   provisions   of   this

Act   and   any   permission   or   licence

granted by the Central Government or

the   Director­General,   as   the   case   may

be,   for   the   construction   within   the

19

prohibited   area   on   the   basis   of   the

recommendation of the Expert Advisory

Committee,   shall   be   deemed   to   have

been validly granted in accordance with

the   provisions   of   this   Act,   as   if   this

section had been in force at all material

times:

Provided   further   that   nothing

contained in the first proviso shall apply

to any permission granted, subsequent

to the completion of construction or reconstruction of any building or structure

in any prohibited area in pursuance of

the   notification   of   the   Government   of

India   in   the   Department   of   Culture

(Archaeological Survey of India) Number

S.O. 1764, dated the 16th June, 1992

issued   under   Rule   34   of   the   Ancient

Monuments   and   Archaeological   Sites

and   Remains   Rules,  1959,  or,  without

having obtained the recommendations of

the Committee constituted in pursuance

of the order of the Government of India

Number 24/22/2006­M, dated the 20th

July, 2006 (subsequently referred to as

the Expert Advisory Committee in orders

dated the 27th August, 2008 and the 5th

May, 2009).]

(4) No permission, referred to in subsection   (3),   including   carrying   out   any

public work or project essential to the

public or other constructions, shall be

granted in any prohibited area on and

after   the   date   on   which   the   Ancient

Monuments   and   Archaeological   Sites

and   Remains   (Amendment   and

20

Validation) Bill, 2010 receives the assent

of the President.”

32. Sections 20C and 20D of the said Act read thus:

20C.   Application   for   repair   or

renovation   in   prohibited   area,   or

construction   or   re­construction   or

repair or renovation in regulated area.—

(1) Any person, who owns any building or

structure,   which   existed   in   a   prohibited

area before the 16th day of June, 1992, or,

which had been subsequently constructed

with the approval of the Director­General

and   desires   to   carry   out   any   repair   or

renovation of such building or structure,

may make an application to the competent

authority for carrying out such repair or

renovation, as the case may be.

(2) Any person, who owns or possesses

any building or structure or land in any

regulated  area,  and  desires  to  carry  out

any   construction   or   re­construction   or

repair   or  renovation   of   such   building  or

structure on such land, as the case may

be,   may   make   an   application   to   the

competent   authority   for   carrying   out

construction or re­construction or repair or

renovation, as the case may be.

GRANT OF PERMISSION BY COMPETENT

AUTHORITY

21

20D. Grant of permission by competent

authority   within   regulated   area.—(1)

Every application for grant of permission

under  Section  20­C  of   this   Act   shall   be

made to the competent authority in such

manner as may be prescribed.

(2)   The   competent   authority   shall,

within   fifteen   days   of   the   receipt   of   the

application,   forward   the   same   to   the

Authority to consider and intimate impact

of such construction (including the impact

of large­scale development project, public

project and project essential to the public)

having   regard   to   the   heritage   bye­laws

relating   to   the   concerned   protected

monument or protected area, as the case

may be:

Provided   that   the   Central  Government

may prescribe the category of applications

in respect of which the permission may be

granted   under   this   sub­section   and   the

application which shall be referred to the

Authority for its recommendations.

(3)   The   Authority   shall,   within   two

months   from   the   date   of   receipt   of

application under sub­section (2), intimate

to the competent authority impact of such

construction (including the impact of largescale   development   project,   public   project

and project essential to the public).

(4)   The   competent   authority   shall,

within   one   month   of   the   receipt   of

intimation from the Authority under subsection   (3),   either   grant   permission   or

22

refuse the same as so recommended by the

Authority.

(5)   The   recommendations   of   the

Authority shall be final.

(6)   In   case   the   competent   authority

refuses   to   grant   permission   under   this

section, it shall, by order in writing, after

giving   an   opportunity   to   the   concerned

person, intimate such refusal within three

months   from   the   date   of   receipt   of   the

application   to   the   applicant,   the   Central

Government and the Authority.

(7)   If   the   competent   authority,   after

grant of the permission under sub­section

(4)   and   during   the   carrying   out   of   the

repair   or   renovation   work   or   reconstruction   of   building   or   construction

referred to in that sub­section, is of the

opinion   (on   the   basis   of   material   in   his

possession or otherwise) that such repair

or   renovation   work   or   re­construction   of

building or construction is likely to have

an   adverse   impact   on   the   preservation,

safety, security or access to the monument

considerably, it may refer the same to the

Authority for its recommendations and if

so recommended, withdraw the permission

granted   under   sub­section   (4)   if   so

required:

Provided   that   the   competent   authority

may,   in   exceptional   cases,   with   the

approval of the Authority grant permission

to the applicant referred to in sub­section

(2) of Section 20­C until the heritage bylaws   have   been   prepared   under   sub23

section (1) of Section 20­E and published

under sub­section (7) of that section.

(8)   The   Central   Government,   or   the

Director­General, as the case may be, shall

exhibit,   on   their   website,   all   the

permissions granted or refused under this

Act.”

33. It could thus be seen that the “authority” has been defined

under   Section   2(da)   of   the   said   Act   to   be   a   “National

Monuments Authority” constituted under Section 20F of the

said Act.  

34. As   per   Section   2(db)   of   the   said   Act,   the   “competent

authority” means an officer not below the rank of Director of

archaeology or Commissioner of archaeology of the Central or

State Government or equivalent rank, specified, by notification

in   the   Official   Gazette,   as   the   competent   authority   by   the

Central Government to perform functions under the said Act.  

35. Undisputedly,   the   Director,   Culture,   Department   of

Tourism   and   Culture   (Culture),   Government   of   Orissa,   vide

notification   issued   by   the   Government   of   India   dated   13th

24

February 2012, has been notified to be “competent authority”

for the State of Orissa for the purposes of Sections 20C and

20D of the said Act.

36. Clause (dc) of Section 2 of the said Act would be the most

important   one.     The   definition   of   “construction”   specifically

excludes the following:

(i) Re­construction, repair and renovation of an existing

structure or building;

(ii) Construction, maintenance and cleansing of drains and

drainage   works   and   of   public   latrines,   urinals   and

similar conveniences;

(iii) Construction   and   maintenance   of   works   meant   for

providing supply of water for public; and 

(iv) Construction or maintenance, extension, management

for supply and distribution of electricity to the public or

provision for similar facilities for public.

37. No doubt that the learned counsel for the appellant is

right in relying on sub­section (4) of Section 20A of the said Act

25

which prohibits any permission including the one for carrying

out any public work or project essential to the public or other

constructions in any prohibited area referred to in sub­section

(3)   thereof   on   and   after   the   date   on   which   the   Ancient

Monuments   and   Archaeological   Sites   and   Remains

(Amendment and Validation) Bill, 2010 receives the assent of

the President.  The same was brought into the statute book by

Act No. 10 of 2010.  

38. It is further to be noted that by the very same amendment,

Section 20C of the said Act has also been brought into the

statute book.   Sub­section (1) of Section 20C of the said Act

provides that any person, who owns any building or structure,

which existed in a prohibited area before 16th June, 1992, or,

which had been subsequently constructed with the approval of

the Director­General and desires to carry out any repair or

renovation   of   such   building   or   structure,   may   make   an

application to the competent authority for carrying out such

repair or renovation, as the case may be.  Likewise, sub­section

26

(2) of Section 20C of the said Act enables a person, who owns

or possesses any building or structure or land in any regulated

area,   and   desires   to   carry   out   any   construction   or   reconstruction   or   repair   or   renovation   of   such   building   or

structure   on   such   land,   as   the   case   may   be,   to   make   an

application   to   the   competent   authority   for   carrying   out

construction or re­construction or repair or renovation, as the

case may be.

39. Section 20D of the said Act deals with grant of permission

by competent authority within regulated area.  Sub­section (1)

of Section 20D of the said Act provides that an application for

grant of permission under Section 20C of the said Act, shall be

made   to   the   competent   authority.     Sub­section   (2)   thereof

requires the competent authority to forward the same to the

authority to consider and intimate impact of such construction

having regard to the heritage bye­laws relating to the concerned

protected monument or protected area.  Under proviso to subsection (2) thereof, the Central Government is empowered to

27

prescribe the category of applications in respect of which the

permission   will   be   granted   under   this   sub­section   and   the

applications which shall be referred to the authority for its

recommendations.  Under sub­section (3) thereof, the authority

is required to intimate, within two months from the date of

receipt   of   application   under   sub­section   (2)   thereof,   to   the

competent   authority,   the   impact   of   such   construction   etc.

Under   sub­section   (4)   thereof,   the   competent   authority   is

required to either grant permission or refuse the same as so

recommended by the authority within one month of the receipt

of intimation from the authority under sub­section (3) thereof.

Under   sub­section   (5)   thereof,   a   finality   is   given   to   the

recommendations of the authority.

40. It is a settled principle of law that all the provisions in the

statute have to be read harmoniously.  It is presumed that each

and every provision has been brought by the legislature into the

statute book with some purpose.  A particular provision cannot

be read in isolation and has to be read in context to each other.

28

An attempt has to be made to reconcile all the provisions of the

statute together, unless it is impossible.

41. At first blush, the arguments of the appellants on the

basis of sub­section (4) of Section 20A of the said Act may

appear to be attractive.   But when sub­section (4) of Section

20A of the said Act is read in harmony with clause (dc) of

Section 2 and the provisions of Sections 20C and 20D of the

said Act, we find that the submission that no construction at

all can be made in the prohibited area or the regulated area,

would be unsustainable.  

42. Firstly, it is to be noted that clause (dc) of Section 2 of the

said   Act   itself   excludes   four   categories   as   mentioned

hereinabove   from   the   definition   of   “construction”.     The

legislative intent is thus clear that the four categories which are

excluded from the definition of “construction” as defined in

clause (dc) of Section 2 of the said Act would not be treated as a

“construction”, wherever the said term is referred to in the

statute.  The legislative intent is clear that the re­construction,

29

repair, renovation of the existing buildings has been excluded

from the definition.   Similarly, the construction, maintenance

etc. of drains, drainage works, public latrines and urinals; the

construction and maintenance of works meant for providing

supply of water to public; and construction etc. for distribution

of electricity, which could be construed to be essential services

for catering to the needs of the public at large, have consciously

been kept out of the definition of “construction”.   It could be

presumed   that   the   legislature   was   aware   that   repairs   and

reconstruction   of   existing   structures   or   buildings   or

construction of essential facilities like public latrines, urinals,

water   supply   and   electricity   distribution   for   the

pilgrims/residents are basic necessities and as such, should be

permitted even in the prohibited area.  If it is not so interpreted,

then Section 20C of the said Act would be rendered otiose and

redundant.  It need not be emphasized that an interpretation

which leads a particular provision to be otiose or redundant or

meaningless, has to be avoided.

30

43. It could further be seen that the said position is also

clarified   in   the   affidavit   filed   by   the   Superintending

Archaeologist, ASI before the High Court, which reads thus:

“E.   While   the   works,   such   as   toilets,   drains,

electrical   works,   etc.,   do   not   fall   within   the

definition of ''construction", and therefore can be

carried   out   even   in   the   prohibited   area.   Some

other   works,   such   as   the   reception   center,   fall

squarely with the definition of "construction", and

being in the prohibited area, is not permitted.”

44. Section   20D   of   the   said   Act   deals   with   the   entire

procedure   regarding   grant   of   permission   by   the   competent

authority within regulated area.  Undisputedly, in the present

case, the competent authority has complied with the procedure

as   required   under   Section   20D   of   the   said   Act   and   the

authority,   i.e.,   the   NMA   has   granted   its  permission   for   the

work, which is undertaken.  It will be appropriate to refer to the

relevant part of the order dated 4th September 2021, passed by

the NMA, which reads thus:

“2. After examination of the case, it is stated that

the Authority has "No Objection' under assurance

31

of strict compliance of AMASR, Act, 1958. Section

2 (de), to the execution of the following works in

the   prohibited   area   namely   Cloak   Room,   Mini

Cloak Room, Shelter pavilion. Female Toilet, Male

Toilet,   Sevayat   Toilet,   Electrical   Room,   and

Pavement   area,   including   a   place   to   stand   in

queue for toilets and reaching sanctum sanctorum

that are permitted under the exception clause to

the  definition  of  "Construction"  as given  in  the

above mentioned section. In respect of the other

proposed   construction   works   in   the   prohibitedarea­namely Reception Centre, Information cum

Donation Kiosk, First Aid Centre, Police Service

Centre and ATM. Kiosk, it is requested that details

with regard to the facilities for the public which

are   sought   to   he   provided   through   these

structures   to   justify   their   location   in   the

prohibited   area   or   may   be   re­located   in   the   _

Regulated   area.   Further,   it   may   clearly   be

established with relevant details that the scale of

repair/renovation proposed to be carried out in

Bada Chhata Matha and Chhauni Matha does not

tantamount   to   addition/alteration   or

reconstruction.”

45. Insofar   as   the   objections   in   the   report   of   the   ASI   is

concerned, it will be relevant to refer to the note signed by the

Director General of ASI dated 21st February 2022, which reads

thus:

“1. Shree Jagannath Temple, Puri 

32

I   visited   the   Shree   Kshetra   Shree

Jagannath   Temple,   a   centrally   protected

monument and the proposed area of work.

The concept plan of the State Government

aims to provide amenities and beautify the

entire environs of the temple. The proposed

amenities fall within the prohibited area of

the   temple.   Since   these   amenities   are

required   for   the   devotees,   it   was   agreed

that this may be allowed. ASI would work

in coordination with the State Government

on the design so that there is no visual

impact   on   the   main   temple.   State

Government was also requested to keep the

entire design  simple in  tandem with the

spiritual   nature   of   the   entire   temple

complex. 

One   point   of   discussion   was   the

proposed Reception centre which is at a

distance of 75 metres from the temple (part

falls   under   the   prohibited   area).   This

bui1ding is proposed to be used to hold

devotees before they proceed to the main

complex.   Given   that   this   would   be   very

essential,   it   was   decided   that   the   State

Government   would   consider   options   to

slightly   move   the   building   beyond   100

metres;   this   would   also   be   good   in   the

interest of security of the temple.”

46. It could thus clearly be seen that the Director­General has

observed that the amenities which fall within the prohibited

area of the temple are required for the devotees, and therefore,

33

it was agreed that this may be allowed.  It was further observed

that   the   ASI   would   work   in   coordination   with   the   State

Government on the design so that there is no visual impact on

the main temple.  The State Government was also requested to

keep   the   entire   design   simple   in  tandem   with   the   spiritual

nature of the entire temple complex.

47. In the impugned order, even the Division Bench of the

High Court has recorded the statement of the learned Advocate

General to the effect that both ASI and the State Government

would work together.  Insofar the reception area is concerned,

the impugned order would also reveal that the learned Advocate

General   has   clarified  that  it   will  now   be   moved   out   of  the

prohibited area and it will be constructed in the regulated area.

48. It will further be relevant to refer to the following extract of

the note of the Director­General of ASI, which reads thus:

“The   potential   of   both   Puri   and

Ekamrakshetra to be taken up for World/

Heritage   was   also   discussed.   A   brief

overview of the World Heritage guidelines

especially relating to management of buffer

34

zone and the Outstanding Universal value

of both temples was shared with them. It

was agreed that all work in both places

would be designed and executed, keeping

in mind the possibility of becoming World

Heritage   Sites,   going   forward.   The   State

Government was also requested to remove

all   encroachments   from   VaitalDeul   and

Paramaguru   temple   which   is   one   of   the

oldest temple of Kalingan Architecture. The

issue   of   shifting   of   the   kitchen   of

Anantabasudev temple to another. suitable

location was also discussed.”

49. It   could   thus   clearly   be   seen   that   even   the   DirectorGeneral   of   ASI   has   recognized   the   potential   of   Puri   and

Ekamrakshetra for being taken up as World Heritage sites.  It

was   agreed   that   all   the   work   in   both   the   places   would   be

designed   and   executed   keeping   in   mind   the   possibility   of

developing   them   for   being   acknowledged   as   World   Heritage

Sites.

50. The affidavit of the Superintending Archaeologist, ASI to

which   we   have   already   referred   to   hereinabove,   would   also

reveal that there does not appear to be any serious objection

with regard to construction of works such as toilets, drains and

35

electrical works in the prohibited area. There also does not

appear to be any serious objection with regard to undertaking

construction in the regulated area.  The insistence is that the

construction has to be carried out after necessary permissions

are obtained from the NMA under the provisions of the said Act.

Another concern appears to be that the entire design or the

facilities should be simple, in tandem with the spiritual nature,

design and aesthetic of the entire temple complex.

51. Taking into consideration all these aspects of the matter,

it is amply clear that the construction activities which are being

undertaken,   are   being   undertaken   in   pursuance   of   the

directions issued by a three­Judge Bench of this Court in the

case of  Mrinalini  Padhi  (supra).   The construction is being

carried out for the purpose of providing basic and essential

amenities   like   toilets   for   men   and   women,   cloak   rooms,

electricity rooms etc.   These are the basic facilities which are

necessary for the convenience of the devotees at large.   As

already discussed hereinabove, the legislative intent appears to

36

be   clear.     The   legislature   has   deliberately   excluded   four

categories from the definition of “construction”.   The purpose

behind it appears to be that the repairs and renovation of the

buildings, which are existing and the constructions which are

necessary for providing basic facilities like drainage,  toilets,

water supply and distribution of electricity should be kept out

of the rigour of requirement of statutory permissions.

52. An argument was sought to be advanced by Shri Navare

that the said provision is only to enable a person who resides in

the prohibited area to get his existing structure re­constructed,

repaired and renovated and the said provision cannot come to

the aid of the State to create facilities for the public.  Such an

argument is taken note of only to be rejected.  If an individual

person can construct a toilet in a prohibited area; can the State

be denied to do so, when the State finds it necessary to do it in

the larger public interest for providing basic facilities to the

lakhs   of   devotees   visiting   the   shrine?     The   answer   is   an

emphatic ‘no’.

37

53. A hue and cry was made that the construction carried out

is contrary to the Inspection Report carried out by the ASI.

However, the note of the Director General of ASI dated 21st

February, 2022 as well as the affidavit filed by the ASI before

the High Court would falsify this position.   

54. It would further be relevant to note that the High Court

itself   has   recorded   the   statement   of   the   learned   Advocate

General for State of Odisha that both the ASI and the State

Government   would   work   together   to   ensure   that   no

archaeological remains are missed out or damaged.  

55. It could thus be seen that even if the appellants had any

genuine   concern,   the   same  is   already   taken   care   of   in   the

impugned order.  

56. In spite of that, the matter was mentioned for obtaining

urgent orders before the Vacation Bench on Monday, i.e., 30th

May, 2022.  Since the matter was not listed on Tuesday, i.e.,

31st  May,   2022,   it   was   again   mentioned   on   the   said   date.

Again, a hue and cry was made as if heavens are going to fall if

38

the petitions were not listed.  As such, the petitions were listed

on Thursday, i.e., 2nd June, 2022. We have heard the learned

counsel for the parties at length. 

57. We   have   no   hesitation   in   holding   that   the   activities

undertaken   by   the   State   are   completely   in   tune   with   the

directions issued by the three­Judge Bench of this Court in the

case of  Mrinalini  Padhi  (supra).   They are necessary in the

larger public interest and there is no prohibition in the statute

for doing so, as sought to be argued by the appellants.

58. We, therefore, find no merit in the contentions raised on

behalf of the appellants.  We are of the considered view that the

public interest litigation filed before the High Court rather than

being in public interest, is detrimental to the public interest at

large.

59. In the recent past, it is noticed that there is mushroom

growth of public interest litigations.  However, in many of such

petitions,   there   is   no   public   interest   involved   at   all.     The

petitions   are   either   publicity   interest   litigations   or   personal

39

interest litigation.  We highly deprecate practice of filing such

frivolous petitions.   They are nothing but abuse of process of

law.  They encroach upon a valuable judicial time which could

be otherwise utilized for considering genuine issues.  It is high

time that such so­called public interest litigations are nipped in

the bud so that the developmental activities in the larger public

interest are not stalled.  

60. In the result, the appeals, having been found to be without

any   substance,   are   dismissed   with   costs,   quantified   at

Rs.1,00,000/­   (Rupees   one   lakh)   each,   payable   by   the

appellants to the respondent No.1 within four weeks from the

date of this judgment.

61. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of in

the above terms.

   …….........................J.       

    [B.R. GAVAI]  

…….........................J.       

   [HIMA KOHLI]        

NEW DELHI;

JUNE 03, 2022.

40

serious lacuna in the conduct of the departmental proceedings in not examining the vital witnesses = The perusal of the record would clearly reveal that an opportunity was given by the Appellate Authority to the Enquiry Committee to examine the important witnesses. Even on remand, the said three witnesses were not examined. 11. In the absence of the examination of these three vital witnesses, the Appellate Authority found that the charges against the respondent were not fully proved and taking into consideration this aspect, the learned Single Judge allowed the petition and the Division Bench affirmed the same.

NON­REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4410 OF 2012

UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS                   …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

SURESH KUMAR SINGH                      …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

B.R. GAVAI, J.

1. The appeal challenges the order dated 14th March 2011 passed by

the   learned   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   at   Patna,   thereby

dismissing the appeal filed by the present appellants, which was in

turn filed challenging the order passed by the learned Single Judge of

the said High Court dated 28th  January 2010, thereby allowing the

writ application filed by the respondent.

2. The   departmental   proceedings   were   initiated   against   the

respondent on the basis of charges communicated to him in the office

order dated 11th October 1999. The allegation was that the appellant

allegedly asserted political pressure for cancellation of his transfer

order and thereby committed misconduct under Section 11 (1) of CRPF

1

Act, 1949.

3. It was further alleged that the respondent along with another

Constable Satyendra Kumar Tiwari made a telephone call to the Senior

CRPF   Officers   and   Additional   DIGP,   Mokamaghat   impersonating

himself as a Member of Parliament, Lok Sabha for getting the transfer

order cancelled.

4. In   the   departmental   proceedings,   the   respondent   was   found

guilty and was awarded the punishment of removal from service.  The

respondent challenged the same before the Appellate Authority­the

Deputy Inspector General of Police, CRPF, Patna in an appeal. The

Appellate Authority found that the departmental proceedings were not

conducted in accordance with the laid down procedure and as such,

remitted the same to the original authority­Office of Commandant 133

BN,   CRPF,   Patna   for   conducting   the   proceedings   denovo.     In   the

denovo proceedings also, the respondent was found guilty. Challenging

the same, another appeal came to be filed, which was partly allowed

on 10.01.2003.

5. The Appellate Authority found that the Enquiry Committee had

not recorded the statement of the then Additional DIGP, Mokamaghat,

Constable Satyendra Kumar Tiwari and the owner of the S.T.D booth

Ram   Tola,   which   were   very   relevant   for   the   case.     The   Appellate

2

Authority therefore modified the punishment of removal from service

and the respondent was awarded 28 days confinement to Quarter

Guard with forfeiture of pay and allowances. The intervening period

from the date of removal from service till the date of reinstatement was

directed   to   be   treated   as   extraordinary   leave.   The   respondent

challenged   the   same   by   way   of   a   revision   before   the   Revisional

Authority and the same was also dismissed.

6. The   respondent,   thereafter,   preferred   the   petition   before   the

learned Single Judge of the High Court. The learned Single Judge

specifically   referred   to   paragraph   4   of   the   order   of   the   Appellate

Authority dated 10th  January 2003 and found a serious lacuna that

the most vital witnesses, that is, the Additional DIGP, the owner of the

STD booth Ram Tola and the Constable Satyendra Kumar Tiwari were

not examined.   The learned Single Judge has set aside the penalty

imposed on the respondent and directed that the respondent would be

paid entire arrears of salary with consequential benefits with effect

from the date of removal till the date of reinstatement.

7. The appellants challenged the same before the learned Division

Bench,   which   also   found   that   the   case   was   of   no   evidence   and

approved   the   findings   as   recorded   by   the   learned   Single   Judge.

Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal has been filed. 

3

8. Mr. Rajeev Kumar Ranjan, learned counsel appearing on behalf

of the Union of India, submits that the learned Single Judge of the

High   Court   as   well   as   the   Division   Bench   are   not   justified   in

interfering with the departmental proceedings and specifically in the

penalty as imposed. They rely on the judgment in State of Rajasthan

and  Others   v.   Sujata  Malhotra1

, to buttress his submission that

unless   the   High   Court   found   a   lacuna   in   the   departmental

proceedings, the interference with penalty was not warranted.

9. Mr. Neeraj Shekhar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondent submits that the view taken by the learned Single Judge of

the High Court as well as the Division Bench are in accordance with

law and no interference was warranted.

10. The perusal of the record would clearly reveal that an opportunity

was given by the Appellate Authority to the Enquiry Committee to

examine the important witnesses. Even on remand, the said three

witnesses were not examined.

11. In the absence of the examination of these three vital witnesses,

the Appellate Authority found that the charges against the respondent

were not fully proved and taking into consideration this aspect, the

learned  Single  Judge  allowed  the   petition  and   the  Division  Bench

1 (2003) 9 SCC 286

4

affirmed the same.

12. Insofar as the judgment of this Court relied on by the learned

counsel appearing for the appellants is concerned, the same is not

applicable to the facts of the present case.   The present case has a

specific finding that there is a serious lacuna in the conduct of the

departmental proceedings in not examining the vital witnesses.

13. We, therefore, find no merit in the present appeal.  The appeal is

dismissed.  However, no order as to costs.

14. Taking into consideration that the respondent is deprived of the

benefits to which he is entitled to in law for a period of more than one

decade, we direct the appellants to clear all dues within a period of

three months from today.

15. Pending   application(s),   if   any,   shall   stand   disposed   of   in   the

above terms.

.........................J.

      (B.R. GAVAI)

…......................J.

New Delhi;  (HIMA KOHLI)

June 01, 2022.

5

ITEM NO.102 COURT NO.5 SECTION XVI

 S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal No.4410/2012

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. Appellant(s)

 VERSUS

SURESH KUMAR SINGH Respondent(s)

Date : 01-06-2022 This appeal was called on for hearing today.

CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI

 HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI

(Vacation Bench)

For Appellant(s) Mr. Rajeev Kumar Ranjan, Adv.

Mr. Arvind Kumar Sharma, AOR

For Respondent(s) Mr. Neeraj Shekhar, AOR

Mr. Ashutosh Thakur, Adv.

Dr. Sumit Kumar, Adv.

Mr. Abhishek Pandey, Adv.

 UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

 O R D E R

The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed non-reportable

judgment.

Pending application (s), if any, also stand disposed of.

(ARUSHI SUNEJA) (RANJANA SHAILEY)

SENIOR PERSONAL ASSISTANT COURT MASTER (NSH)

(Signed non-reportable judgment is placed on the file.)

6

“wholly unreliable” witness - when he was going from Basoda to Budhor on his motorcycle, one person by the name of Pran Singh stopped him and told him that Bhagat Singh was lying dead on the route. He thereafter went to village Budhor and gave this information to Mobat Singh (D.W.3). 13 19. Mobat Singh (D.W.3) in his evidence states that he was informed about Bhagat Singh lying dead on the route by Kok Singh Raghuvanshi (D.W.4). He thereafter went to the house of Bhagat Singh and informed about the same to Prag Singh, Amol Singh (P.W.6), Mokam Singh, Pooran Singh and Akhe Singh. no eye witnesses - therefore alleged eye witness evidence was wholly unreliable .

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.764 OF 2021

MAHENDRA SINGH AND ORS.     ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF M.P.  ...RESPONDENT(S)

WITH 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.765 OF 2021

JUDGMENT

B.R. GAVAI, J.

1. Both these appeals, i.e., Criminal Appeal No.764 of 2021,

filed by Mahendra Singh (accused No.3), Pritam Singh (accused

No.4) and Shambhu Singh (accused No.9); and Criminal Appeal

No.765   of   2021,   filed   by   Lakhan   Singh   (accused   No.11),

challenge the judgment dated 6th August, 2019, delivered by the

1

Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at

Gwalior, in Criminal Appeal No.317 of 2000, thereby dismissing

the appeal filed by the present appellants and upholding their

conviction under Sections 148 and 302 read with Section 149

IPC   and   imposing   the  sentence   of   one   year   rigorous

imprisonment under Section 148 IPC; and life imprisonment

and a fine of Rs.5,000/­ each under Section 302 read with

Section 149 IPC and, in default of payment of fine, sentence of

rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years.  

2. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeals are as

under:

3. The investigation in the present case was set in motion on

the basis of the oral report of Amol Singh (P.W.6), on the basis

of which a First Information Report (“FIR” for short), Exhibit P7, came to be registered.  It is stated by Amol Singh (P.W.6) in

the FIR that on 12th June, 1994, when he was returning from

Basoda, he had met his brother Bhagat Singh (deceased) at

2

about   6:00   pm  and   had   also   met  Akhe   Singh   (PW­4).     He

further stated that they boarded a bus from Nayi Sarak till

Chak Ranapur.   After reaching Chak Ranapur, they walked

towards their village Budhor.  At about 7.00 p.m., when they

reached village Ratanpur, he was walking ahead, followed by

Akhe Singh (PW­4), who in turn, was followed by Bhagat Singh,

he heard the cries of his brother Bhagat Singh and when he

turned, he saw Shambhu Rajput hitting Bhagat Singh with a

ballam; accused Santosh, Lakhan, Mahendra and Pritam had

also assaulted Bhagat Singh with ballam, causing injury on

front side of the body; accused­Padam Singh had hit Bhagat

Singh with a rod; accused­Dashrat Singh had assaulted Bhagat

Singh with a lathi on his head and three others hit Bhagat

Singh with sticks. He further stated that when the accused

charged to assault the complainant­Amol Singh (P.W.6) and

Akhe   Singh   (P.W.4),   they   started   running   for   their   life   and

reached village Budhor and narrated the incident to Deewan

Singh, Pooran Singh, Mokam Singh, etc.  He has further stated

3

that all of them had come back to the spot of incident and

found Bhagat Singh dead.  They hired a tractor of Veer Singh

and took the dead­body to the Police Station.  It is his case that

the accused persons had assaulted the deceased on account of

previous enmity.  

4. After the conclusion of the investigation, a charge­sheet

came to be filed against 11 accused in the Court of Judicial

Magistrate First Class, Ganj Basoda, who committed the case to

the   learned   Sessions   Court,   Ganj   Basoda   District   Vidisha,

Madhya Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as “the Trial Court”).

Charges were framed against all the 11 accused for the offences

punishable under Sections 148 and 302 read with Section 149

of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”).

5. At the conclusion of the trial, the Trial Court acquitted

Bharat Singh (accused No.1), Vishwanath Singh (accused No.2),

Dashrath Singh (accused No.5), Padam Singh (accused No.6),

Bana Lal alias Bana Singh (accused No.8) and Pappu alias

4

Kuber Singh (accused No.10) vide judgment dated 18th  April,

2000.   However, by the same judgment dated 18th April, 2000,

the   Trial   Court   convicted   Mahendra   Singh   (accused   No.3),

Pritam   Singh   (accused   No.4),   Santosh   (accused   No.7),

Shambhu Singh (accused No.9) and Lakhan Singh (accused

No.11) for the offences punishable under Section 148, 302 read

with Section 149 of the IPC and sentenced them to one year

rigorous   imprisonment   for   the   offence   punishable   under

Section 148 IPC; and life imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5,000/­

each for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with

Section 149 IPC.  They were also sentenced to suffer rigorous

imprisonment for a period of two years in default of payment of

fine.  

6. Being aggrieved by the judgment dated 18th  April, 2000,

passed by  the  Trial  Court,  all  the  convicted  and  sentenced

accused preferred an appeal before the High Court of Madhya

Pradesh.  By the impugned judgment dated 6th August, 2019,

5

the  High Court  of Madhya  Pradesh, Bench  at Gwalior,  has

dismissed the appeal.  Hence the present appeals.  

7. We have heard Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned Senior Counsel

appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellants   and   Ms.   Ankita

Chaudhary, learned Deputy Advocate General (“DAG” for short)

appearing   on   behalf   of   the   respondent­State   of   Madhya

Pradesh. 

8. Mr. S. Nagamuthu submits that the entire conviction of

the appellants is based on the sole testimony of Amol Singh

(P.W.6).  The learned Senior Counsel submits that the evidence

of Mahendra Singh (P.W.3) and Akhe Singh (P.W.4) along with

the   evidence   of   Mobat   Singh   (D.W.3)   and   Kok   Singh

Raghuvanshi   (D.W.4)   would   reveal   that   Amol   Singh   (P.W.6)

could not have witnessed the incident.  He submits that Amol

Singh (P.W.6) is the real brother of the deceased Bhagat Singh

and therefore his testimony has to be scrutinized with greater

care, caution and circumspection.  The learned Senior Counsel

6

relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of  Vadivelu

Thevar  vs.  The  State  of  Madras1

.   It is submitted that the

testimony of the said witness falls in the category of “wholly

unreliable” witness and as such, the conviction on the basis of

the testimony of such a witness could not be sustainable.  Mr.

Nagamuthu   further   submits   that   on   the   basis   of   the   same

evidence/testimony, the learned Trial Court had acquitted six

accused while convicting and sentencing the other five. 

9. Mr. Nagamuthu further submits that there is also a doubt

as to whether the FIR in the present case is a real FIR or not.  It

is further submitted that delayed FIR would create a doubt

about the trustworthiness of the prosecution case.  

10. Ms.   Ankita   Chaudhary,   learned   DAG,   on   the   contrary,

submitted that the learned Trial Court as well as the High

Court   have   rightly   relied   on   the   testimony   of   Amol   Singh

(P.W.6).     It   is   submitted   that   merely   because   a   minor

1 (1957) SCR 981

7

contradiction/ inconsistency cropped up in the evidence of the

witness, it cannot be a ground to disbelieve the truthfulness of

the   testimony  of   such   a  witness.     It  is  submitted   that   the

maxim “falsus  in  uno falsus  in  omnibus” is not accepted in

India.   She therefore submits that grain has to be separated

from the chaff to find out the truth from the testimony of the

witness.  She relied on the judgments of this Court in the cases

of Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan (Smt) vs. Vasant Raghunath

Dhoble   and   another2

,  State   of   Andhra   Pradesh   vs.

Pullagummi   Kasi   Reddy   Krishna   Reddy   alias   Rama

Krishna  Reddy  and  others3

; and  Rupinder  Singh  Sandhu

vs. State of Punjab and others4

 to fortify her submissions.

11. From the material placed on record, it would reveal that

the conviction of the present appellants is based basically on

the testimony of Amol Singh (P.W.6).  A corroboration is sought

from the medical evidence in the nature of Post­Mortem Report.

2 (2003) 7 SCC 749

3 (2018) 7 SCC 623

4 (2018) 16 SCC 475

8

12. It will be apposite to refer to the following observations of

this Court in its celebrated judgment in the case of Vadivelu

Thevar (supra):

“…..Hence,   in   our   opinion,   it   is   a

sound and well­established rule of law

that the court is concerned with the

quality and not with the quantity of

the evidence necessary for proving or

disproving a fact. Generally speaking,

oral testimony in this context may be

classified   into   three   categories,

namely:

(1) Wholly reliable.

(2) Wholly unreliable.

(3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly

unreliable.

In   the   first   category   of   proof,   the

court   should   have   no   difficulty   in

coming to its conclusion either way —

it may convict or may acquit on the

testimony of a single witness, if it is

found   to   be   above   reproach   or

suspicion   of   interestedness,

incompetence   or   subornation.   In   the

second category, the court equally has

no   difficulty   in   coming   to   its

conclusion. It is in the third category

of   cases,   that   the   court   has   to   be

circumspect   and   has   to   look   for

9

corroboration   in   material   particulars

by   reliable   testimony,   direct   or

circumstantial.”

13. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   this   Court   has   found   that

witnesses are of three types, viz., (a) wholly reliable; (b) wholly

unreliable; and (c) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.

When the witness is “wholly reliable”, the Court should not

have any difficulty inasmuch as conviction or acquittal could be

based on the testimony of such single witness.  Equally, if the

Court finds that the witness is “wholly unreliable”, there would

be no difficulty inasmuch as neither conviction nor acquittal

can be based on the testimony of such witness.  It is only in the

third   category   of   witnesses   that   the   Court   has   to   be

circumspect   and   has   to   look   for   corroboration   in   material

particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial.  

14. The High Court has found the testimony of Amol Singh

(P.W.6)   to   be   in   the   third   category   and   has   upheld   the

conviction seeking corroboration from the Post­Mortem Report

10

conducted by Dr. S.S. Bhargava (P.W.2).  We will therefore have

to consider as to in which category the evidence/testimony of

Amol Singh (P.W.6) would fall. 

15. Amol Singh (P.W.6) has elaborately given the details of the

incident.   He states that on the day of the incident Bhagat

Singh and Santosh Khawas had gone to Nateran and he had

gone  to  Basoda.    At  around  4.45  p.m.,  he departed  to  his

village.  Bhagat Singh sat in his bus to go to village.  They got

down at Ratan Pur Chak bus stop and thereafter were going to

village Budhor.  While walking towards their village, at around

6.00 p.m., he heard the cries of Bhagat Singh loudly that killed

me (Mar Dala).   Thereafter he saw all the accused assaulting

the deceased.   He states that when the accused persons ran

behind him, he ran away from there and reached his house at

Budhor.  Thereafter, he narrated the incident to his brothers,

namely, Prag Singh, Pooran Singh and Mokam Singh.   All of

them went to the spot, where they found Bhagat Singh dead.

11

Thereafter Pooran Singh got tractor trolley and carried Bhagat

Singh at the Nateran Police Station. Thereafter he lodged the

FIR. He has also stated that previous enmity was the motive for

committing the crime.  

16.  It will be relevant to refer to the testimony of Mahendra

Singh (P.W.3).  He has stated in his evidence that he was sitting

at his Chabutara (Chowk) in his house.  Mobat Singh (D.W.3)

told Amol Singh (P.W.6) that Bhagat Singh is lying dead at

Nagar Chak.   Then, Mokam Singh, Amol Singh (P.W.6), Areg

Singh, Parwat Singh, Himmat Singh, Ratan, Fullu, Gullu, Lallu

went to see Bhagat Singh at the Chak and along with them he

had also gone to see Bhagat Singh.  At the Nagar Chak in front

of the house of Genda, they found Bhagat Singh in a dead

condition.   Thereafter, Amol Singh (P.W.6) and Mokam Singh

carried Bhagat Singh to Nateran. In his cross­examination, he

has admitted that Mobat Singh (D.W.3) in his presence had told

Amol Singh (P.W.6) that Bhagat Singh is lying dead on the

12

route.     Thereafter   Amol   Singh   (P.W.6)   became   nervous   and

started weeping.   Akhe Singh (P.W.4) has given his testimony

on similar lines.

17. It  could   thus   clearly   be   seen   from   the   testimony   of

Mahendra Singh (P.W.3) and Akhe Singh (P.W.4), without even

referring to  the  testimony  of  Mobat  Singh  (D.W.3)  and  Kok

Singh Raghuvanshi (D.W.4), that it was  Mobat Singh (D.W.3)

who had informed Amol Singh (P.W.6) about the dead­body of

Bhagat Singh lying on route.  

18. The evidence of Mahendra Singh (P.W.3) and Akhe Singh

(P.W.4) is fully corroborated by the evidence of Mobat Singh

(D.W.3)   and   Kok   Singh   Raghuvanshi   (D.W.4).     Kok   Singh

Raghuvanshi (D.W.4) in his evidence states that when he was

going from Basoda to Budhor on his motorcycle, one person by

the name of Pran Singh stopped him and told him that Bhagat

Singh was lying dead on the route.  He thereafter went to village

Budhor and gave this information to Mobat Singh (D.W.3).  

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19. Mobat Singh (D.W.3) in his evidence states that he was

informed about Bhagat Singh lying dead on the route by Kok

Singh Raghuvanshi (D.W.4).  He thereafter went to the house of

Bhagat Singh and informed about the same to Prag Singh,

Amol Singh (P.W.6), Mokam Singh, Pooran Singh and Akhe

Singh.  

20. It is a settled law that same treatment is required to be

given   to   the   defence   witness(es)   as   is   to   be   given   to   the

prosecution witness(es). 

21. From the evidence of these witnesses, it is amply clear

that Amol Singh (P.W.6) could not have witnessed the incident.

22. We therefore find that the evidence of Amol Singh (P.W.6)

would fall in the category of “wholly unreliable” witness. As

such, no conviction could be based solely on his testimony.  We

find that the corroboration sought by the High Court from the

medical evidence was not justified.  The medical evidence could

only establish that the death was homicidal.  However, it could

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not have been used to corroborate the version of Amol Singh

(P.W.6) that he has witnessed the incident.  

23. Insofar   as   the   contention   of   learned   DAG   for   the

respondent­State that the prosecution has proved the motive is

concerned,   it   is   well   settled   that   only   because   motive   is

established, the conviction cannot be sustained. 

24. In that view of the matter, we find that the prosecution

has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and as

such, the accused are entitled to be given the benefit of doubt.  

25. In the result, we pass the following order:

(i) The appeals are allowed.

(ii) The   impugned   judgment   dated   6th  August,   2019,

delivered by the Division Bench of the High Court of

Madhya Pradesh in Criminal Appeal No.317 of 2000 as

well as the judgment and order dated 18th April, 2000,

passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ganj

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Basoda, District Vidisha, Madhya Pradesh in Sessions

Trial No.248 of 1996 are quashed and set aside.

(iii) The appellants are acquitted of the charges charged

with. They are directed to be set at liberty forthwith, if

not required in any other case. 

26. Pending applications, including application for bail, shall

stand disposed of in the above terms.  

…….........................J.       

[B.R. GAVAI]

…….........................J.       

[HIMA KOHLI]

NEW DELHI;

JUNE 03, 2022.

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