Whether the allegations are true or untrue, would have to be decided in the trial. -It is a well established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified and based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or complainant.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 2953 OF 2022

Ramveer Upadhyay & Anr.        ...Petitioners

Versus

State of U.P. & Anr.         ...Respondents

J U D G M E N T 

Indira Banerjee, J. 

This special leave petition is against a final judgment and order dated

7

th  March   2022   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Allahabad,

dismissing the application filed by the Petitioner under Section 482 of the

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 being case No.29704 of 2021, whereby the

Petitioner had challenged the order dated 17th  September 2021 passed by

the 4th  Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hathras taking cognizance of

the complaint filed by the Respondent No.2 under Section 365 read with

Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 3(1)(Dha) of

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989,

hereinafter referred to as “the Atrocities Act”.        

1

2. Mr.   Ranjit   Kumar,   Senior   Advocate   appearing   on   behalf   of   the

Petitioners opened his arguments contending that this case is a classic

example   of   malicious   prosecution   of   the   petitioners,   who   have   been

embroiled in a false criminal case, due to political animosity. The complaint

in the Court of the 2nd Additional District and Sessions Judge/Special

Judge under the Atrocities Act, under section 156 (3) of the CrPC , which

has given rise to these proceedings, has been filed by the Respondent No. 2

at the instance of Devendra Agarwal, Ex­MLA , a political opponent of the

Petitioner No. 1. The Petitioner No. 1 and the said Devendra Aggarwal had

fought elections against each other several times. 

3. Earlier, on or about 1st January 2010, Smt. Meera Devi, wife of the

Respondent   No.2   had   filed   a   complaint   before   the   District   Magistrate,

Mahamaya   Nagar   District   (now   Hathras   District)   stating   that   the

Respondent No.2 had been abducted by the brothers of the Petitioner No. 1,

to forcibly make him vote in favour of their party, in the MLC election of

2010. In the said complaint it was alleged that the Petitioner had abused the

Respondent No.2 by his caste, using filthy language. 

4. On the same day, that is, 1st January 2010, Devendra Aggarwal wrote

a letter to the District Magistrate for release of the Respondent No.2. In the

aforesaid   letter,   it   was   stated   that   the   Petitioners   had   abused   the

Respondent No.2 in filthy language by reference to his caste. 

5. On 2nd  January 2010, Meera Devi filed an application in the Court of

the Judicial Magistrate, Sadabad, Hathras under Section 156(3) of the Code

2

of   Criminal   Procedure   (Cr.P.C   ),   being   Complaint   No.   412   of   2010   for

directions on the Station House Officer (SHO) at Chandappa Police Station

to register her Complaint of abduction of her husband.

6. A complaint was thereafter registered, pursuant to which Crime Case

No. 17/2010 was started. The case was investigated by the Circle Inspector

Sadabad, Hathras.   After investigation, the Police filed a final report of

closure of the case, opining that no incident of abduction, as alleged had

taken place, and the complaint had been filed out of political animosity.

7. Meera Devi filed a Protest Petition which was dismissed. The High

Court did not interfere with the order of dismissal of her Protest Petition.

Meera Devi approached this Court. Pursuant to the orders of this court,

further investigation was held by the CB CID. The Investigating Officer filed

a final report dated 17.10.2018 in favour of the Petitioners.  Meera Devi filed

a Protest Petition. By an order dated 5th September 2020, the Special Judge

under the Atrocities Act, Hathras rejected the Protest Petition filed by Meera

Devi in Case No. 17/2010.

8. In February 2017, the Petitioner had contested the Assembly elections

from   Sadabad   Constituency.   Mr.   Devendra   Aggarwal   also   contested   the

election from the same constituency as a candidate of a rival political party.

It is alleged that, on 8th February 2017, when the Petitioner No 1’s son was

campaigning for the Petitioner No 1, Devendra Aggarwal, who was then a

sitting MLA of the ruling party, attacked the Petitioner No 1’s son and his

supporters and opened fire indiscriminately.

3

9. One Pushpendra Singh, a supporter of the Petitioner No 1, was killed

in  the  incident.    Pushpendra’s  father,  Ramhari  Sharma   lodged  an  FIR,

arraigning   Devendra   Aggarwal   as   Accused   No.1,   pursuant   to   which   a

criminal case was started against Devendra Aggarwal and others, inter alia,

under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.       

10.  It is stated that since Devendra Aggarwal was the sitting MLA of the

ruling party, the police did not take action to arrest him.  The father of the

deceased Pushpendra, Ramhari Sharma filed a Criminal Misc. Writ Petition

No.2739/2017   in   the   High   Court   praying   for   action   against   Devendra

Aggarwal.   

11. On 26th October 2017, the Respondent No.2 filed an application in the

Court of the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge SC/ST Act, Hathras

under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C alleging that the Petitioner No.1 along

with his Personal Assistant, Ranu Pandit, being the Petitioner No.2 and 6­7

other persons had abused him in filthy language and asked his associates to

drag him into the car which they could not do, as a crowd had gathered, and

there was resistance put up.   The Respondent No.2 prayed for direction on

the   SHO,   Chandappa   Police   Station   to   register   the   case   against   the

Petitioners. 

12. The   relevant   averments   in   the   said   complaint   are   extracted

hereinbelow for  convenience:­ 

4

“1. The applicant belongs to “Dhobi’ caste – a scheduled caste and is

former BDC Member. 

2. ….

3. That on 01.09.2017, at about 2.45 or 3 P.M. in the afternoon, the

opposite party no.1 Ramveer Upadhyay came to Village­Bisana along

with his convoy of vehicles and after seeing the Complainant started

abusing of his caste and on the road, he said that Saley dhobi you had

forgotten your position and your wings have come out and you are

running up to Supreme Court. You will be sent at a place from where

you will never come back. When the Complainant said you are doing

your work and I am doing my work, Ramveer Upadhyay said to his

associates that pull him and put him in the car, then opposite party

no.2   Ranu   Pandit   and   6­7   other   unknown   persons,   who   can   be

identified by face, dragged the Complainant and with the intention to

kill tried to kidnap him but due to gathering of people on the road and

due to resistance shown by Annu R/o Jindpatti, Bisana, Pradeep R/o

Gambhirpatti,   Bisana,   they   were   not   successful   and   went   towards

Hathras in their vehicles. Due to this incident an environment of fear

and terror was created in the village.”

13. Pursuant   to   the   aforesaid   application,   a   case   was   registered   and

numbered   Complaint   Case   No.19/2018.     The   Respondent   No.2   was

examined   under   Section   202   of   the   Cr.P.C.     The   statement   of   the

Respondent No. 2 being the complainant was recorded under Section 200 of

the Cr.P.C. in the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge,

SC/ST Act, Hathras.    The statements of one Annu son of Rukamal and one

Yogesh Gupta, son of Dhaniram Gupta were also recorded in the same

Court under Section 200 Cr.P.C. 

14. In the meanwhile, in Writ Petition (Civil) No.699/2016 titled Ashwini

Kumar Upadhayay v. Union of India, a three­Judge Bench of this Court

5

presided over by the Chief Justice, passed an order dated 4.12.2018, taking

notice of the fact that there were 4122 cases pending against legislators

including former legislators, out of which 2324 cases were against sitting

legislators.   A chart, presented in Court by the learned Amicus Curiae,

showed that there were 430 cases involving life sentence pending against

sitting as well as former legislators.

15. To expedite the disposal of the cases, this Court requested each High

Court   to   assign/allocate   criminal   cases   involving   former   and   sitting

legislators to as many as Sessions Courts and Magisterial Courts as each

High Court might consider fit and expedient.   Pursuant to administrative

directions issued by the High Court, and pursuant to the directions of this

Court,   Complaint   Case   No.19/2018   was   transferred   to   the   Additional

District and Sessions Judge Court No.4, Hathras, as the Petitioner No.1 was

a legislator/former legislator.  

16. On being prima facie satisfied that the complaint case No.19/2018

made out a prime facie case against the Petitioners, the Additional District

and   Sessions   Judge,   Court   No.4,   Hathras   passed   an   order   dated   17th

September 2021, taking cognizance of the charges against the Petitioners

and issuing summons to the Petitioners. 

17. Aggrieved   by   the   aforesaid   order   dated   17th  September   2021,   the

Petitioners filed an application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C in the High

Court and prayed that entire proceedings in Complaint Case No. 19/2018 as

well as the cognizance order dated 17th September 2021 be quashed.   

6

18. By an order dated 5th  January 2022, the High Court admitted the

application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and stayed further proceedings

in Complaint Case No.19/2018 pending in the Court of Additional District

and Sessions Judge, Court No.4, Hathras.   

19.   However, on 7th  March 2022, the High Court passed the impugned

judgment and order rejecting the application filed by the Petitioners under

Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 

20. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the

Petitioners   questioned   the   jurisdiction   of   the   Additional   District   and

Sessions Judge, Court No.2, Hathras, to take cognizance of the offence in

Complaint Case No.19/2018. 

21. Emphasizing   Section   14   of   the   Atrocities   Act,   Mr.   Ranjit   Kumar

argued that only the Special Judge under the Atrocities Act was competent

to pass an order for issuance of summons.   He argued that the order of the

Additional District and Sessions Judge, Court No.2, Hathras being without

jurisdiction the High Court should have quashed the same in exercise of its

power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.  Mr. Ranjt Kumar also argued that

Complaint Case No.19/2018 patently a case of malicious prosecution which

stemmed from political rivalry and was in gross abuse of the process of

Court. 

7

22. In Shantaben Bhurabhai Bhuriya v. Anand Athabhai Chaudhari

and Ors.1

, Cited by Mr. Siddharth Dave, learned senior counsel, appearing

on behalf of the Respondent No.2, this Court rejected the contention that

only Special Court could take cognizance of offences under the Atrocities Act

and held:

23. Therefore, the issue/question posed for the consideration of this

Court is, whether in a case where cognizance is taken by the learned

Magistrate and thereafter the case is committed to the learned Special

Court, whether entire criminal proceedings can be said to have been

vitiated considering the second proviso to Section 14 of the Atrocities

Act which was inserted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016?

24. While considering the aforesaid issue/question, legislative history

of the relevant provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, more particularly, Section 14 preamendment and post amendment is required to be considered. Section

14 as stood pre­amendment and post amendment reads as under:

........

Provided that in Districts where less number of cases under this Act is

recorded, the State Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief

Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify for

such Districts, the Court of Session to be a Special Court to try the offences

under this Act;

Provided further that the Courts so established or specified shall

have power to directly take cognizance of offences under this Act.”

******

28. Considering   the   aforesaid   legislative   history   which   brought   to

insertion of proviso to Section 14 of the Atrocities Act, by which, even the

Special Court so established or specified for the purpose of providing for

speedy trial the power to directly to take cognizance of offences under

the Atrocities Act, 1989, the issue/question posed whether in a case

where for the offences under Atrocities Act, the cognizance is taken by

the learned Magistrate and thereafter the case is committed to the Court

of Sessions/Special Court and cognizance is not straightway taken up

by the learned Special Court/Court of Session, whether entire criminal

proceedings for the offences under the Atrocities Act, 1989 can be said

1 2021 SCC Online SC 974

8

to have been vitiated, as so observed by the High Court in the impugned

judgment and order ?

29. On   fair   reading   of   Sections   207,   209   and   193   of   the   Code   of

Criminal   Procedure   and   insertion   of   proviso   to   Section   14   of   the

Atrocities Act by Act No. 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016, we are of the

opinion that on the aforesaid ground the entire criminal proceedings

cannot be said to have been vitiated. Second proviso to Section 14 of the

Atrocities Act which has been inserted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016

confers power upon the Special Court so established or specified for the

purpose   of   providing   for   speedy   trial   also   shall   have   the   power   to

directly   take   cognizance   of   the   offences   under   the   Atrocities   Act.

Considering the object and purpose of insertion of proviso to Section 14,

it cannot be said that it is not in conflict with the Sections 193, 207 and

209 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. It cannot be said that it

takes   away   jurisdiction   of   the   Magistrate   to   take   cognizance   and

thereafter   to   commit   the   case   to   the   Special   Court   for   trial   for   the

offences under the Atrocities Act. Merely because, learned Magistrate

has taken cognizance of the offences and thereafter the trial/case has

been committed to Special Court established for the purpose of providing

for   speedy   trial,   it   cannot   be   said   that   entire   criminal   proceedings

including FIR and charge­sheet etc. are vitiated and on the aforesaid

ground entire criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 452,

323, 325, 504, 506(2) and 114 of the Penal Code, 1860 and under

Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocities Act are to be quashed and set aside. It

may be noted that in view of insertion of proviso to Section 14 of the

Atrocities Act and considering the object and purpose, for which, the

proviso to Section 14 of the Atrocities Act has been inserted i.e. for the

purpose of providing for speedy trial and the object and purpose stated

herein above, it is advisable that the Court so established or specified in

exercise of powers under Section14, for the purpose of providing for

speedy trial directly take cognizance of the offences under the Atrocities

Act. But at the same time, as observed herein above, merely on the

ground that cognizance of the offences under the Atrocities Act is not

taken directly by the Special Court constituted under Section 14 of the

Atrocities Act, the entire criminal proceedings cannot be said to have

been vitiated and cannot be quashed and set aside solely on the ground

that   cognizance   has   been   taken   by   the   learned   Magistrate   after

insertion of second proviso to Section 14 which confers powers upon the

Special Court also to directly take cognizance of the offences under the

Atrocities   Act   and   thereafter   case   is   committed   to   the   Special

Court/Court of Session.

30. In   support   of   the   above   conclusion,   the   words   used   in   second

proviso to Section 14 are required to be considered minutely. The words

used are “Court so established or specified shall have power to

directly take cognizance of the offences under this Court”. The

word “only” is conspicuously missing. If the intention of the legislature

would have to confer the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences

9

under the Atrocities Act exclusively with the Special Court, in that case,

the wording should have been “that   the   Court   so   established  or

specified  only  shall  have  power  to  directly  take  cognizance  of

offences under this Act”. Therefore, merely because now further and

additional powers have been given to the Special Court also to take

cognizance of the offences under the Atrocities Act and in the present

case merely because the cognizance is taken by the learned Magistrate

for the offences under the Atrocities Act and thereafter the case has

been committed to the learned Special Court, it cannot be said that

entire criminal proceedings have been vitiated and same are required to

be quashed and set aside.”

23. In  view   of  the  judgment   of  this  Court   in  Shantaben   Bhurabhai

Bhuriya  (supra),  the Argument of Mr. Ranjit Kumar that the Additional

District Judge and Sessions Judge, Court No.4 Hathras had no jurisdiction

to take cognizance or issue summons/orders cannot be sustained.  

24. There was apparently political rivalry between the Petitioner No.1 and

Devendra Aggarwal.  However, Complaint Case No. 19/2018 has not been

lodged   against   the   Petitioners,   by   Devendra   Aggarwal,   but   by   the

Respondent No.2, a Dhobi by caste, which is a scheduled caste.   It cannot

be said that the allegations in the complaint do not make out offence under

the Atrocities Act.  It is specifically alleged that the Petitioners had abused

the Respondent No.2 in filthy language by reference to his caste.   The

allegations in the Complaint Case No.19 of 2018, if established, could result

in conviction under the relevant sub­sections of Section 3(1) of the Atrocities

Act. 

10

25. Respondent   No.2   being   an   employee   of   Devendra   Aggarwal,   it   is

possible  that  Complaint  Case  No.19/2018  may have  been  prompted  by

political vendetta against the Petitioner No.1.   However, since as observed

above, the allegations in the complaint case make out an offence under

Section 3 of the Atrocities Act, it would not be proper to nip the complaint in

the bud, more so, when there are statements recorded in Court  under

Section 200 of the Cr.P.C.  The possibility of retaliation on the part of the

Petitioners by the acts alleged in the complaint, after closure of the earlier

complaint   No.17   of   2010   cannot   be   ruled   out.   Quashing   the   criminal

proceedings at the very inception might result in injustice.  

26. Section 482 of the Cr.P.C provides:­

“482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.—Nothing

in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent

powers of the High Court to make such orders as  may be

necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to

prevent  abuse  of  the   process  of  any  Court   or otherwise  to

secure the ends of justice.”

27. Even though, the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482

of the Cr.P.C., to interfere with criminal proceedings is wide, such power has

to   be   exercised   with   circumspection,   in   exceptional   cases.   Jurisdiction

under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C is not to be exercised for the asking.   

28. In Monica   Kumar   (Dr.)   v.   State   of   U.P2

.,   this   Court   held   that

inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C has to be exercised

2 (2008) 8 SCC 781

11

sparingly,   carefully   and   with   caution   and   only   when   such   exercise   is

justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. 

29. In exceptional cases, to prevent abuse of the process of Court, the

High Court might in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482

quash criminal proceedings.  However, interference would only be justified

when complaint did not disclose any offence, or was patently frivolous,

vexatious or oppressive, as held by this Court in Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R.

Prasanna Kumar3

. 

30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated by reason of

political   vendetta   is   not   in   itself   ground   for   quashing   the   criminal

proceedings,   as   observed   by   Bhagwati,   CJ   in  Sheonandan   Paswan   v.

State of Bihar and Others4

.  It is a well established proposition of law that

a   criminal   prosecution,   if   otherwise   justified   and   based   upon   adequate

evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political

vendetta   of   the   first   informant   or   complainant.       Though   the   view   of

Bhagawti, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there

was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding.  To quote Krishna

Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh5

, “if the use of power is of

fulfilment of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation by malice is not

legicidal.” 

3 AIR 1990 SC 494

4 (1987) 1 SCC 288

5 (1980) 2 SCC 471

12

31. In  Municipal  Corporation  of  Delhi  v.  Ram  Kishan  Rohtagi  and

Ors.6

 A three­Judge Bench of this Court held:

“6. It may be noticed that Section 482 of the present Code is the

ad   verbatim   copy   of   Section   561­A   of   the   old   Code.   This

provision confers a separate and independent power on the High

Court alone to pass orders ex debito justitiae in cases where

grave  and  substantial  injustice has  been done  or where  the

process of the court has been seriously abused. It is not merely a

revisional   power   meant   to   be   exercised   against   the   orders

passed by subordinate courts. It was under this section that in

the old Code, the High Courts used to quash the proceedings or

expunge   uncalled   for   remarks   against   witnesses   or   other

persons or subordinate courts. Thus, the scope, ambit and range

of Section 561­A (which is now Section 482) is quite different

from   the   powers   conferred   by   the   present   Code   under   the

provisions of Section 397. It may be that in some cases there

may   be   overlapping   but   such   cases   would   be   few   and   far

between.   It   is   well   settled   that   the   inherent   powers   under

Section 482 of the present Code can be exercised only when no

other remedy is available to the litigant and not where a specific

remedy is provided by the statute. Further, the power being an

extraordinary   one,   it   has   to   be   exercised   sparingly.   If   these

considerations are kept in mind, there will be no inconsistency

between Sections 482 and 397(2) of the present Code.

7. The   limits   of   the   power   under   Section   482   were   clearly

defined by this Court in Raj Kapoor v. State [(1980) 1 SCC 43 :

1980 SCC (Cri) 72] where Krishna Iyer, J. observed as follows:

[SCC para 10, p. 47: SCC (Cri) p. 76]

“Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law when a

specific provision is made: easy resort to inherent power is not right

except under compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of

jurisdiction but that inherent power should not invade areas set

apart for specific power under the same Code.”

. Another important consideration which is to be kept in mind is

as to when the High Court acting under the provisions of Section

6(1983) 1 SCC 1

13

482 should exercise the inherent power insofar as quashing of

criminal proceedings are concerned. This matter was gone into

in   greater   detail   in Smt   Nagawwa v. Veeranna   Shivalingappa

Konjalgi [(1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 507 : 1976 Supp

SCR 123 : 1976 Cri LJ 1533] where the scope of Sections 202

and 204 of the present Code was considered and while laying

down   the   guidelines   and   the   grounds   on   which   proceedings

could be quashed this Court observed as follows: [SCC para 5,

p. 741 : SCC (Cri) pp. 511­12]

“Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an order

of   the   Magistrate   issuing   process   against   the   accused   can   be

quashed or set aside:

(1)   where   the   allegations   made   in   the   complaint   or   the

statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken

at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused

or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an

offence which is alleged against the accused;

(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently

absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can

ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding

against the accused;

(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing

process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no

evidence   or   on   materials   which   are   wholly   irrelevant   or

inadmissible; and

(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects,

such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally

competent authority and the like.

The   cases   mentioned   by   us   are   purely   illustrative   and   provide

sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High Court

can quash proceedings.”

9. Same   view   was   taken   in   a   later   decision   of   this   Court

in Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar [(1977) 1 SCC 505 :

1977 SCC (Cri) 132 : (1977) 2 SCR 357 : 1977 Cri LJ 1146]

where Bhagwati, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:

[SCC para 2, p. 506 : SCC (Cri) p. 133]

“It is now settled law that where the allegations set out in the

complaint or the charge­sheet do not constitute any offence, it is

competent to the High Court exercising its inherent jurisdiction

under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash

the order passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the

offence.

14

10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an

accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face

of   the   complaint   or   the   papers   accompanying   the   same,   no

offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the

allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or

subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High

Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of

its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.”

32. As held by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Gourieshetty

Mahesh7

, the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of

the Cr.P.C, would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry into whether the

evidence is reliable or not or whether there is reasonable possibility that the

accusation would not be sustained.  

33. In Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttrakhand8

, this Court held:­

  “12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the

Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used

sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the

process   of   any   court   or   otherwise   to   secure   ends   of   justice.

Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends

14 upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential

ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged

by the High Court. …” 

34. In  Madhavrao   Jiwajirao   Scindia   v.   Sambhajirao   Chandrojirao

Angre9

, a three­Judge Bench of this Court summarized the law with regard

7 (2010) 6 SCC 588

8 (2013) 11 SCC 673

9 (1988) 1 SCC 692

15

to quashing of criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.  This

Court held:­ 

“The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the

initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the

court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima

facie   establish   the   offence.   It   is   also   for   the   court   to   take   into

consideration any special  features  which  appear in a  particular

case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice

to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the

court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the

opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and,

therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a

criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into

consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding

even though it may be at a preliminary stage.”

35. In  Inder  Mohan   Goswami   v.   State   of   Uttaranchal10, this Court

observed:­

“46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not

used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private

vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused.

On   analysis   of   the   aforementioned   cases,   we   are   of   the

opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an

inflexible   rule   that   would   govern   the   exercise   of   inherent

jurisdiction.   Inherent   jurisdiction   of   the   High   Courts   under

Section 482 CrPC though wide has to be exercised sparingly,

carefully and with caution and only when it is justified by the

tests specifically laid down in the statute itself and in the

aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal position, the

impugned judgment cannot be sustained.”

10 (2007) 12 SCC 1

16

36. In Kapil Agarwal & Ors. V. Sanjay Sharma & Others11, this Court

observed that Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is designed to achieve the purpose

of ensuring that criminal proceedings are not permitted to generate into

weapons of harassment. 

37. In State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors.12, this Court

held:

“102.   In   the   backdrop   of   the   interpretation   of   the   various

relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the

principles   of   law   enunciated   by   this   Court   in   a   series   of

decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power

under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of

the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we

give the following categories of cases by way of illustration

wherein   such   power   could   be   exercised   either   to   prevent

abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the

ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any

precise,   clearly   defined   and   sufficiently   channelised   and

inflexible   guidelines   or   rigid   formulae   and   to   give   an

exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power

should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report

or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and

accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any

offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and

other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose

a   cogizable   offence,   justifying   an   investigation   by   police

officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an

order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of

the Code.

11 (2021) 5 SCC 524

121992 Suppl (1) SCC 335

17

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or

complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same

do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a

case against the accused.

(4)   Where,   the   allegations   in   the   FIR   do   not   constitute   a

cognizable   offence   but   constitute   only   a   non­cognizable

offence,   no   investigation   is   permitted   by   a   police   officer

without   an   order   of   a   Magistrate   as   contemplated   under

Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so

absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no

prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is

sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the

provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a

criminal   proceeding   is   instituted)   to   the   institution   and

continuance   of   the   proceedings   and/or   where   there   is   a

specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing

efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding  is manifestly attended with

mala   fide   and/or   where   the   proceeding   is   maliciously

instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on

the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and

personal grudge.

103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power

of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very

sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of

rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking

upon   an   enquiry   as   to   the   reliability   or   genuineness   or

otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint

and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer

an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its

whim or caprice.

18

37. Ends of justice would be better served if valuable time of the Court is

spent on hearing appeals rather than entertaining petitions under Section

482 at an interlocutory stage which might ultimately result in miscarriage of

justice as held in Hamida v. Rashid @ Rasheed and Others13

.  

39. In our considered opinion criminal proceedings cannot be nipped

in the bud by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival.   It is

possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a

political   opponent.     However,   such   possibility   would   not   justify

interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal

proceedings.  As observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part

of the petitioners by the acts alleged, after closure of the earlier criminal

case cannot be ruled out.   The allegations in the complaint constitute

offence under the Attrocities Act.   Whether the allegations are true or

untrue, would have to be decided in the trial. In exercise of power under

Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of

the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it

is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any

offence.   The Complaint Case No.19/2018 is not such a case which

should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial.  The High

Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

13 (2008) 1 SCC 474

19

40. For the reasons discussed above, we are not inclined to interfere

with the impugned judgment and order of the High Court.   The special

leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed. 

41. Documents have been brought on record by the Petitioners which

show that the Petitioner No.1 is a patient of lung cancer of an advanced

stage.  He is on strong medication.   Considering the condition of the health

of the Petitioner No.1, the Trial Court may consider exempting the personal

appearance of the Petitioner No.1, if such an application is made to the Trial

Court. 

        ………………………………,J.

  [ INDIRA BANERJEE ]     

  

                                   ..

……………………………..,J.

         [ A.S. BOPANNA ]

NEW DELHI ;

APRIL 20, 2022. 

20

AIR BAGS NOT DEPLOYED= where in a collision, the airbags did not deploy. The complainant, driving the vehicle, suffered substantial injuries as a result thereof. The impact of the collision was such that it would have been reasonable for the respondent to assume that there would have been deployment of the airbags. The safety description of the goods fell short of its 15 expected quality. The content of the owners’ manual does not carry any material from which the owner of a vehicle could be alerted that in a collision of this nature, the airbags would not deploy. Purchase decision of the respondent­complainant was largely made on the basis of representation of the safety features of the vehicle. The failure to provide an airbag system which would meet the safety standards as perceived by a car­buyer of reasonable prudence, in our view, should be subject to punitive damages which can have deterrent effect. And in computing such punitive damages, the capacity of the manufacturing enterprise should also be a factor. There was no specific exclusion clause to insulate the manufacturer from claim of damages of this nature. Even if there were such a clause, legality thereof could be open to legal scrutiny. But there is no reason for dilating on that aspect in this case. That question doesn’t arise here.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL  NO. 3001 OF 2022

(Arising out of Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil)

No. 4881 of 2021)

Hyundai Motor India Limited           ……...Appellant(s)

Versus

Shailendra Bhatnagar           ……Respondent(s)

     J U D G M E N T

ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.

Leave granted.

2. The appellant are manufacturers of vehicles and the present

appeal   arises   out   of   a   complaint   made   by   the   respondent

concerning defect in a vehicle, particularly in relation to its safety

1

features  originating  from  the  appellant,  of  the   model  Creta  1.6

VTVT SX+. The vehicle came with two front airbags. Purchase of the

vehicle was made on 21st August 2015. It met with an accident on

the   Delhi­Panipat   highway   on   16th  November   2017   resulting   in

substantial damage to its RH front pillar, RH front roof, side body

panels, front RH door panels and LH front wheel suspension. The

initials RH and LH appears to be used as short forms of Right Hand

and   Left   Hand   sides   of   the   vehicle.   At   that   point   of   time,   the

complainant   (being   the   respondent   herein),   his   mother   and

daughter were in the vehicle. The airbags of the vehicle did not

deploy at the time of  collision. The complainant suffered head,

chest as also dental injuries. He attributes such injuries to nondeployment   of   airbags   at   the   time   of   accident.   The   appellant

themselves   obtained   an   investigation   report   which   has   been

referred to as SRS report. The remarks and conclusion of the said

SRS Investigation Report, as it appears from pages 53 and 54 of the

paperbook were:­

“Remarks:

2

 Vehicle found with major damage on RH front

pillar,   RH   Side   body   panels   and   LH   front   wheel

suspension. 

 Under ride & Angular impact found on the RH

Front Pillar, Roof and Front RH Door panel. 

 Grazing damages found on the RH side panels

due to the scratch against truck while moving towards

left. 

Findings:

 No crash info recorded in SRSCM, hence no air

bags deployed.

 No impact damage observed on both side chassis

members, damages found away from impact sensors.

 Vehicle found completely dismantled and midrepair condition during inspection.

Conclusion:

 The major impact to the vehicle from RH pillar

resulted in under ride and angular condition.

 Both front chassis member found unaffected by

the   frontal  impact,   hence   no  impact   sensed   by   the

front impact sensors and not triggered any signal to

SRSCM (No crash info recorded in SRSCM for frontal

impact).

 After thorough study, it is confirmed that the

condition   was   not   met   for   the   air   bag   deployment,

hence no air bags deployed. The air bag system was

working proper at the time of accident.

Accident description:

 As per customer verbatim, while he was driving

at 100 kmph speed on Gannaur highway. A front going

truck applied sudden brake, his car hit to the truck

from the right side to the left rear corner of the Truck.

Further   his   car   scratched   against   the   truck   while

moving towards left side of the road and finally hit to

some   stones   on   the   left   front   wheel   and   vehicle

stopped.”

(quoted verbatim)

3

3. The   Delhi   State   Consumer   Redressal   Commission,   in   a

complaint raised by the respondent, upheld his claim. The main

theme of his complaint was that the main reason for his purchase

decision of the model was because of its safety features including

the airbags and the injury was suffered by him because of nondeployment of the airbags. The State Commission granted relief to

the following effect:­

“19. Keeping in view of the facts and circumstances

of   the   present   consumer   complaint,   we   direct   the

opposite party to:

a. Compensate   the   complainant   an   amout   of

Rs.2,00,000/­ for medical expenses and loss of income.

b. Compensate   the   complainant   an   amount   of

Rs.50,000/­ for mental agony.

c. Pay   to   the   complainant   an   amount   of

Rs.50,000/­ as cost of litigation.

20. The   aforesaid   payment   shall   be   made   by

opposite party within two months from the date of this

order by way of demand draft. Failure of opposite party

in paying the said amount in stipulated period will

attract an interest of 7% per annum from the date of

default. Furthermore, failure in replacing the vehicle of

the appellant will also attract an interest of 7% per

annum of the value of the vehicle from the date of

default.”

4. The appellant preferred appeal before the National Consumer

Dispute   Redressal   Commission   (“National   Commission”).   The

4

National   Commission   dismissed   the   appeal   sustaining   the

compensation awarded by the State Commission. The Order of the

National Commission, which was passed on 5th  January 2021, is

under appeal  before us. Neither the  State  Commission  nor  the

National Commission accepted the justification sought to be made

by the appellant referring to the said investigation report, having

regard to the fact of non­deployment of the airbags. It has been,

inter­alia, held by the National Commission:­

“11....   Learned   Counsel   for   the   Appellant/Opposite

Party   submitted   that   the   airbags   deploy   only   when

there is severe impact of force and airbags may not

deploy if the vehicle collides with objects like poles and

trees, when full force of the impact is not delivered to

the sensors. Learned Counsel for the Appellant argued

that   the   SRS   Investigation   report   dated   01.12.2017

clearly stated that the impact of the accident was such

that   the   minimum   threshold   force   required   for   the

deployment  of  the  airbags   was  not   delivered  to  the

front sensors installed in the engine compartment and

hence, the airbags did not deploy. No expert evidence

was produced by the Respondent to substantiate any

manufacturing   defect.   The   Complainant   contended

that   he   purchased   the   car   for   its   safety   features

highlighted by the Manufacturer, but the airbags did

not function when required, due to which he sustained

serious   injuries   as   can   be   seen   from   the   medical

prescriptions and bills furnished by the Complainant.

The   impact/force   required   for   triggering   the   front

airbags   was   not   made   known   to   the   Complainant.

Nowhere   has   the   minimum   threshold   force   been

5

quantified   and   this   defence   can   never   be   refuted.

Highlighting   safety   features   including   airbags   while

selling the car and not elaborating and disclosing the

threshold limits for their opening is by itself an unfair

trade   practice.   Complainant,   however,   had   filed

photographs of the accidental car. Major damage to RH

front pillar, RH front roof, side body panels front RH

door panels and LH front wheel suspension is seen in

the photographs of the car. Without forceful impact,

the car would not have been so badly damaged. The

accident   was   a   major   accident   in   which   the   entire

deriver side of the car, the side part and even the front

mirror of the car got smashed and broken. The impact

of the accident was so intense that the front bumper

grill, dash board and the radiator got totally damaged.

The   State  Commission   rightly  observed   “that   expert

evidence need not be relied upon where the facts speak

for  themselves.  This is  a  case  of  Res   Ipsa   Loquitur

where the photographs of the damaged vehicle placed

on record clearly show the impact of the accident on

the vehicle.”

5. One of the points argued on behalf of the appellant by     Mr.

Huzefa   Ahmadi,   learned   Senior   advocate,   is   that   the   order   for

replacement of the vehicle ought not to have been passed. The

respondent had not asked for replacement of the vehicle as part of

the reliefs claimed before the State Commission. He has otherwise

questioned legality of the decisions of the two fora citing certain

clauses from the owner’s manual. His argument on this count has

been that if force generated by the collision is lesser than a certain

degree, there would not be deployment of the airbags. Thus, there

6

was no defect in the security system according to him. He also

highlighted that impact of the accident was from the side and it was

not a frontal hit.

6. It is the case of the appellant that the airbag deployment

depends on a number of factors including vehicle speed, angle of

impact,   density   and   stiffness   of   vehicles   or   objects   which   the

vehicle hits in the collision.  The vehicle is designed to deploy the

front airbags only when an impact is sufficiently severe and when

the   impact   angle   is   less   than   30   degrees   from   the   forward

longitudinal axis of the vehicle. Mr. Ahmadi has submitted that the

front airbags are not intended to deploy if the impact is from the

side or in cases of rear impact or roll over crashes. He has referred

to a variety of circumstances in a collision which may not result in

deployment of the airbags.  He has cited the investigation report to

which we have already referred to.

7. Before the Commission, point of limitation was also taken and

the   appellant   wanted   the   limitation   to   run   from   the   date   of

purchase of the vehicle and not the date of the accident. This

7

objection on maintainability has been rightly rejected by both the

State Commission and the National Commission. We do not find

any error in the view of the respective Commissions on this point.

Vehicles are goods within the meaning of Section 2(7) of The Sale of

Goods Act, 1930 and they carry implied conditions  as to  their

fitness.   That   is   a   statutory   mandate   and   that   mandate   also

operates in respect of goods, whose defect is subject of proceeding

in   a   consumer   complaint   under   the   Consumer   Protection   Act,

1986. In the complaint, it has been pleaded that the respondent

had relied on the safety features of the vehicle projected by the

manufacturer. In such a situation, the limitation will run from the

day the defect surfaces in a case. There is no way by which the

nature of defect complained against could be identified in normal

circumstances at an earlier date, before the collision took place. In

this case, the safety feature of the vehicle fell short of the quality of

fitness as was represented by the manufacturer by implication. The

National   Commission’s   view   is   broadly   based   on   the   principle

incorporated in Section 16 of the 1930 Act. The defect in this case

8

ought to be treated to have had surfaced on the date of the accident

itself. We quote below the provisions of Section 16 of The Sale of

Goods Act, 1930:­

“16.   Implied  conditions  as  to  quality  or   fitness.—

Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any other

law for the time being in force, there is no implied

warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for

any   particular   purpose   of   goods   supplied   under   a

contract of sale, except as follows:—

(1)Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes

known to the seller the particular purpose for which

the goods are required, so as to show that the buyer

relies on the seller’s skill or judgment, and the goods

are of a description which it is in the course of the

seller’s   business   to   supply   (whether   he   is   the

manufacturer or producer or not), there is an implied

condition  that  the  goods  shall  be  reasonably  fit  for

such purpose: 

Provided that, in the case of a contract for the sale of a

specified article under its patent or other trade name,

there is no implied condition as to its fitness for any

particular purpose.

(2)Where goods are bought by description from a seller

who deals in goods of that description (whether he is

the   manufacturer   or   producer   or   not),   there   is   an

implied   condition   that   the   goods   shall   be   of

merchantable quality:

Provided that, if the buyer has examined the goods,

there shall be no implied condition as regards defects

which such examination ought to have revealed.

9

(3)An implied warranty or condition as to quality or

fitness for a particular purpose may be annexed by the

usage of trade.

(4)An express warranty or condition does not negative

a   warranty   or   condition   implied   by   this   Act   unless

inconsistent therewith.”

8. The question on privity of contract was also raised before the

State as also the National Commission and from the decision under

appeal we find that this point was raised on the ground that the

dealer was not impleaded as a party and there was no contract

between the appellant and the respondent consumer. This issue

was rejected by both the consumer fora. No argument has been

advanced before us on this point and we do not find any error in

the reasoning of the National Commission on this point. 

9. There are findings of the two fora about the defect in the

product sold, in this case being a vehicle. This was sold with front

airbags and there was frontal damage. The airbags did not deploy.

The   accident   caused   injuries   to   the   respondent.   The   appellant

referred to various portions from the owner’s manual to contend

that the impact of the collision was not sufficient to activate the

10

sensor which in turn would have resulted in deployment of the

airbags. We would not like to revisit the facts on which findings

have been returned by the two fora against the appellant. The State

Commission relied on the principle of  Res  Ipsa  Loquitur  to affix

the liability of the manufacturer as regards defect in the airbag

system, having regard to the nature of the collision. The National

Commission affirmed this finding referring to certain photographs

of the damaged vehicle, which showed substantial frontal damage.

In such circumstances, both the aforesaid fora took the view that

expert evidence was not necessary in the subject case. Such view

cannot be faulted as being unreasonable, in the given facts. 

10. We do not find any reason to interfere with the finding of the

National Commission. We would like to add here that ordinarily a

consumer while purchasing a vehicle with airbags would assume

that the same would be deployed whenever there is a collision from

the front portion of the vehicle (in respect of front airbags). Both the

fora, in their decisions, have highlighted the fact that there was

significant damage to the front portion of the vehicle. Deployment of

11

the airbags ought to have prevented injuries being caused to those

travelling in the vehicle, particularly in the front seat. A consumer

is not meant to be an expert in physics calculating the impact of a

collision   on   the   theories   based   on   velocity   and   force.   In   such

circumstances, we do not find that there is any error in the findings

of the two fora as regards there being defect in the vehicle.  

11. We   shall   now   turn   to   the   reliefs   granted   by   the   State

Commission and upheld by the National Commission.   The first

point argued in this regard is that there was no prayer in the

petition for replacement of the vehicle.   This is a case where the

1986 Act was applicable and Section 14 of the said statute lays

down the reliefs which may be granted.   The directions as per the

statute, could be for replacement of defective goods as also punitive

damages.   The   appellant   have   also   taken   a   point   that   so   far   as

replacement   of   the   vehicle   is   concerned,   there   was   no   substantive

direction and no discussion either. The operative part of the order

suffers from a shortcoming on this count, but that is not fatal.  On a

composite reading of the directions, we find from paragraph 20 of the

12

Order of the State Commission that such a direction was made.  The

confusion, if any, arises because of construction defect in the Order of

the State Commission. Considering the fact that the dispute is pending

for a reasonably long period of time, we have ourselves applied our

mind on this issue and our view is that a direction for replacement of

the vehicle is justified in the facts of this case.   The direction for

replacement of the vehicle would not be treated as non­est having

regard to paragraph 20 of the State Commission’s Order.  The fact that

the consumer has got the car repaired on insurance money would not

impact the quantum of damages, which is partly punitive in nature in

this case. 

12. Three cases arising out of motor accident claims were cited

before us. In Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh & Others. [(2003) 2  SCC

274],  it was held  that there is no  restriction  that the Tribunal or

Court cannot award compensation amount  exceeding the claimed

amount.   Two other authorities were cited before us, by Ms. Tamta,

learned counsel for the respondent, being the cases of Sangita Arya

and  Others  v.  Oriental  Insurance  Company  Limited  and  Others

13

[(2020) 5 SCC 327] and Jitendra Khimshankar Trivedi and Others

v. Kasam Daud Kumbhar and Others [(2015) 4 SCC 237]. These two

cases lay down the principle of just and reasonable compensation

that may be paid. The ratio of these authorities, however, do not

directly apply in the facts of this case.

13. The damages awarded against the appellant may have gone

beyond the actual loss suffered by the respondent and may not

represent the actual loss suffered by him in monetary terms.  But

the   provision   of   Section   14   of   the   1986   Act   permits   awarding

punitive damages.  Such damages, in our view, can be awarded in

the event the defect is found to have the potential to cause serious

injury or major loss to the consumer, particularly in respect of

safety features of a vehicle. For instance, defective safety feature in

a vehicle has to be distinguished from a dysfunctional “courtesy

light”.   The   manufacturer   should   be   under   strict   and   absolute

liability   in   respect   of   the   latter.   Compensation   in   the   form   of

punitive damages ought to have a deterrent effect.  We also refer to

14

the principles detailing the factors guiding quantification of liability

laid down by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of M.C.

Mehta and Another v. Union of India and Others  [(1987) 1 SCC

395]. In this case it has been opined:­

“32. We would also like to point out that the measure

of compensation in the kind of cases referred to in the

preceding   paragraph   must   be   corelated   to   the

magnitude and capacity of the enterprise because such

compensation must have a deterrent effect.  The larger

and more prosperous the enterprise, the greater must

be the amount of compensation payable by it for the

harm caused on account of an accident in the carrying

on of the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity by

the enterprise.” 

14. The aforesaid decision arose out of a case involving the death

of an individual and injuries to several others in an industrial

accident. But in our opinion, in the subject dispute also the same

principle can be extended. We are dealing with a case where in a

collision, the airbags did not deploy. The complainant, driving the

vehicle, suffered substantial injuries as a result thereof. The impact

of the collision was such that it would have been reasonable for the

respondent to assume that there would have been deployment of

the airbags. The safety description of the goods fell short of its

15

expected quality. The content of the owners’ manual does not carry

any material from which the owner of a vehicle could be alerted

that in a collision of this nature, the airbags would not deploy.

Purchase decision of the respondent­complainant was largely made

on the basis of representation of the safety features of the vehicle.

The failure to provide an  airbag system which would  meet the

safety   standards   as   perceived   by   a   car­buyer   of   reasonable

prudence,   in   our   view,   should   be   subject   to   punitive   damages

which can have deterrent effect. And in computing such punitive

damages, the capacity of the manufacturing enterprise should also

be a factor.  There was no specific exclusion clause to insulate the

manufacturer from claim of damages of this nature. Even if there

were such a clause, legality thereof could be open to legal scrutiny.

But there is no reason for dilating on that aspect in this case. That

question doesn’t arise here.

15. If the reliefs granted in a consumer complaint fits any of the

statutory provision contained in sub clause (1) of Section 14 of the

Act, it would be well within the power and jurisdiction of the Forum

16

to pass directions irrespective of the fact as to whether specifically

certain reliefs have been claimed or not, provided that facts make

out foundations for granting such reliefs.  In any event, it is within

the jurisdiction of the said forum to mould the reliefs claimed to do

effective justice, provided the relief comes within the stipulation of

Section 14(1) of the Act. We find that the relief granted to the

respondent comes within the statutory framework. We accordingly

do   not   want   to   interfere   with   the   decision   of   the   National

Commission. We do not find the reasoning of the Commission or

the operative part of the order awarding damages to be perverse.

We do not need the aid of the ratio of the three authorities cited

before us pertaining to motor accident claim to sustain the decision

under appeal. We are also of the view that the directions issued

against the appellant by the State Commission and upheld by the

National   Commission   cannot   be   said   to   have   failed   the   test   of

proportionality. We hold so as we find the subject­defect to be of

such nature that the provisions relating to punitive damages ought

to be attracted against the appellant.  

17

16. We accordingly dismiss the appeal. Interim order passed in

this matter shall stand dissolved. 

17. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

18. There shall be no order as to costs.

………………………J.

     (VINEET SARAN)

……………………….J.

(ANIRUDDHA BOSE)

NEW DELHI;

APRIL 20, 2022. 

18

reinstatement -not correct - In any case in the facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons stated above and considering the charge and misconduct of producing the fake and false SSLC Certificate proved, when a conscious decision was taken by the Disciplinary Authority to dismiss him from service, the same could not have been interfered with by the High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2911 OF 2022

M/s Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.          ..Appellant 

Versus

Shri Rajendra D. Harmalkar    ..Respondent 

J U D G M E N T 

M. R. Shah, J.

1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned

judgment and order dated 29.06.2015 passed by the High Court

of Judicature at Bombay at Goa in Writ Petition No.660 of 2013

by which the High Court has partly allowed the said writ petition

preferred by the respondent herein (hereinafter referred to as the

“original   writ   petitioner”)   directing   the   petitioner   herein   to

reinstate the original writ petitioner without any back wages and

other   benefits   by   substituting   the   punishment   of   dismissal

1

imposed by the Disciplinary Authority, the employer – Indian Oil

Corporation Ltd. has preferred the present appeal.

2. The facts leading to the present appeal in a nutshell are as

under:

That   the   respondent   herein   original   writ   petitioner   was

initially appointed in the year 1982 as a casual employee.   He

moved an application seeking the position of Refueling Helper,

wherein under the heading of qualifications, he mentioned that

he has passed Secondary School Leaving Certificate (hereinafter

referred to as “SSLC”) in April, 1986 from Karnataka Secondary

Education Board.  That he was thereafter appointed as Helper as

per the regularization policy regularizing the casual employees,

inter alia,  subject to the contents prescribed in the application

form for employment being correct.  At that stage also the original

writ   petitioner   submitted   SSLC   of   Karnataka   Board   bearing

No.206271 dated 19.05.1986.

2.1 In   the   year   2003,   the   Chief   Vigilance   Officer   of   the

Corporation received a complaint that the original writ petitioner

had secured his job as Re­fueling Helper by submitting a false

and forged SSLC.  Similar complaint was also made to the police

authorities also.

2

2.2 Despite repetitive requests and follow up by the authorities,

original   writ   petitioner   did   not   submit   the   original   SSLC

Certificate.   On the contrary, the original writ petitioner sent a

communication wherein it was mentioned that the original SSLC

has been misplaced.  Thereafter the Manager, ER advised original

writ petitioner to obtain a duplicate copy of the original SSLC and

to submit the same to the Manager, ER.  However, he continued

evading   submission   of   the   original   certificate   or   even   the

Duplicate SSLC from Karnataka Board.

2.3 The Manager, ER thereafter requested the authorities of the

Secondary Board to check up their records and confirm whether

they had issued any marks certificate carrying details available

on the photocopy of the SSLC marks sheet issued by them.  In

response to the same, the Board informed the authority that “as

per the record, SSLC statement of marks for the year March,

1986   bearing   Registration   No.206271   relate   to   one   Agrahar

Jayant S/o Satyanarayana A.L. DOB – 15.02.1968 and does not

belong   to   Rajendra   Dattaram   Harmalkar   S/o   Datta   Ram

Harmalkar, DOB – 08.12.1962”.

2.4 In the above circumstances, a departmental enquiry was

initiated against the original writ petitioner.   The original writ

3

petitioner   was   served   with   the   charge­sheet   containing   two

charges which read as under:

“1.   Wilful   insubordination   or   disobedience

whether or not in combination with another, of

any lawful and reasonable order of a superior.

2. Giving false information regarding one's age,

father's   name,   qualifications   or   previous

service at the time of employment.”

2.5 The original writ petitioner replied to the charge­sheet.  The

Inquiry Officer held that both the aforesaid charges were proved

and   proposed   the   punishment   of   dismissal.     After   giving   an

opportunity to the original writ petitioner on having agreed with

the   findings   of   the   Inquiry   Officer,   and   after   taking   into

consideration the gravity of the acts of misconduct proved, the

Disciplinary Authority imposed the punishment of dismissal from

services. The   appeal   preferred   by   the   original   writ   petitioner

came to be dismissed.  

2.6 At this stage it is required to be noted that the original writ

petitioner was also prosecuted by the Criminal Court, however

the learned Trial Court acquitted him by giving benefit of doubt

mainly on the ground that the original SSLC was not brought on

record.   

4

2.7 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   order   of

dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority confirmed by the

Appellate Authority, the original writ petitioner preferred the writ

petition before the High Court.  It was the case on behalf of the

original   writ   petitioner   that   he   admitted   the   alleged   guilt   of

misconduct on the assurance of a lenient view being taken by the

authorities.   It was also argued that there was no minimum

educational qualification and age limit (minimum or maximum)

prescribed to secure the job or even for the promotion.   It was

submitted that therefore in such circumstances, it cannot be said

that  he  had  submitted  a  false  and  forged  certificate  with  an

attempt to secure the job or promotion.  That the certificate was

produced   only   for   the   purpose   of   record   and   there   was   no

dishonest intention to grab the job or promotion.   It was also

urged that the Criminal Court had acquitted him and that he had

a good service record and that the first charge of insubordination

is not established. The High Court framed only one point for

determination, namely, whether the punishment imposed upon

the   petitioner   is   grossly   disproportionate   to   the   misconduct

committed by the petitioner.   By the impugned judgment and

order the High Court observed and held that the punishment

5

imposed   upon   the   original   writ   petitioner   was   grossly

disproportionate to the misconduct and interfered with the order

of   punishment   imposed   by   the   Disciplinary   Authority   by

observing that the respondent was assured that on admission of

his   guilt   a   lenient   view   may   be   taken   while   imposing   the

punishment. The High Court also observed that the petitioner is

out of service from the year 2006 and as the counsel for the

petitioner had made a statement that he will forgive his back

wages and promotion, by the impugned judgment and order the

High Court allowed the said writ petitioner and the directed the

appellant to reinstate the original writ petitioner from the date of

dismissal from service in the post of Refueling Helper, however

without any back wages or benefits.

2.8 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned

judgment and order passed by the High Court allowing the writ

petitioner and interfering with the order of punishment imposed

by   the   Disciplinary   Authority,   the   Indian   Oil   Corporation   –

employer   –   Disciplinary   Authority   has   preferred   the   present

appeal.

3. Shri Rajiv Shukla, learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the appellant had vehemently submitted that in the facts and

6

circumstances of the case the High Court has committed a grave

error in interfering with the order of punishment imposed by the

Disciplinary   Authority   pursuant   to   the   charge   of   giving   false

information   regarding   his   father’s   name,   his   qualification   by

producing a fake and false SSLC was held to be proved.   It is

contended that the High Court materially erred in observing that

the   punishment   of   dismissal   imposed   by   the   Disciplinary

Authority on the proved misconduct was disproportionate to the

misconduct established and proved.

3.1 It is urged that when an employee has produced a false and

forged SSLC of the Education Board the same can be said to be a

grave misconduct and therefore the Disciplinary Authority was

justified in imposing the punishment of dismissal.

3.2 It is further submitted by learned counsel for the appellant

that the grounds on which the High Court interfered with the

punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority namely that

original writ petitioner:­ 

(i) has admitted the guilt on an assurance that a lenient

view shall be taken while imposing the punishment;

(ii) has been acquitted by the Criminal Court; and

7

(iii) that   no   minimum   qualification   or   age   limit   was

prescribed for getting the job or promotion and that he

had a good service record, are all irrelevant and/or not

germane.

3.3 It   is   submitted   that   the   High   Court   has   not   properly

appreciated   the   fact   that   the   Criminal   Court   acquitted   the

original writ petitioner by giving him a benefit of doubt and there

was no honorable acquittal.

3.4 It is contended that it is immaterial, whether, there was a

minimum   qualification   or   age   limit   prescribed   for   the   job   or

promotion or not and therefore there was no intention to secure

the job by producing the fake/forged certificate.  It is submitted

that it is a case of TRUST and therefore when the Disciplinary

Authority/employer loses the Confidence and TRUST in such an

employee who submitted a forged/fake certificate, the High Court

ought   not   to   have   interfered   with   the   order   of   punishment

imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. 

3.5 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Om

Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386; Union of India v. G.

Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463; Union of India v. Dwarka Prasad

Tiwari, (2006) 10 SCC 388; and  Union of India v. Diler Singh,

8

(2016) 13 SCC 71, it is submitted that while interfering with the

order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority the

High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction while exercising its

powers  under Article  226  of  the   Constitution  of  India.     It  is

submitted that as per the settled position of law unless there is a

procedural irregularity in conducting the disciplinary proceedings

and/or the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate

to the proved misconduct, then and then only, the High Court

can exercise powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

and   interfere   with   the   order   of   punishment   imposed   by   the

Disciplinary Authority.

3.6 It is further submitted that even denying the back wages on

the concession given by the employee cannot be said to be a

sufficient   punishment   imposed.     It   is   submitted   that   in   the

present   case   as   such   during   the   interregnum   period   the

respondent   original   writ   petitioner   was   working   with   the

petroleum unit of Reliance Industries as a driver for the period

between 2006 to 2017.  Therefore, denying the back wages and

promotion by the High Court by the impugned judgment and

order cannot be said to be any punishment at all.

9

3.7 Making the above submissions and relying upon the above

decisions, it is prayed to allow the present appeal.

4. The instant appeal is vehemently opposed by Ms. Suruchi

Suri, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent.

4.1 It is submitted by Ms. Suri, learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the respondent – original writ petitioner that in the

present case the respondent – original writ petitioner did produce

the fake/forged SSLC.  However, the same had no relevance for

securing the job as there was no minimum qualification or age

limit prescribed for getting the job or promotion.  It is submitted

that the same was produced only for the purpose of record.

4.2 Further, the original writ petitioner admitted his guilt of

producing   the   fake/forge   certificate   on   an   assurance   that   a

lenient   view   would   be   taken   at   the   time   of   imposing   the

punishment.

4.3 It  is   submitted  that   even   the   respondent   –  original   writ

petitioner   has   been   acquitted   by   the   Criminal   Court   for   the

offences punishable under Sections 468 and 471 IPC regarding

the said SSLC produced by him.

4.4 It   is   further   urged   that   even   the   respondent   had   an

unblemished and good service record.  Therefore, considering the

10

aforesaid overall facts and circumstances, when the High Court

has   interfered   with   the   order   of   punishment   imposed   by   the

Disciplinary Authority  and  has  ordered  reinstatement  without

any back wages and promotion, the same is not required to be

interfered with by this Court in exercise of powers under Article

136 of the Constitution of India.

4.5 Making the above submissions it is prayed to dismiss the

present appeal.

5. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties. 

6. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court, in

exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,

has   interfered   with   the   order   of   punishment   imposed   by   the

Disciplinary Authority  and  has  ordered  reinstatement  without

back   wages   and   other   benefits   by   observing   that   order   of

punishment   of   dismissal   from   the   service   imposed   by   the

Disciplinary   Authority   is   disproportionate   to   the   misconduct

proved.  

Therefore,   the   short   question   which   is   posed   for

consideration   by   this   Court   is,   whether,   in   the   facts   and

circumstances   of   the   case   the   High   Court   is   justified   in

11

interfering with the conscious decision taken by the Disciplinary

Authority   while   imposing   the   punishment   of   dismissal   from

service,   in   exercise   of   powers   under   Article   226   of   the

Constitution of India.

7. On the question of judicial review and interference of the

courts in matters of disciplinary proceedings and on the test of

proportionality, a few decisions of this Court are required to be

referred to:

i) In   the   case   of  Om   Kumar   (supra),   this   Court,   after

considering   the  Wednesbury   principles   and   the   doctrine   of

proportionality, has observed and held that the question of the

quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is primarily for

the disciplinary authority to order and the jurisdiction of the

High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution or of the

Administrative   Tribunals   is   limited   and   is   confined   to   the

applicability of one or other of the well­known principles known

as ‘Wednesbury principles’.

In the Wednesbury case, (1948) 1 KB 223, it was said that

when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a

decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited.  Lord

12

Greene further said that interference was not permissible unless

one or the other of the following conditions was satisfied, namely,

the   order   was   contrary   to   law,   or   relevant   factors   were   not

considered, or irrelevant factors were considered, or the decision

was one which no reasonable person could have taken.

ii) In the case of  B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6

SCC 749, in paragraph 18, this Court observed and held as

under:

“18. A   review   of   the   above   legal   position   would

establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal

the appellate authority, being fact­finding authorities

have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a

view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the

discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping

in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The

High   Court/Tribunal,   while   exercising   the   power   of

judicial   review,   cannot   normally   substitute   its   own

conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty.

If   the   punishment   imposed   by   the   disciplinary

authority   or   the   appellate   authority   shocks   the

conscience   of   the   High   Court/Tribunal,   it   would

appropriately   mould   the   relief,   either   directing   the

disciplinary/appellate   authority   to   reconsider   the

penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may

itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate

punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.”

iii) In   the   case   of  Lucknow   Kshetriya   Gramin   Bank   (Now

Allahabad,   Uttar   Pradesh   Gramin   Bank)   v.   Rajendra   Singh,

13

(2013) 12 SCC 372, in paragraph 19, it was observed and held

as under:

“19. The principles discussed above can be summed up

and summarised as follows:

19.1. When   charge(s)   of   misconduct   is   proved   in   an

enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a

particular   case   is   essentially   the   domain   of   the

departmental authorities.

19.2. The   courts   cannot   assume   the   function   of

disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the

quantum  of   punishment   and  nature  of  penalty  to  be

awarded,   as   this   function   is   exclusively   within   the

jurisdiction of the competent authority.

19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with

the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority,

only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking

to the conscience of the court.

19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set

aside   as   shockingly   disproportionate   to   the   nature   of

charges   framed   against   the   delinquent   employee,   the

appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back

to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority

with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The

court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the

penalty in such a case.

19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para

19.4   above,   would   be   in   those   cases   where   the   codelinquent   is   awarded   lesser   punishment   by   the

disciplinary   authority   even   when   the   charges   of

misconduct   were   identical   or   the   co­delinquent   was

foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the

doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee

concerned   and   the   co­delinquent   are   equally   placed.

However, there has to be a complete parity between the

two,   not   only   in   respect   of   nature   of   charge   but

subsequent conduct as well after the service of chargesheet in the two cases. If the co­delinquent accepts the

charges,   indicating   remorse   with   unqualified   apology,

lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.”

14

7.1 In   the   present   case,   the   original   writ   petitioner   was

dismissed   from   service   by   the   Disciplinary   Authority   for

producing   the   fabricated/fake/forged   SSLC.     Producing   the

false/fake certificate is a grave misconduct.  The question is one

of a TRUST.  How can an employee who has produced a fake and

forged   marksheet/certificate,   that   too,   at   the   initial   stage   of

appointment   be   trusted   by   the   employer?     Whether   such   a

certificate was material or not and/or had any bearing on the

employment or not is immaterial.  The question is not of having

an   intention   or   mens   rea.     The   question   is   producing   the

fake/forged certificate.   Therefore, in our view, the Disciplinary

Authority was justified in imposing the punishment of dismissal

from service.

7.2 It was a case on behalf of the petitioner – original writ

petitioner   before   the   High   Court   that   he   pleaded   guilty   and

admitted that he had submitted a forged and fake certificate on

the assurance that lesser punishment will be imposed.  However,

except the bald statement, there is no further evidence on the

same.  Nothing has been mentioned on record as to who gave him

such an assurance.  

15

7.3 Even otherwise the conduct on the part of the original writ

petitioner is required to be considered.

As   observed   hereinabove,   prior   to   the   issuance   of   the

chargesheet   and   after   the   complaint   was   received   by   the

Vigilance Officer, there were repetitive requests and follow up by

the authorities requesting the original writ petitioner to produce

the original SSLC.   Initially the original writ petitioner did not

even respond to the said requests.  Thereafter, he came up with a

case that the original SSLC was misplaced.  He was then called

upon to obtain a duplicate copy of the SSLC and to submit the

same   to   the   Manager,   ER.     However,   he   continued   to   evade

obtaining the duplicate certificate from Karnataka Board.  Only

thereafter the Manager, ER directly contacted the authorities of

the Board and requested the Education Board to check up from

their records and only thereafter it was revealed that the SSLC

produced   by   the   original   petitioner   was   forged   and   fake   and

belonged to or related to some another student and it did not

belong to the original writ petitioner.   This shows the malafide

intention on the part of the original writ petitioner.

7.4 Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the original writ

petitioner that he was acquitted by the Criminal Court for the

16

offences punishable under Sections 468 and 471 IPC in respect

of the same certificate is concerned, the said contention is neither

here   nor   there   and   is   of   no   assistance   to   the   original   writ

petitioner.   Apart from the fact that he was acquitted by the

Criminal   Court   by   giving   benefit   of   doubt   and   there   was   no

honourable acquittal, in the present case before the Disciplinary

Authority the original writ petitioner as such admitted that he

produced the fake and forged certificate.   Therefore, once there

was an admission on the part of the respondent – original writ

petitioner,   thereafter   whether   he   has   been   acquitted   by   the

Criminal Court is immaterial.

7.5 Even from the impugned judgment and order passed by the

High Court it does not appear that any specific reasoning was

given by the High Court on how the punishment imposed by the

Disciplinary   Authority   could   be   said   to   be   shockingly

disproportionate to the misconduct proved.   As per the settled

position of law, unless and until it is found that the punishment

imposed   by   the   Disciplinary   Authority   is   shockingly

disproportionate   and/or   there   is   procedural   irregularity   in

conducting the inquiry, the High Court would not be justified in

interfering   with   the   order   of   punishment   imposed   by   the

17

Disciplinary   Authority   which   as   such   is   a   prerogative   of   the

Disciplinary Authority as observed hereinabove.

7.6 From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High

Court, it appears that the High Court has denied the back wages

and   other   benefits   and   has   ordered   reinstatement   on   a

concession given by the learned counsel on behalf of the original

writ petitioner.  However, it is required to be noted that for the

period between 2006 to 2017 i.e. during the pendency of the writ

petition the respondent was working in the Petroleum Division of

Reliance Industries.  Therefore, he was aware that even otherwise

he is not entitled to the back wages for the aforesaid period.

Therefore, the concession given on behalf of the original writ

petitioner as such cannot be said to be a real concession.  In any

case in the facts and circumstances of the case and for the

reasons stated above and considering the charge and misconduct

of producing the fake and false SSLC Certificate proved, when a

conscious decision was taken by the Disciplinary Authority to

dismiss   him   from   service,   the   same   could   not   have   been

interfered with by the High Court in exercise of powers under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India.   The High Court has

exceeded   in   its   jurisdiction   in   interfering   with   the   order   of

18

punishment   imposed   by   the   Disciplinary   Authority   while

exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India.

8. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the

impugned   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   in

interfering   with   the   order   of   punishment   imposed   by   the

Disciplinary Authority of dismissing the original writ petitioner

from service and ordering reinstatement without back wages and

other benefits is hereby quashed and set aside.  The order passed

by   the   Disciplinary   Authority   dismissing   the   original   writ

petitioner   from   service   on   the   misconduct   proved   is   hereby

restored. 

The present appeal is accordingly allowed.  In the facts and

circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

…………………………………J.

                          (M. R. SHAH)

…………………………………J.

       (B.V. NAGARATHNA)

New Delhi, 

April 21, 2022.

19