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Wednesday, December 15, 2021

death sentence = It is well settled that the prosecution must stand or fall on its own feet. It cannot draw support from the weakness of the case of the accused, if it has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.””

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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.434­436 OF 2020

JAIKAM KHAN  ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH      .... RESPONDENT(S)

WITH 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.442 OF 2020

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.437­439 OF 2020

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 440­441 OF 2020 

J U D G M E N T  

B.R. GAVAI, J. 

1. The   present   appeals   arise   out   of   the   common

judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the

High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Allahabad   dated   18th  May,

2018, in Reference No.01 of 2016 and, Capital Case No.602

of   2016   and   Capital   Case   No.844   of   2016,   thereby

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confirming the judgment and order of conviction dated 2nd

January, 2016 and the order of death sentence dated 11th

January, 2016 awarded to original accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4

by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bulandshahr.   Vide the

said impugned judgment dated 18th  May, 2018, the High

Court   has,   however,   allowed   the   appeal   of   the   original

accused   No.2­Nazra   and   set   aside   the   conviction   under

Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter

referred to as “the IPC”) and the death penalty awarded to

her. 

2. Being aggrieved, Criminal Appeal Nos. 434­436 of

2020 are filed by Jaikam Khan (Accused No.3); Criminal

Appeal Nos. 437­439 of 2020 are filed by Sajid (Accused

No.4); and Criminal Appeal Nos. 440­441 of 2020 are filed

by Momin Khan (Accused No.1); whereas Criminal Appeal

No. 442 of 2020 is filed by Ali Sher Khan, the first informant

(P.W.1) (hereinafter referred to as “P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan”)

being aggrieved by the order of acquittal of original accused

No.2­Nazra. 

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3. Appellant­Momin Khan (A­1), deceased Shaukeen

Khan, P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan and Kallu Khan are the four

sons   of   deceased   Mausam   Khan   (father,   aged   about   85

years) and deceased Asgari (mother, aged about 80 years).

Deceased   Shanno   (aged   about   30   years)   is   the   wife   of

deceased Shaukeen Khan, whereas deceased Samad (aged

about 8 years) is the son of deceased Shaukeen Khan and

deceased   Muskan   (aged   about   15   years)   is   the   niece   of

P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan. 

4. Appellant­Jaikam Khan (A­3) is the first cousin of

deceased Shaukeen Khan, appellant­Momin Khan (A­1) and

P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan.   Appellant­Sajid (A­4) is the son of

appellant­Jaikam Khan (A­3).  Original Accused No.2­Nazra,

who was convicted by the trial Court and acquitted by the

High Court, is the wife of appellant­Momin Khan (A­1).

5. It   is   the   prosecution   case   that   deceased

Shaukeen Khan and P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan were not in good

terms with  Momin  Khan  (A­1) and  his  wife  Nazra  (A­2).

Therefore, deceased Mausam Khan (father) had separated

all   the   brothers   and   allotted   their   respective   share   of

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properties.   The houses of each one of them were in one

compound.  Deceased Mausam Khan (father) owned a brickkiln.  In the beginning, appellant­Momin Khan (A­1) used to

run the brick­kiln, but he did not give the money earned by

him from the brick­kiln to deceased Mausam Khan (father)

and his elder brother, deceased Shaukeen Khan.  Therefore,

deceased Mausam Khan (father) had dispossessed Momin

Khan   (A­1)   from   the   brick­kiln.     Thereafter,   deceased

Mausam Khan and P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan were running the

brick­kiln with the help of his brother deceased Shaukeen

Khan.  Jaikam Khan (A­3) and Sajid (A­4) were jealous with

their growing business and so a case was also lodged for

laying bricks over the disputed land.   Thereafter enmity

arose between them, and the younger brother Momin Khan

(A­1)  joined   the   company   of  his   uncle’s  son   i.e.  Jaikam

Khan (A­3) and Jaikam Khan (A­3)’s son Sajid (A­4). 

6. On   the   fateful   day   of   the   incident,   i.e.,   23rd

January, 2014, at around 8.30 p.m., P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan

and   his   brother­in­law,   P.W.2­Jaan   Mohammad,   were

present at home i.e. the place of incident.   At that time,

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Momin   Khan   (A­1)   with   his   wife   Nazra   (A­2)   along   with

Jaikam Khan (A­3) and Sajid (A­4) came armed with knives

and   assaulted   Mausam   Khan   (father),   Asgari   (mother),

Shaukeen   Khan   (brother),   Shanno   (sister­in­law),   Samad

(nephew)   and   Muskan   (niece)   and   killed   them   brutally.

P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan and his brother­in­law, P.W.2­ Jaan

Mohammad,   somehow   managed   to   save   their   lives.     On

hearing the cries of the deceased and others, many villagers

gathered and all four accused fled from the spot through the

back­door. 

7. Immediately   after   the   incident,   P.W.1­Ali   Sher

Khan and P.W.2­Jaan Mohammad went to Police Station

Narora, District Bulandshahr.   On the basis of the report

given by P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan, a First Information Report

(F.I.R.)   came  to   be   registered   for   the   offence   punishable

under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC.  Upon

completion of the investigation, a charge­sheet came to be

filed before the concerned Judicial Magistrate.   The case

was committed to the court of Sessions.  

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8. The trial Judge framed charges for the offences

punishable under Section 302/34 of the IPC and under Section 25/4 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878 (hereinafter referred

to as “the Arms Act”).  The accused pleaded not guilty and

claimed to be tried. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial

judge vide judgment and order dated 2nd  January, 2016

convicted all the four accused for the offence punishable

under Section 302/34 of the IPC and sentenced them to

death vide order dated 11th January, 2016.  The appellantsaccused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 were also convicted for the offence

punishable   under   Section   25/4   of   the   Arms   Act   and

awarded rigorous imprisonment for a term of three years

with a fine of Rupees Five Thousand and in case of default,

they were to undergo additional imprisonment for a term of

three months.  

9. The   trial   judge   vide   the   said   order   dated   11th

January, 2016 also made a reference under Section 366(1)

of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973   (hereinafter

referred to as “Cr.P.C.”) to the High Court vide Reference

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No.1   of   2016   for   confirmation   of   the   death   sentence

awarded by it.  

10. Being aggrieved thereby, all the four accused preferred appeals before the Division Bench of the High Court.

The Division Bench of the High Court vide the impugned

judgment,   dismissed   the   appeals   of   appellants­   accused

Nos. 1, 3 and 4 and confirmed the death sentence awarded

to them.  However, the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal of the accused No.2­Nazra and acquitted

her of the charges under Section 302/34 of the IPC. 

11. Being   aggrieved   thereby,   Momin   Khan   (A­1),

Jaikam Khan (A­3), Sajid (A­4) and P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan are

before this Court in the present appeals.   

12. We   have   heard   Smt.   Nitya   Ramakrishnan,

learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of appellantMomin Khan (A­1) as well as acquitted original accused

No.2­Nazra, Shri Dama Seshadri Naidu, learned counsel for

appellants­Jaikam Khan (A­3) and Sajid (A­4), Shri Anant

Agarwal, learned counsel for appellant­ P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan

and   Shri   Vinod   Diwakar,   learned   Additional   Advocate

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General   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   respondent­State   of

Uttar Pradesh.   

13. Smt.   Nitya   Ramakrishnan,   learned   Senior

Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant­Momin Khan

(A­1) would submit that the entire case rests on the ocular

testimony   of   P.W.1­Ali   Sher   Khan   and   P.W.2­Jaan

Mohammad, who are said to have witnessed the incident

from   the   kitchen   and   the   cattle­shed   of   the   house

respectively.  She submits that both of them are interested

witnesses.     It   is   submitted   that   the   High   Court   has

disbelieved the evidence of these two witnesses insofar as

original accused No.2­Nazra is concerned.  She submits that

when   the   ocular   testimony   of   P.W.1­Ali   Sher   Khan   and

P.W.2­Jaan Mohammad was found to be not trustworthy

and reliable by the High Court with respect to accused No.2­

Nazra, the High Court fell in grave error in convicting the

other accused on the basis of the very same ocular evidence.

14. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the

prosecution   has   placed   on   record   three   site­plans   at

Exhibits Ka­51, Ka­52 and Ka­45.  It is, however, submitted

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that in none of the site­plans, the location of the kitchen

and the bathroom (which is supposed to be adjacent to

cattle­shed) has been shown. She submits that as such,

there is a serious doubt, as to whether P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan

and   P.W.2­   Jaan   Mohammad   have   really   witnessed   the

incident.  She further submits that even if the prosecution

case is to be believed, immediately after the occurrence of

the   incident,  many  villagers  had  assembled  at   the   spot,

however,   though   the   statements   of   such   witnesses   were

recorded,   the   prosecution   has   not   examined   a   single

witness. She, therefore, submits that an adverse inference

needs   to   be   drawn   on   account   of   non­examination   of

independent   witnesses,   though   they   were   very   much

available.  

15. Learned   Senior   Counsel   further   submits   that

both P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan and P.W.2­Jaan Mohammad have

admitted in their evidence that they were possessing mobile

phones.   She submits that in normal circumstances, after

such   a   dastardly   incident   had   occurred,   P.W.1­Ali   Sher

Khan and P.W.2­Jaan Mohammad would have informed the

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Police about it on their mobile phones.  She submits that,

however, the same has not been done by them.   She further

submits that though after recording of the statement under

Section 313 Cr.P.C., the wife of Jaikam Khan (A­3) had filed

an   application   for   producing   the   Call   Detail   Records

(hereinafter referred to as “C.D.Rs.”) of P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan

and   P.W.2­Jaan   Mohammad,   the   said   application   was

rejected by the trial judge.   She submits that if the said

C.D.Rs. would have been placed on record, they would have

established the genuineness of the prosecution’s case. 

16. She further submits that the recovery of clothes

as well as the recovery of weapons are all farcical.   She

submits that from the materials placed on record, it is clear

that the prosecution has not come to the Court with clean

hands.     It   is   submitted   that   as   per   the   Arrest

Memo/Panchnama (Exhibit Ka­49), the Investigating Officer

(I.O.) had received an information that accused Nos. 1, 3

and 4 were standing at Rajghat Square to go somewhere. On

the basis of the said information, the I.O. reached the said

square   and   found   the   said   accused   at   that   spot.     She

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submits that according to the prosecution, at around 2.00

a.m. in the morning on 24th January, 2014, the said three

accused were arrested.  It is submitted that it is improbable

that the accused, after committing such a heinous crime,

would   remain   in   such   a   close   vicinity   of   the   place   of

occurrence.     She   further   submits   that   the   arrest   of   the

accused No.2­Nazra, which is shown at around 6.40 a.m., is

also farcical.  

17. Learned   Senior   Counsel   would   further   submit

that the trial court has grossly erred in convicting all the

four accused and the High Court has erred in maintaining

and confirming the death sentence against the accused Nos.

1, 3 and 4. She submits that in any case, neither the High

Court nor the trial Court has given any reasons justifying

the award of capital punishment.  She submits that there is

not even a whisper, as to why there is no possibility of the

accused being reformed or rehabilitated and as to why there

is   no   other   alternative   than   to   award   the   capital

punishment.  

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18. Shri   Dama   Seshadri   Naidu,   learned   counsel

appearing on behalf of Jaikam Khan (A­3) and Sajid (A­4),

submits that insofar as the said accused are concerned, the

prosecution story is totally unbelievable.  He submits that

deceased Mausam Khan and Zafar Khan are the sons of

Shakoor Khan.  Jaikam Khan (A­3) is the son of Zafar Khan.

He   submits   that   from   the   evidence   of   the   prosecution

witnesses, it is clear that there was a partition amongst

Zafar Khan and deceased Mausam Khan long time ago. Not

only that, but there was a further partition amongst the two

branches of the family.  He submits that the testimonies of

these two witnesses, i.e., P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan and P.W.2­

Jaan   Mohammad,   would   reveal   that   there   is   no   enmity

between deceased Mausam Khan, deceased Shaukeen Khan

and P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan on one side and Jaikam Khan (A3) and Sajid (A­4) on the other.  The alleged enmity was with

Momin Khan (A­1), who belonged to the branch of deceased

Mausam Khan.  He submits that, as such, the prosecution

has utterly failed to prove any motive insofar as accused

Nos. 3 and 4 are concerned. 

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19. Learned counsel submits that even the evidence

of P.W.2­Jaan Mohammad was not trustworthy.  Perusal of

his evidence would reveal that he does not know anything

about the family holdings.  

20. Shri Naidu further submitted that the recovery of

clothes and weapon is totally farcical.  He submits that it is

totally impossible that the accused Nos. 3 and 4, who are

not the members of the family of Momin Khan (A­1), would

keep their bloodstained clothes at the house of Momin Khan

(A­1) after committing the crime.  Learned counsel further

submits   that   though   fingerprints   were   taken   from   the

recovered   articles,   the   fingerprint   expert’s   report   is   not

placed on record and, therefore, an adverse inference needs

to   be   drawn   against   the   prosecution.     Learned   counsel

further   submits   that   all   Forensic   Science   Laboratory

(“F.S.L.” for short) reports are marked during examination

under Section 313 Cr. P.C., which is not permissible.   He

submits that, in any case, the said reports are inconclusive.

Shri Naidu would further submit that since P.W.1­Ali Sher

Khan and P.W.2­Jaan Mohammad are related witnesses,

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their evidence will have to be scrutinized with greater care

and circumspection and it will not be safe to pass an order

of conviction on their sole testimony without there being any

corroboration.

21. Shri Vinod Diwakar, learned Additional Advocate

General   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   respondent–State   of

Uttar Pradesh submitted that both the trial court and the

High Court have concurrently, on the appreciation of the

evidence, convicted the accused. He submits that no error

could be noticed in the concurrent findings.   He submits

that merely because kitchen and bathroom are not shown in

the site­plans, it cannot be a ground to disbelieve the ocular

testimony   of   P.W.1­Ali   Sher   Khan   and   P.W.2­Jaan

Mohammad.  He submitted that the evidence of these two

witnesses is corroborated by the F.I.R.

22. Learned counsel submitted that merely because

there   are   certain   discrepancies   in   the   evidence   of   the

witnesses, it cannot be a ground to disbelieve the ocular

testimonies of the witnesses, which are otherwise cogent,

reliable and trustworthy.   He, therefore, submits that no

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interference is warranted in the appeals preferred at the

behest of accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 and the same deserve to

be dismissed. 

23. Shri Anant Agarwal, learned counsel appearing

on behalf of P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan, would submit that when

the   Additional   Sessions   Judge   on   the   basis   of   correct

appreciation   of   evidence   convicted   accused   No.2­Nazra,

there was no reason for the High Court to reverse the same.

24. The learned counsel for respective parties, while

supporting   their   contentions,   have   placed   reliance   on

various decisions of this Court. 

25. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the

appellants, we have scrutinized the entire evidence in depth.

Since the conviction of the accused appellants is largely

based on the ocular testimonies of P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan and

P.W.2­Jaan Mohammad, we find that it will be appropriate

to reproduce relevant part of their examination­in­chief: 

Examination­in­chief of P.W.1­Ali Sher

Khan

“My father had brick­klin and due to the

same   brick­klin,   the   accused   ­persons

present in court namely Jaikam Khan,

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Shajid, Nazra too bore enmity. Nazra is

wife of Mobin. Jaikam Khan is Mobin’s

cousin and Sajid is Mobin’s nephew from

his taau family. 

The incident is of 23th January, 2014

and it was about 8.30 pm. on that day,

my   sister’s   husband   namely   Jaan

Mohammad had come at about 2 o’ clock

in   afternoon   and   was   present   at   the

house itself at the time of the incident.

At the time of the incident, my father

Mausam Khan, my mother Asgari, my

brother Shaukeen Khan, his wife Sanno

and his elder brother Saukeen Khan’ son

Samad   and   my   niece   Muskan,   my

brother­in­law   Jaan   Mohammad   and   I

were present at the house. Momin Khan,

his wife Nazra, Jaikam Khan and his son

Shajid entered our compound at about

8.30 pm from the direction of the house

of Momin Khan. When I saw them, I was

in the kitchen room. All these accused

persons   were   holding   knives   in   their

hands.   These   four   attacked   my   father

with knife who was sleeping in veranda

and when they attacked my father then I

was   witnessing   it   from   kitchen   room.

Hearing hue and cry raised by father, my

niece Muskan came running then these

four accused persons  present in court

ran behind her and cut her also with

knife holding in their hands. My mother

and nephew Samad were also there in

the   same   veranda   where   Muskan   was

attacked.   These four accused persons

cut these two also with knives. Hearing

this hue and cry, when my elder brother

Saukeen came downstairs from upstairs,

the accused persons killed him also near

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the   gate.   My   sister­in­law   Sanno,   who

had come downstairs hearing hue & cry,

was killed by them going upstairs. My

sister­in­law Sanno seeing the incident

occurring downwards (sic.) ran away. My

brother­in­law   Jaan   Mohammad   was

hiding anywhere in the house saving his

life   and   he   had   also   witnessed   the

incident. The accused persons had fled

away after committing the incident. I due

to fear could not save the dead persons.

After   the   incident,   I   alongwith   my

brother­in­law   Jaan   Mohammad   had

gone to the police station and lodged the

report   at   the   police   station.   The

complaint which was given by me at the

police station is available on the file and

the   same   is   before   me   today   which   I

myself had written down and had given

at the police station. It was marked as

Ext. ka­1. All six persons had died on

the spot.   The accused persons present

in   court   had   committed   all   murders

before me which was witnessed by me

while hiding.”

Examination­in­chief   of   P.W.2­Jaan

Mohammad

“1   ­   The   incident   took   place   on

23.01.2014. on the day of the incident, I

had come to the house of my father­inlaw Mausam Khan at Pilkhana village at

2 p.m. During the time of the incident, I

was present at the house of my fatherin­law Mausam Khan. The incident took

place   at   around   8   pm.   I   know   the

accused persons who are present in the

court namely Jaikam Khan, Sabid Khan,

Momeen Khan and Naazra. I had firstly

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seen the accused persons at the house of

my father­in­law Mausam Khan at the

verandah. That time I had come out of

bathroom and first time I had seen the

accused persons from the place where

the   buffaloes   are   tethered   and   is

adjacent to bathroom. All these accused

persons   were   holding   knife   and

chhuriyan (small knife) in their hands. It

would be a distance of 10­15 steps from

where I had seen them for the first time.

During the time of the incident, inverter

powered   light   was   on.   I  had  seen   the

accused   persons   in   the   light   of   the

inverter. 

2 ­ My father­in­law Mausam Khan was

offering   Namaz   on   the   cot   at   the

verandah. All the accused persons who

are present in the court started inflicting

blows   of   knives   and   chhuriyan   (small

knife) on Mausam Khan and murdered

him. When hearing the voice of Mausam

Khan, Muskan came out, then these four

persons ran behind her and these four

accused   persons   killed   her   in   the

verandah.   After   this   they   killed   my

mother­in­law   Asgari   and   Samad.

Hearing   their   outcry,   Shaukeen   Khan

came   down   from   the   roof.   These   four

persons   caught   Shaukeen   Khan   and

killed him too. When hearing the outcry

of   Shaukeen   Khan,   his   wife   Shanno

came   down   then   these   four   accused

persons ran behind her on the roof and

these four killed her too after going up

on the roof. I had seen all this incident

under the shade of the place where the

buffaloes are tethered and is near the

bathroom. After committing the incident,

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these   four   accused   persons   had   run

away   from   there.   After   these   accused

persons had run away I came out from

the  place  where  I  was  hiding  and  my

brother­in­law Ali Sher and I had raised

alarm   after   coming   out   of   the   house.

People of the village had arrived on the

alarm raised by us. We went inside the

house and saw that all the people had

died.

3   ­   There   was   a   dispute   over   kiln

between Momeen Khan and my fatherin­law Mausam Khan. Momeen wanted

to   run   the   kiln   but   my   father­in­law

Mausam Khan  was  not  willing  to  give

kiln   to   Momeen.   2­3   years   before   the

incident, Momeen had run the kiln and

he had not given statement of accounts

to   Mausam   Khan.   Mausam   Khan   had

taken the charge of kiln from Momeen

and for the same reason he was angry.

4   ­   Accused   Sajid   is   the   nephew   of

accused Momeen. Jaikam is the cousin

brother of Momin. Nazra is the wife of

Momin. The four accused are from the

same group.”

26. It could thus be seen that according to P.W.1­Ali

Sher Khan, all the four accused entered the compound of

his house at about 8.30 p.m.   According to him, he saw

them when he was in the kitchen.   All the accused were

holding knives in their hands.   According to him, firstly,

20

they attacked his father Mausam Khan, who was sleeping in

the veranda.  He was witnessing the same from the kitchen

room.  Hearing a hue and cry raised by his father, his niece

Muskan came running and then these four accused ran

behind her and cut her also with knives holding in their

hands.   His mother Asgari and nephew Samad were also

there in the same veranda where Muskan was attacked. The

accused cut them also with knives.   Hearing the hue and

cry, his elder brother Shaukeen Khan came downstairs from

upstairs and the accused killed him also near the gate.  His

sister­in­law Shanno, who had come downstairs hearing the

hue   and   cry,   was   also   killed   by   them   going   upstairs.

According   to   him,   his   brother­in­law,   P.W.2­Jaan

Mohammad, was hiding elsewhere.  He further stated that

all the accused had fled away after committing the murder.

After the incident, he along with his brother­in­law, P.W.2­

Jaan Mohammad, had gone to the police station and lodged

the report.  

27. According to P.W.2­Jaan Mohammad, on the day

of the incident i.e. 23rd January, 2014, he had come to the

21

house of his father­in­law Mausam Khan at 2 p.m.   He

stated that the incident took place at around 8 p.m.  He had

seen the accused at the house of his father­in­law Mausam

Khan   in   the   veranda.     That   time,   he   had   come   out   of

bathroom and first time he had seen the accused from the

place where the buffaloes are tethered, which is adjacent to

the bathroom.  All the accused were holding knives in their

hands.  According to him, his father­in­law Mausam Khan

was offering Namaz on the cot in the veranda.   All the

accused started inflicting blows of knives on Mausam Khan

and   murdered   him.   After   hearing   the   voice   of   Mausam

Khan, Muskan came out, then the accused ran behind her

and killed her in the veranda.   Thereafter, they killed his

mother­in­law Asgari and Samad.  On hearing their outcry,

Shaukeen Khan came down from the roof.   The accused

caught Shaukeen Khan and killed him too.   After hearing

the cries of Shaukeen Khan, his wife Shanno came down,

then the accused ran behind her on the roof and killed her

too after going up on the roof. 

22

28. Both   P.W.1­Ali   Sher   Khan   and   P.W.2­Jaan

Mohammad are witnesses, who are closely related to the

deceased   as   well   as   the   accused   No.1­Momin   Khan.   No

doubt that, merely because the witnesses are interested and

related witnesses, it cannot be a ground to disbelieve their

testimony.  However, the testimony of such witnesses has to

be scrutinised with due care and caution.  Upon scrutiny of

the evidence of such witnesses, if the Court is satisfied that

the evidence is creditworthy, then there is no bar on the

court in relying on such evidence.  

29. For this proposition, we may refer to the following

observations of this Court in the case of Piara Singh and

others v. State of Punjab1

“4. ….It is well settled that the evidence

of interested or inimical witnesses is to

be scrutinised with care but cannot be

rejected merely on the ground of being a

partisan evidence. If on a perusal of the

evidence the court is satisfied that the

evidence is credit­worthy there is no bar

in the Court relying on the said evidence.

…..”

1 (1977) 4 SCC 452

23

30. We may also refer to the following observations of

this Court in the case of Anil Phukan v. State of Assam2

:

“3. This case primarily hinges on the

testimony of a single eyewitness Ajoy PW

3. Indeed, conviction can be based on

the testimony of a single eyewitness and

there is no rule of law or evidence which

says to the contrary provided the sole

witness passes the test of reliability. So

long as the single eyewitness is a wholly

reliable witness the courts have no difficulty in basing conviction on his testimony alone. However, where the single

eyewitness is not found to be a wholly

reliable witness, in the sense that there

are   some   circumstances   which   may

show that he could have an interest in

the prosecution, then the courts generally insist upon some independent corroboration of his testimony, in material

particulars, before recording conviction.

It is only when the courts find that the

single eyewitness is a wholly unreliable

witness that his testimony is discarded

in toto and no amount of corroboration

can cure that defect. It is in the light of

these settled principles that we shall examine the testimony of PW 3 Ajoy.

4. Ajoy PW 3, on his own showing, is

the nephew of the deceased. He had accompanied the deceased to the place of

occurrence when the latter went to recover the loan from Anil, appellant. This

2 (1993) 3 SCC 282

24

witness, therefore, is a relative of the deceased   and   an   interested   witness.  Of

course,   mere   relationship   with   the

deceased is no ground to discard his

testimony, if it is otherwise found to

be   reliable   and   trustworthy.   In   the

normal course of events, a close relation   would   be   the   last   person   to

spare the real assailant of his uncle

and   implicate   a   false   person.   However, the possibility that he may also

implicate   some   innocent   person

along with the real assailant cannot

be ruled out and therefore, as a matter   of   prudence,   we   shall   look   for

some   independent   corroboration   of

his testimony, to decide about the involvement   of   the   appellant   in   the

crime. Since, there are some doubtful

aspects in the conduct of Ajoy PW 3,

it would not be safe to accept his evidence without some independent corroboration, direct or circumstantial.”

[Emphasis supplied]

31. Undisputedly,   both   P.W.1­Ali   Sher   Khan   and

P.W.2­Jaan   Mohammad   are   witnesses,   who   are   closely

related to the deceased and the accused No.1­Momin Khan.

Therefore, we find that it will be necessary to scrutinise

their evidence with more care, caution and circumspection.

25

32. Even if the evidence of P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan and

P.W.2­Jaan   Mohammad   is   taken   at   its   face   value,   the

accused have murdered six deceased at different places. As

per the admission given by P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan, the house

of the accused No.1­ Momin Khan is 15 steps away from the

place where he was hiding in the compound. According to

him, there are a total of 5 rooms in the house where the

incident took place. He has stated in his cross­examination

that Shaukeen Khan was murdered in the  Angan  of the

house and his father Mausam Khan was murdered in the

veranda.     His   niece   Muskan   was   also   murdered   in   the

veranda.     His   mother­Asgari   and   nephew   Samad   were

murdered in the room which is 15 steps away from the

kitchen, whereas deceased Shanno was murdered in a room

upstairs. He has further admitted that the aforesaid room

cannot   be   seen   from   the   kitchen   and   the   door   of   the

aforesaid room opens towards south.  

33. It   will   be   relevant   to   refer   to   P.W.1­Ali   Sher

Khan’s deposition in his cross­examination.  

26

“Site map was prepared by the police on

my pointing. There is a courtyard in my

house.   There   is   a   room   built   in   the

South of the courtyard whose door opens

in the courtyard. The room which I have

told in South is a kitchen. The door of

this kitchen opens in North. There is a

gate in Western wall of the courtyard.”

34. It   would   further   be   relevant   to   refer   to   the

following deposition of P.W.9­Brahmesh Kumar Yadav, i.e.

the I.O.  

“I had prepared site­map on the day of

occurrence on 24.1.14. I had prepared

the site­map of the scene of occurrence

at the instance of the case­complainant.

I do not remember at what time I started

to prepared the site­map. I don’t even

remember   how   much   time   I   took   to

prepare the site­map. I don’t remember

at   what   time   I   stopped   preparing   the

site­map.   I   don’t   remember   whether   I

had   marked   case­complainant’s   hiding

place   in   the   site­map   or   not.   This   is

correct   to   state   that   the   place,   from

where the case­complainant has stated

27

to hide and see the accused persons, is

not   shown   in   the   site­map.   I   had

prepared the site­map of the scene of”

35. A perusal of the evidence of the P.W.1­Ali Sher

Khan and the evidence of P.W.9­Brahmesh Kumar Yadav

would reveal that the first site­plan  (Exhibit Ka­51) was

prepared by P.W.9­Brahmesh Kumar Yadav on P.W.1­Ali

Sher Khan’s pointing out the details. 

28

36. It will be appropriate to reproduce all the three

site­plans, which are as under:  “

29

30

31

37. It could thus be seen that all the three site­plans

(Exhibits Ka­51, Ka­52 and Ka­45) have been prepared by

32

P.W.9­Brahmesh Kumar Yadav, the I.O. The first site­plan

(Exhibit Ka­51) was prepared on 24th January, 2014.  The

second   site­plan   (Exhibit   Ka­52)   was   prepared   on   28th

January, 2014 and the third site­plan (Exhibit Ka­45) was

prepared on 29th January, 2014.  

38. The   first   site­plan   (Exhibit   Ka­51)   shows   the

places where the dead bodies of the deceased were found.

Serial No.1 in the said site­plan is the place where the dead

body of deceased Shaukeen Khan was found. Serial No.2 is

the spot where the dead body of deceased Mausam Khan

was found.  Serial No.3 is the spot where the dead body of

deceased Shanno Begam was found. Serial No.4 is the spot

where the dead body of deceased Muskan was found.  Serial

No.5 is the spot where the dead body of deceased Asgari was

found.   Serial No.6 is the spot where the dead body of

deceased Samad was found. The arrow marks in the said

site­plan show the direction in which the accused fled away

from the rear gate.  It is to be seen that in the said site­plan,

the room on the southern side is not shown.  

33

39. The   second   site­plan   (Exhibit   Ka­52)   is   with

regard to the recovery of weapons made at the instance of

the accused from the field of the deceased Shaukeen Khan.  

40. The   third   site­plan   (Exhibit   Ka­45),   which   is

drawn in connection with Case Crime No.26 of 2014 under

Section 25/4 of the Arms Act, also shows the places from

where the weapons alleged to have been used in the crime,

were recovered at the instance of the accused. 

41. In the last two site­plans at Exhibit Ka­52 and

Exhibit Ka­45, a room has been shown on the southern

side. 

42. According to the evidence of P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan,

the   room   in   which   he   hid   himself   in   the   south,   is   the

Kitchen.  As per his evidence, the door of the kitchen opens

to the north, whereas as per the third site­plan (Exhibit Ka45),   the  gate  of   the   said  room  on  southern   side,  opens

towards west.  

43. As per the version of P.W.2­Jaan Mohammad, he

has   witnessed   the   incident   from   the   place   where   the

buffaloes are tethered, which is adjacent to the bathroom.

34

Though   the   bathroom   is   not   shown   in   the   site­plan,

believing it to be adjacent to the place where buffaloes are

tethered, it will be in the south­west corner. 

44. As per the testimonies of P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan

and   P.W.2­Jaan   Mohammad,   firstly   Mausam   Khan   was

assaulted   and   done   away   with   in   veranda,   whereas

deceased Shaukeen Khan was done away with in the courtyard.  Deceased Muskan, Asgari and Samad were assaulted

in the rooms, which are in the middle portion of the house.

According to these witnesses, Shanno Begam was assaulted

upstairs. If the version of these two witnesses is compared

with the site­plans, then the position that emerges would

reveal that P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan, at the most, could have

witnessed   the   assault   on   deceased   Shaukeen   Khan,

whereas P.W.2­Jaan Mohammad could have witnessed the

assault on deceased Mausam Khan and deceased Shaukeen

Khan.  However, since from the perusal of the first site­plan

(Exhibit Ka­51), it could be seen that the dead­bodies of

deceased   Muskan,   Samad,   and   Asgari   were   inside   the

house, and the dead­body of deceased Shanno Begam was

35

upstairs, it is difficult to believe that these two witnesses

could   have   also   seen   the   accused   assaulting   Shanno

Begam, Muskan, Asgari and Samad.     It is further to be

noted   that   P.W.9­Brahmesh   Kumar   Yadav   in   his   crossexamination has admitted that P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan and

P.W.2­Jaan   Mohammad   had   not   told   him   about   their

hideouts and that is why it was not mentioned in the siteplan. 

45. We   are   therefore   of   the   view   that   these   two

witnesses cannot be considered to be wholly reliable to base

an order of conviction solely on their testimonies.  

46. It   will   be   relevant   to   refer   to   the   following

observation of this Court in the case of Vadivelu Thevar &

another v. The State of Madras3

“11.….Hence,   in   our   opinion,   it   is   a

sound and well­established rule of law

that   the   court   is   concerned   with   the

quality and not with the quantity of the

evidence   necessary   for   proving   or   disproving a fact. Generally speaking, oral

testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely:

(1) Wholly reliable.

3 (1957) SCR 981

36

(2) Wholly unreliable.

(3)   Neither   wholly   reliable   nor

wholly unreliable.

In the first category of proof, the court

should have no difficulty in coming to its

conclusion either way — it may convict

or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach   or   suspicion   of   interestedness,

incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the court equally has no

difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It

is in the third category of cases, that the

court has to be circumspect and has to

look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial……”

47. As already discussed hereinabove, we are of the

view that though P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan could have witnessed

the assault on deceased Shaukeen Khan and P.W.2­Jaan

Mohammad could have witnessed the assault on deceased

Shaukeen Khan and deceased Mausam Khan, it is difficult

to believe that they could have witnessed the assault on the

other four deceased persons.  We are also of the view that

the said witnesses cannot be said to be wholly unreliable.

They would fall in the category of ‘neither wholly reliable nor

wholly unreliable’ and as such, we are of the view that a

37

greater degree of care and caution would be required and a

corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony,

direct  or  circumstantial,  would  be  necessary  to  pass  an

order of conviction.  

48. We, therefore, find it necessary to consider the

other circumstances relied on by the prosecution.  The other

circumstances,   on   which   the   prosecution   relies,   are   as

under:

A. Arrest   of   the   accused   immediately   after   the

incident; 

B. Recovery   of   the   weapons   alleged   to   have   been

used in the crime at the instance of the accused.

C. Recovery of the bloodstained clothes alleged to

have been worn by the accused while committing

the crime.

D. Motive.

We will now  deal  with the evidence placed on

behalf   of   the   prosecution   with   regard   to   each   of   the

circumstances. 

A.  Arrest   of   the   accused   immediately   after   the

incident:

49. Insofar as the arrest of accused Nos.1, 3 and 4 is

concerned,   P.W.9­Brahmesh   Kumar   Yadav   (I.O.),   states

38

that, on the basis of written complaint, Crime No.25 of 2014

came   to   be   registered   for   the   offence   punishable   under

Section 302/34  of the  IPC.   He stated that thereafter, he

immediately reached at the complainant’s house along with

the force.  It was crowded there.  He recorded the statement

of the complainant­P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan.   He stated that

when they were at the scene of occurrence with the police

force, they received information through informer that the

accused   of   the   aforesaid   case   were   present   at   Rajghat

Chauraha looking for a chance to go somewhere.  Relying on

this information, when they reached at Rajghat Chauraha,

three   persons   were   there   in   the   passenger   shed.     The

informer went away after showing those three men and they

arrested them at 2.00 a.m. in the morning of 24th January,

2014.  They revealed their names as Momin Khan, Jaikam

Khan and Sajid.  According to him, the accused stated that

they had committed those six murders in association with

Nazra and all the accused told them that they had thrown

away the weapons with which they had committed the crime

and they could get those recovered.   His further evidence

39

states about the recovery of those weapons, with which we

will deal later in this judgment.  He further states that when

they   were   returning   to   the   police   station   with   accused,

leaving a few policemen behind at the scene of occurrence,

accused   No.2­Nazra,   met   at   Rajghat   Chauraha,   seeing

whom Momin Khan (A­1) said that she was his wife.  She

was arrested at 6.40 a.m. and everyone was presented at

the police station at 6.50 a.m. on 24th January, 2014.  

50. P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan, in his cross­examination,

states that he does not know how far the road of Rajghat is

from his house.  He further states that he cannot say even

by guessing.  

51. P.W.2­Jaan   Mohammad   admitted   in   his   crossexamination that the house of deceased Mausam Khan is at

a distance of one furlong from Rajghat road.   He further

clarified that by one furlong he means half kilometre.  

52. It is thus difficult to believe that accused Nos. 1,

3  and   4  were   waiting  at   Rajghat   square,   which   is  at   a

distance   of   hardly   half   a   kilometre   from   the   place   of

occurrence, waiting for the Police to come and arrest them.

40

The alleged informer has neither been named nor has he

been examined.  It is further difficult to believe that accused

No.2­Nazra was wandering in the village and coincidently at

6.40   a.m.,   crossed   paths   with   P.W.9­   Brahmesh   Kumar

Yadav (I.O.), when he was returning to the police station

along with other accused.  

53. In this respect, it will also be relevant to refer to

the testimony of P.W.2­Jaan Mohammad.

“When we went to the police station to get

the report written, Momin and Nazra, as

well as Jaikam and Sajid were present at

the police station.”

It   is   thus   clear   admission   of   P.W.2­Jaan

Mohammad that when he and P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan had

gone to the police station to give the written report, Momin

Khan (A­1), Nazra (A­2), Jaikam Khan (A­3) and Sajid (A­4)

were already present there in the police station.  According

to the prosecution, the crime is registered on 23rd January,

2014 at 10.00 p.m. when both P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan and

P.W.2­Jaan   Mohammad   were   present.     If   the   version   of

P.W.2­Jaan   Mohammad,   that   all   the   four   accused   were

present at the police station when they had gone to lodge

41

the FIR, is to be believed, then the arrest of the accused

Nos. 1, 3 and 4 at 2.00 a.m. on 24th  January, 2014 and

arrest of accused No.2 at 6.40 a.m. on the same day, to say

the least, is mysterious.  

B. Recovery of the weapons alleged to have been used

in the crime at the instance of the accused.

54. Insofar as the recovery of the weapons alleged to

have been used in the crime at the instance of the accused

is concerned, the prosecution has relied on the arrest­cumrecovery memo, which is at Exhibit Ka­49. 

55. We have already dealt with this aspect in the said

memo with regard to the arrest of the accused.  The relevant

part of the said memo reads thus:

“The aforesaid three persons were asked

about the incident, Momeen Khan told

that he had dispute with his father over

partition. In the beginning he used to

run   kiln,   later   on   it   was   given   to

Shaukin   Khan.   The   means   of   his

livelihood   came   to   an   end,   he   was   in

trouble. Jaikam  and  Sajid   had  enmity

with his brothers. Thus he took help of

Jaikam and Sajid and killed his parents

and   family   of   Shaukin   in   a   planned

manner   after   inflicting   serious   injuries

over their neck, head and mouth. They

had thrown the knives at the back of

42

house and field with which they caused

the death. Accused told that they could

get   the   weapon   used   in   murder

recovered.   We   came   to   the   house   of

Shaukin at Village Pilkhana along with

all the aforesaid accused in the hope of

recovery of weapon used. All the three

accused   live   in   the   same   compound.

Momeen   walked   forward,   entered   the

middle house where his mother used to

sleep   and   took   out   a  daav  having

wooden   handle   around   7   fingers   and

blade around 1 balisht 1 finger that was

bloodstained from the rubbish beneath

staircase. He handed over the weapon at

around 3 am and told that he caused

death with it.   Field unit is on the spot,

photographs   were   clicked.   Recovery   of

weapon was made in presence of public

witnesses   Khemkaran   s/o   Tara   Singh,

Vilal   s/o   Usman   Khan   r/o   Pilkhana.

Another accused Jaikam s/o Jafar Khan

walked forward into the field at the back

of his house and got a knife measuring 1

balisht   6   fingers   handle   recovered   in

presence   of   aforesaid   witnesses   at

around 3:15 o'clock and stated that he

caused   death   with   the   same.   Its

photograph was clicked and fingerprint

taken   and   after   sometime   fingerprint

team   went   away.     After   much   time

accused   Sajid   walked   into   the   field

behind the house of Shaukin and took

out   a   knife   measuring   1   balisht   5

fingers.   Its   blade   is   fitted   with   plastic

arc. He got it recovered and stated that

he   caused   death   with   it.   The   three

aforesaid knives were bloodstained. Thus

blade was wrapped into a cotton, kept in

separate clothes, sealed and stamped on

43

the spot and sample seal was prepared.

Memo   was   dictated   by   me   to   H.C.P.

Sadar Singh in electric and torch light

and documents were prepared.”

Though the memo shows that the said recoveries

were made in the presence of public witnesses, no public

witness has been examined to support the same.  It will be

relevant to refer to the celebrated judgment of the Privy

Council in the case of  Pulukuri  Kottayya and others  v.

King Emperor4

“…..On normal principles of construction

their Lordships think that the proviso to

S. 26, added by s. 27, should not be held

to nullify the substance of the section. In

their Lordships' view it is fallacious to

treat   the   “fact   discovered”   within   the

section   as   equivalent   to   the   object

produced; the fact discovered embraces

the   place   from   which   the   object   is

produced   and   the   knowledge   of   the

accused as to this, and the information

given must relate distinctly to this fact.

Information as to past user, or the past

history,   of   the   object   produced   is   not

related to its discovery in the setting in

which   it   is   discovered.   Information

supplied by a person in custody that “I

will produce a knife concealed in the roof

of   my   house”   does   not   lead   to   the

discovery   of   a   knife;   knives   were

discovered many years ago. It leads to

the discovery of the fact that a knife is

4 AIR 1947 PC 67 

44

concealed in the house of the informant

to   his   knowledge,   and   if   the   knife   is

proved   to   have   been   used   in   the

commission   of   the   offence,   the   fact

discovered is very relevant. But if to the

statement   the   words   be   added   “with

which   I   stabbed   A.”,   these   words   are

inadmissible since they do not relate to

the discovery of the knife in the house of

the informant.”

56. As   already   discussed   hereinabove,   since   no

public   witness   has   been   examined   to   support   the   said

memo,   the   statement   made   therein   will   have   to   be

scrutinised with greater caution and circumspection.   All

the statements made therein with regard to the confession

of   committing   the   crime   would   not   be   admissible   in

evidence.   Only such information, which distinctly relates

to the discovery of facts will be admissible under Section 27

of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as

‘the   Evidence   Act”).     The   evidence   of   P.W.9­Brahmesh

Kumar Yadav (I.O.) would reveal that immediately after the

F.I.R. was lodged, he had come to the spot of incident for

further investigation. According to him, the accused Nos. 1,

3 and 4 were arrested at around 2.00 a.m. on 24th January,

2014.   Even according to him, the police party was very

45

much there at the spot.   One of the alleged recoveries is

from the room where deceased Asgari used to sleep. The

other two recoveries are from open field, just behind the

house   of   deceased   Shaukeen   Khan,   i.e.,   the   place   of

incident.   It could thus be seen that the recoveries were

made from the places, which were accessible to one and all

and   as   such,   no   reliance   could   be   placed   on   such

recoveries.

C. Recovery   of   the   bloodstained   clothes   alleged   to

have  been  worn  by  the  accused  while  committing

the crime.

57. The   recovery   memo   of   bloodstained   clothes

(Exhibit   Ka­34)   also   makes   for   an   interesting   reading.

Perusal of the aforesaid memo shows that the police party

along with three sons and two daughters of the accused

No.1­Momin   Khan   and   accused   No.2­Nazra   came   to   the

house of the accused No.1­Momin Khan.   At that place,

Hina @ Yasmeen, daughter of accused No.1­Momin Khan

and   accused   No.2­Nazra,   in   the   presence   of   her

grandparents,   viz.,   Akhlaq   and   Shakila   and   neighbours

46

Jabbar and Kishan Chandra and other villagers unlocked

her house and took out her things.  At that time, Maumin

saw some clothes under the bed in the room.  On seeing the

clothes, many villagers identified and told that the clothes

were the same which Momin Khan (A­1) and others had

worn in the evening of 23rd January, 2014.  The clothes were

identified   separately,   in   which   Momin   Khan   (A­1)   was

wearing jeans of blue colour and blue shirt having black

and white squares, Jaikam Khan (A­3) was wearing kurta of

cream   colour   and   printed   readymade   sweater   of   brown

colour, Sajid (A­4) was wearing pants of light black colour

and printed shirt of light yellow, red black colour and Nazra

(A­2) was wearing printed salwar kurta of light red colour.  

58. As  per  the  prosecution  witnesses,  the  accused

had run away from the rear gate of the compound, which is

towards north.  As per the evidence of P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan,

the house of Momin Khan (A­1) is at a distance of 10­15

steps away from the place of the incident.  According to the

prosecution   witnesses,   immediately   after   the   incident

occurred, many villagers had gathered at the spot.  In these

47

circumstances, it is again a mystery as to how all the four

accused fled from the spot, came back at the said spot,

changed their clothes and again went away. It is also a

mystery as to how the accused Nos. 3 and 4, who are not

residing in Momin Khan’s (A­1) house, had changed their

clothes and kept them at Momin Khan’s (A­1) house. This

coupled   with   the   fact   that   the   F.S.L.   reports   are

inconclusive,   creates   a   great   shadow   of   doubt   on   the

genuineness of the said recovery.   In any case, the said

clothes   are   not   recovered   on   the   memorandum   of   the

accused under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and as such,

the said circumstance could not have been used against the

accused.

D. Motive

59. No doubt that, in case of direct evidence and the

ocular   testimony   of   the   eye­witness   being   found   to   be

trustworthy, reliable and cogent, it will not be necessary for

the prosecution to prove the motive for the crime.  However,

in the present case, as we have already held hereinabove,

that the testimony of the eye­witnesses could not be said to

48

be wholly reliable, the motive aspect would be a relevant

factor.  

60. As per the prosecution version, the main motive

behind the crime was with regard to the dispute over the

management of the brick­kiln between the accused No.1­

Momin Khan on one hand and deceased Mausam Khan,

deceased Shaukeen Khan and P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan on the

other hand. In the F.I.R., P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan has stated

that   the   accused   Nos.   3   and   4   were   jealous   with   his

business and a case was also lodged for laying bricks over

the land.  It is further stated that since then, enmity grew

between the family and younger brother Momin Khan (A­1)

joined the company of his uncle’s son Jaikam Khan (A­3)

and Jaikam Khan’s (A­3) son Sajid (A­4).  No doubt, that the

F.I.R. is not a substantive piece of evidence, however, it will

be   relevant   for   scrutinising   the   credibility   of   the   first

informant.     Though   in   his   cross­examination,   P.W.1­Ali

Sher Khan has stated that Momin Khan (A­1) had a rift with

him, the reason for Momin Khan’s (A­1) rift with his parents

and brothers was, due to him not giving an account of the

49

money earned  from  brick­kiln  to   them.   He  has  further

stated that his father, deceased Mausam Khan, had relieved

Momin Khan (A­1) from the duty of brick­kiln in 2010 and

since then Momin Khan (A­1) bore enmity against him. He

has further stated that due to the same brick­kiln, accused

Nos.   2,   3   and   4,   viz.,   Nazra,   Jaikam   Khan   and   Sajid

respectively, too bore enmity against him.  

61. In   his   cross­examination,   P.W.1­Ali   Sher   Khan

has clearly admitted that it is Momin Khan and family who

had dispute with him over the property of brick­kiln.  The

said dispute was over details of accounts.  He has admitted

that accused Nos. 3 and 4 had nothing to do with regard to

brick­kiln of his father deceased Mausam Khan.  It will be

relevant to refer to the original hindi version of the evidence

of P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan, which is as under:

“यह बबात सहह हहकह जयकम व सबाजजद कबा ममेरमेजपितबा ममौसम

खबान समेभट्टबा कमे लमेनमेकबा नहहहथबा|”

62. P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan has categorically admitted in

his cross­examination that the shares in the agricultural

land between his father deceased Mausam Khan and Zafar

50

Khan, father of Jaikam Khan (A­3), were separate.  He has

further admitted that the names of Zafar Khan and his four

sons have been entered in the records and he has seen that

Khatauni was recorded in the name of Zafar’s sons, Jaikam

Khan and Yameen.  

63. It will also be relevant to refer to the admission of

P.W.2­Jaan Mohammad in his cross­examination, which is

as under:

“It is correct that Jaikam Khan and Sajid

Khan   had   no   dispute   with   Mausam

Khan.   It   is   also   correct   that   Jaikam

Khan   and   Sajid   Khan   had   no

partnership in the Kiln of Mausam Khan

and Alisher.”

64. It could thus be seen that the alleged motive, if

any,   is   attributable   to   the   accused   No.1­Momin   Khan.

P.W.1­Ali   Sher   Khan   and   P.W.2­Jaan   Mohammad   have

admitted   that   Jaikam   Khan   (A­3)   and   Sajid   (A­4)   had

nothing   to   do   with   the   brick­kiln   business   of   deceased

Mausam Khan.  They have further admitted that there was

no   dispute   with   regard   to   brick­kiln   amongst   his   father

deceased Mausam Khan on one hand and accused Nos. 3

51

and 4 on the other hand.   It is further to be noted that even

according to P.W.1­Ali Sher Khan, the dispute between his

father deceased Mausam Khan and accused No.1­Momin

Khan with regard to brick­kiln took place in the year 2010.

Though   P.W.1­Ali   Sher   Khan   states   in   his   crossexamination   that   heated   exchanges   regarding   brick­kiln

took   place   between   Momin   Khan   (A­1)   and   his   father

deceased Mausam Khan, during last 3­4 years, no incident,

which would cause provocation to lead to such dastardly

act, has been brought on record.     On the contrary, he

admitted in his cross­examination that though quarrel took

place   between   his   father   deceased   Mausam   Khan   and

Momin Khan (A­1), no quarrel took place between Momin

Khan   (A­1),   deceased   Shaukeen   Khan   and   himself.     He

further   admitted   that   decisions   were   taken   through   the

relatives but Momin Khan (A­1) did not accept it.  

65. It could thus be seen that with regard to Jaikam

Khan   (A­3)   and   Sajid   (A­4),   the   prosecution   has   utterly

failed to prove any motive and has also failed to prove any

strong motive insofar as Momin Khan (A­1) is concerned.  

52

66. The   matter   does   not   end   at   this.   There   are

various   other   inconsistencies   and   lacunae   in   the

prosecution case.  

67. According   to   P.W.1­Ali   Sher   Khan   and   P.W.2­

Jaan Mohammad, a large number of villagers had gathered

at   the   spot   after   the   incident.     However,   none   of   the

independent   witnesses   have   been   examined   by   the

prosecution.  Since the witnesses examined on behalf of the

prosecution   are   interested   witnesses,   non­examination   of

independent witnesses, though available, would make the

prosecution   version   doubtful.     Reference   in   this   respect

could be placed on the following observations of this Court

in the case of  State   of   Rajasthan   v.   Teja   Singh   and

others5

:

“5. In regard to the next argument of the

appellant's counsel that the High Court

was wrong in assuming that other villagers were sitting with PWs 6, 7 and 9,

assuming that it is an error even then

there can be no doubt as could be seen

from the prosecution case that other villagers whether sitting with PWs 6, 7 and

9 or not did rush to the scene of occurrence,   therefore,   it   is   clear   that   apart

5 (2001) 3 SCC 147

53

from the said eyewitnesses produced by

the   prosecution   many   other   villagers

would have at least seen the last part of

the occurrence including the escape of

the accused and the accused not being

strangers   to   the   villagers   could   have

been easily identified by them. By not

examining those independent witnesses,

the prosecution has failed to produce the

available independent corroborative evidence to support the evidence of interested witnesses, namely, PWs 6, 7 and 9

because   of  which  the   High  Court   was

justified   in   drawing   adverse   inference

against the prosecution…” 

68. The evidence of P.W.9­Brahmesh Kumar Yadav

(I.O.) would show that though fingerprints were taken at the

spot, the fingerprint expert’s report is not placed on record.

Similarly, his further evidence would reveal that though he

had come to the spot with the dog squad, report of the dog

squad is also not placed on record.   In our view, the said

also casts a doubt with regard to the genuineness of the

prosecution case.  

69. Apart from that, it could be seen that, though it is

the   assertion   of   P.W.1­Ali   Sher   Khan   and   P.W.2­Jaan

Mohammad that they together had gone to the police station

to lodge the report, the same has been contradicted by the

54

evidence of P.W.4­Manveer Singh, who was the Constable

Clerk at the police station.  He has stated in his evidence

thus:

“The complainant had come at the police

station with the written complaint. Only

Alisher   had   come   to   me   at   the   Police

Station with the written complaint. No

other one had come.”

70. Coupled with the fact that though P.W.1­Ali Sher

Khan and P.W.2­Jaan Mohammad, had mobile phones, they

had not informed the Police on phone, also casts a serious

doubt with regard to the genuineness of the prosecution

case.  

71. Insofar   as   the   reliance   placed   by   Shri   Vinod

Diwakar, learned AAG on the burden not being discharged

by the accused and no explanation given by them in their

Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement is concerned, it is trite law

that   only   after   the  prosecution   discharges   its  burden   of

proving   the   case   beyond   reasonable   doubt,   the   burden

would shift on the accused.   It is not necessary to reiterate

this   proposition   of   law.     It     will   suffice   to   refer   to   the

55

following observations of this Court in the case of Joydeb

Patra and others v. State of West Bengal6

“10. We are afraid, we cannot accept this

submission of Mr Ghosh. This Court has

repeatedly held that the burden to prove

the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable

doubt is on the prosecution and it is only

when this burden is discharged that the

accused   could   prove   any   fact   within   his

special knowledge under Section 106 of the

Evidence Act to establish that he was not

guilty.   In Sucha   Singh v. State   of   Punjab [(2001)   4   SCC   375   :   2001   SCC   (Cri)

717] this Court held: (SCC p. 381, para 19)

“19. We pointed out that Section 106

of the Evidence Act is not intended to relieve   the   prosecution   of   its   burden   to

prove  the guilt  of the  accused  beyond

reasonable doubt, but the section would

apply   to   cases   where   the   prosecution

has succeeded in proving facts for which

a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding   the   existence   of   certain   other

facts,   unless   the   accused   by   virtue   of

special knowledge regarding such facts

failed   to   offer   any   explanation   which

might drive the court to draw a different

inference.”

Similarly, in Vikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab [(2006) 12 SCC 306 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri)

732]   this   Court   reiterated:   (SCC   p.   313,

para 14)

“14. Section 106 of the Evidence Act

does not relieve the prosecution to prove

its   case   beyond   all   reasonable   doubt.

Only   when   the   prosecution   case   has

6 (2014) 12 SCC 444

56

been   proved   the   burden   in   regard   to

such facts which was within the special

knowledge of the accused may be shifted

to the accused for explaining the same.

Of course, there are certain exceptions to

the said rule e.g. where burden of proof

may be imposed upon the accused by

reason of a statute.””

In that view of the matter, we do not find any

merit in the said submissions.  

72. While   coming   to   the   conclusion   that   the

prosecution   has   failed   to   bring   home   the   guilt   of   the

accused   beyond   reasonable   doubt,   we   are   at   pains   to

observe the manner in which the present case has been

dealt with by the trial court as well as by the High Court,

particularly, when the trial court awarded death penalty to

the accused and the High Court confirmed it.   The trial

court and the High Court were expected to exercise a greater

degree of scrutiny, care and circumspection while directing

the accused to be hanged till death.

73. Though there are serious infirmities on various

counts in the judgment of the trial court, we refer to only

one paragraph of the said judgment:

57

“The above mentioned recovery of bloodstained clothes of the accused Momin,

Jaikam, Sajid and Nazra also proves the

involvement of them in the crime. The

above recovery also indicates to this fact

that the entire episode of the murders

was   a   pre­planned   one   and   that   a

comprehensive strategy was chalked out

for it. All the accused gathered at the

house   of   the   accused   Momin   prior   to

committing   the   murders.   They   already

knew   that   on   committing   murders   by

sharp   weapons,   the   splashes   of   blood

would hurl at their clothes because of

which, if they don’t change their clothes,

they would be not be able to hide their

crime during being absconded. That is

why,   they   had   already   managed

additional clothes for them in the house

of the accused Momin. After committing

the crime, they as per the planning, went

to Momin’s  house, changed their clothes

and ran away. Opening the lock of their

home by sons and daughters of Momin

on the third day of the occurrence also

indicates   that   either   Momin’s   all   sons

and daughters were at home at the time

of the occurrence and they left from the

house   with   the   accused   after   the

occurrence or Momin’s and Nazra’s kids

were   not   at   all   present   there   in   the

house at the time of occurrence and that

all   the   kids  were   sent   to   their   grandparent’s house prior to the occurrence.

Since the crime was committed in a well

and pre – planned way, it seems more

probable that the kids were sent to their

grand­parent’s   home   prior   to   the

occurrence.   If   this   probability   is

accepted,   the   arrest   of   the   accused

58

Nazra   after   the   occurrence,   and   the

arrest of the remaining three accused viz

Momin, Sajid and Jaikam at the Rajghat

Chauraha at 2.00 ‘O’ clock at night not

taking place but in the morning at 6.30

‘O’ clock becomes important. It indicates

that   Nazra,   after   the   occurrence,   was

gone to her kids for meeting them and

delivering   them   the   keys   of   home.

Thereafter,   as   per   the   pre­planned

program,   she   had   to   reach   the   same

Rajghat Chauraha, where the remaining

three accused had already been arrested

at   night.   All   the   accused   may   have

planned to gather at the same Chauraha

and run away together from here and

that   is   why,   they   kept   on   waiting   for

Nazra at the same place till 2.00 o’ Clock

at night. It is impossible because of this

reason also that if the occurrence took

place around 8.30 pm, the three accused

Momin, Zaikam and Sajid had sufficient

time after perpetrating this crime, to run

away   very   far.   However,   standing   at

Rajghat Chauraha till 2.00 am, indicates

that they were waiting there for Nazra to

come.”

74. To say the least, we are shocked at the aforesaid

finding.  The narration makes for an interesting reading as a

story.       However,   all   the   observations   are   nothing   but

conjectures   and   surmises,   without   there   being   any

evidentiary support to them.   It is really surprising, as to

how the Additional Sessions Judge could have dealt with

59

the present case in such a casual manner when he was

considering the question of life and death of four accused.   

75. At this stage, we would like to remind ourselves

as well as all the Courts in the country the golden principle

to   be   followed   in   criminal   jurisprudence.     This   Court,

speaking through legendry H.R. Khanna, J., in the case of

The  State  of  Punjab   v.  Jagir  Singh,  Baljit  Singh  and

Karam Singh7

 observed thus:

“23. A criminal trial is not like a fairy

tale wherein one is free to give flight to

one's imagination and phantasy. It concerns   itself   with   the   question   as   to

whether   the   accused   arraigned   at   the

trial is guilty of the crime with which he

is charged. Crime is an event in real life

and is the product of interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the

conclusion   about   the   guilt   of   the   accused charged with the commission of a

crime, the court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities,

its   intrinsic   worth   and   the   animus   of

witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own

facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the courts should not at the same

time   reject   evidence   which   is   ex   facie

trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.”

7 (1974) 3 SCC 277

60

76. We are amazed by the manner in which the High

court has dealt with the present matter.  It will be apposite

to refer to the following observations of the High Court with

regard to the recovery of clothes.  

“It has been urged that in order to prove

the   recovery   of   the   clothes,   no

independent witness was produced. It is

correct   that   the   prosecution   only

produced the formal witness to prove the

recovery,   but   on   the   other   hand   the

disclosure of this fact about the room

having been opened by the keys provided

by Hina, the daughter of accused Momin

was not rebutted by the defence which

could have been done by producing Hina

in order to deny any such recovery.”

77. The finding is not only contrary to the well settled

law interpreting Section 27 of the Evidence Act but also

attempts to put a burden on the accused, which does not

shift   unless   prosecution   has   proved   the   case   beyond

reasonable doubt.  

78. The   following   observations   of   the   High   Court

would also fall in the ambit of conjectures and surmises:

“There is yet another dimension which

deserves   mention   namely,   with   the

61

multiple   nature   of   injuries   and   six

persons   being   slaughtered

simultaneously, the same cannot be an

act of a single assailant. The presence,

therefore, of the three assailants Momin,

Jaikam and Sajid cannot be ruled out as

there is no doubt that such nature of

assault in the natural course of things

would be carried out by more than one

person.”

79. Another finding of the High Court, which makes

for   an   interesting   reading   and   is   foreign   to   criminal

jurisprudence is thus:

“The   question   of   motive   in   relation   to

Jaikam and Sajid may not be immediate

and they being a separate family may be

correct. This however by itself may not

be sufficient to dilute the connection of

Sajid and Jaikam with Momin. However

on this count, we find that the trial court

has raised a presumption about jealousy

amongst   the   families   on   account   of

Mausam   Khan   having   developed   his

business   and   augmented   his   earnings

through a brick klin. This part of the

discussion   of   the   trial   court   does   not

find   sufficient   corroboration   from   the

evidence   on   record,  and   therefore,   the

motive appears to be remote and not a

very strong motive. This, however, does

not   mean   to   say   that   there   was   no

connection with Jaikam and Sajid with

Momin, who did appear to be on friendly

terms and this fact is reflected from the

statement of the witnesses particularly,

62

PW­1   and   PW­2,   where   they   have

indicated an attitude of vengeance being

present for certain reasons. Thus even

though   a  strong  motive  may not  have

been established and the reasonings of

the trial court may be a little stretched,

yet the same would not wipe out their

presence   particularly   when   the   ocular

testimony   to   establish   their   presence

when the offence was committed.”

80. Further,   it   can   be   seen   that,   the   very   same

Judges of the High Court refused to believe the very same

evidence   of   prosecution   witnesses   in   respect   of   accused

No.2­Nazra.  The High Court observed thus:

“The   arrest   of   Smt.   Nazra   has   been

shown   from   a   public   place   in   the

morning at about 6.40 am whereas Smt.

Nazra claims to be present at the police

station   with   her   children.   There   is   no

independent   witness   of   her   arrest.   On

cross­examination,   PW­9   the

investigating officer has stated that he

does not remember as to whether Smt.

Nazra was at the police station with her

children or not. He however denies her

arrest at the police station. PW­2 in his

cross­examination   on   20.03.2015   has

stated that when he went to the police

station   for   lodging   of   the   first

information report, then Momin, Jaikab,

Sajid and Nazra were all present at the

police   station.   This testimony   of   PW­2

corroborates his presence at the police

station   with   PW­1   informant   who   has

63

admitted having   gone   to   the   police

station   with   his   brother­in­law   PW­2.

The story of arrest of Nazra at 6:40 am

the next   day   morning   in   these

circumstances   as   set   up   by   the

prosecution is therefore clearly doubtful.

This aspect further adds to the doubts

expressed above.”

81. We ask a question to ourselves, if the arrest of

the accused No.2­Nazra was from a public place, was the

arrest of the accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 from any other place

than   the   place   from   where   the   accused   No.2­Nazra   was

apprehended.   If according to the High Court, there is no

independent witness of her arrest, is there any independent

witness for arrest of accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4.   If on the

basis   of   evidence   of   P.W.2­Jaan   Mohammad,   who   has

deposed in his cross­examination, that, when he went to the

police station for lodging the F.I.R.,  he found Momin Khan

(A­1),   Jaikam   Khan   (A­3),   Sajid   (A­4)   and   Nazra   (A­2)

present in the police station, which, according to the High

Court, is corroborated by the testimony of P.W.1­Ali Sher

Khan and, therefore, the story of arrest of Nazra (A­2) at

6.40 a.m. was found to be unbelievable, then how was it

different from the arrest of accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4, which

64

was shown to be at 2.00 a.m. on 24th January, 2016, i.e.,

much after the time of lodging the F.I.R.   The High Court

further goes on to have an academic discussion with regard

to the possibility, preponderance of probability, a scientist

conducting   his   experiments   with   great   care,   choosing

between two or more possibilities, and preponderates of one

over the other, etc.  The law, however, that is fully settled, is

that, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the case

beyond reasonable doubt.  

82. We   may   gainfully   refer   to   the   following

observations   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of  Anand

Ramachandra   Chougule   v.   Sidarai  Laxman  Chougala

and others8

:

“10. The burden lies on the prosecution to

prove the allegations beyond all reasonable

doubt. In contradistinction to the same, the

accused has only to create a doubt about

the prosecution case and the probability of

its defence. An accused is not required to

establish or prove his defence beyond all

reasonable doubt, unlike the prosecution.

If the accused takes a defence, which is not

improbable and appears likely, there is material in support of such defence, the ac8 (2019) 8 SCC 50

65

cused is not required to prove anything further. The benefit of doubt must follow unless   the   prosecution   is   able   to   prove   its

case beyond all reasonable doubt.

11. The fact that a defence may not have

been taken by an accused under Section

313 CrPC again cannot absolve the prosecution from proving its case beyond all reasonable doubt. If there are materials which

the prosecution is unable to answer, the

weakness in the defence taken cannot become   the   strength   of   the   prosecution   to

claim that in the circumstances it was not

required   to   prove   anything.   In Sunil

Kundu v. State   of   Jharkhand [Sunil

Kundu v. State of Jharkhand, (2013) 4 SCC

422 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 427] , this Court

observed : (SCC pp. 433­34, para 28)

“28. … When the prosecution is not

able to prove its case beyond reasonable

doubt it cannot take advantage of the

fact that the accused have not been able

to probabilise their defence. It is well settled that the prosecution must stand or

fall on its own feet. It cannot draw support from the weakness of the case of the

accused, if it has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.””

83. We,   therefore,   find   that   the   prosecution   has

utterly failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.

The conviction and death sentence imposed on the accused

is totally unsustainable in law.   

66

Insofar as the appeal filed by the P.W.1­Ali Sher

Khan   with   regard   to   acquittal   of   accused   No.2­Nazra   is

concerned, it is sans any merit.  

84. In the result:

(a) Criminal Appeal Nos. 440­441 of 2020 filed by

Momin   Khan   (Accused   No.1);   Criminal   Appeal

Nos.   434­436   of   2020   filed   by   Jaikam   Khan

(Accused No.3); and Criminal Appeal Nos. 437­

439   of  2020  filed   by  Sajid  (Accused  No.4)  are

allowed;

(b) Momin   Khan   (Accused   No.1),   Jaikam   Khan

(Accused   No.3)   and   Sajid   (Accused   No.4)   are

directed to be released forthwith, if not required

in any other offence. 

(c) Criminal Appeal No. 442 of 2020 filed by P.W.1­

Ali Sher Khan, is dismissed.

85. The appeals are disposed of in the above terms.

All pending applications shall also stand disposed of.   

86. Before   we   part   with   the   judgment,   we   must

appreciate the valuable assistance rendered by  Smt. Nitya

67

Ramakrishnan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf

of accused No.1 as well as acquitted original accused No.2,

Shri  Dama  Seshadri Naidu, learned counsel  for accused

Nos. 3 and 4, and Shri Vinod Diwakar, learned Additional

Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State of Uttar

Pradesh.

…….…....................., J.

                             [L. NAGESWARA RAO]

…….…....................., J.

                                                 [B.R. GAVAI]

…….…....................., J.

                                            [B.V. NAGARATHNA]

NEW DELHI;

DECEMBER 15, 2021

One Time Settlement (OTS) = no writ of mandamus can be issued by the High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, directing a financial institution/bank to positively grant the benefit of OTS to a borrower. The grant of benefit under the OTS is always subject to the eligibility criteria mentioned under the OTS Scheme and the guidelines issued from time to time. If the bank/financial institution is of the opinion that the loanee has the capacity to make the payment and/or that the bank/financial institution is able to recover the entire loan amount even by auctioning the mortgaged property/secured property, either from the loanee and/or guarantor, the bank would be justified in refusing to grant the benefit under the OTS Scheme

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7411 OF 2021

The Bijnor Urban Cooperative

Bank Limited, Bijnor & others …Appellants

Versus

Meenal Agarwal & others …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

M.R. SHAH, J.

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment

and order dated 16.08.2021passed by the High Court of Judicature at

Allahabad in Writ Petition No. 15194 of 2021, by which the High Court

has allowed the said writ petition preferred by respondent No.1 herein

(original writ petitioner) and has, in exercise of powers under Article 226

of the Constitution of India, issued a writ of mandamus directing the

appellant – Bank to positively consider the original writ petitioner’s

application for One Time Settlement (OTS), the Bank has preferred the

present appeal.

1

2. The facts leading to the present appeal in a nutshell are as under:

That the original writ petitioner had obtained credit facility from the

bank of about Rs. 1 crore. The said loan account with the Bank was

categorised as “Non-Performing Asset, (NPA)”. The Bank also initiated

proceedings under the provisions of the Securitization and

Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest

Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘SARFAESI Act’). That there

were two other loan accounts also which were being regularly serviced

by respondent no.1 – original writ petitioner, meaning thereby that the

payment was regularised insofar as two other loan accounts are

concerned. However, so far as the present loan account is concerned,

which was declared as NPA, not a single amount was paid till an

application for extending the benefit of OTS was submitted.

2.1 That One Time Settlement Scheme was issued by the Bank vide

OTS Circular dated 01.08.2013 which provided that on the conditions

contained in the said circular being complied with, the benefit of OTS

can be taken by the debtor. The benefit of OTS Scheme came to be

extended till 30.11.2019. The original writ petitioner submitted an

application for consideration of her case under OTS vide application

dated 22.07.2019. Vide communication dated 17.09.2019, her

application for grant of benefit under the OTS came to be rejected on the

ground that she is not eligible for OTS under the OTS Scheme and that

2

the loan can be recovered by auction of the mortgaged property and that

there are chances of recovering the loan amount and that her loan

account has been declared as ‘NPA’. It appears that to come out of NPA

eligibility, the original writ petitioner deposited a sum of Rs.60 lakhs on

02.03.2020, i.e., after rejection of her earlier application on the ground

that as her loan account is “NPA’, she is not eligible for OTS Scheme.

2.2 The Board of the Bank also passed a resolution dated 28.12.2020

to the effect that original writ petitioner is not eligible for the benefit under

the OTS Scheme for the reason that the loan account is fully recoverable

and all the measures to recover the loan amount have not yet been

exhausted and the chances of recovery of the loan amount are still

there.

2.3 The original writ petitioner filed a writ petition before the High Court

being Writ Petition No. 18221 of 2020 challenging the order dated

17.09.2019 passed by the Bank rejecting her application for giving the

benefit of OTS scheme. Vide order dated 25.01.2021, the High Court

disposed of the said writ petition by directing the Bank to consider the

grievance of the original writ petitioner and to decide her representation

dated 22.07.2019 after affording due opportunity of hearing to her, as

expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of four weeks.

At this stage, it is required to be noted that in the said writ petition, the

original writ petitioner also prayed for a writ of mandamus directing the

3

Bank to give the benefit of OTS so that the original writ petitioner may

deposit the entire amount at once so as to clear her dues for the loan

which she had taken in the year 2013, which prayer was not granted by

the High Court and the High Court only directed the Bank to consider her

grievance and decide her representation dated 22.07.2019.

2.4 Thereafter, the original writ petitioner again submitted an

application dated 06.02.2021 to the Bank to grant the benefit under the

OTS, which again was rejected by the Bank vide communication dated

08.01.2021 and 25.02.2021. The original writ petitioner filed a fresh writ

petition before the High Court being Writ Petition No. 15194 of 2021 with

a prayer to quash the aforesaid impugned orders dated 08.01.2021 and

25.02.2021 rejecting her application for grant of benefit of OTS and also

prayed for a writ of mandamus to direct the Bank to give the benefit of

OTS issued vide Circular Nos. C-108 and C-121.

2.5 The aforesaid writ petition was vehemently opposed by the Bank

by filing a detailed affidavit-in-reply. It was inter alia submitted that the

writ petitioner was not entitled to get any relief under the OTS Scheme

as the probabilities of recovery of loan amount does not diminish and still

stands and sufficient amount of property is mortgaged with the Bank and

therefore by auctioning the mortgaged property the Bank can recover the

loan amount. It was also submitted that her case does not come under

the eligible category for OTS. It was submitted that even the case of the

4

original writ petitioner was referred to the Settlement Advisory

Committee for consideration which after hearing the writ petitioner also

rejected her application for grant of benefit under the OTS Scheme. By

the impugned judgment and order and in exercise of powers under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court has issued a writ

of mandamus and has directed the Bank to positively consider her

application for grant of benefit under the OTS Scheme.

2.6 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment

and order passed by the High court, by which the High Court in exercise

of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has issued a writ

of mandamus directing the Bank to positively consider her application for

OTS, the Bank has preferred the present appeal.

3. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on

behalf of the appellant herein – Bank and Shri V.K. Shukla, learned

Senior Advocate has appeared on behalf of respondent no.1 herein.

3.1 Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Advocate appearing on

behalf of the appellant herein has vehemently submitted that the High

Court has materially erred in issuing a writ of mandamus directing the

Bank to positively consider the application of the original writ petitioner

for grant of OTS which, according to the learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the Bank, could not have been passed in exercise of powers

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

5

3.2 It is vehemently submitted that as such a conscious decision was

taken by the Bank as well as the Settlement Advisory Committee that the

original writ petitioner is not eligible for grant of benefit of OTS as she is

not fulfilling the eligibility criteria for availing the benefit of OTS.

3.3 It is further submitted that a conscious decision was taken

considering the RBI guidelines as well as the OTS Scheme and that too

after giving an opportunity to the original writ petitioner and therefore the

same ought not to have been set aside by the High Court.

3.4 It is further submitted that as such the benefit of OTS cannot be

asked/prayed as a matter of right by any person who is in default. It is

submitted that the benefit of OTS is to be granted as per the Guidelines

issued by the RBI as well as the conditions in the OTS Scheme itself. It

is submitted that if it is found that there are chances of recovering the

loan amount by auctioning the mortgaged property and/or by auctioning

the other properties which are put as a security and the chances of

recovery of the entire loan amount are not diminished, the Bank is

justified in refusing to grant the benefit under the OTS Scheme.

3.5 It is submitted that in the present case, in other two loan accounts,

the original writ petitioner is making the payments, however, insofar as

the present loan account is concerned, not a single amount was

deposited till 2.3.2020. It is submitted that a sum of Rs. 60 lakhs was

deposited cleverly by the original writ petitioner to come out of NPA. It is

6

submitted only when, after her first application for grant of benefit under

the OTS Scheme was rejected on 17.09.2019, the original writ petitioner

thereafter deposited a sum of Rs.60 lakhs to come out of NPA and to

take the benefit under the OTS Scheme. It is submitted that under the

OTS Scheme, once the account is declared as NPA and not a single

amount has been deposited till the application for grant of benefit under

the OTS is filed and there are chances of recovery of the entire loan

amount by auctioning the mortgaged property or other properties put as

a security, the application for grant of benefit under the OTS scheme can

be rejected.

3.6 It is therefore submitted that in the present case, as it was found

that the original writ petitioner is not eligible for grant of benefit under the

OTS Scheme, her application was rightly rejected, both, by the Bank as

well as the Settlement Advisory Committee.

3.7 It is further submitted that the decision/s to reject her application

for grant of benefit under the OTS Scheme was absolutely in

consonance with the guidelines issued by the RBI as well as the OTS

Scheme itself. It is submitted that the High Court ought not to have

issued a writ of mandamus directing the Bank to positively consider her

case for grant of benefit under the OTS Scheme, in absence of any

absolute/vested right in her favour.

7

3.8 Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellant Bank has heavily relied upon the decisions of the Allahabad

High Court in the case of M.M. Accessories v. U.P. Financial

Corporation, Kanpur, reported in AIR 2002 All 96 as well as another

decision in the case of Vipin Kumar Gupta v. Branch Manager, Union

Bank of India, Gyanpur, reported in AIR 2004 All 319 by submitting that

in the aforesaid two decisions, it is specifically observed and held by the

very High Court that no such writ of mandamus directing to grant the

benefit of OTS can be issued in exercise of powers under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India. It is submitted that though the aforesaid

decisions were cited before the High Court, the same have not been

dealt with and considered by the High Court.

3.9 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to allow the present

appeal and quash and set aside the impugned order passed by the High

Court directing the Bank to positively consider the case of the original

writ petitioner for grant of benefit under the OTS Scheme.

4. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by Shri V.K. Shukla,

learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent no.1 –

original writ petitioner. It is submitted that in the present case as it was

found that though the original writ petitioner is ready and willing to

deposit the entire amount under the OTS Scheme and though she is

eligible for the grant of benefit under the OTS Scheme, her application

8

for grant of benefit under the OTS Scheme was rejected which is found

to be arbitrary and against the principle of natural justice, the High Court

has rightly set aside the decision rejecting the application of the original

writ petitioner for grant of benefit under the OTS Scheme.

4.1 It is submitted that under the OTS Scheme, a loanee is required to

deposit at least 25% of the total amount along with the application,

however, the original writ petitioner deposited more than 50% of the

amount to be paid – before her application for grant of benefit under the

OTS is considered. It is submitted that the cheque for the said amount

came to be accepted by the Bank and even the same was credited in

the NPA account, thereby showing that her request for OTS has been

accepted. It is submitted that thereafter to reject the application for grant

of benefit under the OTS is malafide and arbitrary and therefore the High

Court has rightly issued a writ of mandamus and has rightly directed the

bank to positively consider her case for grant of benefit under the OTS

Scheme.

4.2 It is further submitted that as such the original writ petitioner was

being harassed by the Bank even when she was eligible to the benefit

under the OTS Scheme. It is submitted that the Bank with an ill/ulterior

motive deliberately refused to grant the benefit under the OTS Scheme

just to grab her property. It is therefore prayed not to interfere with the

9

impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, in exercise of

powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

5. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length,

the following issues/questions are posed for consideration of this Court:

i) Whether benefit under the OTS Scheme can be prayed as a

matter of right?;

ii) Whether the High Court in exercise of powers under Article

226 of the Constitution of India can issue a writ of mandamus

directing the Bank to positively consider the grant of benefit under

the OTS Scheme and that too de hors the eligibility criteria

mentioned under the OTS Scheme?

5.1 While considering the aforesaid issues/questions, the relevant

clauses of the OTS Scheme are required to be referred to which are as

under:

1. “Introduction:-

A large part of various types of loans dispersed from time to time by the

urban co-operative banks of the state to the institutions/ members are

currently in the form of time-less loans has been blocked. Despite all the

efforts regarding recovery of such lapsed loans, the recovery of loans is

not being done for a long time. According to the guidelines issued by the

Reserve Bank of India for OTS from time to time, it has been decided to

implement the revised one time settlement (OTS) for recovery of nonperforming assets in the state so that serious timeless debts of the bank

can be saved to get maximum recovery.

2. Coverage (Cut-off- date): -

10

This scheme in respect of all types of debts classified as doubtful or loss

assets as on 31 .3.2013 on entities/individuals as per the revised

guidelines by the Reserve Bank of India will apply.

According to the revised guidelines by the Reserve Bank of India, this

scheme is applicable in respect of all types of loans on institutions and

individuals as on 31.03.2013, which have been in the category of doubtful

or loss assets or have been classified in sub-standard on the said date.

The following categories of defaulters will not be eligible under this

scheme:

1. Willful defaulter in repayment of loan, (The person or institution

who has not paid even one installment after taking the loan, he will not

be able to pay the loan will be considered in the category of defaulter).

2. Cases of fraud and forgery.

3. Loans taken by salaried employees.

4. Such timeless loan which has been availed by the bank

secretary / operator or whose guarantee has been taken by any director

of the bank or the close relative of the operator or any institution in

which the interest of the current or former director is vested.

5. Such a timeless loan whose guarantee has been given by the

government.

6. Loans taken by government departments / institutions approved

by the government.

7. Negotiable N.P.A. / Outstanding loan limit is only the amount of

money aggregating all types of loan accounts of an organization /

individual member, for which a lump sum agreement can be made that

the limit of debt will be extinguished.

8. Personal Borrowers Rs.10.00 Lakhs

9. Institutional Borrowers Rs.50.00 Lakhs

In cases of more than the above limit, prior approval of the

registrar co-operative societies will have to be obtained by making a

separate plan by the board of directors of the concerned bank for onetime settlement.

11

4. Settlement Formula:

a) Accounts of non-performing assets which were or should have

been classified as doubtful/loss as on 31st March 2013, the recovery of

the amount will be equal to the total balance (principal and interest) in

that account on the date the account is classified as doubtful and loss. If

the interest has been charged in such accounts after the date of

classification of doubtful/loss category, then the same can be waived, this

policy will be applicable to all the borrowers and defaulters alike.

b) Under this scheme, with the consent of the defaulter, the total

amount of the settlement will have to be deposited in one lump sum, but

if the defaulter is unable to deposit all the amount in one lump sum, then

25 percent of such amount till the date of the consent letter and for the

recovery of remaining 75 percent, amount will have to be deposited in

three equal installments over a period of one year on which interest will

be payable at the rate of minimum loan interest from the date of

settlement till the date of final repayment. Penal interest, legal expenses

and other expenses will be waived.

5. Authority to sanction relief: -

The Scheme will be first approved by the concerned bank management

committee constituted under the provisions contained in the Uttar Pradesh

Co-operative societies Act and the right to decide on one time settlement

cases up to an amount of Rs 5.00 Lakhs will be there's and for the cases

involving more than Rs. 5.00 Lakhs prior approval of the Registrar Cooperative Societies, Uttar Pradesh will have to be obtained. For this

purpose, the bank will constitute a Settlement Advisory Committee, which

after examining the applications received, will present suitable cases

falling within the eligibility before the authority for decision. The bank will

abide by the guidelines relating to the settlement with the loan recipients

without any discrimination. There will be no deviation from the policies by

the Chief Executive Officers/Board of Directors. The decision of the

Settlement Committee will be confirmed in the next meeting of the

management committee or the general body.

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6. Settlement Advisory Committee. After examining the received

cases and presenting the eligible cases before the competent authority, it

will be as follows:

1. Chairman of the bank President

2. Secretary / Executive officer concerned Member / Convener

3. A Director nominated by the board of Member Directors and one

other person and bank officer who have enough experience in the

field of banking/management or law.

There will be three members for the purpose of the settlement advisory

committee will examine the application received from the member and

present it before the board of directors after making its clear

recommendation. While making the recommendation, the following points

will be considered1. The officer recommending the right off loan should not have

personally sanctioned the loan.

2. The transfer has been granted as per the conditions prescribed by the

Reserve Bank.

3. Adequate cares have been taken after the delivery of loan.

4. Efforts have been made to recover the loan and the possibility of

recovery has been minimized.

The board of directors after due consideration will approve the one-time

payment. The decision of the committee (S.A.C) will be reviewed every month

by the board of directors and the settlement proceedings will be completed

within the prescribed time-limit.”

5.2 Therefore, as per the guidelines issued, the grant of benefit of OTS

Scheme cannot be prayed as a matter of right and the same is subject to

fulfilling the eligibility criteria mentioned in the scheme. The defaulters

who are ineligible under the OTS Scheme are mentioned in clause 2,

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reproduced hereinabove. A wilful defaulter in repayment of loan and a

person who has not paid even a single installment after taking the loan

and will not be able to pay the loan will be considered in the category of

“defaulter” and shall not be eligible for grant of benefit under the OTS

Scheme. Similarly, a person whose account is declared as “NPA” shall

also not be eligible. As per the guidelines, the Bank is required to

constitute a Settlement Advisory Committee for the purpose of

examining the applications received and thereafter the said Committee

has to take a decision after considering whether a defaulter is entitled to

the benefit of OTS or not after considering the eligibility as per the OTS

Scheme. While making recommendations, the Settlement Advisory

Committee has to consider whether efforts have been made to recover

the loan amount and the possibility of recovery has been minimized,

meaning thereby if there is possibility of recovery of the amount, either

by initiating appropriate proceedings or by auctioning the property

mortgaged and/or the properties given as a security either by the

borrower and/or by guarantor, the application submitted by the borrower

for grant of benefit under the OTS Scheme can be rejected.

6. In the present case, despite the fact that it was specifically pointed

out before the High Court by way of counter affidavit that (i) the recovery

proceedings under SARFAESI Act are pending; (ii) the borrower and her

husband have availed two credit facilities and both the loan accounts are

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maintained regularly and the money is being deposited on regular basis;

(iii) the Settlement Advisory Committee concluded that the borrower is

enjoying a good financial status and the secured assets are sufficient in

case if any recovery is to be made and by auctioning the mortgaged

property the bank can recover the entire loan amount, the High Court

failed to consider the aforesaid aspects in their true perspective and has

issued a writ of mandamus as if the grant of benefit under the OTS

Scheme can be claimed as a matter of right.

7. In the present case, a conscious decision was taken by the Bank

as well as the Settlement Advisory Committee which is reflected from the

Board’s Resolution dated 28.12.2020 and the decision dated

08.01.2021. Even personal hearing was afforded to the original writ

petitioner by the Settlement Advisory Committee on 25.02.2021. The

High Court in the impugned judgment and order has observed that no

opportunity was given to the original writ petitioner, which is factually

incorrect. Therefore, the decision cannot be said to be in violation of the

principle of natural justice.

8. While passing the impugned judgment and order, the High Court,

in response to the submissions on behalf of the Bank that, there are all

possibilities of recovery of the loan amount and the efforts are being

made to recover the amount by initiating proceedings under the

SARFAESI Act and that the properties mortgaged can be auctioned, has

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observed that the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act have remained

pending for seven years and the Bank has been unable to recover its

dues and therefore the hope of recovery is illusory. This conclusion is

not supported by any material on record. Merely because the

proceedings under the SARFAESI Act have remained pending for seven

years, the Bank cannot be held responsible for the same. No fault of the

bank can be found. What is required to be considered is a conscious

decision by the Bank that the Bank will be able to recover the entire loan

amount by auctioning the mortgaged property and a due application of

mind by the Bank that there are all possibilities to recover the entire loan

amount, instead of granting the benefit under the OTS Scheme and to

recover a lesser amount. It is ultimately for the Bank to take a conscious

decision in its own interest and to secure/recover the outstanding debt.

No bank can be compelled to accept a lesser amount under the OTS

Scheme despite the fact that the Bank is able to recover the entire loan

amount by auctioning the secured property/mortgaged property. When

the loan is disbursed by the bank and the outstanding amount is due and

payable to the bank, it will always take a conscious decision in the

interest of the bank and in its commercial wisdom.

9. Even otherwise, as observed hereinabove, no borrower can, as a

matter of right, pray for grant of benefit of One Time Settlement Scheme.

In a given case, it may happen that a person would borrow a huge

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amount, for example Rs. 100 crores. After availing the loan, he may

deliberately not pay any amount towards installments, though able to

make the payment. He would wait for the OTS Scheme and then pray

for grant of benefit under the OTS Scheme under which, always a lesser

amount than the amount due and payable under the loan account will

have to be paid. This, despite there being all possibility for recovery of

the entire loan amount which can be realised by selling the

mortgaged/secured properties. If it is held that the borrower can still, as

a matter of right, pray for benefit under the OTS Scheme, in that case, it

would be giving a premium to a dishonest borrower, who, despite the

fact that he is able to make the payment and the fact that the bank is

able to recover the entire loan amount even by selling the

mortgaged/secured properties, either from the borrower and/or

guarantor. This is because under the OTS Scheme a debtor has to pay

a lesser amount than the actual amount due and payable under the loan

account. Such cannot be the intention of the bank while offering OTS

Scheme and that cannot be purpose of the Scheme which may

encourage such a dishonesty.

10. If a prayer is entertained on the part of the defaulting unit/person to

compel or direct the financial corporation/bank to enter into a one-time

settlement on the terms proposed by it/him, then every defaulting

unit/person which/who is capable of paying its/his dues as per the terms

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of the agreement entered into by it/him would like to get one time

settlement in its/his favour. Who would not like to get his liability reduced

and pay lesser amount than the amount he/she is liable to pay under the

loan account? In the present case, it is noted that the original writ

petitioner and her husband are making the payments regularly in two

other loan accounts and those accounts are regularised. Meaning

thereby, they have the capacity to make the payment even with respect

to the present loan account and despite the said fact, not a single

amount/installment has been paid in the present loan account for which

original petitioner is praying for the benefit under the OTS Scheme.

11. The sum and substance of the aforesaid discussion would be that

no writ of mandamus can be issued by the High Court in exercise of

powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, directing a financial

institution/bank to positively grant the benefit of OTS to a borrower. The

grant of benefit under the OTS is always subject to the eligibility criteria

mentioned under the OTS Scheme and the guidelines issued from time

to time. If the bank/financial institution is of the opinion that the loanee

has the capacity to make the payment and/or that the bank/financial

institution is able to recover the entire loan amount even by auctioning

the mortgaged property/secured property, either from the loanee and/or

guarantor, the bank would be justified in refusing to grant the benefit

under the OTS Scheme. Ultimately, such a decision should be left to the

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commercial wisdom of the bank whose amount is involved and it is

always to be presumed that the financial institution/bank shall take a

prudent decision whether to grant the benefit or not under the OTS

Scheme, having regard to the public interest involved and having regard

to the factors which are narrated hereinabove.

12. In view of the aforesaid discussion and for the reasons stated

above, we are of the firm opinion that the High Court, in the present

case, has materially erred and has exceeded in its jurisdiction in issuing

a writ of mandamus in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India by directing the appellant-Bank to positively

consider/grant the benefit of OTS to the original writ petitioner. The

impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is hence

unsustainable and deserves to be quashed and set aside and is

accordingly quashed and set aside.

13. The present appeal is accordingly allowed. However, in the facts

and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

………………………………..J.

[M.R. SHAH]

NEW DELHI; ………………………………...j.

DECEMBER 15, 2021. [B.V. NAGARATHNA]


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