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Wednesday, June 2, 2021

We direct the UoI to file an affidavit, which shall address the issues and questions raised in Section E, wherein it shall ensure that each issue is responded to individually and no issue is missed out. We also direct that the affidavit should provide the following information:  The data on the percentage of population that has been vaccinated (with one dose and both doses), as against eligible persons in the first three phases of the vaccination drive. This shall include data pertaining to the percentage of rural population as well as the percentage of urban population so vaccinated;  The complete data on the Central Government‟s purchase history of all the COVID-19 vaccines till date (Covaxin, Covishield and Sputnik V). The data should clarify: (a) the dates of all procurement orders placed by the Central Government for all 3 vaccines; (b) the quantity of vaccines ordered as on each date; and (c) the projected date of supply; and  An outline for how and when the Central Government seeks to vaccinate the remaining population in phases 1, 2 and 3.  The steps being taken by the Central Government to ensure drug availability for mucormycosis. 42 While filing its affidavit, UoI shall also ensure that copies of all the relevant documents and file notings reflecting its thinking and culminating in the vaccination PART F 32 policy are also annexed on the vaccination policy. Hence, we direct the UoI to file its affidavit within 2 weeks. 43 We also note that UoI‟s stated position in its affidavit dated 9 May 2021 is that every State/UT Government shall provide vaccination free of cost to its population. It is important that individual State/UT Governments confirm/deny this position before this Court. Further, if they have decided to vaccinate their population for free then, as a matter of principle, it is important that this policy is annexed to their affidavit, so that the population within their territories can be assured of their right to be vaccinated for free at a State vaccination centre. Hence, we direct each of the State/UT Governments to also file an affidavit within 2 weeks, where they shall clarify their position and put on record their individual policies.

1

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No.3 of 2021

IN RE: DISTRIBUTION OF ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES AND SERVICES

DURING PANDEMIC

2

O R D E R

This order has been divided into the following sections to facilitate analysis:

A Introduction

B Submission by Counsel

C National Vaccination Policy

D Separation of Powers

E Issues with the Liberalized Vaccination Policy

E.1 Vaccine Procurement and Distribution among Different Categories of the

Population

E.2 Effects of Vaccination by Private Hospitals under the Liberalized

Vaccination Policy

E.3 Basis and Impact of Differential Pricing

E.4 Vaccine Logistics

E.5 Digital Divide

F Conclusion

PART A

3

A Introduction

1 Proceedings in the present suo motu writ petition were initiated on 22 April

2021, when this Court took cognizance of the management of the COVID-19

pandemic during the second wave. Subsequently, hearings were conducted on 23

April 2021, 27 April 2021 and 30 April 2021 when submissions were heard on behalf

of the Union of India1

, States/Union Territories2

, learned Amici appointed by this

Court and some of the intervenors.

2 On 30 April 2021, this Court passed a detailed order in relation, inter alia, to

the following issues: vaccination policy, supply of essential drugs, supply of medical

oxygen, medical infrastructure, augmentation of healthcare workforce and the issues

faced by them, and issues of freedom of speech and expression during the COVID19 pandemic. In its order, this Court had noted that its observations and directions

were in consonance with a bounded-deliberative approach3

and hence, the UoI was

directed to re-consider its policies on the above issues, taking into account this

Court‟s observations.

3 Following the order dated 30 April 2021, another two judge Bench of this

Court heard a Special Leave Petition4

against an order of the High Court of Delhi in

relation to the supply of medical oxygen to the National Capital Territory5

of Delhi.

During the course of the proceedings in that matter, the Bench primarily issued

directions in relation to the supply of medical oxygen to the NCT of Delhi. However,

through its order dated 6 May 2021, it also constituted a National Task Force to

provide a public heath response to the COVID-19 pandemic on the basis of a

scientific approach. The terms of reference of this National Task Force included,

inter alia, assessing and making recommendations for the need, availability and

distribution of medical oxygen; devising a methodology for allocation of medical

oxygen and periodical review of the allocation based on the stage of the pandemic;


1

“UoI”/interchangeably referred to as the “Central Government”

2

“UTs”

3

Sandra Fredman, “Adjudication as Accountability: A Deliberative Approach” in Nicholas Bamforth

and Peter Leyland (eds), Accountability in the Contemporary Constitution (Oxford University Press,

2013)

4 Union of India vs Rakesh Malhotra and another, SLP (Civil) (Diary) No 11622 of 2021

5

“NCT”

4

providing recommendations for augmenting the supplies of oxygen; facilitating audits

in each State/UT to determine whether oxygen supplies had reached its destination;

efficacy, transparency and efficiency of the distribution networks within the State/UT;

providing recommendations for ensuring availability of essential drugs, augmentation

of medical and paramedical staff, management of the pandemic and treatment of

cases.

4 During the course of the proceedings on 31 May 2021, we had the benefit of

perusing the details provided in the affidavit filed by the UoI on 9 May 2021. The

submissions contained in the affidavit were supplemented and updated in the

hearing by Mr Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General of India, appearing on behalf

of the Central Government. We have further heard the learned Amici, Mr Jaideep

Gupta and Ms Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior counsel.

5 Since the last hearing in this matter, the second wave of the COVID-19

pandemic has started receding across the nation and the situation appears to have

become more manageable. Hence, some of the issues discussed in the previous

orders can await further deliberation. However, the issue of vaccination is absolutely

crucial, since health experts globally agree that vaccination of the nation‟s entire

eligible population is the singular most important task in effectively combating the

COVID-19 pandemic in the long run. Hence, during the course of the proceedings on

31 May 2021, this Court has limited itself to hearing submissions on the UoI‟s

vaccination policy and its roadmap for the future. By way of abundant clarification,

we note that all of the issues contained in this Court‟s previous orders still retain their

overall importance, and this Court shall continue to monitor them alongside the

National Task Force and intervene whenever necessary.

6 It is also important to note that numerous interlocutory applications and

affidavits by individual State/UT Governments and members of civil society have

been filed before us in this matter. We have perused them to understand the key

issues being raised there, along with the helpful notes provided by the Amici.

PART B

5

B Submission by Counsel

7 Mr Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General, relying on the UoI‟s affidavit

dated 9 May 2021, has made the following submissions to supplement it, in view of

the recent updates:

(i) The vaccination drive will be complete by the end of December 2021, and the

Central Government is in active talks with foreign vaccine manufacturers at

the highest political and diplomatic levels, to ensure the adequate supply of

vaccines;

(ii) It would be incorrect to state that a consequence of the UoI‟s updated policy

on vaccination of those in the 18-44 age group is that there will be competition

amongst the States/UTs; and

(iii) Everyone above the age of 45 years can continue to get vaccinated at a

facility through on-site registration, without previously having to book an

appointment through CoWIN.

8 Mr Jaideep Gupta and Ms Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior counsel and

Amici, have raised the following issues relating to vaccination distribution,

augmentation of vaccine production and differential pricing of vaccines and the future

preparedness for dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic:

(i) With respect to the procurement of vaccines, reports suggest that foreign

vaccine manufacturers are generally not receptive or open to a dialogue with

State/UT Governments on the basis that, as a matter of corporate policy, they

only deal with federal governments of different nations;

(ii) Since 1978 till 1 May 2021, the UoI has implemented the Universal

Immunization Programme6

under which essential vaccines were procured by

the UoI and were distributed to States/UTs free of cost for administering them

to the end beneficiary. The said policy has held the test of times. Even during

the vaccination drive for COVID-19 in phases 1 and 2 for vaccination of

healthcare workers7

, frontline workers8

and persons above the age of 45

years, the UoI procured all the vaccines and distributed them to State/UT


6

“UIP”

7

“HCWs”

8

“FLWs”

PART B

6

Governments for administration. The single procurement model has also been

followed by other nations for ensuring fast and effective administration of

vaccines against COVID-19;

(iii) The UIP has been replaced by the Liberalized Pricing and Accelerated

National COVID-19 Vaccination Strategy9

from 1 May 2021 in phase 3 of the

vaccination drive, whereby State/UT Governments or private hospitals are

required to procure vaccines for persons between the age group of 18-44

years from the private manufacturers on the basis of a pro rata quota set by

the UoI;

(iv) The Liberalized Vaccination Policy leaves the State/UT Governments to fend

for themselves, rather than the Central Government acting on behalf of the

entire nation. As a consequence, the vaccine manufacturers are free to

implement a differential procurement price for the UoI for vaccinating persons

above 45 years of age, and for the State/UT Governments and private

hospitals for vaccinating the persons between 18-44 years of age;

(v) While the Liberalized Vaccination Policy has been introduced to spur

competitive prices, there are multiple States/UTs competing to purchase a

scarce commodity from a few vaccine manufacturers. Consequently, the

manufacturers have the advantage of creating a monopoly and selling it at

any price that they desire to private healthcare institutions. The State/UT

Governments do not enjoy the unique position of the UoI, which has the

advantage of being a monopolistic buyer and can negotiate an appropriate

price for the vaccines on behalf of the entire population of India;

(vi) The Liberalized Vaccination Policy puts an undue burden on persons between

the age group of 18-44 years, specifically persons belonging to a poor socioeconomic background, who have to purchase two doses of vaccines either

from the State/UT Governments or private hospitals;

(vii) In the alternative, the UoI has stated that all State/UT Governments have

agreed to vaccinate their population free of cost and have undertaken to bear

the burden of the vaccines which are available at a higher purchase price than

the one available to the UoI. Thus, the end beneficiary is not impacted by the


9

“Liberalized Vaccination Policy”

PART B

7

differential pricing in the Liberalized Vaccination Policy. With regard to this

submission, the Amici have raised the following concerns:

(a) While some States/UTs have announced that they will vaccinate their

population for free, this policy statement must be confirmed by the

State/UT Governments on affidavit before this Court. The Liberalized

Vaccination Policy as it stands today, does not incorporate a condition

whereby the cost of vaccination is imposed on the State/UT

Governments. Instead, the end beneficiary is liable to pay the cost.

There is a necessity for the State/UT Governments to place their

decisions on record and for it to be part of the formal policy, such that

persons can enforce their right to free vaccination, including before the

courts;

(b) Although the State/UT Governments may have announced free

vaccination for their population, some of them are contesting the

Liberalized Vaccination Policy before this Court and have advanced

submissions for universal vaccination by the Central Government. Thus,

it cannot conclusively be stated that State/UT Governments have agreed

to the policy decision taken by the Central Government of deviating from

the single procurement model;

(c) The Liberalized Vaccination Policy, as a consequence of its differential

pricing, treats individuals living across India residing in different

States/UTs unequally, as States/UTs that are financially distressed may

not be able to afford to purchase the vaccines at the prices set by the

vaccine manufacturers or to lift the quantity allocated to them; and

(d) The end result of the Liberalized Vaccination Policy is that the UoI can

purchase vaccines at Rs 150 per dose for Covishield and Covaxin, while

the State/UT Governments have to pay Rs 300 and Rs 400 per dose

respectively. If the UoI were to be the single procurement agency for all

vaccines at a fixed cost, then the cost of vaccination to the public

exchequer would be substantially lower. Thus, it is incorrect to suggest

that the end beneficiary, who contributes to the public exchequer, will not

be unduly impacted;

(viii) Although public health is a subject under Entry 6 of List II (State List) of the

Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, Entry 81 of List I (Union List) deals with 

PART B

8

inter-State migration and inter-State quarantine and Entry 29 of List III

(Concurrent List) deals with prevention of extension from one State to another

of infectious or contagious diseases. Thus, the management of the pandemic,

control of the spread of COVID-19, vaccination policy and pricing, are the

responsibility of the Central Government, which must work in tandem with the

State/UT Governments. The Liberalized Vaccination Policy, by putting the

burden of vaccination of persons between 18-44 years of age on the State/UT

Governments, conflicts with this constitutional balance of responsibilities

between the Centre and States/UTs;

(ix) With regard to the vaccine distribution, the Liberalized Vaccination Policy has

created a quota of 50:25:25 for the 18-44 age group. The quota of 25% that is

available to State/UT Governments, which is equivalent to the private

hospitals, is extremely disproportionate and not in touch with societal realities,

as a large number of persons may not be able to afford two doses of a

vaccine from a private hospital. Thus, if State/UT Governments are to bear the

burden of vaccinating a majority of the persons in their States/UTs, the quota

available to the private hospitals must be reduced;

(x) The Liberalized Vaccination Policy does not provide any clarity on the basis of

the pro rata allotment of the doses to each State/UT (available for purchase

by the State/UT Government and private hospitals). The Policy does not

indicate whether such apportionment will be on the basis of population; state

of the pandemic in each State/UT; or the number of persons with comorbidities between 18-44 years of age, among others. Further, the Policy

does not indicate whether the pro rata allotment will be made by the UoI or the

private vaccine manufacturer;

(xi) It is reported that UoI on certain occasions has stated that it will refrain from

interfering in the issue of vaccine distribution. Contrarily, UoI has also been

stated that it may decide to redistribute the vaccines procured by it among

State/UT Governments. The basis on which the re-distribution of vaccines will

take place among States/UTs has not been provided in the policy document;

(xii) The Liberalized Vaccination Policy does not provide for prioritizing of persons

with co-morbidities; persons with disabilities or suffering from other illnesses;

care-givers for the elderly and sick; teachers and others in the age group of

18-44 years. Further, the CoWIN application is not built with functions which 

PART B

9

prioritize a certain category of persons, as it only books appointments on a

first-cum-first-served basis;

(xiii) News reports indicate that crematorium workers have either not been

vaccinated, or are unaware that they are eligible for vaccination in phases 1

and 2;

(xiv) With regard to preparedness, the UoI has claimed that it will be able to

vaccinate a substantial number of persons (around 100 crore persons

requiring 200 crore doses) by December 2021. However, no projections have

been shared with this Court regarding how this target would be achieved.

Based on reports, it appears that the UoI has factored a number of vaccines

that are currently in their development stages to reach its projected number of

200 crore doses. This approach would be misguided as the success and

efficacy of vaccines that are currently in the stage of clinical trials is uncertain

and cannot be guaranteed;

(xv) There is material to suggest that the augmentation of vaccine production will

be inadequate to vaccinate the population between 18-44 years of age. The

total population of this age group is 59 crores, which would require around

122 crore doses. Based on reports, the existing manufacturers (Serum

Institute of India10 and Bharat Biotech India Limited11) will be able to produce

less than 10 crore doses per month. Optimistically, around 15-20 crores doses

of Sputnik V will be available per month. At this rate, it would take around 12

months for the population in this age group to be inoculated, by which time the

virus may have mutated, causing further waves of the pandemic;

(xvi) Meanwhile, there is a necessity to ensure that guidelines regarding

standardization of masks are formulated and publicized. Thus, medical

guidance is necessary to ensure that masks of appropriate quality are

produced and distributed free of cost to curb the spread of the infection; and

(xvii) It has been reported that due to dearth of electric crematoria, persons who

have succumbed to COVID-19 are not dignified with a proper cremation and

are cremated without any rituals. The UoI and State/UT Governments may

consider forming appropriate guidelines which augment the creation of

infrastructure for electric crematoria and a protocol for cremation of the dead.


10 “SII”

11 “BBIL”

PART C

10

C National Vaccination Policy

9 Phase 1 of the National COVID-19 Vaccination Strategy was launched on 16

January 2021 and 1 February 2021 and was targeted towards protecting HCWs and

FLWs. Phase 2 was initiated on 1 March 2021 and 1 April 2021, and was directed

towards protecting the most vulnerable population in the age group of persons above

45 years of age. In phase 1 and 2, the UoI was procuring the vaccines and

distributing them to the States/UTs free of cost for disbursal through government and

private COVID-19 vaccination centres. The private facilities were not allowed to

charge a sum above Rs 250 per person per dose (Rs 150 for vaccines and Rs 100

as operational charges) from a beneficiary.

10 During phase 2, eligible beneficiaries could register and book appointments

for vaccination on the CoWIN 2.0 portal or other IT applications such as Aarogya

Setu. From 1 March 2021 onwards, the population aged 60 years or which would

attain the age of 60 years or more as on 1 January 2022 was eligible to register on

the CoWIN platform. Further, persons who were aged 45 years or would attain the

age of 45 years to 59 years as on 1 January 2022 and had any of the 20 specified

co-morbidities were also eligible to register on the CoWIN platform. From 1 April

2021 onwards, all persons who were aged 45 years or would attain the age of 45

years to 59 years as on 1 January 2022 were eligible to register on the CoWIN

platform. On-site registration facility was also made available at vaccination centres

in this phase.

11 In phase 3, a Liberalized Vaccination Policy was introduced by the UoI, which

came into effect on 1 May 2021. We have perused the documents available in the

public domain (guidance note12, press releases13 and policy document14) issued by

the Central Government to understand the written policy of the Central Government


12 Guidance Note For COWIN 2.0 dated 28 February 2021, available at

<https://www.mohfw.gov.in/pdf/GuidancedocCOWIN2.pdf>

13 Press releases dated 28 February 2021 and 19 April 2021, available at

<https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetail.aspx?PRID=1701549> and

<https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetail.aspx?PRID=1712710>

14 Liberalized Pricing and Accelerated National Covid-19 Vaccination Strategy dated 24 April 2021,

available at

<https://www.mohfw.gov.in/pdf/LiberalisedPricingandAcceleratedNationalCovid19VaccinationStrategy

2042021.pdf>

PART C

11

with regard to phase 3. Based on such documents, the main elements of the

Liberalized Vaccination Policy can be identified as:

(i) Vaccine manufacturers are required to supply 50% of their monthly Central

Drugs Laboratory15 doses to the UoI and would be free to supply the

remaining 50% doses to State/UT Governments and in „other than

Government of India channel‟16;

(ii) Manufacturers were required to make a declaration of the price of the 50%

supply that would be available to State/UT Governments and in the „other than

GoI channel‟ before 1 May 2021. Based on this price, States/UTs, private

hospitals and industrial establishments through their hospitals may procure

vaccines from the manufacturers. Private hospitals would be able to procure

their supplies only from the 50% supply earmarked for „other than GoI

channel‟;

(iii) The prices charged for vaccination by private hospitals would be monitored.

As a result, the earlier dispensation where private COVID-19 vaccination

centres which received doses from the UoI could charge up to Rs 250 per

dose ceased to exist;

(iv) The population which is now eligible to obtain vaccines at UoI‟s vaccination

centres is limited to HCWs, FLWs and those above 45 years of age. The

population between 18-44 years is eligible to obtain vaccines from „other than

GoI channel‟;

(v) The vaccination would continue to be available for free for eligible population

groups in those vaccination centres which receive their vaccine doses from

UoI;

(vi) The vaccination would continue to be a part of the National Vaccination

Programme and would follow all existing guidelines. The CoWIN platform

would capture the vaccination, stocks and price per vaccination applicable in

all vaccination centres. The vaccination drive would comply with „Adverse

Event Following Immunization‟ management and reporting, digital vaccination

certificate and all other prescribed norms;


15 “CDL”

16 “other than GoI channel”

PART D

12

(vii) The division of 50% supply to UoI and 50% to „other than GoI channel‟ would

be applicable uniformly across all the vaccine manufactures in the country;

(viii) The fully ready to use imported vaccines are allowed to be utilized entirely in

the „other than GoI channel‟; and

(ix) The UoI from its share will allocate vaccines to States/UTs based on criteria of

performance (speed of administration, average consumption) and extent of

infection (number of COVID-19 cases). Wastage of vaccines would also be

considered in the criteria and would affect the allocation negatively. Based on

the above criteria, a State-wise quota would be decided and communicated to

the States/UTs in advance.

12 The facility of only online appointment on the CoWIN portal was initially

introduced for the entirety of the population between the ages of 18-44 years. Later,

on 24 May 202117, the UoI announced that on-site registration will be made available

for the 18-44 years age group. However, this is contingent on: (i) the State/UT

Government enabling this policy; and (ii) only in cases of wastage at a particular

government COVID-19 vaccination centre due to a no-show by an online appointee.

Further, this facility has not been expanded to private COVID-19 vaccination centres.

D Separation of Powers

13 At the outset, we seek to clarify the nature of this Court‟s jurisdiction in the

exercise of the power of judicial review over the management of the COVID-19

pandemic in India. In its affidavit dated 9 May 2021, the UoI has highlighted a few

concerns which are detailed below:

(i) The executive is battling an unprecedented crisis and the government needs

discretion to formulate policy in larger interest and its wisdom should be

trusted;

(ii) The current vaccine policy conforms to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution,

and requires no interference from the courts as the executive has “room for

free play in the joints” while dealing with a pandemic of this magnitude;


17 Available at <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1721225>

PART D

13

(iii) The current steps are thoughtfully undertaken to tide over an imminent crisis,

which may turn out to be imprudent in the long run. However, they need to be

appreciated from a short-term and holistic perspective;

(iv) Judicial review over executive policies is permissible only on account of

manifest arbitrariness. No interference from judicial proceedings is called for

when the executive is operating on expert medical and scientific opinion to

tackle a medical crisis; and

(v) Any over-zealous judicial intervention, though well-meaning, in the absence of

expert advice or administrative experience may lead to unintended

circumstances where the executive is left with little room to explore innovative

solutions.

14 It is trite to state that separation of powers is a part of the basic structure of

the Constitution. Policy-making continues to be in the sole domain of the executive.

The judiciary does not possess the authority or competence to assume the role of

the executive, which is democratically accountable for its actions and has access to

the resources which are instrumental to policy formulation. However, this separation

of powers does not result in courts lacking jurisdiction in conducting a judicial review

of these policies18. Our Constitution does not envisage courts to be silent spectators

when constitutional rights of citizens are infringed by executive policies. Judicial

review and soliciting constitutional justification for policies formulated by the

executive is an essential function, which the courts are entrusted to perform.

15 We had clarified in our order dated 30 April 2021, that in the context of the

public health emergency with which the country is currently grappling, this Court

appreciates the dynamic nature of the measures. Across the globe, the executive

has been given a wider margin in enacting measures which ordinarily may have

violated the liberty of individuals, but are now incumbent to curb the pandemic.

Historically, the judiciary has also recognized that constitutional scrutiny is

transformed during such public health emergencies, where the executive functions in

rapid consultation with scientists and other experts. In 1905, the Supreme Court of

the United States in Jacobson vs Massachusetts19 considered a constitutional

liberty challenge to a compulsory vaccination law that was enacted to combat the


18 DDA vs Joint Action Committee, (2008) 2 SCC 672

19 197 U.S. 11 (1905)

PART D

14

smallpox epidemic. Justice Harlan had noted the complex role of the government in

battling public health emergencies in the following terms:

“..the State may invest local bodies called into existence for

purposes of local administration with authority in some

appropriate way to safeguard the public health and the public

safety... While this court should guard with firmness every

right appertaining to life, liberty or property as secured to the

individual by the Supreme Law of the Land, it is of the last

importance that it should not invade the domain of local

authority except when it is plainly necessary to do so in order

to enforce that law. The safety and the health of the people of

Massachusetts are, in the first instance, for that

Commonwealth to guard and protect……So far as they can

be reached by any government, they depend, primarily, upon

such action as the State in its wisdom may take, and we do

not perceive that this legislation has invaded any right

secured by the Federal Constitution.”

The Supreme Court of United States, speaking in the wake of the present COVID-19

pandemic in various instances, has overruled policies by observing, inter alia, that

“Members of this Court are not public health experts, and we should respect the

judgment of those with special expertise and responsibility in this area. But even in a

pandemic, the Constitution cannot be put away and forgotten”

20 and “a public health

emergency does not give Governors and other public officials carte blanche to

disregard the Constitution for as long as the medical problem persists. As more

medical and scientific evidence becomes available, and as States have time to craft

policies in light of that evidence, courts should expect policies that more carefully

account for constitutional rights”

21

.


20 Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, New York vs Cuomo, 592 U.S., 141 S. Ct. 63

21 Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley vs Steve Sisolak, Governor of Nevada, et al, 140 S.Ct. 2603

(Mem) (Justice Alito Dissenting Opinion)

PART E

15

16 Similarly, courts across the globe have responded to constitutional challenges

to executive policies that have directly or indirectly violated rights and liberties of

citizens. Courts have often reiterated the expertise of the executive in managing a

public health crisis, but have also warned against arbitrary and irrational policies

being excused in the garb of the “wide latitude” to the executive that is necessitated

to battle a pandemic. This Court in Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha vs State of Gujarat22

,

albeit while speaking in the context of labour rights, had noted that policies to

counteract a pandemic must continue to be evaluated from a threshold of

proportionality to determine if they, inter alia, have a rational connection with the

object that is sought to be achieved and are necessary to achieve them.

17 In grappling with the second wave of the pandemic, this Court does not intend

to second-guess the wisdom of the executive when it chooses between two

competing and efficacious policy measures. However, it continues to exercise

jurisdiction to determine if the chosen policy measure conforms to the standards of

reasonableness, militates against manifest arbitrariness and protects the right to life

of all persons. This Court is presently assuming a dialogic jurisdiction where various

stakeholders are provided a forum to raise constitutional grievances with respect to

the management of the pandemic. Hence, this Court would, under the auspices of an

open court judicial process, conduct deliberations with the executive where

justifications for existing policies would be elicited and evaluated to assess whether

they survive constitutional scrutiny.

E Issues with the Liberalized Vaccination Policy

E.1 Vaccine Procurement and Distribution among Different Categories of the

Population

18 In our order dated 30 April 2021, the UoI was directed to clarify its vaccination

procurement and distribution policy, especially after the introduction of the

Liberalized Vaccination Policy. We had also directed the UoI to apprise this Court

regarding the projected numbers of vaccinations that would be made available in the

coming months to the public and the efforts being taken to augment vaccine


22 AIR 2020 SC 4601, para 9

PART E

16

production. In its affidavit dated 9 May 2021, UoI has made the following

submissions:

(i) The vaccination policy for COVID-19 that was adopted prior to 1 May 2021 in

phases 1 and 2, was designed as a system of prioritization. After vaccinating

the HCWs and FLWs, vaccination was opened up for age groups on account

of their heightened vulnerability and mortality to COVID-19, in consonance

with the WHO guidelines and international practice;

(ii) In phase 1, HCWs (starting from 16 January 2021) and FLWs (starting from 2

February 2021) were vaccinated. In phase 2, persons above 60 years of age

and persons over 45 years of age with certain co-morbidities (starting from 1

March 2021) and all persons over 45 years of age (starting from 1 April 2021)

were eligible for vaccination. This priority was accorded in view of the fact that

COVID-19 deaths across the world demonstrate that over 85% of all deaths

occurred in the age group over 45 years;

(iii) FLWs such as municipal workers (including crematorium workers) and

panchayat workers were also vaccinated in phase 1 of the vaccination drive;

(iv) With effect from 1 May 2021, the Liberalized Vaccination Policy was

implemented as a response to repeated requests by State/UT Governments,

and after detailed deliberations with domain experts. The parallel

decentralized policy aims to achieve higher efficiency and reach;

(v) Currently, vaccine manufacturers are obligated to supply 50% of their monthly

CDL released doses to the UoI and the remaining 50% doses to the “other

than GoI channel” which can be procured by State/UT Governments, private

hospitals and hospitals of industrial establishments to vaccinate persons in the

age group of 18-44 years;

(vi) The priority of the UoI remains vaccinating persons aged 45 years and above

for free since they are more vulnerable. The simultaneous vaccinations for

persons aged between 18-44 years has been introduced to respect the

wishes of the State/UT Governments. In view of the differential vulnerability

and mortality rates, the Liberalized Vaccination Policy conforms to the

mandate of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution;

(vii) In order to eliminate disparity in bargaining powers, “the Central Government

has, in consultation with the vaccine manufacturers determined the pro-rata 

PART E

17

population of each State in the age group of 18-44 and each State will procure

only that quantity”;

(viii) The Central Government will notify States/UTs, every fortnight, on the quantity

of vaccines that will be distributed for vaccinating persons aged 45 years and

above;

(ix) With regard to the augmentation of production of vaccines, it is stated that the

National Expert Group on Vaccine Administration for COVID-1923 had

procured 6.6 crore doses for the initial phases. Support for other vaccine

candidates under clinical development is being provided by the „Mission

COVID Suraksha the Indian COVID-19 Vaccine Development Mission‟;

(x) The Central Government is in talks with several vaccine

developers/manufacturers outside India and is seeking to facilitate imports.

The Drugs Controller General of India24 has already approved import of 1.5

lakh doses of the Sputnik V vaccine by Dr Reddy‟s Laboratories‟;

(xi) The availability of vaccines for the next 6 months would be difficult to project

as it is dynamic and contingent on foreign procurement and successful

ramping of production by the two existing manufacturers;

(xii) However, it is also stated that manufacturing capacity is being increased in

the following terms:

(a) SII: from 5 crore doses/month to 6.5 crore doses/month by July 2021;

(b) BBIL: from 90 lakh doses/month to 2 crore doses/month, and further

increase to 5.5 crore doses/month by July 2021; and

(c) Sputnik V: from 30 lakh doses to 1.2 crore doses/month by July 2021;

and

(xiii) The regulatory and testing process for foreign vaccines has been simplified by

the NEGVAC which now allows bridging trials (a nearly 4-month long process)

of foreign vaccines to occur simultaneously with market development.

19 Based on the response of the UoI and the submissions made by the Amici,

we understand that there are three broad issues that are of concern: (i) vaccine

distribution between different age groups; (ii) vaccine procurement process; and (iii)

the augmentation of the vaccine availability in India.


23 “NEGVAC”

24 “DCGI”

PART E

18

20 The affidavit of the UoI sufficiently clarifies the prioritization of the groups in

phases 1 and 2 for obtaining the COVID-19 vaccines. These include HCWs, FLWs

and persons above the age of 45 years. The prioritization of these groups was based

on the experience of India and other countries during the first wave of the pandemic

in 2020. It was largely observed that these groups faced a higher risk of infection and

thus, it was necessary to inoculate them free of cost and on a priority basis by the

Central Government. During the vaccination for these groups, the Central

Government had allowed on-site registration and there was no prior requirement for

booking an appointment on CoWIN. Having said that, the vaccination policy has

been substantially changed for persons between 18-44 years of age. The Liberalized

Vaccination Policy requires some of these persons to pay for the vaccines; limited

vaccines are made available for this category with the State/UT Governments/private

hospitals and an additional requirement of mandatory digital registration and booking

an appointment through CoWIN has been imposed, among others. Unlike the prior

policy, the Liberalized Vaccination Policy does not prioritize persons with comorbidities and other diseases, persons with disabilities, or any other vulnerable

groups. This is especially at issue because the experience of the second wave of the

pandemic has provided an experiential learning that the COVID-19 virus is capable

of mutation and now poses a threat to persons in this age group as well. Reports

indicate that persons between 18-44 years of age have not only been infected by

COVID-19, but have also suffered from severe effects of the infection, including

prolonged hospitalization and, in unfortunate cases, death. Due to the changing

nature of the pandemic, we are now faced with a situation where the 18-44 age

group also needs to be vaccinated, although priority may be retained between

different age groups on a scientific basis. Hence, due to the importance of

vaccinating individuals in the 18-44 age group, the policy of the Central Government

for conducting free vaccination themselves for groups under the first 2 phases, and

replacing it with paid vaccination by the State/UT Governments and private hospitals

for the persons between 18-44 years is, prima facie, arbitrary and irrational.

21 With regard to the procurement process for vaccinations which is to be

followed in view of the Liberalized Vaccination Policy, there are a number of issues

that need to be addressed. The Amici have indicated that many State/UT

Governments and local municipal bodies have issued tenders and attempted to 

PART E

19

negotiate with foreign manufacturers but they have largely been unsuccessful, as

foreign manufacturers are not inclined to negotiate with individual State/UT

Governments and prefer negotiating with federal governments of countries.

Additionally, it has been urged that Central Government is also better placed to use

its monopoly as a buyer (India being the second most populous country) to bargain

for higher quantities of vaccines at reasonable prices. We find that the submissions

urged by the Amici are extremely pertinent and have indicated that in practice, the

Liberalized Vaccination Policy may not be able to yield the desired results of spurring

competitive prices and higher quantities of vaccines.

22 Additionally, the Liberalized Vaccination Policy seeks to remove the issue of

bargaining disparities by stating that each State/UT would have a prefixed pro rata

quota based on their population in the 18-44 age group, 50% of which will be

available to the State/UT Governments and 50% to the private hospitals. The Amici

have raised concerns that there is a lack of clarity regarding whether the UoI will

intervene in the distribution process. Given that inter-State barriers in India are

porous and persons are free to migrate and work in different parts of the country, it is

essential to understand if the pro rata allotment will take into account such migration

to more densely populated industrial and urban States/UTs. Other concerns, such as

the stage of the pandemic, the healthcare infrastructure and existing capacities of a

State/UT, the literacy rate, age and overall health condition of its population, may

also be relevant factors in making such a pro rata determination. The UoI should

thus specify whether it seeks to address these concerns within the vaccination policy

such that the State/UT Governments have a realistic assessment of the assistance

they can anticipate from the UoI.

23 We shall now address the issue related to augmentation of vaccine

production/availability. We have noted the submissions of the UoI in its affidavit

dated 9 May 2021, that it is difficult to predict the projections for vaccines given that it

depends on variable factors such as introduction of new foreign vaccines, capability

of increased production by existing manufacturers, among others. Mr Tushar Mehta

has during the course of his oral submissions stated that he is in a position to

address these concerns of this Court and that the UoI aims to vaccinate

approximately 100 crore persons by the end of December 2021. Mr Mehta has

agreed to provide a detailed roadmap regarding projected availability of vaccines 

PART E

20

from the various vaccine manufacturers. It has also been highlighted that the Central

Government is in active negotiations with various private foreign manufacturers to

augment the availability of vaccines in the near future.

24 In view of the above, we direct the UoI to undertake a fresh review of its

vaccination policy addressing the concerns raised. Further, we direct the UoI to

provide the following clarifications:

 As noted above, the UoI is directed to place on record a roadmap of projected

availability of vaccines till 31 December 2021;

 The preparedness with respect to specific needs of children in the event of a

third wave of the pandemic in terms of medical infrastructure, vaccination

trials and regulatory approval, and compatible drugs;

 Whether under the policy of the UoI, it is permissible for State/UT

Governments or individual local bodies to access vaccine supplies of foreign

manufacturers;

 The number of crematorium workers vaccinated in phase 1. A targeted drive

can be conducted for vaccination of the remaining crematorium workers;

 The State/UT Governments are diverting the vaccines (procured by them at a

higher price than Central Government) for the persons in the age group of 18-

44 years to vaccinate persons above 45 years of age, due to a shortage of

vaccines being supplied by the Central Government. The manner in which the

Central Government will factor this quantity and price differential into their

subsequent allocation and disbursal of vaccines to States/UTs for the persons

above 45 years of age; and

 The mechanism for redistribution, if the 25:25 quota in a particular State/UT is

not picked up by the State/UT Government or the private hospitals.

E.2 Effects of Vaccination by Private Hospitals under the Liberalized

Vaccination Policy

25 Under the Liberalized Vaccination Policy covering persons in the age group of

18-44 years, the total vaccines produced will be divided in a ratio of 50:25:25

between the Central Government, State/UT Governments and private hospitals. In 

PART E

21

its affidavit dated 9 May 2021, the UoI notes the following salient features of this

Liberalized Vaccination Policy, in relation to vaccination by private hospitals:

(i) Out of the 50% quota allocated for the „other than GoI channel‟, 50% will go to

the State/UT Governments, calculated on a pro rata basis as per the

population. The balance 50% would be open for private hospitals‟

procurement, based on contracts with the manufacturers. As such, the

State/UT Governments and private hospitals would each end up with 25% of

the total CDL doses;

(ii) Vaccination through the private sector of 25% of the total CDL quantity would

reduce the operational stress on government facilities and help with issues of

crowding at vaccination centres; and

(iii) Paid vaccination through private hospitals has been introduced for persons

who can afford to pay, thereby reducing the operational stress on the

Government. However, it has also been submitted that this policy may

undergo a change based on performance and future availability of vaccines.

26 As a consequence of this Liberalized Vaccination Policy, 50% of the

population of any State/UT in the 18-44 age group is expected to pay for its

vaccination. From the UoI‟s affidavit, we understand that this has been done while

taking into account the ability of a certain section of the population to pay for their

vaccination. However, the present system of allowing only digital registration and

booking of appointment on CoWIN, coupled with the current scarcity of vaccines, will

ultimately ensure that initially all vaccines, whether free or paid, are first availed by

the economically privileged sections of the society. As such, even those who may

have been able to afford a vaccine, may opt for a free vaccine simply because of

issues of availability, even if it would entail travelling to far-flung rural areas. Hence,

any calculations of the economic ability of a given individual may not directly

correspond to the vaccination route (paid/unpaid) they opt for. Consequently, it is

plausible that private hospitals may have vaccine doses left over with them because

everyone who could afford them has either already bought it or availed of a free

vaccine, while those who need it may not have the ability to pay for it.

27 Further consequences of the vaccination by private hospitals under the

Liberalized Vaccination Policy relate to a simple issue at the core of their existence: 

PART E

22

that while they provide a public health service, they still remain private, for-profit

entities. Consequently, they may sell the vaccine doses procured at a higher price,

unless regulated stringently. Private hospitals also may not sell all their vaccine

doses publicly through appointments on CoWIN, but rather sell them for lucrative

deals directly to private corporations who wish to vaccinate their employees. Finally,

private hospitals are not equally spread out across a State/UT and are often limited

to bigger cities with large populations. As such, a larger quantity will be available in

such cities, as opposed to the rural areas.

28 It is pertinent to clarify here that we are not opposed to the involvement of

private hospitals in the vaccination drive. Private health care institutions have an

important role as well. The UoI has correctly noted in its affidavit that these hospitals

will reduce the burden on government facilities. This was also happening earlier for

the vaccination of those above 45 years of age, where the Central Government was

providing these hospitals with vaccines and they were allowed to charge patients a

nominal fee (Rs 250). However, the issue is about the effect of privatizing 50% of all

vaccines available for the 18-44 age group. In view of the above concerns, we direct

the UoI to provide the following clarifications:

 The manner in which Central Government will monitor the disbursal of

vaccines to private hospitals, specifically those who have hospital chains pan

India. Further, whether (i) private hospitals are liable to disburse vaccines pro

rata the population of States/UTs; and (ii) the mechanism to determine if

private players are genuinely administering the lifted quota in that State/UT

alone. The UoI shall place on record any written policy in relation to this.

 Whether the Central Government conducted a “means-test” of the

demographic of a State/UT to assert that 50% of the population in the 18-44

age group would be able to afford the vaccine. If not, the rationale for private

hospitals being provided an equal quota for procurement as the State/UT

Governments.

 The manner in which the Centre and States/UTs shall ensure an equitable

distribution of vaccines across sections of the society, and how this factors

into the rationale of equal apportionment between State/UT Governments and

private hospitals.

PART E

23

 The nature of the intervention with respect to the final, end-user price that is

being charged by private hospitals, especially when a cap on procurement by

the private hospitals has been set.

E.3 Basis and Impact of Differential Pricing

Impact of differential pricing

29 In our order dated 30 April 2021, we had elicited the UoI‟s justification for

enabling decentralized procurement where a pre-fixed and differential price was set

for the Central Government, States/UTs and private hospitals. The UoI through its

affidavit dated 9 May 2021, has submitted the following:

(i) The Liberalized Vaccination Policy was introduced to incentivize existing

manufacturers and invite more manufacturers, which will ensure fastest

vaccination of the majority of the population. Differential pricing has been

introduced in order to instill a competitive market which would drive the market

towards affordability and attract offshore vaccine manufacturers;

(ii) Vaccine manufacturers are mandated to transparently declare the price in

advance for procurement by State/UT Governments and private hospitals.

The price for the Central Government is pre-fixed and declared;

(iii) Extensive consultations with the manufacturers were held to ensure that

pricing is uniform and reasonable. The UoI stated that these were “due to

consultations and persuasion" by the Central Government;

(iv) On the differential pricing of the vaccines, it is stated that “the Central

Government by nature of its large vaccination programme, places large

purchase orders for vaccines as opposed to the State Governments and/or

Private Hospitals and therefore, this reality has some reflection in the prices

negotiated”; and

(v) In any event, all persons of all age groups will get free vaccination throughout

the country since all State/UT Governments have announced free vaccination

for persons aged 18-44 years, in addition to the Central Government

vaccinating persons over 45 years for free. 

PART E

24

30 The current Liberalized Vaccination Policy enables State/UT Governments

and private hospitals to procure 50% of the monthly CDL approved doses in the

country at a pre-fixed price. The justification for this Policy has been adduced in a bid

to spur competition which would attract more private manufacturers that could

eventually drive down prices. Prima facie, the only room for negotiation with the two

vaccine manufacturers was on price and quantity, both of which have been pre-fixed

by the Central Government. This casts serious doubts on UoI‟s justification for

enabling higher prices as a competitive measure. Furthermore, the Central

Government justifying its lower prices on account of its ability to place large

purchase orders for vaccines, raises the issue as to why this rationale is not being

employed for acquiring 100% of the monthly CDL doses. The Union Budget for

Financial Year 2021-2022 had earmarked Rs 35000 crores for procuring vaccines25

.

In light of the Liberalized Vaccination Policy, the Central Government is directed to

clarify how these funds have been spent so far and why they cannot be utilized for

vaccinating persons aged 18-44 years.

31 In response to our questions on the poor and marginalized suffering on

account of the vaccine prices, the Central Government in its affidavit stated that the

eventual beneficiary of the vaccine would not be affected by the Liberalized

Vaccination Policy since every State/UT has promised to vaccinate its residents free

of cost. Nevertheless, it is reiterated that the UoI should consider utilizing its position

as the monopolistic buyer in the market and pass down the benefit to all persons.

Even if the States/UTs were to fund the higher-priced vaccines, a burden they were

not discharging before the Liberalized Vaccination Policy was introduced and

potentially may not have planned in advance for, these funds are expended at the

behest of the public exchequer. The Centre and States/UTs, both operate in the

service of the Indian population, and raise and disburse funds in their name. The

additional funds expended on procuring vaccines against a deadly pandemic are

necessary expenditure for any State/UT Government which has battled the public

health emergency for over 15 months now. However, an avoidable expense would

eventually hurt the welfare of individuals residing within those States/UTs, who may

potentially be benefitted by the differential funds being utilized for ramping up the

health infrastructure in the State/UT, which is equally important to combat the


25 Available at <https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/doc/Budget_Speech.pdf>, page 7

PART E

25

pandemic. If the Central Government‟s unique monopolistic buyer position is the only

reason for it receiving vaccines at a much lower rate from manufacturers, it is

important for us to examine the rationality of the existing Liberalized Vaccination

Policy against Article 14 of the Constitution, since it could place severe burdens,

particularly on States/UTs suffering from financial distress.

Basis of pricing

32 In our order dated 30 April 2021, we had requested for data on government

funding and support, direct or indirect, into the two vaccines that are currently

authorized for public use – SII‟s Covishield and BBIL‟s Covaxin. Additionally, in order

to evaluate the bottlenecks in vaccine scarcity, we had sought the UoI‟s stance on

invoking its powers of compulsory licensing under the Patents Act, 1970 in order to

ramp up manufacturing and other statutory provisions to drive down costs. The UoI

has adduced the following justifications in its affidavit dated 9 May 2021:

(i) SII and BBIL have taken a financial risk in developing and manufacturing

these vaccines and prudence dictates pricing through a transparent and

consultative negotiation, and statutory provisions must be invoked in the last

resort;

(ii) Covaxin is developed under a public-private partnership through a formal MoU

between Indian Council of Medical Research26 and BBIL. ICMR would receive

a 5% royalty on net sales, the intellectual property is shared between ICMR

and BBIL and clauses such as prioritization of in-country supplies have been

included. Phase 3 trials of Covaxin have been funded by the ICMR to the tune

of Rs 35 crores;

(iii) Covishield is manufactured by SII. The Central Government has directly

transferred Rs 11 crores to 14 clinical trials sites for conducting phase 3 trials

of over 1600 participants; and

(iv) Covaxin production is being augmented with government support to the tune

of Rs 200 crores to one private manufacturer and 3 public sector

manufacturing facilities – Bharat Biotech, Hyderabad; Indian Immunologicals,

Hyderabad; Haffkine Biopharmaceuticals, Mumbai; and Bharat

Immunologicals and Biologicals, Bulandshar. This is projected to enhance


26 “ICMR”

PART E

26

Covaxin‟s current manufacturing of 1 crore doses/month to nearly 10 crore

doses/month in the next 8-10 months. Grant-in-aids have been

recommended, but the disbursements are yet to be made.

33 We commend the co-operative efforts of the UoI and the private

manufacturers in developing and distributing vaccines which are critical to mitigate

the pandemic. The import of our further line of questioning is to facilitate a better

understanding of the process of development and augmentation of vaccine

production and its pricing for States/UTs and private hospitals. Hence, we direct that

the UoI to provide the following clarifications:

 Since the Central Government has financed (officially, Rs 35 crores to BBIL

and Rs 11 crore to SII for phase 3 clinical trials) and facilitated the production

(or augmentation of production) of these vaccines through concessions or

otherwise, it may not be accurate to state that the private entities have alone

borne the risk and cost of manufacture. Additionally, the Central Government

would have minimized the risks of the manufacturers by granting Emergency

Use Authorization to the vaccines, which should factor into its pricing.

 The manner in which public financing is reflected in the procurement price for

the Central Government, which is significantly lower than price for the

State/UT Governments and private hospitals. Given that the R&D cost and IP

have either been shared between the Central Government and the private

manufacturer (in case of Covaxin) or the manufacturer has not invested in

R&D of the vaccine (in case of Covishield), the manner in which the pricing of

vaccines has been arrived at, with the Central Government refusing to

intervene statutorily. The justification for intervening in pre-fixing procurement

prices and quantities for States/UTs and private hospitals, but not imposing

statutory price ceilings.

 Comparison between the prices of vaccines being made available in India, to

their prices internationally.

 Whether ICMR/BBIL formally invited contracts for voluntary licensing and if so,

whether they have they received viable offers. The manner in which the UoI

is independently trying to assist manufacturers for developing BSL3 labs

which are essential for Covaxin production.

PART E

27

E.4 Vaccine Logistics

34 We have already noted that as a consequence of the Liberalized Vaccination

Policy, the responsibility for the vaccination in phase 3 is being divided between the

Central Government (for those above 45 years of age, HCWs and FLWs) and the

State/UT Government along with the private hospitals (for the age group of 18-44

years). This would mean that the limited vaccine logistics available in a State/UT

would have to be shared between the State/UT Government and the Central

Government. This is different from the situation under the UIP, where the Central

Government buys and allocates vaccines to States/UTs, in order to ensure that their

cold storage facilities are not overwhelmed. Hence, we direct the UoI to provide the

following clarifications:

 The manner in which cold storage equipment capacity is being balanced

between the Central and State/UT Governments. The manner in which the

States/UTs are managing the logistical burden for vaccinating persons aged

between 18-44 years, along with persons aged over 45 years.

 Whether cold storage facilities in India have increased for the COVID-19

vaccination drive; the present numbers, and comparison with the numbers

prior to March 2020;

 Whether the cold storage equipment is indigenously manufactured or is

imported. If it is imported, the steps which have been taken to start

indigenous manufacturing.

 The steps being taken to improve the cold storage management for vaccines

which may require lower temperature to be stored, compared to the ones

which currently have approval in India.

E.5 Digital Divide

35 In our order dated 30 April 2021, we had highlighted the concerns relating to

the ability of the marginalized members of society to avail of vaccination, exclusively

through a digital portal in the face of a digital divide. The UoI‟s affidavit made the

following submissions in relation to the accessibility of the CoWIN portal:

(i) The CoWIN portal enables one person to register 4 persons using the same

mobile number;

PART E

28

(ii) All gram panchayats in the country have Common Service Centres27 which

can effectively enable people residing in rural areas to register online for the

vaccination;

(iii) Citizens who do not have access to digital resources could take help from

family, friends, NGOs and CSCs;

(iv) Walk-ins cannot be permitted due to the scarcity of vaccines and fears of

over-crowding at centres. The online registration requirement counters this

fear and also effectively monitors the administration of the second dose. The

policy may be re-considered subsequently when more vaccines are available;

(v) Identity proofs are required for the purpose of determining age and keeping a

track of persons who are due for the second dose. However, in recognizing

the issues arising with the insistence of one of the seven prescribed photo-ID

proofs, the Central Government issued an SoP dated 23 April 2021 which

enables bulk registration of certain identifiable groups, such as homeless

persons, who would be identified and registered by the District Immunization

Task Force; and

(vi) It is clarified that walk-in vaccination facilities will continue for persons over the

age of 45 years in separate, designated vaccination centres. This is because

vaccinations have been underway for this age group for a while and overcrowding has not been experienced so far.

36 A survey on „Household Social Consumption: Education‟ was conducted by

National Statistics Office (July 2017-June 2018)28 which revealed the following:

(i) Around 4% of the rural households and 23% of the urban households

possessed a computer. In the age group of 15-29 years, around 24% in rural

households and 56% in urban areas were able to operate a computer; and

(ii) Nearly 24% of the households in the country had internet access during the

survey year 2017-18. The proportion was 15% in rural households and 42% in

urban households. Around 35% of persons in the age group of 15-29 years

reported use of internet during the 30 days prior to the date of survey. The

proportions were 25% in rural areas and 58% in urban areas.


27 “CSC”

28 Available at

<http://mospi.nic.in/sites/default/files/publication_reports/Report_585_75th_round_Education_final_15

07_0.pdf>

PART E

29

37 The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India in its report titled „Wireless Data

Services in India‟29 noted that:

(i) Out of the total population of 1.3 billion, only 578 million people in India (less

than 50%) have subscription to wireless data services. The wireless tele

density in rural areas is 57.13% as compared to 155.49% in urban areas as

on 31 March 2019. The report stated that:

“[this] reflects the rural-urban divide in terms of telecom

services‟ penetration. Since, the number of wireless data

subscribers are less than 50% of the total wireless access

subscribers, the number of wireless data subscribers in rural

areas would be much lower”.

(ii) The report also noted that in a few Indian States like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and

Assam the tele density is less than 75%; and

(iii) The monthly income of persons living below the poverty line in urban areas

and rural areas is Rs 1316 and Rs 896, respectively. However, to access

internet data services, a minimum tariff plan would cost around Rs 49, which

includes 1 GB data every 28 days. This would constitute 4-5% of the month‟s

income of such persons accessing data. As such, the report notes that this

would bear a considerable cost for persons living below the poverty line.

38 According to the Annual Report of CSC for 2019-20, published by the Ministry

of Electronics and Information Technology, while there are 2,53,134 Gram

Panchayats in India, as on 31 March 2020 only 2,40,792 Gram Panchayats are

covered with at least one registered CSC30. Hence, approximately 13,000 Gram

Panchayats in India do not have a CSC.

39 It is clear from the above statistics that there exists a digital divide in India,

particularly between the rural and urban areas. The extent of the advances made in

improving digital literacy and digital access falls short of penetrating the majority of

the population in the country. Serious issues of the availability of bandwidth and

connectivity pose further challenges to digital penetration. A vaccination policy

exclusively relying on a digital portal for vaccinating a significant population of this


29 Available at

<https://www.trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/Wireless_Data_Service_Report_21082019_0.pdf>

30 Available at <https://csc.gov.in/assets/events-report/Annual-Report-2019-20.pdf>, at page 8

PART E

30

country between the ages of 18-44 years would be unable to meet its target of

universal immunization owing to such a digital divide. It is the marginalized sections

of the society who would bear the brunt of this accessibility barrier. This could have

serious implications on the fundamental right to equality and the right to health of

persons within the above age group. In this regard, we direct that the UoI to provide

the following clarifications:

 It may not be feasible to require the majority of our population to rely on

friends/NGOs for digital registrations over CoWIN, when even the digitally

literate are finding it hard to procure vaccination slots.

 The issue of over-crowding may also arise at CSCs in rural areas where

people would have to visit constantly in hope of a vaccine slot opening up.

 Certain vaccination centres may be earmarked for on-site registrations for the

population aged between 18-44 years without the existing conditions

prescribed in the circular dated 24 May 2021, potentially with a view to

prioritize those with co-morbidities/disabilities/other socio-economic

vulnerabilities. Alternatively, whether specific daily quotas may be introduced

for on-site registration at each centre or specific centres.

 This policy may not allay the issue of hesitancy which may arise from

approaching a State authority (such as the District Immunization Task Force)

to obtain registration for the vaccination. Whether on-site registration with selfattestation of age to ensure widespread vaccination can be provided.

 The CoWIN platform and other IT applications like Aarogya Setu should be

made available in regional languages. The timeline for ensuring the availability

of the platform in multiple regional languages.

 Conducting a disability audit for the CoWIN website and other IT application

like Aarogya Setu to ensure that they are accessible to persons with

disabilities.

40 It has been brought to our notice that the CoWIN platform is not accessible to

persons with visual disabilities. The website suffers from certain accessibility barriers

which should be addressed. These include:

(i) Audio or text captcha is not available;

PART F

31

(ii) The seven filters, which inter alia, include age group, name of vaccine and

whether the vaccine is paid or free, are not designed accessibly. This issue

can be addressed by creation of a drop-down list;

(iii) While visually challenged persons can determine the number of available

vaccine slots, one cannot find out the day those slots correspond to. This can

be resolved by ensuring that table headers correspond to associated cells;

(iv) Keyboard support for navigating the website is absent;

(v) Adequate time should be given to disabled users to schedule their

appointment without the possibility of being automatically logged off; and

(vi) Accessibility protocols, such as use of appropriate colour contrasts, should be

adhered to.

F Conclusion

41 We direct the UoI to file an affidavit, which shall address the issues and

questions raised in Section E, wherein it shall ensure that each issue is responded to

individually and no issue is missed out. We also direct that the affidavit should

provide the following information:

 The data on the percentage of population that has been vaccinated (with one

dose and both doses), as against eligible persons in the first three phases of

the vaccination drive. This shall include data pertaining to the percentage of

rural population as well as the percentage of urban population so vaccinated;

 The complete data on the Central Government‟s purchase history of all the

COVID-19 vaccines till date (Covaxin, Covishield and Sputnik V). The data

should clarify: (a) the dates of all procurement orders placed by the Central

Government for all 3 vaccines; (b) the quantity of vaccines ordered as on each

date; and (c) the projected date of supply; and

 An outline for how and when the Central Government seeks to vaccinate the

remaining population in phases 1, 2 and 3.

 The steps being taken by the Central Government to ensure drug availability

for mucormycosis.

42 While filing its affidavit, UoI shall also ensure that copies of all the relevant

documents and file notings reflecting its thinking and culminating in the vaccination 

PART F

32

policy are also annexed on the vaccination policy. Hence, we direct the UoI to file its

affidavit within 2 weeks.

43 We also note that UoI‟s stated position in its affidavit dated 9 May 2021 is that

every State/UT Government shall provide vaccination free of cost to its population. It

is important that individual State/UT Governments confirm/deny this position before

this Court. Further, if they have decided to vaccinate their population for free then, as

a matter of principle, it is important that this policy is annexed to their affidavit, so

that the population within their territories can be assured of their right to be

vaccinated for free at a State vaccination centre. Hence, we direct each of the

State/UT Governments to also file an affidavit within 2 weeks, where they shall clarify

their position and put on record their individual policies.

 ……….….....................................................J.

 [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]

 ……..….….....................................................J.

 [L Nageswara Rao]

 ……..….….....................................................J.

 [S Ravindra Bhat]

New Delhi;

May 31, 2021

Whether without any charges under Section 498A, IPC a conviction under Section 304-B, IPC cannot be sustained. On this aspect this Court in the case of Kamesh Panjiyar v. State of Bihar, (2005) 2 SCC 388 held as under: “12. …….It is to be noted that Sections 304- B and 498-A IPC cannot be held to be mutually inclusive. These provisions deal with two distinct offences. It is true that cruelty is a common essential to both the sections and that has to be proved. The 12 Explanation to Section 498-A gives the meaning of “cruelty”. In Section 304-B there is no such explanation about the meaning of “cruelty”. But having regard to the common background to these offences it has to be taken that the meaning of “cruelty” or “harassment” is the same as prescribed in the Explanation to Section 498-A under which “cruelty” by itself amounts to an offence. Under Section 304-B it is “dowry death” that is punishable and such death should have occurred within seven years of marriage. No such period is mentioned in Section 498-A. If the case is established, there can be a conviction under both the sections.” (emphasis supplied) 20. Therefore, the argument raised by the counsel on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted as the offences under Section 498-A and Section 304-B, IPC are distinct in nature. Although cruelty is a common thread existing in both the offences, however the ingredients of each offence are distinct and must be proved separately by the prosecution. If a case is made out, there can be a conviction under both the sections.

Whether without any charges under Section 498A, IPC a conviction under Section 304-B, IPC cannot be sustained.

On this aspect this Court in the case of Kamesh Panjiyar v. State of Bihar, (2005) 2 SCC 388 held as under: “12. …….It is to be noted that Sections 304- B and 498-A IPC cannot be held to be mutually inclusive. These provisions deal with two distinct offences. It is true that cruelty is a common essential to both the sections and that has to be proved. The 12 Explanation to Section 498-A gives the meaning of “cruelty”. In Section 304-B there is no such explanation about the meaning of “cruelty”. But having regard to the common background to these offences it has to be taken that the meaning of “cruelty” or “harassment” is the same as prescribed in the Explanation to Section 498-A under which “cruelty” by itself amounts to an offence. Under Section 304-B it is “dowry death” that is punishable and such death should have occurred within seven years of marriage. No such period is mentioned in Section 498-A. If the case is established, there can be a conviction under both the sections.” (emphasis supplied) 20. Therefore, the argument raised by the counsel on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted as the offences under Section 498-A and Section 304-B, IPC are distinct in nature. Although cruelty is a common thread existing in both the offences, however the ingredients of each offence are distinct and must be proved separately by the prosecution. If a case is made out, there can be a conviction under both the sections.

The Trial Court, after a thorough examination of the evidences- both oral and documentary, concluded that the accused-appellant, who was working as a technician in a hospital, has forged the hospital records to prove the existence of cordial relationship between the families of the deceased and the accused. The relevant observations of the Trial Court on this point are as follows: “Gurmeet Singh accused was working as O.T. Technician. Gurmit Singh brought Baksho Devi to the hospital and he examined her and given Chemotherapy. He has further stated that photo copy of the entries in the file are Ex.Dl and she was treated upto 17.8.2008. This witness in his cross-examination has admitted that it is correct that in the entries in the file it is not recorded as to who brought the patient. He has also admitted that remarks column of Ex.Dl is blank and it does not bear his signatures any where. He also stated that what treatment was to be given is mentioned 10 in the treatment file. He also stated that patient was also treated by other doctors. So this witness has stated that the patient was treated upto 17.8.08. Ex.Dl is dated 18.8.08. Admittedly Rama Devi has expired on 8.8.08. The case against accused Gurmit Singh was registered on 9.8.08. As per the statement of PW-11 SI Dharam Pal, accused Gurmit Singh was arrested in this case on 10.8.08. The personal search memo of the accused is Ex.P26, grounds of arrest memo is Ex.P-27 and ground of information memo is Ex.P-28 which was prepared by him and signed by accused and ASI Sukhdev Singh. So, if the accused was in custody since 10.8.08 till date, then how he could take her mother-in-law for treatment before Dr. K.K. Nayak DW-2 or got her treated from there. So, the defence evidence appears to have been crated and the same has been manipulated by the accused that he had been getting treatment of his mother-in-law to show that his relations were cordial with the family of the victim or with the victim falls to the ground.”

Therefore, the prosecution having satisfied the necessary ingredients under Section 304B of IPC, the presumption under Section 113-B, Evidence Act takes full effect in this particular case, which has not been rebutted by the accused-appellant herein. The appellant has failed to make out a case for us to interfere in the concurrent opinions of the Courts below, convicting the accused-appellant under Section 304-B, IPC. 

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1731 OF 2010

GURMEET SINGH …APPELLANT

Versus

STATE OF PUNJAB …RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

N. V. RAMANA, CJI.

1. The present appeal arises out of the impugned judgment dated

15.03.2010 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana

at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 2298-SB of 2009,

wherein the High Court dismissed the appeal preferred by the

appellant herein and upheld the order of the Trial Court

convicting him under Section 304-B, IPC and sentencing him

to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and a fine

of Rs.5000/-.

2. The facts as per the prosecution are as follows: the deceased,

daughter of the complainant was engaged to the appellant in

REPORTABLE

RE

2

2004. Subsequent to the engagement, the complainant left for

Abu Dhabi in April, 2004 and in his absence the marriage

between the appellant and the deceased was solemnized on

23.11.2004. In 2006, a child was born out of the wedlock.

When the complainant returned from abroad in 2007, the

deceased informed him that the mother-in-law, father-in-law

and the appellant-husband used to physically assault her

pursuant to the demand of dowry. Allegedly, the complainant

gave a gold chain to the accused persons. The complainant

thereafter went abroad and returned to India on 21.07.2008.

The deceased further disclosed that her in-laws were

demanding money for the purchase of a car. However, this

time, the complainant failed to fulfill the demand.

3. On 08.08.2008, the father-in-law of the deceased informed the

complainant that the deceased has consumed poison and lost

her consciousness and was being taken to the hospital. Upon

reaching the hospital, the complainant found his daughter to

be unconscious. Later that day she died.

4. The Trial Court, vide order dated 03.09.2009 convicted the

appellant-husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law for the

offence under Section 304-B and sentenced them to undergo 

3

rigorous imprisonment for seven years each and a fine of

Rs.5000/- each. In default of payment of fine, the accused

persons were directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for

one year each.

5. Aggrieved, the accused persons approached the High Court in

appeal. Vide impugned judgment dated 15.03.2010, the High

Court acquitted the father-in-law and the mother-in-law, but

upheld the order of conviction and sentence passed against

the accused-appellant. Challenging the aforesaid judgment of

the High Court, the accused-appellant has approached this

Court.

6. The counsel appearing on behalf of the accused-appellant

argued that the Courts below have, as a matter of routine,

applied the presumption u/s 113B of Evidence Act in the

instant case wherein even the basic and essential ingredient

of Section 304-B, IPC are not satisfied. It was submitted that

just because the death of the deceased occurred within seven

years of marriage, by no stretch of imagination can it be said

that the deceased soon before her death was subjected to

cruelty in connection with the demand of dowry. The fact that

the deceased was happy with the appellant is clearly evident 

4

as she lived with him and bore his child, and never mentioned

any harassment or cruelty being meted out by the appellant.

Furthermore, the gifts received by the appellant-husband were

voluntarily given by the complainant and his family. Lastly,

without any charges under Section 498A, IPC a conviction

under Section 304-B, IPC cannot be sustained.

7. On the contrary, the counsel on behalf of the State argued that

it was undeniable that the death in the present case has

occurred within four years of marriage, under suspicious

circumstances i.e., due to poisoning. Moreover, fifteen days

before the incident, the deceased had specifically told her

father about the latest demand of money for the purchase of a

car. Lastly, it was established before the Courts below that the

accused had forged the medical records of his mother-in-law

to show cordial relationship between the two families.

Therefore, owing to all the aforesaid circumstances, the

presumption under Section 113B, Evidence Act operates

against the accused-husband, which has not been rebutted.

8. Heard the counsel appearing for both sides. Section 304-B,

IPC, which defines and provides the punishment for dowry

death, reads as under:

5

“304-B. Dowry death. —(1) Where the death

of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily

injury or occurs otherwise than under

normal circumstances within seven years of

her marriage and it is shown that soon

before her death she was subjected to

cruelty or harassment by her husband or

any relative of her husband for, or in

connection with, any demand for dowry,

such death shall be called ‘dowry death’, and

such husband or relative shall be deemed to

have caused her death.

Explanation. —For the purpose of this subsection, ‘dowry’ shall have the same

meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry

Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be

punished with imprisonment for a term

which shall not be less than seven years but

which may extend to imprisonment for life.”

9. Section 304-B(1), IPC defines ‘dowry death’ of a woman. It

provides that ‘dowry death’ is where death of a woman is

caused by burning or bodily injuries or occurs otherwise than

under normal circumstances, within seven years of marriage,

and it is shown that soon before her death, she was subjected

to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her

husband, in connection with demand for dowry. Further,

Section 304-B(2), IPC provides punishment for the aforesaid

offence. This Court, in the recent judgment of Satbir Singh v. 

6

State of Haryana, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1735-1736 of 2010

summarised the law under Section 304-B, IPC and Section

113B, Evidence Act as under:

“i. Section 304-B, IPC must be interpreted

keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb

the social evil of bride burning and dowry

demand.

ii. The prosecution must at first establish

the existence of the necessary ingredients

for constituting an offence under Section

304-B, IPC. Once these ingredients are

satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of

causality, provided under Section 113-B,

Evidence Act operates against the accused.

iii. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in

Section 304-B, IPC cannot be construed to

mean ‘immediately before’. The prosecution

must establish existence of “proximate and

live link” between the dowry death and

cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by

the husband or his relatives.

iv. Section 304-B, IPC does not take a

pigeonhole approach in categorizing death

as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The

reason for such non categorization is due to

the fact that death occurring “otherwise than

under normal circumstances” can, in cases,

be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.”

10. In the present case, admittedly, the marriage between the

deceased and the accused-appellant took place on 23.11.2004,

and the death of the deceased occurred in 2008 after she

consumed poison in her matrimonial home. Therefore, the first 

7

two ingredients as to death under otherwise than ‘normal

circumstances’ within seven years of marriage stand satisfied.

11. The next important ingredient which needs to established is

the existence of dowry demand “soon before her death”. This

Court in catena of judgments have held that, “soon before”

cannot be interpreted to mean “immediately before”, rather the

prosecution has to show that there existed a “proximate and

live link” between the cruelty and the consequential death of

the victim. [See Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana (supra);

Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207; Rajinder

Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477]

12. Here, the evidence of the father of the deceased (P.W.4)-

Sarwan Singh, assumes great importance. He has clearly

stated that after the marriage the deceased had telephonically

informed him about the consistent demand of a car or of

equivalent cash by the accused. In 2007, when this witness

visited India, the deceased had also expressed her

unhappiness due to the constant harassment. Moreover, when

he returned to the country in July, 2008, the deceased had

reiterated the factum of demands before him. The witness also

stated as to how the families attempted to mediate the dispute 

8

themselves and on multiple occasions the father of deceased

gave certain gifts to the accused and his family to ameliorate

the situation. Another important circumstance which comes to

our attention is that the mother of the deceased had informed

the father 15-20 days prior to the incident about the

continuing harassment of the deceased on account of dowry.

Finally, on 08.08.2008, the father-in-law of the deceased

informed this witness about the consumption of poison by the

deceased.

13. It is necessary to highlight that both the Trial Court and the

High Court found the above evidence of P.W.4- the father of

the deceased to be reliable and consistent despite a thorough

cross-examination. No evidence was produced by the appellant

to disregard the aforesaid testimony. On perusing the

testimony of PW4, we are also of the considered opinion that

the same is consistent and inspires confidence. Taking into

account the evidence on record, particularly the testimony of

the father of the deceased, we are of the opinion that the

prosecution has proved the necessary ingredients under

Section 304-B, IPC against the accused-appellant. 

9

14. Now, that necessary ingredients under Section 304-B, IPC

stands satisfied, a presumption of causation arises against the

accused under Section 113-B, Evidence Act and the accused

has to rebut this statutory presumption.

15. The defence of the accused is that his family and family of the

deceased shared a cordial relationship, and in fact, the

appellant had helped the mother of deceased in getting

treatment of cancer. The Trial Court, after a thorough

examination of the evidences- both oral and documentary,

concluded that the accused-appellant, who was working as a

technician in a hospital, has forged the hospital records to

prove the existence of cordial relationship between the families

of the deceased and the accused. The relevant observations of

the Trial Court on this point are as follows:

“Gurmeet Singh accused was working as O.T.

Technician. Gurmit Singh brought Baksho

Devi to the hospital and he examined her and

given Chemotherapy. He has further stated

that photo copy of the entries in the file are

Ex.Dl and she was treated upto 17.8.2008.

This witness in his cross-examination has

admitted that it is correct that in the entries in

the file it is not recorded as to who brought the

patient. He has also admitted that remarks

column of Ex.Dl is blank and it does not bear

his signatures any where. He also stated that

what treatment was to be given is mentioned 

10

in the treatment file. He also stated that

patient was also treated by other doctors. So

this witness has stated that the patient was

treated upto 17.8.08. Ex.Dl is dated 18.8.08.

Admittedly Rama Devi has expired on 8.8.08.

The case against accused Gurmit Singh was

registered on 9.8.08. As per the statement of

PW-11 SI Dharam Pal, accused Gurmit Singh

was arrested in this case on 10.8.08. The

personal search memo of the accused is Ex.P26, grounds of arrest memo is Ex.P-27 and

ground of information memo is Ex.P-28 which

was prepared by him and signed by accused

and ASI Sukhdev Singh. So, if the accused was

in custody since 10.8.08 till date, then how he

could take her mother-in-law for treatment

before Dr. K.K. Nayak DW-2 or got her treated

from there. So, the defence evidence appears

to have been crated and the same has been

manipulated by the accused that he had been

getting treatment of his mother-in-law to show

that his relations were cordial with the family

of the victim or with the victim falls to the

ground.”

(emphasis supplied)

16. The aforesaid conclusion reached by the Trial Court is based

on a detailed analysis of the evidence on record, and does not

warrant any interference. The appellant has not brought to our

attention any material to suggest that the above finding of the

Trial Court was perverse or without any basis. Hence, this

defence of the appellant merits rejection as being untenable.

17. The next submission of the appellant was that the deceased

was suffering from depression owing to the health of her 

11

mother. However, no evidence has been produced on record by

the appellant to indicate that the deceased was depressed due

to the alleged poor health condition of her mother. In fact, no

evidence was produced to even show that her mother’s health

was deteriorating.

18. Therefore, the prosecution having satisfied the necessary

ingredients under Section 304B of IPC, the presumption under

Section 113-B, Evidence Act takes full effect in this particular

case, which has not been rebutted by the accused-appellant

herein. The appellant has failed to make out a case for us to

interfere in the concurrent opinions of the Courts below,

convicting the accused-appellant under Section 304-B, IPC.

19. Lastly, the counsel on behalf of the appellant argued that

without any charges under Section 498A, IPC a conviction

under Section 304-B, IPC cannot be sustained. On this aspect

this Court in the case of Kamesh Panjiyar v. State of Bihar,

(2005) 2 SCC 388 held as under:

“12. …….It is to be noted that Sections 304-

B and 498-A IPC cannot be held to be

mutually inclusive. These provisions deal

with two distinct offences. It is true that

cruelty is a common essential to both the

sections and that has to be proved. The 

12

Explanation to Section 498-A gives the

meaning of “cruelty”. In Section 304-B there is

no such explanation about the meaning of

“cruelty”. But having regard to the common

background to these offences it has to be taken

that the meaning of “cruelty” or “harassment”

is the same as prescribed in the Explanation

to Section 498-A under which “cruelty” by

itself amounts to an offence. Under Section

304-B it is “dowry death” that is punishable

and such death should have occurred within

seven years of marriage. No such period is

mentioned in Section 498-A. If the case is

established, there can be a conviction under

both the sections.”

(emphasis supplied)

20. Therefore, the argument raised by the counsel on behalf of the

appellant cannot be accepted as the offences under Section

498-A and Section 304-B, IPC are distinct in nature. Although

cruelty is a common thread existing in both the offences,

however the ingredients of each offence are distinct and must

be proved separately by the prosecution. If a case is made out,

there can be a conviction under both the sections.

21. Before parting with this matter, we are of the opinion that it

would be beneficial to reiterate the guidelines issued by this

Court in Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana (supra) relating

to trial under Section 304-B, IPC:

13

“v. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304-

B, IPC read with 113-B, Evidence Act, Judges,

prosecution and defence should be careful during

conduction of trial.

vi. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial

Courts record the statement under Section 313,

CrPC in a very casual and cursory manner,

without specifically questioning the accused as to

his defense. It ought to be noted that the

examination of an accused under Section 313,

CrPC cannot be treated as a mere procedural

formality, as it based on the fundamental principle

of fairness. This aforesaid provision incorporates

the valuable principle of natural justice “audi

alteram partem” as it enables the accused to offer

an explanation for the incriminatory material

appearing against him. Therefore, it imposes an

obligation on the court to question the accused

fairly, with care and caution.

vii. The Court must put incriminating

circumstances before the accused and seek his

response. A duty is also cast on the counsel of the

accused to prepare his defense since the inception

of the Trial with due caution, keeping in

consideration the peculiarities of Section 304-B,

IPC read with Section 113-B, Evidence Act.

viii. Section 232, CrPC provides that, “If, after

taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining

the accused and hearing the prosecution and the

defence on the point, the Judge considers that there

is no evidence that the accused committed the

offence, the Judge shall record an order of

acquittal”. Such discretion must be utilized by the

Trial Courts as an obligation of best efforts.

ix. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused

is not eligible to be acquitted as per the provisions

of Section 232, CrPC, it must move on and fix

hearings specifically for ‘defence evidence’, calling

upon the accused to present his defense as per the 

14

procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC,

which is also an invaluable right provided to the

accused.

x. In the same breath, Trial Courts need to

balance other important considerations such as

the right to a speedy trial. In this regard, we may

caution that the above provisions should not be

allowed to be misused as delay tactics.

xi. Apart from the above, the presiding Judge

should follow the guidelines laid down by this

Court while sentencing and imposing appropriate

punishment.

xii. Undoubtedly, as discussed above, the

menace of dowry death is increasing day by day.

However, it is also observed that sometimes family

members of the husband are roped in, even

though they have no active role in commission of

the offence and are residing at distant places. In

these cases, the Court need to be cautious in its

approach.”

22. In light of the above findings, after perusing the relevant

material and the evidence available, we find that the High

Court and Trial Court have not committed any error in

convicting the appellant under Section 304-B, IPC as the

appellant failed to discharge the burden under Section 113-

B, Evidence Act. The appellant has not brought any material

on record which merits the interference of this Court in the

impugned judgment. 

15

23. Appeal dismissed. Pending applications, if any, are

disposed of accordingly.

………………………..CJI.

(N.V. RAMANA)

 ………………………… J.

(SURYA KANT)

…………………………. J.

(ANIRUDDHA BOSE)

NEW DELHI

DATED : 28.05.2021

Section 304­B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.


The   prosecution’s   case   was   that   the   deceased committed suicide by setting herself ablaze just after one year of   her   marriage   and   that   soon   before   her   death   she   was subjected to cruelty and harassment on account of bringing less dowry by both the accused -The appellants were convicted by the Trial Court  vide  order dated 11.12.1997 for the offences under Sections 304­B and 306, IPC and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years for the offence punishable under Section 304­B, IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years for the offence punishable under Section 306, IPC.-The High Court  vide  impugned judgment dated 06.11.2008, upheld the order of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants. The appellants have filed the present   appeals   by   way   of   Special   Leave,   challenging   the concurrent findings of the Courts below=

held that In the present case, the Trial Court and the High Court have concluded that the deceased committed suicide. However, we are of the considered opinion that the conclusion reached by the   Courts   below   is   based   on   assumptions,   as   there   is   no evidence on record to support the same. The reasoning of the Trial Court in this regard is as follows: 23 “Further, there is no direct evidence having been   adduced  by  the   prosecution   the  (sic) any   of   the   accused   caused   death   by sprinkling   kerosene   on   the   body   of   the deceased, the only possibility is that Meena Kumari put an end to her life by sprinkling kerosene on her body.” 35. In light of the fact that there was insufficient evidence to prove the   factum   of   suicide   beyond   reasonable   doubt,   the presumption under Section 113­A, Evidence Act, is not of much help for the prosecution. The essential ingredient of deceased committing suicide has not been proved by the prosecution by adducing   sufficient   evidence.   In   the   present   case,   the prosecution has failed to establish that the death occurred due to suicide. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the finding of the Courts below convicting the appellants under Section 306, IPC merits interference by this Court.

under Section 304­B, IPC read with Section 113­B, Evidence Act can be summarized below:

i. Section 304­B, IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand. ii. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304­B, IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption   of   causality,   provided   under   Section   113­B, Evidence Act operates against the accused. iii. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304­B, IPC cannot   be   construed   to   mean   ‘immediately   before’.   The prosecution   must   establish   existence   of   “proximate   and   live link” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives. iv. Section 304­B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.  v. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304­B, IPC read with 113­B, Evidence Act, Judges, prosecution and defence should be careful during conduction of trial. vi. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record the statement under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual andcursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a mere   procedural   formality,   as   it   based   on   the   fundamental principle of fairness. This aforesaid provision incorporates the valuable principle of natural justice “audi alteram partem” as it enables   the   accused   to   offer   an   explanation   for   the incriminatory   material   appearing   against   him.   Therefore,   it imposes an obligation on the court to question the accused fairly, with care and caution.  vii. The Court must put incriminating circumstances before the accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the counsel   of   the   accused   to   prepare   his   defense   since   the inception   of   the   Trial   with   due   caution,   keeping   in consideration the peculiarities of Section 304­B, IPC read with Section 113­B, Evidence Act. viii. Section 232, CrPC provides that, “If, after taking the evidence for   the   prosecution,   examining   the   accused   and   hearing   the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal”. Such discretion must be utilized by the Trial Courts as an obligation of best efforts.ix. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is not eligible to be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, CrPC, it must move on and fix hearings specifically for ‘defence evidence’, calling upon the accused to present his defense as per the procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is also an invaluable right provided to the accused.  x. In   the   same   breath,   Trial   Courts   need   to   balance   other important considerations such as the right to a speedy trial. In this regard, we may caution that the above provisions should not be allowed to be misused as delay tactics. xi. Apart from the above, the presiding Judge should follow the guidelines   laid   down   by   this   Court   while   sentencing   and imposing appropriate punishment. xii. Undoubtedly, as discussed above, the menace of dowry death is increasing   day   by   day.   However,   it   is   also   observed   that sometimes family members of the husband are roped in, even though they have no active role in commission of the offence and are residing at distant places. In these cases, the Court need to be cautious in its approach. 37. In   light   of   the   above   findings,   after   perusing   the   relevant material and the evidence available, we find that the High Court and Trial Court have not committed any error in convicting the appellants under Section 304­B, IPC as the appellants failed todischarge   the   burden   under   Section   113­B,   Evidence   Act. However, upon appreciation of facts and circumstances we are of the opinion that the offence under Section 306, IPC is not made out. We therefore set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 306, IPC. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 1735­1736 OF 2010

SATBIR SINGH & ANOTHER                 …APPELLANTS

Versus

STATE OF HARYANA              …RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

N. V. RAMANA, CJI.

1. The present appeals arise out of the impugned judgment dated

06.11.2008 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at

Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal Nos. 3­SB of 1998 and 16­SB of

1998, whereby the High Court dismissed the appeals preferred

by   the   appellants   and   upheld   the   order   of   conviction   and

sentence passed by the Trial Court on 11.12.1997.

1

REPORTABLE

2. The case of the prosecution is that the deceased and accusedappellant no.1 were married on 01.07.1994. On 31.7.1995, at

about 4 or 4.30 P.M, some persons informed the complainant

that his daughter was ailing and admitted in the hospital. On

this information he, along with his wife and son, reached the

hospital and found that the deceased passed away due to burn

injuries.   The   prosecution’s   case   was   that   the   deceased

committed suicide by setting herself ablaze just after one year

of   her   marriage   and   that   soon   before   her   death   she   was

subjected to cruelty and harassment on account of bringing

less dowry by both the accused.

3. The appellants were convicted by the Trial Court  vide  order

dated 11.12.1997 for the offences under Sections 304­B and

306, IPC and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment

for seven years for the offence punishable under Section 304­B,

IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years for the

offence punishable under Section 306, IPC.

2

4. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants approached the High Court to

set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed by the

Trial Court. The High Court  vide  impugned judgment dated

06.11.2008, upheld the order of the Trial Court and dismissed

the appeal filed by the appellants. The appellants have filed the

present   appeals   by   way   of   Special   Leave,   challenging   the

concurrent findings of the Courts below.

5. The   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellants

submitted that the possibility of accidental fire has not been

ruled out in the present case. Moreover, most importantly, the

prosecution failed to prove that there was a demand for dowry.

Lastly, the prosecution has failed to prove that the demand,

assuming there was one, was made proximate to the death of

the deceased­victim.

6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondentState submitted that the appellants had not been able to show

any material which would merit the interference of this Court in

the   concurrent   findings   of   the   Courts   below.   The   counsel

3

especially emphasized upon the fact that the suspicious death

of   the   deceased   victim   occurred   within   almost   1   year   of

marriage.   Moreover,   the   witnesses   have   stated   the   specific

instances of demand for dowry with consistency.

7. Having heard counsel appearing on either side and perusing

the material on record, this Court needs to answer following

questions:

I. Whether   the   Trial   Court,   and   the   High   Court,   was   correct   in

convicting the accused on the charge under Section 304B, IPC?

II. Whether   the   Trial   Court,   and   the   High   Court,   was   correct   in

convicting the accused on the charge under Section 306, IPC?

    ISSUE I

8. At the outset, it is pertinent to analyze the law on dowry death.

Section 304­B IPC, which defines, and provides the punishment

for dowry demand, reads as under:

“304­B. Dowry death. —(1) Where the death of

a  woman  is caused by  any burns or  bodily

injury or occurs otherwise than under normal

4

circumstances   within   seven   years   of   her

marriage and it is shown that soon before her

death   she   was   subjected   to   cruelty   or

harassment by her husband or any relative of

her husband for, or in connection with, any

demand for dowry, such death shall be called

‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative

shall be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation.   —For   the   purpose   of   this   subsection, ‘dowry’ shall have the same meaning

as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,

1961 (28 of 1961).

(2)   Whoever   commits   dowry   death   shall   be

punished with imprisonment for a term which

shall not be less than seven years but which

may extend to imprisonment for life.”

Section 304B (1) defines ‘dowry death’ of a woman. It provides

that   ‘dowry death’ is where death of a woman is caused by

burning   or   bodily   injuries   or   occurs   otherwise   than   under

normal circumstances, within seven years of marriage, and it

is shown that soon before her death, she was subjected to

cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her

husband, in connection with demand for dowry. Sub­clause (2)

provides for punishment for those who cause dowry death.

5

Accordingly, in Major Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 5 SCC

201, a three­Judge Bench of this Court held as follows:

“10. To sustain the conviction under Section

304­B   IPC,   the   following   essential

ingredients are to be established:

(i) the death of a woman should be caused by

burns or bodily injury or otherwise than

under a ‘normal circumstance’;

(ii) such a death should have occurred within

seven years of her marriage;

(iii) she must have been subjected to cruelty

or   harassment   by   her   husband   or   any

relative of her husband;

(iv) such cruelty or harassment should be for

or in connection with demand of dowry; and

(v) such cruelty or harassment is shown to

have   been   meted   out   to   the   woman   soon

before her death.”

9. The first contentious part  that exists in the interpretation of

Section 304­B, IPC relates to the phrase “soon before” used in

the  Section.   Being   a   criminal   statute,   generally   it   is   to   be

interpreted strictly. However, where strict interpretation leads

to absurdity or goes against the spirit of legislation, the courts

may   in   appropriate   cases   place   reliance   upon   the   genuine

6

import of the words, taken in their usual sense to resolve such

ambiguities. [refer  Commissioner   of   Customs   (Import),

Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar & Company, (2018) 9 SCC 1, State

of   Gujarat   v.   Mansukhbhai   Kanjibhai   Shah,  2020   SCC

OnLine SC 412]. At this juncture, it is therefore necessary to

undertake a study of the legislative history of this Section, in

order to determine the intention of the legislature behind the

inclusion of Section 304­B, IPC. 

10. Section 304­B, IPC is one among many legislative initiatives

undertaken by Parliament to remedy a long­standing social evil.

The pestiferous nature of dowry harassment, wherein married

women   are   being   subjected   to   cruelty   because   of   covetous

demands by husband and his relatives has not gone unnoticed.

The Parliament enacted the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 as a

first step to eradicate this social evil. Further, as the measures

were   found   to   be   insufficient,   the   Criminal   Law   (Second

Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act 46 of 1983) was passed wherein

Chapter XX­A was introduced in the IPC, containing Section

498­A. 

7

11. However,   despite   the   above   measures,   the   issue   of   dowry

harassment   was   still   prevalent.   Additionally,   there   was   a

growing   trend   of   deaths   of   young   brides   in   suspicious

circumstances   following   demands   of   dowry.   The   need   for   a

stringent law to curb dowry deaths was suo motu taken up by

the Law Commission in its 91st  Law Commission Report. The

Law Commission recognized that the IPC, as it existed at that

relevant   time,   was   insufficient  to   tackle  the   issue   of   dowry

deaths   due   to   the   nature   and   modus   of   the   crime.   They

observed as under:

“1.3     If, in a particular incident of dowry

death, the facts are such as to satisfy the

legal   ingredients   of   an   offence   already

known to the law, and if those facts can be

proved without much difficulty, the existing

criminal law can be resorted to for bringing

the offender to book.  IN practice, however,

two main impediments arise ­­

(i) either the facts do not fully fit into

the pigeon­hole of any known offence; or

(ii) the peculiarities of the situation are

such that proof of directly incriminating

facts is thereby rendered difficult.”

(emphasis supplied)

8

12. Taking   into   consideration   the   aforesaid   Law   Commission

Report, and  the  continuing issues relating to  dowry related

offences, the Parliament introduced amendments to the Dowry

Prohibition   Act,   as   well   as   the   IPC   by   enacting   Dowry

Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986 (Act 43 of 1986). By way of

this   amendment,  Section   304­B,   IPC   was   specifically

introduced in the IPC, as a stringent provision to curb the

menace of dowry death in India. Shrimati Margaret Alva, who

presented the Amendment Bill before Rajya Sabha observed as

follows:

“This is a social evil and social legislation,

as I said cannot correct every thing. We are

trying to see how and where we can make it

a little more difficult and therefore we have

increased   the   punishment.   We   have   also

provided for certain presumptions because

upto now one of our main problem has been

the question of evidence. Because the bride

is   generally   burnt   or   the   wife   is   burnt

behind closed doors in her in­law’s home.

You   have   never   really   heard   of   a   girl

being   burnt   while   cooking   in   her

mother’s  house or her husband’s  house.

It is always in the mother­in­law’s house

that she catches fire and is burnt in the

kitchen.   Therefore,   getting   evidence

9

immediately   becomes   a   great   bit

problem. Therefore, we have brought in a

couple   of   amendments   which   give

certain   presumptions  where   the   burden

of proof shifts to the husband and to his

people  to  show  that   it  was  not  a  dowry

death   or   that   it   was   not   deliberately

done.”

(emphasis supplied)

13. There is no denying that such social evil is persisting even

today. A study titled “Global study on Homicide: Gender­related

killing of women and girls”, published by the United Nations

Office on Drugs and Crime, highlighted that in 2018 female

dowry   deaths   account   for   40   to   50   percent   of   all   female

homicides recorded annually in India. The dismal truth is that

from the period 1999 to 2016, these figures have remained

constant.  In fact, the latest data furnished by the  National

Crime Records Bureau indicates that in 2019 itself, 7115 cases

were registered under Section 304­B, IPC alone.

14. Considering   the   significance   of   such   a   legislation,   a   strict

interpretation would defeat the very object for which it was

10

enacted. Therefore, it is safe to deduce that when the legislature

used the words, “soon before” they did not mean “immediately

before”. Rather, they left its determination in the hands of the

courts. The factum of cruelty or harassment differs from case to

case. Even the spectrum of cruelty is quite varied, as it can

range   from   physical,   verbal   or   even   emotional.   This   list   is

certainly not exhaustive. No straitjacket formulae can therefore

be laid down by this Court to define what exacts the phrase

“soon before” entails. The aforesaid position was emphasized by

this Court, in the case of Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, (2000)

5 SCC 207, wherein the three­Judge Bench held that:

“15. … “Soon before” is a relative term which

is required to be considered under specific

circumstances   of   each   case   and   no

straitjacket   formula   can   be   laid   down   by

fixing any time­limit. … In relation to dowry

deaths,   the   circumstances   showing   the

existence of cruelty or harassment to the

deceased are not restricted to a particular

instance but normally refer to a course of

conduct.   Such   conduct   may   be   spread

over  a  period  of  time.  ….  Proximate  and

live   link   between   the   effect   of   cruelty

based   on   dowry   demand   and   the

consequential   death   is   required   to   be

11

proved by the prosecution. The demand of

dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon

such demand and the date of death should

not   be   too   remote   in   time  which,  under

the   circumstances,   be   treated   as   having

become stale enough.”

(emphasis supplied)

A similar view was taken by this Court in  Rajinder  Singh  v.

State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477.

15. Therefore, Courts should use their discretion to determine if the

period between the cruelty or harassment and the death of the

victim   would   come   within   the   term   “soon   before”.   What   is

pivotal to the above determination, is the establishment of a

“proximate   and   live   link”   between   the   cruelty   and   the

consequential death of the victim. 

16. When the prosecution shows that ‘soon before her death such

woman   has   been   subjected   by   such   person   to   cruelty   or

harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry’, a

presumption   of   causation   arises   against   the   accused   under

Section 113­B of the Evidence Act. Thereafter, the accused has

12

to rebut this statutory presumption. Section 113B, Evidence

Act reads as under:

“113B. Presumption as to dowry death—When the

question   is   whether   a   person   has   committed   the

dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon

before her death such woman has been subjected by

such   person   to   cruelty   or   harassment   for,   or   in

connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court

shall   presume   that   such   person   had   caused   the

dowry death. 

Explanation.   ­   For   the   purpose   of   this   section,

“dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in

section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)” 

17. This   Court,   in   the   case   of  Bansi   Lal v. State   of

Haryana, (2011)   11   SCC   359,   emphasized   the   mandatory

application   of   the   presumption   under   Section   113­B   of   the

Evidence Act once the ingredients of Section 304­B of IPC stood

proved: 

“19. It   may   be   mentioned   herein   that   the

legislature   in   its  wisdom  has  used  the  word

‘shall’ thus, making a mandatory application

on   the   part   of   the   court   to   presume   that

death had been committed by the person who

had subjected her to cruelty or harassment in

connection   with   any   demand   of   dowry.  …

13

Therefore, in view of the above, onus lies on the

accused to rebut the presumption and in case of

Section 113­B relatable to Section 304­B IPC,

the onus to prove shifts exclusively and heavily

on the accused. …

20. Therefore,   in   case   the   essential

ingredients   of   such   death   have   been

established by the prosecution, it is the duty

of the court to raise a presumption that the

accused has caused the dowry death.”

(emphasis supplied)

18. Therefore, once all the essential ingredients are established by

the   prosecution,   the   presumption   under   Section   113­B,

Evidence Act mandatorily operates against the accused. This

presumption of causality that arises can be rebutted by the

accused. 

19. The   usage   of   rebuttable   presumption   of   causality,   under

Section 113­B, Evidence Act, creates a greater responsibility on

Judges, defense and prosecution. They need to be extra careful

during   conducting   criminal   trials   relating   to   Section   304­B,

IPC. In order to address this precarious situation, procedural

law has some safeguards, which merits mentioning herein.

14

20. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record

the statement of an accused under Section 313, CrPC in a very

casual and cursory manner, without specifically questioning

the accused as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the

examination of an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be

treated as a mere procedural formality, as it is based on the

fundamental principle of fairness. This provision incorporates

the valuable principle of natural justice­ “audi alteram partem”,

as   it   enables   the   accused   to   offer   an   explanation   for   the

incriminatory   material   appearing   against   him.   Therefore,   it

imposes an obligation on the part of the Court to question the

accused  fairly, with  care  and   caution.  The  Court  must  put

incriminating circumstances before the accused and seek his

response. A duty is also cast on the counsel of the accused to

prepare his defense, since the inception of the trial, with due

caution, keeping in consideration the peculiarities of Section

304­B, IPC read with Section 113­B, Evidence Act.

21. Section 232, CrPC assumes importance, which reads as, “If,

after   taking   the   evidence   for   the   prosecution,   examining   the

15

accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the

point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the

accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order

of acquittal”. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is

not eligible to be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232,

CrPC, it must move on and fix hearings specifically for ‘defence

evidence’, calling upon the accused to present his defense as

per the procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is

also an invaluable right provided to the accused. Existence of

such   procedural   right   cohesively   sits   with   the   rebuttable

presumption as provided under Section 113­B, Evidence Act.

22. The second contentious part relating to Section 304­B, IPC is

that it does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing

death   as   homicidal   or   suicidal   or   accidental,   as   was   done

earlier. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact

that   death   occurring   “otherwise   than   under   normal

circumstances”   can,   in   cases,   be   homicidal   or   suicidal   or

accidental. However, the Section 304­B, IPC endeavors to also

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address   those   situations   wherein   murders   or   suicide   are

masqueraded as accidents.

23. Therefore, if all the other ingredients of Section 304­B IPC are

fulfilled, any death whether caused by burns or by bodily injury

or occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances shall,

as per the legislative mandate, be called a "dowry death" and

the woman's husband or his relative "shall be deemed to have

caused her death" unless proved otherwise. The section clearly

specifies what constitutes the offence of dowry death and also

identifies the single offender or multiple offenders who has or

have caused the dowry death. [refer  Maya  Devi   v.   State   of

Haryana, (2015) 17 SCC 405,  Shanti v.  State of  Haryana,

(1991) 1 SCC 371]

24. After having observed the law on Section 304­B, IPC, we may

now   turn   to   the   merits   of   this   case.   It   is   clear   that   the

submissions of the counsel for the appellants must be rejected.

It is  an admitted fact  that  the  deceased and  accused  were

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married on 01.07.1994, and the death of the lady occurred on

31.07.1995.  

25. With respect to the cause of death, the doctor (P.W.3) found the

smell of kerosene oil on the body of the deceased who had

suffered 85% burn injuries. Therefore, in the present case, the

deceased   victim   succumbed   to   burns.   As   the   death   was

relatable to burn injuries within seven years of marriage, it

clearly satisfies the first two ingredients of the offence.  

26. Coming to the issue of dowry demand, the evidence on record

indicates that when the brother of the deceased (P.W.7) visited

her in the matrimonial house after one month of marriage on

the occasion of Raksha Bandhan, the deceased had disclosed

that   the   accused,   husband   and   mother­in­law,   used   to

physically harass her on the account of bringing insufficient

dowry. Furthermore, the accused persons had made a specific

demand   of   a   scooter.   Pursuant   to   this   disclosure,   she   was

brought   back   to   her   paternal   house   where   this   fact   was

disclosed to father of the deceased (P.W.6). It is pertinent to

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note that, only a month prior to her death, the deceased had

returned to her matrimonial house. However, the accused still

used to harass the deceased for dowry. The aforesaid fact was

revealed by the deceased to her father, when she had come to

visit him. 

27. It must  be emphasized herein that, just a week before the

death, on the occasion of Teej festival, another brother of the

deceased   (P.W.10)   had   visited   her   while   she   was   in   her

matrimonial home. The deceased had reiterated her plight to

her   brother.   Thereafter,   on   31.07.1995,   the   father   of   the

deceased was informed by some villagers that his daughter has

been   admitted   in   the   hospital.   Upon   reaching,   the   father

discovered that the deceased succumbed to burn injuries. The

aforesaid chain of circumstances proves that there existed a live

and proximate link between the instances of demand of dowry

and the death of the deceased. The Trial Court, and the High

Court, upon a close appreciation of the aforesaid witnesses

came to the conclusion that the statements were corroborative

and consistent. They found the witnesses to be reliable and on

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the basis of the same held that the deceased was subjected to

cruelty soon before her death as she failed to bring sufficient

dowry. We are in complete agreement with the aforesaid finding

of the Trial Court and the High Court. 

28. From the above analysis, it is clear that the prosecution was

able to successfully prove that the death of the deceased due to

burn injuries took place within approximately one year of her

marriage. It has further been proved that soon before her death

she   was   subjected   to   harassment   and   cruelty   pursuant   to

demands of dowry. Since the ingredients of Section 304­B, IPC

stand satisfied, the presumption under 113­B, Evidence Act

operates   against   the   appellants,   who   are   deemed   to   have

caused the offence specified under Section 304­B of IPC. 

29. The   burden   therefore   shifts   on   the   accused   to   rebut   the

aforesaid   presumption.   The   counsel   for   the   appellants   has

canvassed before us that it was a case of accidental death, and

hence no liability can be fixed upon them. However, in the

present case, the accused persons failed to place any evidence

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on   record   to   prove   that   the   death   was   accidental   or

unconnected with the accused persons. 

30. Here, it ought to be noted that, according to the evidence of the

doctor,   the   entire   body   of   the   deceased   was   doused   with

kerosene oil. Therefore, the possibility of an accident can be

safely ruled out. As the Trial Court concluded:

“All these circumstances go to prove that either

deceased   committed   suicide   by   sprinkling

kerosene oil on her body or she was burnt by

sprinkling kerosene on her body either by the

accused or by somebody else and the plea of

accident tried to be made out by the learned

counsel for the accused, is not at all proved.”

31. Therefore,   the   presumption   adumbrated   in   Section   113­B,

Evidence Act takes full effect in this particular case, which has

not   been   rebutted   by   the   accused­appellants   herein.   The

appellants have failed to make out a case for us to interfere in

the concurrent opinions of the Courts below, convicting the

accused­appellants under Section 304­B, IPC.   

    ISSUE II

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32. Apart   from   their   conviction   under   Section   304­B,   IPC,   the

appellants  have  also  additionally challenged their conviction

under     Section   306,   IPC.   Section   306,   IPC   relates   to   the

abetment of suicide and is extracted below:

“306. Abetment of suicide. —If any person

commits   suicide,   whoever   abets   the

commission   of   such   suicide,   shall   be

punished   with   imprisonment   of   either

description for a term which may extend to

ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

33. A bare reading  of the provision indicates that for the offence

under Section 306, IPC the prosecution needs to first establish

that a suicide has been committed. Secondly, the prosecution

must also prove that the person who is said to have abetted the

commission of suicide, has played an active role in the same.

With respect to this latter requirement, Section 113­A, Evidence

Act creates a  presumption against the husband and/or his

relative with respect to the abetment of suicide of a married

woman,   under   certain   conditions.   Not   going   into   the   other

conditions,   a   perusal   of   the   provision   indicates   that   such

presumption shall be attracted only if the factum of suicide has

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been   established   by   the   prosecution   first.   The   necessary

ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 306, I.P.C.

were considered by this court in  Wazir   Chand   v.   State   of

Haryana, (1989) 1 SCC 244, wherein this Court held that:

“5.   …Reading   Sections   306   and   307   (sic 107)

together it is clear that if any person instigates any

other person to commit suicide and as a result of

such instigation the other person commits suicide,

the person causing the instigation is liable to be

punished under Section 306 of the Penal Code,

1860  for  abetting  the  commission   of  suicide.  A

plain   reading   of   this   provision   shows   that

before   a   person   can   be   convicted   of   abetting

the   suicide   of   any   other   person,   it  must   be

established  that  such other  person committed

suicide.”

(emphasis supplied)

34. In the present case, the Trial Court and the High Court have

concluded that the deceased committed suicide. However, we

are of the considered opinion that the conclusion reached by

the   Courts   below   is   based   on   assumptions,   as   there   is   no

evidence on record to support the same. The reasoning of the

Trial Court in this regard is as follows:

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“Further, there is no direct evidence having

been   adduced  by  the   prosecution   the  (sic)

any   of   the   accused   caused   death   by

sprinkling   kerosene   on   the   body   of   the

deceased, the only possibility is that Meena

Kumari put an end to her life by sprinkling

kerosene on her body.”

35. In light of the fact that there was insufficient evidence to prove

the   factum   of   suicide   beyond   reasonable   doubt,   the

presumption under Section 113­A, Evidence Act, is not of much

help for the prosecution. The essential ingredient of deceased

committing suicide has not been proved by the prosecution by

adducing   sufficient   evidence.   In   the   present   case,   the

prosecution has failed to establish that the death occurred due

to suicide. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the finding of

the Courts below convicting the appellants under Section 306,

IPC merits interference by this Court.

    CONCLUSIONS

36. At the cost of repetition, the law under Section 304­B, IPC read

with Section 113­B, Evidence Act can be summarized below:

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i. Section 304­B, IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the

legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and

dowry demand.

ii. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the

necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section

304­B, IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable

presumption   of   causality,   provided   under   Section   113­B,

Evidence Act operates against the accused.

iii. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304­B, IPC

cannot   be   construed   to   mean   ‘immediately   before’.   The

prosecution   must   establish   existence   of   “proximate   and   live

link” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for

dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.

iv. Section 304­B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in

categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The

reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death

occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in

cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. 

v. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304­B, IPC read with

113­B, Evidence Act, Judges, prosecution and defence should

be careful during conduction of trial.

vi. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record

the statement under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual and

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cursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused

as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of

an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a

mere   procedural   formality,   as   it   based   on   the   fundamental

principle of fairness. This aforesaid provision incorporates the

valuable principle of natural justice “audi alteram partem” as it

enables   the   accused   to   offer   an   explanation   for   the

incriminatory   material   appearing   against   him.   Therefore,   it

imposes an obligation on the court to question the accused

fairly, with care and caution. 

vii. The Court must put incriminating circumstances before the

accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the

counsel   of   the   accused   to   prepare   his   defense   since   the

inception   of   the   Trial   with   due   caution,   keeping   in

consideration the peculiarities of Section 304­B, IPC read with

Section 113­B, Evidence Act.

viii. Section 232, CrPC provides that, “If, after taking the evidence

for   the   prosecution,   examining   the   accused   and   hearing   the

prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers

that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence,

the Judge shall record an order of acquittal”. Such discretion

must be utilized by the Trial Courts as an obligation of best

efforts. 

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ix. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is not eligible to

be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, CrPC, it must

move on and fix hearings specifically for ‘defence evidence’,

calling upon the accused to present his defense as per the

procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is also an

invaluable right provided to the accused. 

x. In   the   same   breath,   Trial   Courts   need   to   balance   other

important considerations such as the right to a speedy trial. In

this regard, we may caution that the above provisions should

not be allowed to be misused as delay tactics.

xi. Apart from the above, the presiding Judge should follow the

guidelines   laid   down   by   this   Court   while   sentencing   and

imposing appropriate punishment.

xii. Undoubtedly, as discussed above, the menace of dowry death is

increasing   day   by   day.   However,   it   is   also   observed   that

sometimes family members of the husband are roped in, even

though they have no active role in commission of the offence

and are residing at distant places. In these cases, the Court

need to be cautious in its approach.

37. In   light   of   the   above   findings,   after   perusing   the   relevant

material and the evidence available, we find that the High Court

and Trial Court have not committed any error in convicting the

appellants under Section 304­B, IPC as the appellants failed to

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discharge   the   burden   under   Section   113­B,   Evidence   Act.

However, upon appreciation of facts and circumstances we are

of the opinion that the offence under Section 306, IPC is not

made out. We therefore set aside the conviction and sentence

under Section 306, IPC. 

38. Appeals allowed to the above extent. Pending applications, if

any, stand disposed of.

………………………..CJI.

(N.V. RAMANA)   

…………………………. J.

(ANIRUDDHA BOSE)

NEW DELHI;

MAY 28, 2021

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